Chaloupka, F. J., Straif, K., & Leon, M. E. (2010) - Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policies in Tobacco Control.
Chaloupka, F. J., Straif, K., & Leon, M. E. (2010) - Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policies in Tobacco Control.
com
TC Online First, published on November 29, 2010 as 10.1136/tc.2010.039982
Brief report
2 of 4
Evidence
Conclusion statements Sufficient* Strongy Limitedz Comments and references
1 Increases in tobacco excise taxes that increase prices result in a decline in X There is a negative relationship between cigarette prices and cigarette consumption in countries at all levels
overall tobacco use of income based on aggregated data. Individual-level or household-level data corroborate an inverse relationship
Brief report
The World Bank classification of countries by income include, according to the 2008 gross national income per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas methods. High income: US$11 906 or more; upper middle income: US$11 905e$3856; lower middle
income: US$3855e$976; low income: US$975 or less (for the list of countries, see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income).
*Sufficient evidence: an association has been observed between the intervention under consideration and a given effect in studies in which chance, bias and confounding can be ruled out with reasonable confidence. The association is highly likely to be causal.
Downloaded from http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/ on December 15, 2014 - Published by group.bmj.com
yStrong evidence: there is consistent evidence of an association, but evidence of causality is limited by the fact that chance, bias or confounding have not been ruled out with reasonable confidence. However, explanations other than causality are unlikely.
zLimited evidence: there is some evidence of association between the intervention under consideration and a given effect, but alternative explanations are possible.
Other available criteria: ‘Evidence of No Effect’, methodologically sound studies consistently demonstrate the lack of an association between the intervention under consideration and a given effect; ‘Inadequate/No Evidence’, there are no available methodologically
sound studies showing an associationdthe available studies are of insufficient quality, consistency or statistical power to permit a conclusion regarding the presence or absence of a causal association between the intervention and a given effect. Alternatively,
this category was used when no studies are available.
xPrice elasticity of demand, which is a number without units, indicates by what percentage the quantity demanded changes in response to a 1% change in the price.
{Tax avoidance includes legal activities and purchases in accordance with customs and tax regulations, most of which include the payment of some tobacco taxes, and are undertaken by individual tobacco users, including crossborder shopping, tourist shopping,
duty free shopping, internet and other direct purchases, industry reformulation and/or repositioning.
**Tax evasion includes illegal methods of circumventing tobacco taxes, such as the purchase of smuggled and illicit manufactured tobacco products. Those activities include small and large quantities and often, but not always, involve efforts to avoid paying any
Brief report
should adopt relatively simple tobacco excise tax structures 21. Onder Z. The economics of tobacco in Turkey: new evidence and demand estimates.
that emphasise specific taxes and that include regular tax Economics of Tobacco Control Series paper No 2, World Bank NHP Discussion paper.
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002:7e72.
increases that outpace growth in general price levels and 22. Nassar H. The economics of tobacco in Egypt: a new analysis of demand.
incomes’.2 The WG added that governments should use tobacco Economics of Tobacco Control Series paper No 8, World Bank NHP Discussion paper.
tax revenues to fund comprehensive tobacco control Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003:3e96.
23. Ohsfeldt RL, Boyle RG, Capilouto E. Tobacco taxes, smoking, restrictions and
programmes and other health promotion activities, given that tobacco use. In: Chaloupka FJ, Grossman M, Bickel WK, et al, eds. The Economics
such programmes lead to further reductions in tobacco use Analysis of Substance use and Abuse: an Integration of Econometrics and Behavioral
and improvements in population health. Finally, the WG Economic Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997:15e29.
24. Tsai YW, Yang CL, Chen CS, et al. The effect of Taiwan’s tax-induced increases in
recommended that a multinational surveillance and monitoring cigarette prices on brand-switching and the consumption of cigarettes. Health Econ
system should be implemented that regularly collects data on 2005;14:627e41.
tobacco use among adults and young people, tobacco product 25. Tauras JA, Peck RM, Chaloupka FJ. The role of retail prices and promotions
taxes and prices, price-reducing marketing and lobbying efforts in determining cigarette brand market shares. Rev Ind Organ 2006;28:253e84.
26. Gilmore A, Collin J, Townsend J. Transnational tobacco company influence on tax
of tobacco companies, tax avoidance and evasion, and tax policy during privatization of a state monopoly: British American Tobacco and
administration and enforcement activities. Uzbekistan. Am J Public Health 2007;97:2001e9.
27. Slater SJ, Chaloupka FJ, Wakefield M, et al. The impact of retail cigarette marketing
Funding European Commission Seventh Framework Programme through practices on youth smoking uptake. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2007;161:440e5.
a comprehensive grant proposal that will also encompass original research on price 28. Balbach ED, Campbell RB. Union women, the tobacco industry, and excise taxes:
and tax policies for better control of tobacco in Europe (PPACTE)(EC FP7 Grant a lesson in unintended consequences. Am J Prev Med 2009;37(Suppl 2):S121e5.
Agreement HEALTH-F2-2009-223323): European Commission. 29. Lightwood JM, Glantz SA. Short-term economic and health benefits of smoking
Competing interests None. cessation: myocardial infarction and stroke. Circulation 1997;96:1089e96.
30. Fichtenberg CM, Glantz SA. Association of the California Tobacco Control Program
Contributors All authors contributed similarly to the drafting of the report and with declines in cigarette consumption and mortality from heart disease. N Engl J
revisions made to the manuscript prior to submission. Med 2000;343:1772e7.
31. World Health Organization. WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2010/9789241563994_eng.pdf (accessed 16 Nov 2010).
32. Merriman D, Yurekli A, Chaloupka F. How big is the worldwide cigarette smuggling
problem? In: Prabhat J, Chaloupka F, eds. Tobacco Control in Developing Countries.
REFERENCES Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000:1e464.
1. World Health Organization. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 33. Emery S, White MM, Gilpin EA, et al. Was there significant tax evasion after the
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2005:7e8. 1999 50 cent per pack cigarette tax increase in California? Tob Control
2. IARC. IARC Handbooks of Cancer Prevention: Tobacco Control. Volume 14. 2002;11:130e4.
Effectiveness of Price and Tax Policies for Control of Tobacco. Lyon, France: 34. Joossens L, Raw M. Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the
International Agency for Research on Cancer. In press. supply chain. Tob Control 2008;17:399e404.
3. Working Procedures in: IARC Handbooks of Cancer Prevention: Tobacco Control. 35. Warner KE, Fulton GA, Nicolas P, et al. Employment implications of declining
Volume 13. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Smoke-free Policies. Lyon, France: tobacco product sales for the regional economies of the United States. JAMA
International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2009:327e34. http://www.iarc.fr/en/ 1996;275:1241e6.
publications/pdfs-online/prev/handbook13/index.php. 36. Jacobs R, Gale F, Capehart T, et al. The supply-side of tobacco control policies. In:
4. Becker GS, Grossman M, Murphy KM. An empirical analysis of cigarette addiction. Jha P, Chaloupka F, eds. Tobacco control in developing countries. Oxford, UK: Oxford
Am Economic Rev 1994;84:396e418. University Press, 2000:311e41.
5. Gallus S, Schiaffino A, La Vecchia C, et al. Price and cigarette consumption in 37. Ahsan A, Wiyono N. The impact analysis of higher cigarette price to employment in
Europe. Tob Control 2006;15:114e19. Indonesia. Demographic Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia,
6. Farrelly MC, Bray JW, Pechacek TF, et al. Responses by adults to increases in 2007. Final Report to the South East Asia Tobacco Control Alliance.
cigarette prices by sociodemographic characteristics. South Econ Rev
2001;68:156e65.
7. Kinh HV, Ross H, Levy D, et al. The effect of imposing a higher, uniform tobacco tax
in Vietnam. Health Res Policy Syst 2006;4:1e16. APPENDIX 1
8. Siahpush M, Wakefield MA, Spittal MJ, et al. Taxation reduces social disparities in The Working Group developing IARC Handbook volume 14
adult smoking prevalence. Am J Prev Med 2009;36:285e91.
9. Forster M, Jones AM. The role of tobacco taxes in starting and quitting
(by country alphabetical order) and IARC Secretariat:
smoking: duration analysis of British data. J Royal Stat Soc 2001;164:517e47. Attending meeting
10. Lopez-Nicolas A. How important are tobacco prices in the propensity to start and FJ. Chaloupka, Chair (USA)
quit smoking? An analysis of smoking histories from the Spanish National Health N. Nargis (Bangladesh; University of Dhaka, Dhaka),
Survey. Health Econ 2002;11:521e35. L. Joossens (Belgium; Belgian Foundation against Cancer, Brussels)
11. Franz GA. Price effects on the smoking behaviour of adult age groups. Public Health L. Nguyen (Finland; National Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki)
2008;122:1343e8. L. Clancy, L. Currie (Ireland; Tobacco Free Research Institute, Dublin)
12. Lewit EM, Coate D, Grossman M. The effects of government regulation on teenage S. Gallus, C. La Vecchia (Italy; Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri, Milan)
smoking. J Law Econ 1981;24:24. F. Godfrey (Luxembourg; The Union (IUATLD), Weimerskirch)
13. Van Walbeek C. Recent trends in smoking prevalence in South Africaesome C. Van Walbeek (South Africa; University of Cape Town, Cape Town)
evidence from AMPS data. S Afr Med J 2002;92:468e72. E. Fernandez (Spain; Catalan Institute of Oncology, Barcelona)
14. Kostova D, Ross H, Blecher E, et al. Prices and cigarette demand: evidence from S. Delipalla, AM Perucic (Switzerland; World Health Organization, Geneva)
youth tobacco use in developing countries. National Bureau of Economic Research Z. Onder (Turkey; Bilkent University, Ankara)
Working Paper 15781. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research,
A. Gilmore, (United Kingdom; University of Bath, Bath)
2010:1e23.
E. Blecher, (USA; American Cancer Society, Atlanta)
15. Tauras JA, O’Malley PM, Johnston LD. Effects of price and access laws teenage
smoking intiation: a national longitudinal analysis. IpactTeen Research Paper Series TW. Hu, (USA; University of California, Berkeley)
No 2. Chicago; The University of Illinois, 2001:5e44. D. Levy, (USA; HBSA of Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, Calverton)
16. Cawley J, Markowitz S, Tauras J. Lighting up and slimming down: the effects of H. Ross, (USA; American Cancer Society, Atlanta)
body weight and cigarette prices on adolescent smoking initiation. J Health Econ J. Tauras (USA; University of Illinois, Chicago)
2004;23:293e311.
17. Jimenez-Martin S, Labrega JM, Lopez A. Participation, heterogeneity and
dynamics in tobacco consumption: evidence from cohort data. Health Econ Invited Specialist*
1998;7:401e14. F. Van Driessche, (Belgium; European Commission, Brussels)
18. Lewit EM, Coate D. The potential for using excise taxes to reduce smoking. J Health
Econ 1982;1:121e45. *
19. Jha P, Chaloupka FJ. Curbing the epidemic governments and the economics of An Invited Specialist is an expert in the subject under assessment, but also has
tobacco control. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999:1e118. declared a conflicting interest. Under such circumstances, the expert does not
20. Townsend J, Roderick P, Cooper J. Cigarette smoking by socioeconomic group, sex, participate in the evaluation process while his expertise guides the description of
and age: effects of price, income, and health publicity. BMJ 1994;309:923e7. general remarks on the intervention under assessment.
Brief report
Contributing to Handbook volume 14 but unable to attend the IARC Secretariat (France)
meeting J. Daniel
R. Iglesias (Brasil; Alliance for Tobacco Control, Rio de Janeiro) F. Islami
M. Pekurinen (Finland; National Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki) ME. Leon
A. Yurekli (Switzerland; World Health Organization, Geneva) Q. Li
K. Smith (United Kingdom; University of Bath, Bath) K. Straif
These include:
References This article cites 24 articles, 5 of which you can access for free at:
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2010/11/29/tc.2010.0399
82#BIBL
Email alerting Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the
service box at the top right corner of the online article.
Notes