An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory:

To Truth Through Proof

Peter B. Andrews

CONTENTS

Preface to the Second Edition vii

Preface viii

Chapter 0 Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Propositional Calculus 5

§10. The Language of P.....................................................5
§10A. Supplement on Induction ..............................................17
§11. The Axiomatic Structure of P.........................................21
§12. Semantics, Consistency, and Completeness of P........................32
§13. Independence .........................................................42
§14. Propositional Connectives ............................................44
§15. Compactness...........................................................64
§16. Ground Resolution ....................................................67

Chapter 2 First-Order Logic 73

§20. The Language of F ...................................................73
§21. The Axiomatic Structure of F.........................................84
§22. Prenex Normal Form ..................................................110
§23. Semantics of F......................................................114
§24. Independence ........................................................123
§25. Abstract Consistency and Completeness ...............................125
§25A. Supplement: Simplified Completeness Proof ..........................139
§26. Equality ............................................................142

Chapter 3 Provability and Refutability 151

§30. Natural Deduction ...................................................151
§31. Gentzen's Theorem ...................................................156
§32. Semantic Tableaux ...................................................160
§33. Skolemization .......................................................166
§34. Refutations of Universal Sentences ..................................171
§35. Herbrand's Theorem ..................................................176
§36. Unification .........................................................183

Chapter 4 Further Topics in First-Order Logic 189

§40. Duality .............................................................189
§41. Craig's Interpolation Theorem .......................................196
§42. Beth's Definability Theorem .........................................199

Chapter 5 Type Theory 201

§50. Introduction ........................................................201
§51. The Primitive Basis of Q 0...........................................210
§52. Elementary Logic in Q 0 .............................................215
§53. Equality and Descriptions ...........................................232

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§54. Semantics of Q 0.....................................................238
§55. Completeness of Q 0 ..................................................248

Chapter 6 Formalized Number Theory 257

§60. Cardinal Numbers and the Axiom of Infinity ..........................257
§61. Peano's Postulates ..................................................261
§62. Order ...............................................................269
§63. Minimization ........................................................276
§64. Recursive Functions .................................................281
§65. Primitive Recursive Functions and Relations .........................289

Chapter 7 Incompleteness and Undecidability 301

§60. Gödel Numbering .....................................................303
§71. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems .....................................312
§72. Essential Incompleteness ............................................323
§73. Undecidability and Undefinability....................................332
§74. Epilogue.............................................................338

Supplementary Exercises 339

Summary of Theorems 345

Bibliography 371

List of Figures 381

Index 383

2
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

For the benefit of readers who are already familiar with the first (1986)
edition of this book, we briefly explain here how this edition differs from that
one.

The basic structure of the book is unchanged, but improvements and enhancements
may be found throughout the text. There is more introductory material and
motivation. Historical notes and bibliographic references have been added. The
discussion of vertical paths and normal forms in §14 is now much more
comprehensive. A number of consequences of Gödel's Second Incompleteness
Theorem are now discussed in §71.

Many exercises have been added, and at the end of the book there is a new
collection of Supplementary Exercises which are not explicitly tied to any
particular section. Information about obtaining the ETPS program, which
facilitates work on exercises which consist of proving theorems in the object
language, will be found near the end of the Preface.

PREFACE

This book is an introductory text on mathematical logic and type theory. It is

aimed primarily at providing an introduction to logic for students of
mathematics, computer science, or philosophy who are at the college junior,
senior, or introductory graduate level. It can also be used as an introduction
to type theory by researchers at more advanced levels.

The first part of the book (Chapters 1 and 2, supplemented by parts of Chapters
3 and 4) is suitable for use as a text in a one-semester introduction to
mathematical logic, and the second part (Chapters 5 - 7) for a second semester
course which introduces type theory (more specifically, typed -calculus) as a
language for formalizing mathematics and proves the classical incompleteness and
undecidability theorems in this context. Persons who wish to learn about type
theory and have had a prior introduction to logic will have no difficulty
starting with Chapter 5.

The book is oriented toward persons who wish to study logic as a vehicle for
formal reasoning. It may be particularly useful to those who are interested in
issues related to the problem of constructing formal proofs as models of
informal reasoning or for use in computerized systems which involve automated
deduction. Proofs, which are often the chief end products and principal
manifestations of mathematical reasoning, constitute highly significant pathways
to truth and are a central concern of this book. Our choice of the title To
Truth Through Proof is motivated by the consideration that while in most realms
one needs more than logic to achieve an understanding of what is true, in
mathematics the primary and ultimate tool for establishing truth is logic.

Of course, the study of logic involves reasoning about reasoning, and it is not
surprising that complex questions arise. To achieve deep understanding and
proper perspective, one must study a variety of logical systems as mathematical
objects and look at them from a variety of points of view. We are thus led to

3
study the interplay between syntax and semantics, questions of consistency and
independence, formal rules of reasoning, various formats for proofs and
refutations, ways of representing basic mathematical concepts in a formal
system, the notion of computability, and the completeness, incompleteness, and
undecidability theorems which illuminate both the power and the limitations of
logic.

One of the basic tasks of mathematical logic is the formalization of

mathematical reasoning. Both type theory (otherwise known as higher-order logic)
and axiomatic set theory can be used as formal languages for this purpose, and
it is really an accident of intellectual history that at present most logicians
and mathematicians are more familiar with axiomatic set theory than with type
theory. It is hoped that this book will help to remedy this situation.

In logic as in other realms, there is a natural tendency for people to prefer

that with which they are most familiar. However, those familiar with both type
theory and axiomatic set theory recognize that in some ways the former provides
a more natural vehicle than the latter for formalizing what mathematicians
actually do. Both logical systems are necessarily more restrictive than naive
axiomatic set theory with the unrestricted Comprehension Axiom, since the latter
theory is inconsistent. Axiomatic set theory achieves consistency by restricting
the Comprehension Axiom and introducing the distinction between sets and
classes. Mathematicians often find this distinction unnatural, ignore the
technicalities about existence axioms, and leave it to the specialists to show
that their reasoning can be justified. Type theory achieves consistency by
distinguishing between different types of objects (such as numbers, sets of
numbers, collections of sets of numbers, functions from numbers to numbers, sets
of such functions, etc.). Mathematicians make such distinctions too, and even
use different letters or alphabets to help them distinguish between different
types of objects, so the restrictions which type theory introduces are already
implicit in mathematical practice. While some formulations of type theory may
seem cumbersome, the formulation Q 0 introduced in Chapter 5 is a very rich and
expressive language, with functions (which need not be regarded as sets of
ordered pairs) of all types as primitive objects, so most of what mathematicians
write can be translated into Q 0 very directly. Q 0 is a version of typed -
calculus, and the availability of -notation in Q 0 enables definitions to be
handled very conveniently and eliminates the need for axioms asserting the
existence of sets and functions.

One's choice of a formal language will generally depend on what one wishes to do
with it. If one is choosing a language for expressing mathematics in
computerized systems which deal with mathematics on a theoretical level (such as
mathematically sophisticated information retrieval systems, proof checkers, or
deductive aids), there are several reasons why type theory may be preferable to
set theory. First, the primitive notation of set theory is so economical that
this language is only practical to actually use if one expands it by introducing
various abbreviations. This is usually done in an informal way (i.e., in the
meta-language), but in an automated system it is important that the formal
language be the one actually used to express mathematical statements, since this
is the language which must be studied rigorously and manipulated systematically.
Thus, the formal language should not only be adequate in principle for
expressing mathematical ideas, but it should also be convenient in practice.
Indeed, the translation from familiar mathematical notations to the formal
language should be as simple and direct as possible. Second, in set theory one
can write all sorts of expressions which are not legal in type theory, and which
a mathematician would reject as nonsense almost instinctively. A computer

4
program for manipulating mathematical expressions would certainly be very
awkward and inefficient if it did not have some way of distinguishing between
different types of mathematical objects and rejecting nonsensical expressions.
Third, one of the basic operations in automated theorem proving is that of
finding appropriate substitutions for variables, and an understanding of the
types of various entities allows one to avoid much useless search. Finally, it
has been found (see [Andrews et al., 1984] [Andrews et al., 1996]) that
unification algorithms for type theory (such as [Huet, 1975] and [Jensen and
Pietrzykowski, 1976]) are powerful tools in automating the proofs of simple
mathematical theorems.

As noted in [Hanna and Daeche, 1985], [Hanna and Daeche, 1986], and [Gordon,
1986], typed -calculus is particularly well suited for specifying and verifying
hardware and software. Familiarity with typed -calculus also provides
fundamental background for the study of denotational semantics for functional
programming languages.

While Gödel's Completeness Theorem guarantees that all valid wffs of first-order
logic have proofs in first-order logic, extraordinary reductions in the lengths
of such proofs can sometimes be achieved by using higher-order logic. (See §54.)

It is easy to discuss the semantics of type theory, and to explain the crucial
distinction between standard and nonstandard models which sheds so much light on
the mysteries associated with the incompleteness theorems, Skolem's paradox,
etc. As will be seen in Chapter 7, in the context of the language Q 0 it is easy
to present the incompleteness theorems very elegantly and to show that their
significance extends far beyond the realm of formalizing arithmetic.

Obviously, serious students of mathematical logic ought to know about both type
theory and axiomatic set theory. Pedagogically, it makes good sense to introduce
them to elementary logic (prepositional calculus and first-order logic), then
type theory, then set theory. In spite of the superficial appearance of
simplicity possessed by set theory, its models are more complicated, and from a
logical point of view it is a more powerful and complex language. In [Marshall
and Chuaqui, 1991] it is argued that the set-theoretical sentences which are
preserved under isomorphisms are of fundamental importance, and it is shown that
these are the sentences which are equivalent to sentences of type theory.

A brief explanation of the labeling system used in this book may be helpful. The
sections in Chapter 1 (for example) are labeled §10, §11, ... , §16. Of course,
an alternative labeling would be §1.0, §1.1, ... , §1.6, but the periods are
quite redundant once one understands the labeling system. These tags should be
regarded as labels, not numbers, although they do have a natural ordering.
Similarly, the theorems in §11 (for example) are labeled 1100, 1101, 1102, ... ,
rather than 1.1.00, 1.1.01, 1.1.02, ... . Exercises are labeled in a similar
way, but their labels start with an X. Thus, the exercises for section 11 are
labeled X1100, X1101, X1102, ... . Labeling starts with 0 rather than 1 because
0 is the initial ordinal. (Chapter 0 is the Introduction.)

The reader should examine the table of contents in parallel with the discussion
of the individual chapters below. Much that is in this book is simply what one
would expect in an introductory text on mathematical logic, so the discussion
will concentrate on features one might not expect.

Chapter 1 introduces the student to an axiomatic system P of propositional

calculus and later to more general considerations about propositional calculus.

5
In §14 a convenient two-dimensional notation is introduced to represent wffs in
negation normal form. This enables one to readily comprehend the structure of
such wffs, find disjunctive and conjunctive normal forms by inspection, and
check whether the wffs are contradictory by examining the “vertical paths”
through them.

Chapter 2 contains what everyone ought to know about first-order logic. Students
can learn a great deal about how to construct proofs by doing the exercises at
the end of §21. The discussion of prenex normal form in §22 shows students how
to pull out the quantifiers of a wff all at once as well as how to bring them
out past each connective one step at a time. This discussion is facilitated by
the use of a special notation for the ambiguous quantifier. In Gödel's
Completeness Theorem is proved by an elegant generalization of Henkin's method
due to Smullyan. The notion of consistency in Henkin's proof is replaced by
abstract consistency, and with very little extra effort a proof is obtained for
Smullyan's Unifying Principle, from which readily follow Gödel's Completeness
Theorem in §25, Gentzen's Cut-Elimination Theorem in §31, the completeness of
the method of semantic tableaux in §32, the completeness of a method for
refuting universal sentences in §34, and the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Theorem
in §41. In their first encounter with the proof of Gödel's
Completeness Theorem, students may need a less abstract approach than that of
Smullyan's Unifying Principle, so as an alternative in §25A an elegant and
direct simplified proof of the Completeness Theorem is given. It actually
parallels the abstract approach very closely and provides a good introduction to
the abstract approach. The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and the Compactness Theorem
are derived in the usual way from the Completeness Theorem. It is shown how the
Compactness Theorem can be applied to extend the Four Color Theorem of graph
theory from finite to infinite graphs and to prove the existence of nonstandard
models for number theory.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the logical principles underlying various techniques

for proving or refuting sentences of first-order logic, and provides an
introduction to the fundamental ideas used in various approaches to automated
theorem proving.

The chapter starts in §30 with a system of natural deduction which is

essentially a summary of the most useful derived rules of inference that were
obtained in §21. Methods of proving existential formulas are discussed. A cut-
free system of logic and semantic tableaux are then introduced in §31 and §32 as
systems in which one can search more systematically for a proof (or refutation).
When one constructs a semantic tableau, one often notices that it would be nice
to postpone deciding how to instantiate universal quantifiers by just
instantiating them with variables for which substitutions could be made later.
This is facilitated when one eliminates existential quantifiers to obtain a
universal sentence by Skolemization, which is the topic of §33. It is noted that
several methods of Skolemization can be used.

§34 introduces a method for refuting universal sentences which avoids the
branching on disjunctions of semantic tableaux and uses the cut rule to reduce
formulas to the contradictory empty disjunction. This method has many elements
in common with the resolution method [Robinson, 1965] of automated theorem-
proving. Students are often successful at establishing theorems by this method
even though they were unable to find proofs for them in natural deduction
format.

The proof methods just discussed all yield highly redundant proof structures in
which various subformulas may occur many times. §35 introduces a version of

6
Herbrand's Theorem which enables one to establish that a wff is contradictory
simply by displaying a suitable compound instance of it.

One of the basic processes of theorem-proving in first- or higher-order logic is

that of substituting terms for variables (or instantiating quantified variables)
in such a way that certain expressions become the same. §36 provides a
description of Robinson's Unification Algorithm for first-order logic and a
proof of its correctness. Since substitutions have been defined §10) to be
functions of a certain sort which map formulas to formulas, certain facts about
substitutions (such as the associativity of composition) can be used without
special justification.

Chapter 4 discusses a few additional topics in first-order logic. In §40 the

topic of Duality is introduced with a parable about two scholars who argue about
an ancient text on logic because of a fundamental ambiguity in the notations for
truth and falsehood. Of course, much of this material could appropriately be
discussed immediately after §14.

Chapter 5 introduces a system Q 0 of typed calculus which is essentially the

system introduced by Alonzo Church in [Church, 1940], except that (following
[Henkin, 1963b]) equality relations rather than quantifiers and propositional
connectives are primitive. Type theory is first introduced in §50 with a
discussion of a rather traditional formulation F of type theory in which
propositional connectives and quantifiers are primitive. It is shown that
equality can be defined in such a system in two quite natural ways. It is then
shown that this system can be simplified to obtain naive axiomatic set theory,
which is inconsistent because Russell's paradox can be derived in it. Thus, one
needs some device such as type distinctions or restrictions on the Comprehension
Axiom to obtain a consistent formalization of naive set theory. The discussion
turns to finding as simple, natural, and expressive a formulation of type theory
as possible. (The choice of equality as the primitive logical notion is
influenced not only by the desire for simplicity but also by the desire for a
natural semantics, as discussed at the end of [Andrews, 1972a].) This leads to
an exposition of the basic ideas underlying Q 0. While these ideas usually come
to be regarded as very natural, they often seem novel at this stage, and need to
be absorbed thoroughly before one proceeds to the next section.

By the end of §52 the student should be ready to prove theorems in Q 0, so

notations for some simple but basic mathematical ideas are introduced, and in
the exercises the student is asked to give formal proofs of some simple
mathematical theorems about sets and functions. An exercise in §53 asks for a
proof of a concise type-theoretic formulation of Cantor's Theorem.

Henkin's Completeness Theorem is proved for Q 0 in §55. Skolem's paradox (which

was first discussed in §25) is discussed again in the context of type theory and
resolved with the aid of the important distinction between standard and
nonstandard models. It is shown that theories which have infinite models must
have nonstandard models.

Chapter 6 is intended to make it clear that mathematics really can be formalized

∞
within the system Q0 which is the result of adding an axiom of infinity to Q 0.
It is shown how cardinal numbers can be defined, Peano's Postulates can be
∞
derived, and recursive functions can be represented very elegantly in Q0 .
∞
Proofs of theorems of Q0 are presented in sufficient detail so that students

7
should have no difficulty providing formal justifications for each step.
Naturally, each teacher will decide how (or whether) to treat these proofs in
class. It is good experience for students to present some proofs, or parts of
proofs, in class. By the end of this chapter students should have a firm grasp
of the connection between abbreviated formal proofs and the informal proofs seen
in other mathematics courses, and should therefore be much more confident in
dealing with such proofs.

Chapter 7 presents the classical incompleteness, undecidability and

∞
undefinability results for Q0 . In §70 it is shown that the numerical functions
∞
representable in any consistent recursively axiomatized extension of Q0 are
precisely the recursive functions, and this leads to an argument for Church's
Thesis. In §71 Gödel's First and Second Incompleteness Theorems are presented
∞
for Q0 , along with Löb's Theorem about the sentence which says, “I am
provable”. A number of consequences of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem
are discussed. In §72 the Gödel-Rosser Incompleteness Theorem is presented for
∞
Q0 , and it is shown how this implies that there is no recursively axiomatized
extension of Q 0 whose theorems are precisely the wffs valid in all standard
models. §73 is concerned with the unsolvability of the decision problems for Q
∞
0 and Q0 , and the undefinability of truth. §74 is a brief epilogue reflecting
on the elusiveness of truth.

The exercises at the end of each section generally provide opportunities for
using material from that section. However, students need to learn how to decide
for themselves what techniques to use to solve problems. Therefore, at the end
of the book there is a collection of Supplementary Exercises which are not
explicitly tied to any particular section. Some exercises (see §21 and §52, for
example) involve applying rules of inference to prove theorems of the formal
system being discussed. A computer program called ETPS (which is reviewed in
[Goldson and Reeves, 1993] and [Goldson et al., 1993]) has been developed to
facilitate work on such exercises. The student using ETPS issues commands to
apply rules of inference in specified ways, and the computer handles the details
of writing the appropriate lines of the proof and checking that the rules can be
used in this way. Proofs, and the active lines of the proof, are displayed using
the special symbols of logic in proof windows which are automatically updated as
the proof is constructed. The program thus allows students to concentrate on
the essential logical problems underlying the proofs, and it gives them
immediate feedback for both correct and incorrect actions. Experience shows that
ETPS enables students to construct rigorous proofs of more difficult theorems
than they would otherwise find tractable.

ETPS permits students to work forwards, backwards, or in a combination of these

modes, and provides facilities for rearranging proofs, deleting parts of proofs,
displaying only those parts of proofs under active consideration, saving
incomplete proofs, and printing proofs on paper. A convenient formula editor
permits the student to extract needed formulas which occur anywhere in the
proof, and build new formulas from them. Teachers who set up ETPS for use by a
class can take advantage of its facilities for keeping records of completed
exercises and processing information for grades.

Information about obtaining ETPS without cost can be obtained from

http://gtps.math.cmu.edu/tps.html; alternatively, connect to the web page
http://www.cmu.edu/ for Carnegie Mellon University or

8
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/project/pal/www/pal.html for CMU's Pure and Applied
Logic Program and from there find the author's web page.

I have used versions of this book for a course in mathematical logic at Carnegie
Mellon University for about thirty years. Experience has shown that students
are best prepared for the course if they have had at least one rigorous
mathematics course or a course in philosophy or computer science that has
prepared them to appreciate the importance of understanding the nature of
deductive reasoning and the art of proving theorems. I have found that if one
covers the material rather thoroughly in class, it is difficult to cover all of
Chapters 1 - 4 in the first semester, so I normally cover Chapter 1, most of
Chapter 2 (using §25A and omitting §24 and most of §26), and also §30, §33, and
§34. Naturally, in a course primarily composed of graduate students, or students
with more previous exposure to logic, one could move faster, ask students to
read some material outside class, and cover all of Chapters 1 - 4 in one
semester. In the second semester I normally cover Chapters 5 - 7 fairly
completely. A few comments about notation may be helpful. ``U is a subset of V"
is written as “U  V", and “U is a proper subset of V” as “U  V”. The
composition of functions f and g is written f o g. “iff” is an abbreviation for
“if and only if”. Ends of proofs are marked with the sign .

I wish to thank the many people who contributed directly or indirectly to the
development of this book. Alonzo Church, John Kemeny, Raymond Smullyan, and
Abraham Robinson taught me logic. It will be obvious to all who have read them
that this book has been deeply influenced by [Church, 1940] and [Church, 1956].
Numerous students at Carnegie Mellon helped shape the book with their questions,
comments, and interests. Special thanks go to Ferna Hartman for her heroic work
typing the difficult manuscript.

Bibliography

[Andrews, 1972a] Peter B. Andrews, General Models and Extensionality, Journal of

Symbolic Logic, 37:395-397, 1972.

[Andrews et al., 1984] Peter B. Andrews, Dale A. Miller, Eve Longini Cohen, and
Frank Pfenning Automating Higher-Order Logic. In W. W. Bledsoe and D. W.
Loveland, editors, Automated Theorem Proving: After 25 Years, Contemporary
Mathematics series, vol. 29, pages 169-192, American Mathematical Society, 1984.

[Andrews et al., 1996] Peter B. Andrews, Matthew Bishop, Sunil Issar, Dan
Nesmith, Frank Pfenning, and Hongwei Xi, TPS: A Theorem Proving System for
Classical Type Theory, Journal of Automated Reasoning, 16:321-353, 1996.

[Church, 1940] Alonzo Church, A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types,

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5:56-68, 1940.

[Church, 1956] Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton

University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1956.

[Goldson and Reeves, 1993] Doug Goldson and Steve Reeves, Using Programs to
Teach Logic to Computer Scientists, Notices of the American Mathematical
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9
[Goldson et al., 1993] Douglas Goldson, Steve Reeves, and Richard Bornat, A
Review of Several Programs for the Teaching of Logic, The Computer Journal,
36:373-386, 1993.

[Gordon, 1986] Mike Gordon, Why higher-order logic is a good formalism for
specifying and verifying hardware. In G. J. Milne and P. A. Subrahmanyam,
editors, Formal Aspects of VLSI Design, pages 153-177. North-Holland, 1986.

[Hanna and Daeche, 1985] F. K. Hanna and N. Daeche, Specification and

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Hardware Description Languages and their Applications, pages 418-433, North
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[Hanna and Daeche, 1986] F. K. Hanna and N. Daeche, Specification and

Verification Using Higher-Order Logic: A Case Study. In G. J. Milne and P. A.
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[Henkin, 1963b] Leon Henkin, A Theory of Propositional Types, Fundamenta

Mathematicae, 52:323-344, 1963.

[Huet, 1975] Gérard P. Huet, A Unification Algorithm for Typed -Calculus,

Theoretical Computer Science, 1:27-57, 1975.

[Jensen and Pietrzykowski, 1976] D.C. Jensen and T. Pietrzykowski, Mechanizing

-Order Type Theory Through Unification, Theoretical Computer Science, 3:123-
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[Marshall and Chuaqui, 1991] M. Victoria Marshall and Rolando Chuaqui, Sentences
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[Robinson, 1965] J. A. Robinson, A Machine-Oriented Logic Based on the

Resolution Principle, Journal of the ACM, 12:23-41, 1965.

10