The forgotten human autonomy in Machine Learning

Paula Subías-Beltrán1,2 , Oriol Pujol3 and Itziar de Lecuona2,4

1
Eurecat, Centre Tecnològic de Catalunya, Unit of Digital Health, Barcelona, Spain
2
Bioethics and Law Observatory - UNESCO Chair in Bioethics, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
3
Dept. de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
4
Dept. of Medicine, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

Abstract
There are many rights, freedoms, and principles that build our society and nourish it day after day. No
right, freedom, or principle is absolute; they must always be balanced. Our starting point is the respect
for internationally recognized human rights and we focus on the principle of autonomy, which is not
being adequately treated and protected in the ever-changing algorithmic world. In this article we review
some of the most influential bodies of knowledge and ethical recommendations in artificial intelligence,
and analyze the extent to which they address the principle of autonomy. We ground the concept of
autonomy in operational terms such as being well-informed and being able to make free decisions. Under
these two different aspects, we analyze the technical and social risks and propose different ways in which
artificial intelligence requires further exploration with the aim of preserving human autonomy.

Keywords
human autonomy, machine learning, AI ethics, bioethics and human rights

1. Introduction
The basis of the European society is the respect for the rights and freedoms constitutionally
recognized [1]. But we must keep in mind that no right or freedom is absolute, and that there is
always some tension between the rights and freedoms at stake. And this is the real challenge.
Weighing what should prevail in specific cases gives rise to ethical debates for which there is
not a unique valid answer. But technologists cannot work with uncertain terms.
The need of well-defined concepts leaves no room for interpretation. The articulation of the
right to non-discrimination illustrates this point clearly. This right has been mathematically
addressed through different perspectives corresponding to the notions of independence, sepa-
ration, or sufficiency. However, these concepts are mutually exclusive among them [2]. This
means that a general regulating wording requiring non-discrimination can be multiply realized.
And there is no common agreement on which is the most appropriate realization for a given
situation (this can be seen in the discussion between Northpointe [3] and ProPublica [4] about
the performance of COMPAS).

IAIL 2022 - Imagining the AI Landscape after the AI Act, June 13, 2022, Amsterdam, Netherlands
$ [email protected] (P. Subías-Beltrán); [email protected] (O. Pujol); [email protected] (I. de
Lecuona)
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 Automation has a long history. Automation has been motivated by the search for efficiency,
cost reduction, and even equal access to opportunities, among others. In a society with ambitions
to prosper while preserving all rights, automation is necessary to ensure progress. Until recently,
only repetitive processes that required solely trivial reasoning were automated. But for some
time now, more complex reasoning, such as decision making hitherto relegated to individuals,
has started to be automated. It is in this context that machine learning (ML) has appeared as
a predictive tool that makes it possible to evaluate the impact of certain actions in the future.
Systems using ML are based on finding complex patterns in data that allow to find associations
with the desired outcomes to be predicted. The products and systems based on ML are sometimes
referred as artificial intelligence (AI) in current folk terminology. ML explicitly refers to the
branch of this discipline concerned with systems and methods that improve their performance
based on experience. Experience that many times is translated in data. ML contributes to
improved decision making by removing noise from reasoning, making automated systems more
robust decision-making agents than humans, but the quality of the data they are trained on
should be accurate enough to avoid the leakage of undesired judgement that may perpetuate
and magnify injustices [5]. The problem, in the case of undesired judgement, arises in systems
that process personal data, as they directly shape the being of the individuals that the data
represent.
The inexorable advance of technology means that, over time, more and more actions may
be automated [6]. But, should they? Parasuraman and Wickens [7] thoroughly analyse the
particularities of automation by reflecting on a number of use cases for the different stages of
automation. They suggest that reliance and compliance ought to be balanced and recognize the
importance of adaptively integrate human and automation performance [7]. The current almost
ubiquitous presence of ML makes it necessary to review this issue in terms of its permeability
and reach. Laitinen and Sahlgren’s work makes progress among these lines by providing a
study on the effects that ML may have on people’s autonomy by examining the sociotechnical
bases of the principle of autonomy [8]. This approach reinforces the importance of the respect
for autonomy from a philosophical perspective but, in our view, lacks a technical analysis
that reflects how ML can better address this principle. From our point of view, a systematic
understanding of how ML may contribute to the respect of people guaranteeing our autonomy
is still lacking.
In the last decade, the ML community has been active and concerned with rights and principles
such as privacy, transparency, accountability, or fairness [9]. But there are still other rights,
freedoms, and principles not properly tackled by ML. And the principle of autonomy is one
such example.
Addressing the problems laying at the intersection of many disciplines, such as in this case,
is difficult. These here require the scientific point of view, that of the technology itself, together
with ethical, normative, and societal perspectives. But even in that case, a transdisciplinary team
should be able to go beyond the traditional boundaries of each discipline and face challenges
not necessarily well-defined or present in their own field of study. A first step into this direction
in order to successfully implement this practice is to work on developing a common language,
which would allow us to understand the challenges of each discipline and address them with
a holistic approach. One of the ambitions of this work is to bring us a step closer to this end
by analysing the challenges that arise from the need to assure the respect for autonomy in the
design, development, and implementation of ML-powered systems.
Stakeholder profiles of ML solutions are very diverse and, today, they have different needs.
This article contributes to the creation of an ethical framework through an ethical evaluation of
the current limitations and challenges posed by ML, as well as to narrow the gap between the
abstract definition of autonomy and its operational translation.
To put it concisely, there are four primary aims of this study:

• emphasise the importance of the respect for autonomy in ML solutions;

• distill the principle of autonomy into two operational axes that enable a practical articu-
lation, namely, being well-informed and being able to make free decisions;
• analyse the European strategy in relation to the principle of respect for autonomy in the
design, development, and implementation of ML-based systems; and
• identify and analyse challenges in the design, development, and implementation of ML to
ensure respect for autonomy from a technical approach and from the perspective of the
rest of stakeholders.

This paper begins introducing the concept of autonomy in section 2, with a reflection of its
importance on the development of democratic societies and the different trends and dynamics
that are endangering it. Then, the current normative European framework is presented in
section 3. This includes a bioethical perspective to analyse ethical, legal, and social issues from
an interdisciplinary perspective, as well as a review of the different voices demanding that
autonomy be given the weight it deserves. This section closes with an analysis of the AI Act,
the first European law on AI. The fourth section is concerned with the thorough presentation
of the risks and challenges posed by ML that govern the respect for autonomy. There, we
dissect the concept of autonomy to raise the challenges we face in technical development and
for other stakeholders. The article ends with a discussion of the reflections raised so far and the
conclusions.

2. The principle of autonomy in danger

The word autonomy originates from ancient Greek, and it can be decomposed in two words:
autos, meaning her/his own, and nomos, standing for law. Autonomy describes the ability of a
person to make her or his own rules in life and to make decisions independently. There is a
number of definitions of autonomy, but the idea that freedom is a requisite for people to form
their own lives is fundamental to most of its interpretations [10].
Being autonomous can be operationally defined as being well-informed and being able to
make free decisions. Being well-informed means having sufficient information that describes
the situation of interest in a relevant, pertinent, and neutral manner such that the individual
understands impacts and consequences. While being able to make free decisions implies to have
a chance to speak and the opportunity to act accordingly, i.e., having decision-making capacity.
The principle of autonomy is substantially related to privacy and self/determination, among
other rights, freedoms, and principles; and it is part of the very foundations of human rights.
The articulation of these moral norms is not straightforward, since none of them conforms a
domineering criterion that overrules the rest by default. The application of such moral code
consists of the balance between competing human rights, freedoms, and principles for each use
case.
Democracy (demo, meaning people, and kratos, standing for rule) is the form of government
in European countries. By definition, the principle of autonomy is one of the most important
pillars of democracy. If our autonomy is reduced, third parties can nudge us towards different
judgements responding to their desires and interests. We tend to focus on violations of our
rights and freedoms when they affect us individually. But it is also important to talk about their
impact on the collective.
The ever-changing modern world overwhelms us and our way of responding to the excessive
stimuli is to become docile [11]. In our day-to-day lives we value the transitory over the
permanent, the immediate over the long-term, and utility over any other value. We live
a liquid life, where everything is constantly changing and individuals are forced to adapt
continuously [12]. To cope with this rush, immediacy, and time limitations we are delegating
decision-making to automated systems [13]. Instead of treating these systems as the tools they
are, we use them as our alter ego, forgetting that it is in our hands to take back our agency over
ML decisions. As a result, the balance between decision automation and our responsibility to
make decisions is out of whack. Thus, autonomy is being relegated to the sidelines. We are
giving our autonomy to systems designed to assist us in our decision-making. We are allowing
these tools to stop being passive elements and become active actors in decision-making. We are
opening the door to them to enter the human decision space.
We have reached a point where these tools may know us better than we know ourselves. The
underlying algorithms and data have captured enough relevant information about us that they
cannot only understand us, but, by processing that information, can also engineer us. Thus, the
owners of these tools may discover what kind of push is needed to convince us of a specific
idea. In Yuval Noah Harari’s words, we have became hackable animals [14, 15]. The increasing
available amount of computing power and data is getting us closer to the idea that, soon, some
corporations and governments will be able to systematically hack people.
There are many powers that benefit from the fact that we do not prioritize our autonomy.
Today, this is a concern that falls on society. Those who move the world are not particularly
interested in us imposing our autonomy, and we, as part of a state governed by the rule of law,
must be aware and claim the value it deserves. ML practitioners may lack the societal background
needed to realize about the implications of limiting the information that people receives to form
their judgements. At the same time, the rest of stakeholders may not have enough technological
background to properly understand the ins and outs of technological solutions and assess its
power and ramifications. In other words, ML practitioners are capable of developing solutions
but they cannot really assess whether they respond to the actual societal challenges, while the
rest of stakeholders cannot thoroughly comprehend the effect of technological solutions.
It has been reported that many institutions world-wide are currently profiting of our more and
more diminished autonomy by making us dependent, exploiting our weaknesses [16]. There is
a tendency towards commodification, pricing things before thinking about their value [17], that
impacts all areas and practices. This trend gives a competitive advantage to those organisations
that are able to adapt more quickly to change. And, this, undoubtedly puts enterprises in a
more favourable position in the race of liquid life. Private initiatives are targeted and capable
of adapting to the constant uncertainty and speed of change that is now part of our way of
life. However, public initiatives should not be neglected. Both initiatives have taken steps in
this direction in pursuit of their profits by de-emphasising human values. We have ceased to
be subjects to become objects. We still have the agency, but we do not have enough of time to
apply it.
So far, we have focused on respecting people’s autonomy in machine-human interactions
for those people who are de facto autonomous. However, what about people who suffer a
reduction of their autonomy? Whether due to natural (i.e., age, medical conditions) or social
causes (i.e., immigration, poverty), there are certain discrimination that, if perpetuated, imply
the promotion of systemic inequalities. For this reason, we should not only focus on people who
are already autonomous to understand how ML may limit their autonomy, but we should also
analyse what happens to people who are not and investigate whether ML can be an opportunity
to promote their autonomy. Not only those who are de facto autonomous are entitled to have
their autonomy respected, and ML-based solutions run the risk of inheriting existing problems
and reproducing them in the artificial world. This is why we must be aware of the societal
inequalities that make it difficult for people to build a self-determined life. Unsympathetic
attitudes towards these systemic imbalances conceal unjust realities, where discrimination has
conditioned the present limiting people’s capacity for action and decision-making.
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that in critical situations a pragmatic approach
may be chosen to provide a rapid response to the ongoing conflict, tending to push ethical
considerations into the background for the sake of an imminent good. These situations raise
multiple ethical debates that are difficult to resolve by finding the right balance between rights,
freedoms, and principles. Be that as it may, the multiple use cases that occurred during the
COVID-19 pandemic are a good example that in no situation should ethical considerations be
put aside [18].
We need to look at the balance between benefits, harms, and obligations. Not only in order
to provide guidelines for proper development and ensure prosperous progress, but also to
influence policy and legislative changes in the years to come. In other words, we must analyze
this complex issue from a transdisciplinar approach, where all stakeholders could be represented
and have a voice in the analysis of the implications and consequences of ML systems by building
a common language.

3. Current normative European framework

Bioethics is the multi-disciplinary study of the ethical issues emerging from advances in biology,
medicine, and technologies, and it is grounded on four pillars: respect for autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence, and justice. The link between bioethics and human rights [19] was recognized
by the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) of UNESCO in 2005 [20].
The UDBHR demands the respect for the autonomy of individuals with regard to the power
to make decisions, taking responsibility for these decisions and respecting the autonomy of
others. Autonomy stands as one of the key principles to protect human sovereignty. To further
promote democratic societies as we know them, we must prevent actors who do not serve this
interest from deciding the rules of the ML game. The EU must act as a global standard-setter in
AI [21].
 Today, there are many voices calling for a unified strategy to protect the rule of law from
being undermined by flawed ML developments. But this is not a new issue. The founding of
the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1949 meant the creation of an international entity to uphold
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe. One of the best known bodies that
hangs on the CoE is the European Court of Human Rights, an international court that interprets
the European Convention on Human Rights. Another body of CoE is the Directorate General
Human Rights and Rule of Law, which has overall responsibility for the development and
implementation of the human rights and rule of law standards of the CoE. And there is also
the Commissioner for Human Rights, an independent and impartial non-judicial institution
dedicated to engaging in dialogue with national authorities and civil society, and analysing, ad-
vising, and raising awareness of systematic human rights work. In January 2019 the Directorate
General Human Rights and Rule of Law published a proposal of guidelines [22] while in May
2019 the Commissioner for Human Rights issued a Recommendation [23] that addressed the
risk of ML-based systems undermining human rights rather than strengthening them. Note
that a Recommendation is a non-binding legal instrument proposed by the European Union
(EU) that calls upon the party to whom it is addressed to behave in a particular manner without
any legal obligation. The approach of both proposals is to empower individuals by ensuring
that they are able to understand the why of AI-powered decisions as well as their verification
process. Besides, in order to increase trust in AI, they encourage AI developers and vendors to
design products in such a way that they safeguard users’ freedom of choice over the use of AI.
In 1998 UNESCO set up the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and
Technology (also known as COMEST), with the ambition of creating an advisory body for
decision-makers, a body capable of whistleblowing risky situations, and a forum of reflection. In
2019 COMEST published a preliminary study on the Ethics of AI [24], which included multiple
ethical considerations with regard to AI development and suggested several elements that could
be included in an eventual Recommendation on the Ethics of AI. Regarding the principle of
autonomy, COMEST suggested several generic principles among which we find the respect for
human autonomy, which they propose to articulate as the demand for human control at all
times. This must be understood as a continuous and perpetual monitoring of AI by an educated
person or group of people.
In 2007 the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights was established, which is better
known in English as the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The FRA is a EU independent body
that helps to safeguard the rights, values, and freedoms that set the EU’s Charter of Fundamental
Rights at the EU, national, and local level. Due to the role that AI plays in many decisions
that affect our daily lives, in 2020 FRA published a report called “Getting the future right –
Artificial intelligence and fundamental rights" [25] where they provided an overview of the use
of AI in the EU, an analysis of the awareness of fundamental rights and further implications,
and a discussion of measures to assess and mitigate the impact of AI on people’s fundamental
rights. Among others, this report increases the understanding of how AI-based solutions may
cut across different rights. However, it does not address the principle of autonomy specifically.
One of FRA’s main proposal is that people should be able to contest decisions based on the use
of AI, which, although unstated, would strengthen people’s autonomy. The only place where
this principle is explicitly mentioned is in the section that addresses the impact of AI on the
rights to respect for privacy life and the protection of personal data. The report defends both
rights on the premise that they both strive to protect similar values, such as autonomy and
human dignity. On this account, the two aforesaid rights form an essential prerequisite for the
exercise of other fundamental rights.
In June 2018, the European Commission appointed a group of experts to provide advice on
its AI strategy. This group was called High-level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI
HLEG), and, since its appointment, acts as the steering group of the European AI Alliance. The
AI HLEG, also in 2019, published the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI [26], where they
list seven key requirements that AI systems should meet in order to be trustworthy based on
human rights and ethical principles. AI HLEG adopts respect for autonomy as one of the ethical
principles on which AI should be built. AI HLEG advocates that AI systems should ensure
the full and effective self-determination of their users. They also argue that the allocation of
roles between humans and AI systems should follow human-centred design principles and
leave a meaningful opportunity for human choice, and they present human supervision as the
mechanism to achieve this. In short, AI HLEG defends that AI systems must serve a “democratic,
flourishing, and equitable society" by supporting people’s agency and enabling human oversight.
According to them, this mechanism will ensure that AI-powered systems do not undermine
human autonomy or cause other adverse effects. This has not been without debate about the
voices represented in its creation, with a minority of four ethicists and significant industry
representation [27]. But should it be the voice of industry the one pulling the strings?
Last but not least, the CoE appointed the Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI)
in December 2019 and it was tasked with reviewing the feasibility and possible elements of a
legal framework for AI. In 2020 they published their work named “Towards regulation of AI
systems. Global perspectives on the development of a legal framework on Artificial Intelligence
systems based on the Council of Europe’s standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of
law" that explored the effects of AI over fundamental rights, studied the initial background of AI,
and analysed, overall, the already published ethical AI guidelines [28]. CAHAI defends people’s
self-determination, which they express as their freedom of choice and autonomy. They fear that
AI threatens to reduce the human agency and autonomy needed to make meaningful decisions.
However, they do not provide their own definition of autonomy, although they comment that
soft law documents often speak of autonomy as a positive freedom (i.e., to flourish, to decide
for oneself, and to self-determine one’s own course of action), while a minority of documents,
however, express it as a negative freedom1 (i.e., to be free from technological experimentation,
manipulation or surveillance).
All the documents published by the listed organisations work along the same line of argument.
They agree that being autonomous agents is the basis for respect for people. They also argue
that the principle of autonomy should be translated into the ML systems by ensuring full and
effective space for self-determination, as well as the need to establish mechanisms to exercise our
autonomy. CAHAI even suggests that autonomy should become a new human right. However,
all of them fail to propose an effective way of operationalizing the principle of autonomy so
that it can be distilled and transformed into actionable language, moving from the abstract to
the practical.

1
The term “negative" is used to define autonomy through complementary concepts. In a mathematical analogy,
given the term 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐵, 𝐴 may be defined as 𝐵 ∖ ¬𝐴.
 Furthermore, we need to take into account other norms that regulate this issue. Therefore,
we must consider the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This regulation presented
new rights that react and allow people to exercise control over the algorithmic world. However,
it was not enough. There is no symmetry in the relations among the different ML stakeholders:
ML professionals have the technical knowledge about the solution and have a tendency to
evaluate algorithms solely from the perspective of their accuracy, without assessing whether
they are adequate under other social rules. On this account, the opinion of other stakeholders
is mistreated during the design, development, and implementation of the systems in favour
of the search for the most accurate algorithm. And this imbalance expresses the evident need
for better strategies. The challenge is then to build a framework capable of addressing the ML
challenges from the prism of human rights [29].
Demands for reliable AI have culminated in the AI Act [30], which puts on the table the EU’s
intention to become a global AI standard setter. The AI Act proposes a risk-based approach
constructed on a pyramid of criticality accompanied with a layered enforcement mechanism. It
has received criticisms that may be summarised in two key points: the AI Act does not provide
coverage for all people as it does not sufficiently focus on vulnerable groups, and it does not
provide meaningful rights and redress mechanisms for people impacted by AI systems, as stated
by the Ada Lovelace Institute [31], whose mission is to ensure that AI serves people and society,
as well as many other organisations representing civil society [32]. Additionally, returning
to the issue at hand, the AI Act does not explicitly and completely address the principle of
autonomy, although it does so implicitly and partially. Multiple applications are forbidden,
like manipulative, exploitative, and social control practices; AI systems intended to distort
human behavior; or those that provide social scoring of natural people. But there are less clear
prohibitions, such as the one that forbids “the placing on the market, putting into service or
use of an AI system that deploys subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness in
order to materially distort a person’s behaviour in a manner that causes or is likely to cause
that person or another person physical or psychological harm" (Title II, Article 5, 1a). But what
about practices that are explicitly manipulating our conception of reality, such as image filters
that perpetuate impossible standards of beauty? Besides, this framework wrongly implies that
a person’s behaviour can be altered in an innocuous way, while such practices are used to
undermine the essence of our autonomy.
One mechanism proposed by the AI Act is mandatory human oversight in high-risk AI-based
systems. The implementation of such a measure implies the involvement of a person or group
of people trained to perform the tasks defined in Title III, Chapter 2, Article 14, among which
are: to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the system such that anomalies and
malfunctions are identified and mitigated as early as possible, to be able to detect automation
biases, to interpret the system output correctly by knowing the particularities of the system, to
be able to decide to refuse the use of a high-risk AI system, and to be able to intervene during
its execution and even to stop the use of the system if considered appropriate. But, are we
ready to respond to this point effectively? On the one hand, there are few profiles trained in all
the disciplines necessary to carry out this task correctly. On the other hand, the immediacy
required in the responses of AI-powered systems also makes this type of role uncertain due to
the different pressures to which it may be subjected. It should be noted that the AI Act makes
no mention of the characteristics of the person or group of individuals who can perform this
task. Consequently, we find ourselves in a scenario where there is freedom for individuals
both internal and external to an association to carry out this task. An in-house worker may
be under pressure from the employer to withhold certain information from the public or may
be overworked performing this role in several initiatives and not be able to perform the work
adequately due to the pressure of having to cope with everything. On the other hand, an
outsourced worker has the benefit of being impartial and protected from employer pressure.
But accessing the innards of the system in question is going to be more difficult. Although this
mechanism has the potential to bring a lot of value not only in detecting and mitigating risks,
but also in bringing ethical debates closer to those who develop the system, are we prepared to
put it into practice?
The AI Act proposes a regulation based on several rigid components. This is exemplified by
the list of prohibited systems, which covers specific casuistries that may become obsolete due to
the rapid development and updating of use cases for data-driven systems. In our opinion, this
rigidity calls into question the future relevance of the AI Act and its ability to respond to future
developments and emerging risks, so it would be worth exploring the rationale for this rigidity
in more detail. As is common practice, we rely on the past to legislate, but how certain are we
about its suitability to cover future issues? Compliance with the legal framework is necessary,
as it marks out what can and cannot be done. But the legal framework does not provide enough
information to know what is right and what is better. Although laws and regulations are gearing
towards the idea of ML as a tool to support decisions, this has not yet been translated into
practice. Changes in the perception and use of such solutions do not happen at a rapid pace.
There is still not a sufficiently respectful data management culture (note the fines that the Dutch
Tax and Customs Administration [33], Google [34], and Enel Energia [35] got because of their
inadequate data management in the last year). On the other hand, there will come a time when,
for our own efficiency, we may want to delegate our decisions to ML systems and, consequently,
these will cease to be decision support systems and will take the decisions themselves. And, as
of today, the regulation does not contemplate this case. It is necessary to contemplate that this
may happen and, therefore, systems must be designed to assume this delegation. This implies
that they must be able to understand the context, to understand that a human decision is being
replaced in a human context, and that it must preserve the purpose of the person who delegated
autonomy to it. Whatever the implementation, the balance must remain positive for the person
involved.
The legal framework is insufficient to steer society in the right direction. This is the task of
both the ethics of ML and a good ML governance. ML governance is the practice of defining
and executing procedures for the proper development and use of ML, while ML ethics evaluates
what is socially acceptable or preferable. We must go beyond compliance [36] and set out an
adequate ethical framework that complements the legal bodywork and allow us to progress
towards the kind of society we want to be. In this way, we will be prepared to react to situations
to which the body of law does not yet respond.
4. How machine learning modulates the principle of autonomy
We focus on a social framework where people are autonomous agents and technological solutions
should not limit their autonomy by default. Furthermore, we will address the actions that
are triggered after human-ML interaction. We evaluate the equilibrium between how much
autonomy we should give up, in which cases, and according to which rules. As we stated before,
autonomy can be simplified to being well-informed and able to make free decisions. In the
following paragraphs we elaborate on the risks and challenges posed by ML in both aspects
of autonomy from two different perspectives: that of technological profiles and that of the
remaining stakeholders.

4.1. Technological challenges

In a broad sense, ML systems can be grouped based on their usages: descriptive, predictive,
and prescriptive. Descriptive analytics summarize historical data and allow us to explore
it, predictive systems aim at answering the questions “what will happen?" and “why will it
happen?", and prescriptive systems reply to the questions “what should I do?" and “why should
I do it?". Descriptive systems do not pose any risk from human-machine interaction from
an autonomy perspective beyond the human biases that may affect the interpretation of the
results of the analyses. These biases can lead to misconceptions of reality that can result in
impaired judgement and, consequently, reduced autonomy. But it is not the descriptive systems
themselves that alter autonomy; rather, it is the presentation of the results of these systems that
can alter our conceptions (e.g., framing effect or distinction bias). Accordingly, in the following
paragraphs we will focus on the challenges posed by predictive and prescriptive systems on
autonomy.

4.1.1. Being well-informed

Some ML systems such as recommenders or those based on information retrieval techniques
are usually based on finding the optimal balance between their explorative and exploitative
capabilities. Exploration consists on the examination of the space of solutions (e.g., scouring
the entire supermarket for the best products), while exploitation implies finding the optimal
solution from a set of known and already explored solutions (e.g., choosing the best products
from the aisles visited in a supermarket). Observe that exploitation only considers already
known information and disregard future and more profitable solutions that have not already
been explored. Recommendation systems can be regarded as soft-prescriptive systems that
suggest what to do in the form of a ranked list of options based on an understanding of the user
profile and their context. Currently, most of these systems balance exploration and exploitation
policies with the goal of maximising specific goals: such as maximising profit or maximising
prediction of user’s future choices. This may result in well-known effects such as filter bubbles,
epistemic bubbles, or echo chambers [37]. However, to break these effects it is necessary to
establish adequate mechanisms that ensure avoiding hindering user’s autonomy. For example,
the deliberate exposition of users to a diverse set of information options or choices beyond
those that strictly maximize the adequacy to their preferences and points of view. This may be
done either by balancing a good level of exploration while exploiting the space of solutions or
by explicitly exploiting alternative options that satisfy a diversity criterion. These options that
balance content appropriateness with diversity, would increase the level of well-informedness
and, thus, the autonomy of end-users. Regulation could enforce specific mechanisms that ensure
the exposition to diverse alternative options and points of view of the user.
Prescribers attempt to quantify the effect of future decisions, but the best future action
devised by the system may not be good enough to be accepted. Being well-informed through
ML systems not only involves maximising diversity while still being relevant to the user and
the organization’s goals, but also knowing the degree of confidence and the underlying logic
that led to a prescription. Knowing why a prescription has been suggested will make the user
better informed. For example, if we are talking about a news prescriber, it will be interesting
to know which news you should read because they have a different point of view from yours
and which ones because their content matches your interests. In the same way, knowing the
confidence level of prescriptions will provide the user with information to assess the degree of
reliability that is associated with them. Thus, the user will have sufficient information to weigh
the different contextual factors that complement the information received in order to make a
well-informed decision.

4.1.2. Being able to make free decisions

In the design of the former systems, developers of ML solutions should be aware of the cognitive
biases that come into play when evaluating prescriptions. The presentation of the results can
make or break a decision in the light of the same exact information. The anchoring bias, for
example, is the tendency to rely on the first piece of information that is received, which may
alter the user’s decision-making [38].
But, information retrieval systems are not the only way of decision-making by means of ML
techniques. On the contrary, the most usual way of decision-making by means of ML techniques
directly refers to the so called decision-support systems. These are usually predictive systems.
It is important to highlight that a predictive system may be regarded as a system that describes
the future. It does not leverage different options, their impact or consequences. However, many
times the predictions given by a ML system are taken as optimal decisions at face value. As a
ML developer, one cannot ignore that a predictive system will be used as a prescriptive or a
decision-making system. That we naturally delegate our decision-making into these systems is
a difficulty that is not easily solved. We often do not have the time to add a human-in-the-loop
to the loop, and this leads to predictive systems being used as prescriptive systems. As a result
we are in front of a problem in no-one’s land. From a technological perspective this is simplified
and delegated to the person acting as the human-in-the-loop. This suggests, first, the lack of
accountability of the implementer, and second, the dependence on a third party. In the first
case we find a lack of accountability in the disregard of users’ rights, while the second raises a
different set of questions, such as: what if the person acting as human-in-the-loop does not have
time to cover everything? As such, technologists must assume that the system will be used as a
prescriptive system and implement the adequate measures assuming that the participation of the
human-in-the-loop will be minimal or even negligible. Thus, the system could be self-sufficient
in adjusting human involvement in the loop according to the uncertainty derived from the
prescription, also known as adaptive automation. Whatever the case may be, the system needs
to offer maximum transparency to enable the human-in-the-loop to fully assess the system,
from its technical implementation to its compliance with respect for human rights, freedoms,
and principles.
There is but another important assumption when a prediction system is used as a decision-
making mechanism in the context that it interacts with other humans. While ML leverages the
power of statistical, probabilistic, or even causal prediction theory, this has little to do with
actual human decision or choice. Disciplines such as decision theory or rational choice theory
study different aspects of the process of making decisions [39]. Decision theory is concerned
with the challenge of optimal decision-making under certain consistent conditions. On the
other hand, rational choice theory focuses on the behavioral aspect of individuals’ judgements.
In this context, ML predictions are just an input to a decision system that has to leverage more
contextual aspects in order to postulate the optimal options to the user. The most widely used
underlying assumption that bridges the gap between both is the concept of maximization of
expected utility [40], which stands for the search for the decision that entails the highest utility
value. This assumes that the decision agents are fully rational and are able to assign a utility
value to the different choices at their disposal. And this is a perfect assumption when considering
the ML system in isolation. However, when these systems interact with human beings other
contextual factors should be considered to avoid the rejection of the proposed decision. For
example, a prescription method should be aware of the context under which the decision is being
made when the decision involves some kind of risk. The chance of accepting a prescription of a
decision support system may depend on the individual’s attitude towards risk or even to the
degree of risk the individual assigns to the situation. For example, if users have a good economic
status, they may be more keen to accept more risky gambles concerning gaining or losing wealth
even if the expected utility is lower than that of another option. This is known as framing effect.
Also, as the name itself indicates, expected utility considers expectations. But, many times we
are in face of a single unique decision. In this particular situation would knowing that this is
the best available option on average satisfy our needs? Thus, the rationality of the decision
system as well as the utility theory implicit in the development of ML automatic systems are
assumptions that deserve further development [41] by including aspects of human psychology
and choice preferences such as those proposed in prospect theory [42]. Thus, the construction
of a context that allows the fit between humans and automated decision mechanisms requires
of further thought.
Equally important is the early development of mechanisms to be executed in case the pre-
scription is rejected. In order to ensure people’s decision-making capacity, it is important to
offer alternatives to the automated procedure. As stated by Parasuraman and Riley [7], humans
are still vital after all these years of automation. In the case of recommendation systems, we
may count on a never-ending list of suggestions. In the event that ML solutions fail, there
must be alternatives to achieve the same objective, even if the redress mechanism is not as
efficient as the algorithmic one. For instance, misrecognition may limit the access to goods and
resources. Misrecognition in facial recognition systems illustrates this point clearly. An access
control system not correctly identifying users, in situations such as building [43] or border [44]
access, will be limiting people without justification. Being able to opt-out from the application
of these systems would help to further protect people and their autonomy. There are a number
of new rights, such as the right to be forgotten or the right not to be subject to automated
decision-making, developed to protect us in the changing algorithmic world. Even so, there are
still unresolved challenges, such as those related to the principle of proportionality that should
place value on finding the right balance between benefit and non-maleficence.

4.2. Stakeholders’ challenges

But the impact of ML systems also depends on the usage we do of them. For some time now
there has been a trend towards the criminalisation of algorithms and process automation from
non-technical stakeholders2 . But algorithms are just tools designed to make our lives easier, they
are not meant to act on our behalf. As stakeholders we must know which party is responsible
for what, and taking our share of responsibility as stakeholders it is necessary to build a reliable
framework for ML.

4.2.1. Being well-informed

ML models build their reasoning extracting knowledge from data. Thus, data enforces the limits
of models’ capabilities. Data may be collected or created. In the former case, data aims to capture
a specific reality, but its scope is restricted to the given context and the collection methods.
Thus, data must be interpreted as a crystallization of a specific context at a particular moment
in time, which is the result of the succession of many previous events. ML algorithms process
this information to extract patterns and abstract general rules of behaviour. And to use them
correctly, we must understand their limitations, such as the historical and societal influence that
affects the given piece of data, the biases that may affect data collection or data engineering,
and even cognitive biases that could potentially impact the ML pipeline. ML models respond by
following their learned reasoning based on what they know, but they do not know how to act
given information that does not resemble what they have seen so far. For example, if a model
trained to discern between images of blond and brunet people receives an image of a person
with red hair, it will give a response that escapes its logic. Consequently, we must understand
ML for what it is: a tool for solving specific tasks, not for creating globally applicable reasoning
using only local knowledge. The misuse and misunderstanding of ML systems will result in the
misinterpretation of the proposed solutions (read [48] to know more about the factors associated
with misuse).
Human-created data responds to the necessity of articulating concepts in a machine-readable
format, as in the case of taxonomies. Likewise all human creations, data generated by humans
also inherits humans’ subjectivity. Let us analyze a particular example, such as the image
database of ImageNet, based on the lexical English database of WordNet. ImageNet contains
about one thousand images to illustrate each meaningful concept of WordNet. These images
are quality-controlled and human-annotated. Prior to 2020, ImageNet contained more than
three thousand concepts that characterized people, ranging from race to professions. Due to
the impossibility to visually characterize many of those traits, ImageNet opted for leaving

2
The following excerpts from newspaper’s headlines exemplify the aforesaid criminalisation of algorithms:
“algorithms are biased" [45] or “this is how the algorithms that decide who gets fired from jobs work" [46] from the
Spanish newspaper El País, or the characterization of “creepy algorithm" from the US magazine Wired [47].
them out3 [49]. Identity is a social construct which is derived from the self-determination of
each individual. Thus, ignoring people’s self-determined identity results in non-consensual
classifications. Understanding who defines human-created data permit us to understand under
what perspective we are analysing the information [50].
ML carries the patina of objectivity and neutrality because of the misconception related to
ML reasoning capabilities: ML decreases variance and noise in judgements, but this does not
imply an increase in neutrality. ML reasons in a deterministic manner, which does not entail
an objective reasoning. However, this patina of objectivity and neutrality makes some people
place machines “opinion" before theirs [51]. We, as users of ML systems, must understand
these solutions for what they are: tools that allow us to analyse information more robustly,
eliminating variance in decision-making, but which are limited by the restrictions of data.
Another challenge we face is to respond to people who are not de facto autonomous. Ade-
quately informing people who have certain limitations to be so, for example due to medical
conditions or age, is a challenge to which ML may be able to make some proposals for improve-
ment.

4.2.2. Being able to make free decisions

We have a tendency to anthropomorphize the non-human, and relating the terms “AI" and
“trustworthy" exemplifies it. But “AI is not a thing to be trusted. It is a set of software devel-
opment techniques by which we should be increasing the trustworthiness of our institutions
and ourselves" [52]. Then, we should avoid the usage of this term and talk about reliability
instead [53]. This has already been shown to be a problem by Robinette et al., who executed an
experiment where humans over-trusted robots in situations of emergency evacuation [54]. The
conjecture that ML-based systems are more reliable than humans may lead to the conclusion
that they should be allowed to make decisions of paramount importance [50], escaping the need
to question the rationale behind the proposed solutions. The over-reliance on ML-powered
solutions decreases our capacity to make decisions.
People who are not able to make free decisions for whatever reason, for example because of
their socio-economic context, suffer a reduction in their autonomy. Investigating how ML can
contribute to strengthening the autonomy of people who are not de facto autonomous is an
open research area that deserves attention.
ML-solutions have rapidly permeated our lives impacting our ways of doing and deciding.
The AI Act covers many cases, but at what scale? Is the usage of all platforms that manipulate
us forbidden? Would that imply that all systems of recommendation ought to be shut down?
May e-commerce platforms use their recommendation systems to alter individual perceptions
of reality? Or to push us towards decisions we do not foresee? May streaming platforms use
3
The ImageNet database contains pictures that characterise concepts like “Persian cat", “police wagon", or
“towel". However, previous to 2020, it also included the visual representation of terms like “orphan", “separatist",
or “parricide". The first set of examples represent concepts whose definition responds to the fulfilment of certain
objective requirements. For example, a police wagon is recognisable as a vehicle with a police identification, such as
the logo of the police force to which it belongs. In contrast, the second set of terms cannot be defined by visually
recognisable attributes, but are based on facts that are not recognisable by sight. Assuming that all concepts can be
represented visually is a mistake that can perpetuate stereotypes based on physical attributes, such as appearance or
skin colour.
their suggestion power to influence our collective imaginary? Note that people’s opinion is
what matters in market economy and societies structure and many technological initiatives
have the power and space to affect our judgement. But we tend only to realize about harms once
it is too late. The protection of people’s autonomy and respect for it is a collective issue that
needs not only a view from the present but also towards the future. We do have an obligation
to promote the interests of present and future generations. Securing and preserving people’s
autonomy is a collective matter.

5. Discussion and conclusions

Technology and ethics cannot advance independently of each other. In a democratic society,
progress must go hand in hand with both, involving all stakeholders to find the optimal balance.
Separating the ethical framework that governs our society from any technological development
moves us away from a reliable AI. This kind of solutions should not have an ethics module built
in, but they should nourish from the ethical considerations that derive from each phase of the
life cycle of ML solutions.
ML developers must take responsibility for the creation of ML systems and pre-emptively
mitigate any potential misuse. A proper understanding of the social and ethical impact of
ML systems that may result from each phase of the ML system’s life cycle is necessary. In
the development of ML-based solutions, an appropriate balance must be found between the
exploration and exploitation capabilities of the algorithms to avoid the creation of information
bubbles, epistemic bubbles, or echo chambers. Systems must be able to provide all contextual
information to foster respect for people’s autonomy, from obtaining relevant and complete
information to their ability to make decisions. A system that limits people’s autonomy will
discriminate against them, and if these discriminations are not addressed, they will not be
detected nor made visible. Such a system must ensure respect for the autonomy of people
not only technically but also socially, i.e., the deployment of surveillance systems ought to be
carefully analysed since they indirectly shape the behavior of people, regulating, thus, their
degree of autonomy.
The current ethical framework has several shortcomings, of particular relevance being the
lack of familiarity of ML developers with this framework. We find ourselves with a legal
response that marks a strategic line based on the respect and defence of human rights, but,
to date, does not provide a complete and explicit response on how to respect, in particular,
the principle of autonomy in ML solutions. This gap opens the door to reflect on what step
should be taken now: to seek a consensual ethical basis at the international level or to demand
a more complete legal response? In our opinion, both are compatible and necessary but, first,
we need to work on a common language based on the respect for human rights that allows us
to operatize the application of the rights, freedoms, and principles that govern our society. Only
by respecting and defending human rights will we be able to progress towards a reliable IA. One
of the barriers we face is the current tendency to commodify subjects instead of considering
this as a collective value, a collective enterprise, etc.
Constant change oblige us to adapt permanently. And we do not want to be left behind
because the old has negative connotations. The technological breakthrough of recent years
has changed the way we understand the world around us. Everything happens so fast that it is
impossible for us to process all the stimuli around us. We have so much information within
reach that we are overwhelmed. As a result, we have become dependent on technology. Since
technology does not forget, we do not longer need to dedicate ourselves at 100% to process
everything that surrounds us. The immediacy demanded by the present strains us in such a
way that we give up part of our autonomy. We must be aware of the implications of losing the
balance between autonomy and automation. The current imbalance diminishes our ability to
make decisions. Part of this mismatch comes from the misinterpretation that ML is “intelligent
enough" to replicate our reasoning. But this does not empower us, on the contrary, it diminishes
our autonomy. Our overconfidence in these solutions makes us misunderstand them. Being
better informed about how ML solutions work (from how they are created to how they should
be used) will enable us to treat them as what they are, mere tools. We must also be aware of
what the human-ML interactions are in order to autonomously decide how to use them.
There is always someone who benefits from global imbalances. Being aware of who stands
to gain makes us well-informed and enables us to respond if we disagree with the current
course of events. Be that as it may, we should not think that algorithms are evil. Algorithms
are mechanisms that allow us to automate processes, but what is the purpose of automating
processes? To allow us to spend our time on issues that we think deserve more of our attention.
So that is how we should use them. Currently, systems are evaluated at the design phase and
then they “act freely". This new way of working entails many risks that we should not normalize
nor accept. We should control ML systems, and not allow that ML systems control us. As
individuals in a democratic society we have the power to decide how we want to be governed.
For this reason, we should have a say on the place of ML in the wold and the way we want to
interact with ML systems. For this, however, we need to become a literate and informed society
capable of making free decisions, i.e., a society formed by autonomous people.
We must address this issue with a transdisciplinary approach that allows us to properly
determine how to translate abstract concepts such as autonomy or justice into computer
language. We will find that there is never a one-size-fits-all answer, so what is at stake and
what is involved in prioritising one thing over another must be carefully studied. In this case,
the question that sums up our work is that of finding the right balance between autonomy and
automation. In trying to move from abstract to mathematical language, we may be tempted to
solve the problem by means of a checklist that simplifies and lists important issues. But ethics
cannot be assessed by checklists alone, ethics should not be translated as a mere add-on.
Leaving aside human sovereignty in ML developments can diminish our power. Taken to
the extreme, losing our autonomy could cause democracies to falter and eventually collapse.
Autonomy, as well as all other rights, freedoms, and ethical principles, are matters of collective
interest and should be treated as such.
This research has yielded a number of reflections that open up several lines of work in order
to move towards effective respect for the autonomy of people in ML. It is necessary to continue
working on the issues expounded in Section 4 in order to eventually produce a fully operational
formulation capable of being translated to computer language.
This paper focuses on the principle of autonomy because it is one of the most neglected
ethical principles in the eyes of ML, but it is not the only one. Our future work will focus on
other principles that have still not been adequately replicated or protected in ML and propose a
formulation of how to operatize them in a technical way.

Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 under project PID2019-
105093GB-I00.

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