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100% found this document useful (6 votes)
26 views

Download Study Resources for New Perspectives on HTML5 CSS3 JavaScript 6th Edition Carey Solutions Manual

The document provides information on downloading various test banks and solution manuals, specifically for the book 'New Perspectives on HTML5, CSS3, and JavaScript 6th Edition' by Carey. It includes links to additional resources and products related to HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and other subjects. The content emphasizes comprehensive coverage of web development concepts, practical exercises, and problem-solving skills.

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© © All Rights Reserved
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Discover the thorough instruction you need to build dynamic, interactive Web sites from
scratch with NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HTML5, CSS3, AND JAVASCRIPT, 6E. This
user-friendly book provides comprehensive coverage of HTML, CSS, and JavaScript
with an inviting approach that starts with the basics and does not require any prior
knowledge on the subject. Detailed explanations of key concepts and skills make even
the most challenging topics clear and accessible. Case scenarios and case problems
place the most complex concepts within an understandable and practical context. You
develop important problem solving skills as you work through realistic exercises. Proven
applications and an interesting approach help you retain the material and apply what
you’ve learned in a professional environment.

1. Preface
2. Brief Contents
3. Table of Contents
4. Tutorial 1: Getting Started with HTML5: Creating a Website for a Food Vendor
5. Session 1.1 Visual Overview: The Structure of an HTML Document
6. Exploring the World Wide Web
7. Introducing HTML
8. Tools for Working with HTML
9. Exploring an HTML Document
10. Creating the Document Head
11. Adding Comments to Your Document
12. Session 1.1 Quick Check
13. Session 1.2 Visual Overview: HTML Page Elements
14. Writing the Page Body
15. Linking an HTML Document to a Style Sheet
16. Working with Character Sets and Special Characters
17. Working with Inline Images
18. Working with Block Quotes and Other Elements
19. Session 1.2 Quick Check
20. Session 1.3 Visual Overview: Lists and Hypertext Links
21. Working with Lists
22. Working with Hypertext Links
23. Specifying the Folder Path
24. Linking to a Location within a Document
25. Linking to the Internet and Other Resources
26. Working with Hypertext Attributes
27. Session 1.3 Quick Check
28. Review Assignments
29. Case Problems
30. Tutorial 2: Getting Started with CSS: Designing a Website for a Fitness Club
31. Session 2.1 Visual Overview: CSS Styles and Colors
32. Introducing CSS
33. Exploring Style Rules
34. Creating a Style Sheet
35. Working with Color in CSS
36. Employing Progressive Enhancement
37. Session 2.1 Quick Check
38. Session 2.2 Visual Overview: CSS Typography
39. Exploring Selector Patterns
40. Working with Fonts
41. Setting the Font Size
42. Controlling Spacing and Indentation
43. Working with Font Styles
44. Session 2.2 Quick Check
45. Session 2.3 Visual Overview: Pseudo Elements and Classes
46. Formatting Lists
47. Working with Margins and Padding
48. Using Pseudo-Classes and Pseudo-Elements
49. Generating Content with CSS
50. Inserting Quotation Marks
51. Session 2.3 Quick Check
52. Review Assignments
53. Case Problems
54. Tutorial 3: Designing a Page Layout: Creating a Website for a Chocolatier
55. Session 3.1 Visual Overview: Page Layout with Floating Elements
56. Introducing the display Style
57. Creating a Reset Style Sheet
58. Exploring Page Layout Designs
59. Working with Width and Height
60. Floating Page Content
61. Session 3.1 Quick Check
62. Session 3.2 Visual Overview: Page Layout Grids
63. Introducing Grid Layouts
64. Setting up a Grid
65. Outlining a Grid
66. Introducing CSS Grids
67. Session 3.2 Quick Check
68. Session 3.3 Visual Overview: Layout with Positioning Styles
69. Positioning Objects
70. Handling Overflow
71. Clipping an Element
72. Stacking Elements
73. Session 3.3 Quick Check
74. Review Assignments
75. Case Problems
76. Tutorial 4: Graphic Design with CSS: Creating a Graphic Design for a Genealogy
Website
77. Session 4.1 Visual Overview: Backgrounds and Borders
78. Creating Figure Boxes
79. Exploring Background Styles
80. Working with Borders
81. Session 4.1 Quick Check
82. Session 4.2 Visual Overview: Shadows and Gradients
83. Creating Drop Shadows
84. Applying a Color Gradient
85. Creating Semi-Transparent Objects
86. Session 4.2 Quick Check
87. Session 4.3 Visual Overview: Transformations and Filters
88. Transforming Page Objects
89. Exploring CSS Filters
90. Working with Image Maps
91. Session 4.3 Quick Check
92. Review Assignments
93. Case Problems
94. Tutorial 5: Designing for the Mobile Web: Creating a Mobile Website for a Daycare
Center
95. Session 5.1 Visual Overview: Media Queries
96. Introducing Responsive Design
97. Introducing Media Queries
98. Exploring Viewports and Device Width
99. Creating a Mobile Design
100. Creating a Tablet Design
101. Creating a Desktop Design
102. Session 5.1 Quick Check
103. Session 5.2 Visual Overview: Flexbox Layouts
104. Introducing Flexible Boxes
105. Working with Flex Items
106. Reordering Page Content with Flexboxes
107. Exploring Flexbox Layouts
108. Creating a Navicon Menu
109. Session 5.2 Quick Check
110. Session 5.3 Visual Overview: Print Styles
111. Designing for Printed Media
112. Working with the @page Rule
113. Working with Page Breaks
114. Session 5.3 Quick Check
115. Review Assignments
116. Case Problems
117. Tutorial 6: Working with Tables and Columns: Creating a Program Schedule
for a Radio Station
118. Session 6.1 Visual Overview: Structure of a Web Table
119. Introducing Web Tables
120. Adding Table Borders with CSS
121. Spanning Rows and Columns
122. Creating a Table Caption
123. Session 6.1 Quick Check
124. Session 6.2 Visual Overview: Rows and Column Groups
125. Creating Row Groups
126. Creating Column Groups
127. Exploring CSS Styles and Web Tables
128. Tables and Responsive Design
129. Designing a Column Layout
130. Session 6.2 Quick Check
131. Review Assignments
132. Case Problems
133. Tutorial 7: Designing a Web Form: Creating a Survey Form
134. Session 7.1 Visual Overview: Structure of a Web Form
135. Introducing Web Forms
136. Starting a Web Form
137. Creating a Field Set
138. Creating Input Boxes
139. Adding Field Labels
140. Designing a Form Layout
141. Defining Default Values and Placeholders
142. Session 7.1 Quick Check
143. Session 7.2 Visual Overview: Web Form Widgets
144. Entering Date and Time Values
145. Creating a Selection List
146. Creating Option Buttons
147. Creating Check Boxes
148. Creating a Text Area Box
149. Session 7.2 Quick Check
150. Session 7.3 Visual Overview: Data Validation
151. Entering Numeric Data
152. Suggesting Options with Data Lists
153. Working with Form Buttons
154. Validating a Web Form
155. Applying Inline Validation
156. Session 7.3 Quick Check
157. Review Assignments
158. Case Problems
159. Tutorial 8: Enhancing a Website with Multimedia: Working with Sound, Video,
and Animation
160. Session 8.1 Visual Overview: Playing Web Audio
161. Introducing Multimedia on the Web
162. Working with the audio Element
163. Exploring Embedded Objects
164. Session 8.1 Quick Check
165. Session 8.2 Visual Overview: Playing Web Video
166. Exploring Digital Video
167. Using the HTML5 video Element
168. Adding a Text Track to Video
169. Using Third-Party Video Players
170. Session 8.2 Quick Check
171. Session 8.3 Visual Overview: Transitions and Animations
172. Creating Transitions with CSS
173. Animating Objects with CSS
174. Session 8.3 Quick Check
175. Review Assignments
176. Case Problems
177. Tutorial 9: Getting Started with JavaScript: Creating a Countdown Clock
178. Session 9.1 Visual Overview: Creating a JavaScript File
179. Introducing JavaScript
180. Working with the script Element
181. Creating a JavaScript Program
182. Debugging Your Code
183. Session 9.1 Quick Check
184. Session 9.2 Visual Overview: JavaScript Variables and Dates
185. Introducing Objects
186. Changing Properties and Applying Methods
187. Writing HTML Code
188. Working with Variables
189. Working with Date Objects
190. Session 9.2 Quick Check
191. Session 9.3 Visual Overview: JavaScript Functions and Expressions
192. Working with Operators and Operands
193. Working with the Math Object
194. Working with JavaScript Functions
195. Running Timed Commands
196. Controlling How JavaScript Works with Numeric Values
197. Session 9.3 Quick Check
198. Review Assignments
199. Case Problems
200. Tutorial 10: Exploring Arrays, Loops, and Conditional Statements: Creating a
Monthly Calendar
201. Session 10.1 Visual Overview: Creating and Using Arrays
202. Introducing the Monthly Calendar
203. Introducing Arrays
204. Session 10.1 Quick Check
205. Session 10.2 Visual Overview: Applying a Program Loop
206. Working with Program Loops
207. Comparison and Logical Operators
208. Program Loops and Arrays
209. Session 10.2 Quick Check
210. Session 10.3 Visual Overview: Conditional Statements
211. Introducing Conditional Statements
212. Completing the Calendar App
213. Managing Program Loops and Conditional Statements
214. Session 10.3 Quick Check
215. Review Assignments
216. Case Problems
217. Tutorial 11: Working with Events and Styles: Designing an Interactive Puzzle
218. Session 11.1 Visual Overview: Event Handlers and Event Objects
219. Introducing JavaScript Events
220. Creating an Event Handler
221. Using the Event Object
222. Exploring Object Properties
223. Session 11.1 Quick Check
224. Session 11.2 Visual Overview: Event Listeners and Cursors
225. Working with Mouse Events
226. Introducing the Event Model
227. Exploring Keyboard Events
228. Changing the Cursor Style
229. Session 11.2 Quick Check
230. Session 11.3 Visual Overview: Anonymous Functions and Dialog Boxes
231. Working with Functions as Objects
232. Displaying Dialog Boxes
233. Session 11.3 Quick Check
234. Review Assignments
235. Case Problems
236. Tutorial 12: Working with Document Nodes and Style Sheets: Creating a
Dynamic Document Outline
237. Session 12.1 Visual Overview: Exploring the Node Tree
238. Introducing Nodes
239. Creating and Appending Nodes
240. Working with Node Types, Names, and Values
241. Session 12.1 Quick Check
242. Session 12.2 Visual Overview: Exploring Attribute Nodes
243. Creating a Nested List
244. Working with Attribute Nodes
245. Session 12.2 Quick Check
246. Session 12.3 Visual Overview: Style Sheets and Style Rules
247. Working with Style Sheets
248. Working with Style Sheet Rules
249. Session 12.3 Quick Check
250. Review Assignments
251. Case Problems
252. Tutorial 13: Programming for Web Forms: Creatings Forms for Orders and
Payments
253. Session 13.1 Visual Overview: Forms and Elements
254. Exploring the Forms Object
255. Working with Form Elements
256. Working with Input Fields
257. Working with Selection Lists
258. Working with Options Buttons and Check Boxes
259. Formatting Numeric Values
260. Applying Form Events
261. Working with Hidden Fields
262. Session 13.1 Quick Check
263. Session 13.2 Visual Overview: Passing Data between Forms
264. Sharing Data between Forms
265. Working with Text Strings
266. Introducing Regular Expressions
267. Programming with Regular Expressions
268. Session 13.2 Quick Check
269. Session 13.3 Visual Overview: Validating Form Data
270. Validating Data with JavaScript
271. Testing a Form Field against a Regular Expression
272. Testing for Legitimate Card Numbers
273. Session 13.3 Quick Check
274. Review Assignments
275. Case Problems
276. Tutorial 14: Exploring Object-Based Programming: Designing an Online Poker
Game
277. Session 14.1 Visual Overview: Custom Objects, Properties, and Methods
278. Working with Nested Functions
279. Introducing Custom Objects
280. Session 14.1 Quick Check
281. Session 14.2 Visual Overview: Object Classes and Prototypes
282. Defining an Object Type
283. Working with Object Prototypes
284. Session 14.2 Quick Check
285. Session 14.3 Visual Overview: Objects and Arrays
286. Combining Objects
287. Combining Objects and Arrays
288. Session 14.3 Quick Check
289. Review Assignments
290. Case Problems
291. Appendix A: Color Names with Color Values, and HTML Character Entities
292. Appendix B: HTML Elements and Attributes
293. Appendix C: Cascading Styles and Selectors
294. Appendix D: Making the Web More Accessible
295. Appendix E: Designing for the Web
296. Appendix F: Page Validation with XHTML
297. Glossary
298. Index
Other documents randomly have
different content
country," he said, "it was clear to them that the truce in industry
could not be continued unless some effective relief were given in
regard to the prices under discussion." In other words, the Labour
"organisers" will call for strikes—perhaps hold up a large part of our
war preparations—unless the employers, most of whom are making
no increased profit out of the price of food, are prepared to shoulder
the entire burden.
It is quite clear, to my mind, that the prices of food are being forced
up by gigantic unpatriotic combines, either in this country or abroad,
or both. I do not think that mere shortage of supply is sufficient to
account for the extraordinary advances that have taken place.
Whether the Government can take steps to defeat the wheat rings,
as they did to prevent the cornering of sugar, is a question with
which I am not concerned here. My purpose is merely to point out
that the constant rise in food prices, brought about by gangs of
unscrupulous speculators, is bringing about a condition of affairs
fraught with grave peril to our beloved country.
If we turn to coal we find the scandal ten times greater than in the
case of flour and meat. It is at least possible that agencies outside
our own country may be playing a great part in forcing up the prices
of food; they can have no effect upon the price of coal, which we
produce ourselves and of which we do not import an ounce. Coal to-
day is simply at famine prices. It is impossible to buy the best house
coal for less than 38s. per ton, while the cheapest is being sold at
34s. per ton, and the very poor, who buy from the street-trolleys
only inferior coal and in small quantities, are being fleeced to the
extent of 1s. 11d. or 2s. per cwt. This is an exceedingly serious
matter, and it is not to be explained, even under present conditions,
by the ordinary laws of supply and demand. Why should coal in a
village on the banks of the Thames be actually cheaper than the
corresponding quality of coal when sold in London?
There can be only one answer—the London supply is in the hands of
the coal "ring" which has compelled all the London coal merchants
to come into line. So extensive and powerful is the organisation of
this ring, that the small men, unless they followed the lead of the big
dealers, would be immediately faced with ruin: they would not only
find it difficult to obtain coal at all, but would promptly be undersold
—as the Standard Oil Company undersold thousands of small
competitors—until they were compelled to put up their shutters.
The big coal men, the men who make the profit—and with their ill-
gotten gains will purchase Birthday honours later on—of course
blame the war for everything. The railways, they say, cannot handle
the coal; so much labour has been withdrawn for the Army that
production has fallen below the demand. But I am assured, on good
authority, that coal bought before the war, and delivered to London
depots at 16s. or 17s. per ton, is being retailed to-day at between
36s. and 40s. per ton. The big dealers know that, cost what it may,
the public must have coal, and they are taking advantage of every
plausible excuse the war offers them to wring from the public the
very highest prices possible. "The right to exploit," in fact, is being
pushed to its logical extreme in the face of the country's distress,
and the worst sufferers, as usual, are the very poor, who for their
pitiful half-hundred-weights of inferior rubbish pay at a rate which
would be ample for the finest coal that could grace the grate of a
West-End drawing-room.
Can we shut our eyes to the fact that in this shameful exploiting of
the very poor by the unpatriotic lie all the elements of a very serious
danger? Let us not forget the noble services the working-classes of
Britain are rendering to our beloved country. They have given the
best and dearest of their manhood in the cause of the Empire, and it
is indeed a pitiful confession of weakness, and an ironic commentary
on the grandiose schemes of "social reform" with which they have
been tempted of late years, if the Government cannot or will not
protect them from the human leeches—the Birthday knights in the
making—who suck their ill-gotten gains from those least able to
protect themselves.
The Government have promised an inquiry which may, if unusual
expedition is shown, make a "demonstration" with the coal-dealers
just about the time the warm weather arrives. Prices will then
tumble, the Government will solemnly pat itself upon the back for its
successful interference, and the coal merchants, having made small
or large fortunes as the case may be during the winter, will make a
great virtue of reducing their demands to oblige the Government. In
the meantime, the poor are being fleeced in the interests of an
unscrupulous combine. Is there no peril here to our beloved
country? Are we not justified in saying that the machinations of
these gangs of unscrupulous capitalists are rapidly tending to
produce a condition of affairs which may, at any moment, expose us
to a social upheaval which would contain all the germs of an
unparalleled disaster?
Let the condition of affairs in certain sections of the labour world
speak in answer. I have already quoted the thinly-veiled threat of Mr.
Clynes. Others have gone beyond threats and have begun a war
against their country on their own account. There is an unmistakable
tendency, fostered as usual by agitators of the basest class, towards
action which is, in effect, helping the Germans against our brave
soldiers and sailors who are enduring hardships of war such as have
not been equalled since the days of the Crimea.
HOW WE SUPPLY THE GERMAN ARMY WITH
FOOD
Exports of Cocoa to Neutral Countries
(for the German Market)
Dec. 1, 1913, to Mar. Dec. 1, 1914, to Mar.
1, 1914 1, 1915
3,584,003 lbs. 16,575,017 lbs.
Exports of Tea to Neutral Countries
(for the German Market)
Dec. 1, 1913, to Mar. Dec. 1, 1914, to Mar.
1, 1914 1, 1915
1,146,237 lbs. 15,808,628 lbs.
As I wrote these lines, strikes on a large scale had begun on the
Clyde and on the Tyne, two of our most important shipbuilding
centres, where great contracts—essential to the success of our arms
—are being carried on, and in the London Docks, where most of the
food of London's teeming millions is handled. London dockers, to the
number of some 25,000, are agitating for a rise in wages; between
5,000 and 6,000 of them have struck work at the Victoria and Albert
Dock on the question, forsooth, whether they shall be engaged
inside the docks, or outside. In other words, the expeditious
handling of London's sorely needed food is being jeopardised by a
ridiculous squabble which one would think half a dozen capable
business men could settle in five minutes. But here, as usual, the
poorest are the victims of their own class.
In spite of the well-meaning but idiotic young women who have
gone about distributing white feathers to men who, in their opinion,
ought to have joined the Army, common-sense people will recognise
that the skilled workers in many trades are just as truly fighting the
battles of their country as if they were serving with the troops in
Belgium or France. If every able-bodied man joined the Army to-day
the nation would collapse for want of supplies to feed the fighting
lines. It is not my purpose here to discuss whether the men or the
masters are right in the disputes in the engineering trades. Probably
the authorities have not done enough to bring home to the men the
knowledge that, in executing Government work, they are in fact
helping to fight the country's battles. None the less the men who
strike at the present moment delay work which is absolutely
essential to the safety of our country. We know from Lord
Kitchener's own lips that they have done so.
Our war organisation to-day may be divided into three parts—the
Navy fighting on the sea, the Army fighting on land, and the
industrial army providing supplies for the other two. It must be
brought home to the last named, by every device in our power, that
their duties are just as important to our success as the work of their
brothers on the storm-swept North Sea, or in the mud and slush and
peril of the trenches in Flanders. This war is very largely a war of
supplies, and our fighting must be done not only in the far-flung
battle lines, but in the factory and workshop, whose outputs are
essential to the far deadlier work which we ask of the men who are
heroically facing the shells and bullets of the common enemy.
Now there is no disguising the fact that the industrial army at home
contains far too large a percentage of "slackers."
That is the universal testimony of men who know. There are
thousands of workmen who will not keep full time, for the simple
reason that they are making more money than they really need and
are so lazy and unpatriotic that they will not make the extra effort
which the necessities of the situation so urgently demand. What we
need to-day is, above all things, determined hard work: we do not
want to see our fighting forces starved for want of material caused
by the shirking of the "slackers" or by unpatriotic disputes and
squabbles. To-day we are fighting for our lives. The privates of the
industrial army ought to realise that "slacking" or striking is just as
much a criminal offence as desertion in the face of the enemy would
be in the case of a soldier. It is true, as a recent writer has said, that
"those who fight industrially, working long hours in a spirit of high
patriotism, may not seem very heroic," but it is none the less the
fact that they are fighting: they are doing the work that is essential
to our national safety and welfare. Do they—at least do some of
them—realise this? The following extract from Engineering, the well-
known technical journal, shows very clearly that among certain
classes of highly paid workers there is a total disregard of our
national necessity which is positively appalling. As the result of a
series of inquiries Engineering says:

"Every reply received indicates that there is slackness in many


trades. Be it remembered that high wages can be earned; for
relatively unskilled although somewhat arduous work, 30s. a
day can be earned.
"Time-and-a-quarter to time-and-a-half is paid for Saturday
afternoon work, and double time for Sunday work. Men could
earn from £7 to £10 per week—and pay no income-tax.
"Men will work on Saturday and Sunday, when they get
handsomely paid, but will absent themselves on other days or
parts of days.
"The head of a firm, who has shown a splendid example in his
work, and is most kindly disposed to all workers, states in his
reply to us: 'Our trouble is principally with the ironworkers,
especially riveters, who appear to have a definite standard of
living, and who regulate their wages accordingly; they seem to
aim at making £3 per week: if they can make this in four days,
good and well; but if they can make it in three days, better
still.... The average working-man of to-day does not wish to
earn more money, and put by something for a 'rainy day,' but is
quite content to live from hand to mouth, so long as he has as
easy a time as possible."

What words are strong enough to condemn the action of such men
who, safe in their homes from the perils of the serving soldier, and
infinitely better paid than the man who daily risks his life in the
trenches, are ready deliberately to jeopardise the safety of our
Empire by taking advantage of the gravest crisis in our history to
levy what is nothing less than industrial blackmail? It cannot be
pretended that these men are under-paid: they can earn far more
than many members of the professional classes. Just as truly as the
coal and wheat "rings" are exploiting the miseries of the very poor,
so these aristocrats of the labour world are playing with the lives of
their fellows and the destinies of our Empire. They are helping the
enemy just as surely as the German who is fighting in his country's
ranks. They are, in short, taking advantage of a national danger to
demand rates of pay which, in times of safety and peace, they could
not possibly secure.
For years past we have been striving to arrive at some means of
settling these unhappy labour disputes which have probably done
more harm to British trade than all the German competition of which
we have heard so much. In every district machinery has been set up
for conciliation and settlement where a settlement is sincerely
desired by both parties to a dispute. And if this machinery is not set
in motion at the present moment, it is because one party or the
other is so blind and self-willed that it would rather jeopardise the
Empire than abate a jot of its demands. Could anything be more
heart-breaking to the men who are fighting and dying in the
trenches?
Whatever may be the merits of any dispute, there must be no
stoppage of War Office or Admiralty work at the present moment,
and if any body of men refuse at this juncture to submit their
dispute to the properly organised conciliation boards, and to abide
by the result, they are traitors in the fullest sense of the world. How
serious the crisis is, and how grave a peril it constitutes to our
country, may be judged from the fact that the Government found it
necessary to appoint a special Committee to inquire into the
production in engineering and shipbuilding establishments engaged
in Government work. The Committee's view of the case, which I
venture to think will be endorsed by every thinking man, may be
judged by the following extract from their report:

"We are strongly of opinion that, during the present crisis,


employers and workmen should under no circumstances allow
their differences to result in a stoppage of work.
"Whatever may be the rights of the parties at normal times, and
whatever may be the methods considered necessary for the
maintenance and enforcement of these rights, we think there
can be no justification whatever for a resort to strikes or
lockouts under present conditions, when the resulting cessation
of work would prevent the production of ships, guns,
equipment, stores, or other commodities required by the
Government for the purposes of the war."

The Committee went on to recommend that in cases where the


parties could not agree, the dispute should be referred to an
impartial tribunal, and the Government accordingly appointed a
special Committee to deal with any matters that might be brought
before it.
I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the seriousness of the
danger with which we must be threatened if these unhappy disputes
are not brought to a close, and I know of no incident since the war
began that has shown us up in so unfavourable a light as compared
with our enemy. Whatever we may think of Germany's infamous
methods; whatever views we may hold of her monstrous mistakes;
whatever our opinion may be as to the final outcome of the war, we
must, at least, grant to the Germans the virtue of patriotism. The
German Socialists are, it is notorious, as strongly opposed to war as
any people on earth. But they have, since the great struggle began,
shown themselves willing to sink their personal views when the
safety of the Fatherland is threatened in what, to them, is a war of
aggression, deliberately undertaken by their enemies. We have
heard, since the war began, a great deal of wild and foolish talk
about economic distress in Germany. We have been told, simply
because the German Government has wisely taken timely
precautions to prevent a possible shortage of food, that the German
nation is on the verge of starvation. But would Germany, who for
seven years prepared for war, overlook the vital question of her food
supply? Probably it is true that the industrial depression in Germany,
thanks to the destruction by our Navy of her overseas trade, is very
much worse than it is in England. But no one has yet suggested that
the Krupp workmen are threatening to come out on strike and
paralyse the defensive forces if their demands for higher wages are
not instantly conceded. It is more than probable that any one who
suggested such a course, even if he escaped the heavy hand of the
Government, would be speedily suppressed in very rough-and-ready
fashion by his own comrades. The Germans, at least, will tolerate no
treachery in their midst, and unless the leaders among the English
trade unionists can bring their men to a realisation of the wickedness
involved in strikes at the present moment, they will assuredly forfeit
every vestige of public respect and confidence.
I am not holding a brief either for the masters or the men. Let ample
inquiry be made, by all means, into the subject of the dispute. If the
masters raise any objection to either the sitting or the finding of the
Government Commission, they deserve all the blame that naturally
attaches to the strikers. The inquiry should be loyally accepted by
both sides, and its findings as loyally respected. Prima facie, men
who can earn the wages mentioned in the extract from Engineering
which I have already quoted are well off—far better off than their
comrades who are doing trench duty in France, and are free from
the hourly risk to which the fighting forces are exposed. There may
be, however, good and valid reasons why they should be paid even
better. If there are, the Government inquiry should find them out.
But to stop work now, to hold up the production of the ships, guns,
and materials necessary to carry on the war, is criminal, wicked, and
unpatriotic in the highest degree. It is setting an evil example only
too likely to be followed, and, if it is persisted in, may well be the
first step of our beloved nation on the downward road which leads
to utter destruction.
Mr. Archibald Hurd, a writer always well informed, has summed up
the situation in the Daily Telegraph in the following words, which are
worth quotation:

"The recruiting movement has shown that the great industrial


classes are not, as a whole, unconscious of the stake for which
we are fighting—the institutions which we cherish and our
freedom. Probably if the workers at home were reminded of the
importance of their labours, they would speedily fall into line—if
not, well, the resources of civilisation are not exhausted, and
the Government should be able to ensure that not an
unnecessary day, or even hour, shall be lost in pressing forward
the work of equipping the new Fleet and the new Army which is
essential to our salvation. The Government is exercising
authority under martial law over Army and Navy; cannot it get
efficient control over the industrial army?
"In France and Germany these powers exist, and are employed.
We are not less committed to the great struggle than France
and Germany."

Those are wise and weighty words, and it may be that they point the
way to a solution of what may become a very grave problem.

CHAPTER III
THE PERIL OF NOT DOING ENOUGH

The vast issues raised by the war make it a matter of most


imperative necessity that Great Britain and her Allies shall put
forward, at the earliest possible moment, the greatest and
supremest efforts of which they are capable, in order that the
military power of the Austro-German alliance should be definitely
and completely crushed for ever.
It must never be forgotten that the prize for which Germany is
fighting is the mastership of Europe, the humbling of the power of
Great Britain, and the imposition of a definitely Teutonic "Kultur"
over the whole of Western civilisation. That the free and liberty-
loving British peoples should ever come under the heel of the
Prussian Junker spirit involves such a monstrous suppression of
national thought and feeling as to be almost unbelievable. Yet,
assuredly, that would be our fate and the fate of every nationality in
Europe should Germany emerge victorious from this Titanic struggle
she has so rashly and presumptuously provoked.
With our very existence as the ruling race at stake it is clear that our
own dear country cannot afford to be sparing in her efforts.
Whatever the cost; whatever the slaughter; whatever the action of
our Allies may be in the future, when the terrific out-pouring of
wealth will have bled Europe white, we, at least, cannot afford to
falter. For our own land, the struggle is really, and in very truth, a
struggle of life and death.
If we endure and win, civilisation, as we understand it to-day, will be
safe; if we lose, then Western civilisation and the British Empire will
go down together in the greatest cataclysm in human history. Now
are we doing everything in our power to avert the threatening peril?
Moreover—and this is of greatest importance—are our Allies
persuaded that we are really making the great efforts the occasion
demands? This gives us to pause.
Let us admit we are not, and we have never pretended to be, a
military nation in the sense that France, Russia, and Germany have
been military nations. We have been seamen for a thousand years,
and the frontiers of England are the salt waves which girdle our
coasts. Seeking no territory on the Continent of Europe, and
unconcerned in European disputes unless they directly—as in the
present instance—threaten our national existence, our armed forces
have ever been regarded as purely defensive, yet not aggressive. For
our defence we have relied on our naval power; perhaps in days
gone by we have assumed, rather too rashly, that we should never
be called upon to take part in land-fighting on a continental scale.
Even after the present war had broken out, it was possible for the
Parliamentary correspondent of a London Liberal paper to write that
certain Liberal Members of the House of Commons were protesting
against the sending of British troops to the Continent on the ground
that they were too few in number to exercise any influence in a
European war! Perish that thought for ever! I mention this amazing
contention merely to show how imperfectly the issues raised by the
present conflict were appreciated in the early days of the struggle.
To-day we see the establishment of the British Army raised by
Parliamentary sanction to 3,000,000 men without a single protest
being uttered against a figure which, had it been even hinted at, a
year ago would have been received with yells of derision. Yet, in
spite of that vast number, I still ask "Are we doing enough?" In other
words, looking calmly at the stupendous gravity of the issues
involved, is there any further effort we could possibly make to
shorten the duration of the war?
For eight months German agents, armed with German gold, have
been industriously propagating, in France and in Russia, the theory
that those countries were, in fact, pulling the chestnuts out of the
fire for England. German agents are everywhere. We were
represented as holding the comfortable view that our fleet was doing
all that we could reasonably be called upon to undertake; that,
secure behind our sea barriers, we were simply carrying on a policy
of "business as usual" with the minimum of effort and loss and the
maximum of gain through our principal competitors in the world's
commerce being temporarily disabled. The object of this manœuvre
was plain. Germany hoped to sow the seeds of jealousy and discord,
and to thrust a wedge into the solid alliance against her. Now it is,
to-day, beyond all question that, to some extent at least, this
manœuvre was successful. A certain proportion of people in both
France and Russia, perhaps, grew restive. In the best-informed
circles it was, of course, fully recognised that Britain, with her small
standing Army, could not, by any possibility, instantly fling huge
forces into the field. The less well informed, influenced by the
German propaganda, began to think we were too slow. This feeling
began to gather strength, and it was not until M. Millerand, the
French Minister for War, whom I have known for years, had actually
visited England and seen the preparations that were in progress,
that French opinion, fully informed by a series of capable articles in
the French Press, settled down to the conviction that England was
really in earnest. Unquestionably, M. Millerand rendered a most
valuable service to the cause of the Allies by his outspoken
declarations, and he was fully supported by the responsible leaders
of French thought and opinion. The cleverly laid German plot failed,
and our Allies to-day realise that we have unsheathed our sword in
the deadliest earnest.
In spite of this, however, the thoughtful section of the public have
been asking themselves whether, in fact, our military action is not
slower than it should have been. Germany, we must remember,
started this war with all the tremendous advantage secured by years
of steady and patient preparation for a contest she was fully
resolved to precipitate as soon as she judged the moment
opportune. She lost the first trick in the game, thanks to the
splendid heroism of Belgium, the unexpected rapidity of the French
and Russian mobilisation, and lastly, the wholly surprising power
with which Britain intervened in the fray—the pebble in the cog-
wheels of the German machinery.
The end of the first stage, represented, roughly, by the driving of the
Germans from the Marne to the Aisne, temporarily exhausted all the
combatants, and there followed a long period of comparative
inaction, during which all the parties to the quarrel, like boxers in
distress, sparred to gain their "second wind." Now just as Germany
was better prepared when the first round opened, so she was,
necessarily, more advanced in her preparations for the second stage.
Thanks to her scheme of training, there was a very real risk that her
vast masses of new levies would be ready before our own—and this
has actually proved to be the case.
New troops are to-day being poured on to both the eastern and
western fronts at a very rapid pace, probably more rapidly than our
own. We know that it was, in great part, their new levies that
inflicted the very severe reverse upon the Russians in East Prussia
and undid, in a single fortnight, months of steady and patient work
by our Allies. It is also probably true that Germany's immense
superiority in fully trained fighting men is steadily decreasing, owing
partly to the enormous losses she has sustained through her
adherence to methods of attack which are hopeless in the teeth of
modern weapons. But she is still very much ahead of what any one
could have expected after seven months of strenuous war, and we
must ask ourselves very seriously whether, by some tremendous
national effort, it is not possible to expedite the raising of our forces
to the very maximum of which the nation and the Empire are
capable. It is not a question of cost: the cost would be as nothing as
compared with the havoc wrought by the prolongation of the war. If
there is anything more that we can do, we ought, emphatically, to
do it. It is our business to see that at no single point in the conduct
of the war are we out-stripped by any effort the Germans can make.
Now it is a tolerably open secret that we are not to-day getting the
men we shall want before we can bring the war to a conclusion.
Why? When our men read of the utter disregard of the spy question,
of the glaring untruths told by Ministers in the House of Commons,
of how we are providing German barons with valets on prison ships
—comfortable liners, by the way—of the letting loose of German
prisoners from internment camps, and how German officers have
actually been allowed, recently, to depart from Tilbury to Holland to
fight against us, is it any wonder that they hesitate to come forward
to do their share? Let the reader ask himself. Are all Departments of
the Government patriotic? Is it not a fact that the public are daily
being misled and bamboozled? Let the reader examine the evidence
and then think.
Now, though no figures as to the progress of recruiting have been
published for some months, it is practically certain that we are still
very far from the three million men we still assuredly require as a
minimum before victory, definite and unmistakable, crowns our
effort. I have not the slightest doubt that before this struggle ends
we shall see practically the entire male population of the country
called to the colours in some capacity, and unfortunately that is an
aspect of the case which is certainly not yet recognised by the
democracy as a whole. We have done much, it is true. We have
surprised our friends and our enemies alike—perhaps we have even
surprised ourselves—by what has been achieved, but on the
technical side of the war, under the tremendous driving energy of
Lord Kitchener, amazing progress has been made in the provision of
equipment, and the latest information I have been able to obtain
suggests that before long the early shortage of guns, rifles,
uniforms, and other war material will have been entirely overcome,
and that we shall be experiencing a shortage, not of supplies—but
alas! of men.
That day cannot be far off, and when it dawns the problem of raising
men will assume an urgency of which hitherto we have had no
experience. Up to now we have been content to tolerate the
somewhat leisurely drift of the young men to the colours for the
simple reason that we had not the facilities for training and
equipping them. We cannot, and we must not, tolerate any
slackness in the future. The wastage of modern war is appallingly
beyond the average conception, and when our big new armies take
the field, that wastage will rise to stupendous figures. It must be
made good without the slightest delay by constant drafts of new,
fully trained men, and when that demand rises, as it inevitably will,
to a pitch of which we have hitherto had no experience, it will have
to be met. Can it be met by the leisurely methods with which we
have hitherto been content?
I do not think so for a moment, and I am convinced that our
responsible Ministers should at once take the country fully into their
confidence and tell us plainly and unmistakably what the man-in-
the-street has to expect. I have so profound an admiration for the
men who have voluntarily come forward in the hour of their
country's need that I hope, with all my heart, their example will be
followed—and followed quickly—to the full extent of our nation's
needs. But I confess I am not sanguine. The recent strikes in the
engineering trade on the Clyde have gone far to convince me that,
even now, a very large proportion of our industrial classes do not
even to-day realise the real seriousness of the position, for it is
incredible that Britons who understood that we are actually engaged
in a struggle for our very existence should seriously jeopardise and
delay, through a miserable industrial squabble, the supply of war
material upon which the safety of our Empire might depend. The
strike on the Clyde was, to me, the most evil symptom of apathy and
lack of all patriotic instincts which the war has brought forth; it was,
to my mind, proof conclusive that a section at least of our working-
classes are entirely dead to the great national impulse by which, in
the past, the British people have been so profoundly swayed. Is the
Government doing enough to rekindle those impulses? Has it taken
the people fully and frankly into its confidence? Above all, has it
made it sufficiently clear to the masses that we are not getting the
men we need, and that unless those men come forward voluntarily,
some method of compulsory selection will become inevitable?
No, it has not!
We come back to the question in which, I am firmly convinced, lies
the solution of many of our present difficulties—are we being told
the truth about the war? Has the nation had the clear, ringing call to
action that, unquestionably, it needs?
No, it has not!
I shall try to show, in the pages of this modest work, that the
country has not been given the information to which it is plainly
entitled respecting the actual military operations which have been
accomplished. It is certainly not too much to say that the country
has not been really definitely and clearly informed as to the measure
of the effort it will be called upon to make in the future. I am not in
the secrets of the War Office, and it is impossible to say what the
policy of the Government will be, or what trump cards they hold,
ready to play them when the real crisis comes. But there certainly is
an urgent and growing need for very plain speaking. I speak plainly
and without fear. We should like to be assured that the recruiting
problem, upon the solution of which our final success must depend,
is being dealt with on broad, wise, and statesmanlike lines, and that
the Government will shrink from no measure which shall ensure our
absolute military efficiency. I have no doubt that Lord Kitchener has
a very accurate estimate of the total number of men he proposes to
put into the field before the great forward movement begins, of the
probable total wastage, and of the period for which, on the present
basis of recruiting, that wastage can be made good.
The country would welcome some very definite and explicit
statement, either from Mr. Asquith or Lord Kitchener, as to the real
position, and as to whether the Government has absolute confidence
that the requirements of the military authorities can be met under
the existing condition of affairs. The time is, indeed, more than ripe
for some grave and solemn warning to the people if, as I believe, the
effort we have made up to now, great though it has undoubtedly
been, has not been sufficient. We to-day need an authoritative
declaration on the subject. There is far too strong a tendency,
fostered by the undue reticence of the irresponsible Press Bureau
and the screeching "victories" of the newspapers, to believe that
things are going as well and smoothly as we could wish; and though
I would strenuously deprecate an attitude of blank pessimism, the
perils which hedge around a fatuous optimism are very great.
My firm conviction, and I think my readers will share in it, is that the
great mass of public opinion is daily growing more and more
apathetic towards the war, and truly that is not the mental attitude
which will bring us with safety and credit through the tremendous
ordeal which lies before us. The Government is not doing enough to
drive home the fact that greater and still greater efforts will be
required before the spectre of Prussian domination is finally laid to
rest: the country at large, befogged by the newspapers, and sullenly
angry at being kept in the dark to an extent hitherto unheard of, is
in no mood to make the supreme sacrifices upon which final victory
must depend. We are, as a result, not exercising our full strength:
we are not doing enough, and our full strength will not be exerted
until the Government takes the public into its confidence and tells
them exactly what it requires and what it intends to have. That it
would gain, rather than lose, by doing so, I have not the slightest
doubt, while the gain to the world through the throwing into the
scale of the solid weight of a fully aroused Britain would be simply
incalculable.
While writing this, came the extraordinarily belated news of the
decision of the Government to declare a strict blockade of the
German coasts. It has been a matter of supreme bewilderment to
every student of the war why this decision was not taken long
before. Why should we have failed for so long to use the very
strongest weapon which our indisputed control of the sea has placed
in our hands, is one of those things which "no fellah can
understand." We have been foolish enough to allow food, cotton,
and certain other articles of "conditional contraband" free access to
Germany, and it is beyond question that in so doing we have
enormously prolonged the war. And all this, be it remembered, at a
time when Germany was violating every law of God and man!
Assume a reversal of the prevailing conditions: would Germany have
been so foolishly indulgent towards us? Would she have treated us
with more consideration than she showed towards the starving
population of Paris in 1871? The very fact of our long inaction in this
respect adds enormously to the strong suspicion that in other
directions we are not doing as much as we should. Lord Fisher is
credited with the saying, "The essence of war is violence:
moderation in war is imbecility. Hit first, hit hard, hit everywhere."
I think it is safe to say that in more than one direction we have
displayed an imbecility of moderation which has tended to
encourage the Germans in the supreme folly of imagining that they
are at liberty to play fast and loose with the opinion of the civilised
world. Our treatment of German spies and enemy aliens in our midst
is a classic example of our contemptuous tolerance of easily
removable perils, just as much as is our incredible folly in neglecting
to make the fullest use of our magnificent naval resources. Thanks
to our tolerance, the Germans have been freely importing food and
cotton, with probably an enormous quantity of copper smuggled
through in the same ships. We have paid in the blood and lives of
our gallant soldiers, husbands, brothers, lovers, while the Germans
have laughed at us—and not without justice—as a nation of silly
dolts and imbeciles. Yet we have tardily decided upon "retaliatory
measures" which we were perfectly entitled to take the instant war
was declared, only under the pressure of Germany's campaign of
murder and piracy at sea! Are we doing enough in other directions?
Equally belated, and equally calculated to give the impression that
we have been too slow in using our strength, is the attack upon the
Dardanelles. It has long been a mystery why, in view of the
tremendous results involved in such a blow at Germany's deluded
ally, this attack was not made earlier. We do not know, and the
Government do not enlighten us. But the delay has helped to send
the price of bread to famine prices through blocking up the Russian
wheat in the Black Sea ports; it has given the Turks and the
Germans time to enormously strengthen the defences, and has
prevented us from sending to our Russian friends that support in
munitions of war of which they undoubtedly stood in need. There
may, of course, have been good reasons for the delay, but if they
exist, they have baffled the investigation of the most competent
military and naval critics. It must never be forgotten that the
reopening of the Dardanelles and the fall of Constantinople must
exercise a far more potent influence on the progress of the war
than, say, the relief of Antwerp—another example of singularly
belated effort! It must, in fact, transform the whole position of the
war and react with fatal effect through Turkey upon her Allies. Yet
the war had been in progress for seven months before a serious
attempt was made at what, directly Turkey joined in the war, must
have been one of the primary objects of the Allies. What added
price, I wonder, shall we be compelled to pay for that inexplicable
delay, not merely in the increased cost of the necessaries of life at
home and the expenses of the war abroad, but in the lives of our
fighting men? For it must not be forgotten that a decisive blow at
Turkey would do much to shorten the duration of the war. It would
be a serious blow at Germany, and would be more than likely to
precipitate the entrance into the struggle, on the side of the Allies,
of Italy and the wavering Balkan States. In hard cash, the war is
costing us nearly a million and a half a day. We have to pay it,
sooner or later. The loss of life is more serious than the loss of
wealth, and there is no doubt that both must be curtailed by any
successful operation against the Turks.
The Army has, beyond question, lost thousands of recruits of the
very best class owing to the parsimony displayed in the matter of
making provision for the dependents of men who join the fighting
forces. The scale originally proposed, it will be remembered,
produced an outburst of indignation, and it was very soon amended
in the right direction, but when all is said and done it operates with
amazing injustice. One of the most striking features of the war has
been the splendid patriotism shown by men who, in social rank, are
decidedly above the average standard of recruits.
Many comparatively rich men have joined the Army as privates, and
the roll descends in the social scale until we come down to the day
labourer. We draw no distinction between the loyalty and devotion of
any of our new soldiers, but it cannot be denied that the working of
the system of separate allowances is exceedingly unfair to the men
of the middle classes.
Financially, the family of the working-man is frequently better off
through the absence of the husband and father at the front than it
has ever been before—sometimes very much better off indeed. I am
not complaining of that. But when we ascend a little in the scale we
find a glaring inequality. The man earning, say, £250 a year, and
having a wife and one child, finds, too often, that the price he has to
pay for patriotism is to leave his family dependent upon the
Government allowance of 17s. 6d. per week. Is it a matter for
wonder that so many have hesitated to join? Can we praise too
highly the patriotism of those who, even under such circumstances,
have answered the call of duty?
The truth is that the whole system of separation allowances, framed
to meet the necessity of recruits of the ordinary standard, is inelastic
and unsuitable to a campaign which calls, or should call, the entire
nation to arms. It is throwing a great strain on a man's loyalty to ask
him to condemn his wife and family to what, in their circumstances,
amounts to semi-starvation, in order that he may serve his country,
particularly when he sees around him thousands of the young and
healthy at theatres and picture palaces, free from any domestic ties,
who persistently shut their eyes to their country's need, and whom
nothing short of some measure of compulsion would bring into the
ranks. I am not going to suggest that every man who joins the Army
should be paid the salary he could earn in civil life, but I think we
are not doing nearly enough for thousands of well-bred and gently
nurtured women who have given up husbands and brothers in the
sacred cause of freedom.
And now I come to perhaps the saddest feature of the war—the
case of the men who will return to England maimed and disabled in
their country's cause. That, for them, is supreme glory, though many
of them would have infinitely preferred giving their lives for their
country. They will come back to us in thousands, the maimed, the
halt, and the blind: pitiful wrecks of glorious manhood, with no hope
before them but to drag out the rest of their years in comparative or
absolute helplessness. Their health and their strength will have
gone; there will be no places for them in the world where men in full
health and strength fight the battle of life in the fields of commerce
and industry. Are we doing enough—have we, indeed, begun to do
anything—for these poor victims of war's fury, much more to be
pitied than the gallant men who sleep for ever where they fell on the
battle-fields of France and Belgium?
Too often in the past it has been the shame and the reproach of
Britain that she cast aside, like worn-out garments, the men who
have spent their health and strength in her cause. Have we not
heard of Crimean veterans dying in our workhouses? With all my
heart I hope that, after the war, we shall never again be open to
that reproach and shame. We must see that never again shall a
great and wealthy Empire disgrace itself by condemning its crippled
heroes to the undying bitterness of the workhouse during life, and
the ignominy of a pauper's grave after death. Cost what it may, the
future of the unhappy men "broke in our wars" must be the nation's
peculiar care. I do not suggest—they themselves would not desire it
—that all our wounded should become State pensioners en masse
and live out their lives in idleness. The men who helped to fling back
the Kaiser's barbaric hordes in the terrible struggle at Ypres are not
the men who will seek for mere charity, even when it takes the form
of a deserved reward for their heroic deeds.
Speaking broadly, the State will have the responsibility of caring for
two classes of wounded men—those who are condemned to utter
and lifelong disablement and those who, less seriously crippled, are
yet unable to obtain employment in ordinary commercial or industrial
life. As to the former class, the duty of the State is clear: they must
be suitably maintained for the rest of their lives at the State's
charges. With regard to the second class, I do most sincerely hope
that they will not be thrown into the world with a small wounds
pension and left to sink or swim as fortune and their scattered
abilities may dictate. It is for us to remember that these men have
given their health and strength that we might live in safety and
peace, and we shall be covering ourselves with infamy if we fail to
make proper provision for them.
As I have already said, they do not want charity. They want work,
and I venture to here make an earnest appeal to the public to take
up the cause of these men with all its generous heart. First and
foremost, such of them as are capable should be given absolute
preference in Government and municipal offices, where there are
thousands of posts that can be filled even by men who are partially
disabled. Every employer of labour should make it his special duty to
find positions for as many of these men as possible: there are many
places in business houses that can be quite adequately filled by men
of less than ordinary physical efficiency. Most of all, however, I hope
the Government will, without delay, take up the great task of finding
a way of setting these men to useful work of some kind. In the past
much has been done in this direction by the various private agencies
which interest themselves in the care of discharged soldiers. A war
of such magnitude as the present, however, must bring in its wake a
demand for work and organisation on a scale far beyond private
effort; and if the disabled soldier is to be adequately cared for, only
the resources of the State can be equal to the need.
Are we doing enough, I ask again, for the gallant men who have
served us so well? There are those who fear that, comparatively
speaking, the war has only just begun. However this may be, the
tale of casualties and disablement rises day by day at a terrible pace,
and there is a growing need to set on foot an organisation which,
when the time comes, shall be ready to grapple at once with what
will perhaps be the most terrible legacy the war can leave us.

CHAPTER IV
THE PERIL OF THE CENSORSHIP

War brings into discussion many subjects upon which men differ
widely in their opinions, and the present war is no exception to the
general rule.
Amateur and expert alike argue on a thousand disputed points of
tactics, of strategy, and of policy: it has always been so: probably it
will be so for ever. But the censorship imposed by the Government,
on the outbreak of war, has achieved a record.
It has earned the unanimous and unsparing condemnation of
everybody. Men who have agreed on no other point shake hands
upon this. For sheer, blundering ineptitude, for blind inability to
appreciate the mind and temper of our countrymen, in its utter
ignorance of the psychological characteristics of the nation and of
the Empire, to say nothing of the rest of the world, the methods of
the censorship, surely, approach very closely the limits of human
capacity for failure.
When I say "the censorship" I mean, of course, the system,
speaking in the broadest sense. It matters nothing whether the chief
censor, for the moment, be, by the circumstance of the day, Mr. F.E.
Smith or Sir Stanley Buckmaster. Both, I make no doubt, have done
their difficult work to the best of their ability, and have been loyally
followed, to the best of their several abilities, by their colleagues.
The faults and failures of the censorship have their roots elsewhere.
Now to avoid, at the outset, any possibility of misunderstanding, I
want to make it absolutely clear that in all the numerous criticisms
that have been levelled at the censorship, objection has been taken
not to the fact that news is censored, but to the methods employed
and to the extent to which the suppression of news has been
carried.
I believe that no single newspaper in the British Isles has objected
to the censorship, as such. I am quite sure that the public would
very definitely condemn any demand that the censorship should be
abolished. Much as we all desire to learn the full story of the war, it
is obvious that to permit the indiscriminate publication of any and
every story sent over the wires, would be to make the enemy a
present of much information of almost priceless value. Early and
accurate information is of supreme importance in war time, and
certainly no Englishman worthy of the name would desire that the
slightest advantage should be offered to our country's enemies by
the premature publication of news which, on every military
consideration, ought to be kept secret.
This is, unquestionably, the attitude of the great daily newspapers in
London and the provinces, which have been the worst sufferers by
the censor's eccentricities. They realise, quite clearly, the vital and
imperative necessity for the suppression of information which would
be of value to the enemy, and, as a matter of fact, the editors of the
principal journals exercise themselves a private censorship which is
quite rigid, and far more intelligently applied than the veto of the
official bureau. It would surprise a good many people to learn of the
vast amount of information which, by one channel or another,
reaches the offices of the great dailies long before the Press Bureau
gives a sign that it has even heard of the matters in question. The
great retreat from Mons is an excellent instance. It was known
perfectly well, at the time, that the entire British Expeditionary Force
was in a position of the gravest peril, and it is, perhaps, not too
much to say that had the public possessed the same knowledge
there would have been a degree of depression which would have
made the "black week" of the South African War gay and cheerful by
comparison, even if there had not been something very nearly
approaching an actual panic.
But the secret was well and loyally kept within the walls of the
newspaper offices, as I, personally, think it should have been: I do
not blame the military authorities in the least for holding back the
fact that the position was one of extreme gravity. Bad news comes
soon enough in every war, and it would be senseless folly to create
alarm by telling people of dangers which, as in this case, may in the
end be averted. The public quarrel with the censorship rests on
other, and totally different, grounds.
That a strict censorship should be exercised over military news
which might prove of value to the enemy will be cheerfully admitted
by every one. We all know, despite official assurances to the
contrary, that German spies are still active in our midst, and, even
now, there is—or at any rate until quite recently there was—little or
no difficulty in sending information from this country to Germany. No
one will cavil at any restrictions necessary to prevent the enemy
anticipating our plans and movements, and if the censorship had not
gone beyond this, no one would have had any reason to complain.
What may perhaps be called the classic instance of the perils of
premature publication occurred during the Franco-Prussian War of
1870-71. In those days there was no censorship, and France, in
consequence, received a lesson so terrible that it is never likely to be
forgotten. It is more than likely, indeed, that it is directly responsible
for the merciless severity of the French censorship to-day.
A French journal published the news that MacMahon had changed
the direction in which his army was marching. The news was
telegraphed to England and published in the papers here. It at once
came to the attention of one of the officials of the German Embassy
in London, who, realising its importance, promptly cabled it to
Germany. For Moltke the news was simply priceless, and the altered
dispositions he promptly made resulted in MacMahon and his entire
force capitulating at Metz. Truly a terrible price to pay for the single
indiscretion of a French newspaper!
It is not to be denied that to some extent certain of the "smarter" of
the British newspapers are responsible for the severity of the
censorship in force to-day. In effect, the censorship of news in this
country dates from the last war in South Africa. Some of the English
journals, in their desire to secure "picture-stories," forgot that the
war correspondent has very great responsibilities quite apart from
the mere purveying of news.
The result was the birth of a war correspondent of an entirely new
type. The older men—the friends of my youth, Forbes, Burleigh,
Howard Russell, and the like—had seen and studied war in many
phases: they knew war, and distinguished with a sure instinct the
news that was permissible as well as interesting, from the news that
was interesting but not permissible. Their work, because of their
knowledge, showed discipline and restraint, and it can be said,
broadly, that they wrote nothing which would advantage the enemy
in the slightest degree.
In the war in South Africa we saw a tremendous change. Many of
the men sent out were simply able word-spinners, supremely
innocent of military knowledge, knowing absolutely nothing of
military operations, unable to judge whether a bit of news would be
of value to the enemy or not. Their business was to get "word-
pictures"—and they got them. In doing so they sealed the doom of
the war correspondent. The feeble and inefficient censorship
established at Cape Town, for want of intelligent guidance, did little
or nothing to protect the Army, and the result was that valuable
information, published in London, was promptly telegraphed to the
Boer leaders by way of Lourenço Marques. Many skilfully planned
British movements, in consequence, went hopelessly to pieces, and
by the time war was over, Lord Roberts and military men generally
were fully agreed that, when the next war came, it would be
absolutely necessary to establish a censorship of a very drastic
nature.
We see that censorship in operation to-day, but far transcending its
proper function. It was established—or it should have been
established—for the sole purpose of preventing the publication of
news likely to be of value to the enemy. Had it stopped there, no
one could have complained.
I contend that in point of fact it has, throughout the war, operated
not merely to prevent the enemy getting news which it was highly
desirable should be kept from him, but to suppress news which the
British public—the most patriotic and level-headed public in all the
world—has every right to demand. We are not a nation of board-
school children or hysterical girls. Over and over again the British
public has shown that it can bear bad news with fortitude, just as it
can keep its head in victory. Those of us who still remember the
terrible "black week" in South Africa, with its full story of the horror
of defeat at Colenso, Magersfontein, and Stormberg, remember how
the only effect of the disaster was the ominous deepening of the
grim British determination to "see it through": the tightening of the
lips and the hardening of the jaws that meant unshakable resolve;
the silent, dour, British grip on the real essentials of the situation
that, once and for all, settled the fate of Kruger's ambitions.
Are Britons to-day so changed from the Britons of 1899 that they
cannot bear the truth; that they cannot face disaster; that they are
indeed the degenerates they have been labelled by boastful
Germans? Perish the thought! Britain is not decadent; she is to-day
as strong and virile as of old and her sons are proving it daily on the
plains of Flanders, as they proved it when they fought the Kaiser's
hordes to a standstill on the banks of the Marne during the "black
week" of last autumn. Why then should the public be treated as
puling infants spoon-fed on tiny scraps of good news when it is
happily available, and left in the bliss of ignorance when things are
not going quite so well?
From November 20th, 1914, up to February 17th, 1915—a period of
three months of intense anxiety and strain—not one single word of
news from the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest Army Britain has
ever put into the field was vouchsafed to the British public. For that,
of course, it is impossible to blame Sir John French. But the bare fact
is sufficient condemnation of the entirely unjustifiable methods of
secrecy with which we are waging a war on which the whole future
of our beloved nation and Empire depends. The public was left to
imagine that the war had reached something approaching a
"deadlock." The ever-mounting tale of casualties showed that, in
very truth, there had been, in that silent period of three months,
fighting on a scale to which this country has been a stranger for a
century.
Will any one outside the Government contend that this absurd
secrecy can be justified, either by military necessity or by a well-
meant but, as I think, hopelessly mistaken regard for the feelings of
the public?
We are not Germans that it should be necessary to lull us into a
lethargic sleep with stories of imaginary victories, or to refrain from
harrowing our souls when, as must happen in all wars, things
occasionally go wrong.
We want the truth, and we are entitled to have it!
I do not say that we have been deliberately told that which is not
true. I believe the authorities can be acquitted of any deliberate
falsification of news. But I do say, without hesitation, that much
news was kept back which the country was entitled to know, and
which could have been made public without the slightest prejudice
to our military position. At the same time, publication has been
permitted of wholly baseless stories, such as that of the great fight
at La Bassée, to which I will allude later, which the authorities must
have known to be unfounded.
It is not for us to criticise the policy of our gallant Allies, the French.
We must leave it to them to decide how much or how little they will
reveal to their own people. I contend, with all my heart, that the
British public should not have been fobbed off with the studiously-
guarded French official report, with its meaningless—so far as the
general public is concerned—daily recital of the capture or loss of a
trench here and there, or with the chatty disquisitions of our amiable
"Eye-Witness" at the British Headquarters, who manages to convey
the minimum of real information in the maximum of words. It is
highly interesting, I admit, to learn of that heroic soldier who
brained four Germans "on his own" with a shovel; it is very
interesting to read of the "nut" making his happy and elaborate war-
time toilet in the open air; and we are glad to hear all about German
prisoners lamenting the lack of food. But these things, and countless
others of which "Eye-Witness" has told us, are not the root of the
matter. We want the true story of the campaign, and the plain fact is
that we do not get it, and no one pretends that we get it.
Cheerful confidence is an excellent thing in war, as well as in all
other human undertakings. Blind optimism is a foolhardy absurdity;
blank pessimism is about as dangerous a frame of mind as can be
conceived. I am not quite sure, in my own mind, whether the
methods of the censorship are best calculated to promote dangerous
optimism, or the reverse, but I am perfectly certain that they are not
calculated to evoke that calm courage and iron resolve, in the face
of known perils, which is the best augury of victory in the long run.
Probably they produce a result varying according to the
temperament of the individual. One day you meet a man in the club
who assures you that everything is going well and that we have the
Germans "in our pocket." That is the foolishness of optimism,
produced by the story of success and the suppression of
disagreeable truths.
Twenty-four hours later you meet a gloomy individual who assures
you we are no nearer beating the Germans than we were three
months ago. That is the depths of pessimism. Both frames of mind
are derived from the "official news" which the Government thinks fit
to issue.
Here and there, if you are lucky, you meet the man who realises that
we are up against the biggest job the Empire has ever tackled, and
that, if we are to win through, the country must be plainly told the
facts and plainly warned that it is necessary to make the most
strenuous exertions of which we are capable. That is the man who
forms his opinions not from the practically worthless official news,
but from independent study of the whole gigantic problem. And that
is the only frame of mind which will enable us to win this war. It is a
frame of mind which the official news vouchsafed to us is not, in the
least degree, calculated to produce.
In the prosecution of a war of such magnitude as the present
unhappy conflict the public feeling of a truly democratic country such
as ours is of supreme importance. It is, in fact, the most valuable
asset of the military authorities, and it is a condition precedent for
success that the nation shall be frankly told the truth, so far as it can
be told without damage to our military interests.
Mr. Bonar Law, in the House of Commons, put the case in a nutshell
when he said that—

"He had felt, from the beginning of the war, that as much
information was not being given as might be given without
damage to national interests. Nothing could be worse for the
country than to do what the Japanese did—conceal disasters
until the end of the war. He did not say that there had been any
concealment, but the one thing necessary was to let the people
of this and other countries feel that our official news was true,
and could be relied upon. He wondered whether the House
realised what a tremendous event the battle of Ypres, in
November, was. The British losses there, he thought, were
bigger than any battle in which purely English troops were
engaged. It was a terrible fight, against overwhelming odds, out
of which British troops came with tremendous honour. All the
account they had had was Sir John French's despatch. Surely
the country could have more than that. Whoever was in charge,
when weighing the possible damage which might be brought
about by the giving of news, should also bear in mind the great
necessity for keeping people in this country as well informed as
possible."

That, I venture to think, is a perfectly fair and legitimate criticism.


The battle of Ypres was fought in November. Mr. Law was speaking
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