The Critique of Socrates in Cicero's "De Oratore": Ornatus and the Nature of Wisdom

Author(s): Raymond DiLorenzo

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall, 1978), pp. 247-261
Published by: Penn State University Press
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The Critique of Socrates in Cicero's De Oratore: Ornatus
and the Nature of Wisdom

Raymond DiLorenzo

In the third book of Cicero's dialogue De Oratore, completed by

him in the winter of 55 B.C., L. Licinius Crassus speaks upon
the subject of style, the third of the traditional five parts of
rhetoric.1 The time is early September in 91 B.C., the afternoon
of the second day of conversation. Ail présent are politicai men.
Some, like Crassus and his fellow Senator Marcus Antonius, are
men of much expérience who enjoy great eminence. The others,
younger men, are seeking to learn from them the secrets of their
success. AH the previous day, they talked of orators and élo-
quence. Crassus defended the thesis that the orator- the ideai
orator- needs much besides technical compétence in rhetoric in
order to be truly eloquent: he needs broad and philosophical
learning above ali else. Antonius, less inclined to take this ex-
alted view of the orator, discussed from a practical standpoint
the subjects of invention, disposition, and memory. He thereby
left to Crassus the subjects of style and delivery . In the dramatic
movement of the dialogue, what Crassus says about style and
delivery constitutes the climax of the whole work. The reason is
that thèse two parts of rhetorical art seem to be the special
province of orators. Crassus emphasizes that part of style (elo-
cutio) which concerns the figures of language and thought, the
ornamenta verborum or, simply, ornatus.
In a sort of preface to his treatment of ornatus, Crassus gives
his hearers a short account of Greek philosophy. The centrai
figure in it is Socrates, the man whom ali Greece adjudged to be
the chief of talkers, so subtly and abundantly did he speak,
whichever side of a question he took up. At Socrates Crassus
hurls a serious charge: the disruption of the traditional Greek
conception of wisdom and of philosophy. Says Crassus: "Things
belonging together in reality" (IH, 60: re cohaerentes), namely,
4'thè
knowledge of wise thinking and that of ornate speaking"
(HI, 60: sapienterquesentiendi etornate dicendiscientiam), Soc-

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Voi. 11, No. 4, Fall 1978. Published by The Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, University Park and London.

247
248 RAYMONDDILORENZO

rates split asunder in his disputations. Unlike many illustrious

Greeks before him, he thereby severed the heart (cor) from the
tongue (lingua), the life of politicai service from the pursuit of
knowledge, the teachers of speech from those of thought.2
The charge reexpresses forcefully two leitmotifs of the previ-
ous day's conversation: (1) the ineptitude of the Greeks in
speech - specifically, their disturbing habit of beginning in any
discussion a subtle dialectical inquiry, no matter how inappro-
priate it might be; and (2), a matter very much related, the
failure of Socrates in defending himself before the Athenian
court, a failure repeated by the Roman Senator Publius Rutilius
Rufus who, like Socrates, so preferred to speak the plain truth
that he would not allow his advocates to plead his case
ornately.3
Already we may suspect that the critique made by Crassus
strikes upon the major thème of the dialogue: the ideal orator.4
It is not rhetoric. Rhetoric is practical knowledge, expressed
through precepts and examples, of the techniques of persuasive
utterance. The orator utilizes rhetoric. He is not, however, a
mere rhetorician. To the image of the orator which the dialogue
créâtes in our minds, we must, according to the words of Cras-
sus, a Roman orator, contrast the image of Socrates, a Greek
philosopher. We must because it is through the words of Cras-
sus, whose image Cicero would hâve us entertain, that we think
of Socrates, the image of whom Piato made.
To make us compare thèse images is a part of the expressed
intention of Cicero himself. Speaking in his own person at the
beginning of thè third book, he formulâtes for his brother Quin-
tus, to whom the dialogue is addressed, thè precise way his
reader ought to understand his work. When anyone, says Ci-
cero, reads thè marvellously written books of Piato, "in almost
ail of which there is portrayed an image of Socrates" (III, 15),
he does not fail to spy out "something greater" (III, 15: maius
quiddam) from the one about whom they are written. Cicero
requires from his readers the same thing: "that they grasp some-
thing greater about L. Crassus than the amount which will be
expressed by me" (III, 15).
Let us be sure to understand Cicero's intent hère. He has read
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 249

Piato in a certain way. He believes that Piato 's Socrates is not a

représentation of the perfect philosopher. Yet Socrates is the
means by which we apprehend something greater than Socrates
himself. Similarly, Cicero's Crassus is not an image of the per-
fect orator. Crassus says several times that he is not speaking
about himself but about thè perfectus oratori We must think,
therefore, that Crassus is a partial représentation only. Yet in
himself and through his words, he does make something greater
available to the imagination of those who read De Oratore. In
this way Cicero and Piato are, according to Cicero, alike. They
do differ, however. They hâve, we recognize, différent aims. In
certain dialogues Plato's Socrates causes us to apprehend the
perfect philosopher by way of making a critique of rhetors. We
think hère of Gorgias and Phaedrus. Cicero's Crassus causes us
to apprehend the perfect orator by way of making a critique of
Socrates and Socratic philosophers.
Crassus has pointed to a notion of wisdom (sapientia) which
he sees illustrated in the veteres Graeci who lived before Soc-
rates. That wisdom included both thinking and ornate speaking.
Why does Crassus conceive of wisdom in this way? The princi-
ple behind the critique of Socrates seems to lie somewhere back
along thè road, so to speak, which leads up to this notion of
wisdom. But that road back leads us to the very beginning of the
third book, where Crassus first undertakes to speak upon the
subject of ornatus. We will find there that Crassus gives us an
account of intuitions of unity in thè things of thè world, in the
arts and sciences, and in the forms of éloquence. We begin to
suspect that the subject of ornatus is to him a matter much more
profound than it appears to be. Hère, if any where, he exposes
thè master principle which governs ali that he subsequently says
in this third book and which, therefore, informs the critique of
Socrates and the notion of wisdom articulated in it.

Ornatus and the Intuitions of Unity

After the morning conversation, in which Antonius was the
primary speaker, the entire Company takes a siesta. Crassus,
reclining on a couch, passes almost two hours in silent medita-
250 RAYMONDDILORENZO

tion. His face and eyes appear, to one observer, as they often
did when he was deeply engaged in very crucial civil cases.
When prevailed upon to resumé thè conversation, he recalls that
Antonius has already discussed what an orator ought to talk
about and left to him, Crassus, thè task of explaining "how it is
necessary that these things be adorned" (III, 19: ... quemad-
modum Ma ornari oporteret). However, Crassus adds that An-
tonius, in doing this, "divided what cannot be disjoined" (III,
19). As Crassus teils his friends what he seems to have seen or
recalled during his méditation, we discover why. The context
strongly suggests thè importance of thè pronouncement:

Because ali speech [omnis oratio] consists of matter [res] and words
[verta], thè words cannot have a piace if you take away thè matter; and
thè matter cannot have light if you remove thè words. To me in fact
those ancients, having grasped by mind something greater [maius
quiddam], seem to have indeed seen much more than thè amount thè
acumen of our genius can intuit- they who asserted that ali things, both
above and below, are one [unum] and by one power and consent of
nature [una vi atque consensione naturae] have been drawn together.
For there is no class of things which, having pulled away from thè
others, is able by itself to stand together or which, if thè others lack it,
can they conserve their own power and eternity. (Ili, 19-20)

Crassus Claims that speech has both matter (res) and words
(verba). This distinction between constituents of speech is not,
however, as important as thè idea of a relation of dependence
between them. Crassus explains this sort of relation with thè
help of a metaphor. Verba are thè lumen, thè light, which falls
upon res; and res give, as it were, sedes, seat or piace, to verba.
The metaphor suggests that words cast light upon things. They
reveal things and, through that, receive place. But this teaching
is not thè principle we seek. It is an analogue, in thè order of
discourse, of what obtains in thè physical order of things. The
principle itself is thè fact, intuited by some of thè ancient
Greeks, and seen by Crassus himself, that ali things both above
and below are something one (unum). Crassus seems to mean
here by unum a unity of dependence among différent things.6 He
does not speak as if this unity of dependence were a conclusion
of reasoning. It is something seen, intuited by thè mind. What is
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 25 1

true, then, of existing things both above and below is also true
of the différent constituents of speech. Has he not implied that
they are something one even as, we can infer, the light and that
upon which the light falls are something one? They are one
because they are interdependent.
This theoretical vision, Crassus observes, may be too great
for the compréhension of his hearers. He subsequently makes
another attempt to express it. He refers to a statement of Piato
that "the whole teaching of thèse free and humane arts is con-
tained by a certain single bond of association: for, when the
meaning is perceived of that theory by which the causes and
issues of things are known, a certain wondrous consensus of
7
things, a harmony of doctrines, is discovered" (III, 21). But
Crassus demurs once again. Perhaps even this vision of the
bonded character and harmonious relations of the différent arts
may be too lofty for men set, as they are, upon thè ground. He
insists, nevertheless, that they - the Company of Roman Sena-
tors and lawyers listening to him- ought to know and maintain
what they surely hâve been able to grasp: that "éloquence is
one, whatever shores or régions of disputation it is carried into"
(III, 22). The illustrative metaphor which Crassus employs hère
is that of a great river- one, wherever it ranges. Every possible
use of speech, however différent, "is accompanied by the same
supply and ornament" (III, 23: eodem est instructu omatuque
comitato). The final words of what, in the Latin text, is a great
river of a sentence brings back to our attention the subject of
ornât us.
Ornatus, we know, is the name of that part of rhetorical style
which the figures of words and thought comprise. Crassus, how-
ever, has not spoken hère of rhetorical ornamentation. He has
instead expounded three great visions of unity. Ornatus is a
concept whose meaning includes much more than the techniques
of ornamentation. The visions seem to be a part of a comprehen-
sive theory ornatus. If so, how must we understand this the-
ory? How does it apply to the critique of Socrates which ap-
pears within it?
To the latter of thèse questions an answer cornes immediately
after Crassus concludes his remarks upon the unity of elo-
252 RAYMONDDILORENZO

quence. He criticizes those vulgär men who, being half-edu-

cated, split things up and never put them back together, "who,
just as they separate body from mind, so do they separate words
from thoughts" (III, 24). The import of these words clearly anti-
cipâtes thè critique of Socrates. The master intuition in all three
of the visions, thè unity of interdependence among différent
things, functions here very clearly. When Crassus charges Soc-
rates with disrupting philosophy, with separating wise thinking
from ornate speaking, with disassociating the teachers of think-
ing from the teachers of speech, with severing the heart from the
tongue, he manifestly remains true, we now see, to the central
intuition, the principle of these charges. The severity of the
critique measures the strength of his conviction in the principle.
If we include, as it seems we must, within the meaning of
ornatus the theory of unity by interdependence, we can then
see, in the light of Crassus' critique of Socrates, that ornatus
expresses something about the nature of wisdom. It seems we
must attempt to discover "something greater" about the mind of
Crassus which the critique of Socrates points to; and there is in
thè word ornatus itself thè trace of what that may be.

Ornatus and Kosmos

In Latin rhetorical terminology ornatus and ornare corre-
spond to the Greek words kosmos and kosmein.* Does this cor-
respondence show us how, in the discourse of Crassus, ornatus
pertains to wisdom? Modern éditions of De Oratore have not
pointed out an important parallel between Crassus and Socrates.
When Crassus used thè word unum to indicate the unity of
dependence among the things of thè universe, he echoes a point
which Socrates himself made in Gorgias (508A): "wise men teil
us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held
together by communion and friendship, by orderliness [kos-
miotâta], tempérance, and justice; and that is the reason, my
friend, why they cali the whole of this world by the name of
order [kosmou], and not of disorder [akosmian] or dissolute -
ness."9 The reason the world is called kosmos, "order," is that
all in it is interdependent. Is not the meaning of these words of
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 253

Socrates precisely that which Crassus expressed? We know

from Aetius that Pythagoras was thè first to cali thè universe,
because of thè order in it, /cosmos.10 Likely, it is Pythagoras and
his folio wers whom Socrates calls wise men. Cicero himself
once used thè word ornatus to mean kosmos, the order which is
thè universe.11 The universe is indeed one; and it is one because
ail the diverse parts of it are interdependent.
Let us remember that Crassus pointed to the unity of depen-
dence among the things of nature as a part ofhis discussion of
style. Re s and erba, like the things of the world above and be-
low, belong together. We infer that speech, like nature, is also a
kosmos. With what meanings did the old Greeks, as Crassus calls
them, use thè word kosmos in connection with speech? Perhaps
we shall understand Crassus better if we discover something of
the lore of the old Greeks whom Crassus himself venerated. A
glance at thè lexicon of Liddell and Scott will clearly inform us
that thè word profoundly bespeaks the Greek sensé of the world.
Of this sensé only that part pertains to us which may help to
clarify the notion of ornatus implied in the words of Crassus. In a
very large forest of ideas, there are two studies which seem to
direct us to the pertinent path. One, by Hans Diller, summarizes
the various meanings of kosmos and kosmein in pre-philosophical
Greek writings (prior, that is, to Pythagoras).12 The other, by
Helmut Rahn, argues that thè word kosmos expresses to the
Greeks a part of the essence of rhetorical communication.13
Rahn's study présents a phenomenology of logos in logoi.
What is bracketed, in accordance with thè method, is thè body
of practical techniques which compose the art of rhetoric and
which the ancients themselves often criticized as too scholastic
and pedantic. What is sought is das Rhetorische - what, to the
ears of the Greeks, is rhetorical in any sort of communication.
Rahn's basic thesis is that the essence of "the rhetorical" lies
within the compréhension of three key terms: kosmos (beautiful
order- so Rahn glosses it), poikilia (splendid colorfulness), and
kallos (enchantment of beauty).14
In the light of Rahn's thesis, Cicero's dialogue De Oratore
seems itself to be some what phenomenological in method. It too
"brackets" rhetoric. In Book I Crassus often expresses relue-
254 RAYMONDDILORENZO

tance to say anything about the techniques of rhetoric. The rea-

son, he says, is that eloquentia is not born from artifice (rhe-
toric), but artifice from éloquence (I, 146). Crassus speaks of
eloquentia as thè power of a speaker's words. That is why he
demands that eloquentia conjoin with prudentia. Giving such
power to a man who does not have prudentia is like giving
weapons to a madman.15 Eloquence is power: all of the ancients
would agrée in this with Crassus. As Gorgias put it in his Eneo-
mium of Helen, the logos is a great potentate.16 So understood
as a power, logos requires, almost necessarily, that those who
seek to understand and control it pay attention to its effects; and
its effects the ancients expressed in a varie ty of ways: speech is
a drug, magie, enchantment, love, and arms.17
Resonating within ail thèse metaphorical expressions of the
power of logos is thè idea of kosmos. Rahn's three key terms,
for example, ail of which express thè power (Kraft) of speech,
reduce to kosmos. The scope of its meanings includes colorful-
ness and beauty. It comprises, then* what Rahn calls das Rheto-
rische. When thèse words are used in connection with speech
they refer not only to an order of things conceived by the mind;
they also refer to that order made perceptible, to a cosmetic
whole which allures. The way to this conclusion has been
cleared by Hans Diller's analysis of thè beguiling of Zeus in
Homer's Iliad. The use of thè word kosmos in this épisode helps
us grasp the problem, put into its most acute form by Socrates,
which Crassus strives, within a discussion ofornatus, to résolve
by a critique of Socrates.
What is this problem? Let us try to formulate it hère in outline
and in a way which will do justice both to the philosopher Soc-
rates and to the orator Crassus. Knowledge, we realize, perfects
the knower only. It may lead one to wisdom, but the absorbing
search for wisdom isolâtes thè seeker from thè politicai commu-
nity. By nature, however, men do not live alone, and the
knowledge one man acquires ought not to remain with him
alone. Men, like the things of nature, are related to one another,
and words are their chief means of communing and relating. But
words can clothe, as it were, the things referred to and make
them appear différent. Instead of revealing things better by mak-
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 255

ing them more attraetively perceptible by others, words can de-

ceive. They can create an order of appearances which, though
pleasing, can easily do much harm. In this sketch of the prob-
lem, Socrates would emphasize thè potential in words for décep-
tion. Crassus would emphasize the necessity of speech which
properly adorns.
If we think back upon Hera in Homer' s Iliad, we will find
there an apt illustration of thè problem. Zeus has turned the war
to the advantage of the Trojans. This displeases Hera. She fa-
vors the Achaean cause. She plans, consequently, to seduce her
husband and thereby give her brother Poseidon an opportunity
to enter the battle and beat back the Trojan assault. She goes to
her chamber, bathes, anoints herself with fragrant oil, combs
and styles her hair; then she puts on a robe, pins it, and en-
circles her waist with a tasseled zone. Adding to her ensemble
earrings of mulberry and, to co ver her face, a thin veil, she is
ready. "Now when she had put all the ornament (kosmon) on
her body, she began to go out of the chamber" (Iliad 14, 187-
188).
In thèse Unes from Homer, the word kosmos means "orna-
ment." It may also be translated as "adornment" or "embellish-
ment." The question is how we ought to understand thèse trans-
lations in context. What precisely does kosmos hère mean?
Diller emphasizes that kosmos refers primarily to a whole en-
semble made up of parts fitted to other parts. The word "orna-
ment" (Ger. Schmuck), because it refers to some superfluous
bauble of dress, does not accurately translate the meaning of the
Greek term.18 The primary meaning of kosmos is an order of
parts taken together as a whole. The allure of the ensemble is
not separable from the organization of its constituent parts.
We ought not forget, however, that Hera intends to seduce
Zeus in order to allow Poseidon to aid the Achaeans. Her pur-
pose contains an élément of déception. We can, then, distin-
guish three contituents in the concept of order for which the
word kosmos stands: (1) an order to purpose (which may include
déception), (2) an order among parts, and (3) an order of appear-
ances which allure.
By thè time of Piato, speech is conceived as if it were, when
256 RAYMONDDILORENZO

addressed to others, an alluring power; for speech can communi-

cate not only an order of ideas purposefully arranged but also an
order of appearances. The "order" of speech, like the order of
Hera' s ensemble, adds to the notions of purpose and assembly
of parts a relation to the perception of others by means of ap-
pearances. That speech may deceive others is to Socrates not
merely a possibility but, in thè case of many rhetors, poets, and
rhapsodes, often a fact.19 In the dialogue Ion, for instance, Soc-
rates meets the famous rhapsode Coming from the festival of
Aesclepius. Socrates says that he has often admired rhapsodes
because of their art and because in their art "the body has been
adorned" (Ion 530B: to sòma kekosmästhai).20 Not content with
praise for his dress, Ion says boastfully that it is well worth
hearing "how well I have adorned Homer" (530D: hôs eu
kekosmäka ton Homäron). As Ion adorns himself, so in speech
does he adorn Homer. So also, as we read in Phaedrus, poetry
"by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later gén-
érations" (245A: muria tön palaiön erga kosmousa tous epigig-
nomenou paideuei). There is no need to go further into the Soc-
ratic critique of poetry, rhapsody, and oratory. The pertinent
point is clear: thè cosmetic power of words, their ability to make
things perceptible to others in an alluring array of appearances,
can deceive. The texts quoted from the Ion indicate also that
Socrates is very much aware of Ion's vanity. His adornment of
Homer is all too clearly adornment of himself. Of the three
distinguishable meanings of kosmosf when metaphorically trans-
ferred from dress to speech, it is the third and cosmetic sense of
thè word which, at the beginning of the Ion, occasions the satiri-
cal investigation of Socrates into the art of rhapsody.
Yet the two other sensés of kosmos, the notions of an order to
purpose and an order among parts, enter deeply into Socrates'
own conception of the artistic process of speaking. In the Gor-
gias (503E-504E) Socrates proposes to Callicles how a good
rhetor should speak. Will not a good man, he asks, aim for "the
best" (to beltiston) and speak "with a view to something"
(apoblepön pro s ti)! Like any other craftsman, he looks to his
"task" (ergon); and what he applies, he selects not at random
but in order that what he is working on may have "some sort of
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 257

form" (eidos ti). A craftsman puts everything "in a certain

order" (eis taxin tina) and forces each thing to fit and to har-
monize with each other thing. The whole work becomes thereby
an "ordered product" (kekosmàmenon pragma).
The notion of kosmos allows Socrates to explain how the arts
and crafts are related. The kosmos in a house makes it good, and
likewise in a ship, a body or a soûl. The effect of kosmos in a
body is health and, in a soûl, lawfulness. This state of soûl is
justice and tempérance. As a craftsman fits and harmonizes part
to part and thereby makes "an ordered thing," so a rhetor must
work to fit words to words in order to make his hearers just and
temperate.
The kosmos in speech proposed hère by Socrates - one whose
purpose is good and whose parts are harmonious- does not con-
flict, it seems, with the position of Crassus m De Oratore. In his
insistence upon wisdom in speech, Crassus looks also, in the
Socratic expression, to "the best." The ethical color of "the
best" inheres in the sapientia of Crassus, when we recali the
ethical and politicai context in which he spoke about it. At one
place in his discourse Crassus déclares that, of ail the studies by
philosophers into nature, speech, and the life of men, the orator
ought never to relinquish as his own those which concern life.21
Moreover, it is clear that orators show concern for the formai
perfection of speech as a work, if only from the criticism by
philosophers that orators pay attention to little else.
In what respect, then, do Socrates and Crassus differ? They
differ in their conception of the necessity of cosmetic speech. In
the same dialogue in which he explains his idea of the artistic
process, Socrates transforms the cosmetic meaning of kosmos
into what he calls "flattery" (kolakeia), irresponsible gratifica-
tion of the sensés of others. Rhetoric, like cookery, personal
adornment, and sophistry are certain knacks, not arts. They are
four forms of flattery "because flattery aims at the pleasant with-
out the best" (465A: hoti tou hädeos stochadzetai aneu tou beltis-
ton). What Socrates hère asserts, understood as a corrective criti-
cism of sophistical speakers, strikes the truth; but, being negative
in character, what he says suggests that the cosmetic power of
speech is not an essential élément of good speaking.
258 RAYMONDDILORENZO

Crassus, however, insists that it is. Ornatus is the name for

rhetorical ornamentation. Crassus insists upon it because orna-
tus partakes of the nature of wisdom. This is the essential point
of his critique of Socrates. From all that he says in it, we are
bound to infer that wisdom is not perfectly itself which does not
become perceptible to others through words and alluring
through ornatus. It is, in fact, of the nature of wisdom to be
kosmos, to be ornatus. Wisdom is not knowledge simply for
Crassus. Wisdom is knowledge embodied in speech which, by
attracting others at thè level of thè ir sensés, enters into them at
the level of their convictions and becomes the impetus of their
actions. In short, the old and plenary wisdom which Crassus
praises is like the old and plenary conception of kos mos.
The meaning of the critique of Socrates is that wisdom has as
its primary characteristic kosmos or ornatus. The critique does
not explicate the content of wisdom. It points rather to its essen-
tial bondedness to speech.22 Socrates ruptured that bond. In
doing so he ruptured the integrity of éducation as a process of
formation in both speaking and thinking;23 he ruptured thè pris-
tine communion of action and spéculation.

The Orator and the Philosopher

The aim of this study was to expose how ornatus affected the
notion of wisdom articulated within the critique of Socrates. The
thesis offered here is that ornatus, when seen against the Greek
background of kosmos in speech, functions as the informing
principle of the charge against Socrates and expresses the nature
of wisdom.24 No attempt has been made to présent the theory of
ornatus in its technical expression as rhetorical ornamentation.
Nor has there been an attempt io show how Crassus, in his
remarks upon éducation, résolves the problem of discovering
the actual content of wisdom by putting Greek dialectical reason
in the service of his faith in the teaching authority of Rome, her
laws and customs. Both thèse important matters fall within his
füll discussion of ornatus.
However, thè ultimate purpose of the critique of Socrates
ought here to be recalled again, if only briefly. We have seen
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 259

that Cicero wished to project by means of Crassus an image of

the perfect or learned (doctus) orator. In a very revealing text in
Book III Crassus observes that he will not object to anyone
wishing to give the name philosopher to the orator he has been
describing.25 Alternatively, he will not object to giving the name
orator to the philosopher who joins éloquence with wisdom. He
adds that neither the man who knows much but cannot speak,
nor the man who speaks much but knows little deserves praise.
If forced to choose between them, Crassus says that he would
prefer inarticulate knowledge to loquacious folly. But, if there is
one who excels ali others and to whom thè palm must go, it is
the learned orator. If this man is called a philosopher, there will
be no more controversy. If, however, the philosophers persist in
separating themselves from orators, then they will, when mea-
sured against the perfect orator, show themselves his inferiors;
for the perfect orator necessarily has the knowledge of the phi-
losopher, but the philosopher does not necessarily hâve the élo-
quence of an orator. It is remarked in the text that, when Cras-
sus had finished saying thèse things, for a little while among his
hearers there was silence.

Institute of Philosophie Studie s

University of Dallas

NOTES
1 The standardcriticaiédition in Englishis M. Tulli Ciceronis,De oratore libri
très, ed. with introductionand notes by AugustusS. Wilkins(Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1892). Ail quotationsof the Latin herein are taken from De oratore, ed.
and trans, by E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library
(1942; rpt. London: Heinemann and Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1962).The Englishtranslationsare my own.
2 De orat. III, 56-73.
3 The case of Publius Rufus, a RomanSenatorof consular rank who imitated
Socrates, is recountedin De orat. I, 227-234. On the inept (ineptus)speech of
the Greeknationas a whole, see De orat. II, 16-18.
4 The point is clear from the title of thè work- De oratore. It îs not a dialogue
de rhetorica.
Generalaccounts of Cicero's oratoricalprogramare not hardto find. A good,
brief account appearsin G.M.A. Grube,TheGreekand RomanCritics (London:
Methuen, 1965).A fuller historicaltreatmentis AubreyO. Gwynn,RomanEdu-
cationfrom Cicero to Quintilian(1926;rpt. Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1962).The
most scholarly and philosophical account of De oratore within the frame of
260 RAYMONDDILORENZO

Cicero*s complete works is Alain Michel, Rhétorique et philosophie chez

Ciceroni Essai sur les fondements philosophiquesde l'art de persuader(Paris:
Presses Universitairesde France, 1960).
5 See De orat. I, 71; I, 118;III, 84-85.
In his notes A. Wilkins(see above, n.l) mentionsonly ihdXunumrecalls 'The
Eleatic philosopherswith their doctrine of the One'*(p. 420) and refers us (p.
421) to Piato, Soph. 242D and Cicero, Acad. ii, 118. However obscure the
allusion, the context makes the meaningoiunum plain:it means a unity which,
amongdifférentthings, obtains because of their interdependence.
7 See Piato,Epinom. 992A and the famoustext of Cicerop. Arch. 1, 2: "etemm
artes, quae ad humanitatempertinent,habentquoddamcommune vinculum,et
quasi cognationequadaminter se contine tur" (Wilkins,p. 421).
The primaryaim of Cicero, in his politics as well as in his speculativerhetori-
cal works, seems to be a concordiaordinum.
8 See Ad Herrentum,ed. H. Caplan, Loeb Classical Library(1954; rpt. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, and London:W. Heinemann,1964),p.
274, . b; and Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik
(München:Max Heuber Verlag, 1960)I, 277; II, 770.
9 Trans. W.R.M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library(1925;rpt. London:W. Heine-
mann, and Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversitvPress, 1961).
10 See Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker:Greichisch und
Deutsch. 3 vols. (6th ed. by Walther Kranz; Berlin: WiedmannscheVerlags-
buchhandlung,1952)I, 14, 21.
11Cic. Acad.: II, 38, 119:"... ut hic ornatusumquamdilapsusoccidat."
12 "Der vorphilosophischeGebrauch von kosmos und kosmein/* Festschrift
Bruno Snell. . . . (München:C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,1956),pp.
48-60.
13 Helmut Rahn, "Die rhetorischeKulturder Antike,*'Der altsprachlicheUn-
terricht 10, 2 (1967)23-49.
14Rahn, pp. 30-31.
15De orat. III, 55.
16Text of the encomium,divided into sections, is found in Diels-Kranz,Frag-
mente II, 288-294 (or II, 82, Bl 1). The so-called encomiumis a primarytext for
any inquiryinto the Greek sensé of the logos as a power, especially secs. 8-21,
which deal with the powers of logos and eros.
The encomium is also very importantfor understandingthe meaningof kos-
mos and its relationto logos. The first sentence indicatesa set of notionswhich
mightbe called the firstprinciplesof Gorgianrhetoric:"Order[kosmos]in a city
is its manliness, in a body beauty, in a soul wisdom, in a deed valor, in speech
truth;but the opposite of thèse is disorder" (translationmine). But thèse notions
are not peculiarto Gorgias;they constitute the backgroundfor all ancient rhe-
toricaltheory.
17On speech as medicineor drug, see Pedro Laîn Entralgo,The Therapyofthe
Wordin Classical Antiquity,ed. and trans, by J.L. Ratherand John M. Sharp
(New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1970).On speech and magie,
see Jacquelinede Romilly,Magie and Rhetoricin AncientGreece (Cambridge,
Mass. and London: HarvardUniversity Press, 1975). For the relation of love
and speech, see PietroFerrerino,"Laus Veneris(fasti 4, 91-114)" in Ovidiana,
ed. N.l. Herescu (Paris:Société d'Edition"Les Belles Lettres," 1958),pp. 301-
316. These studies are cited only as places useful to begin inquiry.
18Diller, p. 49: "... kosmos an dieser Stelle in sehr charakteristischerWeise
eine bestimmteOrdnungsvorstellung ausdrückt.Was wir mit "Schmuck" wei-
dergeben würden, kommt erst sekundär in den Vorstellungskomplexhinein.
 ORNATUSAND THE NATURE OF WISDOM 261

Einen Reiz übt der kosmos aus, weil von seinen Teilen ein solcher ausgeht;die
Wirkungeines kosmos aus Teilen könnteeine anderesein."
19 It is well known that a major feature of thè Parmenideanbackgroundof
Piatonicthoughtis that speech can create a kosmos of appearanceswhich belie
what is. In the poem of Parmenides,the custom of mortalsof namingwhat is not
is thè cause of the unreliablekosmos in which they live. See Joseph Owens, A
History of Ancient WesternPhilosophy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1959), pp. 67-68; and LeonardoTaran,Parmenides:A Text with Translation,
Commentaryand CriticaiEssays (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1965),
p. 232, n.2.
20Quotationsof Greek text of Ion taken from the Loeb édition, ed. and trans.
W.R.M. Lamb (1925; rpt. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press and
London:W. Heinemann,1952).
21De orat. I, 68-69: of the three partsof philosophy,physics, logic, and ethics,
Crassusarguesthat the oratorcan never relinquishethics.
22 Thus the définition of éloquence includes wisdom and that ot philosophy
includesornâtus: De Part. Oratoriaxxii, 79: nihil enim est eloquentianisi copi-
ose loquens sapientia;and Tusc. Disp. i, iv, 7: Hanc enim perfectamphiloso-
phiam semperiudicavi,quae de maximisquestionibuscopiose posset ornateque
dicere ....
23See De orat. III, 140:on the unity of éducation.
24In the conclusionof his long and careful study, AlainMichel(see above, n. 4)
cornesto a similarconclusion:"C'est surtoutau nom des exigences du style que
Crassus, dans le De Oratore, s'oppose aux philosophes. Et sur ce point, il ne
rencontre pas d'objection de la part d'Antoine. Il affirmeque l'éloquence est
l'art d'exprimerparfaitmentce que les philosophes sont seulmentcapables de
percevoir. Elle s'associe donc à leur recherche, elle leur demande sa matière,
mais c'est elle qui donne une forme à tout" (p. 658). The présentessay attempts
to deepen awarenessof the meaningof "une forme à tout."
25See De orat. III, 142-143, for the text upon which thèse remarksare based.