Go-Arounds at

Addis Ababa due VOR

Reception Problems
By: Jean Daney
Director of Flight Safety
As reported by an Airbus Operator
and reproduced with their permission

The following article was provided by the started fluctuating during the descent and
involved Airbus operator and has been eventually the indications disappeared. With no
reproduced with their agreement but has been adequate visual reference, a standard missed
de-identified. At the end of the article there is approach was flown from a minimum altitude of
information on the Airbus policy concerning the 8922’ amsl and the aircraft entered the hold over
use of GPS position for Terrain Awareness and the ADS. Once in the hold and after confirming
Warning System (TAWS). This policy was issued with Bole ATC that the VOR/DME was serviceable
in an OIT/FOT (ref: SE 999.0015/04/VHR dated the crew carried out a navigation accuracy check
05 February 2004). that appeared normal and elected to carry out a
further approach. Once again, the VOR indication
fluctuated during the inbound leg and another
The same crew and aircraft had been scheduled missed approach was flown from a minimum
to operate the flight from **** to Addis Ababa altitude of 8866’ amsl after which the aircraft
Bole Airport (HAAB) with a single en-route stop diverted to Djibouti. A brief EGPWS “Terrain Ahead”
at****. warning occurred as the go-around was initiated.

The first sector was operated without incident After refuelling at Djibouti, the commander
and, after disembarking passengers and refuelling, elected to use his discretion to extend the flying
continued to HAAB. On arrival overhead the Addis duty period and return to HAAB. On arrival at
Ababa VOR/DME (ADS 112.90 MHz), the flight Bole, a daylight visual approach was flown to
was cleared to carry out a standard VOR/DME runway 25L and a successful landing made. It
approach to runway 25L at Bole. Touchdown was noted during this approach that the VOR
elevation at Bole was 7593’ amsl and the MDA bearing information was in error up to 30° and
for the procedure 8020’ amsl. There were no that any attempt to fly the procedural inbound
civilian radar facilities. QDM would have displaced the aircraft to the
North of the required track.
The VOR/DME indications had appeared normal
up to the start of the procedure, but during the The commander filed an Air Safety Report (ASR)
outbound leg, ADS 092° radial, an unexpected as required by the company in the event of any
large correction left was required to acquire the go-around. Normal company procedures also
radial. After flying the ADS DME 13nm arc, a left required an inspection of flight data from the
turn was made to intercept the 249° inbound Quick Access Recorder (QAR) as part of the
QDM and descent from 11200’ amsl commenced follow up to any ASR and the company Flight
in accordance with the procedure. The VOR radial Safety Manager carried this out.

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 1

The analysis revealed that at some point on both
approaches the aircraft had passed over a ridge Navigational
of high ground not normally encountered on the
25L approach. At the point at which the second
Considerations
go-around had been initiated the aircraft had All Airbus A320 aircraft are fitted with triple Inertial
passed over the ridge with a clearance of 55’ as Reference Systems (IRS). The navigation function
shown by the radio altimeter recording. At no is performed by the dual Flight Management &
time were the crew aware of this close proximity Guidance Computers using the outputs from the
to the ground. IRS and refining the combined IRS position with
radio navigation aid or GPS satellite information.
A full company investigation into the circumstances The involved aircraft is not fitted with GPS satellite
of the incident continued independently of the navigation equipment and the position refinement
official investigations initiated by the state authorities is taken from ground radio navigation aids only,
concerned and with the assistance of the Airbus typically DME/DME, VOR/DME or VOR/VOR
Flight Safety Department. Following the outcome crosscuts depending on local availability.
of the company investigation, the company has
put in place measures to minimise the risk of In the area of Addis Ababa the only suitable radio
similar incidents which include: navigation aid was the “ADS” VOR/DME located
• HAAB to be treated as a Category ‘C’ airport, between the two runways at Bole Airport at
• Operations to HAAB to be conducted by GPS position N08 58.7 E038 47.9. It follows, therefore,
equipped aircraft only, that any error in the transmitted data from this
VOR would result in a corresponding error in the
• Approach to be discontinued if VOR indications computed FMGC position. Such errors could
differ from GPS derived FMGS indications by result from faulty operation of the VOR/DME
more than 5°, facility, radio frequency interference with the
• The MDA for the 25L VOR/DME procedure transmitted data or anomalous radiation caused
raised to 9380’ amsl (1790’ aal) in association by local terrain (sometimes referred to as
with a minimum visibility of 5KM, “scalloping”).
• Approach to be discontinued if no visual contact
with the runway approach lights at ADS DME The possibility of faulty airborne equipment had
5nm (FAF). (ie MAP is ADS 5DME) to be considered but this is unlikely as similar
anomalous VOR indication behaviour was
Note: The last two restrictions have since been observed during a subsequent approach by
relaxed as confidence in the “ADS VORDME was another A320 fitted with a GPS. This latter
regained. The airport authorities have also occurrence was witnessed by the Flight Safety
installed an ILS on this runway and a new Manager.
DVORDME facility in the area since this incident
took place. The incident was discussed with the Director of
the Air Operations and Navigational Aids
The incident aircraft has also been fitted with a Department (DONAD) and the Head of Safety
GPS engine in the EGPWS computer as an interim Investigations of the Ethiopian CAA. The former
measure, with a full GPS MMR upgrade scheduled stated that he was not aware of any other
for early 2005. reports of problems with the ADS VOR but that
an investigation would be carried out in response
to this particular report. On the following day a
verbal report was received that an examination

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 2

of the VOR transmitter had revealed a 2°error in The airport has been undergoing significant
the radiation pattern and that an alternative development in recent years and has recently
transmitter was in service. Calibration of the seen the construction of a new terminal building
alternative transmitter appeared to have been by and the new 07R/25L runway. The new runway
pilot report from GPS equipped inbound aircraft lays parallel to and approximately 400m south of
and it was stated that the pattern was correct. the original 07L/25R. The ADS VOR was moved
to its current location south of the two runways
At a subsequent meeting with the Flight Safety during the development.
Officer of Ethiopian Airways it was stated that
there had been concerns from Ethiopian Airways In current operations 07R/25L is used as the
pilots that the inbound leg of the 25L VOR/DME main runway with the old runway designated as
procedure was “taking aircraft too far north of taxiway “Foxtrot”. However, 07L/25R is still used
the ideal track”. It was not clear whether these as an active runway by local traffic.
concerns had been relayed to the Ethiopian
CAA, although it was stated that Ethiopian The only instrument approach procedures
Airlines was putting pressure on the CAA too currently available to the operator at the time
install an ILS for this runway prior to the rainy were the VOR/DME procedures for 25L and
season that starts around July/August. 25R. Landings on runway 07R are achieved by
carrying out the 25L VOR/DME procedure and
The following day, the company Flight Safety breaking left for a visual circling approach to 07R.
Manager was subsequently contacted by Bole The Ethiopian CAA has promulgated a GPS/RNAV
ATC and advised that the ADS VOR had been procedure for runway 07R and will shortly
taken out of service following a fault caused by the promulgate one for 25L. The involved operator
heavy rain that had occurred during that evening. does not currently hold an approval for GPS/RNAV
The company flight for that day had already approaches. Full ILS procedures for both 25L
departed and was diverted to Khartoum. A further and 25R are now promulgated.
call from Bole ATC confirmed that the VOR was
back in service and fully serviceable. The diverted In addition to the ADS VOR, there were two MF
flight arrived at HAAB with no reported problems. locator beacons, ‘AB’ 333 KHz and ‘BL’ 352
KHz, situated on the original ILS approach path
to 25R. There were no ILS procedures
Addis Ababa Bole promulgated for the airport at the time, although
the original 25R ILS localiser was believed to be
International Airport still radiating on 110.3 MHz. New aids have now

(HAAB) been installed as stated above.

Bole Airport is located on the south western

outskirts of the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The airport reference co-ordinates shown on the
EAG Aerad chart are: N08 58.7 E038 47.9

Addis Ababa is situated on the Ethiopian plateau

at an elevation of 7600’ amsl and is surrounded
by areas of high ground rising to approximately
11000’ amsl.

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 3

Terrain
Considerations
The airport is situated on a relatively flat plain at The involved aircraft is fitted with a Honeywell
7600’ amsl. The level of the plain rises gradually Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
to the east attaining an elevation of approximately (EGPWS) with software to standard 428. The
8500’amsl 15nm from the airport. There are EGPWS computer has been removed from the
significant high peaks around the airport as aircraft and an attempt made to download event
follows: data from it. This was initially unsuccessful due
to a fault condition at the time of removal. The
• 10535’ amsl 010°T / 8nm
unit was returned to the OEM who achieved a
Bearings and distances are approximate
download in his workshop. During the subject
• 9646’amsl 025°T / 11nm approaches and go-arounds the crew heard only
from VOR/DME position one EGPWS alert, a “Too Low Terrain” call just
• 10167’ amsl 120°T / 11.5nm after initiation of the second go-around believed
• 9200’ amsl 230°T / 9nm to have been triggered by the Terrain Clearance
Floor mode. The QAR recorded a short duration
There is a significant ridge running approximately Mode 4 ”Too Low Terrain” warning at about the
135°T from the first of the above peaks and same time.
running out into the plain at about 6nm from the
VOR. This ridge is the one referred to in later
sections of this report. A further ridge runs
approximately 215°T from the same peak
towards the eastern outskirts of the city. This
runs out into the plain approximately 3.5nm
north of the airport.

Terrain information is provided for the crew by

the following:

• EAG Aerad charts N1/N2

This photograph shows the NW to SE ridge running down towards
these show “safety contours” and Sector Safe the approach path. It was taken from near the village of
Altitudes for the four prime sectors within 25nm Leghedadi 10nm NW of the airport looking WSW from a range of
approximately 5nm.
of the aerodrome reference point. At Addis, the
SSA for all sectors is shown as 13500’. No
detailed terrain information is shown.

• EAG Aerad Terrain Chart

A large scale chart showing the main features in
a large area around Addis. No fine detail of
terrain around the airport is shown.

• Military ONC Chart

A 1:1000000 scale chart of the region
This picture shows the same ridge from a range of about 8nm
from the NW of Leghedadi.

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 4

Terrain Profiles 12000

11000

The following approach and terrain profiles were 10000

9000
derived using the data from the QAR. The pressure 8000
altitudes recorded have been corrected for a 7000

QNH of 1027 HPa for Figure 1 and 1029 HPa for 6000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figures 2 & 3.
Figure 3
12000

11000
Figure 3 shows the profiles for the second
10000

9000
approach at HAAB. Here, the notable points are
8000 again the flat terrain between 15nm and 7.5nm
7000 and the high point at just over 5nm. The river valley
6000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 is still apparent at 9nm, but has split into two.
The terrain clearance at the point of go-around is
Figure 1
55’.
Figure 1 shows the profiles for the approach
carried out on the return from Djibouti which was
carried out visually. The terrain profile is typical Aircraft Position
for a correct approach path with the characteristic
The only position information available from the
gentle slope of the plain from west to east. Other
QAR was the recorded FMGC latitude and
characteristic features are the river valley at 6.5D
longitude. Since the FMGC position was IRS
and the double depression on the final approach
position corrected by radio position and the only
to the threshold.
radio position was based on the suspect
VOR/DME facility, no reliance can be placed on
The distance scale on this figure can be directly
the accuracy of the recorded position information.
related to DME distance from the “ADS”. In
Figures 2 & 3, the 13nm marker can be taken as
One point of interest was the behaviour of the
13D from the “ADS”, but other distances do not
recorded FMGC position immediately after each
relate to DME as the aircraft was not flying
go-around. The standard missed approach
towards the DME facility. The distances have
procedure for the 25L VOR/DME approach
been corrected to take account of the varying
states “Left (max 185kt) as soon as practicable
groundspeed during each approach.
onto ADS 193R to 13500 5910 then right to ADS
12000
and hold or as directed”. (EAG Aerad Chart N1
11000

10000
dated 20 FEB 03). On both go-arounds the
9000 recorded heading information suggests that
8000 the aircraft followed this procedure. The FMGC
7000
position data, however, indicates a right turn
6000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 immediately after each go-around followed later
Figure 2 by an abrupt left turn onto a southerly track.
The crew report stated that during each
Figure 2 shows the profiles for the first approach approach the VOR indications were lost just prior
at HAAB. Notable points are the non-sloping to the go-around, but came back as the
nature of the terrain between 15nm and 6nm and go-around proceeded. During the approach
the high point at just over 5nm. There is also a made by the GPS fitted aircraft the following
marked valley at 9nm and a lesser one at 6.5nm. behaviour was observed:

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 5

• During the outbound leg of the procedure, the Initially, as the procedure is commenced, the
VOR bearing information correlated with the FMGC track and still track appear to be following
GPS derived FMGC data on the Navigation the procedural 094°T track. The FMGC track
Display (ND). then starts to deviate to the south and the
• As the aircraft turned left to intercept the aircraft is turned left to correct taking the still air
249°M track inbound to the VOR, the beam track to the north of the required track. This
bar initially moved in as expected to near correction brings the FMGC position slowly back
centre. to the required track, but the still air track is
• As the wings were levelled on a heading that moving well north.
should have followed the correct track, the
beam bar moved back out to the right and
settled at about half to two thirds full scale
deflection. Airbus Policy
• The crew flew by visual reference to the runway
using the GPS derived navigation data to This Airbus policy is concerning the use of GPS
follow the correct inbound track and the VOR position for TAWS operations. Note that the
indication remained steady at the deflection TAWS is also known as EGPWS (Enhanced
stated above. Ground Proximity Warning System) or T2CAS
• At about 3.5D, the beam bar quickly moved (Traffic and Terrain Collision Avoidance System).
back to the central position.
The TAWS computer has an internally loaded
terrain database and uses position information
from the FMS. The FMS uses ADIRU position
and radio position update. It can also use a GPS
position source when available.
The use of the GPS with multimode receivers
(MMR) provides improved navigation and
surveillance functions. Therefore Airbus strongly
recommends the use of a GPS source in the
global architecture of the TAWS system.

Airbus offers an upgrade package that includes

installation of 2 multimode receivers (MMR) and
Green line = FMGC Position Plot from QAR 2 GPS antennas.
Red Line = Derived Still Air Plot Using Heading However some aircraft configurations may need
and Ground Speed from QAR upgrade of other aircraft equipment to make full
Blue Pecked Line = 25L VOR/DME Procedure Outbound Track 094°T
benefit of the MMR system. The Airbus upgrade
Magenta Pecked Line= 25L VOR/DME Procedure Inbound Track 251°T
services will define everything needed during the
Figure 4 RFC/RFO process.

The two approaches flown during the incident For more information see OIT/FOT ref SE
flight were both conducted in IMC with only one 999.0015/04/VHR, dated 05 Feb 2004
glimpse of ground lights during the first
approach.

Figure 4 on shows the track for the second

approach.

Safety first #01 January 2005 - 6

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