Contract Actual Assignment

Brenda’s Debt Repayment Claim

Issue

The question is whether the agreement in which Carwyn is paying a

discounted rate constitutes a binding modification of their contract, or if
Brenda can revert to the original terms.

Rule

For a contract to be legally binding following a promise to modify an

existing contractual obligation, it requires fresh consideration (Foakes v
Beer [1884]). Therefore, just a discounted payment of debt alone is
insufficient consideration to invalidate the lenders right to the full amount.
However, the rights of the lender may be suspended due to promissory
estoppel in cases where; a clear and unequivocal promise to not enforce
strict legal rights is made, the borrower relies on this promise, and it
would be inequitable for the creditor to go back on the promise ((Central
London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947]). Promissory
estoppel suspends rights temporarily and does not permanently
extinguish them. A creditor may revert to the original terms if
equitable considerations change (D & C Builders v Rees [1966]).

Application

Fresh Consideration

The new agreement lacks fresh consideration as Carwyn did not offer
anything new in return for the reduction in price. Therefore, the common
law principle established in Foakes v Beer does not legally bind Brenda’s
promise of reduced payment and she retains her right to enforce the
original terms of the contract (£3,000).

Promissory Estoppel

As Brenda made a clear promise to accept the reduced payments, Carwyn

can argue that promissory estoppel applies. If Carwyn relied on this
promise to his detriment, such as by reallocating funds to sustain his
economically troubled theme park, this reliance could potentially suspend
Brenda’s rights to enforce the original contract. However, as seen in D & C
Builders v Rees [1966], the effect of promissory estoppel is not indefinite.
Brenda can revert to the original contractual terms if equitable
considerations no longer support the discounted arrangement. This
includes situations where Carwyn is no longer reliant on the promise, or if
enforcing the original terms becomes fair and reasonable under the
circumstances, such as if Carwyn's financial position improves or if
enforcing the previous terms no longer results in unfair detriment to him.

Here, Carwyn’s financial struggles, though significant, do not constitute an

equitable reason for Brenda to indefinitely forego her rights, especially
since she notified Carwyn of the return to full payments after three
months, giving him reasonable notice to adjust.

Conclusion
Brenda is entitled to revert to the original repayment terms of £3,000 per
month. Promissory estoppel is unlikely to succeed, given the lack of
significant reliance and Brenda’s equitable conduct in providing notice of
her decision.

2. Ed’s Claim for Additional £2,000

Issue:
The issue is whether Carwyn is legally obligated to pay Ed the
additional £2,000 promised for the timely completion of the wall.
This raises the question of whether Ed’s performance of a pre-
existing duty, i.e., completing the wall as per the original
contract, constitutes valid consideration for Carwyn's promise of
additional payment.

Rule:
Under general contract law, the performance of a pre-existing
duty does not usually constitute valid consideration for a new
promise. This was established in the case of Stilk v Myrick [1809],
where the court ruled that a promise to pay more money for work
already required under an existing contract was not enforceable.
However, the Williams v Roffey Bros [1991] case introduced an
exception: if the promise to pay extra money provides a practical
benefit to the promisor, it can be valid consideration. A practical
benefit might include avoiding delays or mitigating financial
losses.

Additionally, a promise made under economic duress may be

unenforceable. Atlas Express v Kafco [1989] clarified that for
economic duress to apply, the promise must be made under
illegitimate pressure, where one party is coerced into agreeing to
the terms.

Application:
In this case, Ed’s timely completion of the wall provided Carwyn
with a significant practical benefit. By ensuring that the wall was
finished on time, Ed helped Carwyn avoid customer complaints
and maintain the project's schedule, ultimately maximizing profits
for the business. This aligns with the reasoning in Williams v
Roffey Bros, where the promise of additional payment was
considered enforceable because it provided a clear benefit to the
promisor, in this case, Carwyn.

There is no evidence of economic duress here. Carwyn voluntarily

promised the additional £2,000, without any undue pressure or
threat. Therefore, the promise was not made under illegitimate
coercion or duress.

Conclusion:
Ed is entitled to the additional £2,000 as the completion of the
wall provided a practical benefit to Carwyn, which constitutes
valid consideration under Williams v Roffey Bros. Additionally,
there is no indication of economic duress that could invalidate the
agreement. Thus, Ed can successfully claim the extra £2,000.

3. Tina’s Online Reviews

Issue:
The issue is whether Tina’s false online reviews about the
restaurant, claiming food poisoning, constitute actionable
defamation. Specifically, this raises the question of whether her
untrue statements caused serious harm to Carwyn's reputation,
as required under the Defamation Act 2013.

Rule:
Defamation law requires that the claimant prove a false
statement has been made, the statement was published to third
parties, and it caused reputational harm. The Defamation Act
2013 specifies that the claimant must show that the statement
caused "serious harm" to their reputation, as established in
Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019]. Serious harm can be
demonstrated through evidence of reputational damage,
including emotional distress or financial loss due to the false
statement.

Application:
In this case, Tina’s false statements about food poisoning are
demonstrably untrue and resulted in reputational harm to
Carwyn. The chef’s emotional distress and the subsequent
decline in food quality at the restaurant serve as evidence that
Tina’s reviews caused serious harm. Additionally, the decline in
the restaurant's performance due to the negative reviews further
supports the claim of reputational damage.

Conclusion:
Carwyn can pursue a defamation claim against Tina. The false
reviews about food poisoning have caused serious harm to
Carwyn’s reputation, satisfying the legal threshold for
defamation. Carwyn can seek damages for the harm caused and
may also pursue an injunction to prevent further publication of
the false statements.

4. Confinement of Gareth and Joanne

Issue:
The issue is whether Wyn’s negligence in locking the mine doors
resulted in false imprisonment or negligence claims from Gareth
and Joanne. Specifically, this involves determining whether Wyn’s
failure to check the CCTV and subsequent locking of the doors
breached his duty of care to visitors, leading to actionable claims.

Rule:
False imprisonment occurs when a person is intentionally and
completely restrained without lawful justification (as seen in
Collins v Wilcock [1984]). Additionally, negligence arises when a
person breaches a duty of care owed to another, causing
foreseeable harm (as established in Donoghue v Stevenson
[1932]).

Application:
In this case, Wyn's failure to check the CCTV and his decision to
lock the mine doors directly caused Gareth and Joanne to be
unable to leave the mine, which constitutes false imprisonment.
Furthermore, Wyn’s actions (or lack thereof) demonstrate
negligence, as he breached his duty of care to visitors by not
ensuring the safety and accessibility of the mine.

Conclusion:
Gareth and Joanne can likely claim damages for both negligence
and false imprisonment. Wyn’s failure to properly secure the
mine doors, resulting in their confinement, constitutes a breach
of duty and satisfies the criteria for both torts.

5. Lorraine Smith’s Privacy Claim

Issue: Does Carwyn’s use of CCTV images of Lorraine Smith and her
children without consent violate privacy rights under the tort of misuse of
private information?

Rule: The tort of misuse of private information protects individuals from

the unauthorized use of personal information or images. Courts consider
whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether publication was justified, based on Bloomberg v ZXC [2022].
Furthermore, Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] established that
the privacy rights of children are particularly sensitive, even if the parent
is a public figure. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates Article 8 (right
to private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
balancing it against Article 10 (freedom of expression). The attributes of
the claimant, nature of the activity, and place of occurrence are key
factors (Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008]). Unauthorized commercial use
of private images, as in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005], also constitutes a
breach.

Application: One could claim that Lorraine’s status as a public figure

could reduce her expectation of privacy, however as shown in Campbell
the question was whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy that outweighs the defendant’s freedom of expression (Balancing
article 8 with Article 10 of the human rights act) (Campbell v MGN Ltd
[2004]). However, Murray v Big Pictures Ltd emphasizes that children’s
privacy rights are more robust, irrespective of their parent’s public status.
The CCTV images, taken without consent, involve her children and
strengthen her claim for a breach of privacy.

The nature and purpose of the intrusion—capturing and using private

moments for commercial promotion—further breach privacy expectations.
As in Douglas v Hello! Ltd, exploiting private moments for profit without
consent breaches privacy rights. The absence of public interest in
publishing the images reinforces the lack of lawful justification, violating
the principles of Article 8 of the ECHR.

Conclusion: Lorraine has a strong claim for misuse of private information,

particularly concerning her children that overrides Carwyn freedom of
expression. She can seek damages for the breach and/or an injunction to
prevent further use of the images. The unauthorized use of CCTV footage
underscores the legitimacy of her claim.

6. Sandie’s Injuries

Issue:
The issue is whether Tom and Robert are liable for Sandie’s
injuries under tort law. This raises the question of whether their
actions (Tom’s push and Robert’s release of Sandie’s hand)
amount to battery or negligence.

Rule:
Battery occurs when there is an intentional and direct application
of force to another person without consent (as defined in Collins
v Wilcock [1984]). Negligence, on the other hand, requires
proving that a duty of care was owed, the duty was breached, and
that breach caused harm (as seen in Donoghue v Stevenson
[1932]).

Application:
In this case, Tom’s deliberate push and Robert’s intentional
release of Sandie’s hand directly caused her injuries, which
satisfies the definition of battery. Additionally, while Sandie’s
refusal to undergo the CT scan may raise the issue of contributory
negligence, it does not break the causal link between the actions
of Tom and Robert and her injuries.

Conclusion:
Sandie can claim for battery and negligence. While there may be
a potential reduction for contributory negligence, Tom and
Robert’s actions were intentional and caused harm, making them
liable under tort law.

7. Hospital’s Use of a CT Scan

Issue:
The issue is whether the hospital was justified in conducting a CT
scan on Sandie without her consent. This concerns the question
of whether the hospital’s actions constitute battery or are
justified under the doctrine of necessity.

Rule:
Medical treatment without consent is typically considered
battery, unless there is a justification for acting without consent,
such as necessity. The Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990]
case established that treatment without consent may be justified
when it is necessary for the patient's well-being and there is no
opportunity to obtain consent.

Application:
In this case, Sandie was unconscious and at risk of serious harm,
which provided the hospital with a justification to proceed with
the CT scan. Given the immediate need to assess her condition,
the hospital’s actions fall within the necessity doctrine, which
justifies treatment in the patient’s best interest.

Conclusion:
The hospital’s actions were lawful under the necessity doctrine.
The CT scan was performed without Sandie’s consent but was
necessary to protect her health, meaning no battery occurred in
this situation.

8. Dai’s Threats Against Tom and Robert

Issue:
The issue is whether Dai’s threats and intimidating conduct
towards Tom and Robert constitute assault. This involves
determining whether Dai’s actions caused reasonable
apprehension of imminent harm.

Rule:
Assault occurs when an act creates a reasonable apprehension of
imminent harm (as established in Collins v Wilcock [1984]). Words
or actions can constitute assault if they make the victim fear
immediate harm, as demonstrated in R v Ireland [1998].

Application:
In this case, Dai’s threats towards Robert do not meet the criteria
for assault, as they lack immediacy. However, his intimidating
glare at Tom may have caused reasonable apprehension of
imminent harm, which satisfies the requirements for assault
under R v Ireland.

Conclusion:
Tom may successfully claim assault, as Dai’s intimidating glare
was sufficient to cause reasonable fear of imminent harm.
However, Robert’s claim is less likely to succeed, as Dai’s threats
lacked the immediacy necessary for assault.

9. Theme Park’s Vicarious Liability for Wyn’s Actions

Issue:
The issue is whether the theme park can be held vicariously liable
for Wyn’s actions in locking the doors and failing to check the
CCTV. This raises the question of whether Wyn’s actions fall
within the scope of his employment and whether the theme park
can be held responsible.

Rule:
Vicarious liability holds employers responsible for the actions of
their employees when those actions occur within the course of
employment (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001]). If the employee’s
actions are closely connected to their duties, the employer may
be held liable for any resulting harm.

Application:
In this case, Wyn’s actions—locking the doors and failing to check
the CCTV—occurred during the course of his employment and
were related to his duties. Therefore, the theme park is
vicariously liable for his negligence.

Conclusion:
The theme park can be held vicariously liable for Wyn’s actions.
His failure to check the CCTV and his negligence in locking the
doors falls within the scope of his employment, making the theme
park responsible for any harm caused.

10. Dai’s Payment Claim

Issue:
The issue is whether Dai can claim payment for the extra work he
did when working at the mine. This concerns the question of
whether there was a valid contract between Dai and Carwyn for
the additional work and whether it was supported by valid
consideration.

Rule:
For a contract to be enforceable, there must be an offer,
acceptance, and consideration. Williams v Roffey Bros [1991] held
that if a promise to pay extra for work provides a practical benefit
to the promisor, it can be enforceable, even if it involves
performance of a pre-existing duty.

Application:
Dai performed additional work at the mine, which benefitted
Carwyn by ensuring the mine's operations continued smoothly.
This provides a practical benefit to Carwyn, making Dai’s claim for
additional payment enforceable under Williams v Roffey Bros.

Conclusion:
Dai is likely entitled to the additional payment for his work at the
mine, as it provided a practical benefit to Carwyn and constitutes
valid consideration for the promise.