The Taliban’s Neighbourhood:

Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan

Asia Report N°337 | 30 January 2024

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Preventing War. Shaping Peace.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary................................................................................................................... i

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

II. Regional Diplomacy after the Taliban Takeover .............................................................. 3

A. The Quest for Recognition ......................................................................................... 3
B. The Taliban Turn to the Region ................................................................................. 4
C. A Limited Partnership ............................................................................................... 6

III. Regional Security .............................................................................................................. 8

A. Islamic State-Khorasan Province .............................................................................. 8
B. Militants in Northern Afghanistan ............................................................................ 11
C. Militants in Eastern Afghanistan ............................................................................... 13
D. Fears of “Contagion” .................................................................................................. 16

IV. Economic Dynamics ......................................................................................................... 18

A. New Impetus for Regional Trade and Connectivity .................................................. 18
B. Modest Investments, So Far ...................................................................................... 20
C. Tensions over Water .................................................................................................. 21
1. Concerns from Central Asia ................................................................................. 22
2. Conflict with Iran ................................................................................................. 23
V. Better Regional Dialogue.................................................................................................. 26
A. Security Cooperation ................................................................................................. 26
B. Economic Integration ................................................................................................ 29
C. Western Support or Acquiescence ............................................................................. 31

VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 35

APPENDICES
A. Map of Afghanistan’s Diplomatic Presence in the Region .............................................. 36
B. Country Profiles ............................................................................................................... 37
C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 44
D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2021 .................................................. 45
E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ....................................................................................... 47
 Principal Findings
What’s new? The Taliban, mostly isolated by Western powers, are looking to
build ties with foreign capitals closer by. These countries cannot simply say no:
they must deal with the Taliban on security and economic issues. Regional en-
gagement remains limited, however, due to both mistrust and hurdles raised by
Western sanctions.

Why does it matter? Dysfunction in the relationships between Afghanistan

and its neighbours affects lives and livelihoods across South and Central Asia.
Kabul and its regional partners should explore ways of expanding trade, manag-
ing disputes over water and other shared resources, and combating transnational
militancy. Failure could spell instability in a vast area.

What should be done? Instead of retreating from the many challenges of

dealing with the stubborn Taliban, regional capitals should continue to develop
a clearly defined format for broad-based security cooperation and economic
integration. Western countries should support such efforts – or, at a minimum,
refrain from blocking them.
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°337 30 January 2024

Executive Summary
As most of the world shuns the Taliban due to their violations of women’s and girls’
rights, countries in the region around Afghanistan are dealing with the regime to
address their needs for security and economic stability. This region, as the Taliban
broadly define it, spans the “Eurasian continents”, from China in the east to Türkiye
in the west and from Russia in the north to India and the Gulf monarchies in the
south. It encompasses countries closer in, such as the Central Asian states, Iran and
Pakistan. The Taliban, like previous Afghan rulers, view Afghanistan as a bridge con-
necting all these places. Regional countries’ policies toward the Taliban vary enor-
mously, though all believe contacts with the regime to be necessary, but so far, their
engagement is limited. Kabul and its regional partners are struggling to develop a
modus vivendi as regards issues of mutual concern, which range from boosting trade
to managing disputes over water and halting transnational militancy. It is a fraught
endeavour, but a worthwhile one, and Western capitals should not stand in the way.
The Taliban’s denial of basic rights to Afghan women and girls and their imposi-
tion of draconian social rules since returning to power in August 2021 has sabotaged,
at least for now, the chances that the UN and other international bodies might rec-
ognise their regime. Yet even as Western diplomats cancelled meetings with the Tal-
iban, regional actors sought more dealings with Kabul. Some have condemned the
Taliban’s treatment of women and girls, particularly bans on girls’ secondary and
higher education, but overall regional officials tend not to put emphasis on women’s
and girls’ rights. At the same time, they are convinced that the best way to secure their
countries’ interests and moderate the Taliban’s behaviour in the long term is patient
deliberation with Kabul, rather than ostracism. Channels between Kabul and regional
capitals appear to offer the Taliban their best hopes for diplomatic engagement in the
coming years.
Still, regional collaboration has fallen short of what some of Afghanistan’s neigh-
bours wanted. Some were aspiring to a “grand bargain” that would have traded dip-
lomatic recognition for Taliban action to form a more inclusive government, particu-
larly by empowering Afghan politicians whom they had sponsored in opposition to
the Taliban in the past and with whom they remain friendly. The Taliban, however,
rebuffed all attempts to coax them into including former enemies in the cabinet.
Most regional players have therefore settled for piecemeal engagement with Kabul
that addresses specific issues on a case-by-case basis. More by necessity than design,
this approach aligns with the Taliban’s own preference for transactional relationships
that avoid the prospect of what they perceive as foreign meddling in Afghan affairs.
Taliban talking points about respect for diverse cultural values and alternatives to
the “Western-imposed” global order also chime with the interests of those regional
powers.
At the top of the regional agenda are matters related to security. Regional officials
have observed Kabul’s novel methods of controlling Islamist militant groups with
varying degrees of scepticism and anxiety. After the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan’s
neighbours feared that violence would spill across their borders to hotspots like Indian-
administered Kashmir or the Fergana Valley in Central Asia. Those concerns proved
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page ii

to be exaggerated; as the Taliban firmed up their hold on the country, militancy did
not spread. The major exception is Pakistan, where attacks by the Tehreek-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) climbed during the Taliban’s first two years in power, significantly
raising tensions with Islamabad. The Taliban have used a standard playbook for
answering regional concerns about nearly all militant groups: Kabul refuses to kill or
capture suspected militants. Instead, it relocates them, helping them establish new
lives in an effort to curb their ambitions and break down their command structures.
The first step toward better regional security cooperation could be cooling down
the rhetoric on all sides and getting actors to agree on a set of facts, even if they have
different priorities. Taliban forces have got better at corralling the most dangerous
jihadists, those loyal to Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), but even in that
case the Taliban have not built enough confidence with regional partners to share
information freely. Part of the problem is the gap between how Kabul prefers to deal
with most of the Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan and how the region would
like Kabul to deal with them. Overcoming this divide requires building a common plat-
form for discussing regional security concerns and a common approach to address-
ing challenges. All sides would benefit from improved border management, customs
integration and demarcation of Afghanistan’s rugged frontiers.
The other main area of regional cooperation is economics. Decades of war in Af-
ghanistan shelved ideas of multiplying trade corridors to rival the Silk Routes of old,
but these began to regain currency as the Taliban’s military victory brought greater
stability and the de facto authorities started tackling corruption. Regional capitals
are now seeing glimmers of commercial opportunity. They are dusting off plans to get
trucks, railcars, gas and electricity moving across borders. The Taliban are impatient
to start work on such projects, though some of the barriers will be insurmountable in
the short term.
The logic for better regional economic connectivity is overwhelming, especially in
the energy sector where Central Asian countries are in search of new markets while
South Asia needs new supplies of oil, gas and electricity. Equally importantly, the re-
gion has strategic reasons to encourage ventures in Afghanistan as part of long-term
planning for economic integration, which in turn would help with regional stability.
Some regional actors think building Afghanistan into the regional economic archi-
tecture could increase regional influence, placate detractors of diplomacy among the
Taliban and make the de facto authority a more predictable entity. Many among the
Taliban, for their part, see such integration as a path to greater prosperity for Afghani-
stan and greater longevity for their regime.
Still, a multitude of factors inhibit economic cooperation between Kabul and the
region. Economic restrictions and sanctions continue to stifle private investment. The
desire of some donor states to limit aid to humanitarian assistance, and attempts by
some to block development aid altogether, also contribute. The limited resources
of some regional countries, coupled with inability to attract external financing, also
impede serious economic collaboration between Afghanistan and the region. Equally
importantly, the lack of a legal framework in Afghanistan continues to undermine
private-sector confidence in the country, particularly as the Taliban embark on a
cryptic ad hoc overhaul of laws they inherited from the government they overthrew.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page iii

Some of the Taliban’s actions, including building water infrastructure without co-
ordination with downstream countries, have also engendered tensions with Afghani-
stan’s neighbours, particularly Iran and Uzbekistan. Disputes have occasionally con-
tributed to skirmishes between the Taliban and neighbouring countries’ forces. In such
a febrile atmosphere, regional states might be tempted to scale back their ambitions
for engagement with the Taliban. Doing so, however, would likely make it still harder
to resolve such problems and put solutions to other challenges neighbours face in
Afghanistan further out of reach.
Many steps toward regional cooperation do not involve Western donors, but those
countries have a stake in the results. Europeans, especially, would benefit from a
stable, self-sufficient region that is not a major source of illegal drugs, migrants or
terrorism. Yet sanctions and other measures originating in the West that aim to sig-
nal disapproval of the Taliban are obstacles on the road to more functional relations
between Kabul and regional capitals. Whether it is a vote at the World Bank on a water
project, or permission to send equipment to Taliban border guards despite sanctions,
much progress depends on Western support – or at least, acquiescence. While such
practical steps should not imply recognising the Taliban regime, they would contrib-
ute to regional peace and security.
Kabul/Brussels, 30 January 2024
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°337 30 January 2024

The Taliban’s Neighbourhood:

Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan

I. Introduction

The Taliban takeover in 2021 transformed Afghanistan but not the circumstances
arising from its geographical location.1 Like many past governments in Kabul, the
Taliban regime has advanced a foreign policy of neutrality and promoted Afghani-
stan as a profit-making link between nearby states. The Taliban authorities have
pursued ambitious plans for cross-border railways, pipelines and electricity corri-
dors.2 But the country’s neighbours remain wary, in keeping with a long tradition
of treating it as, at best, a buffer protecting them from other regional powers and, at
worst, a haven for militants and smugglers. Since the Taliban have a bad reputation
of their own, they face major challenges in securing a role for Afghanistan in the
region’s security architecture and economic future.
This report examines the Taliban’s regional diplomacy to date. “The region” is
defined as the Taliban themselves understand the term, looking out from Kabul at
adjacent states and others farther away, with Afghanistan as the middle ground be-
tween what the Taliban call the “Eurasian continents”.3 Neighbouring countries, such
as Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, regard engagement with
the Taliban authorities as a necessary evil if they are to address core concerns. Region-
al powers like China, India and Russia have also explored engagement as a means of
addressing concerns and of supporting their allies in containing any spillover from
Afghanistan. More distant countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the
United Arab Emirates have also entered the diplomatic fray, partly to challenge the
Taliban’s Islamic exceptionalism but also spurred by the need to balance their own
regional rivalries. Appendix B provides an outline of each of these countries’ approach
to Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover.
To illuminate its discussion of specific issues, the report explores the Taliban’s way
of interacting with the world – with limited transactions rather than strategic pacts
– and assesses what regional actors want from their dealings with Kabul. Beyond
top-level diplomacy, it also delves into practical aspects of cooperation in security
and economic affairs, including how countries in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood work
together – or compete – in managing transboundary waterways. Its conclusions
might apply to other foreign actors searching for strategies of political engagement
with the Taliban.

1
Earlier work on Afghanistan’s foreign relations includes Crisis Group Asia Reports N°320, Pakistan’s
Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan, 4 February 2022; and N°317, Beyond Emergency Relief:
Averting Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Catastrophe, 6 December 2021.
2
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Kabul, 2021-2023.
3
Speech by Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi at 4th Foreign Ministers Meeting among
the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan, 13 April 2023. See tweet by Hafiz Zia Ahmad, @Hafiz
ZiaAhmad1, deputy spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2:34pm, 13 April 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 2

Research included dozens of conversations conducted over the course of 2022

and 2023 with government officials and various experts from Afghanistan and region-
al countries, in Kabul, Dushanbe, Istanbul, Ankara, Doha, Dubai, Brussels, London,
New York and Washington, as well as others contacted remotely. Fieldwork was also
carried out at border crossings in Afghanistan at Takhar, Kunduz, Herat, Kandahar,
Khost and Nangarhar.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 3

II. Regional Diplomacy after the Taliban Takeover

The collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Kabul sent tremors through regional
capitals, where officials have spent the last two years grappling with how to deal with
the new Taliban regime. Different governments have engaged with Kabul in different
ways, but common themes have emerged in regional policy toward the Taliban, and,
conversely, in the Taliban’s approaches to the region. This section sums up Kabul’s
relations with the neighbourhood, while the individual approaches of regional actors
are profiled in Appendix B.

A. The Quest for Recognition

In their first months after seizing power, Taliban officials were hopeful that their gov-
ernment would obtain international recognition.4 But not a single foreign government
or multilateral organisation would formally acknowledge the Taliban-controlled
government without concessions on women’s rights and other matters.5 The uniform
refusal angered the Taliban’s more conservative elements, splitting the movement
into two camps: one, centred in the Kabul-based interim government, sought a thaw
with the West; the other, gathered around the Kandahar headquarters of the hard-
line emir, Hibatullah Akhundzada, rejected this notion.6 The emir’s camp, convinced
that the U.S. would block any attempt at rapprochement, argued that the Taliban
should bolster their movement’s cohesion and their government’s prospects for sur-
vival by reintroducing strict policies their earlier regime had decreed in the 1990s.7
Rolling out a series of draconian edicts on women’s rights in 2022 and 2023, the emir
showed his defiance of the West and reassured his followers that the Taliban regime
would not compromise.8
The Taliban’s intransigence, particularly on gender policies, has fuelled a cycle
of worsening relations with the West. Additional restrictions by the Taliban on the
rights of Afghan women and girls prompted repeated condemnations by Western

4
These hopes persisted despite warnings at the 2018-2021 Doha peace talks, where diplomats told
the Taliban in attendance the movement would be ostracised if it seized power by force of arms.
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Doha and Kabul, 2020-2021.
5
Diplomats never spelled out concessions they would demand in exchange for recognition, but they
often raised concerns about the Taliban’s flagrant discrimination against women and girls, as well
as the regime’s lack of political inclusivity. Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, “The World Has No
Choice but to Work with the Taliban”, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2023.
6
The first camp argued that Kabul should seek many international patrons so as not to rely too
heavily on any foreign country or fall into any geopolitical “sphere of influence”. Crisis Group inter-
views, Taliban officials, 2021-2023.
7
Since at least mid-2022, the Taliban have considered the U.S. to be the main obstacle to recogni-
tion. Regional countries also blame the U.S. for the Taliban’s pariah status. For their part, U.S. offi-
cials say the Taliban have not taken necessary steps toward recognition, though they admit that
domestic U.S. politics would likely make it impossible. Crisis Group interviews, U.S. officials, 2021-
2023. See also “U.S. cast as villain during meeting of Afghan neighbours”, Voice of America, 14
April 2023.
8
Crisis Group Asia Report N°329, Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Deepen Afghanistan’s
Crisis, 23 February 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 4

countries – to which the Taliban responded with further measures, in part because
of constituents who praised them for rebuffing the demands of countries that had
invaded Afghanistan. The space for diplomacy shrank ever further. While the Tali-
ban maintained that they would not change domestic policy for the sake of outside
acquiescence to their rule, public opinion in the West urged Western governments not
to “normalise” a regime that may be guilty of “gender apartheid”.9 Pressure mounted
on Western states to keep up the sanctions, asset freezes and other forms of isolation
they had imposed on the Taliban.

B. The Taliban Turn to the Region

The standoff between the Taliban and Western countries placed the region in a bind.
Several of Afghanistan’s neighbours had opposed the group when it ruled in the 1990s,
with only three of them – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates –
recognising its government at the time. Others, including India, Iran, Russia and Tajik-
istan, had backed armed opposition to the first Taliban regime.10 At the start of the
Taliban’s second administration in 2021, many of the same anti-Taliban groups in
northern Afghanistan reached out to regional actors in hopes of renewed support. As
a result, the first question for neighbouring countries after the Taliban’s return to
power was deciding whether to fight the regime or talk to it.11
Although regional actors also condemned the Taliban’s discrimination against
women, they decided to engage with Kabul over the following months. The extent of
cooperation varied, and each actor was motivated by different considerations, but a
common denominator was a tilt toward working with the Taliban rather than isolat-
ing them. Although the U.S.-led coalition had failed to bring peace to Afghanistan,
it was widely perceived as having policed the country and its departure imparted a
feeling of urgency in the region, especially regarding security threats.12 As one dip-
lomat put it, “the West is leaving the problem to regional countries”.13 Since March
2022, when Taliban restrictions on women and girls got more severe, a pattern has
emerged of increasing interaction between Kabul and regional capitals, even as en-
gagement with the West has dwindled.14

9
“Experts: Taliban treatment of women may be ‘gender apartheid’”, UN Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, 11 July 2023.
10
Opposition to the Taliban’s first regime was led by a coalition of militias that found refuge with
Ahmad Shah Massoud in northern Afghanistan. His son, Ahmad Massoud, now heads the National
Resistance Front, one of the largest groups fighting the Taliban. The Front’s leadership is largely
based in Tajikistan. Crisis Group interviews, Dushanbe, 2022.
11
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul and Dushanbe, 2022. See also Samina Ahmad, Praveen Donthi,
Ali Vaez, Amanda Hsiao, Olga Oliker and Oleg Ignatov, “With the Taliban Back in Kabul, Regional
Powers Watch and Wait”, Crisis Group Commentary, 26 August 2021.
12
A Western security official said regional countries, after having pushed for a U.S. exit from Afghani-
stan, are struggling to deal with the aftermath. “It’s like a dog chasing a car and catching the bumper”.
Crisis Group interview, Washington, June 2023.
13
Crisis Group interview, regional diplomat, Kabul, October 2022.
14
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of Kabul”, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 15 August 2022.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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As the Taliban gave up hope of winning over the West and shifted toward the re-
gion, they also adapted their rhetoric. The emir insisted that he would seek positive
relations with the region and beyond.15 Yet such statements were often paired with
assertions that, as the Taliban do not interfere in foreign countries’ internal affairs,
others should not meddle in Afghanistan’s.16 Taliban officials also became more
vocal about their dissatisfaction with Washington, a sentiment sometimes echoed by
regional actors.17 The region’s overtures toward the Taliban appear in part to reflect
that some countries (for instance, China, Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia) have their
own reasons to seek alternatives to a U.S.-led unipolar order that dictates which
regimes are acceptable and which are not.
Still, the neighbourhood’s cautious embrace of Kabul appears to be based not
primarily on anti-U.S. sentiment but on an assessment of what will yield the tangible
results they seek. Regional governments concluded that talking with the de facto
authorities was the best way to nudge them toward responsiveness to their agendas.
Security and economic concerns came before those related to women’s and girls’
rights. “The world will not stop and wait for Western sentiment to shift in favour of
the Taliban”, a regional diplomat said. “We are here on the front lines”.18
Having themselves maintained or re-established a diplomatic presence in Kabul,
many regional countries have welcomed the appointment of Taliban envoys in their
capitals, claiming that such representation does not amount to implicit or explicit
recognition but is a “technical” prerequisite for managing co-existence with Afghani-
stan.19 These working-level relationships are likely to proliferate.20 It is even possible
that, in the future, some countries could break with the Western-led consensus and
officially recognise the regime.21

15
See, for example, the Taliban emir’s Eid message, sent via tweet by Zabihullah Mujahid, Taliban
spokesman, @Zabehulah_M33, 9:30am, 18 April 2023.
16
Ibid. See also the prime minister’s statement in tweet by Azam News, @azamweb, 3:30am, 28
November 2021.
17
See, for example, “The Taliban’s claim: The U.S. is the key obstacle to recognition of our govern-
ment”, Voice of America Pashto, 19 June 2022 [Pashto]; “Acting defence minister says US is obstacle
to intl recognition”, TOLO News, 22 July 2023.
18
Crisis Group interview, regional diplomat, Kabul, September 2022.
19
At the same time, countries such as China have formally accredited the Taliban’s ambassadors,
perhaps signalling implicit acceptance, if not recognition, of their government.
20
According to spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban government has sent diplomats to at
least fourteen countries, though he does not name them. See “Taliban want control of more Afghan
diplomatic missions”, AP, 26 March 2023. According to the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, Amir
Khan Muttaqi, the government has dispatched representatives to China, Iran, India, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See
“Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, video, YouTube, 7 October 2022 [Pashto].
21
Regional scepticism about U.S. efforts to withhold recognition arises, in part, from the poor rec-
ord of such isolation campaigns in recent history. Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, Kabul,
2022-2023. See also Daniela Linge, “Recognizing the Reality of Bad Actors: Afghanistan and the
Taliban”, Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 1 (2023).
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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C. A Limited Partnership

The Taliban’s military dominance has convinced regional capitals that a more stable
Afghanistan, albeit one ruled by a somewhat unpredictable regime, is a lesser evil than
a return to civil war. The regional consensus is fragile, however, underpinned by the
premise that Taliban rule will not devolve into the kind of factional chaos that plagued
the country in the past. Should regional countries feel that the government cannot im-
pose order inside Afghanistan’s borders and contain transnational threats, this con-
sensus may well unravel. If that happens, countries in the region could be tempted to
pick sides in another intra-Afghan conflict, repeating the destructive pattern of past
decades.22
The region’s diplomatic posture should also not be mistaken for full recognition;
even calling it “normalisation” may be going too far. The level of engagement is, for
now, far from the ambitious goal sometimes discussed among Afghanistan’s neigh-
bours: a strategic pact, or “grand bargain”, between themselves and the Taliban. Most
versions of the idea, which thus far is informal, raise the prospect of recognition in
exchange for the Taliban forming an “inclusive” government. Others see the Taliban
as exclusionary, and not just in gender terms, pointing to the fact that their admin-
istration is made up almost entirely of their own members and not many non-
Pashtuns. Nearby countries are pressing for a cabinet in Kabul encompassing other
political and ethnic factions with which they enjoy historical ties.23 The Taliban
bluntly reject such proposals, their vision for maintaining control of the country
being based on keeping a monopoly on the state machinery, with loyalists in all key
positions. They have shot down the region’s ideas about including politicians from
the previous republican order. They promise to “broaden” their government in the
future without providing details.24
Some regional actors are growing disillusioned with the Taliban and appear to
have halted attempts at reaching an overarching agreement with them, instead limit-
ing themselves to piecemeal negotiations over narrow areas of mutual concern. There
has been little or no coordination among regional actors on these micro-engagements,
but they are learning from one another about how best to deal with the de facto au-
thorities. For example, diplomats have noticed that the Taliban’s officials based in
Kabul use conciliatory language but seem hamstrung in terms of what they can offer,
as they are often undermined by their superiors in Kandahar. At the same time,
attempts at bypassing Kabul to negotiate directly with Kandahar have borne no fruit,

22
Crisis Group interviews, regional experts, November 2022-May 2023.
23
Afghanistan contains many ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks
and Hazaras. Among these, the Tajiks have links with Tajikistan; the Uzbeks with Uzbekistan; and
the Hazaras with fellow Shia in Iran. India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and other countries also
have historical affiliations with Afghan political and ethnic factions.
24
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban and regional officials, 2021-2023. What inclusion the Taliban
have allowed has typically involved low-level positions, such as the appointment of 22 Hindus and
Sikhs to municipal posts in Kabul. See tweet by Kabul Municipality, @KblMunicipality, 9:31am, 16
October 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 7

partly because the emir spurns most diplomatic overtures.25 Some neighbouring
countries are still investing time and energy in opening channels with the emir, but
their experience so far has been that Kandahar prefers to stay aloof.26
What remains, then, is a small cadre of regional diplomats posted to embassies in
Kabul – often with modest staffing and tiny budgets – trying to deal with Taliban of-
ficials who are often constrained by their own organisational and political wrangling.
These interactions are also limited by security considerations: Russian and Chinese
diplomats, for example, have scaled back their movements in the Afghan capital due
to jihadist attacks on their compatriots.27 These difficulties aside, most regional dip-
lomats have continued dogged efforts at engagement. On topic after topic – security
concerns, including Islamist militancy, border clashes, weapons proliferation and
counter-narcotics; and economic issues, such as trade, foreign investment, water
management and climate change – they continue to reach out to the Taliban.

25
Although the Taliban leader reportedly receives Afghan visitors, he has only had two meetings
with foreign dignitaries. One was with Qatar’s prime minister, whom he reportedly saw in May 2023.
“Qatar’s prime minister met with top Taliban leader in Afghanistan earlier this month, sources say”,
CNN, 31 May 2023. More recently, Pakistani politician Maulana Fazlur Rahman also met with the
emir. “Fazlur Rahman’s visit to Afghanistan”, The Express Tribune, 15 January 2024.
26
Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, 2021-2023.
27
IS-KP has carried out several attacks against foreigners inside Afghanistan, including attacks
outside the Russian and Pakistani embassies in late 2022 and an attack on a hotel housing Chinese
tourists in December 2022.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 8

III. Regional Security

Given Afghanistan’s turbulent history, it is not surprising that regional governments

see the country mostly as a security problem to be contained. Before the Taliban take-
over, the task of containment fell to U.S. forces, whose counter-terrorism operations,
for all their flaws, gave the country’s neighbours a degree of comfort.28 Although the
UN reported numbers of transnational jihadist fighters in Afghanistan during those
years dwindling to a few dozen, the Taliban’s return to power left regional actors
feeling exposed.29 They worried about the potential for a return to civil war and ex-
pressed fears about militant groups, questioning the Taliban’s willingness or ability
to rein them in. They also harboured concerns that the rise of an Islamist government
in their neighbourhood could galvanise Islamists within their own borders.

A. Islamic State-Khorasan Province

The security threat that Afghanistan’s neighbours most frequently raise is that ema-
nating from the local branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State-Khorasan
Province (IS-KP).30 In some ways, the growing concerns about IS-KP are paradoxi-
cal, as in reality, overall levels of violence related to the group have fallen over the
past two years. As the Taliban improved their counter-insurgency efforts, IS-KP has
launched fewer attacks and killed fewer people.

Figure 1. Incidents Associated with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in

Afghanistan, 2018 to 2024

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Crisis Group calculations.

28
Regional views of the U.S. and NATO presence were mixed: while appreciating Western counter-
terrorism efforts, many countries also viewed the foreign troops as a threat and a source of instabil-
ity. Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, 2013-2021.
29
“Report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban”, May 2023.
30
IS-KP emerged in 2015, primarily among Salafis in eastern Afghanistan. See Crisis Group Asia
Report N°326, Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, 12 August 2022, pp. 8-11.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 9

These three-month rolling averages include all violence involving IS-KP as a primary or associated actor in Afghani-
stan from 1 January 2018 to 1 January 2024.

Figure 2. Fatalities Associated with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in

Afghanistan, 2018 to 2024

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Crisis Group calculations.
These three-month rolling averages include all violence involving IS-KP as a primary or associated actor in Afghani-
stan from 1 January 2018 to 1 January 2024.

Still, regional actors are worried about IS-KP’s continued capacity, and particularly
its new emphasis on attacking citizens of neighbouring countries, both inside Afghani-
stan and outside.31 The attacks on foreigners undermine the Taliban’s claims to be
security guarantors, disrupt their fragile international relations and help IS-KP recruit.
Such incidents, though rare, have attracted significant attention. In April 2022,
IS-KP fired a barrage of Katyusha rockets at Termez, a city on Uzbekistan’s border
with Afghanistan.32 The next month, it launched a similar attack in Tajikistan. Neither
appeared to cause casualties or major damage.33 A more serious incident occurred
that October, when IS-KP struck a Shia shrine in Iran, killing scores of worshippers.34
In addition, the group has targeted foreigners in Afghanistan several times, including
bombing the Russian and Pakistani embassies in September and December 2022, as
well as a hotel that same December many of whose guests were Chinese nationals.35

31
IS-KP’s targets have included Shia and Sufi places of worship; top Taliban officials and the reli-
gious scholars who back them; and foreigners inside and outside the country, with emphasis on the
latter. Ibid.
32
Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State Khorasan claims rocket attack on Uzbekistan”, Voice of America, 18
April 2022.
33
A July 2022 attack on Uzbekistan inflicted no casualties and was not claimed by any group. “Five
rockets fell on the territory of Uzbekistan”, Uzbekistan National News Agency, 5 July 2022.
34
Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State Attacks the Islamic Republic”, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 31 October 2022.
35
Tweet by TOLO News, @TOLOnews, 9:59pm, 12 January 2023; and “IS-K claims suicide attack
near foreign ministry in Kabul that killed six”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 March 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 10

As part of its efforts to boost recruitment, IS-KP has published propaganda in all
major regional languages. It has tapped the grievances of non-Pashtun ethnic groups,
not just those concentrated in Afghanistan’s north, but also those in neighbouring
Central Asian states.36 IS-KP also maintains strong connections to Pakistan, where
many of its founding members were born.37 The group’s leadership regularly calls on
its supporters abroad to carry out attacks inside their home countries.38 This incite-
ment is tied to a surge of violence in Pakistan, where incidents related to IS-KP
became more frequent after 2021.39
Rather than fostering international security cooperation, concerns about IS-KP
have had the opposite effect in recent years, as foreign governments blame each other.
In particular, Russian and Iranian officials claimed, absurdly, that the U.S. supports
IS-KP.40 Such allegations fuelled Kabul’s paranoia, with Taliban officials at times
echoing these claims, while in other instances accusing regional intelligence agencies
of backing the group.41 For example, some Taliban officials charge, perhaps equally
risibly, that Pakistan provides a haven to IS-KP militants.42 These statements have
added to rising tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, as the latter accuses its neigh-
bour of harbouring the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an insurgency that has
mounted numerous attacks on the Pakistani army and police (see Section III.C). Tal-
iban officials also frequently mention their suspicions that Tajikistan is a source of
IS-KP recruits.43

36
Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle, “Islamic State Khorasan’s expanded vision in South and Cen-
tral Asia”, The Diplomat, 26 August 2022; and Lucas Webber and Laith Alkhouri, “Perspectives:
Islamic State recruiting Uzbeks to fight in Afghanistan”, Eurasianet, 29 August 2022. See also “MW
Weekly: ISKP propaganda targets India”, Militant Wire, 7 September 2022.
37
Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan”, CTC Sentinel, vol. 8,
no. 3 (2015), p. 7. See also “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Extremism intensifies”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
6 October 2022 [Russian].
38
“Islamic State in Afghanistan promises attacks on Chinese and Iranian cities, threatens Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan”, Militant Wire, 20 June 2022; and “ISKP’s Eid message calls for attacks in
South and Central Asia”, Militant Wire, 11 July 2022.
39
ACLED data from 1 January 2018 to 1 September 2023 show that IS-KP attacks in Pakistan grew
from an average of about two per month before the Taliban takeover to almost five per month after-
ward. Because attacks vary in lethality, however, average monthly fatalities in the two periods were
not significantly different. Crisis Group analysis, 2023.
40
“US covertly sponsoring IS, says Russia”, The Siasat Daily, 21 January 2023. See also “Qommi:
IS-KP in Afghanistan is a continuation of the U.S. presence in that country”, Sputnik News, 8 Feb-
ruary 2023 [Dari]; tweet by Aamaj News @breaking24_news, 8:54pm, 30 May 2022; and tweet by
Ali Khamenei, @Khamenei_fa, Iranian Supreme Leader, 8:15pm, 31 May 2022.
41
In March 2022, for example, the Taliban’s intelligence agency claimed that IS-KP was a “project”
of the “foreign occupiers”. See tweet by General Directorate of Intelligence, @GDI1415, 8:43pm, 20
March 2022.
42
Leaked memoranda from the Afghan defence and interior ministries claim that IS-KP has train-
ing camps in the Tirah valley, in Pakistan’s rugged Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghani-
stan, and that the group’s leadership operates in the area. See, for example, tweet by Abdul Sayed,
@abdsayedd, independent researcher, 10:47pm, 15 January 2023.
43
The Taliban claimed that IS-KP, struggling to recruit Afghans, has turned to Central Asian mili-
tants, particularly Tajiks. See tweet by Hafiz Zia Ahmad, @HafizZiaAhmad1, deputy spokesman for
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10:08pm, 19 March 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 11

The public discord may mask a degree of behind-the-scenes intelligence coopera-

tion. While information is scant, Iran has hinted that it is working with the Taliban
in counter-terrorism, while other countries, such as the U.S., hold regular bilateral
talks with Kabul on security issues.44 Whatever the source of the Taliban’s intelli-
gence, their strikes on IS-KP have become much more effective and precise. Since
mid-2022, the Taliban have carried out a series of raids that killed prominent figures
in IS-KP, such as its alleged deputy leader, former interim leader, intelligence chief
and head of judiciary. Possibly due to this crackdown, the number of IS-KP attacks
has declined.45 There are also indications that Taliban efforts to curb IS-KP recruit-
ment, particularly on university campuses, might be enjoying success.46
Whether IS-KP could, in the future, become a more potent transnational threat
remains an open question. So far, its operations beyond its original territory near the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border have been limited. The Taliban reportedly eliminated
the group’s cells that targeted Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in late 2022, and the group
has not launched further cross-border attacks since then.47 On the other hand, IS-KP
still attracts recruits from disparate parts of Central and South Asia and encourages
attacks outside Afghanistan, arguably making it the most dangerous armed group in
the region.48

B. Militants in Northern Afghanistan

Regional countries are also concerned about a plethora of other transnational jihadist
groups operating from Afghanistan. Central Asian states understandably focus on
militants in the country’s north, near their borders, who have longstanding ambi-
tions to foment rebellion in their home countries.49 Many of these smaller groups
consist of no more than a few dozen fighters, but however tiny, they remain a key pri-
ority for China, Russia and the Central Asian states because the militants in question
often belong to Uyghur, Uzbek, Tajik and other ethnic groups with links to constitu-

44
See tweet by TOLO News, @TOLOnews, 2.28pm, 15 September 2023. Ayaz Gul, “US says it’s
working to hold Afghan Taliban to anti-terror pledges”, Voice of America, 10 July 2023.
45
Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Khurasan down but not out under increased Taliban CT and spy
pressure”, Militant Wire, 13 May 2023.
46
Antonio Giustozzi, “An Unfamiliar Challenge: How the Taliban are Meeting the IS Threat on
Afghanistan’s Campuses”, Royal United Services Institute, May 2023.
47
“Taliban: Those responsible for firing rockets into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been killed”,
Voice of America Pashto, 17 July 2022 [Pashto].
48
In June 2023, for example, Turkish police arrested a Tajik national who was believed to be
responsible for sending foreign recruits to IS-KP in Afghanistan. See “Turkish police arrest ‘high-
ranking’ Daesh/ISIS terrorist in Istanbul”, Anadolu Agency, 22 June 2023. For background on
Turkish counter-terrorism efforts, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°267, An Enduring Challenge:
ISIS-linked Foreigners in Türkiye, 28 February 2023.
49
Other than IS-KP and the TTP, regional states claim that Afghanistan harbours al-Qaeda; its
local branch, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; Jamaat Ansarullah; Katiba-e Imam Bukhari;
East Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party; Islamic Jihad Group; Katibah al-Tawhid
wal Jihad; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; and others. “Report of the UN Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban”, UNSC S/2023/95, 13 February 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 12

encies in their countries.50 It is partly for this reason that Afghanistan’s neighbours
have pushed the Taliban to form a government that reflects the country’s ethnic
diversity: they fear the lack of inclusion could stir unrest with these ethnic-based
armed groups that might, in theory, spill across borders.51
Of course, most regional engagement with the Taliban on security issues does not
involve pushing for an overhaul of government; day to day, diplomats are making
requests for Taliban action against particular bands of gunmen. These entreaties
sometimes get results: the acting defence minister personally answered a call from a
neighbouring country to disband a militant group in a border province.52 The Taliban
are unwilling to eliminate these groups, however, eliciting frustration and bewilder-
ment from the region.53 For example, in this instance, the Taliban, instead of impris-
oning the jihadists, reportedly split the 75 fighters into three contingents, relocating
each to a separate location on the other side of the country. Allegedly, the Taliban inte-
grated some of these militants into the security forces to keep a close eye on them
and provide them with a source of income.54
Such gambits are risky. The Taliban actively seek diplomatic relations with re-
gional countries, while harbouring groups that want to overthrow the same govern-
ments. As a regional diplomat put it: “Afghanistan continues to remain a safe haven
for terror groups; now, it is just not as blatant as in the 1990s”.55 The risks are even
greater when all sides are not forthright about security concerns. The most notorious
case of Taliban secrecy involved al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose death
in a Kabul house controlled by the acting interior minister raised questions among
neighbours about whether the Taliban could be trusted. After U.S. forces killed Zawa-
hiri, the region grew more vigilant about the Taliban providing other militants with
safe havens – even accusing them of giving foreign fighters Afghan residency and
citizenship documents.56 Prompted by this newfound distrust, a number of regional
actors issued warnings that likely exaggerated the number of foreign fighters in
Afghanistan.57

50
“Report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban”, UNSC
S/2022/419, 26 May 2022.
51
For example, China has called for an “open and inclusive political structure” in Kabul. “China’s
Position on the Afghan Issue”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 12
April 2023. No regional diplomat has admitted to tension between calls for pluralism in Afghani-
stan and the scarcity of such political diversity in their own countries.
52
Crisis Group interview, regional official, August 2023.
53
A Taliban crackdown on the smaller groups discussed in this section is likely only if a group joins
hands with anti-Taliban movements or carries out attacks outside the country. Otherwise, the Tali-
ban often treat foreign militants as political refugees. Crisis Group Report, Afghanistan’s Security
Challenges under the Taliban, op. cit.
54
Crisis Group interview, regional official, August 2023.
55
Crisis Group interview, regional diplomat, October 2022.
56
“Taliban issues 3,000 passports to terrorists, says Tajik interior minister”, Afghanistan Interna-
tional, 19 October 2022.
57
For example, in January 2022, Tajikistan’s president stated that nearly 6,000 foreign militants
were located near the country’s Afghan border. Such figures do not accord with Western estimates.
See “Over 6,000 militants located near CSTO southern border – president of Tajikistan”, TASS, 10
January 2022.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 13

Despite their neighbours’ misgivings, the Taliban seem determined to experiment

with their own way of controlling militant groups: weakening them, relocating their
fighters and curbing their independence. As a rule, Kabul seeks to integrate jihadists
into civilian life rather than cracking down on them or extraditing them.58 At the
same time, the mistrustful region is exploring ways to fortify its rugged borders with
Afghanistan to avoid infiltration. Tajikistan, in particular, has been lobbying nearby
states to create a “security belt” around the country, strengthening patrols along the
frontier.59 China, which feels confident about having secured its own short border
with Afghanistan, is also assisting Dushanbe to guard against militants crossing into
China via Tajikistan.60

C. Militants in Eastern Afghanistan

While militants in northern Afghanistan are mostly a dormant threat to neighbour-
ing countries, more serious transnational risks have emerged in the country’s east.
New Delhi is concerned about the alleged continued presence in Afghanistan of Las-
khar-e Tayyiba and Jaish-e Muhammad, two pan-Islamist groups that have conducted
attacks on Indian soil for decades.61
Islamabad, for its part, has reason to worry about the TTP, an umbrella group of
tribal factions also known as the Pakistani Taliban, which has gained strength under
the tenure of its current chief, Noor Wali Mehsud, intensifying its attacks within Paki-
stan.62 The TTP was already becoming more aggressive before 2021, but the Taliban’s
takeover appears to have emboldened the group. Jailbreaks during the Taliban’s
sweep to power set free many TTP prisoners, allowing fighters to leave Afghanistan
and resume their war to topple the Pakistani state.63 Since then, the group has con-
ducted a series of spectacular attacks in Pakistan, whose security forces struggle to
seal the porous border.64 In response, Islamabad, which claims that the TTP oper-
ates from Afghan soil, has pushed hard for Kabul to crack down on the group – but

58
The Taliban believe that many of these smaller groups pose no transnational threat and that
ex-militants should be allowed to enjoy civilian lives. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials,
2021-2023.
59
Umed Khakimov, “Why is a security belt around Afghanistan needed?”, Central Asian Bureau for
Analytical Reporting, 18 January 2022.
60
Crisis Group interviews, India and Pakistan experts, New Delhi, Islamabad, Peshawar and Wash-
ington, March and April 2023.
61
“Report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban”, May 2023.
62
Crisis Group interviews, India and Pakistan experts, New Delhi, Islamabad, Peshawar and Wash-
ington, March and April 2023. Since July 2020, nearly 31 separate militant groups have merged
with or joined the TTP. See tweet by Abdul Sayed, @abdsayedd, 11:16am, 8 May 2023. See also Ab-
dul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan after the Taliban’s Afghanistan
Takeover”, CTC Sentinel, vol. 16, no. 5 (2023).
63
Samina Ahmed, “The Pakistani Taliban Test Ties between Islamabad and Kabul”, Crisis Group
Commentary, 29 March 2023.
64
“The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border”, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 March 2009; and
Ben Farmer and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “Pakistan builds border fence, limiting militants and
families alike”, The New York Times, 15 March 2020.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 14

with little success as the Taliban, at least publicly, deny the TTP’s very presence in
Afghanistan.
Islamabad has tried several tactics: pausing diplomatic efforts to advocate for
international engagement with the Taliban; accusing Kabul of violating the 2020
agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban, which included counter-terrorism pro-
visions; temporarily closing border crossings; and seeking to complete fences and
other barriers along a border that the Taliban, like earlier Afghan governments, do
not recognise.65 Faced with the Taliban’s refusal of repeated requests for action
against the TTP, Pakistan even conducted air and artillery strikes inside Afghani-
stan, which along with Pakistani Taliban commanders also allegedly killed dozens of
civilians.66 More recently, Islamabad has resorted to drastic measures that fall short
of military action. In October 2023, Islamabad started mass repatriation of Afghan
refugees and asylum seekers, also introducing restrictions on transit goods bound
for Afghanistan.67 None of these methods have delivered results, however, and the
Taliban’s unwillingness to crack down on the TTP could further strain relations
between the neighbours.

Figure 3. Fatalities Associated with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan,

2018 to 2024

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Crisis Group calculations.
These monthly totals include all violence involving TTP and its sub-groups as primary or associated actors
in Pakistan from 1 January 2018 to 1 January 2024.

65
The Taliban have actively opposed Pakistan’s efforts to complete fencing on the porous border.
Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan vows to continue fencing Afghan border, downplays Taliban disruptive acts”,
Voice of America, 3 January 2022. On the disputed nature of the Durand border, see Ahmad-
Waleed Kakar, “The Durand Line: Beyond Nationalist Fables”, Afghan Eye, 28 March 2021.
66
Abubakar Siddique, “Pakistan’s deadly air strikes inside Afghanistan increase tensions with Tali-
ban”, RFE/RL, 21 April 2022. See also “At least 47 dead in Afghanistan after Pakistan attacks: Offi-
cials”, Al Jazeera English, 17 April 2022.
67
Ibraheem Bahiss, “Pakistan’s Mass Deportation of Afghans Poses Risks to Regional Stability”,
Crisis Group Commentary, 13 November 2023.
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Indeed, as with the northern groups, the Taliban have returned to their standard
playbook for reining in foreign militants. Even as they deny the TTP’s presence in
Afghanistan, they have quietly forbidden the group from carrying out external opera-
tions, removed its fighters from border regions, housed TTP groups in “refugee”
camps, separated fighters from their units and embedded them in Taliban units to
break the chain of command.68 The TTP is, however, much larger than the northern
militant groups, and the Taliban said their plan for curbing the group would involve
relocating “thousands” of people.69
The Taliban’s reluctance to clamp down on the TTP is partly motivated by reluc-
tance to act against a longstanding ideological ally.70 They may also feel their clout
with the TTP is limited, given that many of the group’s former members played a key
role in founding IS-KP, and if pushed, might defect to their enemies. So far, it remains
unclear to what extent the Taliban’s approach has moderated the TTP’s behaviour, if
at all. While some experts believe that Taliban pressure has induced the TTP to agree
to negotiations and stick to small-scale attacks on Pakistani troops, such claims are
difficult to verify.71 Whatever the case, one thing is certain: the Taliban are far from
satisfying Islamabad’s demands vis-à-vis the group.
The TTP has also sought to counter the Taliban’s pressures by rallying supporters
among the Pashtun tribes and clans in Afghan regions next to Pakistan. While
the group’s standing on the Pakistani side of the border has diminished in recent
months, as evidenced by mass demonstrations against its revived insurgency, the
group remains popular on the Afghan side, allowing it to continue to operate, while
exploiting differences between Islamabad and Kabul.72 The TTP also appears to
enjoy some local Taliban support.73 Grievances that lead Afghans to back the TTP
include Afghan refugees’ allegations of mistreatment by Pakistani security forces;
Kabul’s claims that Pakistan has annexed Afghan territory; and years of sporadic

68
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials in Kabul, Kandahar and Khost, March-November 2022;
TTP affiliates in Nangarhar and Kandahar, November 2023. See also Crisis Group Report, Afghani-
stan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, op. cit.
69
Ayaz Gul, “Taliban move to address Pakistan’s cross-border terror complaints”, Voice of America,
4 June 2023. Privately, however, Taliban officials intimate that they would require economic assis-
tance in undertaking such a massive relocation program, adding that so far, neither Pakistan nor
any other actor has been willing to provide such assistance.
70
Ahmed, “The Pakistani Taliban Test Ties between Islamabad and Kabul”, op. cit.
71
Crisis Group interviews, TTP experts in Kabul, Islamabad and Zurich, March-September 2023. It
is worth noting that with some exceptions, the TTP has claimed only smaller attacks on Pakistani
security forces, leaving other groups, such as Tehreek-e Jihad Pakistan, to take responsibility for
larger ones. This little-known group is believed to have links with the TTP. Some experts argue it
might be a TTP proxy created to ward off pressure from Islamabad and Kabul. See “Tehreek-e-
Jihad Pakistan: New militant group challenges Pak establishment”, Times of India, 5 November 2023.
72
Crisis Group Report, Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, op. cit. Pakistan es-
timates that up to 30,000 TTP fighters and family members reside in Afghanistan. See, for exam-
ple, “Parliamentary body to keep eye on talks with TTP”, Dawn, 6 July 2022.
73
Asfandyar Mir, Tamanna Salikuddin, and Andrew Watkins, “Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the
TTP?”, U.S. Institute of Peace, 14 February 2023. According to Western experts and Taliban offi-
cials, the de facto security forces have arrested “hundreds” of Afghans, including Taliban members,
whom they suspect of collaborating with the TTP. Crisis Group interviews, Kabul, October 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 16

cross-border shelling by the Pakistani army. Though Islamabad denies many of these
charges, anti-Pakistan sentiment, sometimes fuelled by Pashtun nationalism, is wide-
spread in the borderlands.74
For now, the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan poses the single deadliest threat em-
anating from the country. Islamabad has reacted by stepping up mass deportation
of Afghans and tightening trade restrictions, while also threatening to escalate cross-
border strikes unless Kabul takes immediate action.75 Friction between the neigh-
bours has broader ramifications, including for China, which has extensive economic
interests in Pakistan.76 Any further spread of violence into Pakistan might also erode
the fragile consensus among other regional states that, unlike in previous decades
of civil war, they will not pick sides among Afghan factions. After all, much of the
region’s political calculus in favour of working with the Taliban rests on the assump-
tion that the former insurgents can maintain stability. As a top diplomat put it:
“Should transnational [militancy] thrive, it would make the Taliban unacceptable to
the region”.77

D. Fears of “Contagion”
Besides fearing that militancy may spill across Afghan borders, the region also worries
that the Islamists’ success in overthrowing the U.S.-backed government in Afghani-
stan might inspire their own restive Islamists, heating up simmering insurgencies
in places such as the Indian-administered part of Jammu and Kashmir and Central
Asia’s Fergana Valley.
These “contagion” scenarios arise in part from recent history in other parts of the
world, such as Libya, where the 2011 uprising threw open stockpiles of weapons that
made their way into nearby countries.78 In 2021, Afghanistan looked like a similar
proliferation risk because the U.S. and its allies left behind military equipment worth
billions of dollars when they departed.79 In the confusion of the Taliban’s takeover,
fleeing Afghan government forces took numerous armaments into neighbouring
countries and smugglers brought other materiel into Pakistan.80 At the same time,
weapons fell into private hands inside Afghanistan as government stores were loot-

74
Some claim that Afghans, including Taliban members, might be joining the TTP. See Mir, Salik-
uddin and Watkins, “Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the TTP?”, op. cit.
75
“Khawaja Asif warns of striking terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan”, Dawn, 13 April 2023.
76
Some say the strain on Afghan-Pakistani relations is drawing a reluctant China into a mediation
role. Crisis Group interviews, Pakistan experts in Washington, May 2023. See also “Joint Statement
of the 5th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue”, press release, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 9 May 2023. On China’s economic interests in Paki-
stan, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°297, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and
Risks, 29 June 2018.
77
Crisis Group interview, regional diplomat in Kabul, September 2022.
78
Nicholas Marsh, “Brothers Came Back with Weapons: The Effects of Arms Proliferation from
Libya”, Prism, vol. 6, no. 4 (2017).
79
“Collapse of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors
That Led to Its Demise”, U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2022.
80
Crisis Group interviews, Afghanistan experts, April 2022.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 17

ed.81 The Taliban tried to address this problem by going door to door, collecting guns
for safekeeping in government depots, and they continue to raid hidden arms caches
across the country.82 These actions have slightly eased regional countries’ concerns,
even if not all Taliban local commanders followed rules for securing the weapons.83
Another export from Afghanistan would seem to be harder to control: revolution-
ary ideas. Diplomats from countries across the region express anxiety that the Tali-
ban’s triumph over a superpower will galvanise Islamists opposing their own govern-
ments. To some degree, the Taliban has allayed these concerns as well by expressing
little sympathy for Muslim rebellions in nearby countries. With rare exceptions, the
new authorities in Kabul have refrained from public comment on militant groups in
China, India and Central Asian states. Still, they are putting out propaganda in several
of the languages spoken in the region, and some of the policies they advertise – for
example, on battling corruption and respecting religious values – are troubling to
nearby governments that view such messages as implicit criticism of their own rule.84
So far, at least, the fears of contagion seem exaggerated. Except for Pakistan, places
in the region previously beset with Islamist militancy have witnessed lower levels of
violence since the Taliban takeover. From the start of 2018 to August 2021, Indian-
administered Jammu and Kashmir saw 44 fatalities in violent incidents on average
per month; since the Taliban returned to power, that number has fallen to 21 per
month.85 Central Asia’s Fergana Valley, where Uzbekistan has regularly put down
Islamist uprisings in previous decades, has remained almost entirely peaceful since
2021.86 These developments obviously have local explanations, and probably little,
if any, connection to Afghanistan, but the trend does indicate that the initial worries
about guns, fighters and jihadist ideology spilling across borders in the aftermath of
Taliban victory were overblown.

81
Ibid.
82
Crisis Group Report, Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, op. cit. See also Ash-
ley Jackson, Maiwand and Florian Weigand, “Taliban Arms Management Practices”, Small Arms
Survey, June 2023.
83
Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, Kabul, 2023. One positive indicator is the rising
prices for weapons in local markets, which point to a smaller number in circulation. Justine Fleisch-
ner, “Arms Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban Rule”, Small Arms Survey, July 2023.
84
Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, Kabul, 2023.
85
Crisis Group calculations based on fatalities in all incidents recorded by the Armed Conflict Loca-
tion & Event Data Project (ACLED), 1 January 2018-31 July 2023.
86
Ibid.
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IV. Economic Dynamics

A. New Impetus for Regional Trade and Connectivity

From the days of the Silk Routes, prosperity in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood has
depended on trade – with much of it passing through the country. In the last few
decades, warfare turned Afghanistan into a roadblock to regional development. Since
2021, however, stability under the Taliban has revived regional actors’ dreams of
trade corridors spanning South and Central Asia, giving new life to old plans for eas-
ing the flow of freight, gas and electricity.87 The Taliban and officials of neighbouring
governments express interest in such economic cooperation, all for their own reasons.
The region is trying to insulate itself from Western sanctions on Russia, Iran and Af-
ghanistan, as well as the prospect of further economic restrictions on China. Central
Asian countries, in particular, worry they will end up surrounded by pariah states and
cut off from global markets.88 For their part, Moscow and Beijing are keen to foster
the regional economy as a buffer against pressure from the West.89 The region wants
business with Kabul mostly for the sake of diversifying trade routes – while also, per-
haps, tempering the Taliban’s erratic tendencies with incentives for good behaviour.
Kabul’s motivations are stronger. After the Taliban took over, the West froze cen-
tral bank assets and cut aid that previously had covered 75 per cent of state spend-
ing, while offering only partial sanctions relief.90 Afghan GDP contracted by 21 per
cent in 2021.91 The Taliban scrambled to halt the economic freefall, focusing on self-
sufficiency and regional connectivity, not just as a way of paying the bills, but also
as a defensive measure: by holding out the prospect that stable rule in Afghanistan
would pay dividends in the form of economic opportunities, they made the former a
matter of self-interest for regional actors.92 Customs duties emerged as the biggest
source of revenue for the new regime, as it tackled widespread corruption and re-
moved predatory checkpoints that had proliferated during the war, hampering trade.93
The Taliban also invited foreign companies back to the country, but the few investors
willing to take the risk were mostly from the region: for instance, the largest mining
concessions to date have been awarded to local firms backed by Chinese, Iranian or
Turkish partners.94

87
Previous Afghan governments also sought to exploit the country’s location to connect regional
markets. See, for example, “Manifesto of Change and Continuity Team”, Ashraf Ghani campaign
publication, March 2014.
88
Crisis Group interviews, regional experts in Washington, April 2023.
89
Ibid.
90
Crisis Group Report, Beyond Emergency Relief: Averting Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Catas-
trophe, op. cit.
91
“Afghanistan Socioeconomic Outlook 2023”, UN Development Programme, 18 April 2023.
92
See, for example, “Speech by Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi at OIC For-
eign Ministers meeting in Islamabad 15/05/1443 Hijri Lunar – 19/12/2021”, Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 December 2021.
93
David Mansfield, “Changing the Rules of the Game: How the Taliban Regulated Cross-Border
Trade and Upended Afghanistan’s Political Economy”, XCEPT, 25 July 2022.
94
“The Taliban say they have signed mining contracts worth $6.5 billion in Afghanistan”, AP, 31
August 2023.
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A degree of economic stability returned, as Kabul’s revenues picked up, exports

grew, inflation fell, the currency recovered and the proportion of food-insecure house-
holds declined from 70 per cent in late 2021 to 59 per cent in early 2023.95 Still, mil-
lions of Afghans suffer extreme poverty at a time when Western donors, put off by
the Taliban’s discrimination against women, are turning away, resulting in billions
of dollars cut from humanitarian budgets for 2023.96 The Taliban had found ways
to pay hundreds of thousands of civil servants, but their burden grew in 2023 as
humanitarian agencies stopped covering salaries for some medical staff.97 Pressures
on the central bank, still deprived of its assets, are expected to mount in 2024 as aid
dwindles, clouding the macro-economic picture.98
The Taliban, who know they need economic growth to stay afloat, have pushed
for Afghanistan’s inclusion in regional development plans.99 Their main priority
appears to be constructing a trans-Afghan railway that would link Uzbekistan with
Pakistan, which could shorten delivery times by up to five days, thereby reducing
transport costs.100 It would also connect to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail sys-
tem, which started running trains into the Afghan border town of Hairatan in 2022.101
But no country involved appears to want to spend the billions of dollars required to
build the railway, and international development agencies backed away after the Tal-
iban takeover.102 Doubts persist about Kabul’s technical capacity to undertake such
an ambitious project.103 The deterioration of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations over the

95
“Afghanistan Economic Update”, World Bank, 14 June 2023.
96
Crisis Group’s mid-year calculations found that the UN received only 17 per cent of the funding
requested in its 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan, the lowest proportion for any
country except Honduras. Financial Tracking Service, UN Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs, August 2023.
97
Charlotte Greenfield, “Red Cross set to end funding at 25 hospitals in Afghanistan”, Reuters, 17
August 2023.
98
Crisis Group interviews, Western economists, July-August 2023.
99
Afghanistan previously aimed for inclusion in regional development schemes such as China’s Belt
and Road Initiative; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership;
the Ashgabat Agreement; the EU’s Global Gateway; the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment; and the International North-South Transport Corridor that links India, via Iran,
with Central Asia. The Taliban have continued seeking membership in these schemes, despite their
pariah status. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, 2022-2023.
100
Kabul also seeks to build a secondary railway from Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat, connecting Afghan-
istan’s fledgling network with Iran. For now, these plans appear to be postponed, possibly due to
lack of funds. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, 2023.
101
See tweet by Shen Shiwei, @shen_shewei, political and economic analyst, 10:55am, 26 Septem-
ber 2022.
102
Prior to the Taliban’s takeover, the World Bank had expressed interest in lending support, per-
haps with other international financial institutions. Abdul Hadi Mayar, “Trans-Afghan railway
line”, Daily Times, 3 December 2022.
103
Another challenge is reaching agreement on the route. Afghanistan and Uzbekistan want a rail-
way via the Torkham border crossing, but Pakistan reportedly pushed for the track to run via a cross-
ing farther south, at Kharlachi. See “Afghan Railway Authority: Pakistan has a proposal to change
the route of the Afghan-Transit project”, TOLO News, 3 June 2023 [Pashto].
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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TTP has dulled appetites as well. Similar concerns have delayed longstanding efforts
to link the region’s electricity and gas supply networks.104

B. Modest Investments, So Far

With mega-projects on hold, Kabul appears to be exploring more modest efforts. The
Ministry of Water and Energy has, for example, proposed small-scale projects for
energy generation, such as wind farms.105 Before investing in railways, the Taliban
are also spending their meagre development budget on improving the roads connect-
ing Afghanistan with its neighbours, upgrading infrastructure at border crossings
and regularising trade practices.106
Kabul has also been promoting regional investments in extractive industries, but
most of these projects remain at exploratory stages. For example, in September 2022,
an Iranian company signed an agreement for the extraction of lead and zinc in Ghor
province.107 In January 2023, Kabul inked a deal for development of the Amu Darya
oilfields with a Chinese company, Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas, which
later unveiled further investments in Afghanistan.108 Despite the grand announce-
ments, work has been slow getting started. The exceptions have been low-key pro-
jects such as Perozi Park, an industrial complex near Kabul, with construction co-
sponsored by Beijing. At the time of the ribbon-cutting ceremony, the area was still a
wasteland.109
For now, much of the investment by regional actors is extremely cautious at best,
and performative at worst, geared toward boosting relations with Kabul without
risking much capital.110 Investors may simply lack confidence in the Taliban’s ability
to manage the economy, but some have also had bad experiences in Afghanistan.
Missteps by Chinese entrepreneurs best illustrate the volatility of economic adven-
turism in the country since 2021. The departure of U.S. forces sparked a “gold rush”
among Chinese speculators, many of whom arrived from prospecting in Africa to

104
Kabul continues to push for completion of the Central Asia South Asia-1000 Project, which would
bring electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Turkmenistan-
Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan plan to connect Central Asian countries to an Afghani-
stan electrical grid that could re-export power to Pakistan; and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India gas pipeline. See, for example, “Ministry of Interior Affairs has shared the security
plan for TAPI project with Turkmenistan”, Bakhtar News Agency, 22 February 2022 [Dari].
105
See tweet by TOLO News, @TOLOnews, 2:32pm, 9 May 2023.
106
Most government revenue, about $2.4 billion in 2022, is spent on meeting the state payroll. The
amount left over for rebuilding, however, now goes further than under the previous government.
Construction costs have dropped by 35 to 50 per cent, because significantly less money is going
to cover security and bribes to officials. Crisis Group interview, construction firm owner, Istanbul,
November 2022.
107
“Report: Iran firm signs deal to develop Afghan lead, zinc mines”, Press TV, 28 September 2022.
108
“Chinese mining company to invest $350 million in Afghanistan”, Khaama News, 7 July 2023.
109
“Industrial park construction underway in Afghan province”, Xinhua, 12 May 2022.
110
Such diplomatic signals are well received by the Taliban and amplified in their propaganda. For
example, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar announced that foreign firms had “shown a
willingness to invest around $10 billion”. See tweet by Office of Deputy Prime Minister for Econom-
ic Affairs, @FDPM_AFG, 2:33pm, 28 February 2023.
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Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 21

seek precious metals, gems, rare earths and other mineral wealth.111 Some of these
entrepreneurs told Crisis Group that the early efforts faltered, with the would-be in-
vestors going home “after having discovered that this frontier market might be more
‘frontier’ than expected”.112 Some businessmen tried to bribe their way past Taliban
regulations and, allegedly, set up alcohol distilleries and prostitution rings, getting
themselves arrested.113
There appears to have been a misunderstanding between the Taliban and this
wave of entrepreneurs, with the former hoping for investments by Chinese state-
backed firms and instead getting small-time chancers. So far, bigger Chinese com-
panies seem content to purchase exploration rights to Afghan mines, even if they are
not developing them yet, perhaps as a means of seeking control of what is found
underground and influencing commodity prices.114

C. Tensions over Water

Water management has emerged as a point of contention between the new govern-
ment in Kabul and neighbouring states. Tensions over water had simmered for dec-
ades, but grew in recent years, to the point of reportedly triggering border clashes
with Iran. The most important reason is the impact of climate change: with 80 per
cent of its water coming from snowmelt and glaciers, Afghanistan is among the
countries most vulnerable to global warming.115 About 60 per cent of the country’s
households now suffer water shortages, while hotter winters and precipitous spring
seasons are respectively causing droughts and floods.116 Making things worse is the
fact that Afghanistan lags behind its neighbours in developing water infrastructure.
Meanwhile, other countries have built agricultural sectors that depend on an unhin-
dered supply of water from Afghanistan.
These factors drive the Taliban to seek ways of catching up, pursuing ambitious
water projects that are raising hackles in the region. Afghanistan is mostly upstream
from countries next door, which means they often view Afghan dams and irrigation
systems as threats.117 A complication is that among Afghanistan’s many transbound-
ary rivers, only one is subject to a water-sharing agreement. The rest are governed
only by international customary law, which calls for “equitable and reasonable” use

111
See, for example, “The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’”, video, Al Jazeera,
24 November 2022.
112
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul, October 2022.
113
Ibid. Foreign entrepreneurs who did not speak the local languages also depended on Afghan in-
terpreters, and some Chinese businessmen fell prey to their fraudulent schemes.
114
Crisis Group interview, business consultant involved in such talks, June 2023.
115
See, for example, “Afghanistan Water Resources Profile Overview”, USAID, 2 August 2021.
116
Tweet by OCHA Afghanistan, @OCHAAfg, 1:42pm, 14 May 2023. Crisis Group mapping of Af-
ghan regions affected by floods and droughts between January 1990 and October 2022 shows that
rainfall excesses and deficits have become more intense, affecting larger areas for longer periods of
time. Crisis Group Report, Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Deepen Afghanistan’s Crisis,
op. cit., Appendix A.
117
The previous Afghan government complained that upstream countries had built too many dams
and were not allowing water to flow into Afghanistan. Crisis Group interviews, current and former
Afghan officials, 2022-2023.
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of water, without clarifying what that phrase entails.118 The fact that previous Afghan
governments drummed up nationalist fervour for water projects, giving the issue
populist appeal, has not helped the Taliban in managing relations with their neigh-
bours. The Taliban have also seized upon water infrastructure not only for its practi-
cal value but also as a propaganda piece meant to portray their efficient governance,
filling their media outlets with footage shot from drones showing construction in
several provinces.119 Among these, works in two places – a canal in the north and a
dam in the south – are most contentious.

1. Concerns from Central Asia

In the north, the Taliban inaugurated the Qush Tepa Canal in March 2022, making
swift progress on what ranks as their largest infrastructure project.120 When finished,
the canal will divert water from the Amu Darya, a river that separates Afghanistan
from its Central Asian neighbours. The canal will traverse 285km of northern Afghani-
stan before reconnecting with the river, irrigating up to 550,000 hectares of farm-
land.121 Kabul funded the project from the national budget, at times awarding mining
rights to contractors in lieu of payment to spare the cash-strapped treasury.122 More
than 100 companies are reportedly involved, with over 7,000 workers.123 By October
2023, phase one of the project was complete and the second under way.124
The imminent prospect of the canal diverting part of the Amu Darya revived old
fears in the region: Crisis Group has been reporting about the potential for water
conflicts between Afghanistan and Central Asian states for over twenty years. 125
Afghanistan appears to be joining Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as upstream countries
that, struggling economically, are trying to keep more water even as neighbours
downstream – namely, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – need more for

118
Mohsen Nagheeby, “Anarchy and the Law of International Watercourses”, Northumbria Univer-
sity, 2021.
119
Former President Ashraf Ghani had also hoped that water infrastructure would “unite Afghans”,
transcending ethnic and geographical divisions, according to an ex-official in his government. Crisis
Group interview, 2023.
120
Besides Qush Tepa, the Taliban have been working on several projects that Ghani and his prede-
cessors championed, such as the Kajaki dam in Helmand province, the Kamal Khan dam in Nimroz
province and the Namak Aab canal in Takhar province. Work is also under way on the Toori dam in
Zabul province, while the Taliban cabinet has called for completion of the Shah wa Aroos dam on
the Kabul River. “Ministry of Water and Energy’s press conference on the gains of the past year”,
video, YouTube, 3 April 2023 [Pashto].
121
The canal will stretch across Balkh, Jawzjan and Faryab provinces. Crisis Group interviews,
Afghan and Western officials, Kabul, 2022-2023.
122
Crisis Group interview, Taliban officials, 2022-2023.
123
Crisis Group interview, water experts, Western and Taliban officials, June 2023.
124
The project is divided into three phases: the first entailed a 108km canal extending from Amu
Darya to Dawlatabad district in Balkh; the second involves a 177km extension from Dawlatabad to
Andkhoi district in Faryab via Jawzjan province; and the third will entail digging sub-canals to dis-
tribute water to agricultural lands. Crisis Group interviews, 2023.
125
See, for instance, Crisis Group Europe & Central Asia Report N°34, Central Asia: Water and
Conflict, 30 May 2002.
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their growing agricultural sectors.126 The five Central Asian countries already squab-
ble over water, despite a 1992 agreement among them on allocating it, to which
Afghanistan is not a party.127 Still, Kabul is bound by international law, including the
obligations to notify affected states of waterworks and to abide by a no-harm princi-
ple.128 Central Asian states say they were never informed, let alone consulted, about
the Taliban’s plans for the canal.129
Downstream countries want further discussion of the canal to find ways of miti-
gating its impact on transboundary water flows. In an attempt to reduce wastage
caused by the Taliban’s rudimentary construction methods, Uzbekistan has even
offered technical support for the project.130 But the Taliban are wary, arguing that
the project is in line with provisions in international customary law about “reasona-
ble and equitable” use of water and that previous Afghan governments, having been
planning the canal since the 1970s, already satisfied the notification requirement.
The Taliban sometimes view foreigners’ efforts to talk about the canal or offer assis-
tance as delaying tactics.131 Given how important the project has become to the Tali-
ban’s self-portrayal domestically, and the money involved, Kabul will not want to
adjust the schedule – even as delegations keep visiting from nearby countries to per-
suade them otherwise.132

2. Conflict with Iran

On the country’s southern borders, a similar conflict over water has often sparked
public accusations by both sides. Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Hel-
mand river, Afghanistan’s longest waterway, which drains about 40 percent of the
country and is critical for irrigation in its arid southern provinces. The main point
of contention is Kamal Khan dam, inaugurated in 2021 by the previous Afghan gov-
ernment. Downstream, the river is vital to the wellbeing of the volatile Iranian prov-
ince of Sistan-Baluchestan, where wetlands are drying up and scientists predict that

126
On previous tensions between upstream and downstream countries, see Crisis Group Europe &
Central Asia Report N°233, Water Pressures in Central Asia, 11 September 2014.
127
Aibek Zhupankhan, Kamshat Tussupova and Ronny Berndtsson, “Could Changing Power Rela-
tionships Lead to Better Water Sharing in Central Asia?”, Water, vol. 9, no. 2 (2017), p. 139.
128
Although Afghanistan is not party to an agreement governing the Amu Darya river, certain in-
ternational customary law principles are likely to apply, including the principle of equitable and
reasonable use, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the duty to cooperate and protect
ecological systems. See the UN Watercourses Convention, 1977.
129
Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could be significantly affected. A paper co-authored by
Afghanistan’s former water negotiator concluded: “A reduction in flow would threaten agriculture,
worsen water shortages, and risk aggravating the socio-economic and environmental situation in a
volatile region”. Mohd Faizee and Susanne Schmeier, “Charting Complex Currents: The Qush Tepa
Canal and Central Asia’s Water”, New Security Beat, 18 August 2023.
130
Crisis Group interviews, Western officials based in Kabul, July-August 2023.
131
Crisis Group interview, Taliban officials, June 2023.
132
Ibid. See also “Uzbekistan pursues mediation with Afghanistan over Qosh Tepa canal”, Eura-
sianet, 19 October 2023.
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planned Afghan dams could threaten 70 per cent of wheat production.133 Disagree-
ments over rights to the river may have contributed to deadly clashes between Tali-
ban and Iranian forces in May 2023, though both sides deny it played a role.134
Unlike the dispute with Afghanistan’s northern neighbours, the longstanding
tensions with Iran could ideally be mitigated by an existing deal on water sharing. A
1973 bilateral agreement stipulated that Tehran would be entitled to fixed amounts
of water, which were to be determined after construction of a hydrometric station
and three testing stations in Afghanistan.135 With the political upheavals both coun-
tries lived through in the following years, the deal was never ratified or put into prac-
tice.136 But it remains a point of reference, with both sides invoking its provisions
during their recent spats over water sharing.137
Mirroring their behaviour in other water disputes, the Taliban have signalled that
regional concerns will not slow down their infrastructure plans near the Iranian
frontier. Soon after the border clash, and even as bilateral talks continued about the
Helmand river in May 2023, senior Taliban officials announced fresh construction
on the Bakhshabad dam, located on the Farah Rud, another river flowing into Iran.
The fact that this dam was inaugurated in the middle of the diplomatic tussle over
the Helmand suggested that Kabul will keep building water infrastructure, even when
neighbours vehemently disagree.138
The Taliban’s high tolerance for conflict over water arises in part from their hopes
that hydroelectric projects could make Afghanistan, which currently imports 80 per

133
Hojjat Mianabadi, Simin Alioghli and Saeed Morid, “Quantitative Evaluation of ‘No-harm’ Rule
in International Transboundary Water Law in the Helmand River Basin”, Journal of Hydrology,
vol. 599, August 2021.
134
Ruchi Kumar, “On the Afghanistan-Iran border, climate change fuels a fight over water”, Sci-
ence, 4 August 2023. The May 2023 clash came at a time of heightened tensions between Tehran
and Kabul over the Helmand, leading observers to speculate that it was linked to the water dispute.
But both Iranian and Afghan officials told Crisis Group the border skirmish arose due to local fac-
tors and was not part of broader political tensions. Crisis Group interviews, regional experts, Kabul
and Tehran, August 2023.
135
“The Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty”, original text, archived by the International
Water Law Project, Texas A&M University School of Law. Although it is not covered in the agree-
ment, Afghan officials have claimed that the understanding with Iran also allowed Afghan traders
unrestricted access to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bander Abbas. Fatemeh Aman, “Issue Brief:
Water Dispute Escalating between Iran and Afghanistan”, Atlantic Council South Asia Center,
August 2016.
136
Aman, “Issue Brief: Water Dispute Escalating between Iran and Afghanistan”, op. cit. See also
Nilab Saeedi, “The Silent War: ‘Afghanistan and Iran Water Crisis’”, AHBVU Edebiyat Fakultesi
Dergisi, vol. 7 (2022).
137
See “Iran president says Islamic Emirate allowing experts to check water levels”, TOLO News, 29
August 2023. Also see tweet by Farouq Azam, senior adviser to the Ministry of Energy and Water,
@DrFarouqAzam, 8:09am, 13 May 2022.
138
Downstream neighbours are not without leverage. Afghanistan relies on electricity supplies from
Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and electricity shortages during severe winters have
made Kabul worried that neighbouring states could use electricity as a form of pressure in water
negotiations. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials in Kabul and Balkh, October 2022-March
2023. See also “Cold snap and electricity shortages slam Central Asia, Afghanistan”, The Diplomat,
2 February 2023.
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cent of its electricity, self-sufficient in energy. More urgently, Kabul also faces rising
demand for water from farmers, especially in the Taliban heartlands of southern
Afghanistan. The need for irrigation in those regions rose sharply in 2023, after the
Taliban banned opium cultivation and farmers switched to growing cotton and other
more water-intensive crops.139

139
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Kabul, 2022-2023.
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V. Better Regional Dialogue

The lack of trust between the Taliban and their neighbours is evident, and tensions
on some of Afghanistan’s borders appear to be growing. This wariness prompts
countries in the region to cherry-pick issues they want to engage on, focusing on mat-
ters of highest priority in their respective capitals. While such a pragmatic approach
is logical from a diplomatic standpoint, it misses opportunities for solving interrelated
sets of problems. For their part, the Taliban need to set aside concerns about falling
under foreign influence if they wish to achieve better collaboration with their neigh-
bours. Broad-based security cooperation could address regional states’ concerns about
militant groups inside Afghanistan, while also easing Taliban worries about insur-
gents getting help from outside the country. Similarly, better integration of regional
economic development plans could lead to forging shared economic interests, build-
ing incentives for cooperation instead of destructive rivalries.

A. Security Cooperation
The first step toward better regional security cooperation will be cooling down the
rhetoric on all sides and getting regional actors on the same page about security
issues, agreeing on a set of facts even if they have different priorities. Taliban forces
have got better at targeting IS-KP leaders, but information sharing remains limited,
since the Taliban have not built confidence with regional partners.140 Part of the
problem is that the Taliban lack credibility due to their blanket denials regarding
certain threats – particularly the TTP – while regional countries offer inflated esti-
mates of the number of militants allegedly based in Afghanistan. There is also a
schism between how the Taliban prefer to deal with many of the Islamist militant
groups inside Afghanistan and how the region would like Kabul to deal with them.
It does not help that UN monitoring teams, which used to visit Afghanistan to
provide independent assessments of terrorist threats, have not returned since 2021.
The UN accepts information only from member states, meaning that the Taliban can-
not assist the monitoring because they lack a UN seat. Member states should continue
to encourage the UN to send the monitors back to the country or at least to seek feed-
back from Afghan forces on militant groups, which would represent a step toward
refocusing global counter-terrorism institutions on transnational threats rather than
groups with local agendas like the Taliban.141

140
Some information sharing about security is happening: in August 2023, Pakistan praised the
Taliban for promptly informing Islamabad of the arrest of TTP members inside Afghanistan. Abdul-
lah Momand, “Afghan govt has arrested some perpetrators of terrorism in Pakistan: FM Jilani”,
Dawn, 31 August 2023.
141
UN Security Council Resolution 2716 (2023) includes a provision “encouraging the Monitoring
Team to visit Afghanistan and meet with relevant stakeholders”. UN officials say it is unclear, how-
ever, whether the team will be able to visit the country any time soon. Crisis Group interviews, New
York, January 2024. See also “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
(1988 Committee)”, UNSC S/RES/2716, 14 December 2023.
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Regional forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could also play
a greater role in addressing the plethora of emerging challenges at the regional level.142
In fact, there are conversations within the organisation about reactivating the Afghani-
stan contact group, first established in 2005, with a view to fostering a regional plat-
form for engagement with Kabul.143 Regardless of the format, regional players need to
discuss the legitimate security needs of all actors around the table. Simply comparing
notes might lead to tangible cooperation: some regional countries have expressed a
desire for greater information sharing – and, possibly, even training and equipping
Taliban forces – even if that remains controversial with their own populations.144
If regional security cooperation is to become a viable option, it must be based on
reciprocal transparency. While Afghanistan’s neighbours complain about the Tali-
ban’s lack of decisive action against groups that threaten their security, they them-
selves have only provided limited information in response to Kabul’s requests for
lists of the weapons and ammunition they received from fleeing members of the pre-
vious government’s armed forces.145 The Taliban also express frustration at getting
no answers from neighbours (especially Pakistan) to their queries about alleged sight-
ings of drones in Afghanistan’s airspace.146 Finally, the de facto authorities in Kabul
want to know how anti-Taliban fighters are slipping into the country, but they receive
little response from their neighbours.147
Such cooperation might be easiest, at first, along Afghanistan’s rugged borders,
where neighbouring countries seek to staunch the flows of migrants, drugs, guns and
jihadists coming from the country. Skirmishes on the frontiers fell off in the second
year of Taliban rule, but the persistence of such incidents point to the lack of cooper-
ation between Taliban patrols and their counterparts.148 Central Asian countries have

142
The Taliban want to join security talks at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Afghani-
stan has observer status. The organisation appears reluctant, so far; alternatives might be China’s
Global Security Initiative or ad hoc dialogue tracks such as the meetings hosted in recent years by
Uzbekistan. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, 2022-23.
143
The contact group was revitalised in 2015, when Beijing sought to use it to address questions
about how Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbours might change when U.S. and other foreign
troops eventually withdrew. See “Afghanistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, The
Diplomat, 14 July 2021.
144
In late 2022, Iran called for forming a security commission consisting of Afghanistan and the
regional countries to facilitate greater cooperation with Kabul, including information sharing, train-
ing and provision of equipment. See “Tehran has proposed a regional cooperation commission for
security collaboration with Kabul”, video, YouTube, 22 November 2022 [Pashto].
145
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Kabul, 2022-2023. Except for Iran, regional states have
so far been reluctant to give back the weaponry and aircraft abandoned by forces from the previous
government when they fled across borders in 2021. “Annual Report of the Foreign Ministry”, op. cit.
146
“Taliban accuses Pakistan of allowing US drones in Afghan airspace”, Al Jazeera, 28 August 2022.
147
The Taliban worry that Afghan embassies, controlled by former Afghan officials, are giving busi-
ness visas to anti-Taliban resistance figures. Senior Taliban members have also expressed concern
that IS-KP funnels recruits into the country using illegal migration routes, including from Türkiye
via Iran. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Kabul and regional capitals, 2022-2023.
148
Crisis Group analysis of ACLED data for Afghanistan suggests that from August 2021 to August
2022, there were at least 67 incidents involving the armed forces of neighbouring countries; in the
subsequent twelve-month period the number declined to 40. The number of deaths arising from
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placed restrictions on some border crossings, allowing only representatives of local

businesses to pass, which improves security but hurts trade. Another major problem
is that the Taliban do not recognise the Durand Line as an official border, and have,
at times, sent troops to impede Pakistan’s fencing of the boundary.149 Given that all
past Afghan governments have refused to recognise this border, inherited from colo-
nial times, it is hard to imagine the Taliban doing so, but that should not prevent
them from cooperating on practical steps that improve security for both Afghanistan
and the neighbourhood.
At best, the Taliban would accept help with the professionalisation of Afghan bor-
der guards, and all neighbours would agree on installing new technology at border
crossings. Given the need to build trust, a starting point might be for Kabul to satisfy
the neighbours’ requests to keep Taliban fighters away from their borders unless
they belong to the uniformed Afghan border units. If the region wants the Taliban to
improve the professionalism and efficiency of their security forces, however, they
could support it in doing so. While they may understandably feel uncomfortable
handing over military equipment abandoned on their territory by the armed forces
of the previous Afghan government, countries across the region could also benefit
from supplying equipment for border screening and customs integration. Neigh-
bouring states welcomed Tajikistan’s proposal for establishing a “security belt” around
Afghanistan in early 2023.150 This “belt”, which aims to provide a buffer against mili-
tants operating from inside Afghanistan, could also be extended to address the Tali-
ban’s concerns about infiltration across the border in the other direction.151
Of all the risks that threaten to spill over into the region, the TTP is the deadliest.
Kabul should constrain the TTP by curtailing the group’s capacity to recruit, train
and raise funds on Afghan soil. Stronger action by the Taliban, including jailing indi-
viduals assisting the TTP in attacks on Pakistani targets or putting TTP leaders in
Afghanistan under house arrest, would allow Pakistani forces to counter cross-border
threats more effectively. But Islamabad will also have to address the root causes of
the militancy in Pakistan itself if counter-insurgency operations are to stand a chance
of success.152

these incidents also declined, after a spike in early 2022 when Pakistan conducted airstrikes on
suspected TTP militants in Afghanistan.
149
“DG ISKP press conference”, video, YouTube, 5 January 2022. Some experts on the narcotics
trade say Pakistan does not want to close all the gaps in the fence, because Pakistani officials (along
with the Taliban) allegedly profit from drug smuggling. Crisis Group interviews, 2023.
150
“Samarkand Declaration of the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighbour-
ing States”, press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 14 April 2023.
151
Such cooperation would expand on the meetings that have already occurred between Kabul and
Tashkent on mechanisms for resolving border issues at a technical level. “The Foreign Ministry’s
annual report”, video, YouTube, 7 September 2022 [Pashto].
152
In five months of TTP talks, after a Pakistani parliamentary committee formally approved nego-
tiations in early July 2022 until the discussions fell apart late that November, TTP-related incidents
caused 96 fatalities in Pakistan – lower than similar five-month periods before (185 fatalities) and
after (358 fatalities). Crisis Group analysis of ACLED data.
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B. Economic Integration

The Taliban takeover has resulted in widespread poverty, from which the only escape
is economic development that surpasses the high rate of population growth and over-
comes hurdles such as insecurity and climate change.153 Many neighbouring coun-
tries also need strong growth to keep up with swelling labour forces.154 Against this
backdrop, the case for better regional economic connectivity is overwhelming, espe-
cially in the energy sector, where Central Asian countries are in search of new mar-
kets while South Asia needs new supplies of oil, gas and electricity.155 Government
planners across the region have been drafting schemes for such integration for dec-
ades, but now that Afghanistan is finally peaceful, allowing for their rollout, the Tali-
ban have made themselves into global pariahs.
Investments in the frontier market are no doubt risky, as the bruising experience
of Chinese investors has shown, but the region has strategic reasons to encourage
ventures in Afghanistan as part of long-term planning for economic integration,
which in turn would help with regional stability. The Taliban are frustrated that
regional partners are slow to move ahead with projects such as railways, mines, elec-
tricity lines and trade corridors, and while some of the blame falls on the Taliban (see
below), the region as a whole would clearly benefit from more alacrity with bringing
Afghanistan into its development plans. China and Pakistan have already expressed
support for including Afghanistan in the Belt and Road Initiative.156 More such ef-
forts are needed, however, to fully integrate Afghanistan into the regional economic
infrastructure and insulate it from potential breakdowns in bilateral relations.157
That said, development plans require a reliable partner in Kabul, and the Taliban
have not yet shown they are fully open for business. They have succeeded in tamping
down violence across the country and have, for now, quelled the minor insurgencies
against them. Corruption levels plunged after they took over and have remained much

153
The UN declared the Afghan poverty crisis the world’s largest humanitarian emergency in 2022
and 2023, although a mid-year revision of the humanitarian response plans made Afghanistan’s
smaller, ranking second in the world after Syria. “Afghanistan still a grave humanitarian crisis, sen-
ior aid official says”, UN, 28 February 2023.
154
Afghanistan needs about half a million new jobs annually to keep pace with population growth
rate (2.5 per cent), which surpasses the rates in Tajikistan (2.1), Uzbekistan (2.1), Pakistan (1.9),
Turkmenistan (1.4) and Iran (0.7). World Bank data, 2022.
155
“Tashkent meeting analysis: Central Asia wants path to South Asia”, TOLO News, 31 July 2022;
and “Can India ‘connect’ with Central Asia?”, The Diplomat, 30 November 2017.
156
“Joint Statement of the 5th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue”, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 9 May 2023.
157
The previous Afghan government turned away from trade with Pakistan and focused on growing
commerce with Iran. That trend was reversed under the Taliban, but the new government wants to
diversify its economic relationships for the sake of avoiding dependence on any foreign power. Ten-
sions with Islamabad have also prompted Kabul to seek alternatives to the Pakistani port of Kara-
chi, redirecting trade through Iran’s Chabahar airport and looking into direct shipments to China.
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban officials, Kabul, 2022-2023. See also “Islamic Emirate: Efforts un-
derway to create new crossing with Turkmenistan”, TOLO News, 22 September 2023; “Taliban
minister asks for China’s help to open Wakhan corridor”, Kabul Now, 28 November 2022; and
tweet by RTA English, @rtaenglish1, 8:07pm, 17 September 2023.
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lower than under the previous government.158 While it may not be evident to much
of the world, their government has shown a degree of administrative authority that
is on par with that of most regional countries, with Taliban decisions enforced – for
good and ill – in every Afghan province.
Yet the Taliban’s internal dynamics, with centres of power in Kabul and Kanda-
har vying for influence, as well as their opaque and, often, erratic policies, continue
to give external actors cause for concern. Their government’s discrimination against
women has tarred the Taliban’s name around the world, and some firms will steer
away from the ethical and reputational risks of business with the regime. State reve-
nues seem healthy, but no outsider can feel certain that the fiscal situation is solid
because the government does not publish detailed budgets. The nature of opportuni-
ties also remains a matter of speculation: Afghanistan’s natural resources, for exam-
ple, have never been properly mapped.159 Nor do the Taliban have the regulatory
frameworks needed for large investments. They need to give investors greater pre-
dictability, including by ensuring clarity over applicable laws and establishing mech-
anisms for arbitration of commercial disputes.160
For the sake of regional stability, economic integration must make progress most
urgently on water issues. Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan cannot afford to let
their rivers dry up, but landlocked Afghanistan also cannot grow if water disputes
interrupt trade, including its access to ports such as Iran’s Chabahar. The basis of
an agreement between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand river may exist in the
1973 treaty: as discussed earlier, the two sides never established the hydrometric sta-
tion and testing stations imagined as part of the agreement to determine river levels.
Provided the two countries can pull together the required budget, building this infra-
structure could reduce tensions between them and would offer agricultural returns
on the investment for both. Similar collaboration may be feasible on the northern
border where, as mentioned, Uzbekistan is offering technical support for the Qush
Tepa canal. The Taliban have resisted what they see as foreign meddling in their
flagship project but would have a lot to gain by allowing international expertise into
the process. Including such support as part of a broader package of economic ties
could bring them to compromise.161
Beyond the cases of Iran and Uzbekistan, some kind of wider agreement, or at
least a tacit understanding, will be necessary to move ahead on regional cooperation.
Afghanistan is not party to water-sharing treaties with Central Asian states, and a
concern for many of them might be whether they can conclude binding international

158
Crisis Group interviews, Afghan business owners and Western analysts, 2023.
159
For example, claims based on Soviet-era estimates that the country has $1 trillion worth of min-
erals may be exaggerated. Frik Els, “How Afghanistan’s $1 trillion mining wealth sold the war”,
Mining, 27 August 2021.
160
According to interlocutors involved in economic discussions with the Taliban, government dele-
gations often lack technical knowledge, especially in specialised fields such as mining. This defi-
ciency does not inspire confidence, especially as the Taliban are conducting a review of laws and
regulations enacted by the former government. Crisis Group interviews, Dubai, Istanbul and Kabul,
2022-2023.
161
For example, Taliban and Uzbek delegations have discussed ways of increasing trade across bor-
ders. “Uzbekistan delegation visits Afghanistan to strengthen ties”, Salam Watandar, 28 August 2023.
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agreements with the de facto authorities without bestowing recognition on their gov-
ernment. Yet many seem to believe that important issues could be addressed without
first having decided the issue of recognition. The Taliban and their neighbours thus
have an opportunity to reach broad agreements, perhaps in multilateral discussions,
on watershed management and climate adaptation. In that regard, the Taliban should
be allowed to join the Conference of the Parties climate summits, or similar interna-
tional events, to discuss not only what to build but also how to finance it. Afghanistan
is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, but its access to climate
financing – the Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund and Adaptation
Fund – has been suspended since the Taliban takeover.162
Whatever gets achieved in international forums, be it on climate funding or other
issues, it will almost certainly be less than the Taliban expect. Hundreds of billions
of dollars flooded Afghanistan when Western donors considered it the main front in
the war on terrorism, leading to outlandish ideas among Afghans about how much
foreigners are willing to spend in their country. Recent efforts at economic projects
have reportedly broken down because Kabul’s new bosses had unreasonable expec-
tations. A regional diplomat sardonically accused the Taliban of employing a strategy
that he called “pul bakhshish”, or “money gifts”, meaning that Kabul seeks more and
more concessions as it negotiates an agreement, eventually making the deal a bur-
den on the other party. Too often, Kabul expects support that matches the grants
given the U.S.-backed government when it was battling the Taliban. In other words,
besides the technical hurdles in attracting foreign investments – mapping resources
and establishing legal frameworks – the Taliban also require more exposure to the
workings of global markets.163

C. Western Support or Acquiescence

Diplomats from the region are trying to address security and economic issues through
cautious engagement with the Taliban, but an official at a tiny embassy in Kabul ad-
mitted that the “to do” list feels daunting, as regional aspirations are often stymied by
wider constraints. Only a handful of Western diplomats remain in the Afghan capi-
tal, and much of the day-to-day work with the Taliban falls to regional actors with
budgets that do not match the size of the problems. Western sanctions have been
eased by U.S. exemptions, but many sanctions remain in force, and, in any case, it is
hard to get loans for infrastructure in an impoverished, pariah state.164 Many issues

162
Crisis Group interviews, regional and Western officials, 2023. See, for example, Graeme Smith
and Ulrich Eberle, “Why the Taliban Should Be Brought in from the Cold for Climate Talks”, Crisis
Group Commentary, 24 November 2023.
163
Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, Kabul, Istanbul and Dubai, 2022-2023.
164
The U.S. Treasury Department issued sanctions carveouts, or “general licenses”, in 2022 that
should allow ordinary commerce with Afghanistan despite sanctions against Taliban figures. The
chilling effect of U.S. sanctions remains, however, and several U.S. allies have not followed Treasury’s
lead. In Canada, for example, aid organisations and private businesses that work with Afghanistan
still face hurdles from anti-terrorism laws. Ali Latifi, “How a law change could soon allow Canadian
aid to return to Afghanistan”, The New Humanitarian, 4 April 2023. See also Erica Moret, “Barri-
ers to Afghanistan’s critical private-sector recovery”, Norwegian Refugee Council, March 2023.
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facing Afghanistan are development challenges, but Western donors have cut off
development assistance and offer only fast-shrinking humanitarian aid. “If your en-
gagement is mostly based on humanitarian assistance, and that assistance is declin-
ing, then your engagement strategy is really a disengagement strategy”, as a Western
official in Kabul summed it up.165
Policymakers in the countries that battled the Taliban in previous years might see
this state of affairs as painful but necessary to achieve a range of desired outcomes.
There are more than a few Western leaders who would prefer to forget Afghanistan;
for some of them, shunning the country allows them to avoid the topic of a lost war.
Prominent voices are calling for pressure on the Taliban, and even active support for
anti-Taliban forces, hoping for regime change, but the Taliban show no sign of col-
lapse and subjecting Afghans to more years of war seems particularly cruel.166 Others
may hope that undermining the regime will leave a mess on the doorsteps of China,
Russia and Iran, which some might see as a geopolitical win.167 Still others, including
Western diplomats who want to negotiate a better future for ordinary Afghans –
women and girls, especially – may believe that their leverage with the Taliban is higher
if they hold back security and economic support, using the promise thereof to get
concessions in future negotiations over recognition.
How best to make progress on human rights requires careful consideration and
will almost certainly entail trade-offs, but Afghanistan’s security and economic chal-
lenges cannot be ignored in the meantime – not least because the people who suffer
the most from instability and deprivation are usually women and girls.168 Two years
after the Taliban returned to power, it is worth giving weight to the concerns of re-
gional countries that spend the most time talking to the new leadership in Kabul and
have the most at stake. The countries surrounding Afghanistan are warning that the
world cannot afford to have a failed state in the region and that isolation would only
make the Taliban more intransigent. They need international backing for the modest
steps required to live next door to such a challenging neighbour.
Those needs will vary according to countries and projects, but in many ways
Western countries remain gatekeepers, whether for attaining voting rights at the
World Bank board or granting exemptions from sanctions and export controls to send
equipment for Taliban border guards. Progress will be impossible in many cases with-
out Western support or, at least, acquiescence. For example, regional airlines want
to resume flights to Kabul but have not done so because the radar system at the air-
port is deemed unsafe. Regional diplomats complain that new equipment has been
purchased but remains stuck in Europe due to sanctions. 169 Another chokepoint
is Western banking regulations: regional banks want to facilitate transactions with

165
Crisis Group interview, Western official based in Kabul, August 2023.
166
See, for example, “US congressional leader interested in dialogue with Taliban’s opposition”,
Afghanistan International, 12 January 2024; and “Afghan women call for global action against Tal-
iban’s gender policies”, Kabul Now, 13 December 2023.
167
Crisis Group interviews, Western experts, Washington, London and Kabul, June-July 2023.
168
Crisis Group Report, Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Deepen Afghanistan’s Crisis, op. cit.
169
Similar issues blocked the export of Afghan currency printed in Europe, requiring the personal
intervention of senior U.S. officials to get the banknotes delivered. Crisis Group interviews, Western
and regional officials, Kabul, June 2023.
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Afghanistan, but U.S. banks often forbid them from doing so.170 Western donors dis-
cussing development policy options for Afghanistan should also involve governments
from the region in their deliberations – even if regional actors are not donors them-
selves, decisions made in such meetings can bear directly on their economic wellbe-
ing as well.171
Some solutions will need to move ahead without any, or much, Western funding.
It is, for example, hard to imagine international donors paying for large-scale water
infrastructure on the Helmand river to assist the outcast regimes in Kabul and Teh-
ran. But it would not cost international agencies much to offer technical assistance
for better management of shared waters. For the moment, Afghanistan and Iran pre-
fer to talk about their dispute bilaterally, but their 1973 agreement allows them to
“use the good offices of a third party” and contains additional protocols for arbitra-
tion of disputes.172 It might be desirable to involve the World Bank or a similar insti-
tution that could offer expertise and, possibly, help with small-scale funding to map
and monitor water flows.173 Similar technical assistance could aid Afghanistan in
better regulating migrant labour, offering skills certification for Afghans seeking work
in the Gulf and elsewhere. Solutions proposed for the Afghan banking sector might
also require only a few experts and a green light from the U.S. government, rather
than a major investment.174
The UN Security Council received a blueprint for moving ahead with such ideas
in mid-November 2023, when Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu concluded his
much-anticipated review of international efforts in Afghanistan. Among other pro-
posals, Sinirlioğlu called for greater international support for security cooperation
with the Taliban-controlled government, including provision of assistance related to
addressing “key security and regional stability issues” such as terrorism and border
controls. On economic matters, Sinirlioğlu’s report called for expanding international
cooperation in the fields of climate adaptation and transboundary natural resource
management; completion of near-finished infrastructure projects abandoned in 2021;
and measures to promote transit, trade, and connectivity between Afghans with the
world. The Council should adopt these and other recommendations from the Sinir-
lioğlu report as part of its mandate to maintain international peace and security.175

170
Crisis Group interviews, banking executives, Kabul, Dubai and Istanbul, 2022-2023.
171
Arguably the most important such forum is the Afghanistan Coordination Group, which includes
the biggest donors as well as the UN, European Union, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Develop-
ment Bank and World Bank. The Group has considered taking actions requested by regional actors
– for example, helping with completion of infrastructure projects abandoned in 2021 – but faced
resistance from Western member states. Crisis Group interviews, Western officials, 2022-2023.
172
“The Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty”, op. cit.
173
Crisis Group interviews, experts, Tashkent and Tehran, August 2023.
174
For example, a solution proposed for the Afghan banking sector involves U.S. permission for
frozen assets to be made available to a regional bank, in order to facilitate correspondent banking
relationships with Afghanistan. U.S. officials say the White House is unlikely to endorse any plan
for unfreezing the assets, especially before the 2024 presidential election, because of domestic poli-
tics. Crisis Group interviews, Washington, June 2023.
175
António Guterres, “Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council”, 8 November 2023.
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More fundamentally, Western countries must decide whether the Taliban are a
threat to be contained or unavoidable (if frustrating and, in their gender policies,
odious) interlocutors on regional stability and development. Some Western intelli-
gence officials want more cooperation with the Taliban on counter-terrorism, but
others among their colleagues still talk privately about backing anti-Taliban rebels.176
This policy schizophrenia has persisted for too long. Regional states do not need the
West’s blessing to engage with the Taliban on matters of national security or eco-
nomic integration, but getting it would, in many instances, simplify their efforts in
that regard.

176
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul, London, Washington and Brussels, 2022-2023.
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VI. Conclusion

A Taliban regime that respects human rights might be welcomed into the club of
nations, someday. But that will not happen in the foreseeable future, if ever, which
means that Afghanistan is likely to be ruled by an unrecognised pariah regime for
years to come. Its people should not be held hostage to this reality. For the sake of
destitute millions both in Afghanistan and across the region, efforts must continue
to make the world’s relationship with Kabul more functional, even if on a piecemeal
basis. Afghanistan and its neighbours have urgent needs – among them, security and
economic recovery – that cannot be placed on hold.
With Western influence in Afghanistan fading, most of the responsibility for im-
proving regional cooperation falls on the shoulders of the country’s neighbours and
the Taliban themselves. They must clear a path for greater flows of goods across
borders and work together to keep one another safe. All sides know from history the
nightmarish consequences of failure. While Western countries are unlikely to be en-
thusiastic about such cooperation on account of the Taliban’s attacks on women’s
rights, they should at the very least refrain from blocking practical steps to do such
things as improve trade and counter militants, which will lessen poverty among the
Afghan people – including women – in the long term.
Kabul/Brussels, 30 January 2024
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Appendix A: Map of Afghanistan’s Diplomatic Presence in the Region

Source: Crisis Group research as of January 2024.

* Diplomatic missions in which representation is internally contested between Taliban appointees and diplomats
posted by the former government.
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Appendix B: Country Profiles

The countries surrounding Afghanistan have pursued a variety of policies toward the
Taliban authorities since 2021. This report covers “the region” as a whole. The fol-
lowing appendix provides an overview of individual countries’ approaches.

PAKISTAN
Pakistan suffered the most from aftershocks of the Taliban victory in 2021, much to
the surprise of Islamabad. As a Taliban sponsor since the movement’s birth in the
1990s, Pakistan celebrated its partner’s success: then-Prime Minister Imran Khan
said the insurgents had “broken the shackles of slavery”.177 His ebullience was partly
justified by the peace dividends that followed: trade between the neighbours grew,
driven mostly by Pakistan’s coal imports.178 In 2021, Pakistan became the country
with the most interactions with Kabul and made the strongest calls for international
engagement with the new authorities.179 But rising TTP attacks began straining ties
between the neighbours in late 2022.180 Kabul’s unwillingness or inability to curb the
TTP drove perceptions in Islamabad that the Taliban were growing harder to influ-
ence now that they were in power.181 Still, Pakistan seems likely to continue working
with the Taliban, as both countries struggle to revive their economies and manage
cross-border security threats.182

CHINA
In 2022, China replaced Pakistan as the country holding the most diplomatic meet-
ings with the Taliban and, the following November, it became the first country to ac-
credit a Taliban-appointed ambassador, raising concerns that it might be bestowing
informal recognition on the regime.183 Beijing has longstanding ties with the Taliban
and positions itself at the forefront of regional efforts to manage relations with the new
government.184 China is in the process of becoming Afghanistan’s second-largest

177
Stephanie Findlay, “A win for Pakistan: Imran Khan gambles on Taliban ties”, Financial Times,
30 September 2021.
178
Besides coal, Pakistan also imported large amounts of fruits and vegetables, while exporting phar-
maceutical, industrial and other products to Afghanistan. “Afghanistan Economic Monitor”, World
Bank, 24 February 2023. See also “Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan increases by 32%”, Ariana
News, 13 March 2023.
179
Crisis Group calculations, 2022-2023.
180
Ahmad, “The Pakistani Taliban Test Ties between Islamabad and Kabul”, op. cit.
181
As a Beijing-based interlocutor put it, Pakistan knows that “the closer the Taliban are to power
in Afghanistan, the less influence it has over the movement”. Crisis Group interview, China expert,
April 2023.
182
Islamabad claims that 700,000 Afghan migrants arrived in Pakistan in the two years since the
Taliban takeover, a rate that it views as “unsustainable”. Crisis Group interviews, Pakistani officials,
Kabul, 2022-2023.
183
“Afghan Taliban says China becomes first nation to accept its ambassador”, Voice of America,
1 December 2023.
184
Luke Encarnation and C. Christine Fair, “China and the Taliban: Past as Prologue?”, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 26 February 2023.
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trading partner, overtaking India but remaining behind Pakistan.185 At the same
time, China’s economic engagement has been cautious. Beijing’s concerns are mostly
related to security threats, especially from Uyghur militants who might cross into
China from Afghanistan or indirectly via Tajikistan.186 China has also been thrust in-
to a role as mediator between Pakistan and the Taliban, partly to protect its econom-
ic interests in Pakistan.187 Beijing seeks to limit its role in Afghanistan, fearing that
the country may become “its burden to carry”.188 All the same, China has offered de-
tailed thoughts about Afghanistan policy in an eleven-point strategy paper, the first
of its kind by a regional player. Among other points, the paper included ideas about
how to forge a common regional approach to Afghanistan.189

INDIA
During the first Taliban regime, India viewed the group as a militant Islamist force
supported by Pakistan and beholden to Islamabad. For this reason, New Delhi had
almost no contact with the Taliban and, alongside other regional states, supported
anti-Taliban resistance groups. The 1999 hijacking by Pakistani militants belonging
to Harakat-ul-Mujahideen of an Indian Airlines flight, however, highlighted the
importance of talking to Kabul, as most of the hostages survived due to negotiations
via the Taliban. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, New Delhi withdrew
its diplomats. But sensing the need for communication with the de facto authorities
and encouraged by tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, India began exploring
channels with the Taliban. India made formal contact with the de facto authorities
in late 2021 and sent emissaries back to Kabul in mid-2022 to be its “eyes and ears”
on the ground.190
Building on its minimal presence in Kabul, India continues to explore further
engagement, such as expanded humanitarian assistance and bilateral trade.191 This
outreach is slow, weighed down by decades of mutual distrust and India’s vocal anti-
Taliban constituencies. Still, India wants peace in the neighbourhood, not least
because it fears that instability will push militants into Kashmir. It finds itself in the

185
Chris Devonshire-Ellis and Farzid Ramezani Bonesh, “China to become Afghanistan’s second
largest trade partner in 2023”, Silk Road Briefing, 16 February 2023.
186
“The Taliban Takeover and Central Asian Security: What Will Russia and China Do?”, Davis
Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 30 September 2022.
187
China has invested tens of billions of dollars building Gwadar port and related infrastructure,
some of it located near Afghanistan. “China-Pakistan economic corridor attracted $25.4 billion in
10 years: Beijing”, Anadolu Agency, 7 July 2023. See also Crisis Group Report, China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, op. cit.
188
Crisis Group interview, China expert in Washington, May 2023.
189
“China’s Position on the Afghan Issue”, press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, 12 April 2023.
190
Nayanima Basu, “India reopens embassy in Kabul, sends ‘technical team’ with relief material for
Afghanistan”, The Print, 23 June 2022. See also Suhasini Haidar, “Should India review its position
on the Taliban?”, The Hindu, 30 December 2022.
191
See, for example, Shivam Shekhawat, “India’s Taliban dilemma: Diplomatic engagement and
moral disquietness”, ORF Online, 24 March 2023.
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chorus of regional actors calling for common approaches to security concerns.192

New Delhi is also wary that Beijing, with which its relationship has deteriorated over
the last few years, could take the lead on forging a regional approach to Afghanistan;
as a result, India would prefer to draw Western countries into multilateral talks about
how to deal with the Taliban.

TAJIKISTAN
After the Taliban takeover, Tajikistan’s reaction was the most hostile among neigh-
bouring countries. Dushanbe allowed the National Resistance Front to establish bases
in Tajikistan, and Afghan districts near the Tajik border suffered the worst clashes
between Front and Taliban fighters.193 Dushanbe’s sympathies with the Front stem
from personal ties between Tajik officials and leaders of the Jamiat-e Islami party,
some of whom belong to the Front, and other Afghan factions that resisted the Tali-
ban in the 1990s. During that period, Jamiat-e Islami played a role in mediating an
end to Tajikistan’s civil war.194 More generally, Tajikistan feels an affinity with ethnic
Tajiks in Afghanistan, who live under the Taliban’s authority with little representa-
tion in Kabul; Dushanbe has repeatedly called on the Taliban to form a more inclusive
government.195 Tajikistan also has security concerns, claiming that militant groups
such as Ansarullah, which wants to topple the Tajik government, operate near the
Tajik border, despite Taliban denials.196 More broadly, there is concern that Islam-
ism in Afghanistan might stir up domestic opposition to the Tajik government.
Hints of détente emerged as the Taliban settled into power. After initial interrup-
tions, Tajikistan resumed bilateral trade, exporting electricity and allowing Tajik goods
to transit Afghanistan on the way to Pakistan.197 Although the Taliban cracked down
on poppy cultivation and opium smuggling, some evidence suggests that drug pro-
duction in Badakhshan, a province on the Tajik border, is still significant, allowing
opium into Tajikistan – a major concern for Dushanbe.198 Tajikistan keeps working-

192
On Indian concerns about the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, see Nayanima Basu,
“Why tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan over TTP could be ‘dangerous’ for India”, APB
Live, 11 January 2023.
193
Crisis Group analysis of ACLED data for the period September 2021 to April 2023; Crisis Group
interviews, Dushanbe, October 2022.
194
Crisis Group interview, Tajikistan expert in Washington, May 2023.
195
Fidel Rahmati, “Tajikistan’s president calls for inclusive government in Afghanistan”, Khaama
Press, 21 July 2023.
196
Tajikistan’s concerns about militancy spilling over the border are mirrored by Kabul’s fears about
increasing recruitment of Tajik militants by IS-KP for attacks in Afghanistan. Taliban officials claim
that many IS-KP militants are from Tajikistan. See tweet by Hafiz Zia Ahmad, @HafizZiaAhmad1,
deputy spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9:08pm, 19 March 2023. Similarly, the Tali-
ban’s intelligence service claims that an IS-KP suicide bomber responsible for killing a provincial
governor was from Tajikistan. See tweet by The Khorasan Diary, @khorasandiary, 11:37pm, 26 March
2023. Conversely, Tajikistan continues to highlight infiltration from Afghanistan. See “Tajikistan
reports unrest on its Afghanistan border”, Eurasianet, 28 April 2023; “Over 6,000 militants located
near CSTO southern border – president of Tajikistan”, TASS, 10 January 2022.
197
Crisis Group interviews, traders and port officials in Sher Khan and Aikhanem, October 2021.
See also “Tajikistan increases export volume to Afghanistan by 38%”, Ariana News, 27 July 2022.
198
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces, 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 40

level diplomats in Kabul, and delegations from each country have visited the other’s
capital.199 Front members complain that Tajikistan curtails their activities, expelling
some of them.200 Friendship between the neighbours seems unlikely, but bilateral
relations are improving.

UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan welcomed the new regime more warmly and has subsequently focused its
attention on increasing trade with its neighbour to the south. Afghanistan had
already become one of Uzbekistan’s largest commercial partners, with a trade deficit
of nearly 90 per cent in favour of Uzbek exporters.201 Since the Taliban takeover, the
two sides have sought to deepen these ties, especially as Tashkent looks for alterna-
tives to Russian transport for reaching South Asian ports and markets. With Russia
falling into pariah status after its all-out invasion of Ukraine, Uzbekistan and other
Central Asian states fear being surrounded by sanctioned neighbours; partly as a
result, Uzbek diplomats have been pushing for removal of Western sanctions on the
Taliban and calling for pathways toward recognising the regime.202 Still, Uzbekistan
has security concerns. In addition to IS-KP, which has carried out attacks inside Uzbek-
istan, Tashkent is wary of Uzbek militants hiding in Afghanistan, such as Katiba Imam
al-Bukhari and other remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.203 Tashkent
also feels uneasy about the Taliban’s largest infrastructure project, a canal and irri-
gation system that could drain water from the Amu Darya river on the border.204

TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan was the first neighbour to raise concerns about the Taliban’s irriga-
tion project on the Amu Darya (see Uzbekistan). Afghan governments have been
planning the Qush Tepa canal since the 1970s, but it is now almost complete. Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan both sent delegations to Kabul to discuss the downstream
effects – including on agriculture, infrastructure and the ecology of the Aral Sea basin
– but the Taliban cut off negotiations in late 2022 and seem intent on moving ahead
with the project as a symbol of post-war recovery.205 Besides water, Turkmenistan
has concerns about Afghan migration and long-term ambitions to build a pipeline

199
Tweet by Abdul Qahar Balkhi, @QaharBalkhi, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
9:05am, 25 March 2023.
200
Crisis Group interviews, Dushanbe, October 2022.
201
See, for example, “World Integrated Trade Solution”, World Bank.
202
Crisis Group interviews, Uzbekistan experts in Dushanbe and Tashkent, May and October 2023.
See also “Uzbekistan ready to increase trade to $1 bln with Afghanistan”, Bakhtar News Agency, 23
March 2023.
203
The UN listed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist group in 2001 for its alleged
associations with al-Qaeda. The group suffered crackdowns in Uzbekistan and several members fled
to Pakistan and Afghanistan. A related group, Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, was included on UN sanc-
tions lists in 2018 as a Movement offshoot. UN Security Council, “Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari”, ISIL
(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, 29 March 2018.
204
Tashkent believes that the Taliban are willing to “fight for water”. Crisis Group interviews, Uz-
bek officials, 2023. See also Bakyt Ibraimov and Fawad Ali, “‘A lot of work for diplomats’ in Central
Asia as the Taliban build huge canal”, The Third Pole, 18 May 2023.
205
Crisis Group interviews, Western officials, June 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 41

that could transport its natural gas to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Pakistan is
eager to get started on the pipeline, a decades-old concept that could alleviate energy
shortages.206

RUSSIA
The security vacuum left when U.S. forces and their allies departed Afghanistan pulled
Russia more deeply into Central Asia.207 Responding to concerns about spreading
militancy, Russia organised meetings of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,
particularly to address Tajikistan’s fears of cross-border attacks. Moscow also hoped
that Russia might find a viable regional partner in a Taliban-led government, partic-
ularly to explore the formation of an expanded economic and political bloc – as of
2023, still a nascent concept.208 Like many regional actors, the Kremlin found that
it had little leverage over a movement whose decision-making is often inscrutable to
outside actors.209 The IS-KP attack on the Russian embassy in September 2022 un-
dermined Moscow’s confidence in Kabul and limited the movements of Russian dip-
lomats in the capital. Still, like other regional players, Russia seeks ways of working
with the Taliban: primarily on security, but also on economic issues and counter-
narcotics. Moscow supports collective regional approaches to negotiating with the
Taliban on formation of an “inclusive” government that could gain legitimacy – and
Russia insists that the U.S. and its allies should not block other countries from recog-
nising the regime.210

IRAN
Iranian trade with Afghanistan suffered after the Taliban takeover. Iran had been the
top source of imports to Afghanistan, partly because the former Afghan government
encouraged business with Tehran.211 The return of a regime that had verged on war
with Iran in the 1990s reversed that trend. Despite cultivating ties among the Taliban
during their decades as insurgents, Tehran feels that it now has less leverage over
the group.212 It also perceives a growing threat from IS-KP, especially after the jiha-
dists launched their largest cross-border operation so far in Shiraz in October 2022.213
Skirmishes between Afghan and Iranian border guards, largely over construction of

206
Nizamuddin Rezahi, “Pakistan, Turkmenistan sign TAPI joint implementation plan”, Khaama
Press, 9 June 2023.
207
According to one author, Russia viewed the precipitous U.S. withdrawal as “both a challenge and
an opportunity”. See Charles J. Sullivan, “Kabul and the Kremlin: Russia’s Evolving Foreign Policy
towards the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, Asian Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1 (January 2023).
208
Crisis Group interviews, regional experts, Kabul, Washington and Dubai, June 2023.
209
Russia’s frustrations in dealing with the new regime have included personal frictions with Taliban
diplomats: at one meeting, witnesses saw Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov shouting at a sen-
ior Taliban envoy. For their part, some Taliban remember battling Soviet troops in the 1980s and
express mistrust of Moscow. Crisis Group interviews, Taliban and Western officials, 2021-2023.
210
At a May 2023 meeting of envoys to Afghanistan, Russian diplomats insisted that any country
that deployed troops to Afghanistan “in the last twenty years” be kept out of talks about recognition
of the Taliban regime. Crisis Group interviews, Western officials, May 2023.
211
Crisis Group interviews, current and former Afghan officials, 2023.
212
Crisis Group interviews, regional diplomats, Kabul, 2023.
213
“Fifteen killed in attack on Shia mausoleum in southern Iran”, BBC, 27 October 2022.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 42

border facilities or perceived mistreatment of migrants, have been another irri-

tant.214 Other topics of concern for Tehran include sharing of the Helmand river’s
waters, as well as the flow of drugs coming from Afghanistan. Like their Russian
counterparts, Iranian diplomats have proposed that a committee of regional states –
with UN support but excluding the U.S. and its allies – should take the lead on nego-
tiations with the Taliban on political, security and economic issues.215

QATAR
Qatar, whose prime minister is reportedly the only foreign dignitary to have met with
the Taliban’s emir, promotes itself as a peacemaker in the region. Afghanistan has
served as a showcase of its mediation efforts since 2013, when Doha accepted U.S.
requests to host the Taliban for peace talks. The result was the 2020 Doha agreement,
which paved the way for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Qatar
then facilitated evacuations amid the chaos after the Taliban seized power, and Doha
emerged as a hub for Western diplomats in exile.216 Qatar has been disappointed with
the Taliban’s restrictions on women’s education, though its attempts to convince them
to change their policies have not done so. Doha was also surprised that an Emirati
company won the airport management contract, rather than the Qatari and Turkish
firms that submitted a joint bid, given Qatar’s role in Afghanistan mediation – an
example of the Taliban playing regional rivals off each other.217 All the same, Doha
continues to push for engagement with Kabul. “Instability in Afghanistan threatens
all the neighbouring countries”, a senior Qatari diplomat said.218

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates was one of only three countries to recognise the Taliban
regime in the 1990s, but it aligned itself with the U.S.-backed government after 2001,
deploying troops, helping with logistics and providing financial services for the war to
defeat the Taliban.219 The UAE’s decision in 2021 to shelter the fleeing Afghan presi-
dent, Ashraf Ghani, also boded ill for its relations with the Taliban. But the UAE took
a pragmatic decision to re-engage with the Taliban and eventually won the aforemen-
tioned deal to run Afghan airports in 2022.220 As the co-penholder on Afghanistan in
the UN Security Council, Abu Dhabi has condemned the Taliban’s gender policies
but also spearheaded efforts for an independent review of engagement, seeking a

214
Crisis Group interviews, Taliban and regional officials, Kabul, 2023.
215
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul and Washington, 2023.
216
“Qatar emerges as key player in Afghanistan after US pullout”, AP, 31 August 2021; “Qatar emerges
as bridge between Taliban and the West”, Financial Times, 4 September 2021; and “Blinken will
visit Qatar, where diplomats relocated to keep working on Afghanistan”, NPR, 3 September 2021.
217
The Taliban delayed the decision for a year before making a choice, entertaining bids from the
Emirati firm and a Qatari-Turkish partnership. Key issues in the negotiations included security
provisions; the Taliban refused to allow armed foreigners at the airports. Crisis Group interviews,
Afghan, Qatari and Turkish officials, 2021-2022.
218
Crisis Group interview, Qatari official, Doha, 2023.
219
Crisis Group interviews, UAE officials, Abu Dhabi, 2019.
220
Umer Karim, “Pragmatism Drives Taliban-UAE Engagement”, Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, 31 January 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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more workable relationship between the regime and the world.221 The UAE remains
a centre for Afghan traders, bankers and other business owners, many of whom are
appealing to the Taliban for more lenient policies that might result in fewer sanc-
tions and more foreign investment.222

SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia has transformed in the last decade as Riyadh attempts to shed its repu-
tation for strict conservatism. Part of that shift involves a new focus on countering
the rise of political Islam in the Middle East, a contrast with ultraconservative move-
ments such as the Taliban. In 2017, Riyadh hosted a meeting of the Organisation of
Islamic Countries (OIC) that condemned the Taliban’s insurgency. After the Taliban
seized power, Riyadh evacuated its diplomats but has since sent some of them back
to Kabul.223 Riyadh’s outreach to the Taliban was partly designed to assist its ally,
Pakistan, which encouraged engagement with the new Afghan authorities. Saudi
Arabia even facilitated the opening of OIC offices in Kabul as a conduit for humani-
tarian assistance. Yet as Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban worsened in late 2022,
Riyadh stepped back from its diplomatic efforts. In early 2023, the Saudi and OIC
missions withdrew some staff from Kabul.224

TÜRKIYE
Türkiye considers Afghanistan “distant but not too distant”, as a diplomat put it,
meaning that Ankara suffers the effects of instability in the country, even if not the
worst or most immediate ones.225 These include migration, terrorism and drug smug-
gling, as well as concerns about spillover of conflict into the region.226 Ankara has
taken the position that the best way to stop Afghanistan’s troubles from spreading is
to address them at the source. For this reason, it supports reconstruction and devel-
opment efforts, in the hope that these help in stemming migration and militancy.
Turkish officials also believe that economic interdependence might serve to moder-
ate Taliban behaviour in the medium term. The Turkish private sector has been at
the forefront of reviving the Afghan economy. Like many others, however, Turkish
firms complain that the Taliban’s pariah status, with the attendant sanctions and
banking restrictions, hampers their activities.

221
Crisis Group interviews, UN officials and UN Security Council member state diplomats, New York,
May 2023.
222
Crisis Group interviews, Dubai, 2022-2023.
223
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco and Kristian Alexander, “With Eye on Stability, Saudis Shift
Role in Afghanistan”, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 8 February 2023. See also “Saudi
Arabia and Qatar are coopering with the Taliban. But their approaches to Afghanistan are different”,
Atlantic Council, 12 January 2023.
224
Crisis Group interviews, Kabul, 2023. See “Saudi diplomats leave Afghanistan, relocate to Paki-
stani capital – sources”, Reuters, 6 February 2023.
225
Crisis Group interview, Ankara, November 2022.
226
Türkiye has a large Afghan population and militants such as IS-KP have reportedly been active
in the country. See, for example, Emrah Gokmen, “Turkish police arrest ‘high-ranking’ Daesh/ISIS
terrorist in Istanbul”, Anadolu Agency, 22 June 2023.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisa-
tion, with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or
close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on
information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommen-
dations targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes
CrisisWatch, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in
up to 80 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, includ-
ing the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplo-
macy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations
to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by President & CEO
of the Fiore Group and Founder of the Radcliffe Foundation, Frank Giustra, as well as by former Foreign
Minister of Argentina and Chef de Cabinet to the United Nations Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra.

Comfort Ero was appointed Crisis Group’s President & CEO in December 2021. She first joined Crisis
Group as West Africa Project Director in 2001 and later rose to become Africa Program Director in 2011
and then Interim Vice President. In between her two tenures at Crisis Group, she worked for the Interna-
tional Centre for Transitional Justice and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other
locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in
the following locations: Abuja, Addis Ababa, Bahrain, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Gua-
temala City, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Kabul, Kyiv, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, Seoul, Tbilisi,
Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.

Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, foundations, and private
sources. The ideas, opinions and comments expressed by Crisis Group are entirely its own and do not
represent or reflect the views of any donor. Currently Crisis Group holds relationships with the following
governmental departments and agencies: Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Austria
(Austrian Development Agency), Canada (Global Affairs Canada), Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Emergency Trust Fund for Africa), Fin-
land (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), France (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Development
Agency), Ireland (Department of Foreign Affairs), Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency and
Japan External Trade Organization), Principality of Liechtenstein (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Luxembourg
(Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), New Zealand
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Qatar (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs), Slovenia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Switzerland (Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Kingdom (Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office), and the World Bank.

Crisis Group also holds relationships with the following foundations and organisations: Carnegie Corpora-
tion of New York, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Global Challenges Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Founda-
tions, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, Stand Together Trust, Stiftung Mercator, and Wellspring Philanthropic Fund.

January 2024
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 45

Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2021

Special Reports and Briefings South East Asia

Ten Challenges for the UN in 2021-2022, Spe- Responding to the Myanmar Coup, Asia Briefing
cial Briefing N°6, 13 September 2021. N°166, 16 February 2021.
7 Priorities for the G7: Managing the Global The Cost of the Coup: Myanmar Edges Toward
Fallout of Russia’s War on Ukraine, Special State Collapse, Asia Briefing N°167, 1 April
Briefing N°7, 22 June 2022. 2021.
Ten Challenges for the UN in 2022-2023, Spe- Southern Philippines: Keeping Normalisation on
cial Briefing N°8, 14 September 2022. Track in the Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°313,
Seven Priorities for Preserving the OSCE in a 15 April 2021.
Time of War, Special Briefing N°9, 29 Novem- Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Vir-
ber 2022. tual Battlefield, Asia Report N°314, 18 May
Seven Priorities for the G7 in 2023, Special 2021.
Briefing N°10, 15 May 2023. Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed
Ten Challenges for the UN in 2023-2024, Crisis Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup, Asia Briefing
Group Special Briefing N°11, 14 September N°168, 28 June 2021.
2023. Competing Visions of International Order in the
South China Sea, Asia Report N°315, 29 No-
North East Asia vember 2021.

Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China The Philippines’ Dilemma: How to Manage Ten-
Crisis Management, Asia Report N°324, 20 sions in the South China Sea, Asia Report
May 2022. N°316, 2 December 2021.
Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait, Asia Report Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and
N°333, 27 October 2023 (also available in Struggle in the South China Sea, Asia Report
Simplified and Traditional Chinese). N°318, 7 December 2021.

Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India- Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts,
China Border Dispute, Asia Report N°334, 14 Asia Report N°319, 12 January 2022.
November 2023. Southern Philippines: Fostering an Inclusive
Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°322, 18 February
2022.
South Asia
Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern
What Future for Afghan Peace Talks under a
Philippines, Asia Report N°323, 18 March
Biden Administration?, Asia Briefing N°165, 13
2022.
January 2021.
Resisting the Resistance: Myanmar’s Pro-
Pakistan: Shoring Up Afghanistan’s Peace
Military Pyusawhti Militias, Asia Briefing
Process, Asia Briefing N°169, 30 June 2021.
N°171, 6 April 2022.
Beyond Emergency Relief: Averting Afghani-
Sustaining the Momentum in Southern Thai-
stan’s Humanitarian Catastrophe, Asia Report
land’s Peace Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°172,
N°317, 6 December 2021.
19 April 2022.
Pakistan’s Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan,
Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine
Asia Report N°320, 4 February 2022.
State, Asia Report N°325, 1 June 2022.
Women and Peacebuilding in Pakistan’s North
Coming to Terms with Myanmar’s Russia Em-
West, Asia Report N°321, 14 February 2022.
brace, Asia Briefing N°173, 4 August 2022.
Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the
Crowdfunding a War: The Money behind Myan-
Taliban, Asia Report N°326, 12 August 2022
mar’s Resistance, Asia Report N°328, 20 De-
(also available in Dari and Pashto).
cember 2022.
A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,
Breaking Gender and Age Barriers amid Myan-
Asia Report N°327, 5 September 2022.
mar’s Spring Revolution, Asia Briefing N°174,
Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Deepen
16 February 2023.
Afghanistan’s Crisis, Asia Report N°329, 23
A Silent Sangha? Buddhist Monks in Post-coup
February 2023 (also available in Dari and
Myanmar, Asia Report N°330, 10 March 2023.
Pashto).
A Road to Nowhere: The Myanmar Regime’s
Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangla-
Stage-managed Elections, Asia Briefing
desh, Asia Report N°335, 6 December 2023.
N°175, 28 March 2023.
Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s
Southern Philippines: Making Peace Stick in the
Political Deadlock, Asia Report N°336, 4 Jan-
Bangsamoro, Asia Report N°331, 1 May 2023.
uary 2024.
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 46

Southern Thailand’s Stop-start Peace Dialogue,

Asia Briefing N°176, 25 May 2023 (also avail-
able in Malay and Thai).
Transnational Crime and Geopolitical Contesta-
tion along the Mekong, Asia Report N°332, 18
August 2023.
Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Ex-
pands in Myanmar’s Shan State, Asia Briefing
N°177, 4 September 2023 (also available in
Burmese).
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
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Appendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees

PRESIDENT & CEO Mo Ibrahim Ayo Obe

Comfort Ero Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Chair of the Board of the Gorée
Former Crisis Group Vice Interim Foundation; Founder, Celtel Institute (Senegal); Legal Practitioner
President and Africa Program Director International (Nigeria)

Mahamadou Issoufou Meghan O'Sullivan

CO-CHAIRS Former President of Niger Former U.S. Deputy National Security
Adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan
Frank Giustra Kyung-wha Kang
President & CEO, Fiore Group; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kerry Propper
Founder, Radcliffe Foundation the Republic of Korea Managing Partner of ATW Partners;
Founder and Chairman of Chardan
Susana Malcorra Wadah Khanfar Capital
Former Foreign Minister of Argentina Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; former
Director General, Al Jazeera Network Ahmed Rashid
Author and Foreign Policy Journalist,
OTHER TRUSTEES
Nasser al-Kidwa Pakistan
Fola Adeola Chairman of the Yasser Arafat
Founder and Chairman, FATE Foundation; Former UN Deputy Juan Manuel Santos Calderón
Foundation Mediator on Syria Former President of Colombia; Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate 2016
Abdulaziz Al Sager Bert Koenders
Chairman and founder of the Gulf Former Dutch Minister of Foreign Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Research Center and president of Affairs and Under-Secretary-General Former President of Liberia
Sager Group Holding of the United Nations
Ine Eriksen Søreide
Hushang Ansary Andrey Kortunov Former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chairman, Parman Capital Group LLC; Director General of the Russian Former Minister of Defence of Norway,
Former Iranian Ambassador to the International Affairs Council and Chair of the Foreign Affairs and
U.S. and Minister of Finance and Defence Committee
Economic Affairs Ivan Krastev
Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Alexander Soros
Gérard Araud Strategies (Sofia); Founding Board Deputy Chair of the Global Board,
Former Ambassador of France Member of European Council on Open Society Foundations
to the U.S. Foreign Relations
George Soros
Zeinab Badawi Tzipi Livni Founder, Open Society Foundations
President, SOAS University of London Former Foreign Minister and Vice and Chair, Soros Fund Management
Prime Minister of Israel
Carl Bildt Alexander Stubb
Former Prime Minister and Foreign Helge Lund Director of the School of Transnational
Minister of Sweden Chair bp plc (UK) & Novo Nordisk Governance; Former Prime Minister of
(Denmark) Finland
Sandra Breka
Darian Swig
Vice President and Chief Operating Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Founder and President, Article 3
Officer, Open Society Foundations Former UN Deputy Secretary-General
Advisors; Co-Founder and Board
and Administrator of the United
Maria Livanos Cattaui Chair, Article3.org
Nations Development Programme
Former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce William H. McRaven
Retired U.S. Navy Admiral who served
Ahmed Charai as 9th Commander of the U.S. Special
Chairman and CEO of Global Media Operations Command
Holding and publisher of the Moroccan
weekly L’Observateur Shivshankar Menon
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
Nathalie Delapalme former National Security Adviser
Executive Director and Board Member
at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Naz Modirzadeh
Director of the Harvard Law School
María Fernanda Espinosa Program on International Law and
Former President of UNGA’s 73rd Armed Conflict
session
Federica Mogherini
Miriam Coronel-Ferrer Former High Representative of the
Former Senior Mediation Adviser, UN European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy
Sigmar Gabriel
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Saad Mohseni
Vice Chancellor of Germany Chairman and CEO of MOBY Group
Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi Nadia Murad
Former UN Undersecretary General President and Chairwoman of Nadia’s
and Executive Secretary of Initiative
UNESCWA
The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan
Crisis Group Asia Report N°337, 30 January 2024 Page 48

G L OBA L C OR P O RA TE C O U NC IL
A distinguished circle of Crisis Group supporters drawn from senior executives and private sector firms.

Global Leaders
Aris Mining White & Case LLP
Shearman & Sterling LLP Yamana Gold

Global Partners
(1) Anonymous Eni Sempra Energy
APCO Worldwide Inc. Equinor TikTok
BP GardaWorld TotalEnergies
Chevron META

H ON O U R R O LL O F A N N UA L D O N O RS
A diverse range of philanthropists, prominent business leaders, government officials, lawyers and scholars from
around the world.
Anonymous (several) Geoffrey & Emily Hsu Juan Manuel Santos Calderón
Fola Adeola Mo Ibrahim Carson Seabolt
Chris Bake Gordon Keep Duco Sickinghe
Hakeem Belo-Osagie Wadah Khanfar Bryan Slusarchuk
Mark Bergman Cleopatra Kitti Stichting Giustra International
Stanley, Marion & Ed Bergman Alison Lawton Foundation
Harry Bookey & Pam Bass- Helge Lund Stichting Ochtendstond
Bookey Mark & Trish Malloch-Brown Darian Swig
Peder Bratt Jean Manas Corina Taylor
Maria Livanos Cattaui William H. McRaven Ian Telfer
Ahmed Charai Dennis Miller Steven Urbach
Helima Croft Saad Mohseni Raffi Vartanian
Lara Dauphinee Ayo Obe Marvin F Weissberg Memorial
Herman De Bode Lubna Olayan Fund
Tanaz Eshaghian Steven Oliveira Neil Woodyer & Colleen De
Sigmar Gabriel Thomas R. Pickering Bonis Woodyer
Jonas Grossman Kerry Propper Young Family Foundation
Russell Hardy Quiet Cove Foundation
Houssian Foundation Ahmed Rashid

A M B A S S A D O R C OU N C I L
Young leaders who bring their skills and experiences from diverse backgrounds to support a shared mission:
preventing war and shaping peace.
Khazer Almajali Joe Hill Gillian Morris
Christina Bache Ajla Hotic Duncan Picard
James Blake Lauren Hurst Lorenzo Piras
Iris Bouma Reid Jacoby Sofie Roehrig
Damien Bruckard Jennifer Kanyamibwa Perfecto Sanchez
Pierre Jean Dahaene Andrea Karlsson Christine Savino
Brieuc Debontridde Meera Kotak Rahul Sharma Sen
Darina Dvornichenko Gillian Lawie Alexandra van Nievelt
Sabrina Edelman David Litwak Grant Webster
A.J. Fuentes Madison Malloch-Brown Sherman Williams
Andrei Goldis Federico Firmian Manfredi Yasin Yaqubie

CR IS I S G R O UP E ME RI TI I
Mort Abramowitz George Mitchell Gareth Evans
Founder and Trustee Emeritus Chairman Emeritus President Emeritus

Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Thomas R. Pickering

Founder and Chairman Emeritus Chairman Emeritus