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Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed 1st
Edition Xiaoyu Ruan (Auth.) Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Xiaoyu Ruan (auth.)
ISBN(s): 9781430265726, 1430265728
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 4.02 MB
Year: 2014
Language: english
For your convenience Apress has placed some of the front
matter material after the index. Please use the Bookmarks
and Contents at a Glance links to access them.
Contents at a Glance
v
■ Contents AT A glance
Index���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 239
vi
Introduction
Malware, virus, e-mail scam, identity theft, evil maid, password logger, screen scraper…
Cyber security concerns everyone. Computers can be your trusted friends or traitors.
The Internet is a scary place. Going on the Internet is like walking the streets of a crime-ridden
neighborhood. Cyber criminals work to steal your privacy, money, assets, and even identity.
Cyber-attacks are intangible, invisible, and hard to detect. Due to the increasing popularity of
mobile devices, the danger is several-fold worse today than it was seven years ago.
Technologies that created the security problem as a side effect are supposed to resolve
the problem. Prevention is the key—the potential loss and cost of dealing with incidents is
simply too high to afford.
However, it is more difficult to defend a castle than to build it. The mitigation against
cyber-attacks is complicated and involves multiple layers of building blocks:
• Algorithm: An algorithm is a set of mathematical calculations that
realize a specific cryptographic functionality, such as encryption,
digital signature, hashing, and so forth.
• Protocol: A protocol is a set of rules and messages that govern the
transmission of data between two entities. Security protocols are
always built on cryptographic algorithms.
• Application: An application is a computer program that
accomplishes a specific task, such as authenticating a user to a
protected database. Applications are built with algorithms and
protocols as the backbone.
Algorithms and protocols are often standardized and used across the industry for
compatibility and interoperability. On the other hand, applications may be standardized,
but in most cases they are invented and deployed by individual vendors to distinguish
their products from competitors.
Algorithms, protocols, and applications can be realized in software, hardware, or
combinations of both. Security measures that are rooted in hardware are more robust
than those rooted in software, because attacks against well-designed hardware-based
protections not only require advanced expertise, but also cost significant resources.
xxiii
■ Introduction
xxiv
Chapter 1
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Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Power Efficiency
Mobile devices distinguish themselves from stationary platforms in mobility and
independence of AC (alternating current) power supply. The battery life is hence an
important factor for evaluating the quality of a mobile product. Before the battery
technology sees a major breakthrough, computer manufacturers have to strive to deliver
hardware and software with low energy consumption.
A number of general strategies can be employed to save power:
• Decrease the processor’s clock frequency, with the potential
tradeoff of performance. For example, the security and
management engine runs at a significantly lower speed than the
platform’s main processor. This is possible without degrading
the user experiences, because the engine is not designed to be
involved in performance-critical paths.
• Dim the display screen and shut down devices that are not being
used or place them in sleep states. For example, after being idle
for a configurable amount of time, like 30 seconds, the security
and management engine may completely power off or run in
a low-power state with very low clock frequency. Events that
may wake up the engine to its full-power state include device
interrupts and messages received from the host operating system.
• Simplify and adjust hardware and software logic. Redundant
routines should be removed. For example, applying blinding to
public key operations is meaningless, because there is no secret
to be secured from side-channel attacks; whenever feasible, favor
performance over memory consumptions for runtime programs.
These are part of the design guidelines for the security and
management engine.
2
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Internet Connectivity
Needless to say, the majority of applications running on a mobile device rely on network
connections to function. Looking into the architecture, there are two models of splitting
the workload between the local device and the cloud:
• The main functionality of the cloud is storage, for contents such
as movies, music, and personal files. The local device carries
out most of computational tasks. This model requires stronger
computing capability of the mobile devices, which may imply
higher prices.
• Besides storage, the cloud also performs a certain amount of
computations for the device. The device is responsible for only
limited computations, and its main tasks are input and output.
This model is advantageous in lowering the cost of the device.
However, it requires high network bandwidth and powerful
servers that are able to support a large number of devices
simultaneously.
Security
Security is not standalone, but closely relevant to the other two pillars. Security is
becoming vitally important for computers, thanks to the increasing connectivity. While
enjoying all the benefits and conveniences the Internet has to offer, connected devices
are also exposed to widespread attackers, viruses, and malware on the open network. The
new challenges of securing mobile platforms are originated from three characteristics of
mobile computing:
• Always connected: Smartphones and tablets may never be turned
off. Attacks can be mounted at any time and take any amount
of time.
• Large data transmission: Because of its convenience, mobile
devices are used more often for operations that involve secure
data transmission with servers, for example, web site logon,
financial transaction, online purchase, and so forth. This makes
attacks that require collecting a large amount of data more likely
to succeed.
• Privacy: Mobile devices hold sensitive data that would not
normally appear on stationary computers. The data includes
but is not limited to phonebook and location information.
A security objective for mobile devices is to protect users’
personal information.
To mitigate these threats, security researchers have invented and deployed various
countermeasures to safeguard computers and prevent leakage and abuse of assets. They
include software-based solutions, like antivirus programs, firewalls, and so on, and
hardware-based solutions, such as secure boot.
3
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Now let’s take a look at the relationship between security and power. Unfortunately,
improvements in security and reduction in energy consumption are largely contradictory.
A security measure, although an essential element, costs power to accomplish its
work that is not functionally beneficial. However, an insecure system is not practically
usable. Well-designed cryptography and security implementations can provide desired
protection strengths with minimum power consumption. The following are some
strategies that can be considered:
• Offload intensive mathematical operations to hardware engines
that operate at lower frequency. Most cryptography algorithms
are built on complex mathematics. The dedicated hardware
should feature specific logic for underlying operations, so the
calculation can be completed faster with lower power, compared
to general-purpose processors.
• Utilize efficient algorithms and parameters; for example, when
designing elliptic curve cryptography, select the curves carefully,
and use the ones that require the fewest operations without
degrading the security strength.
• Avoid overengineering. Choose algorithms and key sizes
that meet, but don’t overwhelmingly exceed, robustness
requirements. For example, using a public key cryptosystem with
security strength of 256 bits to protect a 128-bit symmetric key is a
waste of computing power.
• Store keys and other secrets in secure, nonvolatile memory if
possible and avoid repeated derivations for every power cycle.
BYOD
Bring Your Own Device, or BYOD, is a fast-growing emerging application thanks to the
booming mobile computing development. An increasing number of companies now
support BYOD programs and allow employees to use their personal mobile devices for
work, such as sending and receiving corporate e-mails and accessing work data.
According to a survey1 conducted by Intel, the following are the three top-ranked
benefits voted by corporate IT (information technology) managers across different
continents:
• Improve efficiency and worker productivity
• Increase opportunities for worker mobility
• Save costs by not having to purchase as many devices for
employees to use
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Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Alongside the gains are risks and challenges. Not surprisingly, security is the
number-one rated barrier of deploying BYOD in most countries, especially for heavily
regulated industries. With BYOD, it is increasingly common to see malware that targets
the IT infrastructures of government agencies and industrial companies. The safety level
of a corporate asset is equal to the strength of the weakest link that handles the asset.
Because the employees’ devices are handling confidential business data, they must apply
the required security enforcements per the company’s IT policies.
Here are a few security considerations when converting an employee’s device
for BYOD:
• Secure boot: The system integrity must be guaranteed. Rootkits
and malware that infects the boot flow place the entire operating
environment at risk. It is recommended that rooted mobile
devices should not be permitted for BYOD. Refer to Chapter 6 for
technical insights into Intel’s Boot Guard technology.
• Hard-drive encryption: The whole drive, or at least the partition
that stores business data, should be encrypted with a standard
algorithm. The encryption key may be randomly generated at
the first boot and sealed in a dedicated trusted device, such as a
TPM2 (Trusted Platform Module). The key may also be calculated
from the user’s credentials using a one-way function with a salt
at each boot. Regardless of how the key is generated, it should be
unique per device. Deriving the key solely from a password is not
a good idea, because the employee may use the same password
for multiple purposes.
• Strong authentication: The minimal length and complexity of
the login password should be enforced. A password should be a
combination of characters and cannot be a four-digit number.
The device memory should not contain plaintext secrets before
the device is unlocked by the employee. In addition, some
business applications may warrant additional multifactor
authentication at runtime.
• Isolated execution: Sensitive applications should execute in a
secure mode that is logically separated from the nonsecure mode
and other irrelevant applications. Intel’s proprietary features,
like TXT3 (Trusted Execution Technology) and the upcoming
SGX4 (Software Guard Extensions) technology, have built
infrastructures for isolated execution.
• Employee privacy: Depending on the organization’s BYOD policy,
the employee’s personal data, such as photos, videos, e-mails,
documents, web browse cache, and so on, may need to be
secured from access or abuse by business applications. This can
be achieved by the same isolation technique mentioned earlier.
5
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
6
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
7
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
OpenSSL Heartbleed
The Request for Comments 6520 “Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension,”9 published by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in February 2012, introduces and standardizes the
heartbeat extension for the TLS/DTLS protocol. In a nutshell, it is a simple two-way
protocol between a client and a server that have already established a secure TLS/DTLS
session. One party sends a heartbeat request message with an arbitrary payload to its
peer, who in turn sends back a heartbeat response message that echoes the payload
within a certain amount of time. This extension is mainly used for checking the liveliness
of the peer.
The core of the mobile computing is interconnectivity—connections between
a client (laptop, smartphone, tablet, and so forth) and a server, between two servers,
or between two clients. There exist various protocols that offer secure links between
two entities, for example, the SIGMA (SIGn and message authentication) protocol
introduced in Chapter 5 of this book. However, TLS/DTLS is used in the majority of
secure connections over the Internet today. It provides not only one-way or mutual
authentication but also encryption and integrity for messages. Most implementations of
TLS/DTLS take advantage of the open-source OpenSSL cryptography library.
Heartbleed is a severe security bug in OpenSSL.10 The vulnerability was first reported
by Neel Mehta of Google’s security team on April 1, 2014. The Finnish cyber security
company, Codenomicon, found the same issue independently at almost the same time
and named it Heartbleed. The bug was fixed promptly in an OpenSSL release on April 7.
8
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
9
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Attacker’s Target
TLS/DTLS client TLS/DTLS server
Heartbeat request
(D)TLSPlaintext.length = 28 bytes
message_type = REQUEST
payload_length = 65535 bytes
payload = ed15ed7c059f7b9962 (9bytes)
padding =
c1533444c8d1d98b3e3c259f03830072 (16
bytes)
Heartbeat response
The server with a buggy OpenSSL library calculates the total size of the heartbeat
response buffer by adding the sizes of the message type (1 byte), payload_length field
(2 bytes), payload (payload_length bytes), and padding (16 bytes), which works out to be
1+2+65535+16=65554 bytes in this case. Due to the missing bounds check, the server fails
to realize that the size of its response has exceeded the maximum, 16384 bytes, defined by
the specification. The size of the response also exceeds the size, 28 bytes, of the received
heartbeat request. That is, as many as 65535-9=65526 bytes of the server’s memory
(an illustrative example is underlined in the figure: {96 89 e3 07 ee f2 ee 2c 00 aa
3c fd e8 ed 2a 79 ...}) following the payload is sent to the client in the heartbeat
response. The leaked memory could contain the server’s private key.
The bug had existed in OpenSSL for over two years before it was discovered. The two
most popular open-source web servers, Apache and nginx, both leverage OpenSSL and
are hence vulnerable. Among all active Internet web sites in the world, two out of three
use Apache or nginx, as reported by Netcraft’s April 2014 Web Server Survey.11 Affected
sites include popular ones such as Yahoo! and Flickr. Other than web servers, OpenSSL
is the dominant library embedded in many other types of networked computer products
10
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Key Takeaways
What can we learn from the repeated cyber security crisis? How does a company fight
against cyber-attacks that make it the headlines? How to protect users’ safety on the
Internet? Following is a postmortem on the recent incidents.
Strong Authentication
Organizations, such as law enforcement agencies, offline and online retailers, financial
institutions, medical facilities, and so on, that possess and process high-value assets
should consider implementing strong authentication for access control. A strong
authentication mechanism would require multiple factors of credentials for logging in.
The second credential factor is usually a physical object—for example, a token—that
belongs to a legitimate user.
Today, multifactor authentication is no longer an expensive investment, thanks to
the emergence of innovative technologies. For many applications, the potential monetary
loss due to identity theft far surpasses the cost of deploying multifactor authentication.
Chapter 10 discusses strong authentication in detail and Intel’s unique and cost-effective
solution to the problem—IPT14 (Identity Protection Technology).
Network Management
Organizations should closely monitor all network activities and flag suspicious
operations. Advanced firewall devices and antivirus programs should be employed to
detect malware and respond correspondingly. Intel’s AMT, a core member of the vPro
technology, provides a hardware-based out-of-band platform management solution that
reduces cost and simplifies network administrators’ work.
11
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Boot Integrity
A platform that has been infected by virus, malware, or rootkits is running in a state that
is different from its trusted and known-good state. Secure boot mechanisms, available
on most new computers, examine the integrity of the platform’s firmware and software
components during power-on. They are designed to detect changes in platform state and
identify malicious programs on the system.
In addition, secure boot can collaborate with other security measures to store secrets
inside hardware, so that the confidential data is available for use only if the platform is
running in a trusted state.
Hardware-Based Protection
Sophisticated viruses are capable of scanning a system’s memory for signatures of
interesting data, such as transactions and payment card numbers. For software-based
protections, sensitive data has to appear in the system’s memory in the clear at some point
to be consumed by software programs. The duration of the exposure may be very short but
still enough for malware to do its work. Even though the data is properly protected during
transmission and at rest, attackers only need to circumvent the weakest point.
The ultimate solution is to depend on hardware for security, in which case the
secrets are never exposed in the system’s memory in the clear. Successful attacks against
hardware launched from a remote location, if not impossible, would require extremely
advanced skills to find and exploit critical hardware vulnerabilities.
State-of-the-art computers are equipped with necessary devices and hardware-based
countermeasures to safeguard users’ confidentiality, at rest and at runtime. For example,
the TPM serves as the hardware root of trust (see Chapter 7 for more information) for a
platform; Intel’s SGX technology allows software programs to create and run in dedicated
enclaves that are inaccessible by other components, including ring 0 drivers.
12
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
different story. For software development, writing working code is a relatively easier
job compared to security auditing that requires dedicated resources with specialized
expertise for code review and penetration testing, which, due to funding shortage, is often
inadequate for open-source software.
Many adopters do not exercise comprehensive security validation for open-source
modules of the products like they do for their owned components. This is usually due
to lacking an in-depth understanding of the open-source modules, which renders it
difficult or impossible to come up with effective test cases that are likely to identify critical
vulnerabilities. Another excuse for deprioritizing security validation on open source is
the presumption, and de facto an illusion, that open-source software “must be” mature
because it is open and can be read and reviewed by anyone, plus it has been deployed
by countless other products for so many years. In reality, the openness does not imply
secure code. The security validation gap of using open-source software should be filled by
individual product owners.
Eventually, the amount of resources that should be spent on comprehending and
validating open-source code is a judgment call about opportunity cost. If vulnerabilities
are discovered in released products, will the expense of fixing the issue and deploying
the patch be higher than the investment on validation? Notice that there is an intangible
price of brand name damages that must be taken into consideration as well.
In the security and management engine’s firmware, only a small fraction originates
from open-source domain, and it is only used in modules that do not assume security
responsibilities. For example, the TLS implementation in the AMT firmware application
is not ported from OpenSSL and hence not affected by OpenSSL’s vulnerabilities such as
the Heartbleed. The validation of the engine does not discriminate between open source
and closed source. Thorough testing is performed against open-source software used by
the engine.
As a good general guideline, the technical white paper “Reducing Security Risks from
Open-Source Software”15 proposes five steps that organizations should go through to take
advantage of open source and lower the associative risks:
1. Identify and analyze all usages of open source.
2. Assess open source for vulnerabilities ad resolve issues.
3. Develop open-source usage policies.
4. Develop a patch management process.
5. Create a compliance gate.
13
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
■■Note Consider performing comprehensive security validation and auditing for open-source
and third-party software.
14
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Definition Assessment
Architecture
Design
Implementation
Deployment
Release
Assessment
The SDL assessment happens as part of the definition stage of a new product. The privacy
assessment asks whether the product will collect users’ personal information, and if so,
what kinds of information, what it will be used for, and what techniques are employed
to protect it from leakage and misuse. Intel has invented advanced technologies to
safeguard users’ fundamental right to privacy. Chapter 5 of this book is dedicated to
privacy protection and Intel’s EPID (enhanced privacy identification) scheme. The
discussion in this section will focus on the security aspect of SDL.
Based on the nature and properties of the product, the assessment review concludes
the set of SDL activities that must be conducted during the remainder of the product
development life cycle. Generally speaking, a security feature—such as a TPM device
or a cryptography engine—is subject to a complete SDL review, including architecture,
design, implementation, and deployment. On the other hand, only select SDL stages
may be required for those functions that are not sensitive to security per se, for example,
Intel’s Quiet System Technology (QST). Normally, architecture and design reviews may be
skipped if the risk of waiving is deemed low; however, implementation and deployment
reviews are almost always planned for all features.
15
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Architecture
In this phase, the architecture owners of the product put together an intensive
architecture description that presents the following points:
• Security architecture: The architecture includes components of
the products, functionalities of each component, internal and
external interfaces, dependencies, flow diagrams, and so on.
A product’s architecture is driven by its assets and functional
requirements.
• Assets: Assets are valuable data that must be protected by the
product, for confidentiality, integrity, and/or anti-replay. For
example, the endorsement private key is a critical asset for a TPM
and may not be exposed outside of the TPM. Notice that an asset
is not necessarily the product’s native value; it can also be users’
data, such as passwords and credit card numbers. The security
and management engine processes various types of user secrets
and it is responsible for handling them properly per defined
objectives.
• Security objectives: Security objectives are the goals that the
product intends to meet for protection. For example, guarding
the endorsement private key for confidentiality and integrity is
a security objective for a TPM device; whereas thwarting denial
of service (DoS) when an attacker is physically present is a not a
security objective for the security and management engine.
• Threat analysis: Based on the in-scope security objectives, a list
of possible attacker threats to compromise the objectives and
assets are documented and analyzed. For example, in order to
steal TPM’s endorsement private key, an attacker may utilize
side-channel attacks by accurately measuring power and time
consumptions during a large number of the TPM’s endorsement
signing operations.
• Mitigations against threats: The mitigation plans detail how
the architecture is designed to deter threats, protect assets, and
achieve security objectives. In most cases, effective mitigations
are realized through well-known and proven cryptography and
security approaches. Note that security through obscurity is not a
meaningful mitigation approach.
Figure 1-3 illustrates the components of the architecture review and relationships
among them.
16
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Assets
drive protect
Security
Architecture
objectives
defines compromise
Mitigations Threats
thwart
Design
During the design phase, high-level requirements are converted to prototypes. The
design work for a software or firmware product contains a wide range of aspects. From
the security perspective, in general, the most interesting ones are internal flows and
external interfaces:
• Internal flows: A few security best practices should be followed in
the flow design. For example: involve as few resources as possible;
minimize dependency on shared objects and other modules; apply
caution when consuming shared objects to prevent racing and
deadlock conditions; avoid using recurrence on embedded systems.
• External interfaces: API must be defined with security in mind.
For example: simplify parameters; do not trust the caller;
always assume the minimum set of privileges that are needed to
complete the tasks; verify the validity of input parameters before
use; handle DoS attacks properly, if required.
17
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Besides generic design principles, every product has its unique set of security
objectives and requirements derived from the architecture review, which must be
reflected in the design. The mitigations against threats and the protection mechanisms
for assets are materialized in the design phase as well.
The design of cryptography should follow latest applicable government and industry
standards. For example, encrypting data with AES16 (advanced encryption standard);
applying blinding to private key operations, if mitigation against timing attacks is an
objective. Proprietary algorithms should be introduced only if absolutely necessary.
Notice that use of nonstandard cryptography may pose difficulty in achieving security
certifications such as the FIPS (federal information processing standard) 140-2 standard.17
Implementation
Engineers who implement the product in hardware or software languages should be
knowledgeable about security coding practices. Members of the development team that is
responsible for the security and management engine are required to complete advanced
security coding classes and a training session on the security properties of the embedded
engine, prior to working on the implementation.
Here are a few sample guidelines for software and firmware development:
• Use secure memory and string functions (for example,
memcpy_s() instead of memcpy()) where applicable. Note that this
recommendation does not apply to certain performance critical
flows, such as paging.
• Comparison of two buffers should be independent of time to
mitigate timing attacks. That is, memcmp() should process every
byte instead of returning nonzero upon the first unmatched byte
among the two buffers.
• Beware of buffer overflows.
• Make sure a pointer is valid before dereferencing it.
• Beware of dangling pointers.
• Beware that sizeof(struct) may result in a greater value than
the total sizes of the structure’s individual components, due to
alignments.
• Set memory that contains secrets to zero immediately after use.
• Beware of integer overflows and underflows, especially in
multiplication, subtraction, and addition operations.
• Remember bounds checks where applicable.
• Do not trust the caller’s input if it is not in the trust boundary.
Perform input parameter validation.
18
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
19
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Code complete
No
Bug count is zero? Bug fixes
Deployment review
Figure 1-4. Iterations of the implementation review. In this figure, static analysis,
dynamic analysis, and manual review are performed in parallel
Deployment
The deployment review is the last checkpoint before shipment. Sophisticated validations
are performed against the product in this stage. The materials to help validation engineers
create a test plan include output of the previous stages, such as security objectives of the
architecture phase and the interface definition of the design phase. Comprehensive test
cases aiming at validating the product’s security behaviors are exercised.
Interface Testing
The first test object is the product’s interface. Figure 1-5 is a graphical illustration of the
interface test case design. Note that the output validation takes security objectives as
input. A bug will be recorded when the behavior of the system under test violates one or
more requirements.
20
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Security objectives
Interface definition
and requirements
Console
21
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Penetration Testing
The second type of tests intends to verify that the implementation is in accordance
with the threat mitigation plan. A test of this type emulates an attack that is in the threat
analysis of the architecture phase, observes the response of the product under test, and
makes sure that it matches the behavior required by the mitigation plan. This type of
testing is known as penetration testing, or pentest for short.
For example, the security and management engine reserves an exclusive region
of the system memory for the purpose of paging. Any entity other than the engine
changing the content of the region is deemed a severe security violation. Such an attack
is considered and documented in the threat analysis, and the corresponding mitigation
required is to trigger an instant power down of the platform as soon as the embedded
engine detects the alteration.
A basic test for this case would flip a random bit in the reserved region of
the host memory using a special tester and see whether the system indeed shuts
down immediately as expected. Passing this basic test proves the correctness of the
implementation at a certain confidence level. However, a more advanced test would
understand the integrity check mechanism used for paging and replace the memory
content with a calculated pattern that may have a higher chance of cheating the
embedded system, and hence bypassing the protection. Obviously, design of such smart
tests requires the knowledge of internal technical information of the product. This is
called white box testing.
Before rolling out the product, a survivability plan should be drafted and archived.
The survivability plan specifies roles, responsibilities, and applicable action items upon
security vulnerabilities are found in the field.
CVSS
Even after going through stringent review and testing, vulnerabilities reported—either
by internal teams or external sources—after the product is released are not uncommon.
It is important to fairly evaluate the severity of escaped defects in order to take the right
actions accordingly. For rating vulnerability, an industry standard used by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is the
CVSS18 (Common Vulnerability Scoring System).
The CVSS defines three groups of metrics to describe vulnerability. They are base,
temporal, and environmental, respectively:
• Base group: Represents fundamental characteristics of
vulnerability. Such characteristics do not change over time or
environment.
• Temporal group: Includes characteristics that change over time,
but not environments.
• Environmental group: Covers characteristics that are relevant and
unique to a particular environment.
22
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Each group consists of several factors to be rated by the analysis. Figure 1-6 lists the
factors under each group. The CVSS formula calculates a base score, a temporal score,
and an environment score, respectively, from applicable factors. The calculation yields
a score ranging from 0 to 10 inclusive, where a higher number indicates worse severity.
According to NVD’s standard, vulnerabilities are labeled “low” severity if they have a base
score of 0.0 to 3.9, “medium” for a base score of 4.0 to 6.9, and “high” for 7.0 to 10.0.
Confidentiality
Authentication Report confidence
requirement
Availability impact
CVSS
23
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
Once a firmware bug is reported, the remediation plan depends on the CVSS score of
the bug. The following are the general guidelines:
• If the defect is of low severity, then do not fix or fix in the next
scheduled release.
• If the defect is of medium severity, then fix it in the next
scheduled release. Prevent firmware downgrade from a firmware
version with the fix to any vulnerable version.
• If the defect is of high or critical severity, then fix it in an ad-hoc
hot-fix release. Prevent firmware downgrade from a firmware
version with the fix to any vulnerable version. If exploitation of the
bug may result in leakage of the chipset key or EPID private key,
then launch the rekey operation with a remote server after the
firmware is updated.
Notice that bug fixes also pose potential risks—they may introduce new functional
bugs or security vulnerability, or break working flows. Therefore, complete functional
testing and select security reviews should be performed against the fixes for quality control.
Limitations
The CVSS is especially useful for rating software vulnerabilities. However, it is not perfect
when used on hardware, in particular because it does not comprehend survivability.
For example, the level of difficulty of patching a hardware bug is not taken into
account. The remediation may include the following:
• Documentation and specification change
• Software workaround by remote update
• Firmware workaround by remote update
• Recall (in the worst case)
Such factors should be weighed when evaluating hardware issues.
References
1. Intel IT Center, “Insights on the Current State of BYOD,” www.intel.com/content/
www/us/en/mobile-computing/consumerization-enterprise-byod-peer-
research-paper.html, accessed on June 10, 2014.
2. Trusted Computing Group, “Trusted Platform Module Library,”
www.trustedcomputinggroup.org, accessed on March 20, 2014.
3. Intel, Trusted Execution Technology, www.intel.com/txt, accessed on January 30, 2014.
4. Intel, “Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference,” https://software.
intel.com/sites/default/files/329298-001.pdf, accessed on May 10, 2014.
24
Chapter 1 ■ Cyber Security in the Mobile Age
25
Chapter 2
Teflon, the famous chemical, was discovered by Roy Plunkett of E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company (commonly shortened to DuPont), in 1938 and trademarked in 1945.
Teflon’s major application today is in manufacturing nonstick cookware. However, it was
not intended for helping grandmas make delicious pancakes when it was first discovered.
For decades, it has been used in artillery shell fuses and the production of nuclear
materials.
Temper foam was invented in 1966 by Chiharu Kubokawa and Charles A. Yost of
NASA’s Ames Research Center to protect astronauts’ bodies when they are hurtling
toward the earth. Today, temper foam is used to make mattresses that people sleep on
every night.
The list of old inventions finding new applications in new domains goes on. The new
applications benefit a much wider population and improve more people’s quality of life.
When Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT) first appeared in 2005, it was
marketed as an advanced system management feature for Intel 82573E series gigabit
Ethernet controllers. In 2007, a new embedded coprocessor, namely the management
engine, was introduced. Originally, the management engine was designed primarily
for implementing the AMT rather than running security applications. At that time, the
main problem that was supposed to be resolved by the embedded engine and AMT was
the high expense and difficulty of system management by network administrators. The
management engine was a component of Intel chipsets with vPro technology. The Intel
AMT implementation was moved from gigabit Ethernet controllers to the management
engine and became a feature of vPro.
27
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
Intel AMT is not the only application on the management engine. The first security
application on the engine was the integrated TPM (Trusted Platform Module, see
Chapter 7 for details). The number of security applications has been increasing in recent
years with every release of the engine. In the latest releases, most applications running
on the engine are related to security. The applications either realize “pure” security
functionalities, or provide security infrastructures for other consumer features. For
example, TPM and Boot Guard (refer to Chapter 6 of this book for details about Intel’s
Boot Guard technology) are security modules, whereas the dynamic application loader
(DAL, see Chapter 9) is not implemented for security per se, but requires security as a
building block.
In addition to more powerful applications and functionalities, the embedded
engine has also been deployed on more platforms—not only chipsets for traditional
personal computers, laptops, workstations, and servers, but also SoC (System-on-Chip)
products, for example, in-vehicle infotainment, tablets, and smartphones, where security
is becoming a critical infrastructure. The AMT is still widely provisioned on desktop
computers and laptops, but has become an optional add-on for other mobile devices. On
Intel’s SoC platforms, the engine carries only security applications.
Just like Teflon and temper foam, today, the engine is realizing its greater value
in the new usage model—providing robust security solutions and trusted execution
environments to all forms of computer systems. The security and management engine is
contributing to the promotion of people’s computing experience every day and making a
more substantial impact than ever before.
This book is not the first literature on the engine. Back in 2009, Intel Press published
Active Platform Management Demystified: Unleashing the Power of Intel vPro Technology,
authored by Intel’s Arvind Kumar, Purushottam Goel, and Ylian Saint-Hilaire.1 It will be
referred to as the “2009 AMT book” in this chapter.
The 2009 AMT book is a systematic introduction to the management engine and
AMT. It raises the platform management problems to be resolved, evaluates existing
solutions, and then proposes the innovative AMT solution. It covers technical details
of the management engine and the AMT, as well as instructions for setting up and
configuring the AMT.
Although the engine’s design has been improved in many ways since the 2009 AMT
book was published, the fundamental architecture of the engine remains unchanged.
A large portion of the technical descriptions in the 2009 AMT book still applies to today’s
security and management engine. Even after five years, it is still the best reference for
infrastructures of the management engine and the AMT.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly
revisit the 2009 AMT book. We will begin with a review of the hardware and firmware
architectures of the management engine, and then look at the platform management
problems and compare different solutions by analyzing their advantages and
disadvantages. Next, a high-level introduction to the architecture of the AMT is presented.
Finally, select security applications that feature on the security and management engine
today are presented, with reasons for housing the applications in the embedded engine.
28
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
29
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
Hardware
The hardware is comprised of a processor, code and data caches, DMA (direct memory
access) engines, cryptography engines, read-only memory (ROM), internal memory
(static random-access memory, or SRAM), a timer, and other supporting devices. The
devices are connected through an internal bus that is not exposed to the external world.
This ensures independence, isolation, and security of the engine. The management
engine’s hardware devices are only accessible by the processor, the DMA engines, and the
cryptography engine.
The hardware architecture is illustrated in Figure 2-1.
Code Cache
Internal
Processor SRAM
Data Cache
ROM
Internal bus
Cryptography
engine
Interrupt CLink I/O
controller
DMA engine
High Memory
precision Controllers
and HECI engine
watchdog
timer
Early generations of the management engine used ARC as the central processing
unit. Other processors have replaced ARC in newer generations. The processor model
and frequency in a specific engine depends on the form factor on which the engine is
deployed. The model of the processor does not impact the engine’s high-level firmware
architecture.
There is a small code and data cache to help the processor reduce the number of
accesses to the internal SRAM. The internal SRAM is the memory that stores firmware
code and data at runtime. The capacity of SRAM varies depending on the product, but
generally ranges between 256KB and 1MB.
In addition to the internal SRAM, the management engine also uses a certain
amount of DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) from the main system memory.
Code and data pages that are not recently accessed may be evicted from the SRAM and
30
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
swapped out to the reserved memory. When a page is needed again, it will be swapped
in to the SRAM. During the boot process, the DRAM region that will be used by the
management engine is reserved by the BIOS (basic input/output system) for the engine’s
dedicated access. The reserved region, by design, is not visible to the main host operating
system. That being said, the management engine’s security architecture assumes that the
BIOS may be compromised and the local host may be able to read and write the reserved
memory region. The size of the reserved memory varies from product to product, but
usually in the range between 4MB and 32MB. This is only a small fraction of the DRAM
installed on today’s computing devices, and hence the impact to the main operating
system performance is negligible.
For many embedded applications, it is necessary to transmit bulk data between
the embedded memory and the host memory. However, the engine’s processor cannot
address the host memory. Therefore, dedicated DMA engines are introduced for
moving data between the engine’s memory and the main system’s memory. Notice that
the reserved memory is considered the engine’s memory and not the host memory.
When addressing the host memory, the DMA engines can only understand physical
addresses and not virtual addresses that are specific to operating systems processes.
The DMA engines can only be programmed by the embedded firmware running on the
management engine. The DMA engines can also be used to move a large amount of data
between two buffers of the engine’s internal memory. Experiments show that, when data
is greater than 1KB in size, it is more efficient to invoke a DMA engine for data copying
than calling memcpy() of the processor. The firmware cannot program a DMA engine to
move data between two host memory locations.
The cryptography engine device offloads and accelerates heavily-used cryptography
algorithms so those resource-consuming operations can be performed faster and
they do not occupy the processor’s clock cycles. The algorithms implemented by the
cryptography engine include AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), SHA (Secure Hashing
Algorithm), DRNG (Deterministic Random Number Generator), big number arithmetic,
and so on. See Chapter 3 of this book for a complete list of algorithms and their API
descriptions. The cryptography engine is only accessible by the engine’s firmware. They
are not directly available to the host, although some embedded applications implement
and expose external interfaces for the host applications to take advantage of the
cryptography engine. Notice that the cryptography driver in the firmware kernel not only
abstracts interfaces for the cryptography engine hardware, but also implements other
cryptography algorithms that are not available in the hardware.
Overlapped I/O
As shown in Figure 2-1, there are three master devices—processor, DMA, and
cryptography engine—on the management engine. They all can access the embedded
memory and process data. These devices are independent of each other and therefore
can function at the same time without mutual interference, as long as the assets (for
example, memory and global variables) that are being accessed by more than one
device are properly protected against racing conditions. The protection is usually
realized by employing semaphores or mutexes. By commanding multiple devices to
work simultaneously, firmware applications can be optimized to minimize the system
31
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
resource idle time and boost performance. The mechanism implemented by the security
and management engine is de facto equivalent to overlapped I/O (input/output) or
asynchronous I/O for traditional operating systems.
The idea is straightforward. After process A initializes a long cryptography operation,
such as the exponentiation and modulo of RSA (a popular asymmetric-key cryptosystem
invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman) decryption, instead of
sitting idle and waiting for its completion, the processor may switch to process B and
perform operations that do not require the cryptography engine. In the meantime, the
processor may either periodically inquire about the status register for completion of the
RSA operation or watch for an interrupt signaled by the cryptography engine. Similarly,
the DMA engines can also participate in the synchronization to further expedite the
operations.
An interesting example of the overlapped I/O design is the flow for decrypting and
parsing an H.264 video frame during movie playback. For this application, the player
running on the host receives encrypted video frames from a remote content server, but
the player as user-mode software is not allowed to access the content key or the clear
content. The wrapped content key is sent to the security and management engine, which
in turn uses its device private key to unwrap and retrieve the plaintext content key. The
engine then decrypts the encrypted frames, performs slice header parsing, and sends
back the resulting headers to the host. Finally, the player submits the encrypted frames
and parsed headers to the GPU (graphics processing unit) through the graphics driver for
playback.
Because of the limited memory capacity of the embedded memory, a large frame has
to be split into chunks before it is processed. The optimal size of a chunk depends on how
much embedded memory is available.
The firmware has three tasks in this usage:
1. Copy a chunk of an encrypted video frame from the host
memory to the internal memory. This step is carried out by a
DMA engine.
2. Decrypt the encrypted frame. For most cases, it is an AES
decryption, offloaded to the cryptography engine.
3. Parse the clear frame. This step is conducted by the
embedded processor.
The firmware runs the three steps repeatedly on all chunks of the frame, until the
entire frame is processed.
A sequential approach would be to repeatedly exercise steps 1 to 3 for all chunks of a
frame, respectively. The advantage is obviously simple firmware control logic. Figure 2-2
depicts an example of a frame that consists of four chunks. For simplicity, assume that the
three tasks for a chunk— DMA copy, decryption, and parsing— take the same amount
of time (denoted as one time slot in the figure). The number of time slots needed for
processing a frame of n chunks is 3 × n. Processing all four chunks of the frame takes as
many as 12 time slots.
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Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
Obviously, the sequential approach lacks efficiency. In this design, when step 1 is
running, the DMA engine is busy; however, the cryptography engine and the processor
are both idle. Similarly, in step 2 and step 3, only one device is working at any moment
and the other two are not being used.
To implement an overlapped I/O optimization, the firmware must simultaneously
manage three chunks of the frame (namely: previous chunk, current chunk, and next
chunk) of the same size in three distinct memory buffers.
The firmware first initializes DMA for the next chunk of frame, then triggers the
AES decryption for the current chunk (the current chunk has been DMA’ed into the
embedded memory in the previous iteration), and finally parses the previous (decrypted)
chunk of the frame (the previous chunk has been DMA’ed into the embedded memory
and decrypted in the previous two iterations). When the parsing is finished, the
processor waits for the completion of the AES and the DMA. Figure 2-3 explains the flow
graphically.
33
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
It is easy to see from Figure 2-3 that processing four chunks takes only six time slots
thanks to the overlapped I/O optimization. In general, the number of time slots taken for
processing a frame of n chunks is n + 2.
Note that for the security and management engine, the processor, the DMA engines,
and the cryptography engine all operate at the same speed. The exact frequency
varies among different products. This is the major difference between the embedded
overlapped I/O and its counterparts for the host operating systems, where the I/O
devices, that is, hard drive, keyboard, and so forth, are usually operating at significantly
slower speed than the main processor.
Admittedly, managing three masters may result in fairly complex firmware logic.
The best practice for software engineering tells us that complicated code is more prone
to bugs and errors. Therefore, such optimization strategies should be exercised with extra
care. And the implementation must go through thorough testing and validation to cover
all corner cases. For certain use cases, such as video frame parsing, as the throughput
requirement is extremely high to guarantee smooth playback, utilizing the overlapped
I/O trick is necessary.
■■Note If multiple master devices are available on the embedded system, consider
overlapped I/O to improve performance.
Firmware
The security and management engine’s embedded firmware implements the runtime
operating system, kernel, and applications.
34
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
There are numerous products and form factors of the engine. A specific version of
firmware is intended for running on the corresponding engine hardware only, and a
specific engine is intended for running the corresponding version of the firmware; for
example:
• Intel series 5 chipset (codename IbexPeak) can load only security
and management engine firmware version 6.x. It cannot load
version 5.x or other firmware. It cannot load firmware from a third
party or a hacker.
• Security and management engine firmware version 6.x can
only execute on the Intel series 5 chipset. It cannot be executed
on series 6 or other chipset generations. It cannot be executed
on SoC products, nor can it run on a third-party’s or a hacker’s
hardware platforms.
• Security and management engine firmware designed for the Bay
Trail tablets cannot execute on Intel chipsets or other generations
of Intel tablets.
The hardware and firmware mapping is enforced by different image signing keys.
The hash values of the signing public keys are hardcoded in the ROM on different
products.
Figure 2-4 shows the high-level architecture of the management engine firmware.
Privileged-nonprivileged
interface
Privileged firmware (kernel) Nonprivileged firmware
Applications
Storage
AMT
Drivers
Management engine
35
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
There are two storage media—ROM and flash nonvolatile memory—that store the
firmware’s binary data and executable code. The ROM inside the management engine
stores the boot loader. The code in ROM cannot be modified once manufactured. Thanks
to this property, ROM is used as the root of trust of the engine. The boot loader code is
usually smaller than 256KB.
The rest of the firmware is stored in flash. The flash is divided into multiple regions,
for security and management engine firmware, BIOS, network controller, and so forth,
respectively. Depending on which embedded applications are chosen to be included,
the management engine firmware can consume from a few hundred kilobytes to 1.5
megabytes of flash space. The region for firmware is further divided into regions for
executable code, configuration data, embedded applications’ variable storage, and so
on. The OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) are mandated to lock down the
flash so it cannot be altered after the manufacturing process is completed. However,
the management engine does not depend on the flash lockdown for security. The threat
analysis assumes the flash can be replaced or reprogrammed by an attacker as he wishes.
As shown in Figure 2-4, firmware modules are logically divided into two categories:
privileged and nonprivileged. The privileged firmware boots the engine, loads other
modules, abstracts hardware devices (such as DMA engines and cryptography engines),
schedules threads, manages synchronization objects (such as semaphores, timers,
and mutex), and coordinates communications between embedded applications. The
privileged firmware is the kernel and it implements only infrastructure for internal
applications. It usually does not contain applications or expose external interfaces that
are visible to the host.
The nonprivileged firmware is made up of one or more applications that realize
their designed functionalities. The management engine firmware must contain at least
one nonprivileged application. The Intel AMT, a nonprivileged module, is one of such
applications. One notable difference that distinguishes the AMT from other applications
is that the AMT also includes network stacks. Although most applications leverage the
kernel for external communication, the AMT uses firmware wired and wireless network
stacks for communicating with the remote managing console. As will be described
later in this chapter, the firmware shares the same network devices with the host. The
nonprivileged modules are further separated from each other by task isolation. The
boundary between the privileged and nonprivileged domains is safeguarded by hardware
and the privileged, to prevent privilege escalation attacks from the nonprivileged code.
Chapter 4 of this book provides a detailed introduction about the firmware
architecture.
Software
Two classes of software programs run alongside the engine: drivers and user-mode
applications.
The HECI is intended for transmitting a small amount of data between the host
and the management engine firmware. The HECI is implemented as a circular buffer
with limited bandwidth; therefore, the size of the data in general should be smaller than
10KB. The data transmitted through HECI can be commands for the firmware and the
firmware’s responses, but not massive data. The DMA engines should be used to move
large amounts of data between host and firmware.
36
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
During the boot process, the BIOS can exchange messages with the firmware through
HECI. On the host operating system, only ring 0 drivers may access the HECI device to
send and receive messages. Together with the management engine firmware, Intel also
releases HECI driver software for the HECI communication for various operating systems.
The HECI driver is also called the management engine interface (MEI) driver. On Linux
and Android, it is a device driver that supports the main kernel-based distributions.
Most firmware applications serve the role of trusted execution environments for
the corresponding host applications. The firmware applications are typically used for
handling sensitive secrets that must not be visible to the host and for offloading critical
operations that involve the secrets. The software and firmware together realize specific
functionalities. The software agents communicate with firmware applications through the
HECI interface and DMA.
For example, a movie player application sends a 128-bit or 256-bit encrypted content
key to firmware in a HECI message, and then the firmware uses the unique device key
stored in the engine to decrypt the content key. Then the player sends another HECI
command to initialize playback. Note that the device key must be securely provisioned to
the engine beforehand and the device key must never be exposed to the host.
The software may also place bulk data, such as an encrypted video frame of over
1MB in size, in the host memory and notifies the firmware of the data size and the
physical address thorough a HECI command. Upon receiving the HECI command, the
firmware invokes its DMA engine to bring in the video frame from the host. Note that
the embedded engine’s DMA devices understand physical memory address only. Virtual
memory must be converted to physical memory by a ring 0 driver before delivering to
the firmware.
Software Solutions
There are several categories of manageability software. For example, firewalls analyze
network data packets and determine whether they should be allowed or blocked, based
on the rules and policies configured by network administrators. Antivirus software
37
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
detects and removes malicious software programs from the system. Remote desktop
control agents such as VNC (virtual network computing) and SSH (secure shell)
enable IT support technicians to remotely manage a system to perform diagnosis and
resolve problems.
Although very convenient and useful in daily system management, software
solutions also suffer from obvious limitations:
• Dependability: Manageability software runs in the operating
environment that they are attempting to monitor, manage,
and repair. When the operating system is not booting or not
configured correctly, the software manageability solutions may
fail to function.
• Availability: Manageability software is not able to perform
management tasks when the system is in low-power states
(sleeping or hibernating).
• Reliability: Manageability software is usually launched during
boot and runs quietly in the background. However, it may be
accidentally or intentionally turned off by end users or other
system “clean-up” utilities.
• Security: Software solutions are naturally less trustworthy than
hardware solutions. They are vulnerable to denial of service (DoS)
attacks, may be compromised to report bogus information, or
may even be hijacked and become a threat to other computers in
the same network.
Hardware Solutions
In contrast to software solutions, hardware solutions for manageability do not depend on
the operating system or software programs; hardware solutions can be functioning when
the computer is in a low-power state; and hardware-based security measures can be
applied if desired.
The KVM (keyboard, video, and mouse) is a representative hardware approach. In a
typical KVM setup, the computer being managed is locally connected to a network KVM
device, which connects the computer’s I/O devices to a remote management console over
the network. A network administrator can manage numerous computers from a single
console simultaneously. Sitting in his office, the administrator can see the display of the
computer being serviced and control its keyboard and mouse, as if he is sitting in front
of the managed computer. Figure 2-5 is a symbolic representation of the management
solution based on network KVM.
38
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
Network VGA
KVM
USB
Managedd
M
Managementt
M Computer
Console
Figure 2-5. Network KVM connected to a managed computer
The equipment cost is the main factor that prevents the network KVM solution from
being deployed on every computer. As can be seen in Figure 2-5, the KVM stands on
the side of the computer; there must be a KVM device to support a computer (multiple
computers physically located in the same location can share a multiport network KVM).
The retail price of a 16-port network KVM ranges from a few hundred to over a thousand
US dollars. This significantly raises the cost of network and system administration.
A more advanced hardware management solution is the baseboard management
control (BMC). The BMC is a specialized embedded system that monitors various
physical states, including, but not limited to, the temperature, humidity, or voltage of a
computer or server. If a reported value strays out of the normal range, the administrator
will be notified. A BMC combined with network KVM can realize very powerful
management functionalities, including remotely power cycling, seeing displays, and
controlling the keyboard and mouse. See Figure 2-6 for a symbolic representation
of the BMC.
BMC
Management
Console
The powerful capability and convenience of BMC comes with a price. Due to the
cost, BMC is usually only justifiable for deploying on large servers that carry critical tasks.
39
Chapter 2 ■ Intel’s Embedded Solutions: from Management to Security
In-Band Solutions
An important component of any management methodology is how the data of the
managed machine is transmitted to the managing console for diagnosis and analyzed.
The communication link determines the security and reliability of the communication.
An in-band solution leverages the communication and network stacks of the
underlying operating system and is often utilized by software management solutions,
such as VNC, SSH, and so on. The in-band communication suffers the same limitations of
software management, that is, dependability, availability, reliability, and security.
Out-of-Band Solutions
In contrast to in-band, an out-of-band solution employs dedicated channels for
communicating with the console. Generally speaking, out-of-band solutions are more
robust and secure than in-band solutions, thanks to the isolation from the host being
managed.
For example, a network KVM device implements a network interface separated from
the network stack of the managed computer’s operating system. The connections of KVM
and the computer run side by side and are independent of each other.
The 2009 AMT book extends the definition of “out-of-band” for a special case,
where the wired or wireless network adaptor is shared by both the operating system
and an isolated management device. In this case, although the management device is
located inside the chassis of the computer and it is not equipped with dedicated network
hardware, it is still considered out-of-band because the management does not depend on
the operating system. Figure 2-7 illustrates the sharing of a network card.
Operating System
File OS OS Network
System Apps. Agent Stack
Hardware
Management
In-band
Out-of-band
Figure 2-7. Out-of-band management: both the operating system and the hardware
management traffic can use the same network hardware
Sharing a network device such as a NIC (network interface card) certainly reduces
the bill of material (BOM) cost, but this slightly compromises functionality and security
compared to using a dedicated network device. Functionality-wise, if the network card
itself is malfunctioning and requires troubleshooting, then the communication channel
between the computer and the managing console is essentially broken. Because no data
40
Discovering Diverse Content Through
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kertben fogadták; megmutatták neki a lakás régi képeit. A herczeg
kiosztotta neki a a munkát, sőt pár nap mulván magán a telepen,
nyilvános nappal végig ment vele és kijelölte, hogy melyik részlet az,
a mely neki tetszik.
Az ujságíró szinte egyszerre egészséges lett, nem is fürdött
többé. A feje nem zsibbadt, a lába nem csetlett-botlott. A
nagykereskedőt, a ki azon melegiben megkérte, hogy az udvari
szállítóságot szerezné meg neki, lerázta a nyakáról. Maga sem tudta,
hogy, – egyszerre az egész fürdőteleppel ismeretségben állott. A
magyar társaság úgyszólván veszkődött érte. Agg politikusok
érkeztek a hazából, – leöcsémezték. Egy jelentékeny
részvénytársaság elnöke minden átmenet nélkül lap-alapításról
kezdett vele tárgyalni.
Kis mágnáslányok jöttek a nagyszülőikkel. Hogy, hogy nem, az
ujságíró azon vette észre magát, hogy mindennap tenniszezik velük.
Sőt azon, hogy az egyik, a középső kurizál is neki. A kicsi bűbájos
teremtés volt, rózsa és aranyszin, gyöngéd, mégis teli, verekedett
mint egy fiú és holdas éjjeken franczia verseket írt. Egyike ama
mágnásleányoknak, a kik bár sajnálják, de helyeslik a Marie
Antoinette kivégeztetését. Az arisztokráczia hölgyei között vannak
ilyen kis forradalmárok, a kik ideálnak egy csupa haj költőt, festőt
vagy muzsikust választanak; de rendszerint egy kopasz mágnáshoz
mennek nőül. Az ujságíró ismerte ez esetet és lovagias
tartózkodással viselte magát: nem látta meg a legnyilvánvalóbb agit,
a legvaskosabb bókot sem hallotta meg. Egyébként is a herczeggel
volt tele.
A herczeg pedig véle. A fiatalember határozottan tetszett neki.
Legelsőbben is tiszta, rendkivül tiszta volt. Mindkettő ama pedáns
fajtából való, mely nem tűr ruháján egy türemlést, a czipőjén egy
porszemet. És ezt kívánja embertársaitól is; e szerint ítéli meg őket.
A nagy elvekben is tökéletesen megegyeztek:
– A vallás-erkölcsi alap a fő, ha nem volna isten, akkor is hinni
kellene benne. Vallás nélkül az emberiség folyton Kaint és Abelt
játszana.
– Úri embernek kell lenni, mindenkinek úri embernek. A mit
kimondunk, annak úgy kell lenni. A következetesség a fő. Az ember
egyenesen tartsa magát.
– A szegények jórészt tolakodók és hazudnak, de azért nem kell
velük rosszul bánni. A cseléddel azonban fraternizálni nem szabad.
Ha nem fogják őket szigorúan, akkor csalnak és lopnak.
– Mindenkinek szabad akarata van, tehát mindig a jót és
tisztességeset kell akarni.
– A politika voltaképpen a császár dolga és a hadseregé, övék a
felelősség. Azt nem lehet kívánni, hogy a más ostobaságaiért esetleg
a felség szenvedjen területe épségében, a mitől isten ments. A
haszon – esetleg – legyen a másé, a kár pedig az övé? Ez nem
megy!
– Nem kell reformálni. A reformerek svindlerek. Kálvinisták és
zsidó ujságírók mindenféle bolondokat akarnak, a mit ők mindenféle
szép neveken neveznek el. Nem kell más, mint mérsékelt
előrehaladás.
Aurél nem tetette magát, nem szolgai hajlandóságból, de
őszintén osztotta ő fensége meggyőződéseit. A gazdag bourgeoisie,
az eladósodott úri osztály, a herczeg erkölcstana és világnézlete:
voltaképpen ugyanegy. Hogy egy, sőt több, esetleg nagyon sok
magyar ujságíróban rezonál: ez csudálatos és még a regényíró
fantáziája előtt is fölöttébb szövevényes. Nincs is mit bontogatni.
Elég az hozzá, hogy Aurél nem értette, hogyan élhetett, a míg a
herczeget nem ismerte és boldogságát csak az rontotta meg, hogy
folyton rettegett:
– Egyszer csak kitesznek! Otthonról megírják ki vagyok, kinek
tartozom. Csaknem az összes belvárosi szabóknak. Egy
gorombáskodott is velem. Miket mondott! Esetleg azt is megtudják,
hogy az apám papszabó volt és predikátumom, sőt pecsétgyűrüm is
inkább anyai ágamat illeti egy papbácsi révén!
A ki azonban egy valóságos herczeg közelébe jut, azt még a
gondviselés is kedveli. Azok a magyarországi nagy urak, a kiknek
némi – hihetetlenül alázatos – érintkezésük volt a herczeggel,
dicsekedtek az ujságíró ismeretségével, jókat beszéltek róla a háta
mögött, nehogy az viszont róluk beszéljen rosszat. Nem tudták
mennyire ül benne a nyeregben. Talán egészen?!
Ő maga nem tudta, hogy áll. Julit mulattatta, felüdítette, az
bizonyos. De a férfi nem tudja, hogy áll egy asszonynyal, a míg az
neki meg nem mondja. Ostobák és gyávák vagyunk jórészt és nem
hódítunk úgyszólván soha. Csak behódolunk!
A fiatalember próbálta kémlelni a helyzetet. De két álló hétig
semmi pozitivum, kivévén két igen jelentéktelen szimptomát. Az
egyik az, hogy Juli az ujságíró keskeny és kövérasszonyos kezét
nézte, ráütött:
– Hogy tarthat egy férfi ilyen kezet! Ez csúf. Keményíteni kell,
vívni!
A másik jelenség valamivel súlyosabb, négyszem közt történt. Az
asszony meglehetősen ridegen kérdezte:
– Van önnek készpénze? Nem szűkölködik?
A fiatalember elvörösödött, a pénzkérdés váratlan és brüszk
fölvetése megalázta. Ám a következő pillanatban már tudta, hogy e
sértés ránézve értékes, ha ki tudja használni. Felugrott, vette a
kalapját és az ajtónál mondá:
– Ezt a kérdést senkinek, sem másnak bárkinek is, nincs joga
hozzám intézni.
Juli megsajnálta a mit mondott, de igen okos nő volt. A
fiatalember után ment, megfogta a kezét:
– Na, na, csak nem kell heveskedni, megsértődni. Én tudom,
maguk írók kik? Én színésznő voltam, egy ménageon éltem
magukkal. Önök között még a legjelesebbek is megszorulnak tíz
forint erejéig – olykor. Ismertem egy akadémikust, minden évben
éhezett egy-két napot. Nem tudják a jövedelmüket beosztani. És
hogy a szinészek mindent elköltenek a hasukra, maguk meg
kidobálják a pénzt, hogy úrnak látszassanak. Maguk olyanok, mint
egy-egy rossz asszony. Na, na, haragudni azért nem kell! Aztán
maga még nagyon is fiatal. Hány esztendős?
– Huszonhét.
– Én is annyi. De én sokkal többet láttam, éltem. Én tőlem
semmit rossz néven nem szabad venni. Én vagyok a jó Juli. Azt hiszi,
hogy a herczeg azért szeret engem, mert csinos vagyok? Azért mert
jó vagyok. Hozzám bizalommal lehet. Tudom én, hogy mit jelent az,
a mikor nincs készpénz; eleget nem volt nekem is. Akkor
dobálództam a banknótával, most élére rakom a nikkelpénzt is.
Tudja-e Asztalos, mennyi van a könyvecskében? megmondom
magának: egy félmilló. Ha egy kis pénz állandóan együtt van,
nagyszerűen fiadzik, azt mondhatom magának. A herczeg nekem
születésnapomra is pénzt ad, csakhogy ő fenségének fogalma sincs
az értékről. Multkor egy százast kaptam tőle a születésnapomra és
nagyra volt vele, hogy ő milyen nobilis. Máskor meg kisebb
fehérneműre tízezer forintot ad. A fenség nem jár mi közöttünk,
emberek között a földön; ő egy katona és egy angyal. Egy angyal a
katonában!
Juli roppant jóízűen nevetett, boldog volt, hogy közönséges és
régi dolgokról beszélhetett. Elvette Auréltól a kalapját, leültette,
kérlelte, mulattatta:
– Tudja-e, hogy magát a herczeg nagyon megszerette és tudja-e
miért? Mert látta, hogy irántam nagyon figyelmes és lovagias.
Szereti, ha tisztelnek. Már többször férjhez akart adni. Folytak is ez
iránt tárgyalások, de a vőlegényektől azt kívánta, hogy az esküvő
után nála hagyjanak. Csak egy báró akadt, a ki ebbe beleegyezett. A
fenségnek egyszerre eszébe jutott, hogy a ki erre képes, nem
tisztességes férfiú, nem úri ember. Kiutasította.
Ezen már az ujságíró is elnevette magát. De még mindig
megmaradt sértődött álláspontjánál, sőt elvi kijelentéseket is tett:
– Az a férfi, a ki nőtől pénzt fogad el, gazember.
– Akkor az a nő, a ki pénzt vállal el férfitól, szintén az? Én is az
vagyok? A kinek van, az ad a másiknak, ha akar. Kell? Adjak? Majd
megadja, ha miniszter lesz. Ojjé, láttam már én sokkal tökkel
ütöttebb minisztereket, mint maga. Előszobázott nálunk Bécsben
nem egy. Különben nem erőltetem, maga egy affektáns. Vagy egy
ravasz. Mit akar maga itt? A herczegtől akar valamit. Mondja mit?
Az ujságíró elhalványodott: most mindjárt megtörténik a
leleplezés! De az asszony inkább jóakaratúnak mutatkozott:
– Mondja meg, én keresztül viszem.
A fiatalembert kezdetben zavarba hozta a Juli elfogulatlansága,
de a tiszta helyzetben visszanyerte nyugodtságát és jó svádájára
méltó határozottsággal szólott:
– Nem akarok semmit. Szeretem a pályámat és azon sem ő
fensége, sem ön nem használhatnak semmit. Az önök társaságába
jutottam, tudom, mint pótművész és nem mint férfi. De nekem
tetszik a társaságuk. Ez fürdői ismeretség és tudom, vége, ha vége a
fürdőzésnek. Ő fensége bölcs ember és nekem igen tanulságos,
hogy közelében lehetek. Ez élvezetes nekem. Ha valaha drámát irok
egy herczegről, legalább tudom, milyen. Pénzem, a mennyi nekem
kell, van. A mi pedig a főokot illeti, hogy itt settenkedem, azt nem
mondom meg.
Ez utolsó mondatot remegő hangon mondotta. Nem tettetésből,
hanem mert érezte, hogy ebben van a koczkázat, a merészség, a mi
miatt esetleg nyomban kidobják. Ámde Juli egyike volt a
legegyszerűbb asszonyoknak, egyenes, csaknem katonás, a
temperamentumában a legőszintébb. A férfi két halvány arczát az
erős kezei közé fogta és kedveskedve szólt:
– Maga szerelmes belém. Ezt értem. Erről lehet beszélni; de nem
most!