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Activity 8 Silver Bridge Collapse Report

The Silver Bridge collapsed on December 15, 1967, resulting in 46 deaths and highlighting the need for improved bridge inspection and maintenance standards in the U.S. Contributing factors to the collapse included stress corrosion cracking, corrosion fatigue, and increased vehicle weight, which led to a failure in the bridge's structural integrity. This tragedy prompted significant changes in bridge inspection regulations and the eventual construction of the Silver Memorial Bridge to honor the victims.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views9 pages

Activity 8 Silver Bridge Collapse Report

The Silver Bridge collapsed on December 15, 1967, resulting in 46 deaths and highlighting the need for improved bridge inspection and maintenance standards in the U.S. Contributing factors to the collapse included stress corrosion cracking, corrosion fatigue, and increased vehicle weight, which led to a failure in the bridge's structural integrity. This tragedy prompted significant changes in bridge inspection regulations and the eventual construction of the Silver Memorial Bridge to honor the victims.

Uploaded by

Tauni
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 1

Elli Berger

Alycia Darby

Tauni Dela Cruz

ARCE 106 Section 3

Professor Lawson

Professor Estes

6 November 2020

The Silver Bridge Collapse

The once great bridge that spanned over the Ohio river connecting Point Pleasant, West

Virginia and Kanauga, Ohio would meet its maker nearly 40 years after being built. On

December 15 of 1967 the Silver Bridge collapsed causing 46 deaths and nine fatal injuries. The

devastating collapse of the bridge sparked a national awareness for the inspection and upkeep of

every bridge built in the United States. While many factors can be taken into account for the fall

of the bride, ultimately a failure in the structure of the bridge is to blame for the subsequent

collapse.

There were 3 factors that contributed to the structural failure of the silver bridge: Stress

corrosion cracking, corrosion fatigue, and the changes in the weight of vehicles. Corrosion

fatigue is fatigue that occurs as a result of a material residing in a corrosive environment. In the

case of the silver bridge collapse, the carbon steel structure being near both water and air, and

not being maintained properly (ie. consistent inspections of structural integrity and touch ups to

the protective aluminum paint) was detrimental to the structure. Between the time the bridge was

designed and the time it collapsed the weight of cars and trucks changed, becoming heavier, and
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 2

so the bridge was accommodating for a heavier load than it was made for, causing tensile stress.

These 2 factors combined led to stress corrosion cracking, which is the formation of cracks.

The Silver Bridge, named after its color, was a two lane eyebar suspension bridge

constructed of a new heat treated carbon steel. 11 inch pins linked each eyebar to the next

forming a chain-like structure. Due to the location of the bridge there was very little stable

bedrock for anchors to be built upon and into. Consequently the bridge was uniquely anchored to

200 foot long by 34 foot wide troughs filled with soil and reinforced with concrete. The bridge

also showcased “rocker” towers that allowed for movement as weight loads shifted along the

bridge. (Roberge, Pierre) Although many preventative measures were taken to ensure the

stability of the bridge, a single eyebar fracture led to the collapse of the Silver Bridge. In less

than a minute the entirety of the bridge fell to its demise. The other eyebars were not equipped to

handle the extra stress put on the bridge when the first eyebar fractured. As each eyebar was

connected in a chain-like sequence, the breakage of a single eyebar would unfortunately cause

the breakage of all eyebars. The bridge collapse can also be linked to an increase in the weight of

cars being manufactured at the time, everyday traffic, fatigue, and natural corrosion.

During this tragedy, 37 cars were crossing the bridge, and of those, 31 fell into the Ohio

river. As a result, 46 people passed away, 9 people were injured, and 2 people were never found.

A survivor that lost his wife and child has stated that they saw the bridge “quivering” before it

collapsed. On top of this, a major transportation route was destroyed that connected Ohio and

Virginia. This event instigated fear in many Americans and made people fear and question the

reliability of bridges.

In regards to examining the cause of the Silver Bridge collapse, it’s essential to see what

professions were involved in the overall failure of the structure. The bridge was designed by
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 3

J.E. Greiner, a civil, but more specifically a bridge engineering company, that in itself plays a

crucial role in planning and designing the overall structure, construction, operation, and

maintenance of the bridge to ensure safe and effective transportation. The general contractor for

the project was the Gallia County Ohio River Bridge Company, who was responsible for

providing the equipment, labor, material, and services necessary for the construction of the

project, and who generally supervised and coordinated different aspects of the bridge. The

construction was done by the U.S. Steel’s American Bridge Company of Pittsburgh, and both the

bridge inspector and maintenance engineer derived from the Ohio State Road Commision. No

architect or company was found to be involved in this project.

One of the biggest reasons the Silver Bridge failed was because of the stress corrosion

and corrosion fatigue. So one thing they could have done differently was set up regularly

routined paint touch-ups to the corroded surfaces of the bridge, because although the aluminum

paint they used helped prevent corrosion, few coats were not meant to withstand years and years

to come. They maybe also could’ve considered adding a sacrificial coating or more layers of

protection as well. Another thing that could have been implemented was adding more eyebars to

the structure of the bridge because rather than constructing thicker stacks of thinner bars of

moderate material strength to create a pattern of redundancy, the links were composed of each

two bars only, of higher-strength steel adding more eyebars to the structure of the bridge because

they were not redundant because rather than constructing thicker stacks of thinner bars of

moderate material strength to create a pattern of redundancy, the links were composed of each

two bars only, of higher-strength steel but no redundancy. Redundancy is essential within the

structure of the bridge because with only two bars, the failure of one risks inflicting excessive

loading on the second, causing complete failure, ultimately leading to why the bridge was
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 4

brought down quickly in less than a minute — which would have been unlikely if more bars ha

been used. Then again though, poor maintenance and corrosion would have taken the bridge

down despite the design and assembly they used. Another suggestion would be to have

overestimated the weight capacity of the bridge more and design from there, because another

reason for the collapse was that there was more weight than anticipated, which due to the added

pressure, led to what the Safety Board ruled as “a brittle fracture of the eyebar”. Lastly, due to

lack of information about the original drainage systems design for the bridge, we cannot assume,

but in regards to preventing as much corrosion as possible, a good design would have helped by

pushing water away from vulnerable metal parts like girders, end joints, chords, etc. Water or

moisture is a little more controllable than oxygen and salt, which also contributes to corrosion, so

a well thought out drainage system could be very beneficial. We considered suggesting regularly

routined inspections for any possible cracks and defects, especially because eye bar designs were

new at that time and not as explored, but as said previously, technology at that time would not

have allowed inspection prior to construction to have noticed some cracks, like the essential one

that brought down the bridge, without having to disassemble the eye-bar entirely.

The Silver Bridge was modeled after the Menai Suspension Bridge, one of the first

eyebar suspension bridges located in the United Kingdom. The Menai Suspension Bridge was

built in 1826 and was the biggest bridge in the world at the time, a civil engineering feat. The

Menai Bridge was one of the first suspension bridges to utilize eyebars (Williams, Gill). Many of

the same aspects can be found on the Silver Bridge. Both bridges spanned vast distances and had

the same trough anchorage system, however the Silver Bridge managed to collapse, while the

Menai Bridge is still standing (Posts, Related). The construction of the Silver Bridge features
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 5

atypical aspects, however the engineers who built the bridge heavily drew inspiration from the

Menai Bridge.

A cultural impact of the bridge system failure was the construction of the Silver

Memorial Bridge. In light of the collapse and to honor those that had fallen victim to this

tragedy, this memorial was created as a remembrance for all those affected. As in many cultures,

memorials are important to always preserve the memory of those that were lost, and everyone,

whether affected largely or minimally will remember as they drive across the bridge, hopefully

more reminiscent and less fearful. This new bridge also did not only replace and was renamed

after the late Silver Bridge, but it was also kept the same silver, in contrary to the bridges in

surrounding areas that were painted green, to preserve the memory of the old bridge, with the

exception of well kept maintenance and more thorough designs and structure.

The bridge may not have collapsed as it did if it was properly inspected. The last time it

was inspected was in 1959, 8 years before the collapse, and because there was not sufficient

technology available to complete through inspections then, inspections done on the bridge were

conducted with binoculars by people who did not specialize in this sort of work, and so the

structural stability of the bridge was not something that was focused on very much. Although it

is hard to believe that something good can come out of such a horrible tragedy, this resulted in

more awareness and demand for through inspections on bridges, starting with the Federal

Highway Act of 1996, which required the establishment of a national bridge inspection standard,

created in 1971. This inspection standard includes regulations on the procedure and quality of

inspections and its report, and qualifications of personnel. Now, bridges are required to meet

these standards which are updated every so often.


Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 6

The Ohio River is 981 miles long running through or boarding six states. It is a major

source of drinking water for over three million people. The collapse of the Silver Bridge sent

huge amounts of metal and other debris in the water contaminating it and creating an unstable

water environment. The debris floated miles down the river harming the previously peaceful

environment (Banzhaf, Evan). Although it did not take long for the town to clean up the

accident, it did disrupt many of the local ecosystems for a short period of time.

An influence on the bridge system failure may have been influenced by the material that

they chose to use. At the time of construction, the eyebar chain design had come at a lower price

that the conventional wire cables that the original design had called for. So as an alternate and as

a way to save some money, the eyebar design was chosen as an alternate. Again, poor

maintenance and corrosion would have brought the bridge down, but the alternative choice for a

cheaper and less experienced design could potentially have had just as much contribution to the

system failure. An impact of the building system failure would be that due to the failure of the

bridge, a huge loss of the crossing and transportation for an average of 3,500 to 4,000 vehicles

each day, and all of the wreckage that littered the river, obstructing important shipping channels,

the region was estimated to be resulting in a loss of $1 million each month, which took a severe

economic toll on Ohio. This impact led to the construction of the Silver Memorial Bridge that

estimated around $1.2 million. Another impact was when ​the ​United States Steel Corporation

and the J. E. Greiner Company, Inc. were tried in federal court for $950,000 in reparation to the

relatives of the people whose lives were taken away from the collapse of the bridge but the

lawsuits were shut down as the court concluded that the collapse could not have been foreseen,

even with thorough inspections and because the collapse occurred as a result of the eyebars

fracturing which was an unknown phenomenon to engineers when it was designed and when it
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 7

collapsed.

In conclusion, despite having occurred over fifty years ago, the Silver Bridge collapse

will continue to remain not only as an unfortunate tragedy that affected so many in Ohio, but also

as an essential learning lesson for all engineers, architects, construction, maintenance, and more

all over the world that are involved within the designing and constructing process of any

structure. Without these failures, many structures today would not be possible, so to honor the

Silver Bridge and all those lives that had been affected by the incident, it’s important to do

everything possible to learn from those mistakes, continue to develop, and do everything

possible to make sure history is not repeated.


Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 8

Works Cited

Banzhaf, Evan. “Ohio River Facts.” ​Ohio River Facts • Education • Ohio River Foundation,​

www.ohioriverfdn.org/education/ohio_river_facts/.

“In Re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.W. Va. 1974).”

Justia Law, law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/381/931/2005579/.

Posts, Related. “The History of the Bridges on the Menai Straits off the Island of Anglesey.”

Anglesey Info​, 29 Jan. 2020, www.anglesey.info/menai-bridges/.

Roberge, Pierre. “Silver Bridge Collapse.” ​Silver Bridge Collapse​,

www.corrosion-doctors.org/Bridges/Silver-Bridge.htm.

Rossow , Mark. Overview of Bridge Inspection Programs

(BIRM). www.cedengineering.com/userfiles/Bridge%20Inspection%20Programs.pdf.

Special, Agis Salpukas. “Suits on Bridge Collapse Bring $950,000.”

The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Aug. 1973,

www.nytimes.com/1973/08/11/archives/suits-on-bridge-collapse-bring-950000.html.

Watson, Peter S. “Compensating Victims of Bridge Collapses Outside Minnesota.”

Minnesota Legislature , 9 Nov. 2007,

www.senate.mn/storage/scrfa/bridge_collapses_outside_Minnesota.pdf.

Williams, Gill. “Menai Suspension Bridge.” ​Menai Heritage​, 11 Feb. 2015,

menaibridges.co.uk/history/menai-suspension-bridge/.
Berger, Darby, and Dela Cruz, 9

Witcher , T. R. “From Disaster to Prevention: The Silver Bridge.”

American Society of Civil Engineers , Dec. 2017,

www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/CE_Magazine/Home_Page/Content_Pieces/2017-12-history

-lesson--original.pdf.

“Silver Bridge.” ​WV Department of Transportation,​

transportation.wv.gov/highways/bridge_facts/Modern-Bridges/Pages/Silver.aspx.

Bridge Masters. “How to Combat Corrosion, a Top Threat for Bridges.” ​Bridge Masters,​ 14 Jan.

2020, bridgemastersinc.com/combat-corrosion/.

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