PALAWAN STATE UNIVERSITY

School of Law

Cases for Bar Operations

S.Y. 2024-2025
Week 2

Submitted to: ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS

Submitted by: GILBERT A. DELOS SANTOS

No. DATE G.R. NO. TITLE

16. March 15, 2021 G.R. No. 223854 ROBUSTAN, INC., AS REPRESENTED
BY HENRY HYOUNG KI KIM, Petitioner,
v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
WILFREDO WAGAN, Respondents.
17. March 02, 2021 G.R. No. 246777 STO. CRISTO CONSTRUCTION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR,
NOEL J. CRUZ, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
18. March 02, 2021 A.M. No. P-14- GERALYN DELA RAMA, Complainant, v.
3240 (Formerly PATRICIA D. DE LEON,* CLERK III,
OCA IPI No. 12- OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
3835-P) REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA CITY,
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
19. March 02, 2021 A.C. No. 5054 SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, REPRESENTED BY
ANAMIAS B. CO, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
FOR COMPLAINANT, Complainant, v.
ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT,
Respondent.
20. March 01, 2021 G.R. No. 219744 LEVI STRAUSS & CO., Petitioner, v.
ANTONIO SEVILLA AND ANTONIO L.
GUEVARRA, Respondents.
21. March 02, 2021 G.R. No. 224182 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
22. March 17, 2021 G.R. No. 249281 MALAYAN BANK SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner, v. SPS.
JOSEPH & JOCELYN CABIGAO
REPRESENTED BY EDGARDO S.
SUAREZ, AND ROSALINDA E.
TECHICO, FERDINAND ANTHONY C.
SEVILLEJA (AS THE FORMER
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN),
Respondents.
23. March 18, 2021 G.R. No. 239871 LYNNA G. CHUNG, Petitioner, v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN-FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.
24. March 18, 2021 G.R. No. 210329 PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
 CARRIERS INC., AND/OR MARIN
SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED,
Petitioners, v. CLARITO A. MANZANO,
Respondent.
25. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 248530 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. REYNALDO DECHOSO Y
DIVINA, Accused-Appellant.
26. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 244388 JAYRALDIN F. EBUS, Petitioner, v. THE
RESULTS COMPANY, INC.,* MICHAEL
KALAW, SHERRA DE
GUZMAN,** SUMMER
DOMBROWSKI,*** JAY MORENTE AND
FRANCIS LACUNA, Respondents.
27. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 240774 TOYO SEAT PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION/YOSHIHIRO
TAKAHAMA, Petitioners, v. ANNABELLE
C. VELASCO, RENATO NATIVIDAD,
FLORANTE BILASA, AND MARY ANN
BENIGLA, Respondents.
28. March 17, 2021 G.R. No. 202661 LETICIA A. RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v.
FELOMINO ELOMINA, REPRESENTED
BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN�FACT,
FEDERICO ELOMINA,*, Respondent.**
29. March 17, 2021 G.R. No. 202284 CRISTINA* R. SEMING, Petitioner, v.
EMELITA P. ALAMAG, VIOLETA L.
PAMAT, ROLANDO L. PAMAT AND
FERNANDO L. PAMAT, Respondents.
30. March 17, 2021 G.R. No. 203367 ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.

16.) ROBUSTAN, INC., AS REPRESENTED BY HENRY HYOUNG KI KIM, Petitioner,

 vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND WILFREDO WAGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223854, March 15, 2021
Facts:
Petitioner in this case is a domestic corporation engaged in importing refurbished medical
equipment. On the other hand, respondent is this case is an employee of petitioner, which has
primary job as service engineer and tasked with resolving customer needs, concerns and
problems for a particular medical or hospital equipment. In addition to that, he was also tasked to
carry out various maintenance and construction works for Robustan and its clients.
Respondent was assigned to Robustan’s newly opened branch in Cebu, where he was tasked with
painting the new office. Since he could not find a place to stay in Cebu, he was allowed to sleep
in the new office. He is the only employee onsite until the new manager was hired.
Later on, respondent received a memorandum notifying him that two fire extinguishers had gone
missing and that he was noted for using office equipment for his personal use. He was asked by
petitioner to explain and his employment should not be terminated. However, later on he
received another memorandum terminating his employee on the ground of (a) loss of trust and
confidence, (b) gross neglect of duty and (c) abandonment, as just cause for dismissal from
work, is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty. Thus, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, claiming for back wages, separation pay, monetized service incentive leave pays, and
damages.
Labor arbiter dismissed his complaint, finding just cause for his dismissal.
NLRC reversed the Labor arbiter’s decision, it awarded Wagan separation pay but denied his
prayers for back wages and damages.
CA found merit in Wagan's Petition, ruling that the conflicting findings of the labor tribunals
merited a re-examination of which among the parties' claims were supported by substantial
evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals validly affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission's
finding that respondent was illegally dismissed?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Respondent in this case was illegally dismissed, hence,
the CA is validly affirmed the NLRC findings.
As to contention of petitioner that respondent was validly dismissed based on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence is untenable.
Loss of trust and confidence may be just cause for termination of employment only upon proof
that: (1) the dismissed employee occupied a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the
dismissed employee committed "an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence.
In this case, both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals established
that respondent did not hold a position of trust and confidence. Moreover, the second element,
pertaining to the act that breached the employer's trust and confidence, was never established in
prior proceedings.
Petitioner itself states that it could "only surmise that the loss of the fire extinguishers was with
respondent's consent and that respondent may have benefited from it. This is not proof of
respondent's alleged breach of petitioner's trust and confidence, which, in the first place, was
never reposed in him.
As to the second ground that respondent was validly dismissed because gross neglect of
duty is also untenable.
Under the Labor Code, to be a valid ground for dismissal, the negligence must be gross and
habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of the person or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Put differently,
gross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Therefore, even if respondent were negligent, such negligence must be proven to be gross and
habitual. Neither the records nor the Petition establishes the required wantonness and habituality
of respondent's neglect that would merit his dismissal. Petitioner refers to facts allegedly
established in prior proceedings and concludes that the simple fact of loss of property amounted
to gross negligence. However, the records indicate that respondent was willing to admit the
consequences of the loss and even offered to pay for the lost properties' value. This directly
contradicts the "conscious indifference to consequences" indicative of gross and habitual neglect.
Thus, there was no basis to terminate respondent's employment for gross and habitual neglect of
duty.
Lastly, on the grounds of abandonment, as just cause for dismissal from work, is analogous
to gross and habitual neglect of duty is also untenable.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report
for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which
is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.
The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned ills or her work rests on the employer.
Thus, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. First,
petitioner must provide evidence that respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable
reason. Second, petitioner must prove respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever
his ties with petitioner as his employer.
Petitioner argues that respondent abandoned his work when he failed to complete the company's
turnover procedure after receipt of the January 4, 2010 termination notice.
Petitioner's argument fails to convince, as the records would indicate that respondent's
employment had already been terminated by the time he supposedly abandoned his work.
Nothing in the records shows respondent's failure to report for work prior to his receipt of the
January 4, 2010 termination notice. It would have been unreasonable to expect him to continue
reporting for work after having been notified of his dismissal. Thus, petitioner's claim of
abandonment is baseless.
 17.) STO. CRISTO CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR, NOEL
J. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 246777, March 02, 2021
Facts:
Petitioner in this case is a domestic corporation engaged in construction.
In 2010, Sto. Cristo Construction was awarded government contracts for road rehabilitation in
Mexico, Pampanga. The projects were implemented and completed the same year. However,
after reassessments by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and COA,
overstatements in embankment materials were discovered. Based on the findings, the Audit Team
Leader (ATL) issued four notices of disallowance, disapproving payments amounting to
₱22,626,714.71 for ten projects. One of these, ND No. 11-001-101-09/10, disallowed
₱14,926,319.76 for excess embankment materials.
Petitioner appealed the Notices of Disallowance, arguing that corrective measures were taken at
their own expense and that these rectifications were completed under DPWH supervision. They
further argued that they were not properly notified of the disallowance, violating due process.
However, COA decide that despite the rectifications claimed by the petitioner, the COA declared
the notices of disallowance final and executory. The COA reasoned that the findings of the
DPWH Quality Assurance Unit (QAU) and the COA Technical Inspectors were authoritative and
that there was no proper verification of the rectifications.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it sustained the disallowance of the amount paid to the contractor despite the
rectification works undertaken by the latter in the subject infrastructure projects?

Ruling:
No, the Commission on Audit (COA) did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it sustained the disallowance of the amount paid to the
contractor despite the rectification works undertaken by the latter.
The Supreme Court ruled that grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, the COA's decision
was based on findings from both the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Quality Assurance Unit and the COA Technical Inspectors, who identified an overestimation of
embankment materials in the projects. The petitioner argued that rectification works were done,
but the COA found no sufficient evidence confirming that these rectifications addressed the
deficiencies. Furthermore, the COA did not rely solely on the presumption of regularity but also
reviewed the facts and evidence. It gave the petitioner the opportunity to present its side and
decided the case on its merits.
Thus, there was no capricious or arbitrary exercise of power by the COA that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. The Court upheld the COA's decision, as it was supported by
substantial evidence, and there was no indication of bias or irregularity in the performance of the
COA's duties.
 18.) GERALYN DELA RAMA, Complainant,
vs.
PATRICIA D. DE LEON,* CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-14-3240 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3835-P), March 02, 2021
Facts:
On August 8, 2011, Dela Rama and her father were introduced to De Leon by her friend Rosanna
Britanico. During their conversation, Dela Rama mentioned her intention to file an annulment of
marriage against her husband, who had abandoned her for the past ten years. De Leon, who
falsely claimed to be a Clerk of Court of the RTC in Naga City, offered to handle the annulment
case for a fee of P65,000, requiring an initial payment of P40,000.
De Leon suggested filing a case for presumptive death, stating it would be easier to manipulate
and would require only one court appearance from Dela Rama.
After negotiating, Dela Rama paid De Leon P20,000 through a check issued by her friend
Emalyn. De Leon promised that Dela Rama would receive court communication in October
2011.
No court communication was received, and De Leon evaded Dela Rama’s requests for the return
of the money. Dela Rama later discovered that De Leon was only a clerk and not the Clerk of
Court.
De Leon denied all allegations in her defense, claiming that the P20,000 was a loan and that she
merely assisted in finding a lawyer for Dela Rama.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Valentin E. Pura, Jr. for investigation, but no action
was taken. After repeated instructions from the Supreme Court, the investigation was assigned to
Judge Pablo C. Formaran III.
During the investigation, De Leon refused to testify or cross-examine the complainant’s
witnesses. The investigating judge found the testimonies of Dela Rama and her witnesses
credible, concluding that De Leon had engaged in grave misconduct.
Judge Formaran recommended the forfeiture of De Leon's retirement benefits as she had been
dropped from the rolls in 2013 but was still subject to the penalty.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with Judge Formaran's findings and
concluded that De Leon's actions constituted grave misconduct. Dela Rama and her witnesses
proved that De Leon deceived them into believing she could help file the annulment case.
Although De Leon was no longer employed, the Court ruled that she could still be subject to
penalties, including forfeiture of benefits and perpetual disqualification from government
service.

Issue:
Whether or not De Leon should be held liable for Grave Misconduct?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative by adopting and approving the findings of facts and
conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and Recommendation. However, the
penalties were modified.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or employee. To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
In this matter, the OCA observed that Dela Rama and her witnesses were able to establish that De
Leon deceived her into believing that she could help in the filing of the intended annulment of
marriage for a package fee of P65,000.00 and that an initial amount of P20,000.00, through a
check issued by Emalyn, was actually given to and received by De Leon for that purpose.
Moreover, the OCA inferred that the absences of De Leon proves that she is guilty of the
allegations and that this was her way of eluding the constant follow-ups made by Dela Rama.
Although De Leon explained in her Comment that said absences were due to her chronic lumbar
strain, she never elaborated on why she allowed herself to be dropped from the rolls due to said
absences.
Time and time again, this Court has stressed that "the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed
with a heavy responsibility. The Judiciary demands the best possible individuals in the service
and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms
of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine
its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus, tainting its image in
the eyes of the public.
The Court applied Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which imposes the penalty of
dismissal for grave misconduct. However, since De Leon had already been dropped from the
rolls, the Court instead imposed a fine of ₱100,000 as her penalty. Despite not being able to
impose dismissal again, her actions were still deemed severe enough to warrant this penalty,
especially considering her past administrative offenses.

19.) SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, REPRESENTED BY ANAMIAS B. CO, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

FOR COMPLAINANT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5054, March 02, 2021
Facts:
The case involves three administrative disciplinary complaints against the petitioner, all of which
show serious breaches of his fiduciary duties as an attorney:
1. A.C. No. 5054 (May 29, 2002):
In 1982, the petitioner was engaged to sell a client’s lots. Despite successfully selling them, he
failed to remit the proceeds despite multiple demands.
A civil suit was filed, which the client won, but the petitioner defied the final judgment and used
various tactics to avoid payment.
As a result, the petitioner was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount of ₱13,800 to the complainant.
2. A.C. No. 8253 (March 15, 2011):
In 1992, the petitioner was hired to assist a client with a property foreclosure. The petitioner
deposited money from the client into his personal account and failed to file required legal
documents.
Despite demands, the petitioner did not return the money.
Due to this and his prior offense in A.C. No. 5054, the petitioner was disbarred and ordered to
return ₱80,000 to the complainant.
3. A.C. No. 6484 (June 16, 2015):
In 2000, the petitioner was hired for a land recovery case. He accepted money for the redemption
price, filing fees, and legal fees but failed to file the necessary case.
He attempted to pass the case to another lawyer, claiming he was suspended, which the client
discovered later.
The petitioner was again disbarred for unauthorized practice of law and ordered to return
₱95,000 to the client.
In 2019, the petitioner sought judicial clemency, citing his age (70) and remorse for his actions.
He filed a petition for clemency, with supporting testimonials, seeking reinstatement as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Conflicting actions were initially taken across the three cases: A.C. No. 5054 was referred to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), A.C. No. 6484 was noted, and A.C. No. 8253 denied the
petitioner's plea.
The OBC recommended consolidating the cases to avoid conflicting resolutions.
The Court eventually denied the petitioner’s plea for reconsideration in A.C. No. 8253 on June
23, 2020, finalizing the outcome across the three cases.

Issue:
Whether or not judicial clemency should be granted in favor of petitioner?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Petition of Petitioner for Judicial clemency was denied.
In this case, the petitioner has been involved in multiple serious breaches of his fiduciary duties
to his clients, including failing to remit proceeds from a sale, misappropriating funds for personal
use, and continuing to practice law despite being suspended. These acts demonstrate a pattern of
misconduct and dishonesty over an extended period.
In the case of Re: Diaz, the Court established that sufficient time must elapse after the imposition
of penalties to ensure a period of reformation. In this case, the petitioner filed the petition for
clemency only three years and nine months after his last disbarment in 2015. The Court deemed
this an insufficient period for genuine reformation.
The petitioner's application for clemency included testimonials and certifications that appeared
formulaic, pro forma, and without genuine personal accounts from the signatories. These
documents were not executed under oath, further casting doubt on their credibility. Moreover,
there was no corroborative evidence to support the petitioner's claims of engaging in socio-civic
activities, which the Court found unconvincing.
Despite being indefinitely suspended, the petitioner continued to practice law without disclosing
his suspension to his clients. This unauthorized practice of law from 2002 to 2003 shows a
blatant disregard for the rules governing the legal profession, further disqualifying him from
clemency.
After evaluating the petition, the Court found no prima facie merit to justify granting clemency.
The petitioner failed to show genuine remorse, reformation, or any compelling reason for
reinstatement to the legal profession.
Given these factors, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's acts significantly
undermined public trust in the legal profession. Thus, granting clemency would not serve the
interests of justice or preserve public confidence in the integrity of the legal system.

20.) LEVI STRAUSS & CO., Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO SEVILLA AND ANTONIO L. GUEVARRA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 219744, March 01, 2021
Facts:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation and owner of the "LEVI'S" trademark since 1946, used on
Class 25 goods under the Nice Classification (NCL).
Respondent Guevarra (Tony Lim), is the one who operates under Vogue Traders Clothing
Company and holds the rights to the "LIVE'S" trademark, originally registered by Sevilla, and
later assigned to him.
Petitioner granted Levi Strauss Phils., Inc. (LSPI) a non-exclusive license to use the "LEVI'S"
trademark in the Philippines.
Sevilla originally registered the "LIVE'S" trademark, which also covered Class 25 goods under
the NCL. He later transferred these rights to Guevarra.
LSPI conducted a consumer survey (Project Cherokee 5) in 1995, which revealed that a
significant percentage of the public confused the "LIVE'S" mark with "LEVI'S." Specifically,
86% associated "LIVE'S" with "LEVI'S," and 90% misread "LIVE'S" as "LEVI'S."
On December 13, 1995, petitioner filed a petition with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for the cancellation of the "LIVE'S" trademark, alleging
confusing similarity to "LEVI'S."
Respondents argued that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks due to
differences in spelling, pronunciation, price, design, and target market, as well as the close
attention consumers give to these products.
IPO-Bureau of Legal Affairs Decision (January 29, 2009): Denied the petition, holding that
there was no confusing similarity between "LEVI'S" and "LIVE'S." The marks differed in
pronunciation, spelling, meaning, price, and trade channels.
IPO-Director General Decision (August 13, 2012): Affirmed the IPO-BLA ruling, citing a
previous Supreme Court decision (Levi Strauss Phils., Inc. v. Lim) which found no likelihood of
confusion between the two marks.
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision (September 26, 2014): Dismissed the petition, declaring the
case moot and academic because respondents had already assigned their rights over the "LIVE'S"
mark to a third party, Dale Sy. The CA also held that the issue was barred by res judicata, citing
the same Supreme Court decision (G.R. No. 162311).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 28,
2015.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for cancellation should be granted on the ground of confusing
similarity between petitioner's "LEVI'S" mark and respondents' LIVE'S mark?

Ruling:
The Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights Cases instructs that in determining
whether one trademark is confusingly similar to or is a colorable imitation of another, the court
must consider the general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally
prevalent conditions in trade, and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that
class of goods. Visual, aural, connotative comparisons and overall impressions engendered
by the marks in controversy as they are encountered in the realities of the marketplace must be
taken into account. Where there are both similarities and differences in the marks, these
must be weighed against one another to determine which predominates.
In this regard, jurisprudence has developed two (2) tests to aid the Court in ascertaining the
existence of similarity and likelihood of confusion, namely, the Dominancy Test, and the Holistic
or Totality Test. The Court differentiated these tests as follows:
On one hand, the dominancy test focuses on "the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features
of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of
the purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the
mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are the aural
and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to
factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments."
On the other hand, the holistic or totality test necessitates a "consideration of the entirety of the
marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing
similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but
also on the other features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on
whether one is confusingly similar to the other."
Notably, earlier case law does not give an explicit preference as to which of the two (2) tests
should be used and under what circumstances would impel the use of one test over the other.
Expectedly, this resulted in contradictory lines of jurisprudence advocating the Dominancy Test
alone, the Holistic Test alone, or both. However, this matter was definitively settled by the
court wherein the Court made it "crystal clear that the Holistic Test in determining
trademark resemblance has been abandoned."
Applying Dominancy Test, the court found that despite differences in spelling and pronunciation,
the marks are visually and phonetically similar, making respondents' “LIVE'S” a mere anagram
of petitioner’s “LEVI'S.”
It is evidence by the survey conducted which shows that 86% of survey participants associated
"LIVE’S" with "LEVI’S," and 90% misread "LIVE’S" as "LEVI’S."
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decisions and
Trademark Registration No. 53918 for the mark "LIVE'S" is hereby canceled.

21.) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 224182, March 02, 2021
Facts:
From 2005 to 2009, the SSS Central Visayas Division granted Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CAN) incentives totaling P41,311,073.83, under various Social Security Commission
Resolutions.
In 2012, COA issued a Notice of Disallowance, citing violations of budget rules (DBM Budget
Circular No. 2006-01 and PSLMC Resolution No. 2, s. 2003). COA found that the incentives
were unlawfully granted due to: Lack of provision for CNA incentives in the CNA agreement for
2005-2007, and Excessive accruals and lack of proof that savings were generated from cost-
cutting measures.
SSS appealed the disallowance, arguing that the incentives were lawful, citing their operational
autonomy and cost-cutting measures. However, COA’s Corporate Government Sector (CGS)
denied the appeal and affirmed the disallowance in 2015.
SSS filed a Petition for Review with COA Proper but missed the deadline for filing by four days,
resulting in the finality of the CGS decision.
SSS then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that their petition was
timely, as the reckoning date should have been March 9, 2015, when their legal department
received the decision, not March 5, 2015, when the SSS President received it.

Issue #1:
Whether or not respondent's CGS-Cluster 2 Decision became final and executory for failure of
petitioner to file its Petition for Review on time?
Ruling:
The Court generally upholds decisions of administrative agencies, particularly constitutional
bodies like COA, due to their expertise in enforcing laws within their jurisdiction. Judicial
interference is minimal unless grave abuse of discretion is evident.
Decisions of COA can only be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which
is limited to cases where COA acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary actions, such as decisions
not based on law or evidence.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1445 and COA's 2009 Revised Rules, a party has six months
from receiving a decision to file an appeal. Any petition beyond this period renders the decision
final and executory.
In this case, SSS received the Notice of Disallowance on June 26, 2012, and filed its Appeal
Memorandum 178 days later on December 21, 2012, leaving only two days to file its Petition for
Review. The Commission's Corporate Government Sector (CGS) issued its decision on January
27, 2015. SSS filed its petition on March 12, 2015, beyond the two-day remaining period,
whether the receipt date is reckoned from March 5 (when SSS President received it) or March 9
(when SSS's Legal Counsel received it). As a result, COA's decision became final and executory
due to the untimely filing of the petition.
SSS failed to demonstrate how COA acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion. COA
followed its rules in dismissing the petition due to late filing. Even if the Court considered the
merits of the case, the petition would still be dismissed for procedural infirmities.
Issue #2:
Whether or not respondent correctly disallowed the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement
incentives to petitioner's Central Visayas Division employees?
Ruling:
Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) Resolution No. 2, series of 2003, authorizes
the grant of CNA incentives to rank-and-file employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs) if specific conditions are
met, including provisions on improving income and productivity, streamlining procedures, and
implementing cost-cutting measures.
CNA incentives can only be granted if: a) Actual operating income meets the Corporate
Operating Budget (COB) target approved by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM). b) Operating expenses are less than the approved COB level. c) At least 50% of annual
earnings are remitted to the National Treasury.
Further, the CNA must not predetermine the amount of the incentive and should be funded by
savings from Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).
In this case, the Court upheld the disallowance of CNA incentives due to multiple violations,
including: No evidence of a properly executed CAN; Granting of predetermined incentives
(P20,000), contrary to the rules; The lack of savings to fund the incentives, violating Budget
Circular No. 2006-1.; and Failure to meet the income and expense targets required by PSLMC
Resolution No. 2, series of 2003.
SSS failed to produce a valid supplemental CNA supporting the grant of incentives. The SSS
also violated the rules by predetermining the amount and improperly funding the incentives from
contingency funds instead of savings from MOOE.
Additionally, SSS's actual operating income in 2005 was lower than the COB target,
disqualifying it from granting the incentives.
The Court emphasized that the SSS holds its funds in trust for the benefit of workers in the
private sector, and it must allocate these funds strictly in accordance with the law. The grant of
the CNA incentives was an "irregular expenditure" as it did not comply with the applicable rules
and procedures.

22.) MALAYAN BANK SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. JOSEPH & JOCELYN CABIGAO REPRESENTED BY EDGARDO S. SUAREZ,
AND ROSALINDA E. TECHICO, FERDINAND ANTHONY C. SEVILLEJA (AS THE
FORMER REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN), Respondents.
 G.R. No. 249281, March 17, 2021
Facts:
In March 2011, Spouses Joseph and Jocelyn Cabigao (Spouses Cabigao) discovered their
property title (TCT No. T-282258) was canceled and replaced with a new title (TCT No. 040-
20100034036) issued to Rosalinda E. Techico (Techico).
Techico had supposedly acquired the property through a Deed of Absolute Sale from Jocelyn
Cabigao and then mortgaged it to Malayan Bank Savings and Mortgage Bank (Malayan Bank)
for PHP 13 million.
Spouses Cabigao filed a Complaint with the RTC seeking annulment of the titles and other
documents, claiming the mortgage was invalid because Techico was not the real owner.
They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent foreclosure by Malayan Bank, which was
granted.
Malayan Bank argued it conducted due diligence by verifying the title with the Registry of Deeds
and inspecting the property. They contended that it was not possible for them to detect the fraud
if the title was certified by the Registry of Deeds.
The RTC found Malayan Bank acted in bad faith and declared the deeds of sale, the new titles,
and the mortgages as null and void. The RTC ordered the reinstatement of the original titles in
the names of the Spouses Cabigao and awarded them damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, agreeing that Malayan Bank acted in bad faith and failed to
prove its defense of good faith.
Malayan Bank filed a petition challenging the CA's decision, asserting it acted in good faith and
adhered to proper due diligence in the mortgage transaction.

Issue:
Whether or not a mortgagee is in good faith?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit.
The Supreme Court noted that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the review is
limited to legal questions. Issues of good faith and negligence are factual and generally outside
the Court's review scope unless there’s a misapprehension of facts.
The Court found that the CA’s factual findings were well-supported by evidence and consistent
with the RTC’s conclusions. The CA did not err in affirming that Malayan Bank acted in bad
faith.
Banks are expected to exercise greater care and diligence compared to private individuals,
particularly in dealing with registered lands. Malayan Bank’s reliance on the authenticity of TCT
No. 040-2010003403 was insufficient given its knowledge that the property was not registered in
Techico’s name at the time of the loan application.
Evidence showed irregularities in TCT No. 040-2010003403, such as the failure to cancel the
original TCT and the presence of fictitious tax clearances. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
falsified, and the notary’s lack of credentials further indicated fraud. The swift execution of the
mortgage after the supposed sale was also a red flag.
Malayan Bank's failure to appear during pre-trial and its procedural deficiencies led to the
presentation of evidence ex parte. The bank’s appeal was reviewed despite its failure to present
evidence in the lower court, but the appeal did not reverse the RTC’s decision.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision and resolution, emphasizing the need for banks to
exercise utmost diligence and meticulous attention to detail in their transactions.

23.) LYNNA G. CHUNG, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 239871, March 18, 2021
Facts:
Petitioner was the Manager of the PNR's Administrative and Finance Department.
The PNR-Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) recommended Direct Contracting with Pandrol
Korea for the supply of rail fastenings and related components for track repair and replacement.
The recommendation was based on Pandrol Korea’s ownership of necessary patents and its lack
of a sub-dealer in the Philippines.
The contract was approved by the PNR Board of Directors and stipulated the procurement of rail
fastenings, clips, and insulators at specified unit costs. The contract included an irrevocable letter
of credit (LC) and detailed delivery and payment schedules.
Payments were made to Pandrol Korea based on memoranda issued by former PNR General
Manager Manuel D. Andal, including advance payments and additional charges. However,
payments were allegedly made before Pandrol Korea provided all required documents and were
inconsistent with the stipulated payment schedule.
The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed a complaint against PNR officials, including
petitioner, for alleged violations of RA 3019 and RA 6713. The complaint highlighted
irregularities such as premature payments and delivery shortages.
The Ombudsman found petitioner liable for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 due to irregular
payments and failure to ensure contract compliance. Petitioner’s relationship with Jaewoo
Chung, a Pandrol Korea liaison, was noted as a potential conflict of interest.
Other respondents and some charges were dismissed, including administrative charges and other
violations related to RA 6713 and RA 3019.
Petitioner contends that she did not act with manifest partiality or bad faith and that payments
were made in accordance with contract terms. She argues that payments were lawful and that no
notice of disallowance from the Commission on Audit indicated any irregularity.
Respondents argue that the petition does not present a valid ground for the Supreme Court’s
intervention and that there was no grave abuse of discretion or bad faith in the Ombudsman’s
decision.
Petitioner filed a petition challenging the Ombudsman’s resolution, asserting that the proceedings
and findings were improper.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against
petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious.
The Court distinguished Lynna Chung's case from other related cases involving different
defendants. Her actions were deemed separate from those of the PNR-BAC members who
recommended Direct Contracting. Thus, the outcomes of the cases against her co-defendants did
not directly impact her case.
The Ombudsman had charged Lynna Chung with facilitating irregular payments to Pandrol
Korea. This was based on the claim that she authorized payments without adhering to the
contractual payment schedule and relevant procurement laws.
However, the Court noted that not all elements required under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were
present in the case against Lynna Chung. Specifically, there was no clear evidence of manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
The Court emphasized that mere negligence or violation of a contract does not equate to the
criminal elements of corruption. The Ombudsman’s finding lacked a demonstration of fraudulent
intent or corrupt motives.
The Court observed that the evidence against Lynna Chung consisted mainly of documents
showing that she authorized payments following directives from Andal. There was no substantial
evidence showing that payments were made irregularly or that she acted with corrupt intent.
It was noted that the letters she signed were for the opening of Letters of Credit (LCs), not for
actual payments. The disbursement of funds depended on the fulfillment of the contract terms
and not merely on the authorization to open LCs.
The Court rejected the Ombudsman’s inference that Lynna Chung’s relationship with Jaewoo
Chung, who represented Pandrol Korea, implied undue influence in the awarding of the contract
or in the payments. There was no evidence of undue injury to the government or of unwarranted
benefits to Pandrol Korea, as it was found that all products were delivered as contracted.
The Court reiterated that violations of procurement laws alone do not automatically constitute a
violation of RA 3019. Corruption involves showing fraudulent intent or dishonest motives, which
was not sufficiently demonstrated in this case.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the Ombudsman’s Joint
Resolution and Order.

24.) PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC., AND/OR MARIN

SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, Petitioners,
vs.
CLARITO A. MANZANO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 210329, March 18, 2021
Facts:
The respondent was hired as an Oiler on February 3, 2010, for a period of eight months by
petitioner Marin Shipmanagement Limited, assigned to the vessel Maersk Danang. His
employment was covered by the Overriding Total Crew Cost Fleet Agreement (TCC CBA)
between the International Transport Workers' Federation and Transmarine Carriers, Inc. After
passing a pre-employment medical examination, he began working on March 27, 2010,
performing active manual labor on board.
In July 2010, the respondent slipped and fell aboard the vessel, injuring his right knee, right side
of his body, and lower back. He was medically examined in New Jersey and found to have soft
tissue injuries.
In September 2010, he was struck by a metal door on his right shoulder, worsening his pain.
In November 2010, while in Oman, he sought treatment for costochondritis and myalgia in his
right shoulder.
Upon repatriation on December 3, 2010, he sought further medical attention. His MRI results
indicated degenerative disk disease, tendinosis, and joint issues.
Despite undergoing physical therapy and recommended surgeries, his condition did not improve,
and he continued to experience pain in his knee, shoulder, and back.
On August 10, 2010, Dr. Renato P. Runas declared him permanently unfit for sea duty due to his
condition.
The respondent sought disability benefits, but the petitioners refused to grant them.
The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) ruled in favor of the respondent,
awarding him US$137,500 in disability benefits and attorney's fees based on the TCC CBA.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the NCMB erred in applying
the TCC CBA and the 240-day presumptive disability rule. However, the CA affirmed the
NCMB’s decision, concluding that the respondent's disability was caused by an accident, thus
applying Section 19 of the TCC CBA. The CA also noted the absence of a fitness-to-work
certification from the company-designated physician.
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on December 10, 2013.

Issue:
Whether or not a seafarer who finished and completed his employment contract without any
medical complaint on board or upon arrival in the Philippines is entitled to disability
compensation?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative.
The Supreme Court clarified that entitlement to disability benefits for seafarers is determined not
solely by the presence of medical complaints upon repatriation, but also by the following factors:
1. The condition of the seafarer as assessed through medical examination by company-
designated physicians or independent doctors.
2. Relevant statutory provisions, particularly Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, govern
disability benefits.
3. The terms of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) and the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) play a
crucial role in determining compensation.
Even if the seafarer’s injuries or illness manifest after the term of the employment contract, he
may still be entitled to disability benefits if he can prove that his condition is work-related, as
listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, and the illness or injury, though not listed, is
reasonably linked to the nature of his work aboard the vessel.
In this particular case the seafarer’s injuries were documented while on board and continued after
repatriation. The company's physician failed to issue a final medical assessment within the
required 240-day period, thereby converting the seafarer’s temporary disability into a permanent
total disability. Hence, the seafarer was entitled to US$60,000 in disability benefits despite
having been repatriated due to the end of his contract and not for medical reasons.
Additionally, the seafarer was awarded attorney’s fees due to the legal expenses incurred after his
disability benefits were denied by the employer. The Supreme Court emphasized that total
disability does not require complete incapacitation but rather the inability to resume work in the
same capacity.

25.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO DECHOSO Y DIVINA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 248530, March 03, 2021
Facts:
Prosecution's Version:
On November 6, 2009, at around 4:30 a.m., AAA, who was four months pregnant, was walking
near a railroad track in Muntinlupa City when she was approached by Dechoso. He blocked her
path, hugged her, and threatened to kill her if she screamed. He dragged her to a vacant, rocky
area near the track, forcibly removed her clothes, and raped her. Despite AAA's resistance,
Dechoso succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After the assault, AAA threw Dechoso’s
wallet away. Upon leaving, she found an ID near the scene, but Dechoso returned to grab it
before fleeing again.
AAA reported the incident to barangay officials BBB and CCC. They accompanied her back to
the scene where they recovered Dechoso's wallet, which contained his ID. Upon recognizing the
ID, the barangay officials went to his house, where Dechoso’s mother confirmed he had just
arrived. Dechoso was brought to the barangay hall, where AAA identified him as the assailant.
AAA then filed a formal complaint and underwent a medico-legal examination.
Defense's Version:
Dechoso claimed that he was at home on the day of the incident when barangay officials fetched
him. He denied possession of his wallet, alleging that he had lost it after a brawl near the railroad
track days before. He explained that he had been helping a tricycle driver when he was attacked
and later realized his wallet was missing.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Dechoso guilty of rape and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, ordering him to pay moral and civil damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision with a modification, increasing the awards for civil
indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages to Php 75,000 each, with 6% interest per annum until
fully paid.
On appeal, both parties waived the filing of supplemental briefs, stating that their arguments
were fully discussed in their previous submissions.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Dechoso of the crime of Rape?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Reynaldo Dechoso and upheld his conviction for
rape. Dechoso challenged the credibility of the victim, AAA, arguing that her identification of
him was flawed due to the alleged lack of light during the crime, and that her failure to resist the
attack was implausible. However, the Court found AAA’s testimony credible, as it was consistent
with human experience and corroborated by medical evidence.
In this case, according to the Supreme Court, AAA's testimony was clear and detailed, and both
the trial court and Court of Appeals found her credible. The Court emphasized that the evaluation
of the victim’s credibility is best left to the trial court, which had the advantage of observing her
demeanor firsthand.
The defense failed to prove the lack of light at the crime scene. AAA had multiple opportunities
to see Dechoso's face before and during the assault, and she even identified his clothing and
retrieved his ID after the rape.
AAA tried to resist by punching Dechoso and pleading with him. Despite her pregnancy and
physical limitations, her failure to fully resist did not negate the rape. The Court reiterated that
physical resistance is not required to prove rape, and victims react to traumatic situations in
various ways.
The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of rape: the act was committed by
a man, there was carnal knowledge of a woman, and it was accomplished through force, threat,
or intimidation. AAA’s testimony, supported by medical findings, showed that Dechoso
threatened and assaulted her, constituting rape.
Dechoso’s defense of denial and alibi was deemed weak, as it was unsupported by evidence. His
claim that he was home during the incident was contradicted by his proximity to the crime scene
and inconsistencies in his testimony.
Therefore, Dechoso was sentenced to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) for simple rape. The
award of Php75,000 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages was
affirmed, with 6% annual interest until full payment.

26.) JAYRALDIN F. EBUS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE RESULTS COMPANY, INC.,* MICHAEL KALAW, SHERRA DE
GUZMAN,** SUMMER DOMBROWSKI,*** JAY MORENTE AND FRANCIS LACUNA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 244388, March 03, 2021
Facts:
Jayraldin F. Ebus, is an employee of The Results Company, Inc. (TRCI) since August 13, 2012,
started as a sales representative and rose to the position of Team Leader in 2014. His
responsibilities included supervising agents handling TRCI's U.S.-based telecommunications
client. Ebus was recognized for his performance, earning awards and travel incentives during his
tenure.
On December 30, 2014, Ebus received an email from John Christopher P. David, a TRCI
consultant, reporting infractions committed by one of Ebus’s agents, Ruby De Leon, relating to
the improper processing of a customer’s order. David recommended coaching for De Leon.
However, Operations Manager Summer Dombrowski replied, suggesting a final written warning
and potential termination for repeated offenses. But the other program managers, including
Maria Aguilar, disagreed, recommending coaching instead. Aguilar also proposed withholding
De Leon’s commission under the company’s Zero Tolerance Policy (ZTP), which Ebus
challenged, claiming De Leon's actions were not fraudulent.
On January 1, 2015, under Dombrowski’s direction, Ebus issued a Notice to Explain to De Leon
but delayed imposing sanctions as he awaited guidance from Aguilar. Shortly after, Ebus himself
received a Notice to Explain with Preventive Suspension for alleged infractions, including failure
to act on a supervisor’s infraction, gross negligence, willful disobedience, and serious
misconduct. He was suspended for 30 days.
Following an administrative hearing, on February 9, 2015, TRCI issued a Notice of Decision,
admonishing Ebus for insubordination and warning that future violations could lead to dismissal.
Ebus was also placed on a Temporary Lay-Off (TLO) until he could be reassigned to another
account, with a lay-off period of no more than six months and without compensation.
Feeling aggrieved, Ebus filed a complaint for constructive dismissal on March 20, 2015.
On February 1, 2016, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Ebus, finding that TRCI had
constructively dismissed him by placing him on preventive suspension without factual or legal
basis and transferring him to another program under uncertain conditions. The LA awarded Ebus
separation pay, back wages, and moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
TRCI appealed, and on July 29, 2016, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the LA’s decision. The NLRC ruled that TRCI’s actions were valid exercises of
management prerogatives, including placing Ebus under preventive suspension and issuing
memoranda for disciplinary purposes. It also upheld the TLO status as valid.
Ebus sought relief from the Court of Appeals (CA), which, in a decision, affirmed the NLRC’s
ruling, stating that Ebus failed to prove constructive dismissal. The CA held that his transfer did
not result in demotion or a reduction in salary and benefits, and there was no evidence of
discrimination or insensibility on the part of TRCI that would make Ebus’s work environment
unbearable. The CA also ruled that Ebus’s preventive suspension was lawful as it was for a
period of 30 days, within the allowable limit for investigations, and necessary to protect TRCI's
business operations.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction in concluding that Ebus was not constructively dismissed?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Jayraldin F. Ebus and found that his employer, The
Results Company, Inc. (TRCI), failed to justify placing him on Temporary Lay-Off (TLO). The
Court examined whether the Court of Appeals (CA) properly ruled on the National Labor
Relations Commission’s (NLRC) decision and determined that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion.
TRCI had placed Ebus on TLO following an infraction related to his failure to notify his
subordinate of the penalty for an error during a customer call. The Supreme Court found no
evidence that this infraction significantly impacted TRCI's business, nor did TRCI show any
valid or legitimate grounds for the re-profiling that led to Ebus’s lay-off.
Instead of a legitimate transfer, Ebus was placed in an indefinite status where his pay and
benefits were halted, and he was treated like a new applicant. The Court ruled this action
amounted to constructive dismissal, as Ebus’s employment status was uncertain, and TRCI failed
to prove the necessity or validity of the lay-off.
The Court emphasized that while management prerogative exists, it must be exercised within the
bounds of law and fairness. In this case, TRCI's actions were prejudicial to Ebus, and they failed
to establish a valid reason for placing him on TLO.
As a result, the Court ordered that Ebus be awarded: Full backwages from February 9, 2015
(when he was placed on TLO) until the finality of the decision. Separation pay instead of
reinstatement, as previously ruled by the Labor Arbiter. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
total award. Interest of 6% per annum on the total monetary awards from the finality of the
decision until full payment.
The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the total award.

27.) TOYO SEAT PHILIPPINES CORPORATION/YOSHIHIRO TAKAHAMA,

Petitioners,
vs.
ANNABELLE C. VELASCO, RENATO NATIVIDAD, FLORANTE BILASA, AND
MARY ANN BENIGLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 240774, March 03, 2021
Facts:
The case involves the petitioner TSPC (Toyo Seat Philippines Corporation), a manufacturer of
car seats and related products, and its president Yoshihiro Takahama, against the respondents,
former employees who were hired as sewers.
In 2008 and 2009, TSPC engaged the respondents for a project, specifically for Project J68C
(Export Trim for 2008 Mazda 3 vehicles). Although this project was initially expected to end in
2012, production was halted early in 2011 following instructions from Mazda. Subsequently,
TSPC began working on Project J68N (Export Trim for 2011 Mazda 3), and the respondents
were rehired under a new Project Employment Contract for this.
However, the work under Project J68N was inconsistent due to low volume orders from Mazda,
prompting TSPC to assign respondents to another project, GS41 (for Mitsubishi Lancer), on an
alternating schedule.
In December 2012, GS41 ended, but TSPC extended the J68N project until June 2013, with the
respondents agreeing. Yet, by April and May 2013, believing they had achieved regular
employee status due to their length of service, the respondents filed a Complaint for
regularization with the NLRC.
Later, when TSPC sought a further extension of the J68N project to July 2013, the respondents
declined, citing their pending regularization complaint. Consequently, TSPC issued notices of
employment termination effective July 1, 2013. The respondents amended their complaint to
include illegal dismissal and other monetary claims.
Respondents argued their lengthy tenure and the nature of their work justified regular
employment. TSPC countered that the projects were dependent on external contracts, and length
of service alone doesn’t convert project-based employees into regular employees.
The respondents also claimed that TSPC's failure to submit termination reports to DOLE
indicated their status as regular employees. However, both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled
that non-submission did not invalidate the project employment.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the regularization claim but ordered TSPC to pay the respondents
their 13th month pay for January to June 2013. The decision was affirmed by the NLRC, and the
respondents filed for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the decision of the Labor Arbiter regarding
the respondents’ employment status. The CA overturned the NLRC's ruling and ordered the
reinstatement of the respondents.
The CA found that the respondents performed essential functions for TSPC’s business. While it
agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the respondents were validly hired as project employees, the
appellate court held that the extension of their employment by TSPC effectively made them
regular employees. The CA emphasized that the completion of the project was not based on the
actual end of the work but rather on fluctuating consumer demand, which was not a proper basis
for project employment.
The CA cited the case Herma Shipyard, Inc. v. Oliveros, explaining that a "project" must have a
determined or determinable end date. In this case, the extension of the respondents' employment
contracts appeared to be a tactic to prevent them from obtaining regular employment, violating
the law on job security. The CA ruled that TSPC's actions were an attempt to circumvent the
respondents’ right to regular employment and security of tenure, a practice the court found
contrary to public policy.
Additionally, the CA noted that TSPC retained regular employees who performed the same
functions as the respondents, which demonstrated that the business required continuous
production of car seats. TSPC's failure to submit termination reports for the completion of the
respondents' projects further supported the finding that the respondents were not true project
employees but regular employees.
TSPC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied, hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents are a project employee, hence, legally dismissed?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative, hence, grant the petition with merit.
According to the Supreme Court, an employee is deemed a regular employee if their work is
usually necessary or desirable in the employer's business, regardless of the employment contract,
and becomes regular if they have rendered at least one year of service, even if intermittent,
unless their employment is for a specific project or seasonal work.
Project Employment, is defined as employment fixed for a specific project with completion or
termination determined at the time of engagement.
The rationale for distinguishing project employees is that requiring an employer to retain them
after project completion, when no work exists, is unfair.
In this case, the workers (respondents) were hired as "Sewers" for specific projects, including
manufacturing car seat trims for Mazda vehicles. These projects were terminated or extended
based on fluctuating consumer demand and the availability of raw materials.
There contracts indicated the projects had definite start and end dates, but in practice, these dates
were adjusted due to external factors like market demand.
The workers argued that these uncertainties meant the requirements for valid project employment
were not met under Article 295.
However, according to the court, despite the fluctuating project timelines, the workers were
clearly informed of their project-based status at the time of hiring. Also, the employment
contracts were valid, as the workers understood their employment was tied to specific projects,
and the completion or extension of these projects was determined by external economic
conditions. Thus, the workers were correctly classified as project employees, and their
employment could lawfully end upon the project’s completion.

28.) LETICIA A. RAMIREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
FELOMINO ELOMINA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN�FACT,
FEDERICO ELOMINA,*, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021
Facts:
On May 11, 1994, Leticia Ramirez was issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4884
pursuant to Free Patent No. 043404-94-1330 over Lot No. 922, Cad-455-D located in Cabuyao,
Laguna.
On July 11, 2000, Felomino Elomina filed a letter-protest with the Bureau of Lands, alleging that
Ramirez’s title was transferred by Delfin Torinos, but neither Ramirez nor Torinos had
possession of the land, which Elomina’s family had occupied for generations.
Following an investigation, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
found that the Elomina family was in possession of the property, and Ramirez's application for
the free patent contained misrepresentations.
On December 29, 2003, the DENR cancelled Ramirez’s free patent and recommended legal
action to revert the land to the public domain.
In 2005, Felomino filed a reconveyance suit in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) seeking to have
Ramirez's title canceled and the land reconveyed to him, claiming his family had possessed it
since time immemorial.
Ramirez moved to dismiss the case on grounds of forum-shopping and prescription but was
denied. Ramirez defended that the action was barred by prescription, arguing that her title was
issued in 1994, and the case was filed more than ten years later in 2005.
The RTC dismissed Felomino's complaint for lack of merit. The court held that Felomino had no
cause of action as he did not prove ownership or file a patent application before Ramirez’s title
was issued. The RTC further ruled that the cause of action had prescribed since more than ten
years had passed since the issuance of Ramirez's title in 1994.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision, declaring that Felomino was the
lawful owner of Lot 922. The appellate court found that the Elomina family had possessed the
land for over 70 years, and Ramirez obtained her title through fraud. The court ruled that the
four-year prescriptive period for actions based on fraud did not apply because Felomino was in
possession of the property. The Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of Ramirez’s title and
the issuance of a new title in favor of Felomino.
Ramirez’s motion for reconsideration was dismissed for late filing, and the appellate court’s
decision became final and executory.
Ramirez then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to annul the appellate court’s
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed
belatedly and thereafter issuing an order for the issuance of an entry of judgment to the alleged
undue prejudice of petitioner?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed Ramirez's Petition for Certiorari due to her failure to follow
procedural rules. Ramirez sought leniency for filing her Motion for Reconsideration late,
attributing it to her old age and forgetfulness. However, the Court was not persuaded and
emphasized the importance of adhering to the 15-day deadline for filing a motion under Section
1, Rule 52, and Rule 36, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Ramirez had until November 2, 2011,
to file her Motion for Reconsideration but missed the deadline, filing it on November 3, 2011.
The Court reiterated that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and non-compliance with
procedural rules results in the loss of that right. Ramirez failed to prove any exceptional
circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules. The Court held that while procedural rules
can be relaxed for meritorious reasons, this case did not warrant such deviation, as orderly
administration of justice must be upheld.
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that the appellate court's denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration led to the issuance of an Entry of Judgment. Ramirez's failure to timely appeal
the denial resulted in the finality of the appellate court's decision, making the case beyond
reconsideration.
The Court also highlighted that certiorari under Rule 65 is meant to address errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment. Since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, any alleged errors should
have been addressed through a proper appeal, not through a petition for certiorari.
Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can
no longer be altered or modified. Thus, the appellate court's decision declaring Felomino as the
lawful owner of the land stands.

29.) CRISTINA R. SEMING, Petitioner,

vs.
EMELITA P. ALAMAG, VIOLETA L. PAMAT, ROLANDO L. PAMAT AND FERNANDO
L. PAMAT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021
Facts:
The case involves a land dispute between the spouses Christina Seming and Eutiquio Seming
(the spouses Seming), and the spouses Angel and Natividad Pamat (the spouses Pamat). The
dispute centers on a one-half portion of a parcel of land (Lot 512-C) located in Ligao City, Albay.
The spouses Seming alleged that they purchased half of Lot 512-C from Jesusa Seming Vda. De
Lopez in 1977 and later entered into a verbal agreement with the spouses Pamat to purchase the
other half, although no written agreement was executed.
The spouses Seming also claimed they paid part of the purchase price through cash, kind, and by
covering litigation expenses for a case (Civil Case No. 744) involving the property. The spouses
Pamat, however, denied ever selling their share of Lot 512-C.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the spouses Seming, ordering the spouses
Pamat's heirs to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale for 600 square meters of Lot 512-C in favor of
the spouses Seming. The RTC found that a contract of sale was perfected, relying on two receipts
from 1990 and 1991 that acknowledged partial payments for the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's ruling, holding that there was no
contract of sale between the parties. The CA found that the receipts were insufficient to prove the
sale, as they were vague and did not clearly specify what the payments were for or which portion
of the lot was being sold. The CA also noted that the spouses Seming’s possession of the land
was linked to the portion previously owned by Jesusa, not Natividad Pamat’s share.
Consequently, the CA dismissed the complaint and deleted the award of damages and attorney’s
fees.
The spouses Seming sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in concluding that there was no
perfected contract of sale over Lot 512-C?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that no contract of sale existed between the petitioner and Natividad
regarding Lot 512-C. The Court found no clear and convincing evidence proving that a meeting
of minds or consent occurred, as required for a contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil
Code. The only evidence the petitioner presented were two receipts and her testimony, along
with that of Jesusa, who testified about an alleged agreement to sell the lot in exchange for
litigation expenses.
However, the testimonies revealed that only Jesusa had signed a sale document for her portion of
the lot, while Natividad did not. Additionally, a 2006 Compromise Agreement showed that the
petitioner only occupied Jesusa's portion, not Natividad's. Despite initial discussions about
selling the lot, no actual transfer or conveyance of Natividad's share took place. The Court
concluded that no meeting of minds occurred, and Natividad never agreed to the sale of her
portion. Therefore, the petitioner's claim of ownership, including her payment of property taxes
and construction on the lot, was insufficient to prove the sale.
Additionally, the Supreme Court found that there’s no determinate subject matter and a price
certain in money, both of which are essential elements of a contract of sale.
The object of the supposed sale was ambiguous. The receipts from October 22, 1990, and
January 23, 1991, that the petitioner relied upon did not clearly define the portion of Lot 512-C
allegedly sold. The phrase "payment only for two lots" lacked specificity, failing to describe the
exact area or boundaries of the property involved. Furthermore, the receipts were deemed null
and void, rendering them without evidentiary value.
Additionally, the price for the sale was uncertain. The petitioner claimed that financial aid
extended to Natividad, including litigation expenses, formed part of the purchase price.
However, no evidence, such as receipts or documentation, was presented to substantiate these
expenses, leaving the amount unclear and ambiguous.
As a result, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which set aside the lower
court's ruling and deleted the award of damages and attorney's fees to the petitioner for lack of
factual basis.

30.) ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203367, March 17, 2021
Facts:
Energy Development Corporation (EDC) is a domestic corporation registered as a VAT
taxpayer with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In 2007, EDC filed its quarterly and
amended VAT returns. On March 30, 2009, EDC submitted an administrative claim for a tax
credit or refund of unutilized input VAT worth P89,103,931.29 for zero-rated sales.
Subsequently, on April 24, 2009, EDC filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).
On June 18, 2009, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) opposed the claim, citing
EDC’s failure to provide proper supporting documents. In response to EDC's judicial claim, the
CIR filed a motion to dismiss on March 25, 2011, based on EDC’s alleged premature filing
without waiting for the CIR’s decision or the lapse of 120 days from submission of documents,
as required by Section 112 (C) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The CTA Second Division ruled in favor of the CIR, dismissing EDC’s petition for being
prematurely filed, citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Aichi.
Citing Aichi, the Second Division of the tax court explained that after the filing of the
administrative claim, the taxpayer must wait for the decision of the CIR thereon or the
lapse of the 120-day period from the submission of the complete documents in support
thereof before filing a petition for review with the CTA. In both instances, the filing of the
judicial claim must be made within 30 days of either reckoning event or period.
EDC argued that the Aichi ruling should not apply retroactively and relied on previous
jurisprudence, specifically the Atlas ruling, which stated that the two-year prescriptive period
for claims under Section 229 of the NIRC applies to unutilized input VAT refunds.
The CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s decision, stating that EDC's judicial claim was
premature, as EDC failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period for the CIR's action or
inaction. It held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied, and since
EDC filed its claim too early, the petition lacked cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claims for refund under section 112(a) in
relation to 112(c) of the national internal revenue code refers only to administrative claims?

Ruling:
NIRC, Old Provision (Pre-Amendment):
Section 112(A): Allowed VAT-registered persons with zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales
to apply for a tax credit or refund within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made.
Section 112(C): Mandated the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to act on such claims
within 120 days from the submission of complete documents. If the CIR did not act or denied the
claim, the taxpayer had 30 days from the denial or the expiration of the 120-day period to appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
NIRC, Recent Amendment:
Section 112(C) was amended to clarify that the CIR must decide on claims within 90 days,
rather than 120 days.
In the case of Aichi, the Court ruled that the two-year prescriptive period in Section 112(A)
applies only to administrative claims. This means that the two-year period is for filing claims
with the CIR, not for appealing to the CTA.
The CIR has 120 days (or 90 days under the amendment) to decide on administrative claims. If
the CIR fails to act within this period, the taxpayer can appeal to the CTA within 30 days after
the period lapses or after a decision is made.
Administrative claims (under Section 112(A)) and judicial claims (under Section 112(C)) have
different prescriptive periods. The 120-day period is specifically for the CIR's action on
administrative claims and cannot be conflated with the two-year period for filing a judicial claim.
EDC argued that the 120-day period was not critical if both administrative and judicial claims
were filed within the two-year period. The Court rejected this, emphasizing that Section 112(C)
prescribes distinct periods for administrative action and judicial appeal.
Therefore, administrative and judicial claims for VAT refunds or credits are governed by
different periods. Taxpayers must adhere to the 120-day (or 90-day) period for administrative
claims and the 30-day period for judicial appeals post-decision or lapse of the administrative
decision period.
In this case, the ruling finds that EDC did not follow the procedural requirements set by Section
112(C) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) for filing a judicial claim with the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA). Specifically, EDC's judicial claim was filed prematurely, not adhering to
the required timelines.
Despite the non-compliance, the Court applies an exception from the San Roque case. This
exception allows taxpayers to rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 issued on December 10, 2003,
up until it was overturned by the Court in Aichi on October 6, 2010. Because EDC's
administrative and judicial claims were made within this period, their petition for review before
the CTA should be reinstated.
The Court clarifies that the CTA En Banc’s view that EDC's premature filing was merely a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies (and not a jurisdictional defect) is incorrect. The Court
emphasizes that the 120-day period (for administrative claims) plus the 30-day period (for
judicial appeals) are mandatory and jurisdictional, meaning strict adherence to these timelines is
required.