Routledge Revivals

The National Union of Women’s Suffrage

Societies 1897–1914

First published in 1981, this book traces the history of the National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) from 1897–1914. Whereas most
historians have focused on the more militant aspect of the struggle for female
enfranchisement, embodied by the Women’s Political and Social Union
(WPSU), this work provides an essential overview of the often dismissed
nonviolent and constitutional NUWSS — by 1914 the largest single women’s
suffrage organisation. The author argues that, although a less dramatic
organisation than the WPSU, the NUWSS was far more responsible for
laying the pre-war groundwork for the enfranchisement of women in 1918.
The National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies 1897–1914

Leslie Parker Hume

First published 1982
by Garland Publishing Inc.

This edition first published in 2016 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
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© 1982 Leslie Parker Hume

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by
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A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 81048371

ISBN 13: 978-1-138-66672-6 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978-1-315-61921-7 (ebk)
ISBN 13: 978-1-138-66682-5 (pbk)
 THE NATIONAL UNION
OF WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE SOCIETIES
1897–1914

Leslie Parker Hume

 © 1982 Leslie Parker Hume
All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hume, Leslie Parker.

The National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,
1897–1914.

(Modern British history; 3)

Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies—History.
2. Women—Suffrage—Great Britain—History.
I. Title. II. Series.
JN979.H85 1982 324.6′23′06041 81-48371
ISBN 0-8240-5167-X

All volumes in this series are printed on acid-free,

250-year-life paper.
Printed in the United States of America
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES

PREFACE

Chapter
I. 1897–1906: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE NUWSS

II. THE NUWSS AND THE WSPU

III. 1910: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE CONCILIATION BILL

IV. 1911–1912: THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES

V. THE ELECTION FIGHTING FUND AND THE FRANCHISE BILL

VI. 1913–1914: CONVERTING THE PUBLIC AND THE PARTIES TO THE SUFFRAGE
CAUSE

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A: NUWSS: NUMBER OF SOCIETIES, 1907–1913

B: NUWSS: MEMBERSHIP, 1907–1913

C: NUWSS: ANNUAL RECEIPTS, 1907–1913

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX
 LIST OF TABLES

Table
1. Growth of NUWSS, ISWS, and NESWS, 1907–1909

2. Comparison of the Vote on the Conciliation Bill, May 5, 1911, with the Vote on March 28,
1912

3. By-Elections at Which the Election Fighting Fund Was Used, 1912

4. The Franchise and Registration Bill and the Proposed Women’s Suffrage Amendments

5. By-Elections at Which the Election Fighting Fund Was Used, 1913–1914

 PREFACE

Although many historians have studied the women’s suffrage

movement in England during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the scholarship has focused exclusively on the militant aspect of the struggle
for the vote and, in particular, on the activities of the Women’s Social and
Political Union (WSPU). Seemingly dazzled by all the excitement and
sensationalism of stone throwing, arson, and forcible feeding, historians have
lost sight of the less colorful, nonviolent, constitutional suffragists of the
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS). The few mentions
of the NUWSS have, for the most part, repeated uncritically the militants’
own judgments on the NUWSS and dismissed the NUWSS as an "old-
fashioned and official gang" which did little to promote the cause of
women’s suffrage. In other words, historians have tended to treat the NUWSS
as a static organization which, in 1914 as in 1897, differed very little from
the suffrage organizations of the mid-Victorian period.

In fact, the NUWSS was important in its own right, and its history as
related in this volume fills some of the gaps and omissions, and may dispell
some of the misconceptions, which distort our present picture of the British
women’s suffrage movement. I hope that the history will provide a more
complete understanding of the complexity of issues, personalities, and
organizations that characterized the struggle for votes for women. The
NUWSS, which by 1914 had over 50,000 adherents, was the single largest
organization for the promotion of women’s suffrage in Britain. Although in
some ways the NUWSS was, in comparison with the WSPU, a less dramatic
organization, much influenced by its Victorian heritage, it was, far more than
its militant counterpart, responsible for laying the groundwork for the
enactment of women’s suffrage; the enfranchisement of women in 1918 was
in large part the fruit of the prewar labors of the NUWSS.

Many persons have helped me in the research and writing of this

book, and I should like to thank them here. In the early days of the project,
Mildred Surrey and Rosemary Collier of the Fawcett Society, and Jean
Ayton, Archivist of the Manchester Public Library, were of invaluable
assistance in locating materials on the NUWSS. Andrew Rosen, Penny
Kanner, and Margaret Barrow kindly shared their knowledge of archival
sources and suffrage collections with me. On this side of the Atlantic, James
Knox and David Rozkuszka of the Stanford University Libraries took great
pains to help locate materials and proved endlessly patient in answering my
queries.

I am indebted to Shirley Taylor for bringing her editorial skills to

bear on the manuscript. I should also like to express my gratitude to Peter
Stansky who, both as advisor and editor, was unfailingly enthusiastic about
this study; his criticisms and encouragement aided me in every stage of the
research and writing of the book. Finally, I should like to thank George
Hume, who lived with the NUWSS for many years, and managed always to
show interest in and support for this seemingly endless project.

L.P.H.

Stanford, California
8 June 1982
 CHAPTER I

1897–1906: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE NUWSS

The formation of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies

on October 14, 1897, and the first nine years of the NUWSS’ activity were
not so much the start of a new phase in the women’s suffrage movement in
England as they were the ending of the first long phase which began in the
mid–860’s. Although there had been occasional voices crying in the
wilderness for votes for women before the 1860’s, nothing that could be
termed a “movement for women’s suffrage” existed before 1866.1 The
relative lateness of the date is not particularly surprising. Until the passage of
the Reform Act in 1867, only one out of every five English men possessed
the vote; therefore the stigma of being without a vote was more acceptable to
women generally, since it was shared by the vast majority of English men. In
the first half of the nineteenth century, other reforms were far more urgent to
bring more immediate and concrete benefits to women, and the budding
feminist movement tackled these reforms first. The two leading feminist
groups of the 1860’s, the Kensington Society and the Langham Place Circle,
concentrated their energies on seeking the reform of property laws affecting
married women and securing greater educational opportunities and
expanding the spheres of employment for women.2 These small groups of
feminists seemed to believe that these practical reforms would lay the
groundwork for the ultimate political enfranchisement of women and that in
comparison with these much needed reforms, the vote was of secondary
importance and largely of symbolic value.

One may speculate that the feminists refrained from embarking on a

drive for the vote because they realized how controversial and explosive
such a demand would be. Though many feminists were frank in their criticism
of the status quo, they were quite aware of the heavy hand of the Victorian
social structure and their contemporaries’ conviction that men and women
were destined to have separate domains and duties.3 it was as Tennyson
defined it in The Princess (1847):

Man for the field and woman for the hearth;

Man for the sword, and for the needle she;
Man with the head, and woman with the heart;
Man to command, and woman to obey;
All else confusion. [pt. V, 11. 437–41]

Obviously, the political enfranchisement of women presaged the

“confusion” of male and female roles, not only in its assumption that women
had public duties and a political capacity, not just private duties and a
domestic capacity, but also in its implied challenge of the notion of women
as subordinates. The early feminists were quite aware of what the vote
implied for relationships within the family, particularly for patriarchal
authority; indeed, a re-ordering was what they were after, as they
occasionally felt free to say. Lydia Becker, the most prominent figure in the
early women’s suffrage movement, expressed this idea frankly: “I think that
the notion that the husband ought to have headship or authority over his wife,
is the root of all social evils…. Husband and wife should be coordinate and
co-equal, each owing to the other entire personal service and devotion, their
obligations being strictly reciprocal and mutual. In a happy marriage there is
no question of ‘obedience’ or which shall be ‘paramount!”4

It was a great leap, however, from verbally assaulting Victorian

social dogma to beginning a political campaign that could topple one of the
pillars of the Victorian social edifice. At any rate, whether the feminists were
reluctant to commence this battle until they had tested their forces in less
explosive ways, or simply had to do first things first, in 1866 they recognized
that the time had come. They had achieved victories in the fields of child
custody, married women’s property, and employment; and in the House of
Commons, where John Stuart Mill, the great Liberal champion of the rights of
women, had recently won a seat, the question of franchise laws was being
debated.5 The auguries seemed favorable for the beginning of a movement for
women’s suffrage.
 From 1866 on, the supporters of women’s suffrage conducted a
continuous campaign for “votes for women” and established an
organizational basis for their cause in London, Manchester, and other large
cities in England and Scotland. Lydia Becker, who combined strong-
mindedness and dedication with great energy and organizational ability, was
the driving force behind the suffrage movement until her death in 1890; in
1872, at her instigation, a Central Committee was formed to work with
members of the House of Commons to secure the enactment of women’s
suffrage.6

From 1867 to 1884 the women’s suffrage issue generated a good

deal of excitement and enthusiasm both inside and outside the House of
Commons. Becker and her co-workers held public meetings, organized
petitions, and established a suffrage journal to propagandize their cause. This
was the “golden age” of reform, and whether the reforms were justified on
liberal grounds—to protect individual rights and free the individual from
artificial constraints—or in conservative terms—to knit the community
together and promote social harmony—both Conservatives and Liberals
seemed intent on giving legislative expression to their own particular vision
of Victorian England. In such an atmosphere it was not difficult for the
advocates of women’s suffrage to gain a hearing for their cause. During the
decade of the seventies the House of Commons debated the suffrage issue
every year except 1874; in 1881 and 1883, resolutions in favor of women’s
suffrage were introduced in the House, and in 1884, William Woodall, a
Liberal MP for Stoke-on-Trent, tried, without success, to secure the inclusion
of women’s suffrage in the second Reform Bill.7

The year 1884 was the high-water mark of the women’s suffrage
movement in the nineteenth century. With the enactment of the Reform Bill,
Parliament seemed to lose interest in reform, and with it, women’s suffrage,
and the suffragists themselves, disappointed in their failure, lost most of their
enthusiasm. The House of Commons became absorbed in the problems of the
Empire and in the issue of Home Rule, and the whole question of women’s
suffrage, no longer curious or novel, ceased to attract attention or adherents.

In addition, the movement itself, especially after Becker’s death in

1890, was weak and disorganized. The new women’s auxiliaries of the
parties—the Women’s Council of the Primrose League, the Women’s Liberal
Federation, and the Women’s Liberal Unionist Association—attracted much
of the talent, energy, and ability which had once been placed at the disposal
of the suffrage societies.8 The death of Becker, who for so long had led and
sustained the movement, dealt a severe blow to the cause; her successor,
Millicent Garrett Fawcett, was still not devoting all her energies to the
movement and had not yet established the authority she was to have later.
Political disagreements and personal hostilities had been endemic to the
cause since its inception, and these continued to plague the suffrage
movement and sap its strength. Besides lack of agreement over whether the
several organizations should become active in other feminist causes, or
whether they should remain neutral toward the political parties, there had
always been clashes in temperament and personality.9 After 1877 the
movement had achieved a semblance of unity, but in 1888 serious political
differences arose over the matter of permitting political groups, principally
party organizations such as the Women’s Liberal Federation, to affiliate with
the suffrage societies. The minority group (including Becker and Fawcett),
opposed to such a policy, broke off, keeping the old name, Central
Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage. The majority took
the new name, Central National Society for Women’s Suffrage.10

For the next eight years the suffrage movement was directed by
divided counsels, both based in London where they acted as a liaison
committee between Parliament and the suffrage organizations outside
London. In 1895, in anticipation of the upcoming General Election, the two
branches, along with the most important Midlands group, the Manchester
National Society for Women’s Suffrage, agreed to coordinate their activities
so as to make the most of their limited resources.11 The temporary alliance
worked well, and in January 1896 the three groups established a joint
committee to take charge of promoting the suffrage cause in Parliament.12 The
Combined Sub-Committee, as this committee came to be called, soon
included representatives of the Edinburgh National Society for Women’s
Suffrage and the Bristol and West of England Society for Women’s
Suffrage.13 This committee adopted the tactics Becker had used—meeting
with parliamentary supporters of women’s suffrage, sending circulars to
Members of Parliament asking them to ballot for a day for a bill, and
whipping up support whenever a women’s suffrage bill came before
Parliament.14 These same tactics were also used by the NUWSS in its early
years.

The next obvious step, once united action for pressure on Parliament
had been undertaken, was to coordinate activities elsewhere in the country.
To achieve this goal a conference of delegates from the principal women’s
suffrage societies in the United Kingdom, representing some twenty groups,
was held in Birmingham on October 16, 1896.15 The conference decided that
a geographical division was the most workable, so that each suffrage society
would have a definite area in which to conduct its campaign, and it passed a
resolution to that effect: “That this Conference resolves that each society here
represented undertake, as far as is practicable, a definite area of Great
Britain and Ireland, with the object of extending the Women’s Suffrage
movement within that area, each society being left free to work on its own
lines.”16

The Combined Committee and the Birmingham Conference proved

that the societies could work together. Much of the mistrust engendered by the
split of 1888 was dissipated, and the suffragists came to see that their work
would be easier and more productive if they united on a permanent basis;
moreover, the formation of a united body of suffrage societies would do
away with the appearance of dissension within the movement.17 In October
1897 the societies which formed the Combined Committee agreed upon a
scheme of federation, and reconstituted the Combined Committee as the
executive committee of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies18
At the invitation of the Combined Committee, twelve other suffrage societies
agreed to join the new union; thus the newly formed National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies represented the seventeen largest, most
important suffrage societies in Great Britain.19

Although the organizational structure of the new federation was

highly decentralized and left the member societies with almost complete
responsibility for promoting the suffrage cause within the geographical areas
entrusted to them, the NUWSS did formulate certain rules which it expected
the societies to adhere to: they were to be strictly neutral in regard to
political parties (a victory for the Central Committee). and their sole object
was to be the attainment of votes for women.20 Nothing was said in 1897
about “law-abiding tactics” or “constitutional methods of agitation”; the new
NUWSS simply assumed that these were the only methods which its
constituent societies would use to agitate for the vote. It was not until 1908
that the NUWSS specifically stipulated that its member societies should use
only “constitutional” means to propagandize for the cause.21

The newly formed federation was headed by an executive committee

composed of representatives from the member societies, the numbers from
each being determined by the size of the society and the geographic area that
it covered.22 The chief task of the executive, only vaguely defined, was “to
place women’s suffrage in this position, so that no government, of whatever
party, shall be able to touch questions relating to representation without at the
same time removing the electoral disabilities of women,” or in a more
simple formulation, “to obtain the Parliamentary Franchise for Women on the
same terms as it is, or may be granted to men.”23 Its actual duties were
limited to conferring with the Committee of Parliamentary Supporters of
Women’s Suffrage and assisting it in working for the suffrage cause within
Parliament. In theory, the executive was also responsible for coordinating the
societies’ activities in the country, but it had virtually no power over the
member societies and had very little say about how the societies conducted
their local affairs. Thus it was less an executive body than a liaison
committee between Parliament and the member societies. It had almost no
funds at its disposal, and it relied on the staff of its member societies for
clerical assistance.24

But if the committee in 1897 had few actual powers, its implied
power was considerable, for its membership included some of the most
distinguished women in England. The acknowledged leader of the NUWSS
was Millicent Garrett Fawcett, who at the age of fifty was one of the most
capable women of her generation. Born in 1847, the daughter of Newson
Garrett, a Suffolk merchant and shipowner, she had been initiated into the
women’s movement at an early age as a result of the struggles of her sister
Elizabeth to enter the British medical profession. But Newson Garrett was
himself a staunch feminist and he and all his daughters, Louisa, Elizabeth,
Alice, Millicent, and Agnes, were active in some aspect of the feminist
movement.25
 If the Garrett family circle nurtured Millicent Fawcett’s interest in
the women’s movement, her marriage in 1867 to Henry Fawcett intensified
her feminist inclinations. Fawcett, a Liberal MP for Brighton, was a close
friend of John Stuart Mill and an ardent advocate of women’s suffrage.
Through Fawcett and her sister Louisa Garrett Smith, Millicent Fawcett
gained an entry into London suffrage circles, and in 1867 she was present
both at the first committee meeting of the London National Society for
Women’s Suffrage and at the debate on Mill’s famous women’s suffrage
amendment to the Reform Bill.26 Her interests during the 1870’s and early
1880’s went much beyond women’s suffrage, however: she wrote several
works on political economy, published two novels and several articles,
helped found Newnham College, agitated for the Married Women’s Property
Act, and acted as secretary for her blind husband.27

It was not until after her husband died in 1884 that Millicent
Fawcett began to devote herself wholeheartedly to political activity,
particularly to the women’s suffrage movement. Her political convictions
were rooted in the liberal tradition and her sympathies lay with the Liberal
Party, but Gladstone’s opposition to women’s suffrage and his conversion to
Home Rule, which she regarded as both a base act of political expediency
and a cowardly surrender to physical force, convinced her that the spirit of
liberalism had left the party, and in 1887 she broke with the Liberals over the
Home Rule issue. The controversy over Home Rule had the positive effect of
stimulating her interest in party politics; she joined the Women’s Liberal
Unionist Association and in the late 1880’s and the 1890’s was a prominent
speaker against Home Rule. Her involvement in the association was a
valuable preparation for her subsequent role in the suffrage movement, for it
not only increased her knowledge of the political world and earned her a
reputation for intelligence and integrity in Parliamentary circles but also gave
her considerable organizational experience and trained her as a public
speaker. 28

Even while absorbed with the Home Rule issue, Fawcett found time
to continue her association with the women’s movement. She strongly
supported W. T. Stead’s attempts to put an end to the white slave traffic and
was active in the National Vigilance Association. 29 More important, Fawcett
continued to work for women’s suffrage, as a member of the Central
Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage. When Becker died
in 1890 Fawcett had already established a reputation for devotion to
women’s suffrage combined with considerable political sagacity. There was
no question who would succeed Becker as the leading proponent of women’s
suffrage in England.

Fawcett was in many ways a colorless and aloof figure, much in

contrast to Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst, her counterparts in the
Women’s Social and Political Union, but her rational, calm, understated
exterior concealed a remarkable intellect, considerable organizational
abilities, and great political acumen; moreover, she was completely
dedicated to the women’s suffrage movement. As head of the executive of the
NUWSS, her dispassionate nature and practical outlook stood her in good
stead: she never appeared discouraged, grew angry at her colleagues, or
allowed the committee to lose its sense of purpose and direction. 30 In turn,
her fellow suffragists felt great respect and “intense personal loyalty” for her.
31 The fact that she led the NUWSS from 1897 to 1919 is an eloquent tribute

both to her capabilities and to the esteem in which she was held by her
colleagues in the organization.

To a degree, Fawcett embodied the Victorian ideal of womanhood

in that she was, with everything else, a model wife and mother, and therefore
solid and respectable. 32 At a time when journalists such as Eliza Lynn Linton
were complaining about “modern mothers” and “ambitious wives” and
Victorian society was acutely conscious that its ideas about women were
being challenged, Fawcett’s ladylike appearance and exemplary behavior
made her feminism seem less threatening than that generally of the “shrieking
sisterhood” of feminists. 33 She was never the impulsive, emotional,
hysterical female so often depicted as the stereotype by the opponents of
women’s suffrage. 34 Indeed, her imperturbability and her dispassionate
nature tended to mute the importance and the urgency of the women’s cause.
She was at times too cautious and too moderate in pressing the suffragists’
claims upon Parliament. Her idealism and optimism, as in John Stuart Mill
and Henry Fawcett, were rooted in the soil of nineteenth-century liberalism.
She sincerely believed in the universality of reason and the inevitability of
progress and thought that Members of Parliament, being rational men, would
accede to the suffragists’ demands because the enfranchisement of women
was integral to the whole notion of progress. An article which she published
in 1886 summed up these ideas clearly, rather as the supporters of the
Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867 had expressed them:

Women’s suffrage … will come as a necessary corollary of the other

changes which have been gradually and steadily modifying during this
century the social history of our country. It will will be a political
change, not of a very great or extensive character in itself, based upon
social, educational, and economic changes which have already taken
place. It will have the effect of adjusting the political machinery of
the country to the altered social conditions of its inhabitants. 35

Although Fawcett severed her ties with the Liberals, she never
completely cast off the conviction that the Liberal Party was the political
embodiment of liberalism, and that women’s suffrage was part and parcel of
the liberal ideology; this colored her attitude to the party and made her
overly sympathetic to the excuses and blandishments of the Liberal
politicians. Her conception of politics and the interconnection she made
between women’s suffrage, liberalism, and Liberalism, undermined her
natural pragmatism and at times handicapped her ability to act as the
effective leader of the suffrage movement. 36

Fawcett’s colleagues on the executive committee of the NUWSS

were also exceptionally able women, though some were quite different from
Fawcett in personality. Lady Frances Balfour, president of the Central and
East of England Society, the daughter of the Duke of Argyll and sister-in-law
of Arthur Balfour, was opinionated, quick-tempered, and often outspoken; her
commitment to women’s suffrage was personal and emotional. A staunch
churchwoman and an ardent Liberal, 37 she reveled in political intrigue and
continually prodded the indecisive Arthur Balfour to take a firm stand on the
suffrage issue. She moved with great ease in political circles, and her
connections were extremely useful to the NUWSS; undoubtedly had she been
a man, she would have taken a seat alongside her numerous relatives in the
House of Commons. 38
 Many of the other members of the executive were equally
distinguished, such as Helen Blackburn, long-time suffrage worker and editor
of the Englishwoman’s Review; Eleanor Rathbone, of the prominent
Liverpool family, who was to become a Member of Parliament and a great
champion of social reform; Priscilla Bright McLaren, sister of John and
Jacob Bright, a crusader for women’s rights and the matriarch of probably
the most prominent suffrage family in England; 39 Louisa Stevenson, the first
woman to be elected to a parochial board in Edinburgh; Eva Gore-Booth,
who proselytized for women’s suffrage in the cotton mills of Lancashire; and
Eliza wigham, a staunch supporter of Josephine Butler’s crusade to repeal
the Contagious Diseases Acts. Along with the rest of the total membership of
twenty-six. these women shared certain characteristics of age and
background. 40 They were middle-aged, mostly from the middle classes, and
in religion were Evangelicals or Nonconformists; 20 percent of them were
Quakers. They were all very much “insiders” in the world of Parliament,
many of them being related to office holders (usually Members of
Parliament), and were active in women’s party organizations, such as the
Women’s Liberal Unionist Association: some had held ofice in their own
right, often as Poor Law Guardians. 41 Not surprisingly, these suffragists
were in no sense newcomers to the suffrage movement: many of them came
from families which had supported women’s suffrage, and approximately half
of the committee had been actively working for women’s suffrage for more
than twenty years.

Although for most of the executive women’s suffrage was the

primary concern, a good many of the NUWSS leadership either had been or
were currently involved in other causes connected to the feminist movement.
They had agitated for moral reform, campaigned to open the medical
profession and universities to women, encouraged women to participate in
local government, and sought to improve the industrial position of women.
They were a sort of feminist “cousinhood”, linked not only by a common
interest and involvement in the feminist movement but also in many cases by
ties of long-time friendship or even blood relationship. Like their leader,
Millicent Fawcett, the members of the NUWSS executive were eminently
respectable and at least superficially conformed to the Victorian ideal of
womanhood—sober, religious, decorous, good wives and model mothers.42
In no sense, except in terms of sex, were they “outsiders.” They belonged to
the Victorian establishment, and, as able and energetic women, felt that their
credentials of competence and intelligence should be acknowledged and
utilized, regardless of sex. They believed that political privileges were the
concomitants of duties and obligations and that the vote should be conferred
on those who were so supremely qualified. Thus their feminism was
circumscribed in a peculiarly Victorian manner by their acceptance of class
distinctions and a political system which was built around these
distinctions.43 They were not attacking the political system but rather, as
respectable representatives of the middle class, asking to be let in. Like their
leader, they had a naïve confidence in the innate good sense of the Members
of Parliament and were sure that it would not be long before Parliament
bowed to reason and gave votes to women. Because they were so much
“insiders” they gravely underestimated the indestructability of the barrier of
sex and minimized the fears and hostilities which their demand aroused.44

Despite the formation of the NUWSS, the suffrage issue remained in

the parliamentary limbo to which the House of Commons had banished it in
1884. As Lady Frances Balfour noted, the period between 1897 and 1906
was very bleak for the suffragist cause: the suffrage issue “was always
shoved onto a siding to let express trains go by, and even the slowest train
was an express to those who wished the matter shelved.”45 The NUWSS had
no new policies to offer the disheartened suffragists and employed the same
tactics used by its predecessor, the National Society for Women’s Suffrage. It
continued Becker’s policy of promoting a private member’s suffrage bill, in
hopes that the Government would eventually take up the question and adopt it
as one of their own measures.46 The NUWSS realized that it was extremely
unlikely that a private member’s bill would be passed into law, but it still
felt that this was the only way in which the suffrage issue would be brought
to the attention of the Government, the House of Commons, and the public.
For a period of years, as in the days of Becker, the executive of the NUWSS
continued to meet regularly with a Parliamentary Committee for Women’s
Suffrage to discuss the position of women’s suffrage in the House of
Cbmmons.47 At these meetings the parliamentary supporters of women’s
suffrage gave advice and instructions to the NUWSS representatives, and the
NUWSS leadership listened to and followed these suggestions.48 Also in the
Becker tradition, at the beginning of each session the NUWSS would send
out a letter to all Members of Parliament friendly to the cause asking them to
ballot for a day for a bill or for a resolution; when it appeared that a suffrage
bill was to be brought before the House it would issue whips in support of
the bill.49 supplement its activities within Parliament, the NUWSS sponsored
meetings in support of women’s suffrage and organized petitions to
Parliament.50 It kept the local societies informed of its dealings with the
House of Commons and asked the societies to approach their local MP’s
about supporting suffrage—though not all of them did so.51

All these tactics were very much in the pattern of Victorian pressure
groups generally, following in the tradition of the Anti-Corn Law League and
the Liberation Society which relied on petitions, public meetings, and letters
to MP’s to advertise their causes and to influence Parliament.52 The strategy
was to create a parliamentary lobby and also an “enlightened public opinion
which … was supposed to bear on government,” to construct a network of
local branches that would give evidence of a “national voice,” and to apply
electoral pressure to enlist the aid of particular MP’s.53

During the early years of the NUWSS, and in particular from 1897
to 1903, the work of the member societies was actually far more interesting
—and more important—than that of the central organization. While the
NUWSS continued to function chiefly as a liaison between Parliament and
the suffrage societies and as a committee which coordinated the activities of
these societies, the affiliates, acting on their own initiative, were working to
build a strong organizational foothold in the country and to make women’s
suffrage a truly popular cause.

In 1897 the Central and East of England Society for Women’s

Suffrage started a “local associate scheme” which was designed to expand
the suffrage association to every parliamentary constituency within its
territory.54 A local secretary was appointed within each constituency and,
working with a list of names of known sympathizers in the area, was
supposed to seek their help in forming a local society. Gradually, working
through church groups, political and debating societies, and other community
organizations, the secretary could enlist a group of supporters for the suffrage
cause and ultimately form a small suffrage society, with a local secretary to
keep records and act as liaison with the Central Society.55 Associate
members, that is, women who sympathised with the cause but were not able
to become subscribing members, were also welcomed, and together the
associates and members in many places built up a strong local committee and
gained a voice and a base for women’s suffrage in the constituency. The
object of the program was to make women’s suffrage a political force strong
enough to influence the legislative behavior of the local MP:

The final aim should be, of course, to secure enough supporters of all
parties in the constituency to constitute a political force and, though
endless patience may be necessary, this work of building up a strong
public opinion must in the end succeed, for, so soon as it is strong
enough candidates and MPs will feel called upon to take such action
as will immediately bring about legislation.56

By 1899, the Central and East of England Society had instituted the
local associate scheme in eight constituencies and had succeeded in gaining
1,828 supporters and associates.57 The Bristol, North of England, and
Central and Western societies were so impressed by the success of the
program that they also adopted the scheme. The establishment of local
suffrage organizations to enlist public support for the women’s cause and to
put pressure on Members of Parliament was to become a principal goal of
the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. Spurred on by the
successful example of the Central and East of England Society, the NUWSS,
in 1903, adopted the organizational scheme which had originated with its
affiliate.

While the Central and East of England Society for Women’s

Suffrage was engaged in building up a network of local suffrage committees,
the North of England Society, under the leadership of Eva Gore-Booth and
Esther Roper, was attempting to shed its middle class image and bring
working women into the suffrage movement. Both Gore-Booth and Roper
were motivated by a genuine desire to improve the lot of the working
woman, and they championed the enfranchisement of women as a necessary
accompaniment to industrial and social reform.58 They also realized that the
addition of working women to the suffragist forces would be a way of
making women’s suffrage a “mass movement,” both in terms of size and,
more important, in terms of class basis, which would show Parliament that
women’s suffrage was not “a fad of the rich and well-to-do” and might also
result in support from the labor movement.59

Unlike Fawcett, whose suffragist convictions were grounded in the

liberal notion of natural rights, Gore-Booth and Roper looked at the vote as a
matter of expediency: they were convinced that women needed the vote for
their own protection.1 Women were an important part of the work force in the
textile industries of the North. In the cotton trade unions, for example, they
outnumbered men by 96,820 to 69,999.1 But though the women trade
unionists paid dues to support the Labour Representation movement, they had
no votes. Under the direction of Roper and Gore-Booth, the North of England
Society set out to convince these women that the vote was necessary to
rectify industrial grievances of working women. Assisted by Labour
Churches, the Independent Labour Party (ILP), and the Women’s Cooperative
Guild, the North England Society sponsored meetings for working women
and spoke to them about the suffrage cause.1 ultimately, a few suffrage
committees were formed in North Lancashire industrial centers, such as
Accrington, Bolton, and Salford, and working women began to press the
question on trade unions.1 The Northern Society’s work with women textile
workers inspired the Central Society to imitate its example; in 1903, the
Central Society began to organize women working in the Staffordshire
potteries.1

The North of England Society also tried to bring the political

demands of the working woman to the attention of Parliament. In 1901 and
1902 it presented the House of Commons with petitions for the
enfranchisement of women signed by some 66,835 women factory workers in
Yorkshire, Cheshire, and Lancashire.1 At about the same time, the North of
England Society, in conjunction with the Lancashire and Cheshire Women
Textile and Other Workers’ Representation Committee, took another bold
step by deciding to sponsor a women’s suffrage candidate at the next General
Election; in July 1903 it presented this plan to the executive committee of the
NUWSS which agreed to help raise funds for the candidacy.1
 The North of England Society contended with two problems which
the NUWSS was to face repeatedly—the problem of courting the working
class, and the problem of convincing Parliament that women’s suffrage was a
matter of concern to this class—and its groundwork was extremely important
both in giving the NUWSS an organizational foothold in the industrial centers
of the North and in helping to show the House of Commons that the suffrage
cause was not the exclusive property of the middle and upper classes. In its
dealings with the trade unions, the North of England Society opened up the
question of the relationship between the labor and suffrage movements, and
hinted at the possibility of linking the two. Its promotion of the policy of
running a woman’s suffrage candidate stimulated the NUWSS to take a more
aggressive interest in elections, and eventually, in 1907, to sponsor its own
suffrage candidate.

The activity of the North of England Society demonstrates that

although the NUWSS was primarily a middle class organization, led by
representatives of the middle class, its members nonetheless recognized the
necessity of broadening its base of support and attracting working women
into the suffrage movement. This aspect of the NUWSS is often overlooked,
and credit is given to the Women’s Social and Political Union for drawing
women workers to the suffrage cause; the financial and organizational
support which the North of England Society gave to the women textile
workers is forgotten.1 It is true that in this early period, the efforts of the
Northern Society were only partly successful and had no real effect on the
middle class orientation of the NUWSS. But those efforts influenced other
branches of the NUWSS, so that eventually, as other branches began efforts
among the working class, the central organization had to take notice.

During this early period, while the branch societies were launching
the suffrage movement among women textile and pottery workers, the
executive committee of the NUWSS rested. Though its main function was to
act as a parliamentary lobby, it was unable to prod the House of Commons to
action. Between 1897 and 1904 not one resolution or bill on the subject of
women’s suffrage was discussed in the House of Commons.1 In great
measure it was the attitude of the leadership and the structure of the NUWSS
itself that was to blame. As “insiders” the executive committee respected the
political establishment and had confidence in the good faith and good sense
of MP’s. They were more deferential toward and more reluctant to criticize
the House of Commons than were the leaders of other pressure groups, such
as the London Working Men’s Association or even the Anti-Corn Law
League, and this attitude, along with their firm belief that it was inevitable
that the House of Commons would give votes to women, made them reluctant
to lobby aggressively for their cause.1 Letter writing, petitions, and most
important, the innate “reasonableness” of the average MP would eventually
bring about the enactment of women’s suffrage, and as old feminists who had
received their political schooling from Becker and her colleagues, they were
quite used to the necessity of slow, patient work on behalf of all feminist
reforms. Women had, after all, finally gained the local franchise, and had
been admitted to the universities and the medical profession. The same sort
of efforts would gain them the parliamentary vote.

The NUWSS was also handicapped by the weakness of its

organizational structure. Though the executive committee had purposely been
set up not to be permanent, with members appointed by the local societies
and with no fixed term of office for these local representatives, the resulting
lack of continuity proved to be a weakness rather than a strength. The central
organization had to compete with the strong sense of independence of the
local societies. The local societies looked upon the NUWSS mainly as an
administrtive convenience to facilitate dealings with Parliament, and they did
not want the NUWSS to direct their affairs; and because the NUWSS was
totally dependent upon the goodwill of its branches—for funds, offices, and
clerical staff—it was in no position to enforce its ideas upon them or make
any demands.1

The political climate both magnified and aggravated the suffragists’

own failures in promoting the suffrage cause in Parliament. The fortunes of
the women’s suffrage movement tended to fluctuate with the fortunes of
franchise reform: within the context of comprehensive reform, the women’s
suffrage cause prospered, but at other times the suffragists were hard put to
gain a hearing.1 Between 1897 and 1903, franchise reform was neglected for
a host of other political issues, including protection, licensing, education and
labor disputes, and, even more, the Boer War, which from 1899 to 1902
completely overshadowed all other concerns. Given the conservative
inclinations of the NUWSS leadership, it was hardly a proper time for
promoting the cause of women’s suffrage, and Fawcett herself was
preoccupied with war responsibilities, particularly as a member of a
Government commission which went to South Africa in 1901 and 1902 to
investigate conditions in the internment camps.1

In October 1903, however, with the war over and rumors of a

General Election in the air, the NUWSS, at the prodding of W. T. Stead and
Elizabeth Wolstenholme-Elmy, agreed to sponsor a National Convention in
Defense of the Civic Rights of Women.73 This was the beginning of a new,
aggressive stage. On October 16 and 17, two hundred delegates, representing
all the NUWSS societies as well as many other women’s organizations such
as the Women’s Liberal Federation and the British Women’s Temperance
Association, gathered in London. The convention passed four resolutions
which instructed the NUWSS to take steps to make women’s suffrage an issue
at the next General Election: the NUWSS was asked to request all Cabinet
members and leaders of the opposition to receive deputations on women’s
suffrage, to write all parliamentary candidates a letter on the subject, to raise
a fund of £2,000 per annum for three years to agitate and organize for
women’s suffrage, and, most important:

The National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies should take

immediate steps to form a committee, where none already exists, in
every Borough, County, Riding, and, if possible, in every county
division of Great Britain and Ireland, who would pledge themselves
to press the question of Women’s Suffrage, irrespective of party, upon
every Member of Parliament and candidate prior to the next General
Election; and that, so far as possible, such committees should try to
influence the local party associations only to choose candidates who
are in favour of Women’s Suffrage.74

In December the NUWSS appointed a subcommittee to consider

how to implement the instructions of the convention. The committee issued an
appeal for funds to carry on “a vigorous Women’s Suffrage campaign
throughout the country in order to force the subject upon the attention of
constituencies and the candidates at the next General Election.75 In
preparation for the election, it drafted a letter to all parliamentary
candidates, asking them to pledge support for women’s suffrage.76 It also
began to work out a plan (modeled on the “local associate scheme” of the
Central and East of England Society) for forming suffrage committees in each
parliamentary constituency. The committees were to keep in close touch with
party organizations and party agents in order to draw their attention to the
suffrage issue, with the object of securing the selection of suffragists as
parliamentary candidates. The NUWSS would give financial support to
establish and to assist these committees.

As a result of the 1903 convention, the NUWSS emerged as

something more than a consultative body or a liaison committee between
Parliament and the member societies.77 Whereas in the 1897–1903 period the
affiliates were almost completely autonomous, and within their own
geographical territories established and implemented their own programs, in
the 1903–6 period, the NUWSS began to exert more control over its member
societies. The prospect of a General Election gave the NUWSS an immediate
goal and a practical reason for organizing the independent-minded affiliates
into a cohesive national pressure group. Also, the General Election forced
the NUWSS to shift its focus away from Parliament to the parliamentary
constituencies and pay greater attention to the activities of the affiliated
societies. Although the NUWSS did not successfully execute all the
directives of the 1903 convention, it did establish 133 new suffrage
committees and it raised an election fund of some £2,520.78 The fund was
especially important because it gave the NUWSS its own independent source
of financing. Under the direction of the NUWSS, the member societies
questioned all candidates on their attitude to women’s suffrage and received
415 pledges of support for the cause.79

After a long period of inactivity on the suffrage issue, Parliament

itself was beginning to take a new interest in the cause. Whereas from 1897
to 1903 the House of Commons did not once consider women’s suffrage, in
the 1904–6 period it debated the issue four times.80 Although the NUWSS
had helped promote these measures, it was not the women’s persuasive
abilities but the change in the political climate that was responsible for this
new interest in women’s suffrage.81 The impending General Election
undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the change, since all the political
parties, with an eye to the constituencies, were showing an interest in all
sorts of issues, and Members of the House of Commons were eager to use
parliamentary debates as a means of “testing the political wind” and gauging
the response of the electors to a particular issue.

The Liberal victory in January 1906 gave the NUWSS hope that the
House of Commons’ renewed interest in women’s suffrage would be
translated into positive legislation. The NUWSS had always been
irrationally optimistic about the Liberal Party. Compared with the
Conservative Party, the Liberal Party was sympathetic to the suffrage cause:
in the seventeen divisions which were held on women’s suffrage between
1867 and 1904, the number of Liberals who supported women’s suffrage
outnumbered those who opposed it on ten occasions, whereas on the
Conservative benches, the number of Conservatives who opposed women’s
suffrage outnumbered those who supported it on twelve occasions. Yet, on
the average, only 26.7 percent of the total number of Liberal MP’s voted for
women’s suffrage in these divisions; another 26.7 percent voted against it,
and 46.6 percent did not vote at all.82 The NUWSS, convinced that women’s
suffrage was a liberal cause, tended to ignore the figures and to exaggerate
the Liberal Party’s enthusiasm for the cause. The fact that Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, the new Prime Minister, was generally thought to be
sympathetic to women’s suffrage only increased the NUWSS optimism that
great things would come from the Liberals. Campbell-Bannerman’s
announcement that he would receive a deputation of suffragists seemed proof
of his goodwill.83 The NUWSS placed great hopes in the success of the
deputation which it interpreted as a sign that “the agitation has definitely
entered the field of practical politics.”84 On May 19 a deputation of 350
persons, representing twenty-five women’s organizations as well as
parliamentary supporters of the cause, met with the Prime Minister; Emily
Davies, founder of Girton College and a member of the executive of the
Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, spoke eloquently for the NUWSS.85
But it quickly became clear that the suffragists had greatly overestimated
Campbell-Bannerman’s commitment to the cause.86 The Prime Minister told
them that it was not politically realistic to expect the Liberals to promote
women’s suffrage, and he blandly advised them to continue to work to
convert the party, and the country, to women’s suffrage: “I have only one
thing to preach to you and that is the virtue of patience. … You canot shut
your eyes to the fact that no party in the State, and no Government that has
ever been formed or is now in existence, is united entirely on this question.
… It would not do for me to make any definite statement or pledge on the
subject in these circumstances.”87

The Prime Minister’s cool response at least had the positive effect
of causing the NUWSS to take more active measures to stir up support for the
suffrage cause. Although disillusioned by the Liberal leader’s lack of
interest, the NUWSS believed that if it could convert the opposition within
the Liberal Party and, more particularly, within the Cabinet, the Liberal
Government might introduce legislation to enfranchise women. Accordingly,
in July 1906, the executive committee announced that it would organize
special campaigns in the constituencies of prominent Liberal opponents of
women’s suffrage.88 Poplar (Sydney Buxton, Postmaster General),
Rossendale (Lewis Harcourt, First Commissioner of Works), Forfarshire
(John Sinclair, Secretary for Scotland), and Fife (Herbert Asquith,
Chancellor of the Exchequer) were its prime targets. In cooperation with
local suffrage committees, the NUWSS held meetings, collected petitions,
distributed literature, and organized deputations to win support for the cause
in these constituencies.89 October 1906, it announced that it intended to
sponsor its own parliamentary candidates to run against leading opponents of
women’s suffrage: “The National Union adopts the policy of running a
Women’s Suffrage candidate wherever a suitable opportunity occurs at a by
election, and where none of the official candidates are preparing actively to
support women’s suffrage.90

The NUWSS actions had a largely symbolic value. Asquith’s and

Harcourt’s hostility to the cause certainly did not evaporate under the
influence of the NUWSS. But increased activity in the constituencies and a
more aggressive election policy were signs that the NUWSS was beginning
to abandon its passive policy of patiently waiting for Parliament to act on the
suffrage issue. The Convention of 1903 had put new life into the NUWSS; the
efforts to form societies and to collect funds were indications that the
NUWSS was beginning to promote its cause actively and that the central
organization was at last emerging from its state of lethargy. Whereas before
1903 the NUWSS had almost exclusively concentrated on working within
Parliament, leaving the member societies to organize activities in the
constituencies, in the 1903–6 period the NUWSS gradually began to assume
a directing role in organizing the constituencies. Instead of acting as a liaison
committee for the member societies, it was beginning to formulate policies
for these societies and to oversee and to manage their implementation.

The Liberals’ return to power in 1906 intensified these tendencies

within the NUWSS: it increased the organization’s expectations that
Parliament would enact some measure of women’s suffrage and thereby
infused the NUWSS with a new zeal for promoting its cause. The suffragists
believed that they could persuade the Liberal Government to effect some
measure of women’s suffrage if they could show that there was real
enthusiasm for the enfranchisement of women in the nation. There is no
question that this belief was extremely naive. It underestimated the
antagonism aroused by women’s suffrage, overestimated the Liberal’s
commitment to the cause, and tended to make women’s suffrage into an
abstract issue, totally divorced from the political context of party
considertions and electoral reform. Yet, however deluded the NUWSS may
have been in clinging to this conviction, it stimulated the NUWSS to press its
case more actively in the parliamentary constituencies, and as a concomitant
of this, to exert more direction over the activities of its member societies.

In 1906 the NUWSS was no longer merely an umbrella organization

under which the member societies independently pursued their own activities
but was an active central core which intended to determine policies for the
affiliates. And with the change in the nature of the organization, new tactics
were also being tried. The NUWSS was still an extremely weak organization
and it had a long way to go before it aroused much public or parliamentary
enthusiasm for the cause of women’s suffrage, but a beginning had been
made. The heritage of Becker and the nineteenth-century suffrage movement
no longer shaped the features or the actions of the NUWSS in quite so
authoritarian a fashion: the NUWSS had begun to emerge from the nineteenth
into the twentieth century.

____________________

Notes
1Constance Rover, Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Great Britain, 1866–1914
(London, 1967), pp. 2–6.
 2Helen Blackburn, Record of Women’s Suffrage (London, 1902), p. 51; Ray Strachey, The
Cause: A Short History of the Women’s Movement in Great Britain (London, 1928), pp. 73–76, 89–104.
The membership of the Kensington Society was only thirty-three in 1865; two years later it was sixty-
seven. See Andrew Rosen, “Emily Davies and the Women’s Movement, 1862–1867,” unpub. MS.

3For an excellent analysis of the Victorians’ ideas about women, see Kate Millet, “The
Debate Over Women: Ruskin vs. Mill,” in Suffer and Be Still, ed. Martha Vicinus (Bloomington, 1973),
pp. 121–39.

4As quoted in Blackburn, pp. 42–43.

5Josephine Kamm, Rapiers and Battleaxes (London, 1966), pp. 25–28, 89–105; Strachey, pp.
72–76, 89–99; A. P. W. Robson, “The Founding of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, 1866–
1867,” Canadian Journal of History, 8 (1973), no. 1:7.

6Blackburn, pp. 119–21. The London National Society for Women’s Suffrage did not join this
committee until 1877.

7Rover, pp. 63, 218–19.

8Ibid., p. 29. The Women’s Council of the Primrose League was founded in 1885, the
Women’s Liberal Federation and the Women’s Liberal Unionist Association in 1886.

9See Strachey, pp. 110–13, 269–77; Rover, pp. 53–55; Robson, pp. 1–22.

10Blackburn, pp. 175–77.

11Minutes of the executive committee of the Central National Society for Women’s Suffrage,
July 1, 1895, Fawcett Library, London.

12Millicent Fawcett, who was at that time a member of the executive of the Central
Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, suggested the establishment of a permanent
joint committee. Minutes of the executive committee of the Central National Society for Women’s
Suffrage, December 15, 1895, Fawcett Library, London.

13Central Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1897
(London, 1897), pp. 5–6.

14A Parliamentary Franchise (Extension to Women) Bill was scheduled to be introduced by

Faithfull F. Begg (Cons. Glasgow, St. Rollox) on May 20, 1896, but the day was taken up by the
Government. Begg was more successful in 1897; his bill passed its second reading on February 3 by a
majority of 71, but it failed to reach the committee stage. In 1896 and 1897 the efforts of the Combined
Committee revolved around these bills. Minutes of the Combined Sub-Committee, January 22, 1896–
October 14, 1897, Fawcett Library, London.
 15Delegates came from the Central National Society for Women’s Suffrage, the Central
Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, the Women’s Franchise League, the
Parliamentary Committee, the Bristol and West of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, the
Manchester National Society for Women’s Suffrage, the Edinburgh National Society for Women’s
Suffrage, and suffrage organizations in Birkenhead, Birmingham, Cambridge, Cheltenham, Leeds,
Leicester, Liverpool, Luton, Mansfield, Nottingham, Southport, Dublin, and the North of Ireland.
Woman’s Signal, November 5, 1896.

16Ibid.

17Minutes of the Combined Sub-Committee, June 17, 1897, Fawcett Library, London.

18Central and Western Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1898 (London, 1898),
p. 10. The name of the Central National Society for Women’s Suffrage was changed to Central and
Western Society for Women’s Suffrage. The Central Committee of the National Society for Women’s
Suffrage became the Central and East of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. The Manchester
National Society became the North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. This was done to
indicate the areas in which the societies conducted their work.

19The twelve other societies were Birkenhead, Birmingham, Cambridge, Cheltenham,

Halifax, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Luton, Mansfield, Nottingham, and Southport. Englishwoman’s
Review, 29 (January 15, 1898): 24.

20Minutes of the executive committee of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,
February 10, 1898, Fawcett Library, London (hereafter cited as NUWSS, Ex.com.mins.).

21National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1908 (London, 1909), p.1.

22NUWSS, EX. Com. Mins., February 10, 1898, Fawcett Library, London. The
representatives were appointed by the local societies, which were free to change their representation as
often as they liked; this changing in the membership was intentional.

23Central and Western Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1898, p. 14; NUWSS,
Ex. com. mins., February 10, 1898, Fawcett Library, London.

24The five largest societies were each asked to pay £5 into a common fund at the beginning
of each parliamentary session. The smaller societies were asked to pay £1 or less. NUWSS, Ex. com.
mins., January 20, 1898, Fawcett Library, London. The secretaries for the NUWSS were Marie Louise
Baxter, Edith Palliser, and Esther Roper, who were the secretaries, respectively, for the Central and
Western Society for Women’s Suffrage, the Central and East of England Society for Women’s Suffrage,
and the North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. The NUWSS used the offices of the two
Central Societies.

25Ray Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett (London, 1931), p. 13; Robson, p. 2; Millicent
Garrett Fawcett, What I Remember (London, 1924), p. 33; Theodore Stanton, ed., The Woman
Question in Europe (New York, 1884), p. 1. Alice Garrett Cowell was one of the first women to
participate in local government; she served as a member of the London School Board. Louisa Garrett
Smith and Agnes Garrett were both active suffragists. Agnes was also one of the first women in
England to become a professional house decorator. For the story of Elizabeth’s struggle to become a
doctor see Jo Manton, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson (New York, 1965).

26Fawcett, pp. 64–65; Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, pp. 42–43.

27Political Economy for Beginners was published in 1870; this was followed in 1872 by
Essays and Lectures on Social and Political Subjects (written with Henry Fawcett) and in 1875 by her
first novel, Jane Doncaster. Of her second novel, published under a pseudonym, all trace, even the title
and date of publication, seems to have disappeared. Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, p. 55.

28Fawcett, What I Remember, pp. 112–15; Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, pp. 125–27.

29W. T. Stead, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, was responsible for disclosing to the public the
horrors of the White Slave Traffic. When he was imprisoned in 1885, Fawcett wrote to leading
government officials, urging that Stead be made a first class misdemeanant. She wrote to Stead: “I
honour and reverence you for what you have done for the weakest and most helpless among women.”
Her interest in the white slave traffic led her to join the National Vigilance Association, and to become a
member of its executive committee. Fawcett Library Autograph Collection, vol. 11, M. G. Fawcett to
W. T. Stead, November 9, 1885, Fawcett Library, London.

30Interview with Dame Margery Corbett-Ashby, a former member of the executive

committee of the NUWSS, December 4, 1974, London.

31Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, p. 266.

32The Fawcetts had one daughter, Philippe Garrett Fawcett. As a student at Newnham
College, she scored the highest marks in the Mathematical Tripos of all those who took the exam; these
marks placed her “above the Senior Wrangler.” Ibid., pp. 142–44.

33Elizabeth Lynn Linton, Modern Women and What Is Said of Them (New York, 1870),
passim.

34One of the favorite arguments used by opponents of women’s suffrage was that women
were impulsive and emotional and, therefore, by nature, unsuited to having voting privileges. For an
example of this type of argument see H. C. Deb. 4s., vol. 45, February 3, 1897, c. 1209.

35As quoted in Rover, p. 2.

36For an example of Fawcett’s thoughts on the connection between Liberalism, liberalism,

and women’s suffrage, see the Correspondence of Millicent Garrett Fawcett with the London Society
for Women’s Suffrage, Fawcett Library, London, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Miss Benecke, March 11,
1913.
 37Like Fawcett, Lady Frances broke with the Liberal Party over the Home Rule issue but
she returned to the party in 1904 at the time of the free trade controveresy. Affirming her commitment
to the Liberal Party, Lady Frances wrote: “I should feel it as dishonourable to abandon my party name,
as I should to become a Pagan or Papist, or a polyglot Anglo-Catholic, or call myself English instead of
Scot.” Lady Frances Balfour, Ne Obliviscaris: Pinna Forget (London, 1930), vol. 1, p. 189.

38The government acknowledged her considerable abilities when, in 1910, it appointed her to
sit on the Commission to investigate the Matrimonial and Divorce Laws.

39Both Mrs. McLaren’s stepson, Sir Charles McLaren, M.P. (Lib., Leicestershire,
Bosworth), and her son, Walter McLaren, M.P. (Lib., Cheshire, Crewe), were leading parliamentry
spokesmen for thesuffrage cause. Her daughters-in-law, Lady Laura McLaren and Eva McLaren, were
also prominent suffragists.

40In 1898 the members of the executive committee were: Mrs. Ashford, the Lady Frances
Balfour, Mrs. Beddoe, Miss Helen Blackburn, Miss Bigg, Mrs. Broadley Reid, Mrs. Russell Cooke,
Mrs. Enfield Dowson, Mrs. William Evans, Mrs. Fawcett, Mrs. Arthur Francis, Miss Eva Gore-Booth,
Miss S. E. Hall, Mrs. Ashworth Hallett, the Hon. Mrs. Arthur Lyttelton, Miss Mair, Miss J. McLea,
Miss Mellor, Mrs. Priscilla Bright McLaren, Mrs. Wynford Philipps, Miss Rathbone, Miss Roper, Miss
Louisa Stevenson, Mrs. Taylor, Miss Tillotson, Miss Wigham. Secretaries: Marie Louise Baxter, Edith
Palliser, Esther Roper. Central and Western Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1898, p. 13.

41The profile of the NUWSS executive committee bears a striking resemblance to that of
another feminist pressure group, the Ladies National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious
Diseases Acts. See Judith R. Walkowitz, “We Are Not Beasts of the Field: Prostitution and the
Campaign Against the Contagious Diseases Acts, 1869–1886” (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester,
1974).

42According to Geoffrey Best, respectability was “the sharpest of all lines of social
division…. It signified at one and the same time intrinsic virtue and social value.” For an excellent
discussion of the value the Victorians placed on respectability, see Geoffrey Best, Mid-Victotrian Britain,
1851–75 (St. Albans, 1973), pp. 283–85.

43The relationship between feminism and class consciousness in late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century Britain is discussed in Robin Miller Jacoby, “Feminism and Class Consciousness in the
British and American Women’s Trade Union Leagues, 1890–1925,” in Liberating Women’s History, ed.
Berenice A. Carroll (Urbana, 1976), pp. 137–60. See also R. S. Neale, “Working Class Women and
Women’s Suffrage,” in Class and Ideology in the Nineteenth Century, ed. R. S. Neale (London, 1972),
pp. 143–68.

44Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain (London,
1978), gives an excellent analysis of these fears and hostilities. His contention that many of those who
opposed women’s suffrage did so because they feared the enfranchisement of women would break up
the family is particularly interesting, as is his argument that many felt women were, because of temper
and intellect, unworthy of the vote. Harrison, pp. 55–84.
 45Balfour, vol. 2, p. 136.

46Becker adhered to the policy of supporting private members’ bills except when an electoral
reform bill was put before Parliament, in which case (as, for example, the Reform Bill of 1884) she
favored the introduction of suffrage amendments to the bill. Blackburn, pp. 149–50. See also National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1898 (London, 1898), p. 4.

47The composition of the committee varied from Parliament to Parliament depending upon
who supported the suffrage cause. In Miss Becker’s day women were not admitted to the meetings of
the Committee, but were forced to wait outside the room. The executive of the NUWSS, however,
attended the deliberations of the Committee. Blackburn, pp. 174–75.

48For example, at the request of the Parliamentary Committee, the NUWSS agreed not to do
any lobbying for a bill or resolution, as MP’s disliked this. NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 20, 1899,
Fawcett Library, London.

49See, for example, NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., March 3, 1898, and January 11, 1900, Fawcett
Library, London.

50National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1898, p.5; NUWSS, Ex.
com. mins., October 21, 1900, Fawcett Library, London.

51NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., October 2, 1902, Fawcett Library, London.

52Brian Harrison, “State Intervention and Moral Reform in Nineteenth-century England,”in

Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England, ed. Patricia Hollis (London, 1974), p. 292.

53Patricia Hollis, “Pressure from Without: An Introduction,” in Pressure from Without, pp.
14–7.

54Central Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1897, p.
5.

55‘National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,Annual Report, 1898, pp. 6–7.

56Women’s Suffrage Record, June 1903.

57Central and East of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Armual Report, 1899 (London,
1899), p. 7. In 1900 the Central and East of England Society and the Central and Western Society
merged to form the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage. By 1904, the Central Society had
established local committees in eighteen constituencies. Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual
Report, 1901 (London, 1901), pp. 6–7.

58Eva Gore-Booth, the daughter of an Irish landowner and sister of Countess Markiewicz,
came to Manchester in 1897. There she joined forces with Esther Roper, a graduate of Victoria
University, who had been working for the women’s cause for two years. As active suffragists, Gore-
Booth and Roper became members of the executive committee of the North of England Society and the
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. In 1905 they left the North of England Society. The
reasons for their departure are obscure, although it appears that many of the other members of the
committee felt they were running the society into debt and were making the society exclusively a
working class organization.

Christabel Pankhurst was friendly with both these women, and it

was through them that she becme active in the North of England Society. In
1901, both Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurst subscribed to the North of
England Society, and in 1903 Christabel was on the executive committee of
the organization. She, too, resigned from the committee in 1905. Neither
Gore-Booth nor Roper ever became involved with the WSPU, however, and
though they left the North of England Society, they continued to cooperate
closely with the NUWSS and favored constitutional methods rather than
militancy.
59Bertha Mason, a member of the executive of the North of England Society, said the work
of the society “caused many who had treated the question of women’s suffrage as a fad of the rich and
well-to-do” to take an interest in the movement. Manchester Guardian, October 5, 1909.

60Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920 (New York,
1965), notes that in 1890, the American suffragists began to base their arguments for the vote on
expediency rather than natural rights. This shift in argument, she thinks, reflects both the entry of
socially conscious women into the suffrage movement and a change in groups of men either in, or near
power, to whom this appeal for suffrage could be directed. Her arguments seem to have some
applicability to developments in the suffrage movement in the North of England. Gore-Booth and Roper
did exemplify a new type of socially conscious, suffrage activist, and the Labour Party, a relative
newcomer on the political scene, was fast becoming the target of the suffragists’ propaganda. See
Kraditor, pp. 45–74.

61North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1902 (Manchester, n.d.),
pp. 6–7.

62North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1900 (Manchester, n.d.),
pp. 8–9.

63North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1904 (Manchester, n.d.),
pp. 6–7.

64Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1903 (London, 1903), p. 5.

65On March 18, 1901, a petition asking for enfranchisement signed by 29,359 female factory
operatives from Lancashire was presented to Members of Parliament. This was followed on February
18, 1902, by a petition signed by 33,184 textile workers in Yorkshire and 4,292 textile workers in
Cheshire. North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1901 (Manchester, n.d.), p.
4; Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1902 (London, 1902), p. 4.

66The Lancashire and Cheshire Women Textile and Other Workers’ Representation
Committee was formed by Esther Roper, Eva Gore-Booth, and Sarah Reddish in 1903. This
organization, in conjunction with the Lancashire and Cheshire Women’s Suffrage Society (founded in
1905) and the Manchester and Salford Women’s Trade and Labour Council, worked to improve the p
osition o f women in industry. In 1906 it sponsored a women’s suffrage candidate to contest Wigan. The
candidate, Thorley Smith, ran on a labour-suffrage platform, and polled 2,205 votes out of a poll o f
5,778. So far as I have been able to determine, the one record of the committee’s activities is the
following: Lancashire and Cheshire Women’s Suffrage Society, Lancashire and Cheshire Women’s
Textile and Other Workers’ Representation Committee, Manchester and Salford Women’s Trade and
Labour Council, Annual Report, 1905–1906 (Manchester, n.d.). See also NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July
9, and December 3, 1903, Fawcett Library, London.

67See, for example, Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden from History (New York, 1976), pp. 78–79.

68On March 16, 1904, Sir Charles McLaren introduced a motion “That the disabilities of
women in respect to the Parliamentary Franchise, ought to be removed by legislation.” The resolution
passed by a majority of 182 to 68. H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 131, March 16, 1904, cc. 1339–66.

69Alexander Wilson, “The Suffrage Movement,” in Pressure from Without, pp. 80–104;
David Martin, “Land Reform,” ibid. , pp. 131–58.

70One can only guess what the financial position of the NUWSS was at this time, for in these
early years the NUWSS did not issue a balance sheet. The annual report o f 1907 noted that the
NUWSS had almost no money in the 1897–1903 period: “Beyond small affiliation fees to pay printing
expenses, the Union had no funds at its disposal, although on isolated occasions money was given for
specific purposes.” National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies , Annual Report, 1907 (Uxbridge,
1907), p. 5.

71As one historian has noted, pressure groups were generally more successful in securing the
repeal, rather than the introduction of legislation: “Positive legislation, including parliamentary reform, is
likely to have a pedigree of it sown, independent o f pressure from without.” Women’s suffrage did not
have this “pedigree.” See Hollis, p. 24.

72Fawcett later commented: “Two fires cannot burn together and the most ardent suffragist
felt that while war lasted it was not a fitting time to press their own claims and objects.” See Millicent
Garrett Fawcett, Women’s Suffrage: A Short History of a Great Movement (London, 1912), p. 59, and
Fawcett, What I Remember, pp. 153–74.

73NUWSS, EX. com. mins., September 17, 1903, Fawcett Library, London. Elizabeth
Wolstenholme-Elmy was a long-time suffragist and former secretary of the Manchester National
Society for Women’s Suffrage. She and Stead had held a conference of suffrage groups in July 1903 to
consider whether it would be better to work for adult suffrage (votes for all men and women) or to
continue to concentrate exclusively on women’s suffrage. The meeting decided to continue to work only
for votes for women, and asked the NUWSS to call a convention to discuss women’s suffrage.
NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 9, 1903, Fawcett Library, London.

74Women’s Suffrage Record, December 1903.

75Minutes of the subcommittee of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,

December 9, 1903, Fawcett Library, London.

76Ibid., December 11, 1903.

77Comroon Cause, April 4, 1913 (hereafter cited as C.C.).

78NUWSS, EX. com. mins., October 6, 1904, and June 1, 1905, Fawcett Library, London;
Englishwoman’s Review, 36 (January 16, 1905); 26, and 37 (January 15, 1906); 28.

79National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1905–1906 (Uxbridge,

1907), p.5.

80Besides McLaren’s resolution , already referred to, which passed the House on March 16,
1904 (see note 68 above), there were bills by Bamford Slack (Lib. Herts, Mid), Sir Charles Dilke (Lib.,
Gloucs., Forest of Dean), and Keir Hardie (Lab., Metthyr Tydvil). Slack introduced a women’s suffrage
bill for its second reading on May 12, 1905. Debate was adjourned, and on June 2 the bill was talked
out. (H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 146, May 12, 1905, cc. 217–36, and H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 152, March 2, 1906,
cc. 1448–54.) On April 25, 1906, Hardie introduced a resolution on women’s suffrage. The debate was
interrupted by disturbances in the Ladies’ Gallery, and the resolution was finally talked out. H. C. Deb.
4s, vol. 155, April 25, 1906, cc. 1570–87.

81For details on the lobbying see Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society
for Women’s Suffrage, April 12, 1905, and Circulars of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
1906, Circular from Edith Palliser and Frances Sterling, April 20, 1906, Fawcett Library, London.

82Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 28–29, provided the information from which these
figures were tabulated. On the average, only 16.1 percent of the total number of Conservative MP’s
voted for women’s suffrage in these divisions, while 28.3 percent voted against it; 55.6 percent did not
vote at all.

83On February 2, 1906, the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s
Suffrage noted that a group of suffragist MP’s were sponsoring a petition to request the Prime Minister
to receive a deputation on women’s suffrage. The disturbances in the Ladies' Gallery on April 25
complicated negotiations for the deputation and there were suggestions that the Women’s Social and
Political Union, the instigator of these disturbances, should be excluded; this step, however, was not
taken. Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, February 22
and May 1, 1906, Fawcett Library, London.
 Sylvia Pankhurst maintains that the WSPU was responsible for
prevailing upon Campbell-Bannerman to receive a deputation on women’s
suffrage. This seems unlikely. It is much more probable that the suffragist
MP’s were responsible for convincing Campbell-Bannerman to meet the
deputation. E. Sylvia Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement: An Intimate
Account of Persons and Ideals (London, 1931), pp. 207–8.
84Women’s Suffrage Record, July 1906.

85Among the MP’s present were Philip Snowden (Lab., Blackburn), Geoffrey Howard (Lib.
Cumb. N), Henry York Stanger (Lib., N. Kensington), Keir Hardie, and Sir Charles McLaren. The
organizations represented included the NUWSS, the WSPU, the Women’s Liberal Federation, the
British Women’s Temperance Association, the Women’s Industrial Council, and the Women’s
Cooperative Guild. Account of the Deputation to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, May 19, 1906,
NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

86In fact, Campbell-Bannerman was never enthusiastic about women’s suffrage. The
following anecdote, which he told at a meeting of the Women’s Liberal Federation in November 1903,
gives a good picture of his attitude: “I was sitting one day, when the matter came up to be voted upon,
by the side of Mr. John Bright, and he said ‘What do you think about this?’ I said, ‘Well, I am in this
position. I have voted for it, but I am not very much inclined to vote for it again,’ and John Bright looked
at me and said, ‘Dear me, that’s precisely my position; let’s both do the same thing’ And accordingly,
we both walked out from the division. Ever since I have maintained that more or less neutral attitude.”
Women’s Suffrage Record, December 1903.

87Ibid. July 1906.

88The Times, July 5, 1906.

89National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1905–1906, pp. 7–8.

90Women’s Suffrage Record, November 1906; see also note 66 above. The Ladies’ National
Association, which some members of the NUWSS executive had supported, may have inspired both the
North of England Society and the NUWSS to sponsor candidates at elections. The UNA, one of the
most important feminist organizations of the nineteenth century, had used this tactic with some success.
See Josephine E. Butler, Personal Reminiscences of a Great Crusade (London, 1911), pp. 26–33.
 CHAPTER II

THE NUWSS AND THE WSPU

The next three years were a time of growth and organizational

development for the NUWSS. In contrast to its early years, the organization
now devoted its main energies to propagandizing for women’s suffrage in the
parliamentary constituencies, rather than lobbying for the cause within the
House of Commons. The seeds of these developments were planted in the
years between 1903 and 1906; yet, it was the example of the Women’s Social
and Political Union (WSPU) which, in the years between 1906 and 1909,
both stimulated and conditioned the growth of the NUWSS and injected a
new vitality into the constitutional suffrage movement. During this period the
NUWSS defined its relations with the WSPU, and by 1909 a pattern of
relationships was established within the suffrage movement which persisted
until the outbreak of war in August 1914.

The WSPU had been founded in Manchester in October 1903, by

Emmeline Pankhurst, the widow of Dr. Richard Pankhurst, a Radical
politician and ardent suffragist, and Christabel Pankhurst, their eldest
daughter. The new organization was designed to function politically as “a
women’s parallel to the I. L. P., though with primary emphasis on the vote.”1
From 1903 to 1905 the WSPU confined its activities to Lancashire. It was a
small, parochial organization, closely tied to the ILP, and dependent on the
ILP for audiences and financial support. The WSPU had not succeeded in
attracting a large following, nor had it received national attention. Its
methods of agitation were traditional: it had not yet adopted militant tactics
as a means of publicizing its demand and enlisting support for the women’s
suffrage movement.2

In 1905 and 1906, the WSPU underwent a remarkable

metamorphosis. The Pankhursts moved the organization from Manchester to
London, shifted the focus of its energies from the working classes to the
House of Commons, and began to sever its ties with the Labour Party; most
important, they adopted militancy as a political tactic. There were two
dimensions to the Pankhursts’ decision to engage in militancy.
Unquestionably there was a psychological motive for its adoption: militancy
was an overt rejection of the Victorian ideal of womanhood, “of a moribund,
a respectable, a smothering security.”3 It offered women the possibility of
demonstrating strength and "challenging man’s monopoly of traits which
accorded him a dominant position in society"; it expressed "both indignation
at man’s indifference and woman’s ability to protest as men would were they
treated similarly.”4 It would be misleading, however, to imply that the only
motives behind the decision to engage in militancy were psychological. The
Pankhursts were more politically pragmatic than has often been suggested.
Tactical considerations, as well as psychological motivations, led them to
jettison conventional methods of agitation and to embark on a campaign of
militancy, a campaign conceived against a background of stagnation and
failure in the women’s suffrage movement.5 Petitions and polite
conversations, the tactical hallmarks of nineteenth-century feminism, had
failed to arouse much public or parliamentary enthusiasm for the women’s
cause; more strident techniques might meet with more success. According to
Sylvia Pankhurst, the WSPU’s object in resorting to militancy was: “To
create an impression upon the public throughout the country, to set everyone
talking about votes for women, to keep the subject in the press, to leave the
Government no peace from it.”6

Militancy was designed to create a mass movement for women’s

suffrage and thereby to force the House of Commons to enfranchise women.
The militancy took a very mild form at the outset, not going beyond heckling
Cabinet ministers, interrupting public meetings, and holding large
processions and demonstrations.7 These interruptions of meetings and
disturbances in the Ladies’ Gallery seem to have been of only slight interest
to the NUWSS and did not provoke any comment or promote any action by
the constitutionalists.8 But the arrest and imprisonment in October 1906 of
eleven members of the WSPU could not be ignored. The NUWSS, like much
of the public and a large part of the House of Commons, was shocked that the
women should be sent to Holloway as prisoners in the Second Division, as
well as fined, and it thought the punishment harsh and excessive in relation to
the deeds.9 Fawcett publicly announced her support for the prisoners and
urged her fellow suffragists to stand by them:

The real responsibility for these sensational methods lies with the
politicians, misnamed statesmen, who will not attend to a demand for
justice until it is accompanied by some form of violence. Every kind
of insult and abuse is hurled at the women who have adopted these
methods, especially by the “reptile” press. But, I hope the more old-
fashioned suffragists will stand by them; and I take this opportunity of
saying that in my opinion, far from having injured the movement, they
have done more during the last twelve months to bring it within the
region of practical politics than we have been able to accomplish in
the same number of years.10

In a letter that Fawcett wrote to friends she added, “I feel that the action of
the prisoners has touched the imagination of the country in a manner which
quieter methods did not succeed in doing.”11

The WSPU responded warmly to Fawcett’s expressions of support.

Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, the treasurer, called Fawcett’s action “a
generous and noble gesture,”12 and Elizabeth Robins, a member of the
executive committee of the WSPU, thanked her effusively for her support:

They are grateful to you—these women who are fighting the much-
misunderstood battle in the open. Some of them know quite well they
would stand a poor chance indeed, but for the past influence and
present championship of yourself and others like you—if there are
others. … The generous attitude of one like yourself must be of
invaluable help to those of us who cannot hope ever to be so well
equipped, and yet have come to feel they must not hold back one
voice throuqh an ignoble fear of the bugbear charge of notoriety-
hunting.13

Within the NUWSS, there was general indignation. Letters echoing

Fawcett’s sentiments poured into the NUWSS office.14 The annual meeting of
the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage passed a resolution urging the
constitutionalists to take note of the example set by the militants: “It
recognizes the zeal shown by these women who have not hesitated to go to
prison in support of their convictions and it calls upon this society and upon
all women to show an equal zeal in furthering by every constitutional method
the cause to which they are devoted.”15 December 11, 1906, after the eleven
arrested WSPU members had been released from Holloway, Fawcett and
other members of the NUWSS executive gave a banquet in their honor as
proof of their friendship and admiration.16

For all its demonstrations of sympathy and support, however, the

NUWSS was faced with a real challenge by the actions of the WSPU and the
willingness of its members to become martyrs for the sake of women’s
suffrage. The constitutional suffragists of the NUWSS and its affiliates had
always maintained that moral force was a more effective, and a more
honorable, weapon than physical force, and they feared that once the use of
violence was countenanced, it would be impossible to put an end to it.17 In
the past, however, “moral force” had often been a synonym for inaction. The
activities of the militants in a sense put the NUWSS and its constitutional
methods on trial and forced the NUWSS into actions which would prove that
they, too, could contribute to the progress of the suffrage movement, and that
violence and martyrdom were not the only means of rousing the nation to take
an interest in the cause. The almost frenetic activity of the NUWSS in the
years 1906–9 was an attempt to emulate the dedication and determination of
the militants and to vindicate the constitutional suffrage movement. During
this period the example of the WSPU had a great influence on the policies of
the NUWSS, and the NUWSS, following the lead of the WSPU, threw itself
into processions, demonstrations, and extensive activity in elections.

The first sign that the NUWSS was preparing to take more active
measures to promote women’s suffrage came in January 1907, with the
adoption of a new constitution.18 This constitution–in preparation throughout
the previous autumn–was designed to strengthen the organizational structure
of the NUWSS. The executive committee was to be made more permanent
than before, with members elected rather than appointed by the societies, for
one-year terms. The new constitution also established a council composed of
representatives from the local societies; this would meet four times a year to
formulate policies.19 The executive committee was responsible to the council
of representatives, and any changes in policy would have to receive the
approval of this body. The net effect of the new constitution was to facilitate
communication and cooperation among the member societies, and to place
the executive in a position to manage and supervise the activities of these
societies. Other organizational innovations followed the adoption of the new
constitution. The NUWSS moved into its own offices, obtained its own staff,
and in the summer of 1906 began to contribute on a regular basis to Women’s
Franchise, a weekly newspaper.20 The NUWSS was still decentralized, but it
was now a “practical working organization” with independent resources and
a strong executive.21

Shortly after the adoption of the new constitution the NUWSS

started to work in earnest for the introduction of a women’s suffrage bill in
Parliament. The strategy of both the NUWSS and the WSPU at this time was
to promote a private member’s bill for women’s suffrage.22 Although both
organizations recognized that it was unlikely that a private bill would pass
through all its stages, they also realized that since no party was willing to
support a women’s suffrage measure, a private bill was the only
parliamentary alternative available to them.23 The private member’s bill
would have a “nuisance” value in that it would keep the women’s suffrage
issue in front of Parliament, the Government, and the public and publicize the
cause. Also, private bills could be a way of persuading–and pressuring–the
Government to introduce a women’s suffrage measure. If a majority of
Liberal MP’s voted for the private bills, that evidence of support might force
the Government to sponsor a bill of its own.

The main tasks for the moment were to get a member to introduce a
bill, and after that to see that the bill successfuly passed its second reading.
The way to achieve both these ends was to show Parliament that there was a
demand for women’s suffrage. Accordingly, the NUWSS summoned all
supporters of the movement to join in a march from Hyde Park Corner to
Exeter Hall. On February 9, led by Lady Frances Balfour, Fawcett, Jane,
Lady Strachey, and Edith Pechey- Phipson, some 3,000 women representing
forty organizations, all carrying banners and accompanied by bands, walked
in the rain through the streets of London to advertise their cause.24 This so-
called “Mud March” was the largest public demonstration in support of
women’s suffrage that had ever been organized. 25

Four days after the procession, the executive committee of the

NUWSS met with the Parliamentary Committee for Women’s Suffrage to
discuss the introduction of a private member’s bill. 26 On March 8, less than
a month later, Willoughby H. Dickinson (Lib., St. Pancras, N.) introduced a
Women’s Enfranchisement Bill for its second reading. 27 The NUWSS had
taken great pains to drum up support for the bill. All member societies had
been asked to send letters and organize deputations to their local MP’s and,
where possible, to see that male electors in the constituencies approached
their MP’s about supporting the bill. 28 All this activity, coming soon after the
march, aroused great interest in the debate on Dickinson’s bill, and an
unusually large number of MP’s turned up to hear the discussion.
Significantly, Dickinson, in introducing the bill, pleaded with those present
not to let militant methods alienate them from the suffrage movement. 29 The
subsequent debate centered on whether the bill was wide enough in scope,
and whether there was, in fact, any demand in the country for women’s
suffrage. 30 Unfortunately, no final judgment was given on the merits of the
measure, as the Dickinson Bill, like its predecessors, was talked out.

The NUWSS had worked harder for the Dickinson Bill than for any
other previous suffrage measure, and it had expected the House to give the
matter serious consideration and at least to divide on the bill. Now the hard
work had all come to nothing. The NUWSS was disappointed and angry at
the insulting way in which the House of Commons had treated the bill, and it
was now convinced that Members of Parliament were not seriously
interested in women’s suffrage and did not consider the issue to be of great
consequence to the electorate. Instead of relying on Parliament, the NUWSS
resolved to try and arouse interest in women’s suffrage in the nation as a
whole, specifically by working in by-elections. By-elections would give the
suffragists an opportunity to appeal to the public and educate it about the
women’s cause; equally important, they would enable the NUWSS to force
the issue on prospective Members of Parliament.

This strategy had already been adopted by the WSPU, which in

August 1906 had announced that it would oppose all Liberal candidates,
regardless of their views on women’s suffrage, until the Government
introduced a women’s suffrage bill. As Emmeline Pankhurst freely admitted,
the strategy was borrowed from Parnell and the Irish party:

In 1885 … Dr. Pankhurst, stood as a Liberal candidate for Parliament

in Rotherline…. Parnell was in command, and his settled policy was
opposition to all Government candidates. So, in spite of the fact that
Dr. Pankhurst was a staunch upholder of home rule, the Parnell forces
were solidly opposed to him, and he was defeated…. my husband
pointed out to me that Parnell’s policy was absolutely right. With his
small party he could never hope to win home rule from a hostile
majority, but by constant obstruction he could in time wear out the
Government, and force it to surrender. That was a valuable political
lesson, one that years later I was destined to put into practice.31

The NUWSS policy differed from that of the WSPU in not being
anti-Liberal; the NUWSS was ready to support “the best friend of women’s
suffrage,” whatever his party, toward the goal of electing as many candidates
as possible who would be on the suffragists’ side:

It [the NUWSS] believes that if a majority of members can be

returned, publicly and definitely pledged to raise and support the
question in the House, the Government then in office will see the
absolute necessity of dealing with the matter. It, therefore, does not
adopt the policy of opposing Liberal candidates merely because
members of the present Government have so far declared themselves
unable to bring in a Bill for the Enfranchisement of Women.32

Indeed, despite the poor performance of the Liberals, the NUWSS still
thought there was a good chance that they would bring in a bill for women’s
suffrage. Undoubtedly this hope was partly determined by the pro-Liberal
sympathies of the NUWSS executive, as well as by their belief that women’s
suffrage was in the best tradition of liberal reform.33 In looking at the
suffrage issue from a very abstract, moral perspective, they evidently failed
to recognize, or at least they did not accept, the degree to which the Liberal
Party was pragmatic and electorally minded in its attitude toward women’s
suffrage. Though there was no evidence to prove the point, many Liberals
feared that if the vote were given only to women who fulfilled the
qualifications that male voters had to meet, the reform would benefit the
Conservatives more than it would the Liberals.34

Not all of the NUWSS policy was simply party loyalty, however.
The Liberals had been in office for only a year, and the NUWSS felt that the
Government should be given a reasonable amount of time to act on the
question before they were condemned as opponents of women’s suffrage.
Though the WSPU disagreed, the NUWSS did not believe that it would help
the women’s cause to oppose Liberals at elections–not only because it would
antagonize the ruling party, and, by the same token, help the Conservatives,
but also because it would confuse the electorate.35 If the voting records of the
parties were any indication of future trends, the Liberals would be more
likely than the Tories to support women’s suffrage: in the seventeen divisions
that were held on women’s suffrage between 1867 and 1904, the Liberals
had, on the average, contributed 59.7 percent of the votes for women’s
suffrage measures, and the Conservatives only 33.8 percent.36 The NUWSS
believed that the best way of encouraging the Government to bring in a
suffrage bill was to strengthen the suffragist sentiment within the Liberal
Party. It would be a mistake to associate the suffrage movement with anti-
Liberal policies, and there was little point in a policy that indirectly assisted
the Conservatives, who, during their long tenure in power, had done nothing
for women and were not likely to change if returned to power.37 And so far
as the average elector was concerned, the sight of supporters of women’s
suffrage opposing the presumably suffragist Liberals would only be
mystifying.

In part, the disagreement between the NUWSS and the WSPU on the
matter of opposing or not opposing Liberals resulted from their differing
ideas on the value of by-election campaigns. The educational value of these
campaigns was extremely important to the NUWSS, and NUWSS members
always stressed the opportunity to propagandize and enlist public support for
the women’s cause. The WSPU, on the other hand, was preoccupied with the
political ramifications of by-elections: to them, by-elections were
principally a means of putting pressure on the Government, through the loss
of seats in the House of Commons, to introduce a measure for women’s
suffrage.

During 1907, the NUWSS participated in four by-elections:

Hexham, Jarrow, Kirkdale,38 and Wimbledon. At Hexham the NUWSS
supported a Conservative, Colonel Bates; at Jarrow it supported a Labourite,
Pete Curran; and at Kirkdale, finding none of the candidates satisfactory, it
remained neutral and propagandized for the suffrage cause. Although only
Curran was victorious, the NUWSS maintained that from an educational
standpoint, these three by-election campaigns were great successes; as a
result of the interest aroused, women’s suffrage committees had been formed
in all of these constituencies.39 Encouraged by this response, the NUWSS, in
October 1907, decided to take part in all future by-elections; it stressed that
the educational value of these campaigns was as important, if not more
important, than the return of a suffragist to Parliament:

The main idea underlying this scheme of by-election policy is the

education of constituencies in women’s suffrage, and the utilization of
these elections as an opportunity for organizing new women’s
suffrage societies, a by-election offering the best occasion for getting
a hearing from voters and therefore the point to which the chief
energy of the National Union could with most advantaqe be directed
and on which its funds could be best expended.40

The NUWSS hoped that by exciting the country’s interest in women’s

suffrage and creating a demand for the enfranchisement of women, it could
force the Government to pay serious attention to the suffragists’ cause.

The by-election at Wimbledon, in May 1907, was special in that the

NUWSS for the first time sponsored a women’s suffrage candidate—the Hon.
Bertrand Russell, a member of the NUWSS executive committee and a well-
known figure. Wimbledon was a Conservative stronghold, and its sitting
Member, a prominent Tory, Sir Henry Chaplin, was an outspoken opponent of
women’s suffrage. The Liberals, believing the case to be hopeless, had
decided to let Chaplin have the seat, but the NUWSS was unhappy with this
decision because it felt that no confirmed opponent of women’s suffrage
should be returned to Parliament unopposed.41 It therefore prevailed upon
Russell, a Liberal and a Free Trader, to run on a women’s suffrage
platform.42 in choosing him as its candidate, the NUWSS hoped to attract the
votes of the Liberals in the constituency, and even to receive official support
from the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party declined to assist, however, and the
NUWSS was left to bear the whole effort. In a period of ten days it sent 328
workers into the constituency, and it spent nearly £1,400 on the campaign.43
Russell polled a respectable 3,299 votes but Chaplin was returned by a
majority of 6,964.44

The Wimbledon election garnered considerable national publicity

for the suffrage cause, and it created a spirit of elan within the organization,
but the cost was enormous, considering the society’s limited resources, and
one cannot but feel that part of the reason for this departure from the policy of
by-elections for education was the urge to draw some of the limelight away
from the WSPU and get the attention of being an “innovator” in the suffrage
movement. Apparently the NUWSS itself questioned the wisdom of
sponsoring women’s suffrage candidates, for it did not venture into such a
campaign again until the General Election of 1910.

Throughout 1908 and 1909 the NUWSS continued its policy of

participating in by-elections, conducting campaigns to publicize the women’s
cause and gather new recruits for the suffragist ranks. From the modest start
in 1907, the NUWSS went on to take part in thirty-one by-elections in the
next two years—doing propaganda work in twenty-six of those and actively
campaigning in five.45 It acquired a staff of paid organizers—six in 1908, ten
in 1909—and began compiling information about the various parliamentary
constituencies.46 This information was put into divisional books so that
organizers could set to work on a by-election campaign at a moment’s notice
without having to ask questions about party organizations, employment
conditions, and so on.47

Though the concentration in 1908 and 1909 was on by-elections, the

NUWSS also organized mass meetings and processions along the lines of the
successful “Mud March” of February 1907. On June 13, 1908, for example,
it sponsored a procession in London in which 10,000 women representing
forty-two organizations participated.48 The member societies held similar,
though smaller, gatherings in towns and cities throughout England.49 Besides
the public gatherings, there were also countless drawing room meetings
throughout the country, and speakers were sent to mothers’ meetings, church
groups, women’s organizations, and political associations.50 Some of the
local societies sponsored caravan tours in support of women’s suffrage, and
members of the executive and NUWSS organizers went on speaking tours to
publicize their demand; Fawcett even debated the suffrage issue at the
Oxford Union, becoming the first woman ever to address this group.51 The
aim of all these marches, meetings, and speeches was the same: to publicize
the women’s demand and to use public opinion to pressure Parliament to
enact a measure for women’s suffrage.

Throughout this period, even though the NUWSS was actively

seeking public support for women’s suffrage by holding meetings and
demonstrations and participating at by-elections, its attention, like that of the
WSPU, was focused on the House of Commons and the Government. As the
year 1908 began, the NUWSS was still hopeful that the Liberals would come
to the aid of the women’s suffrage movement. In February, Henry York
Stanger (Lib., N. Kensington) introduced a women’s suffrage bill which
passed its second reading by a majority of 179 votes.52 Further progress on
the bill was blocked, but this was the first time since 1897 that the House of
Commons had acted favorably on a measure enfranchising women and the
NUWSS regarded it as an indication that all the efforts to publicize and to
propagandize the women’s cause were beginning to have an impact on
Members of Parliament. Moreover, because a majority of those who voted
for the bill were Liberals—many of them in the Government—the NUWSS
felt that its faith in the Liberal Party had not been misplaced and that its
decision not to adopt an anti-Liberal by-election policy had been the correct
one.53

Nonetheless, although the division on the Stanger Bill re-affirmed

the NUWSS hope that the Liberal Government might introduce a women’s
suffrage bill, it should not have been looked upon quite so optimistically—
since one of the most powerful men in the Government, Herbert Asquith, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, had again placed himself clearly as being
opposed to any Government approval of the suffragist cause.
 Asquith’s biographer, Roy Jenkins, terms Asquith’s attitude to
women’s suffrage “bizzare” and maintains that Asquith was never “happy” as
an antisuffragist.54 Asquith’s opposition to women’s suffrage certainly does
not seem consistent with some of his other views. He invariably supported
measures which enabled women to participate in local government, and, as
Home Secretary, he was responsible for the first women factory inspectors;
yet when the parliamentary vote was at stake, he was the women’s most
ardent opponent.55 In some ways his logic seemed to agree with that of many
other prominent antisuffragists in that he believed women ot have a limited
political capacity and to be unsuited to participate in national affairs.56 He
had an old-fashioned appreciation of women and feared that the rough-and-
tumble of parliamentary politics might “unsex” them and rob them of their
feminine charms and decorative qualities. He wondered why women even
wanted the vote, or how they might benefit from it; the excitement and
mystique surrounding “votes for women” completely eluded him.57

There was more to his opposition than these somewhat superficial

views, however. Asquith was a Liberal of the twentieth century who had
broken with Mill’s nineteenth-century tradition of liberal individualism, and
unlike Mill—and the women of the NUWSS—he looked at reform
pragmatically rather than abstractly, in terms of the rights of the individual.
Reform was a question of “social and imperial efficiency,” and the
enfranchisement of women would not facilitate such efficiency.58 Liberalism,
Asquith believed, “had become excessively dominated by the policy of
political and religious emancipation which it had followed in the past,” and
he considered it “doubtful whether further franchise reform would benefit the
Liberals.”59 In a sense, Asquith’s disagreements with the NUWSS and other
proponents of women’s suffrage were a clash between the radical liberalism
of the nineteenth century and the more collectivist liberalism of the twentieth.

In the winter of 1908, it was rumored that Asquith would succeed

Campbell-Bannerman—who was ailing—as Prime Minister, and that the
change would come about in the not very distant future. Although Asquith’s
views on women’s suffrage were well known, no one, including the leaders
of the NUWSS, had any conception of the lengths to which he would go to
oppose the enactment of a measure for women’s suffrage. At the end of
January, the NUWSS sent a deputation to discuss the suffrage issue with
Asquith. The future Prime Minister told the suffragists that he was not
convinced that the country was in favor of women’s suffrage and that, until he
had proof that women wanted to vote, he would not support such a reform.
Still, he did not convey the impression of being adamantly opposed to the
enfranchisement of women, and he assured the suffragists that he was not “a
sinister figure who is exercising with disastrous results a maleficent
influence upon the fortunes of your cause.”60 Thus, although the
representatives of the NUWSS left the interview discouraged because the
Chancellor had not agreed to help their cause, they did not feel his opposition
to women’s suffrage was insuperable; not unreasonably, they were confident
that if a majority of the party and a majority of the Government favored
women’s suffrage, Asquith would have no choice but to sponsor such a
reform.61

The interview with Asquith was only the first of many

disappointments for the NUWSS. On February 20, the executive committee of
the NUWSS met with the officers of the Labour Party to ask them to press the
Government for full facilities for a women’s suffrage bill. Arthur Henderson,
the party chairman, would not agree to such an undertaking.62 Henderson’s
views reflected those of the Labour Party Conference which had, for the past
three years, opposed any women’s suffrage measures that merely abolished
sex disqualification and extended the franchise to women on the basis of a
property qualification.63 The Labour Party feared that the enfranchisement of
women on such a limited basis would increase the political power of the
propertied classes; thus, it favored giving votes to all men and all women—
that is, adult suffrage.64

The specter of adult suffrage appeared again on May 20, when

Asquith, now Prime Minister, received a deputation of suffragist MP’s.65 He
promised that the Government would, before the end of Parliament, introduce
a scheme of electoral reform; it would be possible to attach a women’s
suffrage amendment to this reform if such an amendment were democratic. If
the amendment fulfilled this condition he would not oppose it, since his
colleagues were in favor of such a reform.66

Asquith’s and Henderson’s pronouncements made it very evident

that both the Government and the Labour Party would consider women’s
suffrage only as part of a larger scheme of electoral reform. Unlike the
NUWSS, neither the Liberals nor Labour could look at women’s suffrage
primarily as a moral or philosophic issue but had to take into consideration
how the enfranchisement of women would affect the party standing. Large
segments of both parties believed that the enfranchisement of women on the
same terms as men were enfranchised would duplicate the class biases and
the anomalies of the existing male franchise, and thereby benefit the
Conservatives.67

Asquith’s announcement caused a good deal of consternation within

the NUWSS because it indicated that the Government intended to entangle
women’s suffrage in the complications of comprehensively reforming the
franchise laws. Bertrand Russell thought the Prime Minister was offering a
great opportunity to the women by promising to make women’s suffrage a
part of a Government Bill. He urged Fawcett to accept this offer in good
faith: “I do not, of course, know what you know about the tricks of official
Liberalism but surely, no Prime Minister has hitherto made any promise on
the subject to a body of members.”68

Fawcett herself did not have much confidence in Asquith’s good

intentions. To her, “democratic amendment” meant votes for all women, and
she thought the Prime Minister knew very well that neither the nation nor the
House of Commons supported such a radical reform; in other words,
Asquith’s promise was a bogus offer. The Government wanted to secure the
passage of an electoral reform bill that would abolish plural voting and
enfranchise more men, but it did not care what happened to the women: “In
offering this ‘concession’ it appears to me that he has contrived to do as
much harm as possible to the Women’s Suffrage Movement, and refrained
completely from identifying his party with it…. His Government is now
pledged to give more enfranchisement to the already enfranchised men, but is
wholly unpledged to give any enfranchisement to the wholly unenfranchised
women.”69

Fawcett was quite right in thinking that, in the absence of official

Government support, there was little likelihood that a “democratic”
amendment for women’s suffrage would ever pass the House of Commons if
there was a free vote on the issue. Conservatives as well as many Liberals
were reluctant to enfranchise even a small number of women, much less to
accept such a sweeping reform; in addition, many Members of Parliament
were confirmed antisuffragists who would oppose any measure that gave
votes to women. Fawcett knew very well that Asquith was asking the
suffragists to commit themselves to a particular type of reform which would
alienate the Conservatives and identify the suffrage movement with the
Liberal and Labour parties; though he wanted a suffrage amendment with a
strong Liberal-Labour bias, he was unwilling to give it Government support
until after it had passed the House of Commons.70 Fawcett believed it would
be harmful to tie the suffrage movement to a political party until the party had
given official support to the reform. The NUWSS goal was to prevail upon
the Liberal Government to support women’s suffrage, but there was no point
in exchanging its nonparty status for what was equivalent to an alliance with
the Liberals if the Government was unwilling to commit itself unequivocably
to women’s suffrage.71

In March 1909, the introduction of an adult suffrage bill confirmed

the NUWSS suspicions that forces within the Liberal Party were attempting
to tie the women’s suffrage movement to the demand for adult suffrage; the
subsequent vote on the bill verified the NUWSS conviction that the women
had nothing to gain, and much to lose, by such a move.72 The NUWSS had,
from the outset, opposed this bill which, “in the alleged interest of women’s
suffrage,” gave votes to more men and embroiled women’s suffrage in the
controversy of comprehensive electoral reform.73 Although the NUWSS had
made a major concession to the Liberals by agreeing to amend the Stanger
Bill to include married women, it would not sponsor a measure which would
alienate many of those who were prepared to vote for a moderate measure of
women’s suffrage.74 As Fawcett noted in a letter to The Times, not one of the
women’s suffrage societies supported Howard’s Adult Suffrage Bill, nor
could they do so as long as there was “no active demand for universal adult
suffrage” in the country.75

The NUWSS predictions proved correct, and many of those who in

the past had supported less comprehensive women’s suffrage measures cast
their votes against the Howard Bill; whereas the House of Commons had
passed the Stanger Bill by a majority of 179, the majority on the Howard Bill
was only 35.76 In the debate Philip Snowden, who, as a member of the
Labour Party, was committed to adult suffrage, frankly admitted that there
was little demand for adult suffrage in the country, and he conceded that the
largest measure that all suffragists could safely support would give women
the same voting rights that men now exercised.77 Not surprisingly, the
Conservative suffragists voted solidly against the measure. In this case, the
loss of Conservative votes was not compensated for by an increase in
Liberal support.78 Prophetically, Asquith, who had been so adamant in
demanding a “democratic” measure of women’s suffrage, abstained on the
Howard Bill.79

The vote on the Howard Bill vindicated the NUWSS assertion that it
would be pointless to press for a comprehensive, “democratic” measure of
women’s suffrage if the Government refused to give such a bill its official
support. Asquith’s abstention confirmed Fawcett’s suspicion that although he
was happy to have the suffragists commit themselves to working for a
measure of women’s suffrage which would most benefit the Liberals, he had
no intention, at this stage, of throwing the weight of his party behind such an
effort.

By the summer of 1909, the NUWSS was pessimistic about the

immediate prospects of the suffrage movement. In June 1909, Fawcett wrote
to Maud Arncliffe-Sennet: “I agree with you in thinking the immediate
outlook for our cause gloomy in the extreme.”80 The NUWSS policy of
courting the Liberals seemed to be making little progress. Asquith, showing
his true antisuffragist colors, only temporized and offered excuses to the
women. Within the rank and file of the Liberal Party, many suffragist MP’s
now appeared to be defecting to the adult suffrage movement. Moreover, the
Conservative Party did not look like an encouraging alternative. As Lady
Frances Balfour wrote to Fawcett, the Conservatives were unwilling to do
more than enfranchise rate-paying women, “which is not practical
politics.”81 Although women’s suffrage had gained a hearing in the House of
Commons, no party was willing to endorse this reform. In a very real sense
the suffragists’ efforts had failed: demonstrations, processions, meetings,
letters, by-election campaigns had attracted attention to the suffrage
movement, but they had not convinced any political party to give official
support to the women’s cause.
 The failure of women’s suffrage to make any progress in the House
of Commons affected the NUWSS attitude toward the WSPU; by 1909, the
NUWSS felt that the militants were partly responsible for the parliamentary
troubles of the movement. Irritated by the actions of the militants, MP’s
frequently told the NUWSS that women’s suffrage would never be a matter of
practical politics while militancy existed. Although the NUWSS did not
condone the Government’s treatment of the suffragettes, it was increasingly
less sympathetic to the actions of the militants. Thus, the NUWSS found itself
in an unenviable middle position, squeezed between the militants on one side
and the politicians on the other. The militants would not cease their activities
until the Government brought in a suffrage bill, and the Government would
not bring in a suffrage bill until militant activities ceased.

Until the summer of 1908, relations between the NUWSS and the
WSPU had been fairly cordial. Militancy, still in rather mild forms, was of
immense propaganda value to the whole suffrage movement, and the NUWSS
readily acknowledged that it owed the WSPU a great debt of gratitude for
rekindling the fires of the suffrage movement. The NUWSS sensed that a
large segment of the public and a substantial portion of Parliament
sympathized with the militants and gave them support because the
punishments meted out to the women were ridiculously severe in relation to
the comparative mildness of the militancy; moreover, the martyrdom suffered
by the imprisoned women caused an outpouring of public sympathy for the
women’s movement.

Vandalism was another matter. The rock throwing in June 1908

followed by a rushing of the House of Commons in October horrified the
NUWSS.82 In the eyes of the constitutional suffragists, the militants were no
longer martyrs, but criminals. Fawcett, greatly perturbed, complained that
militant methods threatened to create anarchy, and would certainly destroy
any chance for the enactment of a women’s suffrage measure:

… on the reassembling of Parliament, the well-known attempt to

“rush the House of Commons” was made and in anticipation of this
handbills were distributed among the lowest classes of London
toughs and the dangerous hordes of unemployed containing the
invitation to “rush the House of Commons.” I have never said in
 public and to very few people in private what I thought of that
proceeding; but I tell you in confidence that I considered it a [sic]
immoral and dastardly thing to have done. The House of Commons,
with all its faults, stands for order against anarchy, for justice against
brutality, and to overcome it and to invite others to endeavor to
overcome it by brute force of the lowest ruffians in London was in my
opinion the act either of a mad woman or of a dastard. It became
evident to me that our organization must separate itself entirely from
all cooperation with people who would resort to such weapons…. It
is not by such weapons as these that we stand to win. They have
helped the antis and discouraged our friends. The crimes committed
in Ireland by Home Rulers stopped Home Rule and if Women
Suffragists embark on crime as propaganda, they will stop Women’s
Suffrage.83

Fawcett’s criticism of militant suffragism, though rather

dramatically stated, got to the heart of the matter: the Irish had been
successful in forcing the Home Rule issue upon Parliament because they had
been able completely to disrupt political authority in Ireland; but the
suffragettes did not have any political hold on Parliament, and their stones
and “rushes” would only antagonize the Members into opposing women’s
suffrage.

In the autumn of 1908, the NUWSS began to hear frequent

complaints about the behavior of the suffragettes. Lloyd George maintained
that the conduct of these women was making the advocacy of their cause
impossible,84 and Herbert Gladstone, whom the NUWSS regarded as a
friend of the cause, showed signs of withdrawing his support from the
movement. Lady Frances Balfour, describing a conversation she had with the
Home Secretary, wrote to Fawcet: “He was a rather keen suffragist, but I see
his trials with the militants have a good deal upset him.”85 Undoubtedly many
members of the House of Commons used militancy as a convenient excuse for
opposing women’s suffrage.86 Yet, many MP’s were shocked by the behavior
of the suffragettes: it was not only unlawful and un-English, it was
unwomanly.87 Many politicians could accept and sympathize with the
militants as martyrs and sufferers, but they suspected and disliked the
spectacle of women behaving as aggressors: this violated the Victorian
teachings which shaped their conception of women. In deciding to use
violence to retaliate against the authorities, the WSPU abandoned its role as
innocent sacrificial victim; at the same time it forfeited the moral authority
which had been instrumental in helping the militants to win support for the
suffrage movement.

But beyond these moral qualms, the NUWSS was dismayed by the
political insensitivity of the new militancy, and felt that it must firmly and
publicly disavow the militants in order to save the suffrage cause. To this
end, in November 1908, the NUWSS sent all MP’s and the press a letter
which stated its disapproval of militant methods. The NUWSS, while
strongly objecting to the violent actions of the suffragettes, noted that delays
and disappointments had encouraged militancy. It made a plea for reason:
“The justice and expediency of our cause is not defeated by the unwisdom of
its advocates; nor should the steady, argumentative agitation of 40 years be
now ignored because, in the disappointment of long-deferred hopes, methods
of anger and impatience and even of violence, have been resorted to.”88

At this time many members of the WSPU were also members of the
NUWSS. Apparently such a practice was not regarded as inconsistent, and
both the militant and constitutional societies gladly accepted these “dual
members.” In November 1908, the antagonisms that emerged at the annual
meeting of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage (LSWS) drastically
altered this policy. At that meeting, four members of the LSWS who were
also members of the WSPU presented resolutions urging the NUWSS to
adopt the anti-Liberal by-election policy and also requesting the LSWS not to
allow members of its executive committee to hold office in party
organizations. The executives of the NUWSS and LSWS interpreted these
resolutions as an attempt on the part of the WSPU to capture the LSWS. The
meeting was stormy. Fawcett, speaking against the resolution, declared that if
the members could not be loyal to the NUWSS policies, they should resign:
“If you have not any confidence in this society leave it. If we cannot
command your confidence we do not ask for your money. I say this simply
‘erring sisters depart in peace,’ but we are not going to be dragged into
unlawful methods which the great majority disapprove of.”89
 Both resolutions were defeated, but the incident, which was covered
in the press, engendered hostility on both sides of the suffrage movement.
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence resigned her membership in the LSWS in
protest against Fawcett’s criticisms of the suffragettes: “I cannot but be glad
to think that the Women’s Social and Political Union has shown the example
of sex loyalty and of honour to opponents that I think all other societies
would do well scrupulously to observe.”90 The meeting signaled that the
policy of mutual toleration was at an end, and that a period of mistrust and
recrimination had begun.

In the months that followed this meeting, the division between the
NUWSS and the WSPU deepened. The militants’ actions in September 1909
brought matters to a crisis. On September 5, three members of the WSPU
accosted Prime Minister Asquith as he was leaving church, and later that
same day the same women pursued Asquith and Gladstone on the golf course.
That evening, stones were thrown through a window of a house in which
Asquith was dining. Twelve days later, in Birmingham, while Asquith was
speaking at Bingley Hall, Mary Leigh and Charlotte Marsh, members of the
WSPU, who had positioned themselves on a roof near the hall, interrupted
the meeting by chopping up slates from the roof and hurling them down on the
police and then on Asquith’s motor car.91 Asquith was not injured, but
Parliament was outraged. (The incident also resulted in the policy of forcible
feeding.) York Stanger, an ardent suffragist, told the NUWSS that the
militants’ actions were “most seriously imperiling” our cause.92 Gladstone,
noting that the WSPU’S tactics were “intensely exasperating without being
effective,” said that these actions were destroying any chance for settlement
of the women’s suffrage question: “All these militant tactics, at any rate in
their later development, are not only lost labour, but now are most seriously
putting obstacles in the way for a solution. I am afraid the outlook is
thoroughly bad.”93

For both moral and political reasons, the NUWSS was appalled by
the Birmingham violence. It appeared that there was no limit to the damage
which the militants were prepared to inflict on persons and on property. The
suffragettes’ actions had already stiffened many MP’s’ spines against
women’s suffrage and if, as seemed possible, a member of the Government
were hurt, there would be no chance of votes for women. Lady Frances
Balfour, in a letter to Fawcett, commented, “I begin to understand what
Parnell felt when his followers murdered Lord Frederick.”94 Other members
of the executive shared her sentiments. Editorials in Common Cause
lamented that violence was damaging the suffrage movement: the WSPU was
seeking notoriety, but it was not working for the good of the cause.95

The NUWSS did all it could to make public its disapproval of

militant methods and to remind the public and the Government that the
majority of those who worked for women’s suffrage were not militant. The
NUWSS Council passed a resolution which condemned the use of violence
and distributed copies of the statement to all Members of Parliament and to
the press: “The Council of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies
strongly condemns the use of violence in political propaganda and, being
convinced that the way of advancing the cause of women’s suffrage is by
energetic, law-abiding propaganda, reaffirms its adherence to constitutional
principles.”96 At the 1909 annual meeting of the LSWS, the suffragists again
emphasized their determination to separate themselves from the WSPU by
passing a resolution which required all members of the society to pledge to
support only “lawful and constitutional methods” and to accept the NUWSS
by-election policy.97

By the end of 1909 all semblance of tolerance and goodwill

between the NUWSS and the WSPU had vanished. The alliance had never
been based on very solid ground, and disagreements over tactics and issues
of morality were inherent in the fundamentally different political outlooks of
the two organizations, as well as in their different attitudes toward the male
establishment and, not the least, their temperaments.

The WSPU was skeptical of the NUWSS’ faith in the Liberal party
and of its close ties to, and reverence for, the political establishment. The
roots of the WSPU lay in the industrial North, far distant from the Houses of
Parliament; in a sense the Pankhursts, unlike Fawcett and her colleagues,
always remained “outsiders” in parliamentary circles.98 It was always clear
that the leaders of the WSPU were much less cautious, less patient, less
amenable to Parliament—and to the standards of society—than were the
leaders of the NUWSS. Among many of the suffragettes, there seemed to be
an almost religious, single-minded devotion to the cause, a devotion which in
their eyes would justify both militancy and outrageous, unfeminine behavior.
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence’s letter welcoming Lady Constance Lytton into
the WSPU is a good example of the tendency:

I do not know, and am quite content not to know, what is it that you
have to do. But the ruler of human destiny knows. … you have been
led to us, for the fulfillment of your own life, for the accomplishment
of your destiny and for the working out of a new deliverance for
humanity…. you have been appointed, just as the little working girl
Annie Kenney in the factory was appointed just as we have each with
our various experiences and powers been appointed to work out the
divine will with regard to a new stage in the evolution of the human
race—as I realize this, I am filled with worship and wonder and
thanks and joy—for the song of Mary the Mother of the Messiah has
been put into our mouths. What does the pain and the sorrow and the
labour and the weariness matter? How little it weighs in the sum of
things.99

The NUWSS could not understand the millenarian zeal which the
WSPU brought to the suffrage cause, nor could it understand the militants1
antipathy toward men. Fawcett and her colleagues—and many of the
members of the affiliated societies—had grown up with liberal-minded men
who had no wish to degrade women. They welcomed the backing of men like
Bertrand Russell and encouraged men to join their organization. The WSPU,
and particularly its leaders, Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurt, distrusted
men and were convinced of their “deliberate oppression and sexual
exploitation of women.”100 They did not welcome men into the WSPU, and
they made sexual separatism one of the prominent characteristics of the
organization.101 This attitude clearly had a great deal to do with their mistrust
of Parliament and, in particular, the desire to oppose it rather than try to work
with it.

Thus, although a mutual goal for a time brought the two groups
together in apparent harmony, differences of opinion on basic issues were
inevitable. Up until 1908, even though some differences were already
evident, the NUWSS, partly because it needed the support of the WSPU and
partly also because it felt a genuine admiration for the way in which the
WSPU had resuscitated the suffrage movement and shaped the policies and
development of its own organization, hesitated to criticize. The security of
increased membership (see Table 1) and an established national identity
gave the NUWSS the confidence to pursue an independent policy and disown
tactics which it not only disapproved of from a moral point of view but also
believed to be politically damaging.

Table 1a

Growth of NUWSS, ISWS, and NESWS, 1907–1909

1907 1908 1909

National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societiesb
Number of societies 31 70 130
Annual income £1,194-1-6 £2,738-6- £3,385-13-9
11
Total membership 5,836 8,291 13,429

London Society for Women’s Suffragec

Number of societies 36 44 34
Annual income £1,031-1-2 £1,307-15- £2,275-0-6
6
Total membership Unknown 2,563 3,111
North of England Society for Women’s
Suffraged
Number of societies 4 8 13
Annual income £209-9-10- £1,102-0-5 £1,099-2-0-
% ½
Total membership 219 1,060 1,740

a“Information contained in this table is compiled from the Annual Reports for the years 1907,
1908 and 1909 of the NUWSS, the LEWS, and the North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage.
b“The annual income of the NUWSS included only those funds directly received at
headquarters, and did not include any of the incomes of the branch societies. In 1909, for example, the
income of the branch societies was estimated to be £8,000–10,000. This was only an estimate, as not all
the societies sent their financial returns to headquarters. Only those societies that were directly affiliated
to the NUWSS were listed as belonging to the NUWSS. The London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
for example, had thirty-four branches in 1909; yet, only the London Society was listed as belonging to
the NUWSS.
c“The decline between 1908 and 1909 in the number of societies belonging to the ISWS is
accounted for by the fact that these societies had become directly affiliated with the NUWSS.
dOther affiliates of the NUWSS also grew in size. For example, between 1908 and 1909 the
Edinburgh Society increased in membership from 400 to 700, and the Brighton Society grew from 95 to
450 members. National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report. 1909, p.12.

Although the NUWSS had become increasingly critical of the

WSPU’s tactics, disapproval of militant methods did not signify that the
NUWSS approved of the Government’s handling of the militants. The
NUWSS consistently maintained that the Government’s delays and evasions
had brought about the militants’ actions. As Lady Frances Balfour wrote to
Herbert Gladstone: “Asquith always thinks he can have a day-to-day hand-
to-mouth policy in this matter. Every time it [the enfranchisement of women]
is put off the strength of the movement grows.”102

The NUWSS criticized the Government for treating the suffragettes

as second-class misdemeanants.103 It believed that the Government should
recognize that these women were fighting for a political goal, and as such,
should be treated as political protestors and put in the first class of prisoners.
Fawcett noted the irony of the spectacle of a Liberal Government doing battle
with the women, when it had managed to turn its back on the outrages in
Ireland: “There is a certain element of humour afforded by the spectacle of
those who condoned every kind of ferocity and crime in pursuit of Irish
Home Rule being driven almost beside themselves by the much milder
degree of criminality which has been perpetrated by the suffragettes.”104 She
felt that the Liberals should have learned that punishment and coercion could
offer no final solution to the suffrage problem.

In placing itself between the Government and the militants, and not
siding with either of the concerned parties, the NUWSS acted very astutely.
Although Members of Parliament and the public at large could condemn the
militants’ actions, it was impossible to praise the Government’s treatment of
the suffragettes. In an age in which women were still put on a pedestal, it was
difficult for many people to stomach the idea of a woman, particularly a
“respectable” woman of middle or upper class background, suffering the
indignities of prison. The institution of forcible feeding made it even more
difficult to defend the Government’s handling of the situation.105 On the other
hand, the militants were destroying property, disrupting public order, and, in
some cases, inflicting personal injury. Did women deserve the vote if they
behaved in such a manner? The NUWSS answer was to cry a plague on both
their houses. Its policy was to depict the militants as a minority group whose
actions, although reprehensible, were in no way characteristic of the
mainstream of the suffrage movement. Its message was simple: by refusing to
give votes to women until militancy stopped, Parliament was paying too
much attention to the suffragettes and was unfairly punishing the
constitutional suffragists for the deeds committed by their militant sisters.
With good reason, the NUWSS saw itself as the representative of solid,
upstanding, law-abiding women who desired the vote and were innocent
victims caught in the cross-fire between the militants and the Government.106

By the autumn of 1909, the prospects for the enactment of women’s

suffrage appeared to be very bleak; under the pressure of events, much of the
optimism which, in 1906, had infused the NUWSS had faded. Within three
years the political fortunes of the suffrage movement had, in many respects,
taken a turn for the worse: the Prime Minister was hostile to women’s
suffrage, and both the Liberal Party and the Labour Party seemed inclined to
press for adult suffrage, if they were going to consider any sort of franchise
reform at all.107 In addition, the Government had begun to do battle with the
House of Lords, and under the circumstances a Government-sponsored
franchise bill seemed unlikely before the next election.108

Militancy, too, had begun to exert an adverse effect on the fortunes

of the suffrage movement. Whereas in 1906 the actions of the WSPU had
abetted the cause of women’s suffrage, by 1909 the increasingly violent
behavior of the suffragettes had begun to alienate many former supporters,
particularly in Parliament, which in December 1909 passed a Public
Meetings Bill purposely designed to control militancy.109 Equally important,
the issue of militancy had divided the suffrage movement itself and vitiated
its strength.

The only consolation that the NUWSS could draw from this
generally unencouraging state of affairs was the realization that, as an
organization, it had made considerable gains between 1906 and 1909. It was
larger, stronger, and more centralized than ever, and its operations were more
diversified and efficient. It had its own offices, an administrative staff, a staff
of organizers, a literature department, and a newspaper. Much of the growth
had been indirectly stimulated by the WSPU, and this growth had made it
possible for the NUWSS to stand on its own against the WSPU. Furthermore,
it did appear that women’s suffrage, as an issue, had begun to make an impact
on the nation. Still, the fact remained that, by the end of 1909, neither the
NUWSS nor the WSPU had found a way of convincing the Liberals to
sponsor a measure to enfranchise women. The extraparliamentary activities
of the suffrage organizations had not secured the passage of a measure of
women’s suffrage, and it now appeared unlikely that women’s suffrage could
ever be rescued from this parliamentary impasse.

_________________________

Notes
1Sylvia Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement, p. 168.

2Andrew Rosen, Rise Up, Wbmen! (London, 1974), p. 57.

3George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York, 1961), p. 144.

4Ruth Freeman Claus, “Militancy in the English and American Woman Suffrage Movements”
(Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1975), pp. 34–47.

5F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, Fate Has Been Kind (London, 1943), p. 68.

6Pankhurst, p. 223.

7The Pankhursts’ association with the ILP influenced their decision to engage in militancy.
Demonstrations, followed by imprisonments, followed by processions when the prisoners were released,
had been very useful to the ILP in dramatizing its cause and gaining publicity. The Pankhursts were
very aware of this and drew on the tactical experiences of the ILP. Rosen, pp. 19–23.
In the nineteenth century, pressure groups such as the National Reform League had held
processions and mass meetings to popularize their demands. Unlike the ILP, however, they do not seem
to have used imprisonments as a tactical weapon to create sympathy for their cause. Alexander Wilson,
“The Suffrage Movement,” in Pressure from Without, pp. 80–104.
 8On October 13, 1905, Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney, representatives of the
WSPU, interrupted Sir Edward Grey who was speaking at a Liberal meeting in the Free Trade Hall,
Manchester, and asked him when the Liberals intended to give votes to women. As a result of this
action, the two women were sentenced to seven days in prison. This incident marked the start of
militancy by the WSPU. Undoubtedly, it attracted new recruits into the suffrage movement. But even
though this and subsequent disturbances created by the WSPU in 1905 and 1906 helped to enlist support
for the suffrage movement, they did not affect the policies of the NUWSS. Until October 1906, the files
of the NUWSS and the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage contain only a small amount of
correspondence relating to the WSPU’s activities. After October 1906, this is not the case.

9One of the eleven arrested was Anne Cobden Sanderson, a daughter of Richard Cobden
and a friend of Fawcett’s—an additional reason for NUWSS reaction.

10The Times, October 27, 1906.

11As quoted in Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, My Part in a Changing World (London, 1938),

p. 171.

12Ibid.

13Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Elizabeth Robins to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, October 27, 1906. Eva Gore-Booth, on the other hand, asked Fawcett not to support the
actions of the WSPU, as the militants’ behavior was repugnant to working women: “There is no class in
the community who has such good reason for objecting and does so strongly object to shrieking and
throwing yourself on the floor and struggling and kicking as does the average working woman, whose
dignity is very real to them. … It is not the fact of demonstrations or even violence that is offensive to
them, it is being mixed up with and held accountable as a class for educated and upper class women
who kick, shriek, bite, and spit.” Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, Eva Gore-Booth
to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, October 25, 1906.

14See, for example, the Fawcett Library Autograph Collection, vol. 1, B2, Edith Kerwood to
Frances Sterling, October 26, 1906, Fawcett Library, London (hereafter cited as FLAC).

15Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, October
29, 1906, Fawcett Library, London.

16The Times, December 12, 1906.

17Josephine Butler’s success in obtaining the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act was one
source of inspiration to the NUWSS, and this example was often cited as proof of the efficacy of moral
force. In 1907, for example, Frances Sterling, secretary of the NUWSS, wrote a long letter to Maud
Arncliffe-Sennett, a member of the WSPU, in which she discussed the policies of the NUWSS and
WSPU and expressed her admiration for Josephine Butler: “After that lesson it would take me a great
deal of despair before I should adopt the new methods.” British Museum, London, Arncliffe-Sennett
Collection, vol. 1, Frances Sterling to Maud Arncliffe-Sennett, April 12, 1907.
 18Representatives from the thirty-one societies in the NUWSS met in London on January 28,
1907 to hear the draft of the new constitution. National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual
Report, 1907, p. 6.

19The number of delegates that each society sent to the Council was determined by the size
of the society. Societies numbering 20 to 50 members were allotted one delegate each; societies of 50 to
100 members were allotted two delegates. One additional delegate was allotted for every fifty members
beyond 100.

20Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage,
February 21, 1907; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., 1907, passim; Fawcett Library, London

21National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1907, p. 6. The WSPU had
also adopted a new con stitution , in October 1906, which made many changes in organizational
structure in an effort to make the Union more democratic. These changes, however, were never put into
effect. See Rosen, pp. 72–73.

22Constance Rover is wrong when she implies that the NUWSS believed that a private
member’s bill could pass the House of Commons and that the NUWSS “preferred” this type of bill
because it kept women’s suffrage from becoming a party issue. Cf. Rover, Women’s Suffrage and
Party Politics in Great Britain, 1866–1914, pp. 68–69, and Ray Strachey, Millicent Garret Fawcett, p.
249.

23The leaders of both the Labour and Conservative parties had refused the Pankhursts’
request to sponsor a women’s suffrage measure. Pankhurst, p. 204; Rosen, p. 94.

24The Times, February 11, 1907. Jane, Lady Strachey, mother of Lytton Strachey, was a long-
time suffragist and president of the Women’s Local Government Society. Edith Pechey-Phipson was
one of the first women to enter the English medical profession. Both women were on the executive of
the NUWSS.

25Ray Strachey, The Cause, p. 305. The processions of the WSPU had been on a much
smaller scale.

26National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1907, p. 8.

27H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 170, March 8, 1907, c. 1102.

28Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, “Suggestions for work in
support of the Women’s Suffrage Bill,” February 1907, Fawcett Library, London.

29H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 170, March 8, 1907, c. 1102.

30Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was one of those who thought the bill was too limited. He,
and others, maintained that the bill would not enfranchise many working women and that the 1,500,000
women who would be given votes would belong to the middle and upper classes. Philip Snowden (Lab.,
Blackburn) denied this, quoting statistics from a survey which the ILP had made in 1904. These
statistics, based on reports from 50 districts, showed that 82.4 percent of the women voters on the
municipal register belonged to the working class.
Though Campbell-Bannerman’s fears were echoed by other Liberals, both in this debate and
in subsequent debates on women’s suffrage, in many cases the contention that the bill was
“undemocratic” was not a matter of sincere conviction but rather a convenient excuse for not
supporting the suffrage issue. The fact that many members of the Labour Party backed these
supposedly “narrow” bills also casts doubt on the motives of these Liberal champions of working class
women.

31Emmeline Pankhurst, My Own Story (London, 1914), p. 18.

32Women’s Franchise, July 4, 1907.

33In 1907 ten of the twenty members of the NUWSS executive committee were in some
way connected with the Liberal Party. Two members, Isabella Ford and Ethel Snowden, were linked
with the Labour Party. Only one member, Lady Strachey, was affiliated with the Conservative Party.

34In fact, the ILP survey of 1904 had shown that this was not the case. And, in the 1907
debate on the Dickinson Bill, Dickinson claimed that in his constituency, St. Pancras North, 60 percent
of the women on the municipal register belonged to the working class. H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 170, March 8,
1907, c. 1108. Neither of these surveys was solid evidence, of course, but the Liberals who argued that
only wealthy women would be enfranchised offered no evidence at all.

35The By-Election Policies of the NUWSS and the WSPU Compared, NUWSS pamphlet
(London, 1907).

36These figures have been computed on the basis of voting information provided in Brian
Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 28–29. The Liberals, on the average, contributed 46.1 percent of the
votes against women’s suffrage, while the Conservatives contributed 51 percent. The votes of the
Labour Party and the Irish Nationalist Party make up the remaining percentage.

37Arthur Balfour, the head of the Conservative Party, was a proponent of women’s suffrage
but not an ardent supporter. Both his sisters-in-law, Lady Frances Balfour and Lady Betty Balfour,
complained of his lack of enthusiasm for the cause. FLAC, vol. 1, Bi, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent
Garrett Fawcett, September 22, 1898, Fawcett Library, London.

38National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1907, p. 11.

39At Hexham a Liberal, R. D. Holt, defeated Colonel Bates. Three new women’s suffrage
committees were formed at Hexham, for example. NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., March 22, 1907, in
Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, Fawcett Library,
London.
 40Report of the Annual Council of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,
October 25, 1907, in Minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Fawcett Library, London.

41W. S. B. McLaren outlined the reasons behind the NUWSS decision to run a candon in a
letter that appeared in The Times on May 9, 1907. On May 17, 1907, The Times printed a letter from
Bertha Mason which also discussed the reasons behind the NUWSS decision to sponsor Russell’s
candidacy.

42The NUWSS executive committee decided that it wanted its candidate to be a suffragist, a
Liberal, and a Free Trader. Russell was chosen because he met these qualifications. NUWSS, Ex. com.
mins., May 1, 1907, in minutes of the executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Fawcett Library, London. Russell’s Liberalism was a handicap in a Conservative constituency like
Wimbledon, and the NUWSS would have been wiser to run a Conservative, protectionist suffragist, as
this would have been a more dramatic way of showing that it opposed Chaplin only because of his
views on women’s suffrage. The women’s suffrage issue was overshadowed by the candidates’
disagreements over protectionism versus free trade. One of the lessons learned at Wimbledon was to
select candidates who held the same political views, and belonged to the same political party as their
antisuffragist opponents.

43London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1907 (London, 1907), p. 8; National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1907, p. 52. The NUWSS had come to an
agreement with the WSPU that it would stay out of the Stepney by-election if the WSPU would agree
to stay out of the Wimbledon election. See NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 3, 1907, in minutes of the
executive committee of the Central Society for Women’s Suffrage, Fawcett Library, London. The
NUWSS raised a special Wimbledon Election Fund to cover the cost of the election. National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1907, pp. 38–39, 52.

44The Times, May 16, 1907.

45National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1908 (London, 1909), pp.
14–17, and Annual Report, 1909 (London, 1910), pp. 16–19. These by-elections were: West Hull,
Ashburton, Worcester, South Leeds, Hastings, Peckham, West Derby, N. W. Manchester, Shef field-
Dewsbury, Wolverhampton (Shrops.), Newport, Pudsey (Yorks), Pembroke, Shoreditch, Haggerston,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Chelmsford, Taunton, Forfar, Central Glasgow, South Edinburgh, Hawick,
Croydon, East Edinburgh, Sheffield-Attercliffe, Stratford-on-Avon, Cleveland, Mid-Derby, East
Edinburgh, Dumfries, Derby-High Peak, and Bermondsey.
The NUWSS did propaganda work at fifteen by-elections in 1908. It supported W. R. Warren
(Lib.) at Haggerston; he was defeated by the Hon. R. Guinness (Cons.). It opposed Sir George Bartley
(Cons.) at West Hull; he was defeated by the Hon. Guy Wilson (Lib.). In 1909 the NUWSS did
propanganda work at eleven by-elections. It supported G. Falconer (Lib.) at Taunton; he was defeated
by the Hon. W. R. Peel (Cons.). It supported J. W. Gulland (Lib.) at Dumfries; he defeated J. B.
Duncan (Cons.).

46See National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1908, p. 8, and Annual
Report, 1909, p. 13. In some cases the member societies employed their own organizers. For example,
in 1909, the North of England Society employed an organizer and an assistant organizer. North of
England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1909 (Manchester, n.d.), p. 10.

47The idea originated with the North of England Society’s secretary, Kathleen Courtney.
Many of these divisional books are contained in the Correspondence of the London Society for
Women’s Suffrage, Fawcett Library, London.

48London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1908 (London, 1909), pp. 8–9.

49On October 23, 1908, for example, the North of England Society held a huge meeting in the
Free Trade Hall, and on the following day it sponsored a procession. Manchester Guardian, October 24,
1908.

50Women’s Franchise and Common Cause give a brief weekly summary of the meetings
sponsored by the member societies of the NUWSS. The Annual Reports of the NUWSS also list ,
although by no means completely, the meetings sponsored by the local societies.

51The Times, November 21, 1908. Students at Newnham College, Cambridge, originated the
idea of the “caravan tours.” National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1908, p. 17.

52H. C. Deb, 4s, vol. 185, February 28, 1908, cc. 212–87. The provisions of the bill were
much the same as those of Dickinson’s b ill of March 1907. The NUWSS had taken the usual steps to
secure a successful reading on the bill , and the societies had been asked to write to their MP’s about
supporting the bill.

53Only 29 Conservatives voted for the measure, as opposed to 191 Liberals. Those Members
of the Government who supported the B ill included Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary), David Lloyd
George (president o f the Board o f Trade), John Morley (Secretary for India), R. B. Haldane
(Secretary for War), John Burns (president o f the Local Government Board), Sydney Buxton
(Postmaster-General), and Herbert Gladstone (Home Secretary). Gladstone even spoke in support o f
the b ill. The Members of the Government who opposed it included Herbert Asquith (Chancellor o f the
Exchequer) and Lewis Harcourt (First Commissioner o f Works). H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 185, February 28,
1908, cc. 283–87.

54Roy Jenkins, Asquith: Portrait of a Man and an Era (New York, 1964), pp. 247–48.

55Asquith had made his first important speech opposing women’s enfranchisement in 1892.
On April 27, 1892, he spoke against Sir Albert Rollit’s (Cons., Islington, S.) Parliamentary Franchise
(Extension to Women) Bill. H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 3, April 27, 1892, c. 1510.

56Interview with Dame Margery Corbett-Ashby, December 4, 1974, London. Asquith argued
that women “operate by personal influence, and not by associated or representative action , and that
their natural sphere is not the turmoil and dust of politics , but the circle of social and domestic life.” H.
C. Deb. 4s, vol. 3, April 27, 1892, c. 1513.

57Jenkins, p. 247.
 58As quoted in H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a Post-
Gladstonian Elite (Oxford, 1973), p. 140.

59Ibid., p. 134.

60Women’s Franchise, February 6, 1908.

61Even Jenkins finds it amazing and incomprehensible that Asquith was willing to oppose both
the majority of his Cabinet and the majority of his party over the suffrage issue (Jenkins, p. 248). This
contravened normal political practices.

62Women’s Franchise, February 27, 1908. Isabella Ford, a former member of the ILP
executive, was a principal speaker for the NUWSS.

63Philip Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography (London, 1934), vol. 1, pp. 282–93.

64The Times, January 23, 1908.

65Ibid, May 21, 1908. Asquith had become Prime Minister in April 1908.

66In theory the term “adult suffrage” meant votes for all male and female adults. Asquith’s
proposal for adult suffrage really amounted to full adult male suffrage: he wished to enfranchise some
four and a half million men who, either because they could not meet one of the seven franchise
qualifications of the Act of 1884, or who could not register because they had not resided continuously in
the same place for twelve months, could not vote. Asquith intended to introduce a Government bill
which would enfranchise all adult males. The bill could be amended to include females, but the
Government would do nothing to promote such an amendment. In fact, given Asquith’s opposition to
women’s suffrage, it was certain he would work against such an amendment.

67For a discussion of the connection between women’s suffrage and electoral reform see
David Morgan, Suffragists and Liberals: The Politics of Woman Sufrage in England (Totowa, N.J.,
1975), pp. 35–50.

68FLAC, vol. 1, C, Bertrand Russell to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, May 21, 1908, Fawcett
Library, London.

69Women’s Franchise, June 4, 1908.

70The Queen, August 1, 1908.

71Other women’s suffrage societies shared the NUWSS reaction to Asquith’s

announcement. In October 1908 the women’s suffrage societies sent a joint appeal to Asquith which
stated their objections to his plan for electoral reform and asked him to include women’s suffrage in any
proposed Reform Bill. The Times, October 10, 1908.
 72On March 19, 1909, Geoffrey Howard (Lib., Cumb. N.) introduced an Adult Suffrage Bill
for its second reading. The bill, which abolished plural voting, would have given votes to all men and
women who met a short residential qualification. Howard was the son of Rosalind, Countess of Carlisle,
who was prominent in temperance reform and in Liberal politics; he was the first cousin of Bertrand
Russell. H. C. Deb., 2nd vol. of session 1909, March 19, 1909, cc. 1360–1429; The Amberley Papers,
edited by Bertrand and Patricia Russell (London, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 26–27.

73FLAC, vol. 1, D, Circular from the NUWSS, February 23, 1909, Fawcett Library, London.

74Ibid. if the Stanger Bill were amended in this manner, married women would be
enfranchised as joit occupiers and would not have to meet a separate property qualification. This in itself
was a major concession on the part of NUWSS, which had always been reluctant to tamper with
qualifications. The existing qualifications were unfavorable to most married women because they could
not qualify as joint occupiers with their husbands. The NUWSS felt that once the qualification
requirements were changed, two separate issues were being dealt with: women’s suffrage and
qualification laws. It felt this would complicate an already difficult situation, and diffuse the focus of the
suffrage movement. Additionally, it might detract Conservative support, since the Conservatives were
most reluctant to alter the laws relating to qualifications.

75The Times, March 14, 1909.

76H. C. Deb., 2nd vol. of session 1909, March 19, 1909, c. 1429.

77Ibid., c. 1384.

78The majority included: 109 Lib., 28 Lab., 20 Nat. The minority included: 46 Lib., 74 Cons., 2
Nat. The vote on Stanger’s Bill in 1908 had been as follows: For—191 Lib., 29 Cons., 21 Nat., 29 Lab.,
1 Soc. Against—49 Lib., 28 Cons., 14 Nat., 1 Lab. An Analysis of Voting on Women’s Suffrage Bills in
the House of Commons Since 1908, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

79H. C. Deb, 2nd vol. of session 1909, March 19, 1909, c. 1429.

80British Museum, Arncliffe-Sennett Collection, vol. 7, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Maud

Arncliffe-Sennett, June 16, 1909.

81FLAC, vol. 1, D, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, February 4, 1909,
Fawcett Library, London.

82On June 30, 1908, Edith New and Mary Leigh threw stones through the windows of No. 10
Downing Street. This was the first act of damage committed by members of the WSPU. E. Sylvia
Pankhurst, p. 286. By October, the WSPU felt that it had exhausted the possibilities of peaceful protest.
See Rosen, pp. 105–6, 110.

83Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Miss
Blackwell, February 22, 1909.
 84Women’s Franchise, October 8, 1908. At a meeting of the Women’s Liberal Federation on
December 8, 1908, Lloyd George declared that only a reaction against the militants’ actions could
prevent the enactment of a measure for women’s suffrage. An Account of David Lloyd George’s
Speech to the Women’s Liberal Federation, December 5, 1908, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

85FLAC, vol. 20, 2, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, November 11, 1908,
Fawcett Library, London. This was probably particularly galling to the NUWSS, because Gladstone was
one of its best contacts in the Cabinet. Lady Frances Balfour was a friend of the Home Secretary’s,
and frequently talked with him about the suffrage movement. In the autumn of 1908 (before the “rush”
on the House of Commons), she had persuaded him to talk to Asquith about receiving a deputation from
the NUWSS. Undoubtedly, the NUWSS feared that the militants’ actions had ruined these delicate
negotiations. FLAC, vol. 1, 6, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, October 3, 1908,
Fawcett Library, London. See also British Museum, Papers of Herbert, Viscount Gladstone, Add. Mss.
46066, Lady Frances Balfour to Herbert Gladstone, November 6, 1908.

86Even before the militants had begun to retaliate against the Government, the House of
Commons had allowed the phenomenon of militancy to distract its attention from the issue of women’s
suffrage. The discussion of tactics threatened to overwhelm the discussion of the principle of women’s
suffrage. See, for example, H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 170, March 8, 1907, c. 1102, and vol. 185, February 28,
1908, c. 219.

87The Daily Mail coined the term “suffragette” on January 10, 1906. The word quickly
became public property and was used to distinguish the militants from the constitutionalists. The latter
were referred to as “suffragists.”

88The Times, November 12, 1908.

89The “erring sisters” were Dr. Flora Murray, Mrs. Henry Nevinson, Mrs. Hylton Dale, and
Dr. Louisa Garrett Anderson. Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Account
of the Annual Meeting, November 10, 1908, Fawcett Library, London. Anderson, who was Fawcett’s
niece, had for some time been trying to persuade Fawcett to amalgamate the NUWSS with the WSPU.
Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Louisa Garrett Anderson to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, January 22, 1908. See also Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Account of the Annual Meeting, November 10, 1908, Fawcett Library, London.

90FLAC, vol. 20, 2, Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence to Miss McKee, November 20, 1908,
Fawcett Library, London.

91for a description of these incidents see Rosen, pp. 122–23.

92FLAC, vol. 1, F, York Stanger to Philippa Strachey, October 5, 1909, Fawcett Library,
London.

93British Museum, Papers of Herbert, Viscount Gladstone, Add. Mss. 46067, H. Gladstone to
Mrs. Richmond, September 22, 1909.
 94FLAC, vol. 1, F, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, October 4, 1909,
Fawcett Library, London.

95C. C., September 16 and October 14, 1909.

96FLAC, vol. 1, F, Resolution of the Cardiff Council sent by Philippa Strachey to H. York
Stanger, October 8, 1909.

97London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1909, p. 16.

98Interview with Dame Margery Corbett-Ashby, December 4, 1974, London.

99FLAC, vol. 20, 2, Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence to Lady Constance Lytton, October 28,
1908, Fawcett Library, London. For other examples of this millenarianism within the WSPU see Rosen,
pp. 196–200.

100Claus, p. 111.

101Ibid., pp. 87–89. Fawcett’s views were quite different: “I never believe in the possibility of
a sex war. Nature has seen after that; as long as mothers have sons and fathers daughters there can
never be a sex war. What draws men and women together is stronger than the brutality and tyranny
which drive them apart.” As quoted in Strachey, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, p. 232.

102British Museum, Papers of Herbert, Viscount Gladstone, Add. Mss. 46066, Lady Frances
Balfour to Herbert Gladstone, November 6, 1908.

103C. C., July 15, 1909. CAB 41/32/29, August 4, 1909, noted that: “If they [the suffragettes]
are made first class misdemeanants, the prisons would soon be full of them.”

104Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “The Women’s Suffrage Movement: Statesmanship or

Coercion?” Englishwoman, 4, no. 11 (December 1909):147.

105See Rosen, pp. 123–24.

106Fawcett, “The Women’s Suffrage Movement,” gives an argument along these lines.

107Asquith’s refusal to see a deputation from the NUWSS in the autumn of 1909 was
another indication that the Prime Minister had no intention of dealing with the suffrage question. C. C.,
October 7, 1909.

108Morgan, pp. 5–56.

109Ibid.
 CHAPTER III

1910: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE CONCILIATION BILL

Just as 1909 was drawing to a close, the announcement of a General

Election to be held in January, promised to improve the prospects for
women’s suffrage and release the suffrage issue from its parliamentary
limbo. Before the year 1910 was over, another General Election would give
the suffrage societies the chance to show that they could help to elect
Members who would support their cause in the House of Commons. More
important, the formation in the House of Commons that year of an all-party
Conciliation Committee for Women’s Suffrage, and the subsequent
appearance of a Conciliation Bill to enfranchise women, made many
suffragists, both inside and outside Parliament, guardedly optimistic that the
House of Commons would soon enact a measure for women’s suffrage. To
Fawcett and her colleagues it seemed as if a reversal had at last come about
in the fortunes of the suffrage movement; the opportunities that 1910
promised overshadowed the frustrations and disappointments of the
preceding years.

In December 1909, Asquith, Grey, and Churchill opened the election

campaign with significant statements on the suffrage issue and implied that
the new Parliament should have a mandate to act on the question.1 The
NUWSS interpreted these statements as an indication that women’s suffrage
was of some political importance as an issue to the Liberal Party, and it
made up its mind to use the election to lobby for women’s suffrage and to
show the Liberals that the electorate desired votes for women.

As in previous elections, the NUWSS concentrated much of its

energy on working to secure the return of MP’s who favored the enactment of
women’s suffrage.2 The local affiliates worked to obtain pledges of support
from candidates and canvassed for those who favored women’s suffrage, and
as in previous elections they used the campaign to publicize the aims of the
society and educate the constituencies about women’s suffrage.3 The
executive committee itself directed propaganda campaigns in certain
constituencies represented by prominent politicians, including the
constituencies of Asquith and Churchill. Hoping to capture the attention, if
not the support, of the Liberal and Labour Parties, it also took an active part
in promoting the candidacy of Arthur Bulley, who was contesting Rossendale
on a women’s suffrage platform. In all these campaigns the aim of the
NUWSS was to force the women’s suffrage issue upon both the general
public and the parliamentary candidates, as well as the parties generally.4

At the election one of the main objects of the NUWSS activity was
to collect signatures for a “voters” petition. The NUWSS hoped that the
signatures of actual electors would have an impact upon MP’s which those of
voteless women had not achieved. Furthermore, because MP’s were bound,
by parliamentary rules, to lay every petition from constituents before the
House, the Government would be repeatedly confronted by the voters’
demand for women’s suffrage. The petitions, which called upon the House of
Commons “without delay to pass into law a measure for the enfranchisement
of women,” were collected in over 290 constituencies, and totaled more than
280,000 signatures.5 The presentation of the petitions to the House of
Commons in March gave the voters, and the politicians as well, a fresh
reminder of the women’s demands.6

The NUWSS was well pleased with the results of their election
work: according to its own perhaps too optimistic estimate, 323 members of
the new House of Commons were in favor of some form of women’s
suffrage.7 Altogether, expenses for questioning, canvassing, and petitioning
by the NUWSS came to some £1,460; additional funds were expended by
local societies.8 Although the NUWSS tended to inflate the actual role that
the women’s suffrage issue played in the election—it was, in fact, only one
of a host of other issues, and prominent politicians maintained that the issue
of women’s suffrage was not one on which votes were won or lost—there
were nonetheless significant ramifications to the NUWSS’ role in the January
election.9 In important, though somewhat intangible, ways, the election
activity of the NUWSS abetted the fortunes of the suffrage movement—not
the least of which was that of reminding the electorate, and the parties, that
the women’s issue was still very much alive, and was in the hands of a large
force of dedicated, law-abiding women, who were working through normal
channels to obtain the vote.10 Under these circumstances, it became more
difficult to write off women’s suffrage as an issue espoused only by a few
militant members of the lunatic fringe. Additionally, the NUWSS’ advocacy
of the women’s issue must have pricked many voters’ consciences. Many
Liberals in particular were extremely unhappy that the party had turned its
back on what was often regarded as a Liberal cause. Especially after the
Government gave its approval to forcible feeding late in 1909, many Liberals
wondered how long Asquith would ignore the wishes of the party rank and
file. If such staunch and “respectable” Liberals as Lady Frances Balfour and
Eva McLaren opposed the Government’s handling of the suffrage issue, how
much longer could the Liberal Party continue to depend on the support of
other Englishwomen?

While the NUWSS election work was still in progress, plans were
under way for a scheme by which the women’s cause could be more
effectively promoted in the new Parliament. In January 1910, Fawcett began
to correspond with H. N. Brailsford about the formation of an all-party
committee which would draft a measure for women’s suffrage and guide it
through Parliament; this correspondence inaugurated an association that was
to have an impact on the women’s suffrage movement for the next four years.

Brailsford had long been a staunch advocate of women’s suffrage,

and, since the summer of 1909, he had been doing his best to try and
convince the Liberal Government either to give time for the passage of a
moderate suffrage bill which would get the support of all parties or to seek
an electoral mandate to extend the franchise to women.11 He had resigned his
position as leader-writer for the Daily News in October 1909 in protest
against the paper’s acquiescence in the Government’s decision to implement
forcible feeding. The arrest of Brailsford’s wife, Jane, a WSPU member and
a former member of the NUWSS, that same month further strengthened his
sympathies with the suffrage movement. He was appalled by the
Government’s brutal treatment of those arrested and full of admiration for the
courage and determination of the militants: “I am not a woman’s man. I am
indeed quite absurdly unsusceptible save in my wife’s case. But towards all
of these twelve, from the brave little mill girl to Lady Constance Lytton—a
saintly woman—I feel a reverence I could not exaggerate.”12 Although
Brailsford was closer to the militant wing of the suffrage movement, his
reputation as an advocate of women’s suffrage had spread to constitutionalist
circles, and in December 1909 the Scottish Women Graduates had invited
him to contest Dundee as a women’s suffrage candidate.13

By January 1910, Brailsford had abandoned hope that he could,

either on his own, or through the Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage, of
which he was a member, do anything to end the impasse over women’s
suffrage. Accordingly, he began to formulate a plan to work through the
political system for a nonpartisan solution to the suffrage problem: his idea
was to form a “conciliatiton committee” to promote the settlement of the
women’s suffrage question.14 Though he was not yet certain about the exact
organization of this committee, he realized that if it was to have any success,
it would need the support of the leading suffrage societies. Brailsford did not
know Fawcett personally, but he thought that her parliamentary contacts and
her political experience would make her a desirable ally and a natural
sounding board for his ideas.15

On January 18 Brailsford wrote to Fawcett, outlining his plan for

the new parliamentary committee:

I have some thought of attempting to found a Conciliation Committee

for Women’s Suffrage. My idea is that it should undertake the
necessary diplomatic work of promoting an early settlement. It will
not be large, and should consist of both men and women—the women
in touch with the existing societies, but not their more prominent
leaders, the men as far as possible not identified officially with either
party.16

Brailsford went on to say that he thought the committee should work

for a limited bill the first session and he asked Fawcett for her advice.
Fawcett, though delighted by Brailsford’s scheme, expressed doubts whether
members of militant and nonmilitant societies could happily co-exist on such
a committee, and the militants concurred with Fawcett’s diagnosis.17
Accordingly, in a letter dated January 25, Brailsford scrapped the idea of
having women on the committee and went on to give his thoughts as to how
the present political situation affected the women’s cause. He was by no
means overconfident. The prospect of the militants’ declaring a truce
undoubtedly paved the way for accord with the Government and heightened
the chances for success within Parliament.18 Additionally, the even balance
of political parties within the House of Commons was favorable to a
bipartisan compromise which would bring some limited form of women’s
suffrage: the Liberals had lost their majority in the House of Commons, and
any women’s suffrage measure would need the backing of members of all
parties if it were to pass.19 But though the timing seemed right, Brailsford
was uneasy about the grumblings of the adult suffragists:

The principle in my mind is a “settlement by consent,” i.e., by the

good will of all political parties. The relatively nice balance in the
new House seemed to me to favour this, and I know that a few men in
the front benches desire it.… The new situation seems to me
excessively difficult. There can be no reform Bill. Yet I fear that the
drift towards Adult Suffrage has gone so far that the absurdly named
“limited” Bill stands no chance unless a resolute concerted effort is
made to force it through.20

By February the prospects for a “settlement by consent” looked

more promising, and Brailsford’s plans had begun to materialize. He wrote
Fawcett informing her that Lord Lytton had assumed the chairmanship of the
newly formed Conciliation Committee, which now included a dozen
members from all parties: “At the start the M.P.’s wish to act alone, not to
invite more outsiders or women—the idea being that what is needed is
private negotiations among the various parties and their leaders. It is on this
we are concentrating.”21 Brailsford, now secretary of the Committee, gave
Fawcett a lengthy analysis of the parliamentary situation and asked her to use
her political influence to gain support for the committee: he particularly
wished her to convince Sir Charles McLaren, a prominent Liberal, to give
his backing to the newly formed group.22 Brailsford felt, correctly, that
women’s suffrage had become something of an embarrassment to the
Government and was one issue which all parties wished to settle, one way or
the other. In addition, the party distribution in the House of Commons favored
a nonparty solution of the women’s suffrage question; all parties in the House
had a suffragist wing, but no one party was in a position to dictate a
settlement on the issue. Therefore a nonpartisan “conciliation” bill for
women’s suffrage, introduced by a private member, might prove the best and
most acceptable way to end the controversy over women’s suffrage. The
main drawback to the plan appeared to be the intransigence of the Liberals:

Our chief obstacle is the decision of the Liberals to work on party

lines, or rather not to work on them. For though they won’t join with
others, they don’t propose to do anything themselves. I saw Mr.
Geoffrey Howard about this, and he assured me that their women
advisors were agreed in recommending party action, or as I prefer to
call it, inaction. He said that a deputation from the NUWSS had
attended their meeting and given this advice—or acquiesced in this
decision (I am not sure which). I hope he misrepresented the advice
given him. But it is very difficult to argue with reluctant Liberals
when they produce as an excuse for doing nothing, that the women
themselves want nothing done.23

Brailsford was anxious to find out whether Fawcett had, in fact, supported
the Liberals’ position, and he hoped to try and persuade her and the
organization she represented to convince Liberal suffragists to cooperate
with the Conciliation Committee.

Fawcett and her colleagues were only too glad to give Brailsford
any assistance possible. For the NUWSS Brailsford’s scheme came as a
godsend: the Conciliation Committee seemed to promise a way out of the
parliamentary impasse. By 1910 the NUWSS had grown weary of trying to
persuade the Liberal Government to introduce a women’s suffrage bill and
was pessimistic that it would ever convince Asquith to sponsor such a
measure; moreover, given the antisuffragist component in the Liberal Party,
the election results of 1910 made it unlikely that any private member’s bill
for women’s suffrage, if framed in the interests of Liberalism, would pass the
House of Commons. Thus the idea of a compromise bill, backed by members
of all parties, was very appealing.
 Having secured Fawcett’s blessing, Brailsford went ahead with
plans for the nascent Committee. By March the difficulties with the Liberals
seemed to have been overcome and MP’s of all parties were slowly joining
the Committee.24 Brailsford was optimistic that the Government would give
facilities for his bill, and he informed Fawcet that Grey and other ministers
were supporting the Committee’s efforts.25 The problem now was to devise a
bill that would be acceptable to suffragists of all partiies. Brailsford thought
that a bill modeled on Stanger’s 1908 measure to extend the franchise on the
basis of the existing male qualifications offered the simplest and most
acceptable solution. The Liberals, however, balked at this suggestion
because they feared “the property vote in the Counties”.26 They were
convinced that they would meet with electoral defeat if women were given
the vote according to the existing franchise. An adult suffrage measure had
some appeal for both the Liberals and Labour, but it, too, had severe
drawbacks: the House of Lords would undoubtedly reject it, and the Irish
Nationalists, who feared that it would involve redistribution of seats, would
probably oppose it. With their majority dependent on the Irish, the Liberals
could not afford to incur their hostility.27 In addition, many Liberal suffragists
were not prepared to support a measure that established an electorate in
which women outnumbered men. Furthermore, there was no Conservative
support for adult suffrage. If the Liberals feared the votes of wealthy women,
the Tories disliked the prospect of working men and women going to the
polls to vote for socialist legislation.28

Taking all these considerations into account, Brailsford decided that

the best chance for success was to offer a bill based on the municipal
qualification. The Liberals would accept it because “it omits the freeholder
and the ‘property’ and the Plural vote,” and the Conservatives would accept
it because it “does not enfranchise married women.”29 The question was
whether the suffrage societies would accept it: it was limited in scope and
did not fulfill the suffragists’ demand that women be enfranchised on the
same basis as men.

At the end of March, Brailsford wrote to Fawcett to ask her support

for the proposed bill: “I am now nearly sure that most of the Liberals,
including even the Adultists, would support a Bill on the basis of the present
municipal qualification. I know of course that would not satisfy you, and it
ought not to satisfy you, but I think you will be glad to welcome it as an
installment of justice.”30 Very much the pragmatist, Fawcett quickly replied
that she would warmly welcome any bill that had a reasonable chance for
success. From the Nuwss point of view, the most important criterion for a
bill was not how many women it would enfranchise, but how many votes it
would receive in the House. The proposed bill was not ideal. It withheld the
vote from women lodgers, women owners, and women university graduates,
and also from most married women, because husband and wife could not
qualify with respect to the same property. Furthermore, Fawcett pointed out,
the municipal basis for the parliamentary franchise had the drawback of not
being uniform for England, Scotland, and Wales, or for London and the
country. Nonetheless, she believed the Bill was a step in the right direction
and she gave her approval.31 Brailsford replied with thanks for her approval
and her criticism, and asked her to see that the Nuwss adopted a resolution
giving its support to the proposed measure. The Nuwss backing would be of
great value to the Conciliation Committee. He added that he was having
trouble convincing Arthur Balfour, the Conservative leader, to make public
his support for the measure. Although Balfour had privately stated that he
favored the proposal, he was now showing signs of indecision, “a state of
mind with which I imagine his friends are rather familiar.”32 Acting on
Brailsford’s request, the Nuwss executive committee quickly passed a
resolution in support of the proposed Conciliation Bill; at the same time it
firmly stated that it was not abandoning its ultimate goal of votes for all
women.33

Having secured the blessing of the Nuwss, and the more grudging
acquiescence of the WSPU, the Conciliation Committee went ahead with its
plans to introduce a suffrage bill based on the municipal franchise. On May
27, The Times announced that a Conciliation Committee composed of thirty-
six MP’s belonging to all parties planned to introduce a women’s suffrage
bill under the ten-minute rule. A few weeks before this the Committee had
issued the text of the proposed bill:

1. Every woman possessed of a household qualification, or of a ten

pound occupation qualification, within the meaning of The
Representation of the People Act (1884), shall be entitled to be
 registered as a voter, and when registered to vote for the county or
borough in which the qualifying premises are situate.

2. For the purposes of this Act, a woman shall not be disqualified by

marriage for being registered as a voter, provided that a husband and
wife shall not both be qualified in respect of the same property.

The memorandum that accompanied the bill noted that it represented a

“working compromise,” and as such, tried to conciliate all those who were
to some degree favorable to women’s suffrage. It was a cautious, moderate
measure which recommended it to Conservatives; yet, it excluded the
ownership and lodger qualifications which the Liberals and Labourites
disliked. The provisions of the bill were simple, so that no great demands
would be made on parliamentary time. Since all householders would be
given the vote, the bill would enfranchise working, as well as middle and
upper class, women.34 Moreover, the one million women who would receive
the parliamentary vote were not neophytes in matters of government, since
for the most part they already enjoyed the municipal franchise. The
Committee admitted that the bill was not ideal, but it made a first step in
giving votes to women; more important, it stood a good chance of winning
approval in the House of Commons: “Its single merit is that, in a way which
no party can consider objectionable or unfair, it breaks down the barrier
which at present excludes all women from citizenship rights.”35

For the next month members of the Nuwss executive closely

followed the progress of the bill. At the end of May, Lady Frances Balfour
informed Fawcett that such prominent politicians as Alfred Lyttelton (Cons.,
St. George’s, Hanover Square), Birrell, and Churchill had agreed to speak in
its support.36 Fawcett replied that she was optimistic about the bill, and felt
it was “a big step in the direction of a practical settlement.”37 Brailsford
encouraged her hopes for success. Late in May, he wrote her a glowingly
optimistic letter, saying the bill was being received with unexpected
enthusiasm and that he was confident that it would pass its second reading.
He cautioned her, however, that the suffrage societies would have to manifest
their enthusiastic support for the bill to ensure its success in the House. They
would have to show a united front to the Government, and, “in the interests of
the Bill,” the militants and the nonmilitants would have to put aside their
differences.38 Both Brailsford and Lytton were convinced that the key to
success lay in bringing public opinion to put pressure upon the Government,
and they both urged the Nuwss to do everything possible to win support for
the bill. Brailsford was particularly anxious that the Nuwss should try and
convince the Women’s Liberal Federation to press the Government to give
time for the bill.39 Lytton wanted Fawcett and her colleagues to lobby for the
bill in any manner they thought would be effective: “… any help wh. you or
any of the members of your society could give in the next few days to induce
the Govmt. to consider favourably our demand for time would now be
invaluable…. Will you do what you can both privately and publicly to
impress upon the Govt. that our Bill is weightily supported.”40

Acting on Lytton’s and Brailsford’s request, Fawcett began to

marshall the Nuwss organization behind the Conciliation Bill. On June 6, she
sent out a circular to all Nuwss branches, urging the local societies to do
everything possible to demonstrate support for the all-important bill. This
was, she said, the most promising opportunity for women’s suffrage since
1884, and she urged the societies to hold meetings, organize deputations, and
pass resolutions to show their local MP’s and the Prime Minister how
widely the bill was supported.41

The NUWSS branches responded quickly to Fawcet’s prompting—

reiterated by similar appeals from members of the executive—and began
putting on pressure. The London Society for Women’s Suffrage contacted
some three hundred influential male supporters and asked them to interview
or write to MP’s; it sent circulars to all its members requesting them to write
letters on behalf of the bill to members of the Government. It also sponsored
meetings, organized deputations to MP’s, and on June 8, hired fifty
sandwichmen to picket Whitehall with placards in support of the bill.42 In
Tunbridge Wells the local Nuwss affiliate canvassed all those who had
signed the voters’ petition and asked them to request their MP’s to vote for
the bill. The Newcastle Society for Women’s Suffrage sent a barrage of
letters to all the MP’s in Northumberland and Durham begging their support
for the measure. At Portsmouth the Nuwss branch contacted temperance
groups and party organizations and urged them to lobby for the bill.43 On the
whole, the Nuwss staged a very effective and persuasive campaign; but on
June 14, the efforts of the suffragists were rewarded when the Conciliation
Bill at long last passed its first reading.44

The first hurdle had been overcome: the Nuwss was now concerned
that the Government would refuse to grant further facilities to the bill.
Brailsford, who remained in close touch with the Nuwss throughout this
period, shared the suffragists’ anxiety. He was eager for the Nuwss to
continue lobbying for the bill and wanted the organization to devote special
attention to the mercurial Lloyd George. Lloyd George had not given his
benediction to the bill, and, according to Emily Davies, Brailsford was
worried that his opposition might prove fatal: “Mr. Brailsford said that our
great enemy in the Cabinet is Mr. Lloyd George, who declares that he will
not look at anything but Adult Suffrage, and that pressure brought to bear on
him would be more useful than anything else.”45 Both the Nuwss and
Brailsford felt that there was no reason that the Government should not give
facilities for the bill: the militants were quiet, the constitutional crisis was in
abeyance, and there was no real pressure of business. There would probably
not again arise so favorable an opportunity for the House of Commons to
consider a women’s suffrage bill.”46

Although supporters of women’s suffrage desired a promise of full

facilities for the Conciliation Bill, the immediate problem was to secure the
bill’s second reading. To this end, with the assistance of the Women’s Liberal
Federation (some of whose executive were active members of the Nuwss),
the Nuwss prevailed upon Asquith to receive a deputation to discuss the
future of the Conciliation Bill.47 Brailsford was delighted by this turn of
events and was anxious for Fawcett and her colleagues to make the most of
the interview. He wanted the suffragists to concentrate on extracting a
promise for a second reading and, for the moment, to skirt the issue of further
facilities for the bill. Brailsford assured Fawcett that if the suffragists
proceeded “stage-by-stage,” the Government might, eventually, be pressured
into giving full facilities: “We need at the start get no more than a Second
Reading. I count on the interest and pressure rising in volume as people begin
to realize that there really is a chance now. If we can delay a hasty refusal, it
may in a few weeks be morally impossible for any Government to say no at
the final stage.”48
 On the eve of the deputation, Brailsford’s chief worry was that the
suffragists would show their impatience with the Government’s handling of
the Conciliation Bill. He feared that any display of aggressiveness on the part
of the women would only cause Asquith to deny their request for a day for
the second reading. Brailsford recognized that Asquith would not be pushed
by the women, and he counseled Fawcett to proceed warily and tactfully with
the Prime Minister:

Above all we must not allow him to give an advance decision hastily.
All we need at once is a second reading, and all we propose to ask
for now is a second reading free from conditions.
For these reasons may I suggest that while your deputation state
the case for facilities this year as strongly as it can be put, you might
also add that so far from pressing him for an answer now, you ask
him to watch the feeling of the country and the House before coming
to any final decision.49

The interview with Asquith took place on June 21. Fawcett, leading
a delegation of twenty-one extremely distinguished members of the Nuwss,
calmly requested Asquith to give the House of Commons the opportunity to
discuss and vote on the Conciliation Bill. The Prime Minister, however, was
unwilling to make any such commitment; the interview ended with the
opposing opinions aired but no promise or hints of future promises.50 Yet, the
deputation, coupled with other pressure, both parliamentary and public, may
have brought about a slight shift in Asquith’s position. On June 23, he
announced in the House that the Government would give time, before the
close of the session, for a full debate and division on the second reading of
the Conciliation Bill; he added very firmly, however, that the bill would not
be given any more facilities that session.51

The members of the Nuwss, although discouraged by the interview

with Asquith, did not accept this as the last word on the Conciliation Bill;
they believed that if Asquith had been pushed this far, he could be pressured
into giving the bill full facilities. The immediate task was to obtain an early
date for the second reading, since a postponement of the debate until August
would not leave time for the bill to pass on to subsequent stages. During the
last week of June, the members of the Conciliation Commitee and their
suffragist colleagues in Parliament lobbied to secure an early date for the
second reading.52 While this agitation was going on in parliamentary circles,
the Nuwss was busy organizing extraparliamentry support for the bill as
another means of bringing pressure to bear on the Prime Minister. On June 28
it sponsored a huge meeting in Queen’s Hall in support of the bill.53 Fawcett
had been worried that the meeting might be vituperative toward the
Government. She felt that the suffragists, as supplicants, were in a vulnerable
position, and would have to couple determination with tact; like Brailsford,
she believed that supporters of the Conciliation Bill would have to deal very
gingerly with the Prime Minister while they waited patiently for him to bow
to the pressure of opinion:

I feel that quite our best line for tomorrow is to emphasize what we
have gained thus far and make the most of it. We must be very careful
not to say anything irritating to the Government or to the Liberals in
the House. Don’t give them an excuse for throwing us over. Place an
implicit and childlike faith in their vague promise. Above all we must
not charge Asquith for being squeezable. It is the very way to prevent
successful squeezing.54

Under Fawcett’s careful control, the meeting went as planned, and it raised
£1,500 for the Nuwss war chest.55 Two days later Fawcett received a
telegram from Walter McLaren announcing the good news that the suffragists
had won another partial victory.56 Asquith had once again bowed before the
combined forces of the suffragists and had given the Conciliation Bill an
early date for its second reading: the House of Commons would hold a
debate and division on it July 11 and 12. Brailsford’s and Fawcett’s strategy
of proceeding slowly and using pressure, both parliamentary and
extraparliamentary, to wring concessions from Asquith seemed to be
working. Fawcett, not unreasonably elated over this success, exclaimed
jubilantly, “The walls of Jericho have not gone down, but they are beginning
to tremble.57

But even as the agitation on behalf of the Conciliation Bill appeared

to be making some headway with the Government, the very thing that
Brailsford had warned against—a split in the suffrage ranks—was rapidly
developing. Brailsford had cautioned Fawcett that the Government would
rejoice at any signs of disunity and would use those dissensions as an excuse
to postpone the bill. Now, at the end of June, a series of disagreements and
misunderstandings between the Nuwss and the WSPU threatened to lead to a
complete breakdown in communications between the two societies.

The immediate cause of the squabble was the Nuwss decision to

hold a demonstration in July in support of the Conciliation Bill. Prompted by
Brailsford’s plea for a show of unity, the Nuwss executive decided to
abandon, for this one occasion, its policy of “clear separation between the
two wings of the movement” and to extend the olive branch to the WSPU.58
On June 27 Fawcett met with Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence and Christabel
and Emmeline Pankhurst and invited their organization to participate in the
Nuwss procession, on the condition they would agree to abstain from
violence until after it was held. The WSPU, impatient with the Government’s
procrastination over fixing a date for the second reading of the Conciliation
Bill, would not guarantee to prolong the truce, and Fawcett abandoned the
idea of a joint demonstration.59

The very next day, June 28, Fawcett received a letter from
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence regretting the fact that the Nuwss would not
cooperate with the WSPU in a public demonstration, and asking her to
reconsider the matter. Fawcett was angered by the implication that it was the
Nuwss and not the WSPU that had been uncooperative, and she immediately
sent out a circular to all the branch societies which described her
conversation with the WSPU’s leaders and charged them with being
intransigent and duplicitous: “No offer of joint action of a peaceful character
has been made by the Social & Political Union. An offer of this kind had
been made by the National Union and rejected emphatically by Mrs. and
Miss Pankhurst and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, who stated on the 27th that in
their opinion the time for peaceful demonstrations was over and the last
word had been said.”60

Fawcett must have taken her grievances against the WSPU to

Brailsford, for on June 30 he wrote to her, obviously trying to calm her and
to soften her attitude toward the WSPU. Brailsford, caught between the two
parties, was in the unenviable situation of having to try and make the peace.
All the women involved were extremely strong-minded and could be
intractable, and a petty disagreement could very well turn into a full-scale
and possibly a public dispute. For the sake of the Conciliation Bill,
Brailsford had to try and smooth the troubled waters. In his letter to Fawcett
he attempted to convince her of the good intentions of the WSPU’s leaders:61

They are really most generous and large-minded women, from whom
any tactics of the kind you suspect are entirely foreign. Mrs.
Lawrence’s fault (as it is her virtue) is a kind of spiritual exhaltation,
a wholly sincere if somewhat meridional absorption in the subjective
beauty of big brave actions. Miss Pankhurst is all for frontal attacks
and for a sort of Lancashire “fannoch” directness, which I have often
found a little rough though I like and respect her. Mrs. Pankhurst in
the gentlest and most self forgetful way was for going herself on the
spot to call on you to make her explanation…. They are thinking of
nothing but the vote, and they value as much as any of us the need for
absolute unity at this moment. Their attitude to the National Union—it
would be foolish to deny it—was often critical in the past though
never, so far as I saw it, bitter or unsisterly. It was simply the
inevitable attitude of eager, self-confident people, who felt absolutely
sure that they had invented a better strategy than yours. Of late, ever
since we came together to work for this Bill, all of this has changed
into a hopeful confident friendly sense that we are all good allies.

He went on to say that he was sure Fawcett had misunderstood their

intentions regarding violence, and he made a final plea for unity:

Assume that you are just in your judgment and think as ill of these
women as you please. Still they control a great organization. We need
it to carry our Bill. We can succeed only by unity now and in the
future. Ought we not to set the personal factors aside and as statesmen
consider solely what use we can make of all our forces?

Fawcett was not easily appeased, nor were the WSPU leaders ready
to compromise. Fortunately the disagreement did not become public, but
tensions remained high and neither group seemed to be able to give up any
part of its basic principles for the sake of unity within the movement as a
whole.62

In retrospect the disagreement between the WSPU and the Nuwss

over the proposed demonstration seems very petty and highly exaggerated.
Yet, this apparently trivial squabble is important because it illustrates the
tensions which were present within the women’s suffrage movement—
tensions which, however latent, had the potential to jeopardize the whole
campaign for votes for women. Part of the problem was, of course, a matter
of tactical differences, or, as one member of the Nuwss executive committee
put it, “the old antithesis between those who ‘know no argument but force’
and those who ‘know no force but argument.’”63 It would be simplistic,
however, to imagine that tactical considerations alone ignited the controversy
between the two societies. As in the past, in its dealings with the militants,
the Nuwss was torn between a desire for unity and a desire to establish its
own pre-eminence in the suffrage movement. It recognized the services
which the WSPU had performed for the suffrage movement, but it felt that
militant enthusiasm might endanger the very future of the suffrage cause.
Additionally, there seemed to be a complete lack of rapport between the
leadership of the two organizations. The executive of the Nuwss, and
particularly Fawcett, resented the WSPU attitude as being both self-righteous
and condescending. The Nuwss prided itself on its democratic principles and
it was very impatient with the Pankhursts’ high-hands manipulation of the
WSPU.64 And while the Nuwss was doing everything it could to help the
Conciliation Committee win support for the bill, the WSPU was capturing the
headlines and getting the attention of the nation. With some justification, the
Nuwss felt that it received none of the credit for the advances made in the
suffrage movement and yet was always penalized for the militants’
mistakes:65 “Like all moderate parties, we were kicked on both sides and,
while we had to endure the stones and offal which were frequently hurled at
us on their account, we were constantly told by wobbly politicians that they
could no longer support us unless we somehow stopped the militants.” As the
NUWSS role in the suffrage movement became more prominent, the NUWSS
attitude to the WSPU became less conciliatory and by June 1910,
cooperation between the two societies had become increasingly difficult.
This lack of communication, verging on rivalry, between the two wings of the
suffrage movement, was a major weakness in the movement; moreover, it
was a weakness which those who opposed women’s suffrage could easily
exploit.

Meanwhile, as the NUWSS was involved in this dispute with the

WSPU, it continued its efforts on behalf of the Conciliation Bill. Brailsford
and others on the Conciliation Committee had told Fawcett how effective the
NUWSS had been in lobbying for the bill thus far, and Fawcett urged the
affiliates to work diligently to obtain a large majority on the bill’s second
reading:

We have been assured that at this particular juncture it is of great

importance for the Conciliation Committee to have at their back the
great constitutional movement represented by the National Union.
This is absolutely the case, and every member of the Conciliation
Committee will tell you so. The point we have now reached could not
have been reached but for the exertions and influence exercised by
the National Union, therefore I feel it is absolutely necessary for us to
continue in our line of movement. … I know we shall have great
difficulty in keeping certain men to their pledges. You must leave no
stone unturned to make them feel they risk a great deal in their
constituencies if they do not keep to their pledges.66

The NUWSS was very conscious that if the bill did not receive a
substantial majority on the second reading, there would be no question of
further facilities, and during the first part of July it lobbied energetically. The
affiliates sent deputations to MP’s, organized letter-writing campaigns, and
sent whips to the MP’s urging them to vote for the bill on July 12.67 On July 9
the NUWSS sponsored a huge demonstration in Trafalgar Square, in a last
effort to convince the House of Commons to act favorably on the bill. The
branch societies sent deputations to the event, and large contingents of
suffragists came from as far away as Manchester and Edinburgh. Over
10,000 people gathered in the square, festooned with the red. white, and
green banners of the NUWSS, to listen to the speakers.68 The demonstration
was a fitting climax to the NUWSS activities on behalf of the bill. Working
closely with the Conciliation Committee, the organization had neglected no
possibility in its search for support for the bill; the NUWSS had been told
that its activities had influenced some MP’s to look favorably on the suffrage
measure.69 The true test of all these long months of lobbying would come in
two days’ time when the House of Commons would begin debate on the
Conciliation Bill.

The attention of all suffragists was fixed on Parliament on July 11,

when David Shackleton (Lab., Lanes., N. E.. Clitheroe) introduced the
Conciliation Bill for its second reading.70 The first day of debate was only a
sparring session between those who supported and those who opposed the
measure; on July 12, the arguments became much more heated and the
opponents of the Conciliation Bill placed their heavy artillery in the field.
Churchill, whom the suffragists had regarded as a friend, made perhaps the
most damning, and the most articulate, attack on the bill.71 He brought forth a
battery of arguments against it, calling it undemocratic and accusing it of
discriminating against wives and mothers.72 He also attempted to scare the
Liberals with the specter of plural and faggot votes which would benefit the
Tories: “I also see a grave danger in creating without great consideration a
vast body of privileged and dependent voters, who might be manipulated and
manoeuvered in this direction or that… . It is not merely an undemocratic
Bill it is worse. It is an antidemocratic Bill. It gives an entirely unfair
representation to property as against persons.”73 Lloyd George, also a
supposed friend of the suffrage movement, joined his colleague in speaking
against the bill. His arguments were similar to Churchill’s—that the bill was
undemocratic, and that it did not go far enough in enfranchising large numbers
of women. He emphasized that the bill could not be amended, and declared
that this constituted “an attempt to dictate to the House of Commons the way
in which the question should be solved.”74

The Prime Minister joined in the fray, and, in a speech which both
opponents and supporters of the bill termed one of the best of his political
career, he forcefully reiterated his opposition to this “half-hearted and
unstable compromise.” In a remarkable statement, Asquith, a stalwart
opponent of women’s suffrage, criticized the bill precisely because it did not
enfranchise enough women: “For my part I should not regard any measure of
woman suffrage as satisfying my conceptions of equality which did not
confer the suffrage on precisely the same grounds as, for the time being, it is
enjoyed by man.”75 Like Churchill, he appealed to the Liberals’ fears of
votes for the propertied, and he expressed his doubt that the House of
Commons would ratify a bill that was so undemocratic, and had so little
public support: “In the first place there should be the fullest and clearest
proof that it was in accordance with the wishes and desires of the women
themselves, and in the second place, it must be democratic in its character
and scope. Neither of these propositions is satisfied by the measure before
us.”76

With the exception of Philip Snowden, supporters of the bill were

not nearly so effective in their arguments as those who opposed it. Snowden,
however, was brilliant in his defense of the measure, and he brought the
debate to a close with an impassioned, yet reasoned speech on behalf of the
Bill. He was furious over Lloyd George’s and Churchill’s defections, and
accused them of trying to kill the bill: “They are quite in favour of the
principle, but it would pass the wit of man to put that principle into a Bill
which would meet the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
Home Secretary… . They think they can take shelter and hide their opposition
to the enfranchisement of women by pretending to be more democratic than
those in favour of women’s suffrage.”77 Snowden heatedly refuted the
criticism that the bill was undemocratic, quoting statistics that showed that
94 percent of women occupiers in London belonged to the working class.
Yet, if Lloyd George persisted in calling the bill undemocratic, Snowden
promised that its sponsors would be happy to recommit it in respect of the
title, provided the Government would guarantee to give the time necessary to
discuss the amended bill. In a succinct phrase he pointed out the one reason
why all suffragists should support the bill, regardless of its imperfections:
“For the best of all possible reasons—namely, that it is the only Bill which
can unite the various sections of ooinion which are in favour of the extension
of the suffrage to women.”78

When the bill was at last put to a vote, it passed its second reading
by the large majority of 299 to 189.79 Yet, the suffragists’ victory was once
again Pyrrhic; by an even more decisive majority—320 to 175—the House
voted to send the bill to a Committee of the Whole House.80 It appeared that
the House of Commons had chosen to prevent the bill from proceeding any
further.81 The Times commented wryly that the division lists constituted a
“pleasing subject of study for all those who are interested in political
gyrations, and care to note how members who made impassioned speeches
on the suffragist side promptly dashed suffragist hopes by swelling the
majority for the extinction of the Bill.”82

The NUWSS’ official reaction to the events of July 11 and 12 was

restrainedly enthusiastic, but privately members of the organization were
fearful about the future fate of the bill. The Liberals had not responded to
Brailsford’s efforts to gain a compromise, and the opposition of Churchill
and Lloyd George, in particular, did not bode well for the measure.83
Fawcett was well aware that the bill’s supporters inside the House predicted
that the bill would not proceed any further that session. Lady Frances Balfour
wrote her the details of a conversation she had had with her brother-in-law,
Arthur Balfour, about the bill:

… he thought the best speaking was against us and that he had never
heard Asquith speak so well or with more seriousness. He
understood the Cabinet had taken the matter very seriously, all the
more as they were so divided. I said I believed it would make both
parties put off the day of extending the franchise. He said, “that is a
very true and pertinent observation.” By implication the talk implied
the Bill was dead.84

Within the House it soon became apparent that enthusiasm for the
Conciliation Bill was on the wane. Liberal adult suffragists, fearing that the
passage of the measure would damage their cause, were making moves to
overthrow it, and Lloyd George, who had emerged as the suffragists’
archopponent, was doing his best to dissipate Liberal support.85 On July 20
Lloyd George flatly told a meeting of Liberal suffragists that the Government
could not afford to be embarrassed by the suffrage issue at a time when it
was engaged in a struggle with the House of Lords.86 A week later John
Redmond indicated that his party concurred with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer: he announced that the Nationalists would not press for further
facilities for controversial bills until the constitutional question was
settled.87 Soon after this the fate of the Conciliation Bill was publicly sealed.
On July 28 Lloyd George announced in the House of Commons that the
Government would not give further facilities to the bill that session.88 Three
days later Parliament was prorogued until November. The suffragists would
have to await Parliament’s return in the hope that the Government would
prove more conciliatory about facilitites for the bill in the autumn.

Although all these auguries indicated that the Conciliation Bill was
“dead” for that session, the NUWSS went ahead with its plans to marshall
support for the bill; throughout the summer and autumn of 1910 it continued to
lobby for the measure. To a large extent tactical considerations influenced the
NUWSS decision. The Conciliation Bill gave the NUWSS a focus around
which it could organize, and it placed the suffrage cause, in a concrete
fashion, before the nation. Equally important, the NUWSS feared that if the
bill were dropped, and it acknowledged the bill was dead, the WSPU would
end its truce and once again wage war on the Government. The NUWSS
believed such a move would be suicidal: the Government would not even
consider granting facilities to a women’s suffrage bill while the WSPU
persisted in its militant campaign. Thus, the specter of militancy encouraged
the NUWSS to behave as if the Conciliation Bill were very much alive.89

Besides these tactical considerations, the NUWSS still harbored a

faint hope that Asquith, who had, in the past, made concessions to the
suffragists, might again prove “squeezable if only we can squeeze hard
enough.”90 This perception greatly underestimated the depth of Asquith’s
opposition to women’s suffrage, and it also tended to ignore the degree to
which the Liberal Party was split over women’s suffrage. Brailsford and
other members of the Conciliation Committee shared the NUWSS
misconceptions, however, and to a large extent, the NUWSS took its political
cues from this Committee; it saw itself as the working partner of this
parliamentary body of suffragists and felt strongly that it must support these
men. The Conciliation Committee had refused to accept or to admit defeat,
and the NUWSS followed its lead. At the end of July, the NUWSS executive
passed a resolution, “That until the promoters of Mr. Shackleton’s Bill
decide to drop it, the National Union shall not consider the Bill destroyed.”91
The Conciliation Bill had given the women’s suffrage movement its most
promising opportunity since the 1880’s. If there was any chance at all for the
bill, the suffragists could not concede defeat.
 Influenced by these factors, the NUWSS continued throughout the
summer and autumn of 1910 to campaign for the Conciliation Bill. The aims
of the suffragists were to keep the issue alive in the constituencies, to enlist
public support for the suffrage cause, and to convince MP’s to press for
further facilities for the bill. The local societies cooperated enthusiastically,
sending deputations to MP’s, canvassing women municipal electors to
support the measure, holding weekly meetings to explain the bill, and, on
occasion, sponsoring impressive demonstrations.92 At the request of Bertha
Mason, parliamentary secretary of the NUWSS, the affiliates also contacted
women’s organizations, such as the Women’s Cooperative Guild and the
British Women’s Temperance Association, and tried to stir these groups to
give active support to the bill. The NUWSS was particularly eager to reach
women who were active in party politics, notably in the Women’s Liberal
Association and the Women’s Liberal Federation; it felt that these women
could be particularly useful in “squeezing” Asquith to grant further facilities
to the bill.93 Members of the NUWSS executive, who were making speaking
tours during the parliamentary interim, were very impressed by all the work
of the branches. Lady Frances Balfour, describing to Fawcett her suffrage
“progress,” declared that her audiences were larger and more sympathetic
than ever before.94

Throughout these months the NUWSS remained in close contact with

the Conciliation Committee. Brailsford was extremely appreciative of the
information the NUWSS supplied to him regarding shifts in Parliamentary
opinion. He was particularly concerned about the possible defections of
Liberal adult suffragists, and at his suggestion, an affiliate of the NUWSS, the
North Western Federation for Women’s Suffrage, conferred with Geoffrey
Howard and Richard Denman (Lib., Carlisle) and secured a promise that
they would not introdudce a wider suffrage bill.95 Also at Brailsford’s
request, the NUWSS arranged deputations to Cabinet ministers who were
friendly to women’s suffrage, solicited MP’s for their opinions on the
Conciliation Bill, and persuaded city councils to petition Parliament on
behalf of the bill.96 Acting on Brailsford’s suggestion, the NUWSS also
began to collect statistics on women municipal electors, so that the
Conciliation Committee could use this information to refute the charge that its
bill was “undemocratic.”97 Brailsford depended on the NUWSS, with its
large network of affiliates, to lobby for the Conciliation Bill during the
parliamentary recess. The NUWSS, for its part, was eager to show the
Government that the Conciliation Bill had strong support both in Parliament
and in the constituencies; Bertha Mason emphasized this objective to the
affiliates:

The Conciliation Committee do not regard Mr. Shackleton’s Bill as

dead, but intend before Parliament reassembles to lay before the
Prime Minister further evidence of the urgency of the demand for the
passage into law of the Bill this year. The clear duty then of the
National Union is to strengthen in every possible way the hands of the
Conciliation Committee in their work, and they beg that your society
will do its utmost to gain further support for the Bill.98

Nonetheless, there were clear indications, throughout the

parliamentary interim, that Asquith intended to stick to his guns and that the
Government had no intention of granting further facilities to the bill. Lloyd
George continued his attacks on the measure, claiming it would add
“hundreds of thousands” to the plural vote; he admitted, however, that the
battle with the House of Lords colored his views on the bill and that the
Government intended to settle the constitutional question before it became
embroiled in women’s suffrage.99 Other Cabinet ministers echoed Lloyd
George’s sentiments: Runciman and Birrell both informed the NUWSS that it
would be impossible to give facilities to the Conciliation Bill that session.100
Even more disappointing and disheartening to the suffragists was the position
of Sir Edward Grey. Early in November the Foreign Secretary, viewed as
one of the most staunch supporters of women’s suffrage in the Cabinet,
announced that the Government would neither give facilities for the bill that
year, nor make any promises for the coming year.101 Clearly, the Conciliation
Bill was in trouble if Cabinet support for the measure was beginning to
wither. The constitutional crisis provided a convenient pretext for blocking
the Conciliation Bill, but the real problem was that even those ministers who
favored women’s suffrage were not committed to this particular measure.

Parliament reconvened on November 15. The week before the

session opened the NUWSS began a series of meetings and demonstrations in
support of the bill which culminated in a procession to Westminster
Abbey.102 But “suffrage week” was a rather hollow pageant, for by mid-
November the NUWSS executive committee had abandoned hope that the
Government would give facilities to the bill that session. The collapse of the
constitutional conference and the prospect of imminent dissolution had sealed
the fate of the measure.103 On the day the House of Commons reassembled,
Bertha Mason visited No. 10 Downing Street to make one last plea for
facilities for the bill. Vaughan Nash and Geoffrey Howard, who acted as
Asquith’s spokesmen, confirmed the pessimism of the suffragists; they would
make no guarantee that the Government would give facilities to the bill even
in the next parliamentary session.104

Both the NUWSS and the Conciliation Committee reluctantly

acknowledged that the Conciliation Bill was dead for 1910; their aim now
was to obtain full facilities for the bill in the next session of Parliament.
Brailsford, however, was not sanguine about the future prospects for the
bill.105 He informed Fawcett that a General Election would be held soon and
gloomily predicted that if, as he expected, the Liberals were returned with an
increased majority, the Government would not agree to grant facilities to the
bill in 1911:

This greatly diminishes our chances of getting a pledge for next year.
And if the Liberals improve their majority (as they expect) they will
be less inclined than ever to take a limited Bill.
We shall continue to negotiate, and shall probably get something
but not good enough, I’m afraid, to satisfy the Liberals.106

There was not enough support for women’s suffrage within the Liberal Party
to carry a “democratic bill,” unless the bill had the official support of the
Government. This was unlikely to be forthcoming, and therefore any bill for
women’s suffrage would need the support of some Conservative MP’s if it
were to be successful. And since the Conservatives, both because they were
philosophically opposed to any wide extension of the franchise and because
they feared such a change would hurt their party at the polls, would not
support a “democratic bill” for women’s suffrage, it seemed best to stick
with the Conciliation Bill instead of jettisoning it in favor of a more
comprehensive measure.

Brailsford’s worries were compounded by his fear that the WSPU

was about to end its truce with the Government—since any revival of
militancy would make it imDossible to bargain with the Government about
facilities for the bill.107 Lytton shared Brailsford’s pessimism and was
desperately negotiating with Asquith for some assurance that he would give
facilities to the bill next year. On November 17 Lytton wrote Fawcett that he
was “sanguine of success” that he could obtain the desired guarantee,
provided the militants did not jeopardize his diplomatic efforts by resorting
to violence:

I may tell you confidentially that I have already received private

assurance from Mr. Balfour that if the Prime Minister will give an
undertaking on this point he will be prepared to do the same in the
event of his being in office… . The only danger is that the raid which
the WSPU are preparing tomorrow may spoil everything. I have
reasoned with them as strongly as I can, explained to them what I am
working for and my reasons for expecting success—but it is useless
and they will not listen to me. … It will be deplorable if their
impatience prevents us from getting the assurance wh. wd. be really
valuable.108

Lytton’s worst fears were realized. On November 18—“Black

Friday”—the militants stormed into Parliament Square and battled with the
police. The clash resulted in the arrest of 115 women.109 Brailsford was
furious at the WSPU and claimed that the raid “wrecked his diplomacy with
Asquith.”110 As Lytton predicted, the revival of militancy only harmed the
women’s cause. Asquith refused to make any commitment to give facilities to
the bill in the next session of Parliament,111 and on November 22, the
militants again vented their wrath, this time mobbing Asquith and injuring
Birrell; they also threw rocks at the houses of Churchill, Grey, Harcourt, and
Burns. As a result of these rampages, 180 women were arrested.112
 Grimly, the NUWSS and the Conciliation Committee went on with
plans for the coming General Election. Asquith had at least promised to give
facilities to a women’s suffrage bill sometime in the new Parliament.113 The
Times declared that Asquith’s pledge, though vague, had made women’s
suffrage an issue at the election: “if the election confirms the Government in
power, the new Parliament will be considered to have received a mandate on
the subject of women suffrage.”114 Sharing The Times’ interpretation of the
Prime Minister’s promise, the Conciliation Committee issued a resolution
which called on all women to campaign for the return of MP’s who were
pledged to support the Conciliation Bill.115

The NUWSS concurred with the Conciliation Committee and

adopted the position that it was more fruitful to worry about the suffragist
component in the new Parliament than to bemoan the failings of the past
Parliament. Fawcett blamed the militants for much of the coolness in
Parliament. Lady Frances Balfour had lunched with Asquith the day after the
militants mobbed him, and she reported to Fawcett that the Prime Minister
had barely escaped harm, while Birrell had injured his knee.116 Fawcett’s
reply was blunt:

The PM’s statement of the 22nd was not just exactly what we wanted,
but it was better than anything that had ever been offered us before
and was at any rate good enough to make The Times say the next day
that it had made w. s. [women’s suffrage] a question definitely before
the country at the election and that if there is a Liberal majority it will
be a mandate to “grant suffrage to women.” And then those idiots go
out smashing windows and bashing ministers’ hats over their eyes.117

In Common Cause, she made her criticism of the militants’ political stupidity
even stronger:

I deeply deplore the futile silliness and want of political instinct

which led, at such a moment, to window smashing and assaults on
Cabinet Ministers. … But for this folly the Conciliation Committee
might have entered into negotiations with the Prime Minister. … No
one can negotiate with a man and “bash” his hat over his eyes at one
 and the same moment. The sane suffragists will have to suffer these
absurdities.118

However, there was an immediate task at hand—the General

Election—, and on November 26 the NUWSS held a special council to map
out its electioneering strategy. As in the past, the NUWSS would support
proponents of women’s suffrage and oppose antisuffragist candidates; in
addition, in certain selected constituencies where the sitting member was a
staunch opponent of women’s suffrage, the NUWSS would sponsor
candidates to run on a women’s suffrage platform. Taken as a whole, the
policy of the NUWSS was to secure the return of as many MP’s as possible
pledged to support women’s suffrage. The NUWSS evidently still believed
that a Liberal Government, led by Asquith, would have to give full facilities
to a Conciliation Bill if the House of Commons were firmly behind it, and it
was up to the NUWSS to see that those elected to the new Parliament would
back the Conciliation Bill.119

During the election campaign the NUWSS focused its main energy
on three constituencies where it sponsored women’s suffrage candidates. The
South Salford Women’s Suffrage Association, an affiliate of the NUWSS,
persuaded Brailsford to run as a women’s suffrage candidate against Hilaire
Belloc, an archopponent of women’s suffrage. The local Liberal organization
thereupon withdrew Belloc’s name and nominated the Hon. Charles Russell,
a suffragist, as its official candidate. After some negotiations, the South
Salford Committee agreed to withdraw Brailsford after Russell had
promised to send out a letter to the electors of South Salford in support of the
Conciliation Bill.120 Fawcett was triumphant at what she felt was a victory
over the Liberal party machine and claimed, “The Liberals came crawling on
their knees" at South Salford.121 Unfortunately, the NUWSS met with less
success in the other two constituencies in which it sponsored women’s
suffrage candidates, and its candidates came in miserably last: at Camlachie
the NUWSS candidate, William Mirlees, polled only 35 votes, and at East
St. Pancras Herbert Jacobs polled 22 votes.122 Something was no doubt won
in the realm of propaganda, but all the effort expended in sponsoring
women’s suffrage candidates had no effect on decimating antisuffragist ranks
in Parliament.
 More real gains were made in the twenty-two constituencies in
which the NUWSS aided party candidates—most of them Liberals—by
supplying organizers, volunteer workers, and money, though here, too, the
gains were mainly valuable as propaganda. The contests did give the
suffragists an opportunity to educate the public about the Conciliation Bill
and promoted the NUWSS as an organization, but the outcomes were
determined by local factors, competing issues, and local party standing rather
than by positions on women’s suffrage, and only eight of the candidates
whom the NUWSS supported were victorious.123

Even so, the results of the second General Election of 1910 were
better than expected in that the Liberal landslide that Brailsford had dreaded
had not come about, and the new House of Commons was almost as evenly
balanced as the old:

January, 1910 December, 1910124

Liberals 275 272
Conservatives 273 272
Irish Nationalists 82 84
Labour 40 42

The Government had been returned to power, and the new Parliament had
received its “mandate” on women’s suffrage; in addition, there were more
supporters of women’s suffrage in the newly elected House than there had
been in the old.125

The outcome of the election was the one bright ray in an otherwise
clouded horizon; in December 1910 it appeared the NUWSS was only a little
closer to its goal of securing votes for women than it had been in 1909. In the
annual report for 1910 the NUWSS summed up a year of great achievement,
and great failure. The gains in income and membership were striking:126

Number
of Societies Annual Income Membership
1909 130 £3,385–13–9 13,429
1910 207 £5,503–7–1 21,571
The growth of the affiliates paralleled that of the central organization: in
1909, their total income was estimated to be, at most, £10,000, and by 1910
it had risen to £14,000.127 The NUWSS thought these statistics proved that it
had been successful not only in popularizing the women’s suffrage cause but
also in strengthening the conviction that the vote could be won by legal
means. Each additional shilling, each new member, made the NUWSS more
confident that both its cause and its tactics were beginning to make an impact
on the country and to win new advocates.

The darker side of the picture was that the prospects for the
Conciliation Bill, which had once appeared so bright, now seemed dim. In
summing up the NUWSS activities for 1910, one member correctly noted:
“The history of the National Union has been in the main the history of the
Conciliation Bill, every effort being directed to backing the self-sacrificing
and arduous efforts of Mr. Brailsford.”128 The NUWSS had presided over the
birth of the bill and had paved the way for its acceptance by the House of
Commons; yet, despite all its work on the Conciliation Bill’s behalf, the
NUWSS had once again witnessed the familiar but painful sight of a suffrage
bill being prevented from going beyond a second reading. At the close of
1910, it seemed probable that, despite Asquith’s November pledge, the
suffragists would never celebrate the passage of the Conciliation Bill.
Brailsford, writing to Fawcett, gave a most somber prediction:

Since the Conciliation Committee met I have been able to ascertain

direct from the Prime Minister (and Lord Lytton has news from Sir
Edward Grey) what the “pledge” means. It is not a pledge for our
Bill, even implicitly, and we are frankly warned that it must not be so
interpreted. The Government holds itself free to judge what Bill will
meet with the largest support in the House! … I think we shall get
time for some Bill and then every conceivable dodge will be used to
defeat it.129

With the additional threat of a renewal of militancy, it appeared the agitation

for women’s suffrage could indeed “go scuffling on for years.”130
 As of December 1910, the NUWSS was pessimistic about the future
of the women’s cause. In the immediate sense all its work had been a failure.
But as a lesson in practical politics, the NUWSS work on the Conciliation
measure had been valuable, and it was to have a great impact on the
organization’s future development. The Liberal Government’s handling of the
Conciliation Bill had caused both disappointment and rancor. The suffragists
felt, with justice, that the ministers’ criticisms of the bill were unfounded and
that the Government could have found time for full facilities for the bill had
they been so inclined. The Government’s unwillingness to respond to the
women’s pleas left the NUWSS both angered and disillusioned. Unlike the
WSPU, however, the NUWSS as an organization was given to long
deliberations and was not quick to translate anger into action. Furthermore,
many members of the NUWSS still continued to have faith in the notion that
women’s suffrage was a Liberal cause and that eventually the party would
come round. In December 1910, with the Liberals again in power, the
NUWSS could see only two possibilities of action: to continue to cooperate
with the Conciliation Committee, in hopes that a Liberal Government would
grant full facilities to the committee’s bill, or to make war on the Government
and work for the Liberals’ ouster. Continued cooperation might not ever
bring results, but the NUWSS regarded militancy as suicidal, so cooperation
it would have to be. Yet this decision did not mean that the experience with
the Conciliation Bill had left no impression on the NUWSS. In January it had
appeared that 1910 would be a banner year for supporters of women’s
suffrage. By December, the Liberal Government had dashed this hope. In
retrospect it appears that the fate of the Conciliation Bill in 1910 caused the
NUWSS to become seriously disappointed for the first time with the
Liberals, and propelled it in the direction of an alliance with the Labour
Party.

___________________

Notes
1On December 10, at a meeting in the Albert Hall, Asquith stated that the Government had
no desire to “burke” the women’s suffrage question, and that accordingly, the House of Commons ought
to have an opportunity to express its views on the subject. On the same day Grey, speaking at Alnwick,
reiterated his support for women’s suffrage. A few days earlier, Churchill had made a similar statement.
 2The election manifesto of the NUWSS appeared in The Times, December 18, 1909.

3C. C., February 10, 1910; Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Parties, and the People: The British
General Elections of 1910 (Toronto, 1972), p. 335; London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual
Report, 1910), pp. 6–7.

4C. C., December 9 and 16, 1909. The constituencies were Dewsbury (Walter Runciman,
Lib., president of the Board of Education); Blackburn (Philip Snowden, Lab.); Barnard Castle (Arthur
Henderson, Lab.); Dundee (Winston Churchill, Lib., president of the Board of Trade); Cleveland
(Herbert Samuel, Lib., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster); East Fife (Herbert Asquith, Lib., Prime
Minister); East Lothian, Haddingtonshire (Richard Haldane, Lib., Secretary for War). Bulley, a member
of the Fabians and of the Social Democratic Party, was put up against Lewis Harcourt (Lib., First
Commissioner for Works), a noted antisuffragist, by the Lancashire and Cheshire Women’s Textile and
Other Workers’ Representation Committee. In his campaign Bulley coupled a Labour appeal to the
suffrage cause; he polled only 639 votes. See Blewett, p. 335.

5Englishwoman’s Review, 41 (April 15, 1910): 112. This was approximately 4 percent of
those who voted in the election. David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts, 1900–1968
(3rd ed.; London, 1969), p. 141.

6In March “blue papers” in the House of Commons contained daily references to the voters’
petitions. At this time the petitions were being presented at the rate of betwen 10 and 20 per day.
Englishwoman, (April 1910):245.

7C. C., February 10, 1910. The NUWSS thought it had the support of 185 Liberals, 85
Conservatives, 32 Labourites, and 21 Nationalists. The League for Opposing Woman Suffrage, basing
its calculations on the July 12, 1910, vote on the Conciliation Bill, estimated that there were 283
suffragists in the House of Commons: 146 Liberals, 83 Conservatives, 37 Labourites, and 17
Nationalists. Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906–1918 (London, 1978), p. 187.

8See National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p. 45. According
to the Annual Report, 1910 of the North of England Society, it spent, for example £260-6-8-1/2. See p.
67.

9Neal Blewett notes (pp. 330–33) that the January election was charactereized by an
unprecedented amount of activity on the part of pressure groups, and that they spent vast amounts on
propaganda. Although Blewett considers that the women’s issue was peripheral to the election debate,
he does note that the women’s movement had a considerable number of dedicated workers at its
disposal, and that it also commanded large financial resources. See also, for example, Archives,
Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Rt. Hon. Walter Runciman to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, July
10, 1910.

10The LSWS, in approaching candidates, emphasized that it had no connection with the
WSPU, and stated that all NUWSS affiliates “have invariably worked by peaceful methods only and
deeply regret the lawless actions of a section of the advocates of women’s suffrage.” Circulars of the
London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Circular to Parliamentary Candidates, December 1909, Fawcett
Library, London. The NUWSS believed that militant methods and women’s suffrage had become
inextricably confused in the public mind; it emphasized the need to change this perception. C. C.,
February 3, 1910.

11Fred Leventhal, “The Conciliation Committee,” unpub. ms., pp. 122–23.

12British Museum, Papers of Herbert, Viscount Gladstone, Add. Mss. 46067, H. N.

Brailsford to Mrs. Byles, [October 1909]. Jane Brailsford was arrested for chopping a barricade with an
ax. For a full account of the incident see Andrew Rosen, Rise Up, Women!, p. 125.

13Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e615, December 20, 1909. This committee wanted to
obtain the parliamentary vote for women graduates of the Scottish universities. Chrystal MacMillan, the
hon. secretary and treasurer of this organization, was a member of the NUWSS executive.

14Leventhal, p. 127.

15Apparently Brailsford had not had any communication with Fawcett prior to January 1910.
Professor Fred Leventhal, who is writing a biography of Brailsford, has said that he thought Brailsford
wrote to Fawcett about the formation of the committee only because she was influential in the suffrage
movement, not because she was a personal friend. (In conversation, Boston, November 1, 1974.)

16Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, January 18, [1910].

17Leventhal, pp. 127–28.

18Brailsford was able to persuade the militants to announce a truce on January 31, 1910.
Christabel Pankhurst had agreed to this truce because she felt mild militancy was “played out” and that
the pause would strategically benefit the militants. Christabel Pankhurst, Unshackled: The Story of How
We Won the Vote (London, 1959), pp. 153–54. Throughout January, Brailsford and Lord Lytton had
negotiated with the Pankhursts to call a halt to militancy. Public Record Office, London, Papers of
Edward, Viscount Grey of Falloden, FO 800/90, H. N. Brailsford to Augustine Birrell, [1910], enclosed
in a letter from Augustine Birrell to Sir Edward Grey, November 2, 1910.

19The Liberals held 275 seats, the Conservatives 273, the Nationalists 82, and Labour 40.

20Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, January 25, [1910].

21Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, February 28, [1910]. Like Brailsford,
Lord Lytton had close ties with the women’s suffrage movement. His grandmother Ftosina, Lady
Lytton, was an early suffragist and a close friend of Lydia Becker. One of his sisters, Lady Constance
Lytton, was active in the WSPU, and another sister, Lady Betty Balfour, was a moving spirit in the
Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Association. In March 1910, Lord Lytton became
president of the Hitchin Women’s Suffrage Society, a branch of the NUWSS.
 22For the McLarens (like the Lyttons), suffrage was a family affair, and the family’s ties to
the NUWSS were particularly strong. Priscilla Bright McLaren, Sir Charles’s mother, had been active in
the suffrage movement since the 1860’s and had been a member of the first NUWSS executive
committee. Sir Charles’s brother, Walter McLaren, was chairman of the NUWSS executive committee,
and his sister-in-law, Eva McLaren, was a former member of the NUWSS executive.

23Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, February 28, [1910].

24At the end of March the Conciliation Committee had twenty members. Ibid., H. N.
Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, March 21, [1910]. By May 1910, the committee had grown to
include 36 members: 16 Liberals, 11 Conservatives, 5 Nationalists, and 4 Labourites.

25Although Brailsford did not name the other ministers, he was probably referring to Birrell
and Churchill, who, in April 1910, allowed Brailsford to announce that they welcomed the formation of
the Committee. Ibid., Circular of the Conciliation Committee for Women’s Suffrage [May 1910].

26Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, March 21, [1910].

27At the time Brailsford was drafting the Bill, the Irish were very critical of the Government.
See, for example, CAB 41/32/50, February 22, 1910, and CAB 41/32/51, February 25, 1910.

28The vote on Geoffrey Howard’s Adult Suffrage Bill in March 1909 had shown that
Conservatives would not support an Adult Suffrage Bill. It had also shown that Liberal support for such
a measure was weaker than for a more limited women’s suffrage measure such as the Stanger Bill. See
Chapter 2, note 78.

29H. N. Brailsford to Lord Lytton, March 17, [1910], as quoted in Leventhal, p. 131.

30Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, March 21, [1910].

31Ibid.

32Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, March 27, [1910].

33Ibid., E. Dimock to H. N. Brailsford, April 9, 1910.

34The contention that the bill would enfranchise working women was based on the ILP
survey of 1904 and on a canvass conducted in 1904 which revealed that 91 percent of registered
women occupiers belonged to the working class. For a defense of the democratic aspects of the
Conciliation Bill see H. N. Brailsford, “Mr. Lloyd George and Women’s Suffrage,” Nuwss leaflet (n.p.,
n.d.).
 35Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 15, Circular of the Conciliation Committee
for Women’s Suffrage [May 1910].

36FLAC, vol. 1, Hi, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, May 26, 1910,
Fawcett Library, London.

37Ibid., Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Lady Frances Balfour, May 29, 1910.

38Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, May 27, [1910].

39Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 2, [1910]. The Women’s Liberal
Federation (WLF) had arranged to hold its Annual Council in London in mid-June. The Federation was
influential with the Liberal Party, as it had a membership of around 90,000. Fawcett had a very good
relationship with the WLF: many members of the Nuwss executive were also on the WLF executive.

40Ibid., Box 9, Lord Lytton to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 3, 1910.

41FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Circular from Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 6, 1910, Fawcett Library,
London.

42C. C, June 16, 1910; Circulars of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Circular from
Philippa Strachey, June 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

43C. C., June 16 and 23, 1910.

44H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 17, June 14, 1910, cc. 1202–7.

45Papers of Emily Davies, Emily Davies to Philippa Strachey, June 12, 1910, Fawcett Library,
London.

46C. C., June 2, 1910.

47Bertha Mason, parliamentary secretary of the Nuwss, requested the interview, and Asquith
acceded to this request. See National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p.
18. Mrs. Broadley Reid, Mrs. Walter McLaren, the Hon. Mrs. Bertrand Russell, and Lady Bamford-
Slack, members of the executive of the Women’s Liberal Federation, were also active members of the
Nuwss.

48Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, June 2, [1910].

49Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 20, [1910].

 50National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p. 18. The deputation
included Emily Davies, the founder of Girton College; Eleanor Rathbone, Liverpool town councillor;
Clementina Black, a member of the executive of the Women’s Industrial Council; Isabella Ford, a
former member of the executive of ILP; Sophie Bryant, headmistress of the North London Collegiate
School; and Ethel Snowden, a leading figure in the Labour Party.

51H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 18, June 23, 1910, c. 488. The Cabinet made this decision on June 23,
reversing the position it had taken on June 8 and on June 15. CAB 41/32/63, June 23, 1910; CAB
41/32/61, June 8, 1910; CAB 41/32/62, June 15, 1910.

52One hundred ninety-six MP’s signed a memorial to the Prime Minister in support of the bill.
C. C, July 7, 1910; The Times, June, 29, 1910.

53The Nuwss invited a number of its most noted supporters to sit on the platform at the
meeting. Among these was George Bernard Shaw, who refused this invitation in his own inimitable
manner: “My presence on the platform would be of no use unless I were labelled; and if I were, the
audience would be so irritated at seeing me sitting there without hearing a speech from me that it would
probably move an amendment in opposition to the Bill and carry it. Besides, I shall not be in town that
Tuesday.” FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, G. B. Shaw to Philippa Strachey, June 23, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

54FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Lady Frances Balfour, June 27, 1910,
Fawcett Library, London.

55National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p. 19.

56FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Walter McLaren to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 30, 1910, Fawcett
Library, London.

57Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “The Parliamentary Situation on Mr. Shackleton’s Bill,”

Englishwoman, 6 (July 1910): 243.

58Circulars of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Circular from Philippa Strachey,
May 19, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

59Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, Circular issued by the National Union
of Women’s Suffrage Societies and signed by Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 28, 1910. On June 27, the
day of the meeting, Asquith had not yet announced his intentions regarding the Conciliation Bill.

60Ibid.

61Ibid., H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, June 30, [1910].

62July 16 Fawcett sent a confidential memo to all Nuwss branches informing them that
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence had asked the Nuwss to participate in a WSPU demonstration scheduled
for July 23. She said she had accepted the invitation provisionally on condition that the WSPU agreed to
abstain from militancy until after that time but that the WSPU had refused to make such an agreement.
FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Circular from Millicent Garrett Fawcett, July 16, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

63Helena Swanwick, I Have Been Young [London 1935], p. 189.

64Dame Margery Corbett-Ashby, a former member of the Nuwss executive committee,

repeatedly emphasized the point that the Nuwss was a completely democratic body. The executive
committee, which was elected by representatives from the Nuwss branches, made its decisions
collectively, and no individual, including Fawcett, ever completely dominated it. By contrast, Dame
Margery spoke of the autocracy of the WSPU, and referred to it as “pure tyranny.” (In conversation,
December 4, 1974).

65Swanwick, p. 192. It must be emphasized that, except on rare occasions, the NUWSS
hostility to the militants did not extend to the Women’s Freedom League. Like the NUWSS, the
Women’s Freedom League (WFL) was a democratic organization. It was a much smaller organization
than the WSPU, and its activities were much less publicized. Although it engaged in militancy, it never
went to the extremes of the WSPU; to a large extent, it lived in the shadow of the WSPU. The
NUWSS executive felt great admiration and respect for Charlotte Despard, the leader of the WFL, and
her sister, Katherine Harley, was in fact a member of the NUWSS executive committee.

66Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Report of Proceedings of

the Council Meeting Held at the Victoria Rooms, Bristol, on Friday, July 1st, 1910, pp.1–2, Fawcett
Library, London.

67Circulars of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Circular to the local committees,
July 1, 1910; Circular to MP’s, July 5, 1910; Fawcett Library, London.

68FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, K. D. Courtney to Philippa Strachey, July 2, 1910; Elsie Inglis to Philippa
Strachey, July 7, 1910; Fawcett Library, London. The Times, July 11, 1910; North of England Society for
Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1910, p. 17.

69See, for example, Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Sir
Samuel Scott to H. M. Phipson, July 8, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

70H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 11, .1910, cc. 41-48.

71The suffragists exaggerated Churchill’s support for their cause. Churchill, as his biographer
notes, was at best ambivalent toward the movement. Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2
(Boston, 1967), p. 379. The saga of Churchill and the Conciliation Bill is fully told in Randolph S.
Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Companion vol. 2, part 3 (Boston, 1967), pp. 1427-56.

72Under the provisions of the bill, most married women could not receive the vote since they
could not qualify as joint-occupiers. The Committee had framed the bill in this manner because it felt
that the House would not consent to the enfranchisement of between six and seven million women.
 73H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 12, 1912, cc. 221-24. Brailsford had told Churchill, before the
debate, that if he was really worried about large-scale faggot voting, the Committee would be willing to
amend the bill so that a husband and wife could not be qualified in respect of premises situated in the
same constituency. Churchill opposed the bill, not for the reasons he stated in the debate, but because he
feared his party’s interests would be hurt by the Bill. See Winston S. Churchill, Companion vol. 2, part 3,
pp. 1444 and 1453.

74H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 12, 1910, c. 308. The bill had been committed with a restricted
title so that it would take up as little of the House’s time as possible. Lloyd George’s objections, like
Churchill’s, were, in truth, based on considerations of party advantage. Lewis Harcourt, who organized
the antisuffragist opposition to the bill, had persuaded Lloyd George to speak against it. Brian Harrison,
Separate Spheres, p. 165.

75H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 12, 1910, c. 249.

76Ibid., c. 251.

77Ibid., c. 323.

78ibid., c. 318.

79The Times, July 14, 1910. The vote was as follows: For—161 Lib., 87 Cons., 31 Lab., 20
Nat. Against—60 Lib., 113 Cons., 2 Lab., 14 Nat.

80The decision to send the bill to a committee of the Whole House instead of to a standing
committee meant the Government would have to find time and grant special facilities for the committee
stage on the floor of the House. Normally when a bill passed its second reading, it was sent to a Grand
Committee, which sat while the House of Commons was transacting other business; thus, the committee
stage could proceed without special facilities. The vote to refer the bill to a Committee of the Whole
House was as follows: For—125 Lib., 175 Cons., 5 Lab., 15 Nat; 118 MP’s who voted for the bill also
voted to refer it to a Committee of the Whole House: 59 Lib., 55 Cons., and 4 Lab.

81Some members maintained that they voted to refer the bill to a Committee of the Whole
House, not because they wished to bury it but because they believed franchise bills were too important
to be sent to a Grand Committee. See H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 29, 1910, c. 2599.

82The Times, July 14, 1910.

83The NUWSS dubbed Lloyd George “the wrecker” and Churchill “the contortionist.” c. c,
July 28 and August 4, 1910.

84FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, July 14, 1910,
Fawcett Library, London.
 85The Times, July 14 and 16, 1910. Brailsford commented icily: “It has apparently escaped
the notice of our Liberal critics that our Bill was expressly framed to meet their objections to the old
Suffrage Bill.” H. N. Brailsford, “The Tactics of Woman Suffrage,” The Nation, July 23, 1910, p. 596.

86The Times, July 21, 1910.

87Ibid., July 28, 1910.

88H. c. Deb. 5s, vol. 19, July 28, 1910, c. 2339.

89The WSPU was, indeed, at this time hinting that it intended to end the truce. See Leventhal,
p. 139.

90Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Helena Swanwick to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, June 22, 1910.

91C. C., August 4, 1910.

92C. C., September 22 and October 20, 1910; North of England Society for Women’s
Suffrage, Annual Report, 1910, p. 17.

93FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Circular from the Bertha Mason, [September 1910], Fawcett Library,
London; c. c, August 11, 1910.

94FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, October 18, 1910,
Fawcett Library, London; see also Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Fawcett Library, London, passim.

95Papers of Catherine Marshall, Cumbria County Record Office, Carlisle, Cumberland, H. N.

Brailsford to Catherine Marshall, August 12 and August 20, 1910 (hereafter cited as Marshall Papers);
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report and Rules of the North Western
Federation, 1910–1911 (Carlisle, 1911), p. 8. Catherine Marshall, chairman of the North Western
Federation, came from a staunchly Liberal family and thus enjoyed good relations with the Women’s
Liberal Association. Howard had introduced an Adult Suffrage Bill in 1909.

96Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Philippa Strachey to H. N.

Brailsford, September 20 and October 21, 1910, Fawcett Library, London; North of England Society for
Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1910, p. 18, C. C, October 20, 1910.

97c. c., October 20, 1910.

98FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Circular from Bertha Mason, August 3, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

99The Times, September 29, 1910. Brailsford was irate at these accusations and accused
Lloyd George of being blatantly insincere in his protestations of friendship for women’s suffrage. He
declared that, if given the chance, Lloyd George would indefinitely postpone women’s suffrage: “His
alternative is to wait first until the constitutional question is settled, then until the Welsh Church is
disestablished, and at that distant date to bring in a Bill for which there is in the House no majority, and
from the suffrage societies no backing.” Manchester Guardian, October 3, 1910.

100C. C, November 3, 1910. Brailsford had urged Birrell to come out with a strong statement
in favor of granting full facilities to the bill, if not this session, next session. He told Birrell that the
Committee was prepared to open the title of the bill, although this might mean that Lloyd George would
so amend it that all Tory support would be lost. PRO, Papers of Edward, Viscount Grey of Falloden, F0
800/99, H. N. Brailsford to Augustine Birrell [1910], enclosed in a letter from Augustine Birrell to Sir
Edward Grey, November 2, 1910.

101The Times, November 14, 1910.

102C. C, November 17, 1910.

103FLAC, vol. 1, Hiii, Circular from T. G. Whitehead, November 5, 1910, Fawcett Library,
London.

104National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, pp. 22–23.

105On November 17 Asquith informed Lytton that, owing to lack of time, no further facilities
would be granted to the bill that session. The Conciliation Committee took Asquith at his word and
declared the bill dead for 1910. The Times, November 18, 1910.

106Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, November 11, [1910].

107Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, 1, November 9, 1910.

108FLAC, vol. 1, Hiii, Lord Lytton to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, November 17, 1910, Fawcett
Library, London. The Nevinson Journals indicate that Lytton had arranged a meeting with Asquith and

109Rosen, pp. 138–39.

110Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, November 29, 1910.

111H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 20, November 22, 1910, cc. 272–73.

112The Times, November 23, 1910.

113H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 20, November 22, 1910, cc. 272–73.

114TheTimes, November 23, 1910.

 115Ibid., November 24, 1910.

116FLAC, vol. 1, Hiii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, November 24,
1910, Fawcett Library, London.

117Ibid., Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Lady Frances Balfour, November 28, 1910.

118C. C., December 1, 1910.

119FLAC, vol. 1, Hiii, Copy of the resolutions passed at the Special Council of the NUWSS,
November 26, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

120Manchester Guardian, September 26, 1910; C. C., November 24, 1910; North of England
Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1910, pp. 20–21; The Times, November 28 and 30, 1910.
Belloc’s biographer contends that Belloc’s withdrawal had nothing to do with women’s suffrage, but the
fact that the Liberal machine replaced Belloc with a candidate who was very conciliatory to the
suffragists indicates that the suffrage issue did influence the selection of candidates at South Salford.
See Robert Speaight, Hilaire Belloc (New York, 1957), pp. 293–95.

121FLAC, vol. 1, Hiii, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Lady Frances Balfour, November 28,
1910, Fawcett Library, London.

122C. C., December 8 and 15, 1910. The poll at Camlachie was as follows: Halford
Mackinder (Cons.), 3,479; James Hogge (Lib.), 3,453; James Kessack (Lab.), 1,439; and William
Mirlees (W.S.), 35. Thus, Mackinder, the antisuffragist, won the election by only 26 votes. The poll at
East St. Pancras was as follows: Joseph Martin (Lib.), 3,891; John Hopkins (Cons.), 3,038; and Herbert
Jacobs (W.S.), 22. The full particulars of the East St. Pancras election are contained in the
Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage relating to the East St. Pancras Election,
Fawcett Library, London.

123See H. C. Sessional Papers, 1911 (lxii) (272).

124David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts, 1900–1968, p. 141.

125Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “The Political Outlook for Women’s Suffrage,” Englishwoman,
9 (January 1911): 2; C. C., February 9, 1911; Daily Chronicle, February 25, 1911. The NUWSS
estimated there were 323 supporters of women’s suffrage in the old House of Commons. In the new
House of Commons it estimated there were 246 “resolute supporters” of women’s suffrage, 120 “less
reliable” supporters, 42 adult suffragists, 65 neutrals, and 193 opponents.

126National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1909, pp. 42–43; National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, pp. 44–45. Because of the tremendous
growth which it had sustained, the NUWSS restructured its organization in 1910 and established
federations composed of all its affiliated societies within a given area. Each federation was headed by a
committee consisting of one representative from each society in its area, and one representative from
the NUWSS executive. The federation committees were instructed to promote the formation of new
societies, and to secure cooperation among the branch societies in their respective areas. Twice a year
conferences were held between representatives of all the federation committees and members of the
NUWSS executive. The federation scheme strengthened the ties between societies within a given area,
and enabled them to coordinate their activities. The formation of federations improved and consolidated
the local organization of the NUWSS, and it enabled the NUWSS executive to discharge its supervisory
and directorial duties more efficiently. Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,
Report of the Annual Council of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, March 19, 1910,
Fawcett Library, London. By the end of 1910, there were fifteen federations in the NUWSS. National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.

127National union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1909, p. 40; National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1910, p. 44. The London Society for Women’s
Suffrage and the North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage had greatly increased their incomes:

1909 1910
LSWS £2,275–0–6 £3,358–2–2
NESWS £l,099–2–0–½ £1,925–18–3–½

London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1909, p. 18, and Annual Report, 1910, pp. 16–
17; North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1909, p. 51, and Annual Report,
1910, p. 67.

128North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1910, p. 31.8

129Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, December 3, [1910].8

130Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, January 2, 1911.

 CHAPTER IV

1911–1912: THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES

From January 1911 to March 1912, the NUWSS continued the long,
slow task of pushing the Conciliation Bill. The close alliance with the
Conciliation Committee, the intransigence and procrastination of the
Government, and the disagreements with the militants—all that had been part
of the struggle in 1910—were to be repeated again in 1911 and 1912. But
there were changes. The NUWSS, severely tried by the Government’s
duplicitous attitude to the Conciliation Bill, lost all confidence in the Liberal
Party. And as the antics of the militants grew wilder, the NUWSS and the
Conciliation Committee finally had to abandon any hope that the unity of the
suffrage movement could be preserved. During this period the NUWSS came
of age as an organization. It firmly established its leadership in the suffrage
movement and developed the confidence to break away from its own past and
forge a new strategy for winning the vote.

As 1911 opened, it was clear to the NUWSS that the prospects for
the Conciliation Bill in the new year were at best uncertain.1 On the positive
side, there were more suffragists in the new House than there had been in the
old, and the distribution of seats continued to favor a nonparty measure along
the lines of the Conciliation Bill.2 Asquith had pledged that facilities would
be given in the new Parliament for effectively proceeding with a bill for
women’s suffrage. The promise was vague, but the suffragists hoped they
could convince the Prime Minister to honor it this session: the Parliament Bill
would be out of the way by summer and time would be available for facilities
for the Conciliation Bill. There was even a good chance that Asquith might
resign because of difficulties with the Parliament Bill, and that Haldane or
Grey, both suffragists, would replace him.3 if that were to happen, the outlook
for the Conciliation Bill would improve dramatically.

Although loath to admit it, the NUWSS recognized that the liabilities
of the Conciliation Bill far outweighed its assets. In January 1911 Cabinet
support for women’s suffrage was on the wane. Both Grey and Lloyd George
had refused to promise to work for facilities for any women’s suffrage bill in
1911 and confidently predicted that other issues would fully occupy the
Government for the next two years.4 Uncertainty about the intentions of the
militants compounded the suffragists’ worries about the Cabinet. The WSPU
had not yet agreed to extend its truce with the Government, and a resumption
of militancy would only arouse antagonism within the Cabinet and endanger
the Conciliation Bill. Augustine Birrell, a suffragist, claimed that the WSPU’s
November raids had incensed Liberal suffragists and admitted to C. P. Scott,
the editor of the Manchester Guardian, that he was so enraged by their actions
that he was “quite prepared to see the suffrage question shelved in this
Parliament and indefinitely postponed.”5 If the Conciliation Bill was to be
successful in the House of Commons, it would need the support of a large
block of Liberal MP’s; thus, the suffragists could not risk the alienation of
Liberal votes.

Within the Liberal Party the adult suffragists were encouraging their
suffragist colleagues to jettison the Conciliation Bill. Led by W. H. Dickinson,
a cabal of Liberals agitated for a women’s suffrage bill that would
enfranchise married women as joint occupiers with their husbands; such a
measure would add some 6,000,000 women to the electorate.6 Not
surprisingly, this proposal appealed to many Liberal and Labour MP’s who
considered the Conciliation Bill too narrow and feared that the women whom
it would enfranchise would vote for the Tory Party. The NUWSS and the
Conciliation Committee opposed the Dickinson plan because they thought it
was too extreme to pass the House of Commons: moderate suffragists would
never support such a sweeping measure, and most Conservatives would
regard it as anathema. Yet, if such a measure was available as an alternative
to the Conciliation Bill, many members of the Liberal and Labour parties
would favor the more radical proposal.7

Added to the machinations of the adult suffragists, the indifference of

Liberal ministers, and the threat of renewed militancy, the Conciliation Bill
was also, it appeared, being threatened by the possibility of a referendum on
the subject of women’s suffrage. The National League for Opposing Woman’s
Suffrage (NLOWS) was urging Asquith to adopt this course, and supporters of
the Conciliation Bill feared that the Government were almost unanimous in
agreeing that women’s suffrage was a good subject for such a test.8 The
NUWSS was very pessismistic about the outcome of a referendum, and it
realized that an adverse vote on the question would kill the Conciliation Bill.9

Assessing the balance sheet on the Conciliation Bill, the NUWSS

recognized that there was little hope for the measure in 1911. The suffragists
were reasonably confident that the measure would be given a second reading,
but doubted that it would get any further facilities. They decided that they must
continue their partnership with the Conciliation Committe nonetheless and
lobby for the bill—hoping, as before, that a show of public enthusiasm for the
measure combined with a substantial majority on the second reading might be
enough to persuade the Government to give the bill full facilities. This logic
may have underestimated Asquith’s perfervid opposition to the women’s
cause and overrated Liberal support for the Conciliation solution, but since
the Conciliation Bill, as the Labour Leader pointed out, still offered the only
hope for solving the suffrage question, it would have to be tried once again.
“Obviously the Bill is a compromise,” the Labour Leader noted, “—an
honourable compromise—but it is a measure not in the clouds but on the table
of the House of Commons, and is the only measure of Women’s Suffrage likely
to become law for some time.”10 There were also no indications that force,
rather than persuasion, would “squeeze” the Government to look more
favorably on the women’s cause: neither the stick of the militants nor the
carrot of the constitutionalists provided the key to the tactical dilemma of
how, in 1911, the women could wrest women’s suffrage from the House of
Commons.

Throughout the first weeks of 1911, preparations went ahead for the
first reading of the Conciliation Bill. Unfortunately, none of the MP’s who
were pledged to bring in the bill had been successful in the ballot, but through
a comic twist of fate, the member who had won first place in the ballot
withdrew, and Sir George Kemp (Lib., N.W. Manchester), who had won
second place, was prevailed upon by the NUWSS, and its affiliate, the
Manchester Society for Women’s Suffrage, to introduce the bill.11 In an effort
to appease the bill’s critics and to obtain wider support for the measure, the
Conciliation Committee had made some not insignificant modifications in the
original bill: the £10 qualification had been dropped, and, with an eye to
Asquith and Lloyd George, the Committee had altered the title so that the bill
could be amended; also, to eliminate Churchills’ bogy, the faggot vote, the
new bill prohibited a husband and wife from registering in the same
parliamentary borough or county constituency. As Brailsford noted, the
Conciliation Bill of 1911 embodied the simplest, most widely accepted
franchise—the household qualification. Describing the virtues of this
qualification, he wrote: “It is better understood than any other. It was the great
gift of Conservatives and Radicals in 1867. It will give a vote to every
woman, rich or poor, who is the head of her house, and the mistress of her
own offices—to every woman who is the tenant even of one room over which
she can prove that she has full control.”12

The first reading of the Conciliation Bill took place on February 9.13
As the suffragists expected, the bill passed this test and was scheduled to be
read a second time on May 5. The NUWSS was confident that the bill would
pass its second reading as well, but it wanted it to do so with such a large
majority that the Government would seriously have to consider granting
additional facilities to the bill that session. Thus, from February to May, the
NUWSS lobbied to win support for the bill.

As in 1910, the NUWSS worked in close cooperation with the

Conciliation Committee and used its own large network of affiliates to
propagandize for the bill in the constituencies. At Brailsford’s behest the
NUWSS also directed all its affiliates to obtain resolutions in support of the
Conciliation Bill from town, county, and district councils, the object being to
convince the councils “to petition for facilities for the Bill.”14 The affiliates
attacked this challenge with great enthusiasm and persuaded 146 councils to
support the bill.15 The London Society for Women’s Suffrage maintained that
the resolutions pressured MP’s into supporting the bill and produced statistics
which showed a direct correlation between the council resolutions and the
votes of MP’s.16

The NUWSS also directly confronted Members of the Bouse and

asked their support for the bill.17 In this work, as with the council resolutions,
the NUWSS kept in close touch with the Conciliation Committee and put its
organizational resources at the Committee’s disposal. Brailsford supplied the
NUWSS with the names of MP’s whose vote on the second reading was in
some doubt, and the NUWSS in turn sent on information about the attitudes of
MP’s to the affiliates, asking them to give special attention to those who
seemed to be wavering in their support for the bill. The affiliates then
painstakingly courted MP’, by both letter and deputation, duly reporting the
results of the se labors to headquarters.18 When the vote came on the second
reading of the bill, many of the affiliates claimed that their work had directly
influenced the votes of MP’s.l9

To capture the attention of the House of Commons and win public

support for the bill, the NUWSS sponsored a variety of suffrage activities in
the winter and spring of 1911—public meetings, garden parties, at-homes, and
suffrage plays—and it also sponsored a National Convention in London to
dramatize support for the measure.20 The convention, attended by 268
representatives from the affiliates, drafted a resolution demanding full
facilities for the bill.21 In addition to the se activities, the NUWSS
participated in seven byelections, using these occasions to work for the return
of candidates who supported the bill.22 It sent speakers to women’s
organizations, such as the Women’s Liberal Association and the Women’s Co-
Operative Guild, to enlist their support for the measure, and it took particular
pains to strengthen its ties with the Irish Women’s Suffrage and Local
Government Society.23 The NUWSS recognized that the Nationalists could
prove influential in persuading the Prime Minister to give full facilities to the
bill, and it hoped to work through the Irish suffrage organization to secure the
support of Irish MP’s.24 During the spring of 1911, the NUWSS not only
worked to promo to the bill but also tried to subvert the strategems of the
NLOWS, which was promoting its referendum scheme and, using the argument
that women did net want the vote, was urging MP’s to vote against the
Conciliation Bill. The NUWSS’ counterargument was that it was unfair to
make women’s suffrage a “legislative experiment.”25 Through all these
various activities the NUWSS tried to strengthen the hand of the Conciliation
Committee in negotiating with the Liberal Government. It continued to work
right up to the eve of May 5, the day that had been set for the second reading.

In contrast to July 1910, the debate on May 5 was almost dull. When
Sir George Kemp presented the Conciliation Bill for its second reading, the
front benches were nearly empty because, in the interests of saving time, the
leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties had decided not to participate
in the debate.26 Looking at the empty benches, Lord Hugh Cecil (Cons.,
Oxford Univ.) drily observed: “From the appearance of the Front Benches it
would seem that the Olympians have determined to leave the contest and to let
the Greeks and the Trojans fight it out themselves.”27 But there was no fight
and it seemed as if the MP’s were so certain of the outcome of the debate that
they were disinclined to exert themselves. Supporters of the bill continued to
emphasize its democratic aspects; in a play for Liberal votes, they promised
that if the bill passed, neither its sponsors nor the women’s suffrage societies
would demand an immediate dissolution but would be prepared to wait until
the next General Election to bring in the new register.28 Representing the
suffragist camp, Lord Hugh Cecil sternly warned the Government that many
Members would be extremely displeased if the bill passed its second reading
only to be denied further facilities: “… the House of Commons, to which the
Government are always offering incense, though they offer very little besides,
and to which they show the utmost respect in words, should be allowed a full
and fair opportunity of deciding upon this great issue.”29 On the antisuffragist
side, opponents of the bill devoted much time to expatiating on “the role of
women” but, unlike 1910, made few damaging criticisms of the provisions of
the bill.30

When the vote came, the optimism of the Conciliation Committee and
the NUWSS proved more than justified; 255 MP’s voted for the bill, while
only 88 voted against it.31 Analyzing the vote, the NUWSS noted there were
108 MP’s whom it considered suffragists who did not vote or pair on May 5,
and 11 MP’s who it thought favored the suffrage cause but voted or paired
against the bill; in the future the NUWSS would pay particular attention to
those 119 MP’s.32 The affiliates of the NUWSS were delighted by the
successful vote and felt that their work had helped produce the large
majority.33 Brailsford shared their jubilance and declared that the “superb
division” was “the fruit of all the unremitting work which women all over the
country had been doing.”34 Fawcett was equally exuberant and wrote Lady
Frances Balfour, “Yes, it really is quite glorious and I feel we are nearing the
end of our long fight.”35

Both Brailsford and Fawcett, for all their delight at the victory, were
very aware that the successful division did not guarantee that the Government
would give time to the bill; a re-enactment of 1910 was entirely possible.
Brailsford was anxious to persuade Cabinet ministers to support the demand
for facilities—particularly the Chancellor of the Exchecquer, Lloyd George,
whose well-known powers of persuasion would be very useful. Brailsford
urged the NUWSS to do everything possible to cajole their old opponent
Lloyd George into their camp and suggested that flattery and praise for the
insurance scheme might beguile him into working for facilities for the
Conciliation Bill: “He is sore at all the treatment he has received from
suffragists both militant and nonmilitant. That phase was inevitable and even
salutory. But l see the chance of ending it. I think the insurance scheme is the
golden opportunity. The moment he thinks he can be the hero of the women of
England our Bill will pass.”36

Like Brailsford, Fawcett was determined to do everything possible

to press the Government for facilities for the bill: she was concerned that if
the Conciliation Bill did not pass through all its stages this session, it would
not receive the protection of the provisions of the parliament bill before the
next dissolution.37 At her direction NUWSS headquarters ordered the
affiliates to try and persuade MP’s to lobby for parliamentary time for the bill.
Edith Palliser, parliamentary secretary of the NUWSS, urged the branches to
pay special attention to Liberal MP’s, and she asked them to work through
both Men’s and Women’s Liberal Associations to press for facilities. The
NUWSS predicted that the more “pressure we can bring to bear from the
constituencies upon the prime Minister am the MPs,” the greater the
likelihood that time would be given to the Conciliation Bill.38

Throughout May the pressure on the Government to grant facilities to

the Conciliation Bill increased. Such diverse groups as the London University
Convocation, the Dublin Corporation, and the Women’s Liberal Federation
urged the Government to give time for the bill.39 Suffragist MP’s convincingly
argued that there was time available, and one such MP, Lord Robert Cecil,
pointed out that this was the ideal moment for Parliament to enact a women’s
suffrage bill:

Everyone knows that it is inconceivable that any better opportunity

than the present will be found for giving effect to that pledge. will the
Government act up to their promises, or are we to he met by further
evasions? We heard much recently about the difference between the
 male and female sense of honour. If facilities for the Bill are again
withheld, women may rightly thank God that such a difference exists.40

The Committee of Liberal Suffragist MP’s echoed Cecil’s sentiments

and urged Asquith to grant the time necessary to carry the bill through all its
stages. The Conciliation Committee pressed the Prime Minister to receive a
deputation to discuss the bill; if Asquith hedged on the question of facilities,
the Committee intended to ask for time to put the matter to a division of the
House by way of a resolution reaffirming its desire to proceed effectively
with the bill this year. Sir Edward Grey had promised that if such a resolution
were carried, he would ask that the bill be given a week in August.41

Faced by this clamorous demand for facilities, the Government could

not indefinitely postpone consideration of the fate of the Conciliation Bill. On
May 14 the Cabinet held a long discussion about the bill. Grey, Runciman,
Haldane, and Birrell wanted the House to decide by vote whether it wished to
proceed with the bill this year, while Loreburn, Lloyd George, and McKenna
—supported by a majority of the Cabinet—opposed the suggestion. A final
decision on the matter was postponed until the following week.42 On May 24
the Cabinet again examined the issue and decided to refuse the Conciliation
Bill additional facilities in the current session; it agreed, however, “to
undertake to give a week for its consideration (after second reading) in next
session.43 The ostensible reason for the Government’s decision was lack of
time: the Government maintained it could not give facilities to the bill without
endangering other legislative proposals. But the real reasons were highly
political: divisions within the party, and, more particularly, within the
Cabinet, over the question of women’s suffrage, as well as reservations about
the provisions of the bill and the possible effect of the bill on the fortunes of
the Liberal Party. On May 29 Lloyd George announced the Cabinet’s decision
in the House of Commons: “… they could not allot to the Woman Suffrage Bill
this year such an amount of time as its importance demands. They will be
prepared next session, when the Bill has again been read a second time… to
give a week (which they understand to be the time suggested as reasonable by
the promoters), for its further stages.”44

Not surprisingly, this announcement infuriated the Conciliation

Committee and the NUWSS. At Brailsford’s suggestion the NUWSS executive
issued a resolution expressing its belief that the Government had once again
betrayed the suffragists. The scenario was altogether too familiar to the
NUWSS; the Government had given pledges to the suffragists, the bill had
passed its second reading, the Government had waffled on its promises, and
the Conciliation Bill had once again been postponed. The suffragists were
uneasy about the “week” promised to the bill next session and wanted the
Government to clarify the particulars. Did the Government mean a week for
all stages, or only for the committee stage? Would it provide for a closure
resolution? Would it give time for the third reading of the bill early in the
session so that the bill could go to the House of Lords that session? Until the
Government elaborated on these questions, Lloyd George’s vague promise
would not satisfy the suffragists.45

Sir Edward Grey’s reply on June 1 was convincing enough to raise

the morale of the whole suffrage movement.46 Grey assured the suffragists that
this was not another “bogus offer,” and that the week promised to the bill
would be “elastic”; the Government had, he declared, given a “real
opportunity” to the suffragists.47 On June 17 the doubts of the suffragists were
further allayed and their spirits buoyed by a letter from Asquith to Lytton
which substantiated Grey’s declaration:

It follows that “the week” offered will be interpreted with

reasonable elasticity, that the Government will interpose no obstacle
to a proper use of closure, and that if, as you suggest, the Bill gets
through Committee in the time proposed, the extra days required for
Report and Third Reading would not be refused.
The Government, though divided in opinion on the merits of the
Bill, are unanimous in their determination to give effect, not only in the
letter, but in the spirit, to the promise in regard to facilities which I
made on their behalf before the last General Election.48

Thus in the summer of 1911, the NUWSS was more optimistic about
the fate of the Conciliation Bill than it had ever been before: Asquith and
Grey had disseminated the “mist of ambiguities” surrounding the question of
facilities for the Conciliation Bill and had convinced the suffragists that there
was a “real opportunity” for this measure.49 Although the executive committee
had decided to abandon all efforts to gain a further hearing for the bill in the
current parliamentary session, its members were confident that the bill would
go through all its stages in the first session of 1912.50 Fawcett declared, “we
are higher up on the ladder of success than we have ever been before.”51

The WSPU was quite as jubilant as the NUWSS. Christabel

Pankhurst described Asquith’s pronouncement as “a pledge upon which
women can base the expectation of taking part as voters in the election of the
next and every future Parliament,” and the WSPU, “full of hope and joy” and
confident of the Government’s good intentions, suspended its anti-Liberal by-
election policy.52 The old spirit of unity among the suffragists, for two years
so missing, reappeared. On June 17 the suffrage organizations staged a
spectacular procession which demonstrated both the magnitude and the new
cohesiveness of the movement; 40,000 women, stretched in a procession five
miles long, marched from the Embankment to the Albert Hall. The Times
commented: “The surprise of the demonstration, however, was the unexpected
strength of the constitutionalists which it showed. The Women’s Social and
Political Union and the Women’s Freedom League combined were
outnumbered and overshadowed by the National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies.”53 Here was a testimonial to all the work that the NUWSS had done
on behalf of the Conciliation Bill.

In a very real sense the suffragists’ optimism about the prospects of

women’s suffrage was justified. Within the Cabinet suffragist sentiment was
growing stronger. Although Asquith was still adamantly opposed to the very
idea of women’s suffrage, he had given a public pledge that the Conciliation
Bill would have full facilities next session; it seemed unlikely that the Prime
Minister would renege on so explicit a promise. Churchill and Lloyd George
were a problem, of course. The NUWSS had given up all hope of converting
Churchill, but it had not yet written off Lloyd George and believed it could
woo him to support the bill. As Brailsford had pointed out, Lloyd George was
perhaps the most influential man in the Liberal Party, and his approval of the
bill would carry considerable weight with his colleagues.

As the summer wore on, the NUWSS grew even more hopeful about
the prospects of women’s suffrage in the next session. In August the
Government at last won their battle with the House of Lords. With the passage
of the Parliament Act, the Liberals could no longer use the constitutional
crisis as an excuse to delay women’s suffrage; moreover, the Government
could now attend to other parts of their program, including electoral reform.
The Court of Appeals reversal of the Kent versus Fittall decision, with its
redefinition of “the latchkey voter,” combined with the Liberals’ desire to
eliminate the plural voter, virtually guaranteed that the Government would
introduce some measure of electoral reform in the next session of
Parliament.54 Given the suffragist sentiment in the Cabinet, it would be
difficult for the Government to tackle this issue without considering the claims
of the proponents of women’s suffrage.

Finally, the NUWSS believed that the militants’ decision to continue

the truce could not but help the suffrage cause. The suggragettes’ violent
actions, and their anti-Liberal by-election policy, had outraged many MP’s,
while providing others with a convenient excuse to oppose the Conciliation
Bill. With suffragists and suffragettes joined in a united front, opponents of
women’s suffrage could no longer play one faction of the suffrage movement
against the other nor use militancy as a “red flag” to wave in front of MP’s to
encourage them to oppose women’s suffrage. In the summer of 1911, the
NUWSS began, on an unprecedented scale, to cooperate with the militants,
working with them at by-elections and staging meetings and processions
throughout the country.55 The divisions of the past were forgotten; the display
of unity could only be an asset to the suffrage movement.

From July to October 1911, the NUWSS concentrated its energies on

building up parliamentary support for the Conciliation Bill. Although the bill
would not come before the House of Commons until 1912, the NUWSS
believed that continuous pressure must be applied on MP’s to ensure a
sucessful vote on the bill: the task before the NUWSS was “the consolidation
of the majority for the Conciliation Bill.”56 As in the past, the local affiliates
sent deputations to MP’s, sponsored meetings and lectures, organized
suffragist caravan tours, did propaganda work among a variety of political
associations, sent speakers to social and educational groups, and worked at
by-elections.57 NUWSS headquarters continued to keep in close contact with
the Conciliation Committee, and Brailsford depended on the suffrage
organization both to lobby for the bill and to act as a liaison between the
commitee and the parliamentary constituencies.58
 Most of the NUWSS propagandist and lobbying activities in this
period were directed toward the Liberal Party. The July Council of the
NUWSS ordered the affiliates to devote special attention to the local Liberal
associations, particularly the Women’s Liberal Federation, and to persuade
them to pressure Liberal MP’s to support the Conciliation Bill.59 The main
threat to the Conciliation Bill would be within the Liberal Party, notably
Liberal MP’s who wished to “widen” the bill; by Brailsford’s estimate, the
fate of the bill depended on the votes of seventy to eighty Liberals who were
good suffragists, but had qualms about the narrowness of the Conciliation
Bill.60 The NUWSS realized that the bill was limited, but continued to feel
that, without the official support of the Liberal Party, no wider suffrage
measure would pass the House of Commons. The Conciliation Bill had been
successful both in 1910 and 1911 because it commanded Conservative
support, and the NUWSS predicted that any attempt to widen the measure
would alienate the Tories.61 As Brailsford noted, if this happened, “the Bill
from that moment is lost.”62

Doubts about the solidity of Liberal support for the Conciliation Bill
had been confirmed on July 19, when the NUWSS received word that the
Liberal suffragists were considering adopting a bill that would enfranchise
householders and wives of householders, or, if this proved infeasible, would
attempt to attach “widening” amendments to the Conciliation Bill. This was a
political ploy of Lloyd George’s. At Brailsford’s request the NUWSS
contacted all Liberal MP’s, reminding them that the authors of the Conciliation
Bill had already made concessions to the Liberals and that there were not
enough Liberal suffragists to carry a measure which did not take into account
Conservative prejudices; if the Liberal suffragists wished a more
comprehensive measure of women’s suffrage, they would have the opportunity
to secure this when the Government introduced its proposed Reform Bill.63
Fortunately, the NUWSS arguments proved persuasive and the Liberal
suffragists voted to continue their support for the Conciliation Bill.64

Lloyd George was a tenacious combatant, however, and the

persuasive powers of this “Welsh wizard” seemed endless. His hints that he
might be able to convince the Government to give official support to the
Conciliation Bill if its provisions were extended were very alarming.65 In
August the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House of Commons
that the Government’s promise of facilities did not apply exclusively to the
Conciliation Bill, but to any women’s suffrage bill which passed a second
reading and could be amended.66 Much to the suffragists’ relief, Asquith let it
be known that he was standing by his June promise. Lytton wrote Fawcett:
“Mr. Lloyd George is quietly put aside and there can no longer be any
question that the promise was given to our Bill and will be fulfilled in due
course.”67

But Lloyd George was far from having been “quietly put aside.”
Ostensibly, Lloyd George opposed the Conciliation scheme because it
discriminated against the working class, but his real reason was political: he
feared the bill would benefit the Tories. In June 1911, Lloyd George had told
C. P. Scott that he favored giving the vote to all joint householders, and that he
felt he could rally the party behind such a measure.68 By September he was
considering his women’s suffrage scheme within the context of large–scale
electoral reform. On September 5 he wrote the Master of Elibank and asked
him to ascertain the Liberal agents’ opinions on the defects of the present
electoral system. Lloyd George was particularly concerned about the
Conciliation Bill and complained that it would add “hundreds of thousands of
votes” to the Conservative Party:

I think the Liberal Party ought to make up its mind as a whole that it
will either have an extended franchise which would put working
men’s wives on to the Register, as well as spinsters and widows, or
that it will have no female franchise at all…. we are likely to find
ourselves in the position of putting this wretched Conciliation Bill
through the House of Commons, sending it to the Lords, and eventually
getting it through. Say what you will, that spells disaster to Liberalism
and unless you take it in hand and take it at once, this catastrophe is
inevitable.69

Lloyd George’s worries were echoed by the Liberal agents, who,

according to J. Renwick Seager, head of the Registration Department at
Liberal headquarters, were “emphatically adverse” to the Conciliation Bill.70
 To Lloyd George the issue was clear-cut: either there would be no
women’s suffrage, or there would be a comprehensive measure of women’s
suffrage. Lloyd George was certainly not prepared to sacrifice the Liberal
Party for the women’s cause, but he did have some sympathy for the
suffragists and the goal they sought to achieve, and he therefore chose to work
for an extensive measure of women’s suffrage. He knew that although Asquith
would never agree to include women’s suffrage as part of a Government
Reform Bill, he would allow such a bill to be amended in favor of votes for
women and he believed that he could use his influence to push such
amendments through the House of Commons. The task would be to convince
the suffragists to jettison the Conciliation Bill and throw their support to his
plan of amending the Reform Bill. Accordingly, on October 26 Lloyd George
approached C. P. Scott with a “deal”: if supporters of the Conciliation Bill
would endorse his idea of a Reform Bill which could be amended to
enfranchise women, he would agree not to oppose the Conciliation Bill,
should such an amendment fail to pass the House of Commons. To make his
point clear, he threatened to use every means in his power to defeat the
Conciliation Bill if the suffragists rejected his plan; his opposition, he assured
Scott, combined with that of Churchill, Harcourt, Chamberlain, Smith, and
Long, would kill the Conciliation Bill.

At Lloyd George’s request Scott communicated this proposal to the

Conciliation Committee and the NUWSS.71 Brailsford was not enthusiastic
about the proposal. He was worried that the militants, who thoroughly
distrusted Lloyd George, would oppose any project connected with him;
moreover, he feared the Conservatives would desert the Conciliation Bill if
the Committee endorsed Lloyd George’s scheme.72 Caught between Scylla
and Charybdis, Brailsford assented to Lloyd George’s plan, with the proviso
that the Chancellor would promise to give active support to the Conciliation
Bill if the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill were defeated.
Obviously worried about the reaction of the WSPU, Brailsford was
determined to keep these negotiations with Lloyd George “absolutely secret”
until a firm agreement had been made.73

The reactions of the NUWSS were far more enthusiastic than those of
Brailsford. Courtney and Swanwick, whom Scott informed of the proposal,
“hailed the prospect as opening up a new and far better prospect of success”
and were confident that Fawcett would support the plan.74 The suffragists
were cognizant of Lloyd George’s immense prestige and felt that his active
involvement in the suffrage cause would be a tremendous asset; as Swanwick
wrote Maud Arncliffe–Sennett: “We have suffered immensely from the lack of
driving force within the House and if anything we can do can help to engage
Lloyd George so deeply that he can’t get out—why, I want to do it.”75
Whatever reservations some of the suffragists may have had privately about
Lloyd George’s morals or methods, they could not doubt his influence in the
party or in the Cabinet.76 The NUWSS had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade
prominent suffragists in the Cabinet, such as Haldane and Grey, to be more
vocal and active in espousing the cause.77 They had not expected support from
Lloyd George, but they certainly were prepared to look favorably on any
proposal which enlisted him in the suffragist ranks.

The women’s suffrage issue had forced the Government to “undertake

a comprehensive measure at a time when they would not otherwise have done
so for lack of parliamentary time”; on November 7 Asquith informed a group
of adult suffragists that next session the Government intended to introduce a
franchise bill that would give universal manhood suffrage.78 He assured them
that the bill could be amended to include votes for women. The NUWSS had
expected this announcement. After conferring with Brailsford, it issued a
statement which criticized the exclusion of women from the proposed Reform
Bill, and announced that the NUWSS would work to amend the bill in favor of
women; it added that the suffragist forces did not intend to abandon the
Conciliation Bill until they had seen how women fared in the Reform Bill.79

At this time the NUWSS had two immediate goals: to determine the
exact terms on which the Government would accept amendments to the
Reform Bill, and to enlist Cabinet support for the proposed women’s suffrage
amendments. On November 17, representatives from the NUWSS participated
in a deputation to Asquith, the purpose of which was to elicit information
about the Reform Bill. In answer to Fawcett’s queries, Asquith promised that
the Reform Bill would go through all its stages in 1912, and that it would be
drafted in such a way that women could be enfranchised on different
qualifications from those that enfranchised men. He pledged that the
Government would not oppose women’s suffrage amendments, and said that if
such an amendment were carried, the Government would regard it as an
integral part of the bill. This last promise was particularly important, because
it meant the Government would bear responsibility for piloting women’s
suffrage through the House of Lords.80

The NUWSS delegation left the interview feeling pleased at the way
in which Asquith had clarified his intentions in regard to the bill. The next
step was to convince members of the Cabinet to come out in strong support of
the women’s suffrage amendments: the chief targets were Lloyd George and
Sir Edward Grey, whom the NUWSS regarded as the linchpins of the suffrage
forces in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons. On November 7, the day
of Asquith’s “bombshell,” Brailsford had held a very satisfactory interview
with Lloyd George and the Master of Elibank; in the event the amendment
scheme failed, they had promised to use all their influence to secure a
moderate suffrage bill, such as the Conciliation Bill, and had said they could
keep Churchill and Redmond from opposing such a measure.81 Brailsford had
left the interview certain of victory.82 The NUWSS negotiations with Lloyd
George had also gone well. Swanwick had lunched with Scott and Lloyd
George on November 15 and had left the meeting convinced that the
Chancellor sincerely wished to help the suffragists. She wrote her husband:

He is very anxious to get us on his side, and of course we want him on

ours. He strikes me as amazingly quick and adaptable, indiscreet and
unscrupulous. I should never feel he wouldn’t throw anyone or
anything over if he saw something he wanted. But he wants to get this
done. He said with curious candour, “It’s the Conciliation Bill has
done it. I’m bound to confess it set me thinking of a practicable
measure to substitute for it. Now it’s blown into the air.” So I said,
“Don’t you believe it! It’s waiting round the corner for you unless you
give us something better,” and he answered, “Oh, I know, I’m going to
give you something better.”83

Two days later the Chancellor of the Exchequer told a group of

Liberal women that he was prepared to do all in his power to promote a
women’s suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill and that he would even be
willing to move the amendment.84 Shortly after this he promised the NUWSS
that he would speak at a meeting which was scheduled for February in the
Albert Hall, and sent a message of encouragement to the suffragists: “I am
willing to do all in my power to help those who are labouring to reach a
successful issue in the coming session. Next year provides the supreme
opportunity, and nothing but unwise handling of that chance can compass
failure.”85 On November 23 he intimated that he and other members of the
Government were prepared to stump for women’s suffrage throughout the
country.86

Sir Edward Grey echoed many of Lloyd George’s sentiments. Since

June, Grey, preoccupied with Agadir, had been very quiet on the subject of
women’s suffrage. Now at last he seemed ready to work for the women’s
cause. He assured Lytton that women’s suffrage had a much better chance of
being enacted by the amendment proposal than by the Conciliation Bill, and
hinted that he might move such an amendment. Grey added that he favored an
amendment which would enfranchise householders and wives of
householders, and indicated his willingness to campaign for such a measure.87

Grey’s pronouncement, combined with Asquith’s pledge and Lloyd

George’s promise of support, elated both the NUWSS and Brailsford.88 The
suffragists felt that they now had two strings to their bow. If the scheme to
amend the Reform Bill failed—and they had been assured that the Reform Bill
would precede the Conciliation Bill—they would still have the Conciliation
Bill; moreover, Lloyd George, the most powerful opponent of the Conciliation
Bill, now promised to support it.89 Brailsford regarded the “whole situation
as much more favourable” than it had been before Asquith’s announcement.90
Fawcett echoed his sentiments and wrote her niece, Louisa Garrett Anderson,
“We have the best chance of women’s suffrage next session that we have ever
had, by far.”91

On December 8 the NUWSS held a special council to map out

strategy. A great deal of discussion focused on the proposed amendments to
the Reform Bill. Brailsford, a guest at the meeting, informed the audience that
there would be a series of amendments to include women in the bill, and that
these amendments would be considered in descending order, with the most
comprehensive amendment first. He predicted that three amendments would
be moved: first, an amendment that would give votes to women on the same
terms as men; second, a “Norwegian amendment” which would enfranchise
householders and wives of householders; third, a “Conciliation” amendment
which would enfranchise women householders.92 Given Grey’s and Lloyd
George’s support for the Norwegian amendment, Brailsford felt that most
Liberals, Nationalists, and Labourites could be persuaded to support this
proposal and he seemed confident that it could be carried. He reminded the
Council that if all three amendments failed, there still remained the
Conciliation Bill to fall back on.93 Summing up the prospects, Brailsford
termed the suffragist position “incomparably more secure than we occupied a
month ago” and predicted that “we cannot fail to secure something as
substantial as the Conciliation Bill and we may reasonably hope for some
intermediate compromise immensely more satisfactory.”94 The council
resolved to “keep all options open” and to work for both the Conciliation Bill
and the amendments to the Reform Bill. Like Brailsford, the representatives of
the NUWSS seemed confident that some measure of women’s suffrage would
be enacted next session.95

Undoubtedly much of this optimism was inspired by the groundswell

of Liberal and Labour support for the suffrage cause. The suffragists had
every reason to be pleased by developments in the Liberal and Labour
parties. Ramsey MacDonald, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, had
promised that the Labour Party would do everything possible to put women’s
suffrage in the Reform Bill; equally important, the ILP had inaugurated a
“political equality campaign” in support of women’s suffrage and planned to
use its 800 branches to promote the suffrage cause.96 With the assistance of
leading members of the Liberal and Labour parties, the NUWSS and a number
of other women’s organizations had formed a central committee to coordinate
propaganda in support of women’s suffrage.97 Fawcett had also been able to
persuade Grey to promise to move an amendment to the Reform Bill, most
probably the Norwegian amendment. She was delighted with this pledge, for
she felt, quite correctly, that the Conservatives were more likely to support a
measure advocated by Grey than one by Lloyd George, whom they detested.98

By December 1911 the NUWSS had determined its primary goal: to

secure the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the Government Reform Bill. The
suffragists did, however, intend to keep the Conciliation Bill alive for two
reasons. They wanted to make sure that the Liberals, spurred on by fear of the
Conciliation Bill, would work hard for a women’s suffrage amendment to the
Reform Bill, and they intended to use the Conciliation Bill as a “safety
valve,” should the amendment scheme fail. Full of confidence, the NUWSS
analyzed its prospects for the coming year and foresaw only two possible
impediments to its desired victory: the revival of militancy on a large scale,
and the massive defection of Conservatives from the suffragist camp. The
NUWSS predicted that either of these developments would play havoc with
the suffrage issue.99

Unfortunately, the WSPU’s reactions to Asquith’s proposed Reform

Bill were very different from those of the NUWSS: the militants were “livid
with rage and deaf to reason.”100 On November 9, the day after Asquith’s
announcement, The Times reported that the WSPU had ended its truce and
intended to revive militancy and its anti-Government election policy as a
protest against the exclusion of women from the Reform Bill. The suffragettes’
analysis of the prospects for next session directly contradicted that of the
NUWSS: the Pankhursts were positive that the House of Commons would not
attach a women’s suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill.101 The WSPU
thought that Asquith’s chief motivation for introducing a Reform measure at
this juncture was a desire to destroy the Conciliation Bill, and, despite
Brailsford’s reassurances, the Pankhursts persisted in regarding the Prime
Minister’s announcement as treacherous. As one chronicler of the WSPU has
written, “with regard to the probity of male politicians, the WSPU was now in
the incipient stage of what was to become a most Manichean outlook.”102

For all the near-hysteria of the WSPU’s reaction to the news of the
Reform Bill, there are indications that the WSPU was tiring of the truce and of
the Conciliation Bill even before the news of November 7 and that Asquith’s
announcement may have been merely a much needed excuse for the resumption
of militancy.103 In addition, the idea of Lloyd George as the champion of the
suffrage forces undoubtedly increased the ire of the militants. The WSPU
thoroughly distrusted and disliked the Chancellor of the Exchequer; according
to Brailsford, Christabel Pankhurst conceived of the whole suffrage battle as a
duel between herself and Lloyd George.104 The interview with Asquith on
November 17 did nothing to alleviate the anger of the militants. The WSPU
demanded nothing less than a promise that the Government would introduce a
women’s suffrage bill; when the Prime Minister refused, the WSPU retaliated
with a vengeance. On November 21 it staged a demonstration in Parliament
Square which culminated in the arrest of 220 women.105 Three days later the
suffragettes heckled Lloyd George while he was addressing the National
Liberal Federation. A shouting match ensued and Lloyd George, angered
beyond reason, boasted—to the dismay of Brailsford and the delight of the
WSPU—that the announcement of the Reform Bill had once and for all
“torpedoed the Conciliation Bill.”106 Shortly after this the WSPU prevented
the Prime Minister from delivering a speech at the City Temple.107

The suffragettes’ actions, particularly their treatment of Asquith,

outraged even those members of the House of Commons and the Cabinet who
sympathized with the militants’ goals. Members of all parties vehemently
criticized the WSPU’s behavior; the reaction of suffragists in the Cabinet was
particularly strong.108 Grey informed Lytton that it would be “repugnant” to
him and to his fellow suffragists in the Cabinet to give active support to the
women’s suffrage movement if militancy persisted.109 Lloyd George
complained to Fawcett that the continuation of militancy would prove fatal to
the prospects of women’s suffrage:

The action of the militants is alienating sympathy from the women’s

cause in every quarter. … If next year’s chances of carrying either a
women’s amendment or a Bill are not to be totally ruined some
emphatic action must be taken at once. You can hardly realise what the
feeling is even among Members of Parliament who have hitherto been
steadfast in support of Women’s Suffrage. I feel confident that if these
attacks are persisted in our hopes of being able to secure the
confirmtion of a Women’s Suffrage amendment in next year’s Bill will
be of the slightest. I have consulted Sir Edward Grey and other friends
of the movement and they take an equally serious view of the situation.
What do you suggest? Anti-Suffragists are of course exuberant and I
feel confident that the effect of our agitations will be neutralised by the
antics of the militants.110

Both the NUWSS and Brailsford were worried that Lloyd George’s
predictions were presciently accurate. The suffragists feared that the
continuation of militancy would lose them the support both of sincere
suffragists who wanted to teach the lesson that violence does not pay, and of
“token” suffragists who were only waiting for an excuse not to support
women’s suffrage. Brailsford was angry with Lloyd George for striking “the
strident party note” by jubilantly declaring that he had “torpedoed” the
supposedly Tory-inspired Conciliation Bill, but he was quite as angry with
the militants for using methods that were both futile and bankrupt, since “no
degree of force which the women can use will avail to coerce the
Government.”111 The NUWSS was just as furious, and Fawcett lamented that
“revolutionary violence” would destroy their chances for next session.112
Hoping to placate the politicians and public opinion, the NUWSS issued a
manifesto denouncing the actions of the militants.113 Fawcett also wrote Lloyd
George a long letter which sharply condemned the WSPU and exhorted him
not to withdraw support from the cause because of the behavior of the
suffragettes:

I regret and deplore, condemn also, if the word must be used, the
disgusting scenes of November 21 and 29 as much as you do. The
disorders of which the events of November 21st and November 29th
are specimens are symptoms of a social and political disease. You
may punish the offenders, but mere punishment does not affect the
causes of the disease. Force is no remedy. You must seek the causes
and endeavor to remove them. … As your desire to secure the
enfranchisement of women before the next general election becomes
clear, the supporters and perpetrators of violence will be more and
more isolated.114

Fawcett did not relish public denunciations and reciminations, but

she and her colleagues in the NUWSS were convinced that this was the only
way to stem the tide of desertions from the suffrage camp. The WSPU was
deaf to reason and would not heed direct appeals from the NUWSS.115
Fawcett was distressed by this rift in the suffrage movement, but to avert
disaster in the House of Commons, the NUWSS must disown and disassociate
itself from the militants. If the suffragettes escalated their efforts, the NUWSS
doubted that it could continue to mollify either the outraged politicians or the
public. Fortunately, the WSPU, exhausted by its November outburst of energy,
did not persist in its violent exploits; by the end of 1911, the threat militancy
posed to the suffrage cause appeared to be dormant.
 If the militants imperiled the passage of some measure of women’s
suffrage in 1912, the Conservatives’ response to Asquith’s proposed Reform
Bill also augured that difficult times lay ahead for the proponents of women’s
suffrage. Conservative MP’s had supported the Conciliation Bill precisely
because it was a moderate measure which enfranchised only a very small
number of women. Moreover, it was a nonpartisan measure: in drafting the
proposal the Conciliation Committee had taken great care to frame a bill that
was not biased toward any one party. Asquith’s announcement of a Reform
Bill which could be amended to give votes to women frightened
Conservatives for several reasons. First of all, it seemed to make women’s
suffrage a party issue. The Liberal Government had seized the initiative, and
if women were included in the bill, the Government would be responsible for
piloting the bill through both houses of Parliament. In addition, many
Conservatives believed that the Government had designed its amendment
proposal with the intention of “torpedoing” the Conciliation Bill and ensuring
that women’s suffrage would be granted only on terms that would benefit the
Liberal Party. As one Conservative complained, “Asquith is nothing but a
ponderous and self-righteous posing trickster over this women’s suffrage
business.”116

Many Conservatives interpreted Asquith’s proposal as an indication

that there would not be moderate reform, along the lines of the Conciliation
Bill, but a very comprehensive installment of women’s suffrage. Bonar Law,
the new leader of the Conservative Party and a proponent of women’s
suffrage, mirrored the attitude of many Conservative suffragists when he
wrote that he opposed any large extension of the franchise:

I have felt, and feel strongly, that women should not be

deprived of votes on account of their sex; but, on the other hand, the
suffrage is already sufficiently extended, for it is a most dangerous
thing that absolute power should rest with any one class, and it is still
more dangerous if there is a great extension of that power while there
is in the country a distinct danger of a revolutionary movement. I have
always felt, therefore, that the argument that it would not do to allow
women who are in actual majority to control power has nothing in it,
because women are not a class; yet, on the other hand, if the franchise
is radically lowered, then, of course, the women in every class will
 vote as the men of that class and that would mean, in my belief, a most
alarming extension of power in a direction which at present at least is
dangerous. … On the other hand, I should presumably have been
delighted to see the Conciliation Bill passed, for it might have settled
the question for a long time, and without any of the evil effects which I
dread.117

The Conservatives were also very suspicious of Lloyd George’s

unexpected conversion to women’s suffrage. The Earl of Selborne, a staunch
Conservative suffragist, wrote his wife: “I cannot stand Mrs. Fawcett’s ‘My
dear Mr. Lloyd George’ and I think she is quite wrong in her estimate both of
the situation and of Mr. Lloyd George.”118

The net effect of Asquith’s November proclamation was to make the

Conservatives wary of the whole subject of women’s suffrage. If the Liberals
intended to use the Conciliation Bill as a lever to secure a wider measure of
women’s suffrage, it might not be safe to support any women’s suffrage
proposal. The Conservatives indicated their growing aversion to the women’s
suffrage question at the conference of the National Conservative Union;
whereas previous conferences had passed resolutions in support of women’s
suffrage, the 1911 conference decided no further action should be taken on
extending the franchise until the matter had been referred to the country.119

The NUWSS hoped it could convince the Conservative suffragists to

continue their support for the Conciliation Bill and, more important, to attract
their support for the “Norwegian” amendment to the Reform Bill. According
to Brailsford’s calculations, the votes of at least nine Conservative suffragists
were necessary if the amendment was to be successful;120 and so, throughout
the winter of 1912, the NUWSS courted the Conservatives.

The chief argument used was that the Norwegian amendment added
stability and moderation to the electorate and was framed in both the spirit
and the interest of Conservatism.121 Seeking Conservative support for this
amendment, Eleanor Rathbone wrote: “I believe that a good many
Conservative MPs alarmed at the influx into the electorate of a crowd of
irresponsible young men will welcome the married woman householder as a
mature and moderating influence.”122 The NUWSS collaborated with the
Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Association, and with
Conservative suffragists such as Lord Robert Cecil and the Earl of
Selborne.123 In her cultivation of the Conservatives, Fawcett purposely
minimized the role of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the campaign and
maximized the role of Sir Edward Grey; Grey’s standing in Conservative
circles was high, and for that reason she had persuaded him to move the
Norwegian amendment. Fawcett correctly gauged Conservative’s reactions.
Lady Cecil, describing her husband’s response to the Norwegian amendment,
wrote: “He attaches great importance to the amendment being moved by Sir
Edward Grey as he thinks it would be impossible to get members on our side
to follow Lloyd George.”124 At the same time, however, the NUWSS did not
forget the Conciliation Bill, since it realized that this was the suffrage
measure that most appealed to Conservatives.

Indeed, the Conservatives were very disinclined to support any

women’s suffrage measure that was more extensive than the Conciliation Bill.
Although Lytton told the NUWSS that he had been successful in persuading
Conservatives to support the Norwegian amendment,125 Lord Robert Cecil
was far more pessimistic about the Conservatives’ attitude to the amendment;
in fact, he was convinced that a franchise bill amended to include women
would never become law:

What chance then will this measure have of becoming law with the
Prime Minister and some of his principal colleagues so opposed to
one of its chief provisions as to regard its enactment as a national
disaster? I confess it does not seem to me a very good one. Such a Bill
must inevitably be rejected by the House of Lords. Will the present
tottering Government have authority to override the opposition of the
Second Chamber supported as all will know by the profound
convictions of the Prime Minister? Any attempt to do so would reduce
the provisions of the Parliament Act to the merest force. Nor for other
reasons is it by any means certain that the life of the Government will
be long enough to enable it to fulfill the conditions imposed by that
measure.126
 Cecil’s advice, which other Conservative suffragists echoed, was to
concentrate on the Conciliation Bill, which he felt might prove acceptable to
the Lords.127 In view of the Liberals’ attitude to the Conciliation Bill, the
NUWSS could not afford to follow Cecil’s counsel, and as the new year
began, the main worry to the NUWSS was not the Conservatives at all, but the
Liberals.

By the beginning of 1912 it was well known that the Cabinet was up
in arms over the suffrage question.128 Austen Chamberlain, a leading
antisuffragist and an astute parliamentary observer, wrote:

It is reported that they have had some stormy meetings of the Cabinet
on the suffrage question. … the suffragists in the Cabinet are very
angry with those of their colleagues who are to take part in the Albert
Hall meeting, but I hear that Asquith turned fiercely on Lloyd George
and told him that it was all his fault for trying to commit the
Government and the Party at the Bath meeting.129

Margot Asquith complained that women’s suffrage had “split us into

smithereens” and reproached her husband for his reluctance to impose
Cabinet unity on this question: “Henry’s present position is hopeless and even
ridiculous—he alone never saw the importance of enjoining silence on Grey
and L. George, and this fearful mistake will break us to a certainty. What a
subject to smash over!”130 Asquith was himself concerned about the Cabinet
schism and wrote gloomily, “we open 1912 with a lack of cohesion and
driving part in the forces behind us.”131

In mid-December, to heal the breach in the Cabinet, but also with the
thought of quashing women’s suffrage once and for all, Churchill had begun
lobbying for a referendum on the women’s suffrage question. He thought that if
the Cabinet ministers compromised over the suffrage problem by agreeing to
abide by the country’s decision on the question, the schism in the Liberal Party
could be healed—particularly if he could win over Grey and Lloyd George,
the two most ardent suffragists in the Cabinet.132 Employing both threats and
entreaties, Churchill begged Lloyd George to abandon his advocacy of
women’s suffrage:
 I cannot help feeling anxious about the women. If you and Grey go
working yourself into a mawkish frenzy on the “are they not our flesh
and blood” cry, all sorts of difficulties of a personal character will be
added to the [word illegible] wh. on this topic loom before us; and
this strong Government on wh. our life’s work depends may easily
come to grief…. if you were to get yourself into the sort of state where
the enfranchisement of 6,000,000 without a fresh appeal to the country
became the most important political object in your mind, I cd. not find
any good foothold for common action.133

Churchill proposed to Lloyd George and Grey that he would agree to

work for a women’s suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill, provided they
would promise to submit the amendment—if it were carried in the House—to
a referendum. Although no definite agreement was reached, Churchill
reported that “unity on these lines was not impossible.”134

Both Brailsford and the NUWSS were concerned about these

machinations for a referendum on women’s suffrage. The NUWSS opposed
any suggestion of a referendum on the suffrage issue because it was convinced
that its cause would lose. Jane, Lady Strachey, a member of the NUWSS
executive, expressed this feeling when she predicted “the result of such an
experiment would be the ruin of our cause for an incalculable period of
time.”135 Unfortunately, however, the referendum scheme appealed to a large
segment of both the Conservative and Liberal Parties. By removing the thorny
question from the hands of the politicians and leaving it to the electorate to
decide the women’s fate, a referendum would absolve Members of the House
of Commons of all responsibility for the women’s suffrage question. Many
Conservatives felt that any major constitutional change, such as the Parliament
Act or a women’s suffrage measure, should receive the approval of the
country.136 Lady Selborne, head of the Conservative and Unionist Women’s
Franchise Association, and her brother, Lord Robert Cecil, both supported the
referendum scheme.137 Many Liberals favored a referendum because, like
Churchill, they felt that this would heal the growing rift in the party over the
suffrage question.

By the end of January 1912, the NUWSS was concerned that a

referendum would, in fact, be held on the women’s suffrage question.138 Both
Grey and Lloyd George were showing signs of succumbing to Churchill’s
blandishments. Grey, in a widely publicized statement, had announced that the
Government would not oppose the referendum scheme but would leave the
question to a free vote of the House of Commons; and Lloyd George, for the
sake of Cabinet unity, appeared willing to attach a referendum proviso to the
women’s suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill.139

Working in close collaboration with C. P. Scott and Brailsford, the

NUWSS tried to smash the referendum scheme. Fawcett, Courtney, and
Swanwick discussed the referendum proposal at length with Scott and urged
him to intercede with Lloyd George on their behalf.140 An NUWSS deputation
to Lloyd George only succeeded in irritating him because it refused even to
consider his referendum plan, but Scott was more successful. He convinced
Lloyd George to abandon the idea, and Lloyd George promised to do
everything possible to prevent a referendum and even suggested forming a
committee of Conservative and Liberal suffragists to work against the
proposal.141

Although the suffragists had succeeded in dissuading Lloyd George

from agreeing to Churchill’s referendum proposal, the whole controversy had
given the NUWSS a severe jolt and sapped its confidence in the certainty of
victory for the women. Now even the Liberals, whose support for the
amendment scheme had appeared assured, seemed inclined to throw the
women over. Churchill’s intrigues had lent credence to the gossip about
Cabinet disunity, and in February and March of 1912 the NUWSS received
further reports of dissension within the Cabinet over the suffrage issue. Lady
Frances Balfour confided to Fawcett that both Loreburn and Lloyd George
had threatened to resign over women’s suffrage, and that Asquith was so angry
about Lloyd George’s advocacy of women’s suffrage that “he would not speak
to him for some days.”142 Divisions within the Cabinet over the suffrage
question had grown so intense that ,according to Lady Constance Lytton, the
Government was “beginning to fear the situation they have created for
themselves on this question.”143 The NUWSS was very concerned that many
Liberals, alarmed by the public disagreements and possible resignation of
ministers, might withdraw their support from the women’s cause in order to
end the controversy and thereby strengthen the divided Government.144
 The already dim prospects grew dimmer the first week in February
when the Government announced that it was postponing the Reform Bill. This
meant that the Conciliation Bill would precede the Government’s franchise
measure.145 The suffragists had counted on the Conciliation Bill as a measure
to fall back on should the more comprehensive bill fail; with good reason,
they feared that if the Conciliation Bill came up before the Reform Bill, it
would be difficult to generate much enthusiasm among, the Liberals, who had
set their sights on a more extensive measure.146 The opportunity to vote for a
wider installment of women’s suffrage might influence Liberals to vote
against the supposedly “anti-Liberal” Conciliation Bill. Fawcett, sizing up the
situation, wrote Lady Frances Balfour: “I am very full of fear about our
prospects and believe we shall probably be tricked again though anything
more plain and positive than the pledge Asquith gave us on November 17
cannot be imagined.”147

Bad news was just around the corner. On March 1 the WSPU for the
first time attacked private property, smashing store windows in the West End,
and three days later the suffragettes went on rampages in Knightsbridge and
Kensington.148 These outrages horrified political circles and touched off
rumors of worse deeds to come. According to Lady Frances Balfour, Asquith
told Haldane and Grey that “the police believed there was a plot to assasinate
Lloyd George.”,149

As had so often been the case in the past, violence only stiffened the
spines of the politicians and made them determined not to bow to the
militants’ demands. Despite appeals from the NUWSS not to punish law-
abiding suffragists because of the actions of a “small and decreasing
minority,” many MP’s responded to the militancy by withdrawing their
support from the Conciliation Bill.150 The Times jubilantly declared that “the
window-smashing outrages have given such a setback to the cause of womens
suffrage as none of its opponents could have hoped for under normal
conditions”; many politicians confirmed these predictions by announcing they
would vote against the Conciliation Bill to show disapproval of militant
methods.151 Members of Parliament complained to the NUWSS about the
WSPU’s actions and testified to the adverse effects of militancy. One member,
Alan Burgoyne (Cons., Kensington, N.), wrote:
 I know well that none of your body is in sympathy with those unsexed
harridans but the odium of association attaches to the whole of those
who hold the principle of their views. … In the House of Commons
the matter was for days the subject of comment and a resolve entered
the minds of a growing number of those who formerly supported the
Conciliation Bill to withdraw their support during the present
Parliament.
I can only tell you that my attitude is shared by over four score of
the former supporters of this measure and the damage done to the
movement will be seen in the Division which will eventuate on March
22nd.152

Even the Women’s Freedom League, once a practitioner of militancy,

criticized the WSPU’s actions: “When everything depends on the good will of
the average member of Parliament and his electors, suffragists have to be
doubly careful that the favourable majority built up over the years of hard
work done by the National Union should not be turned into an adverse
one.”153

In the opinion of the NUWSS, the militants could not have chosen a
more inopportune time to conduct their raids. The antisuffragists, led by F. E.
Smith (Cons., Liverpool, Walton), Harcourt, and Loreburn, had already begun
to mount a campaign against the Conciliation Bill. They devoted special
attention to the Nationalists and played upon their fears that Loreburn, whom
the Irish regarded as their staunchest supporter in the Cabinet, might resign
over the women’s suffrage question; they also hinted that the time necessary
for consideration of the subsequent stages of the Conciliation Bill might
jeopardize the prospects of Home Rule.154 Militancy gave the antisuffragists a
second string for their bow. They could now make the effective appeal that it
would be both cowardly and dishonorable to give in to violence by voting for
women’s suffrage and could urge fellow MP’s to voice their disapproval of
militant methods by voting against the Conciliation Bill. 155 Austen
Chamberlain claimed that the WSPU’s actions had left the antisuf fragist camp
ebullient: “… there is a growing feeling that it may be possible to defeat the
Bill on the Second Reading. If a few more windows were smashed the Bill
would be smashed at the same time, but I expect we shall hear nothing more of
the militants till after the vote has been taken.”156
 Among the leaders of the NUWSS, it was generally understood that
the Conciliation Bill, which had received such a successful reading ten
months earlier, was probably going down to defeat. Lady Frances Balfour
wrote to Fawcett, “I don’t believe we could be worse off than we are just
now. There is a regular stampede.”157

For two years the NUWSS had worked to build up a favorable

majority for the Conciliation Bill. It had written letters, organized deputations,
courted politicians, collaborated with political associations, and devised
countless other lobbying strategies; since Asquith’s November announcement
these efforts had, if anything, increased.158 The LSWS, for example, had held
199 meetings in three months and had twice sent deputations to each of the 71
MP’s in its bailiwick: other federations had engaged in similar propaganda
efforts.159 The NUWSS had sponsored a meeting in the Albert Hall which the
Manchester Guardian termed “probably the most impressive held in London”;
£7,000 had been collected.160 After the March outbreak of militancy, the
NUWSS frantically tried to stop the flow of desertions in the House of
Commons by sending letters and deputations to those who had announced their
intentions of withdrawing support from the bill. Fawcett and Courtney had
also seen Lloyd George and tried to persuade him to use his influence to
counteract the effects of militancy and to secure the Irish vote.161 In the end,
all these efforts proved futile. On March 28 the House of Commons killed the
Conciliation Bill by a vote of 222 to 208.162 Analyzing her reaction to the
news of the defeat, Fawcett wrote, “I felt that what I had been working for for
40 years had been destroyed at a blow.”163

The differences between the vote on the Conciliation Bill in 1912

and the vote in 1911 are interesting (see Table 2). The 1912 vote had far
fewer abstentions than the 1911 vote, and most of the abstentions—
particularly among the Conservatives—became negative votes in the second
voting. In 1912, of those MP’s who either voted or paired for the 1911 bill, 70
abstained from either voting or pairing, and 34 voted or paired against the
measure.164 The number of switches from neutral or favoring to opposition
was particularly large in the Nationalist Party: all the Nationalists who voted
for the bill in 1911 withdrew their support, and 11 of these MP’s, joined by
19 Nationalists who abstained in 1911 (including John Redmond), voted
against the bill.165 The Labour Party vote in 1912 is also interesting because
in January 1912 the annual Labour Party Conference had formally committed
itself to women’s suffrage; yet the number of Labour MP’s who voted for the
1912 Conciliation Bill decreased since 1911, and the number of abstentions
rose.166

The reversal in March 1912 of the vote of some ten and a half months
earlier cannot be explained by one single cause. A number of influences were
at work, some stronger than others. Unquestionably, the Nationalist’s Party
opposition to the bill had much to do with its defeat. According to Brailsford.
Redmond had ordered his followers not to give any support to the bill.167
Antisuffragists had encouraged the Nationalists to fear that the Liberal
Government, upon whom their hopes for Home Rule depended, would break
up over the women’s suffrage issue. The Irish also believed that if further
facilities were given to the Conciliation Bill, there might not be enough
parliamentary time left for consideration of the Home Rule Bill;168 the
WSPU’s continued attacks on Liberal proponents of Home Rule, such as
Churchill, may also have influenced the Nationalists’ attitude to the
Conciliation Bill.169 In any case the Nationalist Party’s assessment of the
relationship between Home Rule and women’s suffrage was disastrous for the
Conciliation Bill.

Table 2a

Comparison of the Vote on the Conciliation Bill, May 5, 1911, with the Vote on March 28, 1912
 aInformation contained in this table is compiled from An Analysis of Voting on Women’s
Suffrage Bills in the House of Commons Since 1908, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.)

The Labour Party’s vote was also critical in determining the fate of
the bill. This vote, too, was influenced by an outside issue, in this case a coal
miners’ strike. Because of the strike, the miners’ representatives were not in
London on March 28; this accounts for the large number of Labour
abstentions.170 In view of the January conference resolution, it is probable that
these absent members of the Labour Party would have voted for the bill; had
they done so, the bill would have passed by one vote. As in the case of Home
Rule, the competition of an outside issue was detrimental to the suffragist
cause.

In apportioning the blame for the defeat of the Conciliation Bill, it is

important to emphasize that the rampages of the militants had disastrous
repercussions upon the suffrage bill. Although members of the WSPU denied
that their actions were responsible for the bill’s extinction, the evidence
speaks otherwise.171 Within both the Liberal and, more important, the
Conservative Party, the effect of militancy was very pronounced. Twenty-six
MP’s (16 Lib., 10 Cons.) who were pledged to support the bill voted against
it because of militancy;172 even more serious was the change from abstainer to
opponent (19 Lib., 47 Cons.) and from supporter to abstainer (17 Lib., 23
Cons.)173 Even with the loss of the Irish vote, these votes would have secured
the passage of the Conciliation Bill.

In analyzing the shift in votes between 1911 and 1912, Brailsford,

Fawcett, prominent members of the parties, and political correspondents all
underscored the actions of the militants. The WSPU’s outrages provided
unenthusiastic supporters of the suffrage cause with an excuse to withdraw
support from the Conciliation Bill. Both Fawcett and Brailsford publicly
blamed the militants for bringing about a change in public opinion. Fawcett
said in an interview in the Manchester Guardian; “… the doings of the
militants had undermined our position so far as public opinion was
concerned, and had alienated public sympathy from the movement. We have to
bear the odium created by the most recent militant outbreaks. The members
who wanted to ‘rat’ were provided with an excuse, and they had not their own
people in the constituencies which would .have been behind them if the
militants had remained quiet.”174 Brailsford, in the same newspaper,
emphasized the political consequences of the suffragettes’ actions: “The
disastrous effect of the recent militancy was that it scandalised public
opinion. The pressure which had hitherto kept unsteady members true to their
pledges was temporarily relaxed and an atmosphere created in which these
men supposed that they might safely face their constituents with a
dishonourable vote on their records.”175 Within the Conservative Party
leading suffragists bemoaned the effects of militancy: Selborne complained
about “the foolish militants,” and Cecil termed their actions “ruinous,” “a
godsend” for the antisuffragist forces.176 And Sir Edward Grey, writing to
Fawcett about the Liberal defections from the suffragist ranks, likewise
placed the blame for the bill’s defeat squarely on the militants: “What really
upset the Conciliation Bill was the resentment caused by the senseless
window breaking. But for that the Irish vote would not have been effective. If
there are no more outrages there will soon be a reaction favourable to the
suffrage.”177
 The testimonies of leading politicians and the statements of MP’s as
well as the evidence of the broken pledges and the shift in voting patterns
between 1911 and 1912 indicate that militancy was the single most important
factor in securing the defeat of the Conciliation Bill.178 Proponents of the
WSPU and apologists for the militants have tried to defend the suffragettes by
arguing that the vote on the Conciliation Bill was not important. According to
this reasoning, the Conciliation Bill would never have come through the
House of Commons intact; adult suffragists and antisuffragists would have
amended the bill so drastically that the House of Commons would finally have
rejected it.179 This argument, founded on second-guessing, completely
overlooks the psychological importance of the vote of March 28. Possibly the
House of Commons might not have passed the Conciliation Bill through all
stages, but that possibility in no way diminishes the importance of the vote on
the bill’s second reading.

Both the leaders of the NUWSS and prominent suffragists in the

House of Commons placed great weight on this vote. They felt, with good
reason, that it was essential for the House of Commons to show that it
supported the principle of votes for women by giving the Conciliation Bill a
favorable second reading. Without this sort of pressure, neither the incumbent
Liberal Government, nor subsequent Governments were under any obligation
to pursue the suffrage issue. Fawcett and Brailsford had other reasons for
continuing to keep the Conciliation Bill alive: it was a nonparty measure,
acceptable to members of all parties, which offered the chance, as the
Government Reform Bill might not, of a nonpartisan solution to the suffrage
question. Moreover, the Conciliation Bill was useful as a spur to Liberals and
Labourites to devise a more comprehensive solution to the suffrage problem;
it was, after all, the prospect of the Conciliation Bill which had driven Lloyd
George into the arms of the suffragists. With the demise of the Conciliation
Bill, the suffragists lost a very useful weapon for cudgeling the Liberals.

The defeat of the Conciliation Bill made a tremendous impact on the

course of the suffrage movement: it destroyed the chance of a nonparty
solution to the suffrage question and it led to the breakup of the Conciliation
Committee, which had served not only as a lobby for women’s suffrage but
also as a meeting ground where members of different parties could discuss
their differences on the suffrage question.180 The NUWSS had looked on the
Conciliation Bill both as a bargaining chip and as something to fall back on in
the event that the amendment scheme to the Reform Bill failed; these
possibilities no longer existed.

The vote of March 28 had a great influence on the NUWSS. For more
than two years the suffragist organization had made the Conciliation Bill the
focal point of all its activities. In cooperation with Brailsford and the
Conciliation Committee, and with other suffrage organizations and political
associations, the NUWSS had worked for the success of this compromise
solution to the complex problem of women’s suffrage. Owing to the chicanery
of politicians, divisions within the suffrage movement, the complication of
party considerations, and the competition of other political issues, the task had
assumed an almost Sisyphean character. Yet the NUWSS had managed to
function as an effective parliamentary lobby; even a rival organization, the
WFL, which disagreed with the NUWSS over the question of tactics, credited
the NUWSS with building up parliamentary support for the Conciliation
Bill.181 The NUWSS naturally reacted with both anguish and ire at seeing its
efforts of two years undone in one day; but it rebounded with a characteristic,
almost reflex, action. Two days after the fateful vote the executive committee
directed the societies to begin working on building up support for the
women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill.182 The leaders cautioned
that the passage of a suffrage amendment depended on the suffragists’ ability
to neutralize the impact of militancy and to convince the Nationalists that their
opposition to women’s suffrage might damage the prospects of Home Rule.

For the moment, it was to be business as usual; but the vote on March
28 prompted a reevaluation of old allegiances and political strategy by the
NUWSS. Though the NUWSS had since its founding in 1897 steadfastly
maintained a position of political neutrality, its sympathies—based on family
traditions, a conception of women’s suffrage as an integral component of
liberalism, and an analysis of voting support for women’s suffrage in the
House of Commons—had always lain with the Liberals. To some extent the
confidence in the Liberals had been shaken by the struggles with the Asquith
government, particularly the debacle of the 1910 Conciliation Bill. But the
confidence had been largely restored by Asquith’s promise that his
Government would accept a women’s suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill,
by the friendship of Cabinet ministers such as Grey and Lloyd George, and by
the Liberals’ enthusiastic response to the amendment scheme. At the same
time, the failure of the Conservative Party to demonstrate any real enthusiasm
served to strengthen the NUWSS Liberal inclinations.183

The vote on March 28 exploded the myth of the Liberal Party as the
friend of the women’s suffrage movement and left the NUWSS thoroughly
disillusioned with the Liberals. The NUWSS had counted on the Liberals, and
their betrayal seemed to imply a great deal about the present state of
liberalism. The NUWSS was particularly angry at those Liberals who had
allowed militancy to color their views and who had in consequence broken
their pledges to support the bill. It also blamed the Liberal leadership for the
Nationalists’ opposition to the bill: the NUWSS was convinced that if Liberal
suffragists had tried to assuage Irish fears about the impact of the Conciliation
Bill upon Home Rule, the vote on March 28 might have gone differently.
Expressing her dissatisfaction with the Liberals and, in particular, with Lloyd
George, Kathleen Courtney wrote: “I can’t help thinking that if Lloyd George
had exerted himself a little the defeat might have been saved. Brailsford says
he (L. G.) didn’t do one single thing he said he would do in connection with
the second reading.”184

Disillusioned with the Liberals, unoptimistic about the

Conservatives, the NUWSS looked for comfort in a new quarter: the Labour
Party. Early in April 1912, Fawcett gave an indication of the direction in
which her thoughts were moving:

It must not be overlooked that although 13 or 14 members were absent

on account of the impending ballot on the continuance of the coal
strike, every Labour member in the House gave us his support, and that
this course had been sanctioned by an official resolution previously
adopted by the party. It may well be a subject for careful thought and
discussion at our next Council meeting whether under these
circumstances we should not modify our existing election policy and
support Labour candidates.185

The undoing of two years of hard work in a single night caused the
NUWSS to redefine its whole relationship with the political parties. In a way,
the formation of the alliance with the Labour Party is the epilogue to the story
of the NUWSS fight for the Conciliation Bill.

___________________

Notes
1 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “The Political Outlook for Women’s Suffrage,” Englishwoman, 9
(January 1911): 2; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 2, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

2 C. C., February 9, 1911; Daily Chronicle, February 25, 1911.

3 Fawcett, “The Political Outlook for Women’s Suffrage,” p. 6.

4 Fred Leventhal, “The Conciliation Committee,” p. 142.

5 British Museum, Scott Papers, Add. Mss. 50901, Diary of C. P. Scott, February 2, 1911
(hereafter cited as Scott diary).

6 Dickinson introduced this bill, entitled the Women’s Enfranchisement (No. 2) Bill, for its first
reading on April 5, 1911. H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 23, April 5, 1911, c. 2279.

7 Both Brailsford and the NUWSS continued to believe that the House of Commons would not
pass any measure for women’s suffrage which was more comprehensive than the Conciliation Bill. For
this reason they continued to favor the “limited” measure.

8 The Times, February 13 and 21, 1911. The NLOWS was confident that women’s suffrage
would be defeated in such a referendum. Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres, p. 160.

9 FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, Eleanor Rathbone to Helen Ward, July 23, 1910, Fawcett Library, London.

10 Labour Leader, February 24, 1911. By this writing, however, relations between Brailsford
and the Pankhursts had improved and the WSPU had agreed to extend the truce. Leventhal, p. 142.

11 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 16, 1911; National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies, Annual Report, 1911 (London, 1912), p. 32. According to one journalist, an Irish Member “who
thought he was balloting for tickets for the Ladies’ Gallery” won first place and later withdrew when he
discovered his mistake. B. F. Cholmeley, “The Parliamentary Situation”, Englishwoman, 9, no. 27 (March
1911): 241.

12 C. C, February 9, 1911. These changes met most of the criticisms which had been leveled
at the bill in 1910, and, as the debate on May 5 was to show, they effectively silenced some of the more
persuasive and eloquent arguments formulated by the critics.
 13 H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 21, February 9, 1911, c. 452.

14 correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Circular from
Kathleen Courtney, February 9, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

15 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, pp. 19-20.

16 London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1911 (London, n.d.), pp. 8-9.

17 NUWSS, Ex. corn. mins., February 16, April 27, and May 4, 1911, Fawcett Library,
London.

18 See Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Kathleen
Courtney to Philippa Strachey, February 9, 1911, and Philippa Strachey to T. G. Whitehead, February 14,
1911; Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1911, Circular from the London Society for
Women’s Suffrage, May 4, 1911; FIAC, vol. l, Ji, J. Sidney Buxton to Miss Deverall, April 28, 1911;
Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage with its branch societies, passim; all in the
Fawcett Library, London.

19 See, for example, Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1911, Philippa Strachey
to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, November 30, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

20 For an ide a of the number and variety of functions that the NUWSS organized during this
period see the fo11owing: C. C., March and April 1911, passim; Manchester and District Federation;
Annual Report, 1911 (Manchester, n.d.), pp. 15-40; North Eastern Federation of Women’s Suffrage
Societies, Annual Report, 1912 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, n.d.), pp. 12-18.

21 Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1911, p. 12; London Society for
Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1911, p. 12.

22 Nationa1 Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, p. 16. The by-
e1ections were Horncast1e, Cambridge Univ., Western Wilts. (Westbury), N.E. Lanark, Bootle,
Haddington, and Cheltenham.

23 See , for example, Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1911, Circular regarding
Miss Deverall’s speech to the East St. Pancras W.L.A., May 2, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

24 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Resolutions of

the Annual Council of the NUWSS, January 26, 27, 28, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

25 Ibid., Circular from Edith Pa11iser, March 2, 1911, Fawcett Library, London; The Times,
May 1 and 3, 1911.

26 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, A. J. Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, May 3,

1911, Fawcett Library, London. Philippa Strachey sarcastically commented that it was not the
consideration of parliamentary time, but the Parliamentary Golf Handicap, which prompted the leaders’
decision not to participate in the debate. Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
1911, Philippa Strachey to Lady de la Warr, May l, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

27 H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 25, May 5, 1911, c. 805.

28 The normal procedure was to have an immediate dissolution the moment the new register
was brought in. David Morgan, Suffragists and Liberals, p. 53.

29 H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 25, May 5, 1911, c. 806.

30 Sir Maurice Levy (Lib., Leicester, Loughborough), for example, claimed women “pre fer
the sovereignty and authority of men” and thus had no desire to vote. Ibid., c. 755.

31 Ibid., c. 806. The breakdown on the vote, including the pairs, wasas follows: For—170 Lib.,
78 Cons., 31 Nat., 31 Lab. Against-48 Lib., 86 Cons., 9 Nat. The bill received a larger majority than any
Government measure obtained in the same session.

32 In the first category there were 42 Lib., 40 Cons., 17 Nat., 9 Lab.; in the second category
there were 6 Lib., 4 Cons., l Nat. Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1911, List of Miss
Edith Palliser analyzing the vote of May 5, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

33 Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1911, Philippa Strachey to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, November 30, 1911; Surrey, Sussex, and Hants Federation, Annual Report, 1912 (Southsea,
n.d.), p. 6.

34 Archives, Manchester Public Library M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, May 7, [1911].

35 FLAC, vol. 1, Ji, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Lady Frances Balfour, May 6, 1911, Fawcett
Library, London.

36 Archives, Manchester Public Library, MIsa, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, May 7, [1911].

37 Mil1icent Garrett Fawcett, “Women’s Suffrage: The Political Situation,” Englishwoman, 10,
no. 30 (June 1911): 243.

38 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Circular from
Edith Pa1liser, May 17,1911, Fawcett Library , London.

39 The Times, May 10 and 11, 1911: H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 2S, May 12, 1911, c. 1529.

40 The Times, May 9, 1911.

41 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,1911, Circular from

Edith Palliser, May 20, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.
 42 CAB 41/33/15, May 14, 1911.

43 CAB 41/33/16, May 24, 1911.

44 H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 25, May 29, 1911, cc. 703–4.

45 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Circular from
Edith Palliser and Kathleen Courtney, June 1, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

46 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, June 2, 1911.

47 The Times, June 2, 1911.

48 Ibid., June 17, 1911.

49 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, as quoted in ibid., June 3, 1911.

50 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., June 29, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

51 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “Women’s Suffrage: The Political Situation,” Englishwoman, 10,
no. 30 (June 1911): 241.

52 F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, Fate Has Been Kind, p. 252; Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals,
e616, June 18 1911; Andrew Rosen, Rise Up, Women!, p. 150.

53 The Times, June 19, 1911.

54 Morgan, pp. 80-82; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, p.
35; Votes for Women, September 22, 1911. The court’s decision meant that a lodger with his own door
key could be considered a householder. The Government hoped to gain this “householder” vote. There
were approximately 500,000 plural voters. The Liberals had for some time wished to eliminate the plural
voting system, which benefited the Conservative Party. Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and
Peace, 1906-1918, pp. 1-2, 31-32.

55 For examples of this cooperation see: North and East Ridings Federation, Annual Report,
1911–1912 (Whitby, n.d.), p. 10; West Midland Federation, Annual Report, 1911–1912 (n.p., n.d.), p. 12;
North Eastern Federation, Annual Report, 1912, p. 7.

56 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Circular from Edith Palliser and
Kathleen Courtney, October 3, 1911.

57 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, pp. 17-18; London
Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1911, p. 11; Manchester Federation, Annual Report, 1911,
p. 14; North Eastern Federation, Annual Report, 1912, pp. 7, 9, 11.
 58 For evidence of this collaboration see NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., September 14, October 19,
and November 2, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

59 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Memorandum

on the Provincial Council held on July 7 and 8, 1911; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., August 3, 1911; Fawcett
Library, London.

60 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, H. N. Brailsford, “Memorandum on the

Present Position of the Conciliation Bill,” October 2, 1911.

61 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Millicent

Garrett Fawcett, “Parliament and the Conciliation Bill: A Plea for Firmness,” October 3, 1911; Circular
from Edith Palliser, July 25, 1911; Fawcett Library, London. On July 20, the Conservative suffragists met
and agreed to resist any amendment that would extend the provisions of the Conciliation bill. The Times,
July 21, 1911.

62 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, H. N. Brailsford, “Memorandum on the

Present Position of the Conciliation Bill,” October 2, 1911.

63 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 20, 1911, Fawcett Library, London. The NUWSS estimated
that within the Liberal and Nationalist Parties there were 65 confirmed antisuffragists, and it felt certain
that if the Conciliation Bill were widened, the Conservatives would combine with these antisuffragists to
defeat it. The Conciliation Committee shared this opinion. Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50,
Box 1, Circular from the Earl of Lytton, August 10, 1911.

64 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 20, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

65 See C. C., August 3, 1911; Manchester Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report,
1912, p. 14; Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Millicent
Garrett Fawcett, “Parliament and the Conciliation Bill: A Plea for Firmness,” October 3, 1911, Fawcett
Library, London.

66 H. C. Deb. 5s, vol. 29, August 16, 1911, cc. 1913–14.

67 FLAC, vol. 1, Hii, the Earl of Lytton to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, August 24, 1911, Fawcett
Library, London.

68 Scott diary, June 15, 1911.

69 David Lloyd George to Alexander Murray, Master of Elibank, September 5, 1911, as quoted
in Morgan, p. 82. Pugh, p. 35, indicates there was no factual basis for this assumption. See also Chapter
2, note 34 above.
In 1911 the Conciliation Committee, in order to prove “that the Bill was not a measure for
giving ‘votes to ladies,’” took a census of women householders in Bangor, Carnarvon, and Dundee. The
object of the survey was to ascertain the social position of women householders. In Dundee, 89.1 percent
of these women were working class; in Bangor and Carnarvon, 75 percent were working class. On the
basis of these findings, the Committee estimated that in these constituencies, eight out of every ten
women enfranchised by the Conciliation Bill would belong to the working class. Philip Snowden, In
Defense of the Conciliation Bill, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

70 CAB 37/108/148, Report of J. Renwick Seager, November 8, 1911. Seager had canvassed
the secretaries of twelve Liberal Federations to ask their views on three aspects of the franchise: the
value of a simple residential qualification, the impact of current registration laws on the Liberal Party, and
the potential consequences of the Conciliation Bill on the electoral fortunes of the Liberals. Seager’s
report is interesting not only because it shows the Liberal agents’ hostility to the Conciliation Bill, but also
because it reveals some of the prejudices and suspicions that surrounded women’s suffrage. The Liberal
agents obviously had mixed feelings about the whole issue of women’s suffrage. They declared that
“religious bigotry would find a ready response among the women” and that women would vote for
“Temperance, Social Reform, and Peace.” The agents’ attitude to women’s suffrage is paradoxical: their
analysis of the Conciliation Bill shows they believed women would vote along class lines, yet in other
parts of their report they treat the women’s vote as a single block and indicate that sex is a more
important demarcation than class.

71 Scott diary, November 16, 1911. Scott’s diary flatly contradicts Morgan’s assertion that
“there also exists no evidence that the suffragists expected that the Government was reviving the whole
electoral issue.” Morgan, p. 83.

72 According to Nevinson, by the end of October 1911 relations between the WSPU and
Brailsford had become strained. (Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, October 31, 1911.) Not
surprisingly, Brailsford was reluctant to do anything that would further jeopardize his relations with the
militants; he knew the Pankhursts hated Lloyd George. Scott diary, November 16, 1911.

73 Leventhal, p. 148.

74 Scott diary, November 16, 1911.

75 British Museum, Arncliffe-Sennett Collection, vol. 15, Helena M. Swanwick to Maud

Arncliffe-Sennett, November 10, 1911.

76 In November, Helena Swanwick made most unflattering comments about Lloyd George to
her husband: “I get so horribly depressed at having to use such a man I can’t get over the nausea of
having to treat him more or less as a friend.” Helena M. Swanwick, I Have Been Young p. 215.

77 Papers of Emily Davies, Emily Davies to Philippa Strachey, October 20, 1911, Fawcett
Library, London.

78 Pugh, p. 36; The Times, November 7, 1911.

79 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., November 9, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

80 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, p. 38; “Echoes,”
Englishwoman, 12, no. 36 (December 1911): 347–49. The deputation included representatives from the
WSPU and the WFL. The NUWSS had arranged a previous conference for all the organizations
concerned, in order to map out a common strategy. The WSPU refused to attend, on the grounds it could
not adopt the same line as the other societies.

81 Leventhal, p. 148.

82 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, November 18, 1911.

83 Swanwick, p. 211.

84 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1911, p. 39.

85 C. C., November 23, 1911; Swanwick, p. 215.

86 C. C., November 30, 1911; The Times, November 24, 1911.

87 The Times, November 21 and December 1, 1911.

88 Haldane, Runciman, and Birrell had agreed to help Grey and Lloyd George. C. C.,
November 30, 1911.

89 Lloyd George had told Brailsford the Reform Bill would come up before the Conciliation Bill
(Leventhal, p. 148). The NUWSS assumed the Reform Bill would have precedence over the Conciliation
Bill because it would have to be passed next session in order to allow time for the Lords’ veto. C. C.,
November 16, 1911.

90 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, November 8, 1911.

91 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Millicent Garrett. Fawcett to Louisa Garrett Anderson,
copy, December 3, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

92 In Norway all women who qualified as householders, or who were wives of householders,
could vote. Manchester Guardian, November 17, 1911.

93 C. C., December 14, 1911.

94 H. N. Brailsford, Women and the Reform Bill (London, 1911), p. 7.

95 Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, “Memo on Special Council
Meeting, Friday, December 8, 1911,” Fawcett Library, London.

96 C. C., November 16, 1911; FLAC, vol. 2, Circular from the ILP, December 1911, Fawcett
Library, London; Labour Leader, January 12, 1912.

97 C. C., December 21, 1911; The Times, December 15, 1911.

 98 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Sir Edward Grey to Millicent Garrett Fawcett,
December 14, 1911; Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Sir Edward Grey, copy, December 16, 1911, Fawcett
Library, London; FLAC, vol. 1, Ji, Sir Edward Grey to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, December 20, 1911,
Fawcett Library, London; Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Notes by Millicent Garrett
Fawcett on a meeting held with Sir Edward Grey, December 9, 1911.

99 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911; Circular

regarding deputation to Conservative MPs, December 7, 1911; Statement issued by the executive
committee condemning militancy, November 30, 1911, Fawcett Library, London. The NUWSS had, in
conjunction with the Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Association, begun to lobby for the
Norwegian amendment within the Conservatitve Party. See C. C., December 14, 1911; NUWSS, Ex.
com. mins., December 7, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

100 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, November 8, 1911.

101 Manchester Guardian, December 12, 1911.

102 Rosen, p. 155.

103 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, October 31, 1911.

104 Scott diary, November 16, 1911.

105 Manchester Guardian, November 22, 1911.

106 The Times, November 25, 1911. According to Swanwick, Lloyd George had gone over the
speech with her before the meeting, and she had persuaded him to delete his remarks about “torpedoing.”
The militants, however, so angered him that he reinstated the phrase. Swanwick, pp. 216–17.

107 Manchester Guardian, November 29, 1911.

108 The Times, November 30 and December 6, 1911.

109 Manchester Guardian, December 1, 1911.

110 Beaverbrook Library, London, Papers of Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, C 8/1/1, David
Lloyd George to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, copy, November 30, 1911 (hereafter cited as Lloyd George
Papers). This letter is also in the Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Fawcett Library, London. Lloyd
George had also told C. P. Scott that the actions of the militants were damaging the suffrage movement.
See Lloyd George Papers, C 8/1/1, David Lloyd George to C. P. Scott, copy, November 30, 1911; Scott
diary, December 2, 1911.

111 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N. Brailsford to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, November 26, [1911]. The Conciliation Bill had, of course, been drafted by a committee
composed of members of all parties. In revising the bill in 1911, Brailsford had taken great pains to
accommodate Liberal criticisms of the 1910 proposal. In no sense was it a “Tory-inspired” proposal. See
also Manchester Guardian, December 4, 1911.

112 Papers of Millicent Garrett, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Louisa Garrett Anderson,
December 3, 1911, Fawcett Library, London. Anderson concurred with her aunt and resigned from the
WSPU in protest of the militants’ actions. Ibid., Louisa Garrett Anderson to Millicent Garrett Fawcett,
December 4, 1911.

113 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., November 30, 1911, Fawcet Library, London; The Times,
December 1, 1911.

114 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to David Lloyd George,
copy, December 2, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

115 Ibid.

116 Bodleian Library, Papers of William Waldegrave Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne, Ms. 102,
the Earl of Selborne to the Countess of Selborne, November 19, 1911 (hereafter cited as Selborne
Papers).

117 Beaverbrook Library, Papers of Andrew Bonar Law, 33/3/17, Andrew Bonar Law to Lady
Betty Balfour, copy [November 11, 1911] (hereafter cited as Law Papers).

118 Selborne Papers, Ms. 102, the Earl of Selborne to the Countess of Selborne, December 6,
1911.

119 Manchester Guardian, November 18, 1911.

120 See C. C., December 14, 1911.

121 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1911, Account of
deputation to John Harm wood-Banner (Cons., Liverpool), December 7, 1911; Correspondence of the
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from Edith Palliser, January 10, 1912;
Fawcett Library, London.

122 C. C., December 14, 1911.

123 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 7, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

124 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Lady Eleanor Cecil to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, December 24, 1911.

125 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 7, 1911, Fawcett Library, London.

126 British Museum, Papers of Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Add. Mss. 51160, Lord Robert
Cecil to Miss Theilman, copy, January 2, 1912 (hereafter cited as Cecil Papers).
 127 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Lady Eleanor Cecil to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, December 24, 1911. See also British Museum, Arnclife-Sennett Collection, vol. 16, Lord Robert
Cecil to Maud Arncliffe-Sennett, January 19, 1912; The Times, December 14, 1911, and January 4, 1912.

128 Pall Mall Gazette, January 5, 1912, gave the following analysis of the Cabinet split. For
women’s suffrage—Grey, Lloyd George, Morley, Haldane, Churchill, Carrington, Earl Beauchamp,
Birrell, Burns, Buxton, Pease, Runciman. Against—Asquith, Loreburn, Harcourt, McKenna, Samuels,
Lord Pentland (doubtful), Crewe. The contention that Burns, Churchill, and Pease were suffragists is
unfounded.

129 Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (New Haven, 1937), pp. 413–14.

130 Margot Asquith to the Master of Elibank, January 14 and 28, 1912, as quoted in Morgan,
pp. 89–90.

131 H. H. Asquith to Winston S. Churchill, December 23, 1911, as quoted in Winston S.

Churchill, Companion vol. 2, part 3, p. 1477.

132 Winston S. Churchill to the Master of Elibank, December 18, 1911, as quoted in Ibid., vol.
2, pp. 388–89.

133 Lloyd George Papers, C 3/15/12, Winston S. Churchill to David Lloyd George, December
16, 1911. Churchill wrote a similar letter to Grey. See Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2, p. 390.

134 Winston S. Churchill to H. H. Asquith, December 21, 1911, as quoted in Winston S.

Churchill, vol. 2, pp. 391–92.

135 Papers of Jane, Lady Strachey, Lady Strachey to the Countess of Selborne, January 23,
1912, Fawcett Library, London.

136 The Times, February 8, 1912.

137 Law Papers, 24/4/91, the Countess of Selborne to Andrew Bonar Law, November 29,
[1913].

138 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 1, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, “Women’s Suffrage and the Referendum,” Englishwoman, 13, no. 38 (February 1912): 127.

139 C. C., January 25, 1912; Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 10, H. N.
Brailsford to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, January 22, [1912]; M/50, Box 9, Kathleen Courtney to Millicent
Garrett Fawcett, January 22, 1912.

140 J. L. Hammond, C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian (New York, 1934), p. 110.
 141 Scott diary, January 24, 1912. Brailsford had tried to persuade Lloyd George to resign if
the Government acceded to the referendum proposal, but Lloyd George was unwilling to do this.

142 FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, February 10 and
March 7, 1912, Fawcett Library, London. According to Austen Chamberlain, Loreburn threatened to join
a committee in the House of Lords to put down obstructive amendments to the Government Franchise
Bill if it contained a women’s suffrage amendment. Chamberlain, p. 424.

143 FLAC, vol. 21, Lady Constance Lytton to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, February 6, 1912,
Fawcett Library, London; Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Lady Constance Lytton to
Millicent Garrett Fawcett, February 6, 1912.

144 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 13.

145 C. C., February 8, 1912; Hammond, p. 110.

146 Bodleian Library, Nevinson Journals, e616, November 8, 1911.

147 FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, Millicent Garett Fawcett to lady Frances Balfour, February 11, 1912,
Fawcett Library, London.

148 F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, p. 88; The Times, March 2 and 5, 1912.

149 FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, March 7, 1912,
Fawcett Library, London.

150 See Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular
from the NUWSS to Members of Parliament, March 8, 1912; Manchester Guardian, March 8, 1912.

151 The Times, March 7, 11, 18, 22, and 25, 1912.

152 Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage with the North Kensington
Society for Women’s Suffrage, Alan Burgoyne to Miss Chadwick, March 15, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.

153 Manchester Guardian, March 6, 1912.

154 Chamberlain, p. 447; Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage with
the East St. Paneras Society for Women’s Suffrage, Augusta Harrington to Philippa Strachey, March 6,
1912, Fawcett Library, London; Manchester Guardian, March 13, 1912.

155 The Times, March 12, 1912; Manchester Guardian, March 11, 1912.

156 Chamberlain, p. 447. Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 175–76, indicates that in the winter
of 1912, the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage was having both organization and financial
problems; thus, the exploits of the militants in March 1912 came as an especially “welcome diversion” to
the NLOWS and injected vitality into the flagging organization.

157 FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, March 7, 1912,
Fawcett Library, London.

158 For examples of this work see: Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from Edith Palliser, February 16 and 28, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London; Marshall Papers, Correspondence of Eleanor Acland and Catherine Marshall, February 1912,
passim.

159 Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, “Report of Meetings,
1911,” Fawcett Library, London; Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1912, “Report on work
in the London area,” Fawcett Library, London; East Midland Federation, Annual Report, 1911–1912 (n.p.,
n.d.), passim; West Midland Federation, Annual Report, 1911–1912, passim.

160 Manchester Guardian, February 24, 1912.

161 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular
from Edith Palliser, March 9 and 22, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., March 21, 1912; Fawcett Library,
London.

162 The Times, March 29, 1912. The bill was scheduled to be read on March 22 but the
Government took the day to consider emergency legislation on the Coal Miners’ strike and the second
reading was postponed until March 28.

163 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, What I Remember, pp. 205–6.

164 An Analysis of Voting on Women’s Suffrage Bills in the House of Commons since 1908,
NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.), p. 3.

165 Peter Rowland, The Last Liberal Governments; Unfinished Business, 1911–1914 (London,
1971), pp. 137–38.

166 C. C., February 1, 1912.

167 Manchester Guardian, March 30 and April 5, 1912.

168 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After: Personal Reminiscences,
1911–1918 (London, 1920), pp. 21–22; Manchester Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1913
(n.p., n.d.), p. 13.

169 C. C, April 4, 1912.

170 Manchester Guardian, March 30, 1912; The Times, March 30, 1912.
 171 Rosen, p. 162, downplays the impact of militancy on the 1912 vote on the Conciliation Bill,
but his analysis does not explain why Liberals who were pledged to support the bill subsequently broke
their pledges, or why such a large number of Conservatives who either supported or remained neutral to
the bill in 1911 voted against it in 1912.

172 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular
from Edith Palliser and Kathleen Courtney, March 30, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

173 Rowland, pp. 137–38; Correspondence concerning the Conciliation Bill, 1912,
“Memorandum on the Voting of London MPs on March 28, 1912, compared with the voting on May 5,
1911,” Fawcett Library, London; Manchester Guardian, March 30, 1912.

174 Manchester Guardian, March 30, 1912.

175 Ibid., April 5, 1912.

176 Law Papers, 25/3/26, the Earl of Selborne to Andrew Bonar Law, March 13, 1912; Lord
Robert Cecil, “The Suffrage Crisis,” Englishwoman, 14, no. 40 (April 1912): 3–5.

177 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Sir Edward Grey to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, April 5,
1912, Fawcett Library, London.

178 See, for example, The Times, March 30, 1912; West Midland Federation, Annual Report,
1911–1912, pp. 15–16, 36, 39.

179 Rosen, p. 162.

180 Leventhal, p. 153.

181 The Times, March 6, 1912.

182 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular
from Kathleen Courtney and Edith Palliser, March 30, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

183 The Conservatives’ response to women’s suffrage discouraged even the most steadfast
party supporters. In February 1912, Lady Betty Balfour wrote to Bonar Law: “The sad thing is that so
many of our Conservative Suffragists are like you—wildly in favor of woman suffrage, but quite unwilling
to help to bring it about, whereas in the Conservative Antisuffragists there is a vein of real fervor and
enthusiasm and they are quite willing to bring active pressure on their party to prevent its being brought
about.” Law Papers, 25/2/31, Lady Betty Balfour to Andrew Bonar Law, February 17, 1912.

184 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Kathleen Courtney to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, April 8, 1912.

185 C. C., April 4, 1912.

 CHAPTER V

THE ELECTION FIGHTING FUND AND THE FRANCHISE

BILL

With the defeat of the Conciliation Bill, the NUWSS rested its hopes
on the women’s suffrage amendments to the Franchise and Registration Bill;
yet, the suffragists’ prospects were negligible if the same conditions that had
extinguished the Conciliation Bill prevailed. If the vote on the women’s
suffrage amendments were to be successful, the NUWSS would, in some
way, have to prevent the coalescing of forces that had occurred on March 28.
The NUWSS and its supporters in Parliament believed that the cessation of
militancy would undercut the antisuffragist campaign against the amendments;
the Pankhursts chose to turn a deaf ear to this argument and the suffragists
unhappily acknowledged that they could not persuade the WSPU to abandon
militancy. With the House of Commons, the NUWSS still thought it had some
influence. The vote on the second reading indicated that the Liberals and the
Irish held the keys to victory on the vote on the Franchise Bill; the NUWSS
did not dismiss the Conservatives, but it felt, quite correctly, that its cause
was more popular with the rank and file of the Liberal Party than with the
Tories.1 Therefore if the suffragist forces within the Liberal Party could be
strengthened, and those who had abstained on March 28 could be persuaded
to support the amendments, there was a good chance that the House of
Commons would incorporate women’s suffrage in the Franchise Bill. About
the Irish Nationalists, whose fortunes were so intertwined with the Liberal
Party, there was less reason to be sanguine. Fawcett, complaining to Sir
Edward Grey about the Nationalists’ vote on the Conciliation Bill, predicted
that there would be little chance of carrying a women’s suffrage amendment
if the Irish persisted in their opposition to the cause: “The fact that not one of
Mr. Redmond’s followers voted for the Bill, though 31 voted for it last year,
is very ominous for the future unless something can be done to win them back
to a more reasonable attitude.2 If a repetition of March 28 were to be
averted, the NUWSS would have to secure, at the least, the neutrality of the
Irish. The Liberals’ attitude to women’s suffrage would exert a great
influence on the behavior of the Nationalists.

Between April 1912 and January 1913, the NUWSS turned its
energies to the job of building up a parliamentary majority for the women’s
suffrage amendments to the Franchise and Registration Bill. The main objects
of the pressure were the Liberals and the Irish, who had to be drawn back to
solid support. As in the past, the lobbying took the form of letters, memorials,
meetings, and deputations. Some mention was also made of the women’s
suffrage amendment to the Home Rule Bill, the “Snowden amendment.” The
Irish were much opposed to this amendment, and the NUWSS thought it
would be possible to use it as a way of showing the Nationalists that the
suffragists could place obstacles in the path of Home Rule and perhaps
coerce the Irish into remaining neutral on, if not supporting, the women’s
suffrage amendments to the Franchise Bill.3 Lastly, the NUWSS adopted a
new by-election policy: the Election Fighting Fund. This marked an
important new departure in its political strategy.

The failure of the Conciliation Bill had severely shaken the NUWSS
confidence in the Liberal Party, particularly in the party’s leadership, and had
simultaneously demonstrated that the Labour Party was committed to
women’s suffrage. By their official support of the Conciliation Bill, the
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) had given substance to the women’s
suffrage resolution adopted at the January party conference.4 The NUWSS
thought it was justified in showing the erring Liberals that they could not
continue to toy with the suffragists, and at the same time rewarding the
Labour Party for its steadfast support for women’s suffrage. The Election
Fighting Fund (EFF) was worked out as a means of combining these several
political motivations into a single strategy. If successful, the strategy would
not only punish the Liberals but even entice them with the carrot being
offered to the Labourites.

The EFF scheme, as first outlined in May 1912, was quite simple:
the NUWSS agreed to form a special committee—the EFF—which would
raise “a sum of money for the specific object of supporting individual
candidates standing in the interests of Labour in any constituency where the
N. U. thinks it advisable to oppose a Liberal Antisuffragist” and offered to
“support such candidates by the organization of a vigorous campaign on their
behalf.”5 The new policy was not anti-Government in the same sense as the
WSPU’s election policy: it did not challenge all Liberals, only the
antisuffrage ones. Moreover, unlike the militants’ policy, there was a positive
content to the EFF: it would work to build up the forces of the prosuffrage
Labour Party in the House of Commons. The NUWSS did not regard the EFF
as an abandonment of its former “best friend of women’s suffrage” by-
election policy. Rather, its support for Labour was simply a recognition that
“a suffragist who belonged to a suffrage party was a better friend than a
suffragist who belonged to a party which was Anti-Suffrage or neutral.”6 As
Fawcett admitted, the defeat of the Conciliation Bill had administered a
“fatal shock” to the old by-election policy of the NUWSS: forty-two “best
friends” had voted against the bill and ninety-one had abstained. The EFF
would add a new and more solid dimension to the interpretation of “best
friend": in deciding whether or not to support a candidate, the NUWSS
would take into account not only the individual’s views but also the views of
his party.7

In short-range terms the NUWSS adopted the EFF to rid the House
of Commons of antisuffragists and to augment the suffragist forces, thereby
increasing the chance of a successful vote on the women’s suffrage
amendments to the Franchise Bill.8 The EFF was not aimed indiscriminately
at all antisuffragists, however—only at Liberal antisuffragists—and its main
purpose was to coerce members of the Liberal Party into supporting the
women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill.9 Brailsford’s analysis of
the causes of the Liberals’ antipathy to the Conciliation Bill agreed with that
of the NUWSS in finding that many party members were afraid of the
disruptive influence of women’s suffrage on the Cabinet and feared the
electoral effects of the bill: “There was a general sense in the House that
women’s suffrage was dangerous. It is fear which defeated us, and a
calculation of party advantage. The belief which confronts us is that it may be
dangerous to Liberalism to carry women’s suffrage. It lies with us to arrange
that it will be much more dangerous to delay it.”10

In adopting the EFF, the NUWSS attempted to make such an

arrangement. It intended to show the Liberal Party managers that “in
consequence of the defeat of the Conciliation Bill and the uncertainty about
the Government Reform Bill an increased number of three-cornered contests
would take place. ”11 Since the Liberals’ control over the House of
Commons was no more than tenuous, three-way contests which would divide
the progressive vote could well prove disastrous for the Liberals and put the
Conservatives back in power. The NUWSS realized that the Liberal Party
machine resisted women’s suffrage because of its electoral implications; it
designed the EFF to persuade the Liberals that it would be more damaging to
delay than to conclude a settlement of the women’s suffrage question. In
assessing the prospect of an increased number of three-cornered by-
elections, the Liberal Party managers might decide to press for the passage of
women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill, rather than risk the loss of
Liberal seats.12 Through the EFF the NUWSS also intended to influence,
indirectly, the behavior of the Nationalists: the Irish, disturbed by the
possible loss of Liberal seats at a time when Home Rule hung in the balance,
might reverse their attitude to women’s suffrage.13

The new policy also had a subtler, long-range rationale. The

NUWSS intended, should the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform
Bill fail, to continue the EFF policy with an eye to the next General Election:
the object would be to increase the number of seats which Labour would
contest at the election and to eliminate the antisuffragist element in the
Liberal Party, particularly in the Cabinet. Brailsford, who was still the
NUWSS parliamentary watchdog, had assured the suffragists that “Two
changes in the present disposition of forces in the House would ensure our
success; the elimination of the present antisuffragist element in the Liberal
ranks and any considerable increase in the Labour strength.”14 A contest
between Liberals and Labourites for the same seats might result in an
electoral victory for the Conservatives, but that was a risk the NUWSS was
willing to take. At this point, the suffragists were inclined to feel that their
position could be no worse under a Conservative Government, particularly
as the leadership of the party included a distinguished suffragist component;
and besides, they were convinced that the Liberals would agree to a
women’s suffrage measure if they believed that the suffrage issue would
prove a handicap to them at the General Election.15

The negotiations that led to the formation of the EFF reveal much
about the Labour Party and the NUWSS as political organizations. As had so
often been the case in the past, Brailsford, himself a Liberal, played a
guiding role in shaping the NUWSS policy, and he was responsible for the
suffragists’ decision to formulate an alliance with Labour.

Brailsford had for some time been critical of the NUWSS by-
election policy and had questioned its effectiveness in influencing the
behavior of Members of the House of Commons. However, he also criticized
the anti-Government by-election policy of the militants as being too
sophisticated and too demanding for the average voter; in addition, until the
defeat of the Conciliation Bill, he preferred to give the Liberals the benefit of
the doubt on the question of women’s suffrage because he thought an anti-
Government policy might be self-defeating.16 The demise of the bill
convinced Brailsford that it was time to jettison the Liberals and “to show
the Government that we can make ourselves very objectionable”; but this
would have to be done in a way which would “rally the votes of some large
section of the electors, without demanding from them the heroic sacrifice of
most of their opinions.”17 Accordingly, he suggested to Kathleen Courtney
that the NUWSS form an alliance with the Labour Party; as Brailsford
envisaged it, this new coalition would not indiscriminately challenge all
Liberals, but only antisuffrage Liberals.18

The ground was ready for such a suggestion. There are indications
that Fawcett and other members of the NUWSS executive had been
dissatisfied with the NUWSS by-election policy for some months; the House
of Commons vote on March 28 only intensified this feeling.19 On April 4, in
an article published in Common Cause, Fawcett hinted that the NUWSS was
prepared to redefine its by-election policy. Soon afterward she received a
letter from Courtney which relayed Brailsford’s suggestion and assured her
that opinion within the NUWSS was in favor of such a move: “A good many
letters have come to the office urging us to do something and it is evident that
there is any amount of keenness in the country. So I do think the question
arises as to whether the psychological moment has come for us to enter into
provisional arrangements with the Labour Party and then lay a proper scheme
before a meeting of the General Council. ”20 Ten days later, on April 18, the
executive committee voted to summon a council on May 14 to consider
changing the by-election policy.21 Brailsford and Courtney had given Fawcett
the final push. As Fawcett admitted, Brailsford had convinced her that the
only way to gain the respect of the Liberal “whips and wirepullers, was to
prove, by by-election work, that the suffragists could transfer seats from one
side of the House of Commons to the other.”22

The next step was for the NUWSS to approach the Labour Party and
negotiate a “scheme of cooperation.” After much correspondence with Arthur
Henderson, the Labour Party secretary, the officers of the NUWSS met with
him on April 30 to discuss the proposed plan; Henderson, in turn, sought out
Hardie’s and MacDonald’s reaction to the NUWSS proposal.23 Two weeks
later, Fawcett and Courtney conferred with MacDonald, as chairman of the
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), in an effort to come to some agreement
with Labour.24

The officials of the Labour Party were hardly enthusiastic about the
NUWSS proposal. The NUWSS wanted to make it explicit that, as a reward
for Labour’s support for women’s suffrage, it intended to establish a fund to
help Labour candidates fight Liberal antisuffragists, and it wanted to make a
public statement that the sole purpose of the fund was to support “individual
candidates standing in the interests of Labour in any constituency where the
N. U. thinks it advisable to oppose a Liberal Antisuffragist.”25 The Labour
Party, although not averse to accepting the suffragists’ financial assistance,
wanted to obfuscate the issue and to delete from the resolution the phrase
“the interests of Labour.” The party’s representatives were not eager to
advertise that the party was a willing partner to an agreement that would pit
Labour against its supposed ally the Liberal Party. MacDonald also feared
that if the NUWSS announced that it intended to raise a fund to help Labour,
this would “expose his party to the charge of being bought for an object” and
would “weaken in the eyes of the public the independence of his party.”26

Henderson’s and MacDonald’s skepticism was partly based on the

complicated attitude of the Labour Party toward the whole question of
women’s suffrage. Notwithstanding the party resolution on the subject, there
were three, if not four, different opinions within the party, ranging from that
of George Lansbury (MP from Bow and Bromley), the most radical, to that of
MacDonald. Lansbury thought women’s suffrage should take precedence over
every other issue and he wanted the party to vote against every Government-
sponsored measure as a protest against the Liberals’ attitude toward the
women’s cause. Snowden and Hardie opposed any further electoral reform if
women were excluded but were unwilling to put women’s suffrage ahead of
all other issues.27 MacDonald, who as unquestionably the most powerful man
in the Labour Party had many supporters, more or less favored women’s
suffrage but was prepared to sacrifice women in order to secure universal
male suffrage.28 At best, MacDonald was a tepid suffragist and the behavior
of the militants had dampened whatever enthusiasm he may formerly have
had for the cause.29 MacDonald could not bear the militants’ unwomanly
behavior, and complained somewhat paradoxically that their actions
demonstrated “those petti-fogging qualities which, insultingly to women,
used to be known under the generic title of 'feminine'” and made him question
whether women should vote.30 Henderson’s position on women’s suffrage
was somewhere between those of Snowden and MacDonald: emotionally he
sympathized with Snowden and Hardie, but from a political point of view he
sided with MacDonald.31 in any case, the women’s suffrage problem was, as
MacDonald’s biographer has written, as “potent a source of disunity in the
Labour movement as industrial unrest.“32 The Labour Party officials
apparently feared—no doubt with good reason—that an agreement with the
NUWSS, even an informal one, might well bring these tensions to the surface
and only exacerbate discord within the party.“33

If the new agreement with the NUWSS threatened to inflame

disagreements over women’s suffrage within the party, it also challenged
Labour’s whole relationship with the Liberal Party. In 1903 MacDonald, then
Secretary of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC), and Herbert
Gladstone, acting as Chief Whip of the Liberal Party, had worked out an
informal entente: the Liberal Party promised not to oppose LRC candidates
in thirty-five specified seats, and MacDonald, in return, promised that the
LRC would avoid sponsoring candidatures which might split the anti-
Conservative or progressive vote.34 The Liberals had promoted such an
agreement because they realized that a Labour candidate drew votes away
from a Liberal; the Gladstone-MacDonald pact was a cornerstone of the
relationship of the Liberal and Labour parties and, moreover, one which had
benefited both parties.35
 Labour took this entente seriously and, at least in one instance,
threatened to withdraw from the House of Commons for a fortnight in protest
against the Liberal Party’s contesting what it regarded as Labour’s seat.36 In
General Elections the Labour Party had lived up to the agreement and, on the
whole, had avoided three-cornered contests; this certainly helped the
Liberals in 1906 and, in the opinion of one historian, Robert Blake, may have
cost the Conservatives the election in January 1910.37 Although at by-
elections three-cornered contents were more frequent, the NUWSS proposal
promised that the electoral struggles between the Liberals and Labour would
increase. Given the precariousness of the Government’s parliamentary
majority, by-elections very much mattered to the Liberals, particularly three-
cornered contests which split the progressive vote. MacDonald continued to
champion the political partnership between the two parties, and to those,
such as Hardie, who criticized the partnership, he always pointed out that the
enemies of the Liberals were the enemies of Labour. He had no desire to be
party to any scheme that might jeopardize Labour’s relations with the
Liberals or further reduce the Government’s already slim majority.38

Besides these considerations of possible party disunity and the

matter of the entente with the Liberals, the Labour Party also had to consider
how the NUWSS proposal might affect both its financial and its political
independence. Since the Osborne judgment of 1909, the Labour Party had
been very short of funds; but it had no wish to risk being charged with
bribery.39 As MacDonald told Fawcett, the EFF would certainly provoke
accusations that Labour was “being bought.“40 MacDonald frankly admitted
that he feared the suffragists might feel that they should have a say in the
party’s political decisions in return for their financial support; he was
particularly apprehensive that the NUWSS might try to dictate which seats
Labour should contest, and would insist on the Labour Party’s opposing the
Reform Bill should it exclude women.41 In fact, the Labour Party constitution
specifically debarred the party from forming an “alliance” with any
organization; though the NUWSS proposal was not a formal alliance as such,
it seemed to threaten the independence that the Labour Party was so
determined to preserve.

MacDonald was right to suspect that the suffragists were “using” the
Labour Party. Fawcett wanted the best of both worlds: she intended to
preserve the “nonparty attitude” of the NUWSS while at the same time
supporting Labour candidates.42 she viewed an agreement with Labour as a
“temporary accident,” an alliance which was, for the moment, both
convenient and politically useful to the suffragists. Once the EFF had brought
the Liberals to heel, the suffragists would sever their connections with
Labour.43 But there were many members of the NUWSS who found the idea
of even a temporary relationship with Labour repugnant. They identified the
Labour Party with socialism and had no desire to be connected with this
creed.

In persuading the NUWSS to establish the EFF, Fawcett emphasized

that the NUWSS had not abandoned its traditional “nonparty attitude” and
argued that the adoption of the EFF involved an extension of, rather than a
fundamental change in, the NUWSS old policy of supporting those candidates
who had shown themselves to be the best friends of women’s suffrage; in the
future, however, in judging between candidates, the NUWSS would take into
account not only the individual opinion of candidates but also their parties’
attitude to women’s suffrage. In order to minimize the radical implications of
the suffrage-Labour entente and to sell her more timid colleagues on the idea
of the EFF, Fawcett emphasized that the NUWSS was prepared to give its
support to members of the Conservative and Liberal parties as soon as these
parties took a strong stand on women’s suffrage.44 “I cannot join the Labour
Party because I am not a socialist,” she declared, but the support of Labour
candidates should not be misconstrued as support for the Labour program.”45
In Fawcett’s view, it was no more than passing political convenience that
linked suffragists to the Labour Party; the alliance was in no sense intended
as permanent, nor did it imply any loss of the NUWSS independence of
action.46

To preserve the notion that the NUWSS intended to retain its

nonparty status, and to satisfy those in the organization who did not favor the
EFF, the NUWSS executive purposely set the EFF somewhat apart from the
parent organization. The EFF was placed under the aegis of the NUWSS
executive, but its finances were completely separate and it had it own staff
and its own executive, which included men and women who did not belong
to the NUWSS.47 Fawcett and her colleagues on the executive realized that in
matters other than women’s suffrage, the members of the NUWSS were
inclined to be conservative, and might not welcome any alliance with
Labour, which was, after all, the party of the working class. Fawcett
anticipated that if those conservative-minded women were compelled to
make what they saw as a choice between loyalty to their class and loyalty to
their cause, they would abandon their feminist inclinations in favor of class
interests. The evident separation of the EFF from the NUWSS organization
was supposed to make any choice of that sort unnecessary. Always, the
NUWSS took pains to stress the limited nature of the partnership with
Labour: “We are suffragists first,” Fawcett delcared; “We belong to all
parties, and to none.“48

Nonetheless, a good many members of the NUWSS remained

unhappy with the EFF, and some eventually left.49 The EFF was criticized as
being a break with the NUWSS past policy, and a threat to old party
loyalties. Some suffragists disliked any connection, however tenuous, with
the Labour Party and carped that the NUWSS was “casting in its lot with
socialism.”50 Still others felt that it was politically unwise to adopt the EFF
because it would only irritate the Liberals. John Galsworthy, representing
this last point of view, complained to Fawcett that the EFF would so
exasperate the Liberals that it would destroy any hope of passing the
women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill.51 To some extent, these
criticisms were undeniable: the EFF did involve a fundamental change in the
“nonparty” policy of the NUWSS. No matter how much Fawcett and her
friends wished to deceive themselves or the rest of the organization, the EFF
was bound to alter the NUWSS relationship with both the Liberal and the
Labour parties. Even if the entente with Labour was temporary and
conditional, its purpose would be solely to help Labour candidates fight
Liberals. How could such a proposal not prejudice the nonparty status of the
NUWSS?

Although a vocal minority at the May council of the NUWSS

opposed the new scheme, Fawcett and her supporters succeeded in
persuading the delegates to adopt the EFF proposal.52 At the same time the
council voted to inaugurate a program known as “the Friends of Women’s
Suffrage” (FWS): this program, consciously modeled on the American Carrie
Chapman Catt’s Woman Suffrage Party, enabled those who sympathized with
the NUWSS but could not afford to join, to enroll as “Friends” of the
organization by signing a simple statement of approval of the principle of
women’s suffrage.53 The scheme was aimed at attracting the support of
members of the working class in order to rid the NUWSS of its middle class
image,54 and its appearance gave substance to the predictions of those
suffragists who had divined that the EFF would draw the NUWSS closer to
the working class. From the executive’s point of view, the FWS, working as
an adjunct of the EFF, would compensate for any falling off in membership
which might result from the adoption of the EFF, and it would provide a
valuable nucleus of information and organization within the constituencies
for any political party allied with the NUWSS.55

The Labour Party did not officially accept the NUWSS proposal
until the first week in July. Brailsford, always the mediator, was probably
responsible for prevailing upon the party to put aside its objections to the
EFF plan. Even before the NUWSS had actually adopted the EFF, Brailsford
wrote Henderson a long letter in which he reproached the Labour Party
leadership for its reluctance to sanction the proposal and asked him to
reconsider his position:

The suppression of any reference to Labour candidates in the formal

definition of the scheme is to all our minds totally impossible. If you
must insist on that, the whole plan falls to the ground. A vague
resolution telling of support for “individual candidates” would mean
nothing or anything, and would bring in no money. It would be
generally interpreted to mean the pursuit of the hopeless old plan of
suffrage candidatures—which everyone knows to be a futility. … To
get money one must have an intelligible, hopeful scheme, which the
resolution as amended by you would not be. You will not be
surprised to hear that there is a good deal of doubt and opposition to
the scheme inside the National Union. … I leave you to guess the
effect on these critics of the news that the Labour Party, while
apparently quite glad to take the women’s money, refuses to accept
their support publicly… . all who have been urging that the Labour
Party should be trusted and helped are made to look ridiculous… .
I hardly think you have realized the potentialities of this scheme.
… I believe that in the course of a fighting alliance most of them
[suffragists] would end by becoming decided and permanent
 adherents of the Labour Party. But that certainly will not happen if at
this crucial juncture women realize that you do not care to avow any
cooperation with them, and in effect reject a plan which involves
from most of them sacrifices of party ties.”56

Brailsford’s criticisms must have made some impression on the leaders of

the Labour Party; moreover, the tempting prospect of new recruits as well as
additional funds may have helped overcome their objections to the alliance.
Although the Labour Party Executive did not meet officially to consider the
proposal until early July, by the end of May the Labour Party had begun to
cooperate with the NUWSS.57 On July 2 the Executive adopted a resolution
offered by MacDonald, which called for acceptance of money and support
from the NUWSS for candidates contesting seats where Liberal
antisuffragists might be easily opposed. The partnership between the
suffragists and Labour had formally begun.58

The NUWSS purposely chose members for the first EFF committee
from a broad spectrum, in order to attract funds from as wide a variety of
sources as possible and establish a broad base of support. The new
committee included men such as the writers Israel Zangwill and Laurence
Houseman, who had close ties to the WSPU; staunch Liberals, such as
Muriel, Countess de la Warr; supporters of Labour, such as Margaret
McMillan; and prominent suffragists such as Brailsford and Lytton.59 The
driving force behind the new committee was its secretary, Catherine
Marshall.”60 Marshall, the daughter of a suffragist family with close ties to
the Liberal Party, had worked her way up through the ranks of the NUWSS,
beginning as secretary of the Keswick Women’s Suffrage Society, and had
eventually achieved a place on the NUWSS executive. As acting
parliamentary secretary to the NUWSS, she had learned the art of pressure-
group politics and had become familiar with the politics of suffrage within
the House of Commons. Marshall was a zealot where suffrage was
concerned, yet she managed to temper her determination with charm and
humor. She was both perspicacious and persuasive and was an indefatigable
worker; above all, she was a born organizer.61
 Under Marshall’s direction the EFF committee quickly recruited a
staff of organizers, led by the very capable Margaret Robertson; in two
months the EFF executive also succeeded in raising £4,130–6–3.62 Almost
before the committee had set the wheels of the new organization in motion, it
was faced with the prospect of fighting four by-elections. The Labour Party,
which had never contested more than one by-election at a time, was as
overwhelmed by this task as the suffragists were.63 But even in this first
venture, the EFF organization and the local Labour committees worked well
together. Wisely, the EFF executive, whenever possible, recruited suffragists
with Labour sympathies to serve both as organizers and as volunteer workers
at these by-elections.64

The EFF staff went to great efforts to emphasize to the electors the
links between the suffrage cause and the Labour Party. It opened committee
rooms, canvassed for the Labour candidates, held joint meetings with Labour,
and even supplied motor cars to take Labour voters to the polis.”65 The
perseverance of the suffragists impressed the Labour Party. Arthur Peters,
chief agent of the party, declared that there were “no more enthusiastic
supporters and workers than the members of the National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies.”66 The Labour Leader called the suffragists “among the
most effective regiments in the army of Labour.”67

Besides the by-election work, the EFF during the period between
June 1912 and January 1913, was also busy making preparations for the next
General Election and agitating to strengthen the Labour Party’s commitment
to women’s suffrage. After consulting with officials of the Labour Party, the
EFF started laying the groundwork for contesting seats held by prominent
antisuffrag ist Liberals—particularly those of the Cabinet ministers who
opposed women’s suffrage: Accrington (Harold Baker), E. Bristol (Charles
Hobhouse), N. Monmouth (Reginald McKenna), Rossendale (Lewis
Harcourt), and Rotherham (J. A. Pease).68 The EFF also began organizing
work in certain Labour constituencies which the suffragists feared might
come under attack at the next election: Blackburn (Philip Snowden), Gorton
(J. Hodge), E. Leeds (J. O’Grady), and W. Bradford (F. W. Jowett).69 The
object of all of these preparations was twofold—to defend the seats held by
Labour MP’s who had “taken a strong line on the Women’s Suffrage
question” and to attack the seats of Liberal antisuffragists.70 The EFF
intended to build up strong local organizations in the constituencies that
could be used effectively at the General Election to secure the return of
Labour-suffrage candidates. According to Marshall, the Labour Party had
said it was prepared to contest any constituency in the northeastern area and
would attack several seats held by the Liberals, provided it had the support
of the EFF; with this end in mind, the EFF began to organize in Gateshead,
North Leeds, East Bradford, and Bishop Auckland.71

At this time the EFF organizers also began to propagandize for

women’s suffrage among the trade unions. The miners, who had consistently
opposed women’s suffrage resolutions at the annual conferences of the
Labour Party, were singled out as the main target. The EFF committee
reasoned that if the unions put pressure on the Parliamentary Labour Party, it
might officially resolve to oppose the third reading of the Reform Bill if
women were excluded. At the very least, these propaganda efforts would
make the rank and file of the party more aware of, and presumably more
enthusiastic about, the suffragigsts’ demands.72

Although the executive of the EFF, in consultation with the NUWSS

executive, was responsible for formulating all these plans and creating the
organization to carry them out, many of the federations of the NUWSS began
to establish regional EFF committees in order to make the implementation of
the EFF more effective.73 Also, many federations which did not form local
EFF committees did undertake the Friends of Women’s Suffrage scheme, and
that proved very successful.

The affiliates seem to have recognized that the reservoirs of

working class support for women’s suffrage were largely untapped. The EFF
established a visible and demonstrable link between Labour and women’s
suffrage, and the NUWSS could use this Labour-suffrage partnership to
attract workers’ support for the suffrage cause. The FWS provided the local
affiliataes with a new means of reaching the working class by enabling
workers, male or female, to become adherents of the suffrage organization
without making any financial contribution. The NUWSS branches sent
volunteers into working class neighborhoods to canvass for women’s
suffrage and to register those who were sympathetic as “friends”; these
“friends” then met periodically to discuss women’s suffrage. By the end of
1912, over one hundred branches of the NUWSS had inaugurated the FWS
program.74 NUWSS headquarters anticipated that these new footholds among
the working class would be very valuable to the suffragists at the General
Election, particularly in the voter-registration drive. The potential for both
the organization and registration of workers which the FWS offered would
be especially appealing to the Labour Party; the NUWSS intended to dangle
this prospect before Labour in order to secure its commitment to the cause of
women’s suffrage.75

The effectiveness of the EFF can be measured in part by the results

of the four by-elections in which the EFF participated, since the EFF was
established with by-elections in mind and the major portion of its financial
and organizational resources was devoted to that activity.76 At first glance
(see Table 3), the EFF work in these elections may seem to have come to
naught; but one must remember that the EFF had four interrelated goals in
mind for these by-elections: to increase the number of Labour MP’s in the
House of Commons; to decrease the number of Liberal MP’s in order to make
the Labour Party more important in the House relative to the Liberal Party; to
rid the House of Liberal antisuffragists; and to secure enough votes for the
Labour candidate to demonstrate Labour’s importance in the constituency.”77

Table 3

By-Elections at Which the Election Fighting Fund Was Used, 1912

Holmfirth—June 1912a January 1910 election resultsb

S. Arnold, Lib. 4,749 H. J. Wilson, Lib. 6,339
G. Ellis, Cons. 3,379 R. G. Ellis, Cons. 3,043
W. Lunn, Lab. 3,195 W. Pickles, Lab. 1,643
Liberal majority 1,370 Liberal majority 3,296

Hanley—July 1912c December 1910 election results

R. L. Outhwaite, Lib. 6,647 E. Edwards, Lab. 8,343
G. H. Rittner, Cons. 5,993 G. Rittner, Cons. 4,658
S. Finney, Lab. 1,694 Labour majority 3,685
 Liberal majority 654

Crewe—July 1912d December 1910 election results

E. Craig, Cons. 6,260 W. S. B. McLaren, Lib. 7,629
H. Murphy, Lib. 5,294 E. Y. Craig, Cons. 5,925
J. Holmes, Lab. 2,485 Liberal majority 1,704
Conservative majority 966

Midlothian—September 1912e December 1910 election Results

Major J. A. Hope, Cons. 6,021 Master of Elibank, Lib. 8,837
Hon. A. Shaw, Lib. 5,989 Major J. A. Hope, Cons. 5,680
R. Brown, Lab. 2,413 style="padding-left:1em"Liberal 3,157
majority
Conservative majority 32

aCommon Cause, June 27, 1912; The Times, June 19, 1912; Pod’s Parliamentary Companion,
1912 (Londnon, 1912), p. 217.

bAt the December 1910 election, the Liberal candidate, Wilson, ran unopposed.

cCommon Cause, July 4, 1912; Pod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 194.

dCommon Cause, August 1, 1912; Pod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 184.

eCommon Cause, September 19, 1912; Pod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 190.

In terms of these goals, only one by-election (Hanley) was a total

failure for the EFF; two (Crewe and Midlothian) were extremely successful,
and one (Holmfirth) was a qualified success. At Holmfirth, the first test of
the EFF, although the Labour candidate was not victorious, the intervention of
Labour did substantially reduce the Liberal majority, and the election
undoubtedly left Labour richer in terms of an organizational base in the
constituency. Hanley, which followed on the heels of Holmfirth, was a huge
disappointment. Not only did Labour lose a seat to the Liberals, but the poll
of the Labour candidate was much below that of both the Liberal and the
Conservative candidates. The suffragists, with justification, blamed the
defeat on the fact that the local Labour organization was in the hands of the
Liberals (who had not run a candidate in December 1910).78 At Crewe, also
in July, Labour’s contesting the election cost the Liberals a seat. The NUWSS
regarded the Liberal’s loss, by 32 votes, of the seat at Midlothian,
Gladstone’s old constituency, which the Liberals had held since 1880, as a
real vindication of the EFF policy.79

Although other issues besides women’s suffrage, notably industrial

grievances, played some part in the Liberals’ defeat at Crewe and
Midlothian, Labour’s presence at these by-elections, which was encouraged,
financed, and organized by the EFF, did determine the outcome of the
contests.80 Snowden may have overstated the case when he declared that the
Liberals’ loss of Crewe and Midlothian was due solely to the suffragists;
however, Arthur Peters, chief agent of the Labour Party, substantiated this
contention when he told members of the EFF that the Liberals’ defeat was in
no small degree due to their organization.81 As one historian has written, the
EFF coincided with an “upsurge in Labour candidatures in Liberal held
constituencies,” and it “did a lot to make the new candidatures effective and
almost certainly extended the range of practicable candidatures into hitherto
hopeless seats.”82 So far as women’s suffrage was concerned, these by-
elections were undoubtedly successful to the extent of creating interest in
constituencies that had formerly been untouched. Both the NUWSS and the
Labour Party gained an organizational base in these constituencies that was
bound to be of help to Labour in the next General Election.83

Not much evidence is available by which to measure the Liberals’

response to the EFF, but there are indication that the Liberals connected the
loss of Crewe and Midlothian with the suffragists. John W. Gulland (Lib.,
Dumfries Burghs), a Liberal Whip, told Marshall that the EFF’s by-election
activities had caused great consternation in the Liberal Party.84 The
Manchester Guardian on September 22, 1912, assessing the results of the
Midlothian by-election, sternly warned the Government: “… if the forces at
work in Midlothian (including those of the suffragists) were all to continue to
move with their present direction and velocity for the next three years, their
normal result would be at the end of that time the return of a small
conservative majority at a General Election.”

In the case of the Labour Party, the impact of the EFF was much
more profound and direct. The EFF gave the women’s suffrage issue a new
and more elevated status in the Labour Party: it erased much of the bitterness
caused by the militants and brought the Labour Party and the suffragists
closer together. The Labour Party, as a whole, was extremely impressed by
the EFF.85 The Labour Leader paid tribute to the “tact, insight, and ability” of
the suffragists, and even MacDonald, who had held so many reservations
about the EFF, admitted that he could not “praise too highly the hard,
unpleasant work done by the Representatives of the National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies.86 As a result of the EFF, Labour began to
cooperate more closely with the suffragists, and the constituency
organizations of the Labour Party and the local societies of the NUWSS even
began to hold joint meetings.87

The link between the NUWSS and the ILP became particularly
close. Local branches of the ILP collaborated with affiliates of the NUWSS
to lobby for Liberal and Labour support for the women’s suffrage
amendments to the Reform Bill.88 Representatives of the EFF frequently
consulted with W. C. Anderson, chairman of the ILP: among other matters
they discussed how the suffragists could influence the selection of Labour
candidates and the possibility of the EFF’s paying the salary of an ILP
organizer who could represent the interests of both Labour and women’s
suffrage.89 The ILP’s contact with the EFF deepened its commitment to the
women’s cause; in December 1912, the chief agent of the ILP informed
Isabella Ford, a member of the EFF executive and a former member of the
executive of the ILP, that the representatives of the ILP in the House of
Commons would vote against the third reading of the Reform Bill if women
were excluded.90

Although the Labour Party as a whole was not so fervently

dedicated to the women’s cause as the ILP was, the EFF did influence it to
take a stronger stand on women’s suffrage.91 in August 1912, Henderson told
Marshall that there was a growing feeling within the PLP that Labour should
vote against the third reading of the Reform Bill if it did not include
women.92 Shortly after this, at the request of the EFF committee, officials of
the Labour Party began to put pressure on Redmond to allow a free vote on
the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill.93 Finally, and most
dramatically, the Labour Party Conference in January 1913, took a much
stronger stand on women’s suffrage than had the 1912 conference, calling
“upon the Party in Parliament to oppose any Franchise Bill in which women
are not included.”94 Altogether, the actions and declarations of members of
the Labour Party and representatives of Labour organizations indicate that
women’s suffrage was fast becoming a more popular issue within the Labour
Party. Much of the evidence seems more than coincidental: the party became
more enthusiastic about women’s suffrage after the initiation of the EFF, and
suffragist sentiment within the party became more pronounced the longer the
EFF-Labour entente operated.95

The entente was not without its rough spots. On at least three
occasions in the first half-year of working together Labour and the NUWSS
were quite in disagreement. In June 1912 the EFF’s offer of £500 to the local
Labour organization at Ilkeston, without having first consulted the Labour
Party executive, infuriated the executive and lent credence to MacDonald’s
predictions that the suffragists intended to interfere in the internal politics of
the party.96 Fortunately, Henderson and Marshall were able to smooth over
the differences and agree that such a circumvention of authority would not
recur.97 In October, the WSPU’s decision to make war on the Labour Party
unless it promised to vote against the Government on every question again
threatened to dampen the party’s enthusiasm for women’s suffrage.98 The
NUWSS managed to prove to the party that its attitude was not the same as
that of the militants, and it soothed Labour MP’s with reminders of the EFF’s
support for Labour at the recent by-elections.99 A month later the NUWSS
decision to support George Lansbury, who had resigned his Labour seat and
was contesting Bow and Bromley as an independent, again brought the
suffragists into conflict with Labour.100 Lansbury had made himself a thorn in
the Labour Party executives’ side over the question of women’s suffrage, and
the executive was extremely annoyed when the NUWSS, instead of going
along with the party, actively campaigned for Lansbury.101 Lansbury lost, and
a month after the election, probably owing to the diplomatic efforts of
Marshall and Henderson, the NUWSS and Labour were once more in
working agreement.102

It was, indeed, the EFF that kept the entente working so well. Even
though the EFF had not yet succeeded in winning a seat for Labour, the
suffragists’ hard work in the constituencies and their cooperation with
Labour Party organizations and officials had won them the respect of the
party and made Labour more responsive to women’s suffrage. Much of the
suspicion and mistrust which officials of the party had harbored toward the
suffragists evaporated under the influence of the EFF.

The NUWSS as an organization was, in turn, influenced by the

activities of the EFF and the contact with the Labour Party which
accompanied it. Encouraged by the loss of Liberal seats at Crewe and
Midlothian, and pleased by the Labour Party’s response to the suffragists, the
NUWSS Council voted to expand the EFF as a sign of its increased
commitment to Labour: the EFF would now be used not only to oppose
antisuffrage Liberals but also to defend the seats of Labour MP’s and carry
out organization work for Labour in the constituencies in preparation for the
General Election.103

Through the EFF, the NUWSS had strengthened its ties with the
Labour Party, and it now looked as though the suffragists might soon have an
ally that would represent their cause in the House of Commons— the
women’s suffrage resolution passed at the Labour Party Conference in 1913
indicated that this was not an unrealistic proposition. Although the Labour
Party was decidedly the minor party in the House of Commons, it had a
potential for influencing political developments that was much greater than
its numbers. Labour had brought “new strength to the Edwardian Liberal
revival.”104 As a member of the coalition, its position was not altogether
unlike that of the Irish in 1885. Neither the Nationalists, eager for Home
Rule, nor the Liberals, eager to stay in power, could afford to neglect the
desires of the Labour Party. If the Labour Party made women’s suffrage a top
priority, the other members of the coalition would have to give serious
consideration to this demand.

One of the aims behind the adoption of the EFF by the NUWSS was
to put pressure on the Liberals and the Irish Nationalists to support the
women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill. In the spring of 1912, the
NUWSS also began to lobby for an amendment—commonly known as the
Snowden amendment—to clause 9 of the Home Rule Bill as another means of
persuading the Irish to look more favorably on women’s suffrage. Under this
amendment, which was borrowed verbatim from Birrell’s Irish Council Bill
of 1907, the municipal register would be used to determine who would vote
for the Irish Parliament. The municipal register included approximately
150,000 women who would, therefore, automatically qualify as electors for
the proposed Parliament.105 The idea of such an amendment originated with
Brailsford (who had thought of the EFF), and he hoped to use it against the
Irish as a way of keeping them from voting on the women’s suffrage
amendments to the Reform Bill as they had voted on the Conciliation Bill in
March 1912. As Courtney wrote Fawcett:

Mr. Brailsford’s proposition was that no amendment to the Reform

Bill could be carried if the Irish Party voted on it as they voted on the
Second Reading of the Conciliation Bill. I think he is right here, for
on a wide amendment we could not hope to get as many Unionists as
for the Conciliation Bill, and on a narrow amendment we should lose
a certain number of Liberals, so that we could not cover our defeat by
14 votes. It therefore becomes essential … to win the support of the
Irish. Mr. Brailsford is, I understand, writing to the Irish Societies
telling them to ask the Conciliation Committee to organize the moving
of a women’s suffrage amendment to the Home Rule Bill; it appears
the Irish really dislike this plan.106

Brailsford hoped the Irish would “barter enfranchisement in England for the
exclusion of women voters at home.”107 At his urging, the Conciliation
Committee adopted the scheme and Snowden agreed to move the amendment
on behalf of the Committee.

The NUWSS executive—for reasons that were partly vindictive,

partly sensible—enthusiastically endorsed Brailsford’s proposal. The Irish
vote of March 28 was fresh in the suffragists’ minds, and any scheme that
placed obstacles in the path of Home Rule had a certain emotional appeal for
these normally fair-minded women. Tactically, the idea was even more
appealing. Brailsford was sure that, if the Irish repeated their March
performance, no women’s suffrage amendments would be included in the
Reform Bill. The NUWSS thought it could use the Snowden amendment as a
bargaining tool with the Irish. The Nationalists would dislike the Snowden
amendment not only because it would infringe upon the authority of the Irish
to decide who should vote for the Irish Parliament but also because, if
successful, it would introduce a new and emotionally charged issue into the
already explosive Home Rule proposal. If Redmond, the Nationalist leader,
would agree at least to remain neutral to the women’s suffrage amendments to
the Reform Bill—if not to support them—the Snowden amendment would be
withdrawn. Fawcett was prepared to use any lure to win over the intractable
Irish and even hinted—though she had no basis for such a claim—that the
WSPU might agree to suspend militancy if Redmond were to strike a bargain
with the suffragists.108

The first problem was, of course, to convince the Irish that the
Snowden amendment had a good chance of being included in the Home Rule
Bill; from April to November, the suffragists sought to do just this, lobbying
for support for the proposed amendment. The branch societies of the NUWSS
wrote letters to MP’s, contacted party agents, held meetings in support of the
amendment, and even sent deputations to discuss the amendment with their
MP’s.109 In addition, Marshall and Courtney, representing the Parliamentary
Committee of the NUWSS, held interviews with leaders of the Liberal,
Labour, and Nationalist parties about the amendment; at the NUWSS
instigation, a number of suffragist MP’s also lobbied actively for the
amendment.110

Naturally, the appeals varied according to the bias of the party being
courted. To Conservatives the NUWSS emphasized that both Bonar Law and
Carson supported the amendment and it ingeniously argued that a vote for the
amendment did not signify either a commitment to Home Rule or to women’s
suffrage. To Liberal antisuffragists, the NUWSS emphasized that the
proposed Irish Parliament would only deal with matters of local government
and that so prominent a Liberal as Churchill was in favor of giving women
votes for governmental bodies which dealt with local and domestic, as
opposed to Imperial, questions.111 Of course, the greatest effort was made
with the Nationalists, and to that end the NUWSS sent a special organizer to
Ireland to coordinate the NUWSS campaign with that of the Irish Women’s
Committee for Securing Votes Under the Home Rule Bill.112

All the strategy failed. Redmond was not concerned enough about
the Snowden proposal to strike the bargain hoped for by the suffragists.
Although the NUWSS had publicly denied that the Snowden amendment “was
in the nature of a tactical move,” the suffragists did not really want the
proposal to come before the House for debate and division.113 Nevertheless,
on November 5 the House of Commons voted on and defeated the amendment
by a majority of 173.114 Fearful that passage of the amendment might damage
the prospects of Home Rule, the Government sealed the fate of the measure
by putting its whips on against the amendment.

In spite of the defeat, the proceedings of November 5 were

interesting in two respects: MacDonald made his maiden speech on the
women’s suffrage question, sharply criticizing the Government, and twenty-
nine Liberals disobeyed the Government whip by voting for the amendment,
while another fifty-six Liberals abstained.115 Although the Labour Party did
not give its official support to the amendment, the NUWSS was, on the
whole, pleased by the show of support for the amendment from the Liberal
and Labour camps and, in particular, by MacDonald’s speech. Speaking for
the suffragist camp, Common Cause noted:

The debate … has well served our turn. It has given our friends of the
Labour Party an opportunity for advancing our cause at the cost of
detaching themselves from the coalition. It has subjected the Irish
Party to an afternoon of heckling which their betrayal of last March
richly deserved. It has shown Mr. Redmond that there are Liberals
who care enough for women’s suffrage to vote against the
Government. And finally it has exhibited the Ministry in a frankly
antisuffrage attitude which justifies to the full our adoption of a
Fighting Fund.116

The number of Liberal and Labour votes for the amendment was small, but
the NUWSS had hopes that it might be enough to influence Redmond to adopt
a more favorable attitude to the women’s suffrage amendments. In the debate
Redmond, echoed by other leaders of the Irish party, had promised that his
followers would be free to vote as they chose on the women’s suffrage
amendments.117 Snowden, encouraged by this development, wrote Fawcett:
“I am more hopeful today than I have been for a long time. The debate
yesterday did enormous good. It put the Irish in a position which prevents
them from repeating their policy on the Conciliation Bill.” And he added, “It
has left many Liberals anxious for an early opportunity to remove the
reproach of their vote last night.”118

The NUWSS was not so wholeheartedly optimistic as Snowden. It

fully realized that no matter how encouraging the debate or division may
have been, the strategy behind the amendment had failed; Redmond had not
come to a firm agreement with the suffragists, and the NUWSS, which neither
liked nor trusted the Irish leader, did not have much confidence in his pledge
of November 5. The suffragists recognized that supporters of women’s
suffrage and, in particular, members of the Liberal and Labour parties would
have to make the Irish the prime object of their attention if the Reform Bill
were to include women’s suffrage.119 Unfortunately the Nationalists, egged
on by the antisuffragists who were “incomparably better organized” than ever
before, remained convinced that women’s suffrage—whether in the form of
the Snowden amendment or in the form of a women’s suffrage amendment to
the Reform Bill—posed a threat to Home Rule.120 The suffragists would
have to convince the Irish that it would be more hazardous to their cause to
oppose women’s suffrage than to support it; the NUWSS recognized that this
would not be an easy task.

Both the Snowden amendment and the EFF were stepping-stones to

a larger goal: the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the Franchise and
Registration Bill. With the demise of the Conciliation Bill, the women’s
suffrage amendments offered the only remaining opportunity for the enactment
of women’s suffrage; if one of these was not included in the Reform Bill, the
suffragists had little hope that anything could be done before the next General
Election to enfranchise women. From April 1912 to January 1913, therefore,
the NUWSS most immediate and important objective was to secure support
for the women’s suffrage amendments to the Franchise Bill.121 Asquith had
announced in November 1911 that the Liberal Government intended to
introduce in the next session of Parliament a franchise bill which could be
amended to include women. The Liberals had designed the bill to abolish the
practice of plural voting and to shorten the residency qualification; the party
managers felt that in these two respects, the existing franchise laws greatly
benefited the Tories.122 The proposed Franchise Bill, and the Home Rule
Bill were the two major pieces of legislation which the Government wanted
to enact in the 1912–13 session.
 The Franchise Bill was read for the first time on June 17 and passed
its second reading on July 12.123 suffragists’ “best opportunity,” the
opportunity to obtain the inclusion of women in a Government-sponsored
Reform Bill, had arrived.124 In its original draft, the Franchise Bill had not
contained any mention of women’s suffrage, but by July 1912, the women’s
suffrage amendments which the House would consider on the bill’s third
reading had been formulated and placed on the order papers.125 The women’s
suffrage amendments dealt with two sections of the Franchise Bill: Clause 1,
section (1), the formal, prefatory enfranchising section which stipulated that
“every male person” who was qualified in terms of the act could register and
vote; and Clause 1, section (2), which defined the qualifications that had to
be met in order to vote. (See Table 4). To win the vote, the suffragists had to
amend both sections of Clause 1. As Brailsford noted: “It follows from the
structure of the bill that suffragists have two trenches to carry. Women must
first be made eligible for the Parliamentary franchise, and when that is done
some positive qualification must be conferred upon them.”126

Four amendments appeared on the order paper in July: the Grey

amendment, the Henderson amendment, the Dickinson amendment, and the
Conciliation amendment.127 Even before the amendments had appeared on the
order paper, the NUWSS had begun to evaluate the Liberal and Conservative
parties’ attitudes to the amendments in order to decide how it could most
effectively lobby for the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the Reform Bill.
The suffragists assumed, correctly, that the Labour Party would support all
the women’s suffrage amendments, and they felt, with reason, that the
Nationalists were less concerned with the particulars of the amendments than
they were with the effect that women’s suffrage as an issue would exert on
the Liberal Party. It was obvious to the NUWSS that it would have to work to
build up a majority for the Grey amendment: if this amendment failed, there
would be no possibility of enfranchising women under the Reform Bill. But
which of the remaining amendments should it concentrate upon?

Table 4a

The Franchise and Registration Bill and the Proposed Women’s Suffrage Amendments
FRANCHISE AND REGISTRATION BILL

Clause 1

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every male person shall be entitled to be registered
as a Parliamentary elector for a constituency, if that person is qualified in accordance with this Act to
be registered in that constituency, and while so registered shall be entitled to vote at an election of a
member to serve in Parliament for that constituency; but a person shall not be registered or vote for
more than one constituency.

(2) For the purposes of this Act a person shall be qualified to be registered in a constituency
as a Parliamentary elector if that person resides, or is an occupier of land or premises, in that
constitutency, and has so resided, or been an occupier, for a continuous period of at least six months
last past, or during such a period has so resided for part of the period, and so been an occupier for the
remainder of the period.

GREY AMENDMENT

This amendment would delete the word “male” from the phrase “every male person” in
clause 1, section (1). This amendment was a preliminary step to the other three amendments: if it was
not carried, and the word “male” was retained, it would not be possible to confer a qualificatiton on
women in clause 1, section (2). If it was successful, the House of Commons would still have to decide
which women should be qualified, and how they should quality (clause 1, section [2]).

HENDERSON AMENDMENT
(Also called the Adult Suffrage Amendment)

This amendment would add to the phrase “every person” in clause 1, section (1), the words
“of either sex”; it would also incorporate this phrase in clause 1, section (2). Thus, all women who met
the six months’ residency qualification stipulated in clause 1, section (2) would receive the vote. It
would enfranchise approximately 10 million women.

DICKINSON AMENDMENT
(Also called the Norwegian Amendment)

This amendment, which would be inserted in clause 1, section (2), would qualify a woman to
register “if she is over 25 years of age and is the inhabitant occupier, as owner or tenant, or the wife
of such an inhabitant occupier, of a dwelling-house in that constituency, and has resided therein for a
period of at least six months past. Provided that except herein enacted no women shall be registered
as joint occupiers in respect of the same dwelling.” In effect, the amendment gave the vote to all
women householders and wives of householders and thereby would enfranchise approximately 6
million women.

CONCILLIATION AMENDMENT
(Also called the Lyttelton Amendment)

This amendment, which would be included in clause 1, section (2), stipulated that “a person
being a female shall be qualified to be registered in a constituency as a Parliamentary elector if she is
a local government elector for the purpose of all local government elections in that constituency.” This
meant, essentially, that only women householders could qualify to register; the amendment would
enfranchise approximately 1½ million women.

aThe information contained in this table has been compiled from the following sources: C. C,
June 27, 1912; Henry Brailsford, Women and the Reform Bill, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.);
Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from Edith
Palliser [July 1912], Fawcett Library, London; Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s
Suffrage, Circular from Philippa Strachey [July 1912], Fawcett Library, London.

There seemed to be no chance at all that the House of Commons

would approve the Henderson amendment—its provisions were too
comprehensive for either the Liberals or the Conservatives—and this
amendment was ruled out long before July. The Dickinson amendment
seemed to have the best chance of success. The suffrage wing of the Liberal
Party liked this amendment, which was felt to be beneficial to the electoral
interests of the Liberals, and both Grey and Lloyd George had given it their
support; Liberals who had criticized the Conciliation Bill on the grounds that
it was too narrow were prepared to back the Dickinson amendment. Passage
of this amendment would. however, depend upon the support of some twenty
to thirty Tories.128 Although Lord Robert Cecil felt that the Dickinson
amendment would enfranchise too many women, he had agreed to give it his
support, and he admitted that a number of Conservatives might support the
proposal because they felt “married women are responsible people who
would add an element of stability and moderation to the electorate.”129 The
Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Association had also given its
support to the Dickinson plan, noting that the Conservative Party would
benefit from the enfranchisement of wives since the family was “the
foundation of Conservatism.”130 These rumblings from the Conservative
Party convinced the NUWSS that there was a real possibility of convincing
Conservative suffragists to vote for the Dickinson amendment, provided the
Tories could be persuaded that the amendment would benefit their electoral
interests: the NUWSS might succeed in promoting the idea that the addition
of six and a half million women to the electorate would compensate for the
elimination of the plural vote and the enactment of a shorter residency
qualification.

The NUWSS, however, decided that it should not gamble all its
resources on one amendment. The experience of the Conciliation Bill had
shown the NUWSS and its suffragist colleagues in the House that the
Conciliation amendment was too narrow to appeal to the Liberals, but they
hoped that if the Dickinson amendment came up first (and suffragists in the
House had made sure that this would be the case) and failed to pass, they
might be able to persuade the Liberals to vote for this less desirable
proposal if the choice were between enfranchising one and a half million
women or not enfranchising any women at all.131 The NUWSS was probably
overoptimistic in this calculation, but it was not depending on the goodwill
of the Liberals alone. It intended to barter with the Liberals: the NUWSS
would agree to work for the Dickinson amendment if the Liberals agreed to
support the Conciliation amendment as a second choice. As an additional
enticement to the Liberals, the NUWSS also promoted the idea that if the
Liberals wanted to extend the provisions of the Conciliation amendment after
it had passed, they could bring in a bill to alter the municipal franchise on
which it was based.

By the summer of 1912 the NUWSS had decided to focus its

energies on the Dickinson and Conciliation amendments and, specifically, to
try and win Conservative support for the former and Liberal support for the
latter.132 From July to January it mounted a massive propaganda effort on
behalf of the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill,
concentrating, in particular, on the Dickinson and Conciliation amendments.
As in the past, the NUWSS kept in close touch with the suffrage groups in the
House of Commons which MP’s had formed to promote each of the
amendments.133 It was also very active in the Joint Campaign Committee for
Women’s Suffrage, an organization which representatives of the principal
women’s suffrage societies and suffragist MP’s had organized to lobby for
women’s suffrage both in the constituencies and in the House of Commons.134
In its deallings with all of these bodies, the NUWSS stressed the need to
coordinate the activities of the suffrage forces.135

The NUWSS campaign in support of the women’s suffrage

amendments was, by any standard, impressive. Fawcett told Maud Arncliffe-
Sennett, a stalwart suffragist, that she intended to devote all her energies to
lobbying for the women’s suffrage amendments, and her attitude was
reflected in the entire NUWSS organization.136 Between July and January the
NUWSS sponsored a wide variety of demonstrations and meetings, from a
huge public gathering in the Albert Hall at which £5,394–14–3 was
collected, to drawing room meetings in country villages; in one week in
October, 137 meetings were held.137 NUWSS headquarters organized
postcard campaigns to MP’s from their constituents and the branch societies
sent memorials to MP’s which were signed by prominent persons in the
constituencies, including town councillors and members of political
associations. For three months, a hired van toured the countryside drumming
up support for the women’s suffrage amendments.138 The local branches,
which were in constant contact with headquarters throughout this period, sent
deputations to their local MP’s to secure support for the amendments; the
Parliamentary Committee of the NUWSS tried to follow up these deputations
by interviewing every MP.139 Various women’s political organizations, such
as the Women’s Liberal Federation and the Conservative and Unionist
Women’s Franchise Association, were enlisted to help lobby, and the
NUWSS also cooperated with and, to a large extent, coordinated its
activities with those of the other constitutional suffrage societies.140
Throughout this period the NUWSS was in close contact with its leading
supporters in Parliament, in particular, Arthur Henderson, Lord Robert Cecil,
and Sir Edward Grey. The Parliamentary Committee constantly tested the
House of Commons’ mood on the women’s suffrage amendments; Marshall,
as acting secretary of the committee, frequently held interviews with
prominent suffragists in the various parties in order to keep abreast of the
parties’ attitudes to the amendments. The suffragists felt that if they were
well informed about developments in Parliament, they would be in a position
to apply pressure where it was most needed.141

Despite these massive campaigning efforts, the forces that had

destroyed the Conciliation Bill—the militants and the Irish—threatened to
coalesce once again to defeat the women’s suffrage amendment. In July 1912,
at the very time the NUWSS inaugurated its campaign for the amendments,
the militants began a campaign of a very different sort—arson.142
Simultaneously, they increased the severity of their attacks upon supporters
of the Government. On July 18, Redmond and Asquith narrowly escaped
injury when a suffragette threw a hatchet into the carriage in which they were
riding.143 An angry Times on July 20 commented, “there has been no more
cowardly outrage in the history of the movement.”
 Both the NUWSS and its supporters in the House of Commons spoke
out against what they described as the “provocative and bellicose” actions of
the WSPU.144 Fawcett publicly criticized the militants for “the criminal
violence even more detestable than any in which they have previously
indulged”; the militants were, she said, “the most powerful allies the
antisuffragists have.”145 Privately, she pleaded with the WSPU to call a
temporary halt to militancy until after the House of Commons had acted on
the women’s suffrage amendments, but her appeals got nowhere. Annie
Kenney, in reply, noted with rather questionable logic that the King held his
throne because of a revolution and cited other historical examples to show,
as she contended, that only violent means could achieve political ends.146

Some three months after these events, in October 1912, the Pethick-
Lawrences, who quite disagreed with Christabel Pankhurst about the
escalation of violence, were forced out of the WSPU. With their departure,
reason and restraint no longer had any volce in the counsels of the militants,
and arson, window breaking, and other forms of violence became the
hallmark of the suffragettes.147 As Pethick-Lawrence later wrote in his
memoirs, the Pankhursts refused “to be deflected by criticism or appeal one
hair’s breadth from the course which they had determined to pursue.”148

As before, the militant campaign had long-lasting reverberations in

the House of Commons. The suffragettes’ actions “made most politicians feel
that their only moral obligation was to resist any surrender to violence,” and,
rightly or wrongly, many MP’s regarded voting for the women’s suffrage
amendments as just such a surrender.149 By January 1913 many of the suffrage
movement’s staunchest advocates in the House were seriously concerned
about the adverse effect militancy would have on the voting on the
amendments. Lord Robert Cecil wrote Balfour, “I am consumed by anxiety to
prevent the militant women from committing more outrages”; in his opinion,
the militants were “more attached to their own methods than to the good of
the cause.”150 The Pankhursts, it seemed, no longer cared about the reaction
of the audience for whom the spectacle was being staged: the tactics had
become more important than the cause of women’s suffrage.

On the eve of the scheduled vote on the amendments to the Franchise

Bill, the WSPU finally agreed to call a truce and suspend militancy until after
the House had divided on the amendments.151 Once again, however, the truce
had come too late. As in March 1912, militancy, particularly militancy which
encouraged the burning of property and the maiming of Cabinet ministers,
provided lukewarm supporters of women’s suffrage with an excuse to vote
against the amendments and gave the opponents of women’s suffrage a
powerful argument to use in their efforts to dissuade MP’s from supporting
women’s suffrage. It is impossible to tabulate exactly the impact of militancy,
but there is no doubt that militancy adversely affected the House of
Commons’ attitude to women’s suffrage.152 At the very time when suffragists
both inside and outside the House of Commons were doing everything
possible to secure the inclusion of women in the Franchise Bill, the militants,
whatever their intentions, were undermining all their efforts, and they refused
to desist until it was too late. LLoyd George went so far as to prophesy that,
had the House divided on the women’s suffrage amendments, militancy
would have been responsible for securing their defeat.153

Aside from the militants, the NUWSS’ main concern was the attitude
of the Irish Nationalists. If the Irish voted in January as they had in March,
none of the women’s suffrage amendments would pass the House of
Commons. The NUWSS seems to have felt that it had a better chance of
persuading the Nationalists to change their attitude to women’s suffrage than
it did of convincing the WSPU to suspend militancy. The Irish, unlike the
militants, might be brought round by reason and political leverage. Had
militancy itself not been an issue in the House of Commons, the Irish would
probably not have had the power to determine the fate of the suffrage
question; as it was, the added issue of militancy in effect gave the Irish the
powers of life and death over the suffrage measures. In January 1913, there
were 84 Nationalists in the House of Commons. According to the NUWSS
calculations, 43 of them supported women’s suffrage, 16 opposed it, and 25
were neutral. If Redmond left the members of his party free to vote according
to their convictions, there was a good chance the House of Commons might
enact some measure of women’s suffrage; if he did not, there was almost no
chance the Franchise Bill would include women.154

The raison d’être of the Irish party, and the only issue which
mattered to the Nationalists, was Home Rule. They looked at all issues
through the prism of Home Rule, voting not on the intrinsic merits of a
measure but rather on how it affected Home Rule. By the summer of 1912,
the struggle for Home Rule had become increasingly bitter. To some it looked
as if civil war might break out; others thought the stresses and strains of
Home Rule might split the Liberal Party.155 The more bitter the struggle
became and the closer Home Rule came to actuallty, the more protective,
almost paranoie, was the attitude the Irish adopted toward their cause.

The Nationalists believed, quite correctly, that the fate of Home

Rule was indissolubly linked with that of the Asquith Government. Anything
that in any way threatened the stability of this Government indirectly
imperiled Home Rule. Urged on by the antisuffragists, the Irish took the
position that the passage of women’s suffrage would cause the breakup of the
Liberal Government. In the spring of 1912, a member of the Irish Party,
anticipating the debate over the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform
Bill, had dismally forecast: “… day after day they will be advertising their
own dissensions, and when the week is over there will be nothing left of the
Government’s prestige. I question whether there will be anything left of the
Government.”156 From June 1912 to January 1913 this attitude seems, if
anything, to have deepened along with their concern for Home Rule. The
militants’ activities in Dublin in July 1912, and, in particular, their attack
upon Redmond and Asquith, reinforced the worries of the Irish; but Asquith’s
political prestige probably mattered quite as much to the Irish as his physical
well-being. They did not want to support any measure which in any way
seemed to weaken his authority, and they believed it would be very
embarrassing for the Prime Minister, whose antisuffragist opinions were
well known. to accept the inclusion of women’s suffrage in a Government
measure.157 They even suggested that Asquith might resign rather than take
responsibility for a Franchise Bill which gave votes to women. Convulsions
at the Cabinet level would, they believed, doom Home Rule.158

The antisuffragist forces in the House of Commons did everything

possible to encourage the Nationallst Party’s fears that the Government might
break up over the women’s cause.159 The rumor spread that not only Asquith
but also Harcourt and Churchill might resign if women’s suffrage were
included in the Franchise Bill.160 Supporters of women’s suffrage in the
House of Commons, including Sir Edward Grey, tried to quash these rumors,
but with little effect; Asquith’s public utterances were so ambiguous that they
did little to allay the Nationalists’ fears.161

The NUWSS had tried every means, from persuasion to coercion, to

try and convince the Irish that women’s suffrage was not a threat to Home
Rule and would not be an impediment to the Nationalists’ goals unless the
Irish party, by its hostillty to women’s suffrage, allenated the support of
suffragists in the House of Commons. The NUWSS had designed the EFF, in
part, to put pressure on the Irish; it had backed the Snowden amendment in
order to obtain Redmond’s promise that he would not order his party to
oppose the women’s suffrage amendments.162 Marshall had held several
interviews with the Irish leaders in an effort to persuade them to take a more
favorable attitude to the amendments, and the NUWSS had made financial
grants to the Irish Women’s Suffrage Federation and had sent an organizer to
Ireland for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on Redmond et al. from
the Irish constituencies.163

The NUWSS had also prevailed upon suffragists in the Liberal and
Labour parties to reason with the Irish. Staunch advocates of Home Rule,
including Snowden and Scott, had argued that Irish hostillty to women’s
suffrage might prove damaging to Home Rule.164 Scott had warned Redmond
that it would be very difficult for Home Rulers, such as himself, to choose
between loyalty to Home Rule and loyalty to women’s suffrage; yet, if the
Irish voted against the women’s suffrage amendments, he would feel “there
had been a betrayal by the Home Rule party of the very principle of Home
Rule and that the emancipation of Irishmen had been purchased at the cost of
its refusai for Englishwomen.”165 In a moment of panie, the NUWSS and its
supporters in the House of Commons had even toyed with the idea of “buying
off” the Irish by proraising to exclude Ireland from the Dickinson
amendment.166 Since it was concern for Home Rule rather than opposition to
women’s suffrage itself that shaped the Nationalists’ attitude to the
amendments, it is doubtful that the proposed exclusion of Ireland would have
mitigated Irish hostillty to the amendments.

Despite all the NUWSS efforts to bring the Irish round, the
suffragists, by January, doubted that the Irish would remain neutral to, much
less support, the women’s suffrage amendments: the NUWSS did not believe
Redmond would honor his promise of November 5 that his followers would
be free to vote as they chose. Some observers of Parliament felt that the Grey
amendment might prove the exception to the Rule, but this alone would not
enfranchise any women. The Nationalists remained obdurate in their
conviction that women’s suffrage would be a millstone for the Government,
and therefore a millstone for Home Rule. It could, in fact, be argued that as
1912 progressed, the chances of carrying a women’s suffrage amendment to
the Franchise Bill declined. During the summer and autumn of 1912, the Irish
became increasingly concerned about Home Rule, and the suffragettes
became increasingly violent. The combination of these two forces imperiled
the passage of any women’s suffrage amendment.

How the House of Commons would have voted on the suffrage

amendments can only be a matter of speculation because the opportunity
never came. The evaluations of the prospects of the amendments by the
NUWSS and its supporters in Parliament were carefully considered and
might have proved sound. The NUWSS seemed to assume that the House of
Commons would pass the Grey amendment, and political correspondents
concurred with this view.167 The chances for passage of the Dickinson and
Conciliation amendments were much less certain. In December Cecil told the
NUWSS that he had obtained sixteen definite promises from Conservatives
to vote for the Dickinson amendment; a month later he indicated to the
NUWSS executive that the amendment might draw even more support from
the Conservative benches.168 But the NUWSS calculated that even if thirty
Conservatives at most supported the amendment, it would still fail on
account of the anger aroused by militancy and the opposition of the Irish. In
mid-January Marshall learned from John Dillon that the Irish attitude to the
suffrage amendments was hostile. Since the Irish vote was somewhat less
essential to the passage of the Conciliation amendment than it was to the
Dickinson, by January it was the Conciliation amendment that the NUWSS
felt had the best chance of passing.169 Conservative suffragists who did not
like the Dickinson amendment would support this moderate proposal; in
addition, Labour MP’s, and, to a surprising degree, Liberal MP’s, were
friendly to the Conciliation amendment. Out of forty MP’s in the Lancashire
region, all the Labour and Liberal MP’s who favored the principle of
women’s suffrage had agreed to support this amendment.170 The Labour Party
had offered to put out a special whip for the Conciliation amendment if the
Dickinson amendment failed, and the WLF had promised to throw its support
behind the amendment. Thus, on the eve of the debate the NUWSS pinned its
hopes on the Conciliation amendment. At the same time it was acutely aware
that this amendment had only a slim chance of success if Redmond threw the
weight of the Irish party against it, and it knew there was a strong likelihood
that this would happen.171

On January 20 the newspapers published the probable timetable for

the women’s suffrage amendments to the Franchise Bill; the House of
Commons was to begin debate on the amendments on Friday, January 24.172
On January 23, the Speaker of the House, the Right Hon. James Lowther
(Cons., Cumberland, Penrith), indicated, although he did not make a definite
ruling, that if the women’s suffrage amendments were inserted in the
Franchise Bill, this would so change the measure that the Government would
have to withdraw it and re-introduce it in another form.173 Asquith wrote the
King:

This is a totally new view of the matter which appears to have

occurred for the first time to the Speaker himself only two or three
days ago, and is a flat contradiction of the assumption upon which all
parties in the House have hitherto treated the Bill.
In Mr. Asquith’s opinion which is shared by some of the best
authorities on procedure, the Speaker’s judgment is entirely wrong
with what took place in the case of the previous Franchise Bills in
1867 or 1884…. In these circumstances it is felt, not without reason,
by the supporters of woman suffrage that they cannot be afforded
under the present Bill the opportunity for a “free” discussion and
division on their cause which was promised by the Government….
The general feeling of the Cabinet was that the Bill should be
withdrawn, but so much depends on the nature of the statement to be
made that further consideration of the matter is adjourned till Monday
morning.174

On January 27 the Speaker ruled that the amendments, if included, would

force withdrawal of the bill. The Cabinet met the same day and decided to
withdraw the bill. As a gesture of condolence to the suffragists, it promised
to give facilities for a private member’s suffrage bill next session; members
of the Government would be free to vote as they pleased, but the Government
would not assume any responsibility for the measure.175 The saga of
women’s suffrage and the Reform Bill had come to an unexpected end.

The Speaker’s ruling and the subsequent action of the Cabinet

caused an uproar both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith
was genuinely surprised by the ruling and later pronounced the decision “not
only unpalatable but unexpected.”176 Despite Asquith’s innocence, many
MP’s, including members of the Government, believed that the Government
had betrayed the women; Lloyd George and Haldane had even threatened to
resign if the Government did not honor its promises.177 Snowden exulted in
the Government’s embarrassment: “To have forced women suffrage into the
position it has today as the overthrower of Cabinet unity and constitutional
procedure is almost as great success as winning it [the vote]. No question
since 1886 has dominated politics as women suffrage does today. It is surely
the very eve of victory.”178

Snowden was optimistic, but the Labour Party, at its Annual

Conference, January 30, did protest against the Government’s action by
passing a resolution which dictated that the PLP must oppose any franchise
measure that did not include women.179 Snowden assured Fawcett that the
Conference’s action precluded the Liberals from reintroducing any Franchise
Bill which dealt only with male suffrage: “The importance of this vote is
tremendous. It has killed any Franchise Bill which might have been intended.
I was talking to two members of the Cabinet yesterday (George was one) and
they quite fully confirmed that it had just put the idea of reintroducing a man
Franchise Bill into the region of the impossible.”180

The extinction of the women’s suffrage amendment was also, no

doubt, a defeat for the Government: the Liberal Government would not obtain
the franchise reform which they so much desired, and which had been
designed with an eye to the next General Election.181 Unwittingly, the
suffragists had driven a nail in the coffin of the Liberal Party. As one
historian has written: “Paradoxically, the new Liberalism’s failure was not
over social democracy but political democracy. A fourth Reform Act was
needed, yet the only terms on which it could come were by including woman
suffrage. Asquith’s failure to see either the necessity or the urgency of this is
the most serious criticism that can be made of his leadership.”182

The wailing and gnashing of teeth, offers of sympathy and

condolence, and the satisfaction derived from having blocked further
franchise reform did not help the cause of women’s suffrage, however. No
matter how important the Labour Party’s resolution was for the future, it did
not revive the opportunity which the Speaker’s ruling had snatched away.
The whole episode had lowered the prestige of the Government, but more
important, it had extinguished the suffragists’ “best opportunity” for obtaining
votes: no private bill could compensate for the loss of protection by the
Parliament Act and the immunity from the danger of wrecking amendments
which inclusion in a Government Franchise Bill would have guaranteed to
the women.183 Moreover, the withdrawal of the Franchise Bill meant that it
would be impossible to include women on the electoral register before the
next General Election. The NUWSS did not believe that Asquith had
connived with the Speaker, but it did feel that the Government had been
negligent and sloppy in its handling of the matter; in addition, the NUWSS
apparently believed, erroneously, that the Government had known of the
Speaker’s intention some weeks before the ruling and had done nothing to
avert it.184 The NUWSS did not accept the offer of time for a private
member’s bill as a substitute for the potential inclusion of women’s suffrage
in a Government measure: the experience of the Conciliation Bill had taught
the suffragists that no private member’s bill could pass the House of
Commons. Fawcett and Courtney had seen Acland and Grey, both of whom
had tried to persuade them to accept the Government’s offer. Common Cause
wryly commented: “We have not forgotten all the emphatic statements by Mr.
Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and the Master of Elibank designed to
persuade us how hopeless it was to attempt to carry a Private Member’s Bill,
and how safe was the opportunity of the Reform Bill. Today the pleading is
reversed. We lack the agility to share in these political gyrations.”185

Fawcett, hardened by the experience of the Conciliation Bill, was

now convinced that a women’s suffrage measure needed the protection of the
Government in order to be enacted into law. The obstacles in the path of a
private measure were insurmountable: the Conservatives might not support
any women’s suffrage measure if it involved invoking the Parliament Act, the
Irish would oppose any women’s suffrage measure, and the antisuffragists
would introduce “wrecking amendments” in Committee in order to diminish
support for the measure.186 With these considerations in mind, Fawcett firmly
rejected the Government’s offer of facilities for a private bill and demanded
a Government measure for women’s suffrage:

The chances of obstruction and cross-voting in Committee, the

difficulty of combining suffragists of all parties in a valid majority,
the hazardous position of any Bill introdudced next session under the
Parliament Act, and above all, the certainty that Irish Members and
ultra-official Liberals would again cast a tactical vote to relieve the
Prime Minister from embarrassment, these considerations convince
the National Union that in pronouncing this offer inadequate it is
prejudicing no real chance for women’s suffrage.187

Fawcett’s gloomy assessment of the situation was not an exaggeration: even

members of the Cabinet who favored women’s suffrage admitted that the
Government’s offer was a gesture to save face, and that no private member’s
bill could pass the House of Commons.188

The Government’s withdrawal of the Franchise Bill brought to an

end a very long chapter in the history of the women’s suffrage movement. The
Speaker’s ruling guaranteed that women’s suffrage was now a dead issue in
the House of Commons and would remain so until after the next General
Election. Up until January 1913, the NUWSS had been willing to accept
something less than a Government bill for women’s suffrage—a private
member’s bill, a Conciliation Bill, the possibility of including, by
amendment, women’s suffrage in a Government Franchise Bill. Ever since
the Liberals had returned to power in 1906, the House of Commons had, each
year, considered a measure which would give votes to women. During this
entire period the NUWSS had focused its energies on the House of
Commons, with the hopes of persuading MP’s to enact women’s suffrage in
some form. In the years between 1910 and 1913, the NUWSS had
progressively taken a more commanding role in the suffrage movement;
suffragists both inside and outside Parliament had become increasingly
certain that the House of Commons would enact some measure of women’s
suffrage before the next General Election. In the last half of 1912, the
NUWSS activities had come to a crescendo; unprecedented growth
accompanied this activity and the NUWSS had increased in size at the rate of
a thousand members a month.189 The NUWSS had become the driving force
behind the demand for women’s suffrage; the lobbying for the women’s
suffrage amendments, the Snowden amendment, and, in particular, the EFF
were indications that the NUWSS had become more aggressive and
imaginative, and less patient and trusting in its dealings with the politicians,
especially with the Liberals.

In January 1913 the NUWSS finally abandoned all hope of obtaining

women’s suffrage by means of anything less than a Government Bill. The
NUWSS, wearied and exasperated by the Liberal’s dallying with the
women’s suffrage question, had become too politically pragmatic and too
self-assured to accept gratefully whatever crumbs the Liberals chose to
throw to the women. It recognized the Government’s offer of a private bill
for what it was—a token. Thus, in January 1913, the strategy and the
activities of the NUWSS underwent a change. The House of Commons was
no longer the focal point for the NUWSS, and the NUWSS took no interest in
the measure for women’s suffrage which came before the House in 1913.190
The NUWSS was now only interested in a Government Bill, and it was
convinced that the next General Election would determine whether such a
bill would become a reality. Thus, from January 1913 to the outbreak of war
in 1914, the NUWSS’ main interest was the next General Election; its goal
was to place more members of the Labour Party in the House of Commons
and to make sure that if the Liberals did return to power, the new Liberal
Government would introduce a Government bill for women’s suffrage. At the
same time, as a way of hedging its bets, the NUWSS negotiated with the
Conservatives to obtain a commitment from them to introduce a women’s
suffrage measure, should they return to office. In the past the NUWSS had
focused its sights on a women’s suffrage measure before the House of
Commons; in the future its attention would be centered on the General
Election and the parliamentary constituencies—on party agents, political
associations, trade unions, or any organization or individual who might prove
helpful in the upcoming election. In the past, the NUWSS had lobbied for any
measure that would give votes to women; in the future it would support a
women’s suffrage measure only if it had the sponsorship of the Government.
In the past the NUWSS had negotiated with the political parties to win their
support for some suffrage proposal before the House of Commons; in the
future it would negotiate with the party leaders to see what the parties would
do for the women should they be victorious at the next General Election.

The events of January 1913 changed both the strategy of the NUWSS
and the character of its activities. It is possible to criticize the NUWSS, as
the militants did, for having been naive in believing in the possibility of
enacting a privately sponsored measure for women’s suffrage and for having
been too patient, even passive, in responding to the subterfuge, temporizing,
and procrastination of the Liberal Government. Yet it can also be argued that
the NUWSS was much more politically astute than its critics suggest. Up
until January 1913, it was not a “given” that no privately sponsored measure
of women’s suffrage such as the Conciliation Bill would pass the House of
Commons. Leading members of the political parties and political analysts
such as Scott and Brailsford all concurred that it was possible to enact
women’s suffrage in this fashion. The increased activity of the antisuffragists
in the period between 1908 and 1913 is, in its own way, a testimony that a
real possibility existed for enacting women’s suffrage without the blessing of
the Government.191 When it came to deciding how this could be done, and
what tactics should be used to persuade the House of Commons to pass such
a measure, opinion was once again behind the NUWSS: militancy would
never win votes in the House of Commons; peaceful agitation, whether in the
form of deputations or an EFF, was the most realistic way to win the support
of MP’s.

In a sense, the militants fulfilled their own prophecies: their actions

made it difficult for any private measure for women’s suffrage to pass the
House of Commons and made much of the public and many politicians
sympathetic to the Government’s cavalier treatment of the suffrage question.
It is, in fact, possible to turn the militants’ criticisms around at the militants
themselves and to accuse them of having been naive, as well as idealistic and
unpragmatic, in the approach to the House of Commons and the Liberal
Government. The suffragettes were the most visible and most strident
representatives of the women’s suffrage movement, but it was the suffragists
of the NUWSS who were, in the years 1910 to 1913, responsible for
whatever advances women’s suffrage made in the House of Commons and for
building up support for women’s suffrage at the constituency level. The
suffragettes were the philosophers and the impresarios of the women’s
movement; the women of the NUWSS were political workhorses and the
steadying main line in the struggle for the vote. In the early years the WSPU
gave life to the women’s suffrage movement in Britain, but it was the
NUWSS that supported and sustained the movement and, at both the
constituency and parliamentary level, kept women’s suffrage alive as a
political issue.

_____________________

Notes
1This belief is substantiated by the fact that in only 7 out of the 21 divisions held on women’s
suffrage before 1917 did support for women’s suffrage among Conservatives outweigh opposition; on
two of these seven occasions (June 1884 and November 1912) the Conservatives’ vote on women’s
suffrage was determined by a desire to “dish” the Liberals. Conversely, in every division on women’s
suffrage except June 1884 and November 1912, the Liberals and Radicals contributed a higher
percentage of votes for women’s suffrage than did the Conservatives. Brian Harrison, Separate
Spheres, pp. 27, 39. See also Chapter 1, note 82.

2Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Draft of a letter from Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Sir
Edward Grey, April 1, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

3C. C, April 18, 1912; Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Kathleen Courtney
to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, April 8, 1912.

4C. C, May 2, 1912.

5NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., April 18, 1912; Correspondence of the National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from Kathleen Courtney, May 2, 1912; Fawcett Library,
London.

6Millicent Garrett Fawcett, What I Remember, p. 206.

7Millicent Garrett Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 29. There were to be a few
exceptions to this rule. “Tried friends,” that is, those who placed women’s suffrage above party, were to
be supported regardless of their party’s attitude to women’s suffrage. The number of MP’s who fell into
this category was exceedingly small and included such stalwart suffragists as Walter McLaren and Lord
Robert Cecil.

8David Morgan, Suffragists and Liberals, p. 106, contends that the NUWSS had abandoned
the hope of amending the Reform Bill. He maintains that the NUWSS did not design the EFF to have an
immediate impact on the Liberals but only to give Labour more opportunity at the next General Election.
His interpretation of the evidence he cites to support this belief is very questionable, and it is
contradicted by most of the evidence in the NUWSS archives.

9The New Development in the Policy of the N.U.W.S.S., NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

10H. N. Brailsford, “The Reform Bill and the Labour Party,” Englishwoman, 14, no. 41 (May
1912): 124–54.

11C. C, May 23, 1913.

12Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from
Kathleen Courtney, May 2, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

13C. C, September 26, 1912.

14Brailsford, “The Reform Bill and the Labour Party,” p. 128.

15C. C, June 20, 1912.

16Brailsford, “The Reform Bill and the Labour Party,” p. 126.

17Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Kathleen Courtney to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, April 8, 1912; Brailsford, “The Reform Bill and the Labour Party,” p. 126.

18Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Kathleen Courtney to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, April 8, 1912.

19Ibid.

20Ibid.

21NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., April 18, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

22Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 37.

23Archives of the Labour Party, Transport House, London, LP/wom/12/1, Kathleen Courtney
to Arthur Henderson, April 19, 1912; I.P/wom/12/2, Arthur Henderson to Kathleen Courtney, copy,
April 20, 1912; LP/wom/12/3, Kathleen Courtney to Arthur Hunderson, April 23, 1912; LP/wom/12/4,
Kathleen Courtney to Arthur Henderson, April 23, 1912; LP/wom/12/5, Arthur Henderson to Kathleen
Courtney, copy, April 25, 1912; LP/wom/12/6, Kathleen Courtney to Arthur Henderson, April 26, 1912;
LP/wom/12/7, Arthur Henderson to Kathleen Courtney, copy, April 26, 1912 (hereafter cited as Labour
Party Archives); NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 2, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.
 24Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Copy of notes on an interview held by Millicent
Garrett Fawcett and Kathleen Courtney with J. Ramsay MacDonald, May 13, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.

25NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 2, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

26Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/11, Arthur Henderson to Edith Palliser, copy, May 3,
1912; Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Copy of notes on an interview held by Millicent Garrett
Fawcett and Kathleen Courtney with J. Ramsay MacDonald, May 13, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

27Colin Cross, Philip Snowden (London, 1966), pp. 113–14.

28A. Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left; Thirty Years of Platform, Press, Prison, and
Parliament (London, 1942), p.34.

29FLAC, vol. 19, J. Ramsay MacDonald to Mrs. Cavendish Bentinck, March 15, 1911; J.
Ramsay MacDonald to Mrs. Cavendish Bentinck [1912], Fawcett Library, London.

30David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), pp. 148–49; C. C, July 4, 1912.

31Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/16, Arthur Henderson to Kathleen Courtney, copy,

May 15, 1912.

32Marquand, p. 147.

33For a discussion of some of the other issues over which the party was divided see
Marquand, pp. 138–40, 144, passim.

34Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (New York, 1970), p. 175.

35P. F. C. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 311–39.

36Manchester Guardian, July 3, 1912.

37Blake, p. 175.

38Marquand, p. 137.

39In 1909 the House of Lords upheld an injunction against the Railway Servants which
restrained the union from using its funds for political purposes. This decision, which was known as the
Osborne judgment, had a serious impact on Labour finances. Cross, p. 115.

40Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Copy of notes on an interview held by Kathleen

Courtney and Millicent Garrett Fawcett with J. Ramsay MacDonald, May 13, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.
 41Ibid.; Fred Leventhal, “The Conciliation Committee,” p. 154.

42Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Draft of letter by Millicent Garrett
Fawcett [April 1912].

43Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Millicent Garrett Fawcet to
Miss Benecke, March 11, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

44C. C, May 23, 1912; Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 33.

45Christian Commonwealth, June 26, 1912.

46Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “The Election Policy of the National Union,” Englishwoman, 14,
no. 42 (June 1912): 2414–45.

47Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Memorandum

from Kathleen Courtney, May 2, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

48Christian Commonwealth, June 26, 1912. A few months later, as a way of illustrating her
attitude to political parties, Fawcett quoted a young lady’s remark about her fiancè: “I do not love him. l
do not hate him. He is to me as that footstool.” Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s
Suffrage, 1912, Account of Fawcett’s speech at a reception held at the Westminster Palace, October
15, [1912], Fawcett Library, London.

49In 1914 some prominent members of the NUWSS, including Eleanor Rathbone and
Margery Corbett-Ashby, left the NUWSS because they disliked the EFF and felt that it would be a
mistake to work for the return of Labour candidates at the General Election. They feared that this
would split the progressive vote and result in the return of the Conservative Party, which, they said,
would never introduce any legislation on women’s suffrage. This disagreement over the EFF caused
much rancor and unhappiness within the NUWSS. Correspondence of the NUWSS regarding the
“secret committee,” Circular from Eleanor Rathbone and Olivia Japp, February 7, 1914; Statement by S.
Cross, Eleanor Rathbone, and Winifred Haverfield on the activities of the “secret Committee,” [1914];
Mr. Armstrong to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, April 17, 1914; Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Mr. Armstrong,
April 20, 1914, Fawcett Library, London; Marshall Papers, Eleanor Rathbone to Catherine Marshall,
November 14, 1914. See also note 52 below.

50Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Philippa Strachey to Helena
Swanwick, May 20, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/14, H. N.
Brailsford to Arthur Henderson, May 6, [1912],

51FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, John Galsworthy to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, August 18, 1912, Fawcett
Library, London.

52Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Resolutions

Passed at the Council Meeting-May 14th and 15th, 1912, Fawcett Library, London. The opposing
minority included some very influential members of the NUWSS, among them Emily Davies, Eleanor
Rathbone, and Margery Corbett-Ashby.

53C. C, May 9, 1912. The Central and East of England Society had adopted a similar scheme
as early as 1897.

54Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Memo on the
FWS by Maude Royden and Ida B. O'Malley, April 24, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

55Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Proceedings of the Special
Council held May 14 and 15, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Hitchin, Stevenage, and District Society
for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1912–1913 (Welwyn, n.d.), p. 6.

56Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/14, H. N. Brailsford to Arthur Henderson, May 6,

[1912].

57Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/20, Edith Palliser to Arthur Henderson, May 21, 1912;
LP/wom/12/21, Assistant Secretary [no name given] to Edith Palliser, copy, May 22, 1912. The
Holmfirth election was fought before the Labour Party officially accepted the scheme.

58Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/27, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, July 2,

1912; Leventhal, p. 156. The Labour Party executive did not meet between May and July. See Labour
Party Archives, LP/wom/12/11, Arthur Henderson to Edith Palliser, copy, May 3, 1912.

59Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Election Fighting Fund, June 14, 1912, Fawcett
Library, London (hereafter cited as EFF mins.).

60Jo Newberry of Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge University, is writing a biography of

Marshall.

61During World War I she put her considerable abilities to use as political secretary of the
No-Conscription Fellowship. Brockway, p. 68; Keith Robbins, The Abolition of War; The Peace
Movement in Britain During the First World War (Cardiff, 1976), pp. 7, 82–86.

62EFF mins., July 5, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., August 1, 1912; Fawcett Library,
London.

63Manchester Guardian , July 3, 1912.

64Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 38; EFF mins., July 21 and 25, 1912, Fawcett
Library, London. Margaret Robertson, chief organizer for the EFF, was a member of the ILP.
Brockway, pp. 33, 42.

65C. C, July 4 and 11, 1912; The Times, June 18, 1912; West Riding Federation, Annual
Report, 1913 (n.p., n.d.), p. 6; Edinburgh Federation, Annual Report, 1913 (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 7; EFF
mins., August 2, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

66Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/28, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, July 2,

1912; LP/wom/12/32, Asst. Secretary to Catherine Marshall, copy, July 29, 1912; EFF mins., August 2,
1912, Fawcett Library, London.

67Labour Leader, June 27, 1912, and January 9, 1913.

68EFF mins., October 18, December 6, and December 20, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; C.
C, October 24, 1912, and January 17, 1913.

69NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., October 17, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Marshall Papers,
Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, copy, October 14, 1912; C. C, October 24, 1912; EFF mins.,
October 4, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

70Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, copy, October 14, 1912.

71EFF mins., August 2, October 4, and October 18, 1912, Fawcett Library, London. These
seats were held respectively, by H. L. Elverston, R. H. Barron, Sir W. E. B. Priestley, and Sir H.
Havelock Allan.

72EFF mins., November 22 and December 6, 1912, and NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., January
17, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913
(Manchester, n.d.), p. 12.

73National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 28; Manchester
and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p. 11; C. C, February 14 and 21, 1913.

74National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 31.

75The Friend of Women’s Suffrage, no. 1, July 1913.

76The EFF spent £1,254-85-4 at these four by-elections. This figure does not include the
loans which the EFF made to the Labour Party. National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual
Report, 1912, p. 45.

77The Election Fighting Fund; What It Has Achieved, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.), Fawcett
Library, London.

78C. C, July 4 and 11, 1912; Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, p. 9.

79Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 36.

80At Crewe, for example, the Liberals had aroused great resentment by bringing in the
military during the railway strike. C. C, August 1, 1912.
 81Philip Snowden, “The By-Elections and Woman Suffrage,” Englishwoman, 14, no. 46
(October 1912): 4; C. C., September 26, 1917.

82Pugh, p. 23.

83C. C, August 1, 1912.

84EFF mins., November 8, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

85Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/35, Asst. Secretary to Catherine Marhsall, copy,

August 30, 1912.

86Labour Leader, January 9, 1913, and August 1, 1912.

87See, for example, NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 4, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; East
Midland Federation, Annual Report, 1912–1913 (Nottingham, n.d.), p. 17; Manchester Guardian,
November 18, 1912.

88NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., September 9 and October 17, 1912, Fawcett Library, London;
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 29.

89EFF mins., June 14, October 4, November 22 and December 20, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.

90EFF mins., December 20, 1912.

91The NUWSS wanted the PLP to promise to oppose the third reading of the Reform Bill if it
did not contain any measure of women’s suffrage. The PLP, probably because of MacDonald, was
unwilling to make such a promise.

92EFF mins., August 2, 1912.

93EFF mins., November 8, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., October 17, 1912; Fawcett
Library, London.

94C. C, February 7, 1913; The Election Fighting Fund; What It Has Achieved, NUWSS
pamphlet (n.p., n.d.). The resolution passed by a vote of 870,000 to 437,000. The miners, who had
opposed a women’s suffrage resolution in 1912, remained neutral in 19l3. The EFF work with the miners
probably helped encourage the miners to take a slightly more favorable position.

95EFF mins., September 20, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

96EFF mins., June 14, 1912; The Times, June 17 and 25, 1912; Manchester Guardian, June
18, 1912.
 97Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/24, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, June 20,
1912; LP/wom/12/25, Arthur Henderson to Catherine Marshall, copy, June 20, 1912; LP/wom/12/26,
Arthur Henderson to Catherine Marshall, copy, June 26, 1912; Correspondence of the National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies, Circular from Catherine Marshall, July 23, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins.,
July 18, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

98Andrew Rosen Rise Up, Women! p. 197; C. C, October 31, 1912.

99Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from
Kathleen Courtney, October 15, 1912; Philippa Strachey to Miss Cooke, October 18, 1912, Fawcett
Library, London.

100NUWSS, Ex. com., mins., November 14, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; C. C, November
22, 1912.

101The Times, October 17, 1912; Manchester Guardian, November 27, 1912.

102The results of the election were: Reginald Blair, Cons., 4,042; George Lansbury, Ind.,
3,291. See also EFF mins., December 6 and 20, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

103Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/39, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, October

5, 1912; LP/wom/12/42, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, October 14, 1912.

104Clarke, p. 339.

105The Times, August 2, 1912; Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies, 1912, Mrs. Haslam to the NUWSS, November 4, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

106Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 9, Kathleen D. Courtney to Millicent

Garrett Fawcett, April 8, 1912.

107Leventhal, p. 157.

108C. C, August 1, 1912; The Times, July 25, 1912.

109Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular

from Edith Palliser, May 3, 1912; Circular from Catherine Marshall, October 21, 1912; Correspondence
of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage regarding the Snowden Amendment, passim;
Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Circular from Philippa Strachey, June 19,
1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 4, 1912; all in the Fawcett Library, London.

110NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., October 17 and November 7, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

111Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular

from M. Mackenzie, October 23, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.
 112Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Mrs.
Duncan to Miss Cooke, June 11, 1912; Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Aileen Connor Smith and Geraldine Lennox to Philippa Strachey, October 23, 1912; Fawcett Library,
London.

113The private correspondence of the NUWSS does not support the denial. In addition,
Helena Swanwick admitted in October, at a meeting of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, that
the NUWSS was lobbying for the Snowden amendment in hopes of persuading the Irish to adopt a more
favorable attitude to the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform Bill. See also the Manchester
Guardian, October 23 and November 2, 1912. Tactically, too, withdrawal of the amendment would have
indicated that Redmond had promised not to oppose the women’s suffrage amendments to the Reform
Bill.

114The Times, November 6, 1912; Manchester Guardian, November 6, 1912. The vote was
as follows: For the amendment—Lab., 27; Lib., 29; Cons., 80; Ind. Nat., 5. Against the amendment—
Lab., 5; Lib., 173; Cons., 64; Nat., 72. Abstain—Lab., 8; Lib., 56; Cons., 136; Nat. 4.

115C. C., November 14, 1912.

116Ibid., November 8, 1912.

117Christian Commonwealth, November 13, 1912.

118Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Philip Snowden to Millicent Garrett Fawcett,

November 6, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

119NUWSS Ex. com. mins., November 21 and December 5, 1912, Fawcett Library, London;
Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/42, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, October 14, 1912.

120C. C., November 14, 1912.

121Morgan, p. 166, asserts that the NUWSS had, by the summer of 1912, abandoned all hope
of amending the Reform Bill. All the evidence contradicts this contention.

122CAB 37/108/148, November 8, 1911; CAB 37/108/181, December 1911; CAB 37/111/88,
July 4, 1912; Lloyd George Papers, C3/15/18, Winston Churchill to David Lloyd George, January 1913.

123The Times, June 18, 1912; Manchester Guardian, July 13, 1912. Asquith, in supporting the
Franchise Bill, had expressed his conviction that the House of Commons would not be so ill-considered
as to amend the bill on behalf of the women: “I dismiss as altogether improbable the hypothesis that the
House of Commons is likely to stultify itself by reversing in the same session the considered judgment at
which it has arrived.” Fawcett acerbically commented, “Considering the means which had been taken to
defeat the Conciliation Bill … this almost surpassed in arrogance and effrontery what one had become
accustomed to expect from the Liberal Prime Minister.” Fawcett, What I Remember, p. 204.
 124Morgan, p. 101.

125C. C, July 18, 1912.

126Manchester Guardian, July 17, 1912.

127Sir Edward Grey, Lord Robert Cecil, the Hon. Alfred Lyttelton (Cons., St. George’s,
Hanover Square) and Philip Snowden had agreed to speak for the Grey amendment. Arthur Henderson,
Philip Snowden, and J. H. Thomas (Lab., Derby) had agreed to speak for the Henderson amendment.
W. H. Dickinson, F. D. Acland (Lib., Canborne, N.W.), Sir John Rolleston (Cons., Hartfordshire, E.),
and E. A. Goulding (Cons., Worcester) had agreed to speak for the Dickinson amendment. The Hon.
Alfred Lyttelton, C. S. Goldman (Cons., Penryn and Falmouth), Murray MacDonald (Lib., Falkirk
Burghs), and G. J. Bentham (Lib., Lincolnshire, West Lindsey) had agreed to speak for the Conciliation
amendment.

128Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular

from Edith Palliser [July 1912], Fawcett Library, London. Brailsford had originally estimated that only
nine Conservative votes were necessary to secure passage of the Dickinson amendment (see Chapter
4, p. 126). The vote on the Conciliation Bill in March 1912 must have caused him to revise his estimate.
The vote on March 28 made it clear that he could not count on support from the Irish. In addition it
showed that as long as militancy persisted, some MP’s, although they were in favor of granting votes to
women, would not vote for any women’s suffrage measure in protest against militancy.

129Cecil Papers, Add. mss. 51075, vol. I, Memo on the Number of Women Who Would Be
Enfranchised by the Amendments to the Reform Bill, July 8, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 14,
1912, Fawcett Library, London. Cecil favored a complicated plan that would give a vote to all widows
and unmarried women over twenty-five, and half a vote to all married women. This plan was never
translated into an amendment.

130The Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Review [1912], p. 258.

131Cecil Papers, Add. mss. 51075, vol. I, Memo on the Number of Women Who Would Be
Enfranchised by Amendments to the Reform Bill, July 8, 1912; Manchester Guardian, July 3, 1912.

132Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular

from Edith Palliser [July 1912], Fawcett Library, London.

133In addition to these groups, suffragists in the House of Commons had also formed party
groups to lobby for women’s suffrage within each party. Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, pp.
44–45.

134National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 14.

135NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 18, 1912; Correspondence of the National Union of
Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Circular from Edith Palliser [July 1912]; Fawcett Library, London.
 136British Museum, Arncliffe-Sennett Collection, vol. 19, Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Maud
Arncliffe-Sennett, September 25, 1912.

137C. C., October 17 and November 8, 1912; London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual
Report, 1912, p. 12.

138Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Millicent

Garrett Fawcett to Edith Palliser, September 18, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Surrey, Sussex, and
Hants Federation, Annual Report, 1912–1913, p. 7; West Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales
Federation, Annual Report, 1913 (Liverpool, 1913) p. 7; West Midland Federation, Annual Report,
1917–1913 (n.p., n.d.), p. 8.

139Eastern Counties Federation, Annual Report, 1913 (n.p., n.d.), p. 10; Surrey, Sussex, and
Hants Federation, Annual Report, 1912–1913, p. 7; Kentish Federation, Annual Report, 1913 (Tunbridge
Wells, n.d.), p. 28; Marshall Papers, Memorandum on the activities of the Parliamentary Committee of
the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (n.d.).

140West Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales Federation, Annual Report, 1912
(Liverpool, 1912), p. 7; C. C. Osler, The Vital Claim: An Appeal from Liberal Women to Women
Liberals, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.); Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Memorandum on a meeting of the constitutional suffrage societies, October 16, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.

141NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., July 14, July 18, October 17, November 7, December 5,
December 19, 1912; January 2 and January 17, 1913; Fawcett Library, London.

142E. Sylvia Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement, p. 401. On July 13 two members of the
WSPU were arrested near Nuneham House, the country residence of Lewis Harcourt. It was obvious,
from the contents of their bags, that they intended to bum it. Five days later, on July 18, two suffragetes
tried to set fire to the Theatre Royal in Dublin. Rosen, pp. 169–70.

143Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections (London, 1928), vol. 1, pp. 261–62.

144The Times, July 23, 1912.

145C. C., July 25, 1912.

146Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Millicent

Garrett Fawcett to the Hon. Sec. of the Women’s Social and Political Union, July 19, 1912, Fawcett
Library, London; C. C., July 25, 1912.

147Rosen, pp. 173–74.

148F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, Fate Has Been Kind, p. 100.

 149Leventhal, p. 157.

150Balfour Papers, Add. mss. 49737, Lord Robert Cecil to Arthur Balfour, January 22, 1913.

151NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., January 17, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Rosen, p. 186.
Evelyn Sharp, a former member of the WSPU, persuaded Emmeline Pankhurst to declare the truce.

152See, for example, W. H. Dickinson, “The Franchise Bill and Women’s Suffrage,”
Englishwoman, 15, no. 45 (September 1912): 255; Christian Commonwealth, September 9, 1912; The
Times, December 4 and 11, 1912.

153Scott diary, February 3, 1913.

154C. C., December 20, 1912 and January 24, 1913; Labour Leader, January 2, 1913.

155In October Lady Frances Balfour wrote to Fawcett, “Salisbury is here full of great scenes
in Ulster, and the feeling is that the Government must give it up, or their party divide in the face of it.”
FLAC, vol. 1, Jii, Lady Frances Balfour to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, October 1, 1912, Fawcett Library,
London.

156As quoted in Brailsford, “The Reform Bill and the Labour Party,” p. 122.

157See, for example, C. P. Scott’s account of his interview with John Dillon (Nat., Mayo,
East) and Joseph Devlin (Nat., Belfast, West). Scott diary, January 15 and 16, 1913.

158See, for example, T. P. O’Connor’s (Nat., Liverpool, Scotland) interview with the Chicago
Tribune as quoted in C. C., February 28, 1913. See also C. P. Scott’s account of his interview with John
Redmond; Scott diary, January 20, 1913.

159Hammond, p. 112; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912,
p. 15; Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, p. 47.

160Manchester Guardian, January 8, 1913; Christian Commonwealth, January 15, 1913.

Common Cause commented sarcastically on Harcourt’s threatened resignation: “The Front Bench has
always been a more congenial seat to Mr. Harcourt than the sacrificial altar.” Nor would Churchill ever
resign office because of loyalty to a conviction: “In all his brief public career all his opinions have been
subject to modification, save only his belief in the desirability of office.” C. C., January 10, 1913.

161C. C., December 13, 1912; Manchester Guardian, December 10, 1912; The Times,
December 17, 1912; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 5, 1912, Fawcett Library, London.

162Labour Party Archives, LP/wom/12/26, Catherine Marshall to Arthur Henderson, July 2,

1912.
 163NUWSS, Ex. com. rains., November 7, November 21, and December 5, 1912, and
January 2, 1913; Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1912, Mrs.
Duncan to Miss Cooke, June 11, 1912; Fawcett Library, London.

164NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., October 17, 1912, Fawcett Library, London; Labour Leader,
November 7, 1912; Christian Commonwealth, January 15, 1913.

165Scott diary, January 20, 1913.

166NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., January 17, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Manchester
Guardian, January 21, 1913. Lloyd George designed this plan. Scott diary, January 16, 1913.

167Daily Citizen, January 22, 1913; Manchester Guardian, January 22, 1913. Lloyd George
told C. P. Scott that he thought the Grey amendment would not have passed the House, but he may well
have made this statement in order to minimize the impact of the Speaker’s ruling upon the cause of
women’s suffrage. Scott diary, February 3, 1913.

168NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 5, 1912, and January 17, 1913, Fawcett Library,
London. Cecil was very pleased about the Conservatives’ response to the amendments and thought
Bonar Law’s promise to speak for the Grey amendment had boosted the fortunes of women’s suffrage
within the party. Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Philippa Strachey to
Emily Davies, January 1, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

169NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., January 17, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; C. C., January 10,
1913.

170Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 3, Memorandum of the Manchester and
District Federation headed “Information re Members of Parliament on Women’s Suffrage Amendments
to the Franchise Bill” [1913]. Out of the 40 MP’s in the district, 25 were in favor of women’s suffrage,
7 opposed it, and 8 were undecided.

171NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., January 17, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; C. C., January 17,
1913.

172Manchester Guardian, January 20, 1913.

173National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1912, p. 16. Lowther
made his final decision over the weekend of January 25–26. James W. Lowther, A Speaker’s
Commentaries, vol. 2 (London, 1925), p. 137.

174CAB 41/34/4, January 25, 1913. Women’s suffrage amendments had been moved for
inclusion in the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884. There was no suggestion that such amendments were
out of order. J. Arthur Price, “The Speaker’s Ruling,” Englishwoman, 17, no. 51 (March 1913): 257–64.

175CAB 41/34/5, January 28, 1913.

 176Earl of Oxford and Asquith, vol. 1, p. 221. See also Roy Jenkins, Asquith: Portrait of a
Man and an Era, p. 250; Pugh, p. 41.

177Morgan, p. 117; Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside, p. 519.

178Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Philip Snowden to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, January
26, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

179C. C, February 7, 1913.

180Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Philip Snowden to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, January
31, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

181Pugh, pp. 42–43.

182Clarke, p. 399.

183Cecil Papers, Add. mss. 51075, Press release by the National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies, January 25, [1913]; C. C, February 7, 1913.

184Morgan, p. 118, asserts that the suffragists believed that Asquith had collaborated with the
Speaker to secure the ruling. The evidence does not support this contention. See, for example, West
Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p. 6. See also Scott
diary, February 3, 1913.

185NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 6, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; C. C, January 31,
1913.

186C. C, February 7, 1913; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 6, 1913, Fawcett Library,
London.

187Millicent Garrett Fawcett, “A Government Measure,” Englishwoman, 17, no. 50 (February

1913): 121.

188Scott diary, February 3, 1913.

189Marshall Papers, The Position of the N.U.W.S.S., February 1913, NUWSS pamphlet
(n.p., n.d.); C. C., August 15, 1912. For evidence of this growth at the local level see Eastern Counties
Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p. 13.

1900n May 6, 1913, the House of Commons defeated W. H. Dickinson’s Representation of

the People Bill by 47 votes. This bill would have given votes to women over twenty-five who were
either householders or wives of householders. Constance Rover, Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in
Great Britain, p. 185.
191Harrison, Separate Spheres, p. 121.
 CHAPTER VI

1913–1914: CONVERTING THE PUBLIC AND THE PARTIES

TO THE SUFFRAGE CAUSE

After the withdrawal of the Franchise Bill in January 1913, the

NUWSS, realizing that it was improbable that the present Parliament would
enact any measure of women’s suffrage, however limited, turned its attention
from Parliament to the parliamentary constituencies and the British public.
The fortunes of the suffragists now rested on the next General Election,
which would be held, at the latest, in 1915.1 If the next Government, Liberal
or Conservative, were to sponsor a bill for women’s suffrage, they would
have to be convinced that it would be politically unwise to delay the
enactment of women’s suffrage any longer and that the country saw women’s
suffrage as a “desirable and beneficient change.” According to Asquith, if
this were the case, even the most antisuffragist of governments could not
prevent the suffragists’ success and “no Political Party would attempt to do
so.”2 Thus, from February 1913 to the outbreak of war in August 1914, the
NUWSS threw itself into the laborious tasks of propagandizing for women’s
suffrage in the constituencies, counteracting the efforts of the militants and
keeping the constitutional suffrage movement before the public eye, extending
its organizational network, and building up support for the suffrage cause. At
the same time the NUWSS kept in close communication with prominent
politicians and, alternating flattery with threats, tried to secure a commitment
that the next Government elected would introduce some measure for women’s
suffrage.

From 1913 to 1914, the NUWSS bombarded the British public with
an unprecedented amount and variety of suffragist propaganda; it strove to
make women’s suffrage a truly popular cause and to create a clamorous
demand for women’s suffrage that no Government could, with impunity,
ignore. Its motivations for undertaking this campaign were mixed. Leading
political figures such as Grey and Lloyd George constantly confronted the
NUWSS with the accusation that women’s suffrage was not a “popular”
cause, in the broadest sense of the term.3 Although this accusation was
undoubtedty true—in 1913 the average British man and woman were
apathetic to franchise reform in general and if they did have feelings on
women’s suffrage, were more likely to be opposed than not—it also gave the
politicians a convenient excuse for not acting on the women’s demand,
thereby averting interparty strife over this electoral apple of discord.4 The
conversion of the public would at least remove this pretext for inaction.
Equally important, the NUWSS felt that its propaganda efforts would isolate
the militants and prevent the public from branding the whole suffrage
movement with the tar from the suffragette brush. In February 1913, the
WSPU had begun “a concerted campaign of destruction of public and private
property,” smashing the orchid house at Kew, setting a railroad carriage
ablaze, and bombing Lloyd George’s house; by 1914, the King was
complaining of receiving letters from suffragettes threatening to shoot him.5
The militants were now at war not only with the Government but also with
the British public, and their actions did more to alienate public opinion than
to create sympathy for the cause. The NUWSS hoped that its propaganda
efforts would decimate the bad feelings engendered by militancy and show
the suffrage movement in a more sober and respectable light.6

A great deal of the NUWSS work in this period was very much as
before—meetings, teas, lectures, letters, processions, bazaars—but there
was a significant change. Whereas the NUWSS had formerly based its appeal
for women’s suffrage on nineteenth-century liberal arguments, claiming that
men and women were equally rational and capable of determining their own
destinies and that this natural equality should be reflected in their political
status, it now began stressing the differences between men and women.7
Women, the NUWSS said, had interests and capabilities that were different
from those of men, and it was because of these differences that they should
have a voice in the body politic: women were not the equals of men, and no
man could speak for them. Rather than stressing the “anti-male" aspect,
however, the NUWSS took pains to make it clear that it was not encouraging
a revolt against domestic life; on the contrary, it said, women had a special
aptitude for and knowledge of domestic matters, and a special interest in
moral reform which men did not share and which ought to be represented in
government.8

In part, this change in emphasis came about because of the change in

the audience at whom the propaganda was directed. Increasingly, the
NUWSS had been broadening its base beyond the upper middle class Liberal
nucleus that had formed the backbone of the suffragist movement. The
affiliated societies—particularly in the Midlands in the North—had
expanded the membership into other classes, and the entente with Labour in
1912 had strengthened the NUWSS ties with the working class. After 1913
the NUWSS, using the “argument from expediency”—the idea that women
needed the vote to protect their interests as wives, mothers, and workers—
set out to capture working class women.9 The expediency argument was
much less threatening to male workers as well in that it did not challenge
men’s role in the family by claiming, as the old liberal argument had done,
that women were the equals of men, nor did it in any way imply that women
wanted to throw off their domestic function. By implicitly disclaiming that
women’s suffrage would disrupt the family and by emphasizing the
differences between men and women, the suffragists made the idea of
women’s suffrage much more acceptable. Paradoxically, by underscoring the
unique “feminine virtues” of women and by denying the ideas of natural
equality, the suffragists made women’s suffrage a more popular cause.

During the 1913–14 period, the NUWSS hired organizers, such as

Selina Cooper and Ada Nield Chew, who were of working class origin and
had close ties to the labor movement, to propagandize for the suffrage cause
in working class areas.10 In its appeals the NUWSS claimed that the sex
barrier and the class barrier were due to the same spirit of monopoly and
privilege, and that women and workers were linked by a common interest in
tearing down these barriers.11 The organizers emphasized that working
women were “sweated” and used to keep down the wages of men and argued
that home and family were adversely affected by the long hours and low pay
of workers, male and female. The implication was that if women could vote,
all workers would benefit: sweating would be abolished, social welfare
legislation would be enacted, and the working class home would become a
healthier, happier place.12
 Efforts were made to reach organized labor, that is, the trade unions,
not only to gain their support for the suffrage movement but also as a way of
exerting pressure on the Labour Party—and indirectly on the Liberal Party—
to keep up to the mark on the suffrage question.13 In May 1913, the Council of
the NUWSS directed all affiliates of the NUWSS to collect resolutions from
trade unions in support of women’s suffrage.14 Throughout the next fourteen
months the societies gave top priority to this work, and unions of cab drivers,
bakers, miners, and textile workers all became the focus of the NUWSS
propaganda.15 The Election Fighting Fund took charge of a large part of this
work and at one time had fifteen organizers working in industrial centers in
the North collecting resolutions in favor of women’s suffrage.16 This work
with the trade unions did bear fruit; on September 5, the Trade Union
Congress, which represented over 2,000,000 working men, passed a
resolution which strongly protested the Government’s handling of the
women’s suffrage question: “… this Congress protests against the Prime
Minister’s failure to redeem his repeated pledges to women, and calls upon
the Parliamentary Committee to press for the immediate enactment of a
Government Reform Bill, which must include the enfranchisement of
women.”17 The NUWSS had been instrumental in securing this statement.18

The example of the Miners’ Federation, which had traditionally

been antipathetic to women’s suffrage, gives another illustration of the
NUWSS success in convincing organized labor to support the suffrage
cause.19 In October 1913, the NUWSS, after months of propagandizing
among the mining populace of the North, staged a huge demonstration in
conjunction with the annual meeting of the Miner’s Federation. Robert
Smillie, president of the National Federation of Miners of Great Britain and
president of the Scottish Miners’ Federation, John Robertson, vice-president
of the Scottish Miners’ Federation, and William Brace, president of the South
Wales Miners’ Federation, all made speeches in support of women’s
suffrage. 20 Four months later, after the NUWSS had done more work for the
suffrage cause in mining areas, the Miners’ Federation, at the Labour Party
Conference at Glasgow, endorsed a resolution which stated that no franchise
reform would be acceptable to Labour if it excluded women’s suffrage; this
was the first time the miners had supported such a proposal.21
 Analyzing the results of its work with the trade unions, the NUWSS
termed it “one of the most valuable pieces of propaganda ever undertaken.”22
This activity attracted new support for the suffrage movement and
strengthened the ties between the Labour Party and the suffragists. Moreover,
this cooperation between the forces of organized labor and the supporters of
women’s suffrage did not go unnoticed by the Liberal Party; Grey, Ponsonby,
and Acland all told Catherine Marshall that the NUWSS work with the trade
unions had made an impression upon the party.23

Organized labor, however, was not the only target for NUWSS
propaganda during this period. To enlist the working class at-large in the
suffrage movement, the NUWSS relied on the work of the Friends of
Women’s Suffrage (FWS), which had been initiated with this end in mind.
The FWS expanded rapidly in 1913–14, and by August 1914 it numbered
over 46,000 Friends.24 in addition to this, the societies formed suffrage clubs
—partly social and partly educational—for working class men and women in
industrial areas such as Macclesfield and South Salford.25 In poor urban
areas, the NUWSS established suffrage committees, which included workers,
to serve as centers for suffrage propaganda: the London Society, which
formed seven such committees in working class districts of the South and
East End and opened a suffrage shop to disseminate information about votes
for women, reported that this work had been “particularly encouraging.26 In
1913 the NUWSS also inaugurated an “educational campaign” which,
although not aimed exclusively at workers, was obviously formulated to have
special appeal to this segment of the populace. The campaign undertook to
enlighten public opinion on the causes that lay at the heart of the women’s
suffrage movement, and a number of these causes, such as the position of
women in industry or the disabilities of wives and mothers, were of
particular interest to workers.27 Throughout 1913 and 1914 the NUWSS
societies sponsored lectures, meetings, and debates on these specially
selected topics, and publicized this “educational campaign” in the local
press, all in an effort to stir “the imagination and consciousness” of the
public, particularly its working class segment.28

It is impossible to gauge how successful the NUWSS efforts were

with regard to the working class, but it seems fair to say that for the first time
a sustained effort had been made to make women’s suffrage an issue for the
working class populace throughout Britain. Sylvia Pankhurst had done some
work in lower class districts in London, but now an organizational nucleus
for women’s suffrage had been created in many working class neighborhoods
previously untouched by suffrage propaganda. Through the FWS, the NUWSS
had established a permanent line of communication with workers. This
activity, combined with the work with trade unions and the EFF’s support for
the Labour Party, had, at the very least, done much to eliminate the prejudice
that the women’s suffrage movement responded only to the needs of the
middle and upper classes and, moreover, that it was a movement composed
of a coterie of hatchet-wielding, man-hating suffragettes.

The “Pilgrimage for Women’s Suffrage” was the most spectacular

single piece of propaganda undertaken by the NUWSS during this period, and
was probably the most impressive demonstration for women’s suffrage ever
staged in Britain. The Pilgrimage was not designed specifically for the
working class, but it undoubtedly reached many working men and women.
The Pilgrimage was designed to demonstrate the dedication of the supporters
of women’s suffrage, to spread the suffrage gospel to all corners of Britain,
and most important, to recapture public opinion, which the lunacies of the
militants had estranged from the suffrage cause.29 It succeeded on all three
counts.

The Pilgrimage, which began on June 18, 1913, was a march of

bands of members of all the NUWSS societies, from every part of Britain—
Land’s End to John o’ Groats—to London. The pilgrims, wearing the badges
of the NUWSS, converged on eight main roads and arrived in London July
25. A huge meeting of some 70,000 was then held at Hyde Park, followed by
a service at St. Paul’s. Along the route, as the pilgrims made their way to
London, meetings were held and speeches were given. From all accounts the
Pilgrimage was a tremendously successful piece of propaganda. Some
£8,777 was raised during its course, the suffragist message was heard in
parts of Britain that had not really heard it before, and the crowds, with very
few exceptions, were warm and enthusiastic.30 As an added bonus, the
Pilgrimage convinced a number of Liberal ministers, including Asquith, to
receive deputations from the NUWSS. Although nothing came of these
interviews, the ministers—echoed by the Press—conceded that the
Pilgrimage had helped to dissipate the ill-will left by the militants and had
shown the suffrage movement in a very favorable light.31 From the standpoint
of publicity, the Pilgrimage benefited both the NUWSS and the cause of
women’s suffrage.

During the 1913–14 period, the NUWSS aim was to keep women’s
suffrage before the British public and to make women’s suffrage a popular
cause, but it did not lose sight of Parliament altogether. It snubbed the
Dickinson Bill, the only bill to enfranchise women which the House of
Commons considered in this period, but it took advantage of several
opportunities to raise the women’s suffrage issue in Parliament.32 It did not
entertain the hope that the present Parliament would do anything for the
women, but still it did not want women’s suffrage to become a dead issue in
the parliamentary arena. At the least, some discussion of women’s suffrage
was valuable as publicity and propaganda for the movement.

Devolution gave the NUWSS important openings for bringing the

suffragsts’ claims to the attention of the House of Commons. The Irish Home
Rule movement had spawned similar movements in Scotland and Wales, and
in 1914 Scottish and Welsh Home Rule bills were introduced in the House of
Commons.33 The NUWSS did not expect these bills to pass, but it saw in
them a golden opportunity to raise the demand for women’s suffrage: even the
antisuffragists argued that women should have a voice in “domestic,” as
opposed to “imperial” legislation, and the proposed national parliaments
would deal only with this sort of domestic legislation. The NUWSS believed
that the House of Commons should officially recognize “the principle that
women should be admitted as electors for National domestic legislatures.”
This principle might someday be put into practice and this limited suffrage
for local parliaments might serve as the “thin edge of the wedge” for suffrage
for the Imperial Parliament.34 Thus, the NUWSS lobbied, successfully, to
secure the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the Welsh and Scottish Home
Rule bills, organizing meetings, writing letters, and holding deputations to
MP’s.35 Although nothing came of either of these bills, the lobbying efforts
gave the NUWSS the excuse to argue the suffrage cause before a number of
politicians and did secure the concession that women should have a vote for
National Parliaments.
 Further efforts were made, too, with the Irish, who had sparked the
federalist movement. Working in close cooperation with the Irish Women’s
Suffrage Federation, the NUWSS tried to secure the inclusion of women in
the Irish Home Rule Amending Bill, and it lobbied, unsuccessfully, to obtain
a promise from Sir Edward Carson (Cons., Dublin University), that if a
referendum were taken in the Ulster counties, women would vote in the
referendum; the Ulster Unionist Council did, however, include women’s
suffrage in the scheme it drew up for forming a Provisional Government in
Ulster.36 The outbreak of war put an end to the NUWSS dealings with the
Irish Unionists. Again, as in the case of Scotland and Wales, the negotiations
were mainly valuable from the point of view of keeping open the channels of
communicatiton between the suffragists and the politicians, and giving some
vitality to the otherwise moribund state of the suffrage cause in Parliament.

Perhaps the most interesting example of the NUWSS efforts to keep

the suffrage cause alive at Westminster was the introduction in the House of
Lords of a bill to enfranchise women. It was the first time the House of Lords
had debated and divided on the issue. The NUWSS realized that the Lords
would be unlikely to pass any measure for women’s suffrage, but it felt the
debate and division would be valuable as a demonstration of suffrage
activity and, in particular, suffrage activity in the Conservative Party.37
Working in conjunction with the Conservative and Unionist Women’s
Franchise Association (CUWFA), the NUWSS lobbied to form a suffrage
group in the House of Lords, trying to keep these plans as quiet as possible in
case Lord Curzon, who headed the National League for Opposing Woman
Suffrage, should hear of these activities and organize opposition to the bill.38
Lord Selborne, who was closely allied with the NUWSS and the CUWFA,
agreed to introduce a women’s suffrage bill which would give votes to
women who were on the municipal register—in other words, a Conciliation
Bill. Both the NUWSS and the CUWFA preferred an “equal” suffrage bill,
which would enfranchise women on the same basis as men were
enfranchised, but they were overruled. Lady Selborne complained to
Catherine Marshall: “Lord Newton rather thinks we should have a better
chance with Conciliation, which seems incredible if one did not know how
extraordinarily stupid the Conservative Party are.”39 The bill received its
first reading April 2, and its second reading May 5, and it was defeated by a
vote of 104 (80 Cons., 23 Lib., 1 Cross-bench) to 60 (31 Cons., 23 Lib., 6
Bishops).40 The suffragists had expected the bill to lose, but the vote came as
something of a surprise and delight to them, for the bill received more votes
than either the 1910 Budget or the Home Rule Bill.41 In terms of publicity
value, the division showed that there was a surprising amount of suffragist
sentiment in the Lords, and that some of the most influential Conservative
peers were in favor of women’s suffrage.42 The prestigious Liberal journal,
The Nation declared that the vote indicated “a sharpening Tory appetite for a
Suffrage Bill” and predicted that the Conservatives, if returned, would
introduce a bill to enfranchise women.43 This kind of talk, however
exaggerated, could only help the suffrage movement.

The NUWSS still hoped to persuade the party leaderships and party
agents that the claims of the women suffragists would be difficult to evade
and to convince them that the women’s suffrage movement did have electoral
power. Specifically, it wanted to be assured that whichever party formed the
next Government would secure the enactment of some measure for women’s
suffrage.

As in 1912, relations between the Labour Party and the NUWSS

remained close. The EFF, still under the capable direction of Catherine
Marshall, continued to be the fighting arm of the NUWSS; its purpose was to
build up pressure on the left of the Liberal Government for women’s suffrage.
As Marshall told a suffragist colleague, the EFF was designed to bring the
Liberal Party to the bargaining table:

They are beginning to get really uneasy about our E.F.F. policy, and
their fears are magnifying the sums which they think we are amassing.
The more uneasy they are, and the richer they think we are, the better,
especially just at this moment when they are anxiously watching to
see which way every straw blows, that they may shape their policy
accordingly for the next election.44

The NUWSS wanted to frighten the Liberals with the power of the Labour
vote in the constituencies, to reduce the Liberal majority, and to make the
Labour Party more powerful in relation to the Liberals. It wanted to make
sure that if the Liberals were returned at the next election, they would be
dependent on a Labour Party which was strongly committed to the
enfranchisement of women. The smaller the Liberal majority and the larger
the number of Labour MP’s, the more the suffragists would benefit,
particularly if the enactment of Home Rule had removed half of the
Nationalist Party from Westminster.45

During 1913–14 the EFF expanded the activities that it had begun in
1912. In an attempt to rid the Liberal Government of its antisuffragist
component and “produce a Cabinet united on women’s suffrage which would
make a Government Bill possible,” the EFF extended its work in the
constituencies of the antisuffragist ministers, particularly Rossendale, East
Bristol, Rotherham, North Monmouth, and Accrington.46 In these
constituencies EFF organizers worked to build up the woefully inadequate
Labour organization by canvassing and registering voters, and the NUWSS,
to complement the more political aspect of the EFF’s activities, tried to rouse
organized labor to support the suffrage cause.47 All this was groundwork
which might make it possible for the Labour Party to put up strong women’s
suffrage candidates in these constituencies at the next election. As a result of
the EFF activities, the Labour Party definitely decided to contest East
Bristol, North Monmouth, and Rotherham in the next General Election.48

In addition to this work, the EFF systematically went ahead with

preparations for the General Election in a number of other selected
constituencies where the NUWSS felt that it was particularly desirable that it
should support the Labour candidate “because he was a specially active
friend of the cause of Women’s Suffrage, or because the Liberal was anti or
unreliable,” or because it seemed that the work of the EFF “might be the
decisive factor in securing the seat for Labour.”49 These selections were
made in consultation with Arthur Peters, chief agent of the Labour Party, and
included constituencies such as Ilkeston (Col. Seely) and Glasgow,
Bridgeton (A. MacCallum Scott), which were represented by prominent
Liberal antisuffragists, as well as constituencies such as Barnard Castle
(Arthur Henderson), where the Labour MP was in danger of losing his seat.50
In 1914 the EFF further extended the defensive aspect of its election
preparations and compiled a list of twenty-five Labour MP’s whom it
intended to give substantial support to at the General Election.51
 The EFF devoted its main attention to industrial centers in the North
—Blackburn (Snowden), Clitheroe (A. Smith, Lab.), N.E. Manchester (J. R.
Clynes, Lab.)—and to constituencies in the Northeast—Bishop Auckland
(Sir H. Havelock Allan, Lib.), Chester-le-Street (J. W. Taylor, Lib.),
Houghton-le-Spring (T. Wing, Lib.), Mid-Durham (John Wilson, Lib.),
Gateshead (H. L. Elverston, Lib.), and South Shields (R. Rea, Lib.).52 Funds
and organizers were sent to these constituencies, and the EFF helped the
Labour Party with “registration, canvassing, and all the other spade work
which is necessary as the preliminary to a successful election”; in one
constituency, Mid-Durham, the EFF organizer, Miss Dring, even went into the
Revision Court as a Labour agent.53 In addition to these preparations for the
General Election, the EFF established NUWSS branches in the
constituencies in which it was working, propagandized for women’s suffrage
among the trade unions and the Trade and Labour councils, and enrolled
FWS.54 The strategy of the EFF was to make the local labor forces more
critical and independent of the Liberals, and to strengthen labor’s support for
women’s suffrage. The NUWSS was so pleased by the EFF’s work in these
selected constituencies that it was considering enlarging the scope of EFF
activities. Offensively, the NUWSS had used the EFF to attack antisuffrage
Liberals. It contemplated changing its focus from quality to quantity, and
contesting Liberal seats on a much wider scale. It would base its criteria for
selection on the size of the Liberal majority and the strength of the Labour
vote, rather than on the suffrage views of the Liberal candidates.55 Grey told
Marshall that he took this threat seriously, and estimated that there were forty
constituencies in which the Labour vote was large and the Liberal majority
small.56 There, the presence of the EFF could make a real difference.

In 1913–14 the EFF also supported Labour candidates at four by-

elections (see Table 5). Although none of the Labour candidates was
victorious, Labour’s decision to contest these elections cost the Liberals two
seats: South Lanark and Leith Burghs. At the other two by-elections,
Houghton-le-Spring and N.W. Durham, the Liberal majorities were
substantially reduced.57 The Labour poll at all four by-elections was, at the
least, respectable, particularly in view of the fact that in three of these
constituencies, Labour had never before run a candidate.58 The EFF took a
major role in all four campaigns. Not only did it persuade Labour to put up
candidates, but it also sent workers and funds to the constituencies, and,
working closely with the local supporters of Labour, helped to set up party
organizations and also NUWSS societies.59 These organizational nuclei
would help Labour contest these seats at the next General Election.

Table 5

By-Elections at Which the Election Fighting Fund Was Used, 1913–1914

Houghton-le-Spring—March January
1913a 1910
election
results”b
T. Wing, Lib. 6,930 R. Cameron, Lib. 10,393
T. Richardson, Cons. 4,807 Major H. Streatfield, Cons. 4,382
Alderman W. House, Lab. 4,165
Lib. majority 2,123 Lib. majority 6,011
S. Lanark—December 1913c December
1910
election
results
Hon. W. Watson, Cons. 4,257 Sir W. Menzies, Lib. 5,160
G. Morton, Lib. 4,006 Dr. C. M. Douglas, Cons. 3,963
T. Gibb, Lab. 1,674 Lib. majority 1,197
Cons, majority 251
N.W. Purham—January 1914d December
1910
election
results
A. Williams, Lib. 7,241 L. A. Atherly-Jones, Lib. 8,998
J. O. Hardicker, Cons. 5,564 J. O. Hardicker, Cons. 4,827
G. H. Stuart, Lab. 5,026 Lib. majority 4,171
Lib. majority 1,677

Leith Burghs—February 1914e December

1910
election
results
G. W. Currie, Cons. 5,159 Rt. Hon. A. C. Munro- 7,069
Ferguson, Lib.
 Provost M. Smith, Lib. 5,143
J. N. Bell, Lab. 3,346 F. A. MacQuisten, Cons. 5,284
Cons, majority 16 Lib. majority 1,785
aCommon Cause, March 28, 1913; Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1910, p. 180.

bAt the December 1910 election, the Liberal candidate, Cameron, was unopposed.

cCommon Cause, December 19, 1913; Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 198.

dCommon Cause, February 6, 1914; Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 189.

eCommon Cause, March 16, 1914; Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1912, p. 200. 207

The NUWSS felt that these by-elections were valuable from the
point of view of discomfiting the Liberals and encouraging Labour to be
more independent of the Liberal Party, and also in building up support for
women’s suffrage in the constituencies. It took great pleasure in announcing
that in the eight by-elections in which the EFF had participated, the Liberals
had, on the average, lost 1,800 votes, while Labour had gained 1,100.60 The
Nation, voicing a Liberal view on the matter, commented that the Labour vote
could “make all the difference between a small Liberal majority in
Parliament (or an actual defeat of the party at a General Election) and a large
sufficient one.61 And P. W. Wilson warned his fellow Liberals of the
dangerous situation they were creating by pushing the advocates of women’s
suffrage into the arms of Labour:

In the constituencies, which determine all things, Liberalism and

Conservatism are to-day threatened by Labour, and the central fact of
the times which are ahead of us is the rapidly extending association
of the workers with the political aims of women…. The restlessness
of women, if it stood alone, might have been negigible, but when, as
now, it is associated with the seething undercurrents of industrial
discontent, when its satisfaction is the condition precedent to
fundamental Liberal reforms, it can only be answered with evasion,
at the risk of a Liberal debacle…. the suffragists … are in every
 direction reinforcing and influencing the balancing vote on which
depends the fate of Governments.62

In general the NUWSS was gratified by the results of its work with
the Labour Party. The election preparations and the propaganda activities of
the EFF had continued to strengthen the link between Labour and the
women’s suffrage movement. There were however, still the occasional rough
spots, mostly caused by MacDonald’s continuing lack of enthusiasm for the
suffrage cause and his complaints about the women’s stranglehold on the
party.63 The NUWSS was inclined to feel that his attitude influenced the
whole party and encouraged Labour to be compliant with the Liberals. The
NUWSS tended to be impatient with Labour for being, as one member put it,
“extraordinarily anxious to be passive about everything” and not always
standing up to the Liberals in the manner in which the NUWSS desired.64 The
NUWSS was very unhappy with Labour’s support for the Plural Voting Bill,
for example, which it felt would secure “to the Government all that they
really cared about in the Franchise Bill of last session.”65

At times, the Labour Party had specific complaints about the

NUWSS. The EFF’s failure to support the Labour candidate at the Keighley
by-election made the party question the sincerity of the NUWSS commitment
to the Labour Party.66 And there were some Labour MP’s, including G. N.
Barnes (Glasgow, Blackfriars), who continued to view the NUWSS as a
group of “rich women” whose interests had nothing to do with the Labour
Party.67 On the whole, however, the Labour Party much appreciated the
assistance that the EFF had given to the party in the con stitu en cies.68
Henderson, Peters, and Snowden cooperated closely with the NUWSS and
worked to prevent misunderstandings between the party and the suffragists.
On several occasions the Labour Party gave visible demonstrations of its
support for women’s suffrage: the Annual Conferences of the Labour Party
and the ILP continued to pledge their support for women’s suffrage; the TUC
sent a deputation to the Prime Minister to demand women’s suffrage; and the
PLP, to remind the House of Commons of the women’s demand, introduced
an Adult Suffrage Bill.69 The work o f the EFF had done much to strengthen
the Labour Party’s commitment to women’s suffrage. On the eve of the War,
Arthur Henderson assured Marshall that the National Labour Party would, in
all probability, make women’s suffrage a test question at the next General
Election , in the same way it had done with Taff-Vale in 1906; this would
give a prominence to women’s suffrage which it had never before enjoyed at
an election and would oblige the Liberal party managers to put up suffrage
candidates in any constituency in which the Labour vote was important.70

At the same time that the NUWSS was, through the EFF, applying
pressure for women’s suffrage on the left of the Liberal coalition , it was also
trying to convince the Liberals that the Conservatives were considering
sponsoring a women’s suffrage measure, should they be returned at the next
election. If the Liberals wanted to prevent a recurrence of 1867, and another
“dishing of the Whigs,” it would be prudent for them to make some
commitment to women’s suffrage before the Conservatives grasped the
initiative and climbed on the suffrage bandwagon. Francis Acland told
Marshall that, given the present electoral qualifications, the Liberals
believed that an “equal terms Bill—one that enfranchised women on the
same terms as men”—would keep the Liberals out of office for a generation;
the NUWSS wanted to play on this fear.71 Aside from scaring the Liberals
into taking action on women’s suffrage, the NUWSS negotiations with the
Conservatives were carried on with an eye to the General Election: the
NUWSS wanted to secure a pledge from the Conservatives that they would
introduce a women’s suffrage b ill if they were chosen to form a Government.

During 1913–14, the NUWSS, working hand in glove with the

CUWFA, lobbied for women’s suffrage in the Conservative Party and tried to
promote the idea that women’s suffrage would benefit the electoral fortunes
of the Tories.72 A number o f the party’s leaders, including both Balfour and
Bonar Law, were nominally in favor of women’s suffrage and it was not
unreasonable to think that some concessions on women’s suffrage could be
wrung from the Conservatives on the grounds of electoral advantage. Lord
Robert Cecil had told Marshall that he was convinced “the next Unionist
Government will have to do something [about women’s suffrage] if it comes
in in the course of the next few months.”73 The NUWSS met with Bonar Law,
organized deputations to MP’s, and asked it s members to help “make the
Conservative Party re a lise the time has come when the Government cannot
be neutral on women’s suffrage.”74 Most important, it spent a great deal of
time consulting with its close friends in the Conservative Party—notably
Cecil, Lytton, and SelborneȔto see if the Tories and the NUWSS could come
to some agreement over women’s suffrage before the General Election.
These politician s, in turn, discussed the issue with Bonar Law, as well as
with prominent antisuffragists, such as Curzon. Their aim was to impress
upon the party that it must formulate some plan to deal with the suffrage
question, in order to avoid drifting “into the same kind of position on the
question as have the present ministry—to their lasting discredit.”75 Selborne
emphasized to Cecil that they must be firm in pleading their cause:

The essential thing is to have a plan and to let our colleagues know
before a General Election what our plan is…. Some of them do not
believe in the strength of our convictions, others like Curzon think
that if only the decision is put off until the last moment we shall not
be able to resist the pressure to join either without conditions or with
only vague assurances.

Curzon must be made to realize:

that unless he is prepared to agree to something Lansdowne and

Bonar Law will have to choose between him and you and me. I do not
think it would break his heart to lose us as colleagues, but I do not
think that he would regard the position with equanimity. In fact I
regard it as of great importance that he should understand that we will
not under any circum stances be placed in the position in which the
members of the present Government are p laced.76

Three separate plans were discussed by the NUWSS and the

Conservatives. One of these was the “Massingham plan,” favored by Lord
and Lady Selborne, by which the Government would introduce a women’s
suffrage bill, most probably on the Conciliation basis; if the bill passed, it
would then be up to each constituency to decide by local referendum whether
women should vote.77 The “Lytton plan” called for an “initiatory
referendum” on women’s suffrage; the electors would be asked if they
desired legislation on women’s suffrage, and if so, the Government would
introduce a suffrage bill.78 A third plan, the “Cecil plan,” called for a
national referendum on women’s suffrage, which would be held after a
Government bill for women’s suffrage had passed the House of Commons.
The Cecil plan was similar to the Massingham plan, except that it would be
up to the nation, rather than the individual constituencies, to decide whether
women should be enfranchised.79

All these plans fell far short of what the NUWSS hoped for—that is,
a straightforward Government bill on women’s suffrage—but friends of the
NUWSS in the Conservative Party had made it clear that, given the
antisuffragist contingent in the party, no bill of that sort would be forthcoming
from the Tories. Therefore, after some discussion with Cecil, Selborne, and
Lytton, the NUWSS decided that Cecil’s proposal would be the most
palatable of the plans so far proposed.80 But it was very distasteful.
Marshall, speaking for her colleagues, told Cecil that they feared no
referendum on women’s suffrage would be successful:

If only the apathetic and indifferent could be eliminated from the

referendum I should not fear it. The active undoubtedly outnumber the
active anti-suffragists. … You might get a majority in favor of
repealing some grossly unjust or repressive measure, the evil of
which has been proved by experience but I don’t believe you would
ever get a majority for enacting something new or untried.81

By August 1914, the NUWSS and the Conservative Party had not
come to any agreement on women’s suffrage: Bonar Law, though according to
Cecil, “speaking more strongly than I have ever heard on the justice of the
women’s claim,” had not struck any bargain with the suffragists.82 Moreover,
the bargain he was most likely to accede to, a referendum, was not appealing
to the women. The main value of all this work had been to provoke
considerable thought and discussion within the Conservative Party over the
suffrage question. In June 1914, Marshall reported that the Conservatives
were starting to grow anxious that the Liberals were preparing to take up the
suffrage question; they feared the Liberals would introduce a bill along the
lines of the Dickinson Bill, which would benefit the electoral fortunes of the
Liberals. Cecil reported that a growing number of Conservatives were eager
to see the women’s suffrage question settled once and for all,83 and the House
of Lords vote on Selborne’s bill seemed also to suggest that the
Conservatives were becoming more responsive to the suffrage cause. Cromer
reported that the prospect of a moderate women’s suffrage measure had
“hypnotized the Unionist Agents,” and Steel-Matiland, chairman of the Party
Organization, had approached the NUWSS about various proposals for the
enactment of women’s suffrage.84 Even Arnold Ward (Cons., Herts., West), a
leading antisuffragist, was agitated that the Conservative Party was going to
adopt the Conciliation Bill.85 Marshall could not resist dangling the prospect
of a Conservative bill for women’s suffrage before Lloyd George: “A propos
of our bet, and your scepticism when I said that the Conservatives were
beginning to concern themselves seriously with women’s suffrage, you may
be interested to hear, in confidence, that on Thursday I met at tea Mr. Balfour,
Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Lytton, and Mr. Steel-Maitland and they all talked of
nothing but women’s suffrage for an hour and a half.”86

By August 1914, the NUWSS had come around to the idea that the
return of a Conservative Government might be better for the women than the
return of the present Liberal Government with a greater majority. In order to
embarrass the Conservatives, the Liberals might, in opposition, take up the
cudgel of women’s suffrage. Moreover, if a referendum on a Conservative
measure for women’s suffrage was held and the bill defeated, it could be
construed not as a defeat for women’s suffrage, but as a defeat for a
Conservative women’s suffrage bill.87

The NUWSS dealings with both the Labour and Conservative

parties were carried on with an eye to the Liberal Party. The NUWSS wanted
to alarm the Liberals with the prospect of harnessing the suffrage cause to the
labor movement, and it also wanted to alarm them with the prospect of a
Conservative Government enacting a women’s suffrage measure framed in a
manner that would destroy the electoral fortunes of the Liberals. The idea
was that this pressure, conducted on two fronts, would “make the
Government see that delay is likely to be more embarrassing than
settlement.”88 According to Marshall, the Liberals were beginning to respond
to the pressure: “the result of the fear of an ’equal terms’ Bill on the one hand
and pressure for an Adult Suffrage Bill on the other hand is to make the
Liberals more inclined to think that the safest course would after all be to
pass a Bill on Dickinson lines.”89
 For all its disillusionment with the Liberal Government, the
NUWSS had not given up the conviction that the Liberals could, through an
appeal to party self-interest, be brought to agree to bring in a women’s
suffrage measure if a Liberal Government were returned at the next General
Election. Throughout 1913–14 the NUWSS worked not only indirectly,
through the Liberal and Conservative parties, but directly, through Liberal
orgnizations and party politicians, to make the Liberal Party change its mind
on the suffrage question. Although the NUWSS was much more hardheaded
about the Liberals, and had taken its gloves off in dealing with the party,
traces of the assumption that the Liberal Party was the natural champion of
the suffrage movement still lingered. As Catherine Marshall wrote rather
sadly to Sir John Simon (Lib., Essex, Walthamstow):

The failure of a Liberal Government to recognize the biggest

movement for political liberty of its day is very bitter to those of us
who are liberals. I was burning with zeal for the great principles of
Liberalism and as soon as I left school I started working for the
Liberal Party almost as hard as I am working for women’s suffrage
now. It has been the greatest disillusionment of my life to find how
little those principles count with the majority of Liberal men.90

The NUWSS devoted a great deal of attention to building up support

within the Liberal Party for women’s suffrage and to creating lobbies which
would agitate for women’s suffrage within the Liberal Party organization.
Francis Acland, Willoughby Dickinson, and Sir John Simon were the closest
allies of the NUWSS in this work: they supplied the NUWSS with
information about the party’s attitude on the women’s suffrage question,
discussed tactics with the NUWSS, and acted as emissaries between the
NUWSS and prominent politicians such as Grey.91 Simon was chairman of
the Liberal Suffrage Committee in the House and active in the Society of
Liberals, with headquarters in Manchester, which was pressing the
suffragists’ claims on the Government.92 Acland and Dickinson, abetted by
the NUWSS, were instrumental in forming the Men’s Liberal Suffrage
Society, which was designed to ensure that the next Liberal Government
would bring in a measure for women’s suffrage.93 Acland’s wife, Eleanor,
who was active in the Women’s Liberal Federation (WLF), was also a
valuable contact for the NUWSS. At her instigation a Liberal Women’s
Suffrage Union was formed within the WLF to strengthen support for
women’s suffrage within the party and make sure that suffragist candidates
were selected at the General Election.94 Members of the NUWSS, including
Margery Corbett-Ashby, were active in the new union, which also acted as a
haven for suffragists who resigned from the NUWSS in opposition to the
EFF. According to Acland, the Liberal Women’s Suffrage Union had done
much good in strengthening women’s suffrage within the WLF.95 At the annual
council in 1914, the WLF decided that when an antisuffragist was standing,
the WLF would not take any official steps to support him; it also urged the
Government to make women’s suffrage part of its program at the General
Election.96

Aside from these indirect lobbying activities, the NUWSS also

approached its friends in the Cabinet and tried to secure their help in pushing
the Liberal Government to agree to introduce a women’s suffrage bill after
the next General Election. Grey and Lloyd George were the main targets. The
NUWSS had an-idea, shared by some Liberals, that if Home Rule were
enacted before Parliament was dissolved, Asquith might step down as Prime
Minister and Grey would replace him.97 In this case, their having secured a
commitment from Grey to give women’s suffrage top priority would be
extremely valuable. And even if Grey did not. succeed Asquith, his public
advocacy of women’s suffrage would be important in terms of creating
pressure within the party for women’s suffrage and influencing the actions of
the other suffragist ministers.98 Francis Acland had told the NUWSS that
Grey felt that, depending on the circumstances of the next election, he could
be very helpful to the suffrage cause: “Grey is quite certain that if we had to
have a General Election on Ulster, i.e., to finish Home Rule, he could do
nothing, but if we’d got the two big bills (Home Rule and Welsh
Disestablishment) out of the way, he could do a good deal. I feel the same.”99

Grey was very evasive with the NUWSS, however, and would make
no guarantees about what action he would take on the suffrage question. At an
interview with Marshall, he admitted that he could not indefinitely continue
as a member of a Government which would not take up women’s suffrage,
but said he would not make any pledges to the NUWSS until after Home Rule
was enacted.100 His only offer of advice was the now hackneyed exhortation
“to go on educating the country.”101

The NUWSS dealings with Lloyd George were no more productive

than those with Grey. The NUWSS was convinced that Lloyd George, for all
his double dealings over the Conciliation Bill, was a suffragist at heart and
that he could become the Liberal Lochinvar of the suffrage cause. The
problem was to paint the women’s suffrage movement in bold enough colors
to attract the fancy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and then to highlight
Lloyd George’s role in this movement in even brighter tones. This was just
what the NUWSS set out to do, and using Catherine Marshall as its
mouthpiece, it began its courtship of Lloyd George. An appeal to Lloyd
George’s ego, combined with a little flirtatious chiding, might convince
Lloyd George, as Marshall archly told him, to come out of his “tent and lead
the Women’s Suffrage Cause to Victory.”102

The courtship went on through most of 1913 and 1914, as Marshall

painstakingly worked at convincing Lloyd George that the suffrage cause was
related to the other causes he had championed, and that it could serve as a
springboard to further his political career:

… it is a movement which holds big possibilities for the future, I

think, if the right leader is forthcoming when the time is ripe for
action. It must be someone big enough to see, and to make others see,
the phenomenon of militancy in its true proportion and not allow it to
throw everyone’s judgment off its balance as it does at present,
obscuring the great fundamental principles which are at stake in our
struggle against the old enemies which have always barred the way of
progress—the spirit of monopoly and privilege (this time not of class
but of sex), the opposition of those who possess power to those who
demand liberty.
I thought at the time of your Bath speech that you were going to
be the leader whom the Suffrage movement needed—that having
successfully championed the cause of the poor, the old, and the sick,
you would turn your attention next to the cause of the unrepresented
sex, and help us to win our political liberty.103
She scolded him and his suffragist colleagues for using militancy as an
excuse to ignore the suffrage cause and urged him to supply the political
leadership which the women’s suffrage movement so badly needed:104

What disappointed us so much was that you could not offer us any
assurance of a better chance for women’s suffrage even when Home
Rule and Welsh Disestablishment are out of the way than we have had
hither to…. it is disappointing when those who have the power to
make your work bear fruit in an Act of Parliament say, in effect: “Yes,
you are good little girls, we quite approve of the way in which you
are working and the object you are working for, and our advice to you
is to go on pegging away. Don’t get tired and don’t get cross. Some
day, when we have settled all our own business, we will bring in a
Bill to give you what you want—only of course we cannot do
anything so long as some of you are naughty and throw stones.” When
we know that it is just that attitude which makes naughty ones throw
stones, we feel you are asking us to work in a vicious circle.
I often wish you were an unenfranchised woman instead of being
Chancellor of the Exchequer. With what fire you would lead the
Women’s Movement and insist the legislation was more important
than the right of those whom it concerned to have a say in it.105

Marshall urged Lloyd George to “start a really effective demand for Adult
Suffrage (which there never has been yet) at the same time as your Land
Campaign. It would be a grand programme on which to go to the country.”106

Yet these blandishments, coupled with threats that the Conservatives

were about to take up the suffrage cause and descriptions of the EFF’s
successful work with Labour, did not produce the desired impact on Lloyd
George: Lloyd George continued to be “most amiable but oh but
indefinite.”107 There are indications in Lloyd George’s papers that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer was testing the wind in the Liberal Party before
taking any action on the suffrage question, but he gave no hint of these plans
to the NUWSS.108 He informed the NUWSS that until Welsh
Disestablishment, Home Rule, and the Land Campaign were out of the way,
he could not make any promises to the suffragists. He would not make any
pronouncements on what a future Liberal Government would do for the
women, nor would he give the NUWSS any idea what role he, as a proponent
of women’s suffrage, might play in this government. His only advice to the
NUWSS was to go on educating the public to erase the blot that militancy had
placed on the suffrage cause.109 Most discouraging of all, he hinted that as
long as militancy persisted, he would never champion the women’s suffrage
cause.110

In its efforts to come to an understanding with the Liberal

Government before the next General Election, the NUWSS even went so far
as to see Asquith to plead the cause of women’s suffrage one more time.
Asquith agreed to see the suffragists, because, as he told Fawcett, her request
“has a special claim on my consideration and stands upon another footing
from similar demands proceeding from other quarters where a different
method and spirit is predominant.”111 On August 8, 1913, the Prime Minister
held a discussion on women’s suffrage with a deputation from the NUWSS.
Although he was much more polite and sympathetic to the representatives
than he had been in the past, it was clear that he had not changed his attitude.
He rebuffed Fawcett’s suggestion that he follow Wellington’s and Peel’s
example and preside over the enactment of a measure to which he was
opposed; he also ignored her appeal that he, like Lord Goschen, should
temporarily stand aside from active participation in party politics and allow
the Liberal Party to take action on the suffrage question.112 Asquith admitted
the suffragists’ position “was one of great hardship,” and acknowledged that
their work with the working class had greatly impressed him. He did not,
however, show any signs of abandoning his opposition to the enfranchisement
of women.113 Ten months later, in an interview with representatives from
Sylvia Pankhurst’s East London Federation, Asquith made it very clear that
his position on women’s suffrage had not fundamentally changed: he still
opposed the enfranchisement of women.114

On the eve of World War I, the NUWSS had not received a

commitment from either the Liberals or the Conservatives that, if chosen to
form a government, they would introduce legislation for women’s suffrage.
The Labour Party was firmly committed to the women’s cause, but there was
no possibility that the Labour Party would govern. The activities of the
NUWSS had stirred the Liberals to fear that the Conservatives might
introduce an equal terms bill, and the Conservatives to worry that the
Liberals might enfranchise women on the Dickinson basis,115 but neither
party was concerned enough about these possibilities to take preemptive
action on the suffrage question. Both the p arties stood at the edge of the
chasm, but unlike Disraeli they were afraid to take the “leap into the dark”:
the risks involved in introducing a measure for women’s suffrage seemed to
outweigh the dangers of inaction. The conundrum of women’s suffrage had
denied the Liberals the comprehensive franchise reform which they so badly
needed, but Asquith, intransigent, preferred to forgo these reforms rather than
surrender.116 A Conservative measure for women’s suffrage would
compensate for the loss of the plural voter, but Bonar Law was unwilling to
risk the wrath of curzon and other anti suffragists in the party by sponsoring a
women’s suffrage bill. Liberals and Conservatives were afraid of the
electoral repercussions of women’s suffrage, and of the divisive effect that
women’s suffrage would have within the parties. To them, women’s suffrage
was a Pandora’s Box that was best left unopened; fortunately, militancy,
public apathy, and more pressing political business—Ulster, Welsh
Disestablishment, Land Reform—all provided convenient excuses for
postponing the opening.

As the NUWSS assessed the situation at the beginning of August

1914, the best thing it could hope for at the General Election seemed to be
the return of a Liberal Government with a small majority, backed up by a
strong Labour Party demanding the enfranchisement of women. The worst
thing would be the return of a Liberal Government with a large majority, and
with Asquith as Prime Minister. The return of a Conservative Government
fell somewhere in between. The NUWSS did not like the Conservatives’
idea of a referendum, but it shrewdly thought the Liberals out of office might
come around to espousing the women’s cause.

Speculations about the General Election abruptly came to an end on

August 4, 1914, when England declared war on Germany. After two days of
meetings, the NUWSS executive decided to suspend all political activity.
The NUWSS organization was to be kept intact, but it was to be used not to
agitate for women’s suffrage, but “to help those who will be the sufferers
from the economic and industrial dislocation caused by the war.”117 Fawcett,
speaking for her colleagues, exhorted the members of the NUWSS to forget
their grievances against the Government and support the war effort: “Now is
the time for resolute effort and self-sacrifice on the part of every one of us to
help our country. Let us show ourselves worthy of citizenship whether our
claim to it be recognized or not.”118

The women’s suffrage movement had come to a sudden and

unexpected end—but in terms of legislative progress, the women’s suffrage
movement had long since lost momentum. The NUWSS had succeeded in
establishing strong roots for the suffrage cause in the labor movement and in
bringing the suffragists’ demands to the working class. Its educational and
propaganda activities had helped to quell the hostility caused by the militants
and to prove that the women’s suffrage movement was not all sensationalism.
The NUWSS had expanded the organizational basis of the suffrage
movement, and by July 1914 it included over five hundred societies.119 Over
100,000 suffragists were allied with the NUWSS—either as subscribing
members or as Friends of Women’s Suffrage—and the organization was
raising over £45,000 a year.120 The NUWSS had succeeded in establishing
good relations with many of the leading politicians and had helped to build
up suffragist sentiment within the Liberal, Labour, and Conservative parties.
Yet, although the NUWSS had done much to prepare the way for the
enactment of women’s suffrage, it had not found the catalyst that would force
Government legislation on the women’s suffrage question. World War I
proved to be the deus ex machina for the suffrage cause; paradoxically,
though it brought to an end the agitation for women’s suffrage, it released
women’s suffrage from its parliamentary limbo.

_________________

Notes
1 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1913, Circular from
Helena Auerbach and Millicent Garrett Fawcett [1913]; Proceedings of the Councils of the National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Proceedings of the Provincial Council, May 1913; Fawcett
Library, London.

2 Papers of Henry, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Bodleian Library, vol. 89 f. 47,
Proceedings of the NUWSS deputation to H. H. Asquith, August 8, 1913 (hereafter cited as Asquith
papers).
 3 An Account of the Northern Men’s Federation for Women’s Suffrage Deputation to Sir
Edward Grey, October 22, 1913, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.); Lloyd George Papers, C9/5/10,
Typescript account of a meeting between the NUWSS and the suffragist ministers, August 8, 1913.

4 Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906–1918, p. 30, discusses popular
attitudes to franchise reform in the period between 1906 and 1914.

5 Andrew Rosen, Rise Up, Women! pp. 189–90; Selborne Papers, Ms. 79, the Earl of
Selborne to the Countess of Selborne, June 14, 1914.

6 Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 193–95, discusses the public impact of militancy; see
also Philip Snowden, The Present Position of Women’s Suffrage, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.). In 1913
the NUWSS received firsthand knowledge of the public impact of militancy during its Pilgrimage for
Women’s Suffrage. Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, pp. 55–56; K. M. Harley, “The
Pilgrimage,” Englishwoman, 19 (September 1913): 254–62.

7 Richard Evans, The Feminists: Women’s Emancipation Movements in Europe, America and
Australasia (London, 1977), passim, argues that all suffrage movements, in Europe, the United States,
and Australia, changed the rationale behind their argument for the enfranchisement of women. He
contends that women’s suffrage was accepted only when it abandoned its liberal justification.

8 See, for example, editorials and articles in C. C, 1914, passim; Correspondence of the
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1913, Circular from NUWSS headquarters regarding
obtaining resolutions on women’s suffrage from trade unions [1913]; Fawcett Library, London.

9 This term is borrowed from Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage
Movement, 1890–1920, p. 45–46. See also chapter 1, note 60, and Marshall Papers, Report of the
Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the N.U.W.S.S., [October 1913]; Manchester
Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1914 (n.p., n.d.), p. 12; London Society for Women’s
Suffrage, Annual Report, 1913, p. 18.

10 Jill Liddington, “Rediscovering Suffrage History,” History Workshop 4 (1978): 196–98.

11 C. C, April 17, 1914; Labour Leader, August 28, 1913.

12 The Friends of Women’s Suffrage, no. 1 (July 1913); Correspondence of the National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1913, Circular from NUWSS headquarters regarding obtaining
resolutions on women’s suffrage from trade unions [1913], Fawcett Library, London.

13 Marshall Papers, Report of the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the
N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913].

14 Proceedings of the Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,

Proceedings of the Provincial Council, May 1913, Fawcett Library, London.
 15 Kentish Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p. 7; West Riding Federation, Annual Report,
1913 (Leeds, n.d.), pp. 15–16; West Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales Federation, Annual
Report, 1913, p. 7; Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p.11.

16 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913 (n.p., n.d.), p. 51.

17 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., September 18, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; C. C, September
12, 1913.

18 Marshall Papers, Margaret Robertson to Catherine Marshall, September 18, 1913.

Robertson wrote a very amusing account of her exploits at the Congress: “Did I tell you about the
agonies at the TUC? How the miners actually decided to vote against and I had to chase all around and
see them individually and get them to meet again and reverse it (deadly secret of course that I had
anything to do with it). That sort of thing makes the gray hairs sprout.”

19 For accounts of the NUWSS work with the miners, see the Marshall Papers, Reports of
the EFF organizers’ work [1913]; C. C, September 5, 1913.

20 C. C., October 17, 1913.

21 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 4, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; C. C, February 16,
1914. In 1912 the Miners’ Federation had opposed a similar resolution and in 1913 it had remained
neutral to it.

22 West Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales Federation, Annual Report, 1913, p. 7.

23 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 18, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Marshall Papers,
Notes on an interview with F. C. Acland, April 14, 1913; Notes on an interview with Arthur Ponsonby,
June 20, 1913.

24 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 17–18. This is
based on the estimate that was made in January 1914. The NUWSS did not issue an annual report for
1914, probably because of the war.

25 Manchester Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1914 (n.p., n.d.), p. 12;
Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 12, 47.

26 FLAC, vol. 10, Philippa Strachey to Lady St. Davids, November 3, 1913, Fawcett Library,
London; C. C., November 21, 1913; Correspondence of the London Society for Women’s Suffrage,
Report on work in the East End by Winifred Foulkes, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; London Society
for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1913, p. 18.

27 Proceedings of the Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,

Proceedings of the Provincial Council, May 1913, Fawcett Library, London; National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 14–15.
 28 See Surrey, Sussex, and Hants Federation, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 17–19; Edinburgh
National Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1914 (Edinburgh, 1913), p. 11.

29 C. C., June 20, 1913.

30 K. M. Harley, “The Pilgrimage,” Englishwoman, 19 (September 1913): 254–63;

Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 10–11; Kentish Federation, Annual
Report, 1913, pp. 12–13; Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After, pp. 54–59.

31 Asquith Papers, vol. 39 f. 47, Proceedings of the NUWSS deputation to H. H. Asquith,

August 8, 1913; Lloyd George Papers, C9/5/10, Typescript account of a meeting between the NUWSS
and the suffragist ministers, August 8, 1913; Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies, 1913, Circular from the NUWSS describing a meeting with the Rt. Hon. Reginald
McKenna, July 30, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

32 After the debacle of the Franchise Bill, the NUWSS came to believe that no private
member’s bill could pass the House of Commons. Dickinson’s bill was defeated on its second reading,
May 6, 1913, by a vote of 268 (Con. 140, Lib. 74, Nat. 54) to 221 (Cons. 28, Lib. 146, Lab. 34, Nat. 13).

33 The Welsh Home Rule Bill was introduced for its first reading March 11, 1914. It did not
receive a second reading. E. T. John (Lib., E. Denbyshire), who introduced the bill, had worked closely
with the NUWSS. NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 19 and March 19, 1914, Fawcett Library,
London. The Scottish Home Rule Bill was read a second time May 15, 1914. Closure was refused and
there was no division.

34 Lloyd George Papers, C11/1/14, Circular from Catherine Marshall, May 14, 1914, Fawcett
Library, London. For a discussion of the reasons antisuffragists could support the idea of giving women
votes for “domestic” legislatures while opposing their enfranchisement for “imperial” legislatures see
Harrison, Separate Spheres, pp. 74–76.

35 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 5 and June 5, 1913, and March 5, 1914, Fawcett Library,
London; Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Lord Strathclyde, November 26, 1913; Correspondence
of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1913, Circular from headquarters regarding the
Scottish Home Rule Bill, May 29, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies, Annual Report, 1913, p. 27.

36 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., March 19 and April 2, 1914, Fawcett Library, London; Archives
of the Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Proceedings of the Provincial Council of the NUWSS,
November 1914; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 42–43.

37 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., April 2, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

38 Proceedings of the Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,

Proceedings of the Annual Council, February 27 and 28, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; NUWSS, Ex.
com. mins., May 1, 1913, and February 19, 1914, Fawcett Library, London; South Western Federation,
Annual Report, 1914 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 6–7; Marshall Papers, the Countess of Selborne to Catherine
Marshall, October 15, 1913.

39 Marshall Papers, the Countess of Selborne to Catherine Marshall, October 18, 1913.

40 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 7, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

41 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Proceedings of the Provincial Council
of the NUWSS, November 1914.

42 Lord Willoughby de Broke, for example, supported the bill and lamented the opposition of
his former ally, Lord Ampthill, to the bill: “I am sorry that he is going to die in a different ditch from what
I am.” As quoted in C. C., May 15, 1914.

43 The Nation, May 9, 1914.

44 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Mrs. Hope, copy, June 12, 1913.

45 Catherine Marshall, “Women’s Suffrage and the Next General Election,” Englishwoman,
19 (August 1913): 125–26. The suffragists believed that the Home Rule Bill would be enacted into law
before the next General Election. Under the terms of this bill, the number of Nationalist MP’s in the
House of Commons would be substantially reduced.

46 C. C., September 26, 1913.

47 Marshall Papers: Ada Chew to Margaret Robertson, May 28, 1913; M. Hilton to Catherine
Marshall, June 21, 1913; Report of the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the
N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913]; C. C., July 18, October 10, 17, and 31, 1913; Manchester and District
Federation, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 11–14.

48 Marshall Papers, Report of the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the
N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913]; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, p.
54.

49 Proceedings of the Councils of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies,

Proceedings of the Half-Yearly Council, November 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

50 Marshall Papers: Catherine Marshall to Eleanor Acland, copy, April 25, 1913; Report of
the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913].

51 Marshall Papers, “Absolutely Confidential” Memorandum on Labour MPs [1914].

52 Marshall Papers, Report of the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the
N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913]; Manchester and District Federation, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 11–14;
NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 1, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.
 53 Marshall Papers: Catherine Marshall to Eleanor Acland, copy, April 25, 1913; Report of
the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913].

54 Marshall Papers, Report of the Election Fighting Fund to the Half-Yearly Council of the
N.U.W.S.S. [October 1913]; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp.
53–55.

55 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Francis Acland, copy, November 4, 1913. The EFF
had collected all the relevant information. See Marshall Papers, NUWSS Federation Reports on
antisuffrage Liberals, enclosed in a letter from Mary McKenzie to Catherine Marshall, April 20, [1913].

56 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 18, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

57 The N.W. Durham by-election was a real test of the NUWSS loyalty to the Labour Party
because the Liberal candidate, Aneurin Williams, was a close friend of the NUWSS. See Papers of
Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Correspondence concerning the N.W. Durham by-election, passim, Fawcett
Library, London.

58 C. C., March 20, 1914. Leith Burghs was the only constituency in which the Labour Party
had previously sponsored a candidate.

59 I bid., February 28, March 28, November 18, December 12, and December 19, 1913;
February 6, February 20, and March 6, 1914; The Election Fighting Fund: What It Has Achieved,
NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

60 The Election Fighting Fund; see also Chapter 5, Table 3.

61 The Nation, May 20, 1914.

62 P. W. Wilson, “Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics,” English-woman, 22 (April 1914): 2–

11.

63 See p. 150 above; also David Morgan, Suffragists and Liberals, pp. 128–29. The NUWSS
did not believe MacDonald would accept the EFF’s help at the General Election. See Marshall Papers,
“Absolutely Confidential” Memorandum on Labour MPs [1914].

64 Marshall Papers, Kathleen Courtney to Catherine Marshall, November 23, 1913; G. Evans
to Catherine Marshall, October 4, 1913.

65 On March 13, 1913, the Cabinet decided to proceed with the Plural Voting Bill, which was
designed to do away with the plural voting system which was thought to be beneficial to the
Conservatives. The bill was passed twice by the House of Commons but had not passed into law when
World War I began. The Labour Party supported the bill because it felt its passage would improve
Labour’s electoral fortunes. See National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913,
p. 24.
 66 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., November 20 and December 4, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.
The EFF’s reasons for not supporting the candidate were that it did not receive adequate notice to
prepare for the election and felt it would be impossible to put up an effective fight, and furthermore, that
the Labour organization in the consitutency was extremely weak. Marshall Papers, G. Evans to
Catherine Marshall, October 30, 1913.

67 Marshall Papers, “Absolutely Confidential,” Memorandum on Labour MPs [1914].

68 C. C., March 28, 1913; Christian Commonwealth, March 26, 1913. On February 14, 1914,
the NUWSS sponsored a demonstration in the Albert Hall which was attended by a number of Labour
Mp’s. Henderson spoke and complimented the NUWSS on its work. C. C., February 20, 1914.

69 C. C., February 16 and Mach 28, 1913; Electoral Reform and Women’s Suffrage, 1914–
1917, NUWSS parphet (n.d., n.p.); Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Proceedings of
the Half-Yearly Council of the NUWSS, November 1914. In 1914, the Labour Party also tried to raise
the demand for women’s suffrage in an amendment to the address in reply to the King’s Speech;
Asquith, however, moved the closure, and the opportunity was lost.

70 NUWSS, Ex. Com. Mins., June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library, London. The Taff-Vale
decision of 1901 held that a trave union could be sued for the actions of its officers and members. The
Labour Party wanted to reverse this decision.

71 Marshall Papers: Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall, November 9, 1913; Catherine

Marshall to the Countess of Selborne, copy, November 9, 1913; Catherine Marshall to the Counterss of
Selborne, copy, November 13, 1913. Lady Selborne shared the belief that an “equal terms bill” would
benefit the Conservatives. Marshall Papers, the Countess of Selborne to Catherine Marshall, October
18, 1913.

72 Both Liberals and Conservatives agreed that a moderate bill, along the lines of the
Conciliation Bill, would help the Tories at the polls. They assumed that his sort of legislation would
enfranchise upper and middle class women who would vote Conservative. Though there does not seem
to have been any foundation for this conviction, the conviction persisted. Wilson, “Women’s Suffrage
and Party Politics,”, pp. 6–7; Pugh, pp. 26–27.

73 Marshall Papers, Lord Robert Cecil to Catherine Marshall, November 19, 1913.

74 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., September 18, 1913; Correspondence of the London Society for
Women’s Suffrage, Circular from Philippa Strachey [1914]; Fawcett Library, London.

75 Law Papers, 32/4/2, Lord Robert Cecil to Andrew Bonar Law, June 4, 1914.

76 Selborne Papers, Ms. 79 f. 189, the Earl of Selborne to Lord Robert Cecil, copy, May 30,
1914.
 77 Law Papers, 24/4/91, the Countess of Selborne to Andrew Bonar Law, November 29,
1913; Selborne Papers, Ms. 79 f. 185, the Earl of Selborne to Lord Robert Cecil, copy, May 20, 1914; C.
C., March 7, 1913; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., March 6, 1913, Fawcett Library, London. Henry W.
Massingham, the Liberal journalist, had formulated this plan, probably in an effort to help the Liberal
Government deal with the conundrum of women’s suffrage.

78 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 17 and May 21, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

79 Cecil Papers, Ms. 51075, Memorandum on Women’s Suffrage by Robert Cecil, December
20 [1913]; Selborne Papers, Ms. 79 f. 179, Copy of Memorandum on Women’s Suffrage by Robert
Cecil, December 24, 1913; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 4, 1913.

80 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 17 and May 21, 1914. Pugh, p. 25, says that the NUWSS
flatly rejected the referendum proposal. This is not the case. In 1912, the NUWSS had objected to the
referendum proposal because it had something better to bank on: the Conciliation Bill. By 1914, with no
immediate prospects for women’s suffrage, the NUWSS was much more willing to consider a
referendum proposal, although it was not enthusiastic about it. See Chapter 4, pp. 128–130.

81 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Lord Robert Cecil, copy, November 24, 1913.

82 Selborne Papers, Ms. 79 f. 189, Lord Robert Cecil to the Earl of Selborne, June 1, 1914.
Militancy also damaged the fortunes of women’s suffrage within the Conservative Party. Lord Robert
Cecil testified to this when he wrote to Fawcett: “I am sorry your interview with Bonar Law was so
unsatisfactory…. But I fear it is true that as long as militancy goes on nothing can be done with the
Conservatives. … I was shocked at the kind of wild beast feeling displayed in the House during our little
Cat and Mouse Debate on Wednesday.” FLAC, vol. I, K, Lord Robert Cecil to Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, July 25, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

83 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

84 As quoted in Pugh, p. 26; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library,
London; Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Proceedings of the Half-Yearly Council of
the NUWSS, November 1914.

85 Pugh, p. 26.

86 Lloyd George Papers, Cll/1/68, Catherine Marshall to David Lloyd George, July 11, 1914.
The Daily News took this threat seriously. See the Daily News, June 15, 1914.

87 See NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., February 5, March 5, and June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library,
London.

88 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall’s notes on an interview with Arthur Ponsonby, June
20, 1913.
 89 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to the Countess of Selborne, copy, November 13,
1913.

90 Marshall Papers, Catherine Marshall to Sir John Simon, copy, August 10, 1913.

91 Marshall Papers: Notes on an interview with Francis Acland, April 14, 1913; Notes on a
planned interview with Sir Edward Grey, October 22, 1913; Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall,
November 9, 1913; Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall, October 29, 1913.

92 Much to the delight of the NUWSS, Simon was appointed Attorney-General with a seat in
the Cabinet, October 19, 1913.

93 Marshall Papers, Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall, November 9, 1913; NUWSS, Ex.
com. mins., April 2, 1914, Fawcett Library, London; J. Malcolm Mitchell, “Women’s Suffrage and the
New Liberalism,” Englishwoman, 22 (June 1914): 241–48.

94 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., May 5 and June 6, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Eleanor
Acland, “Prospects of a Government Suffrage Measure,” Englishwoman, 19 (July 1913): 7–8.

95 C. C., July 18, 1913; Marshall Papers, Eleanor Acland to Catherine Marshall, November
20, 1913; see also Chapter 5, pp. 154–55. There are no figures available on the number of members
who resigned from the NUWSS as a protest against the EFF. On the basis of the archival evidence, it
would seem that this number was not large. The Liberals do not seem to have tried to exploit the
divisions within the NUWSS over the EFF.

96 C. C., June 19, 1914; NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

97 Mitchell, “Women’s Suffrage and the New Liberalism,” p. 248. NUWSS, Ex. com. mins.,
July 3, 1913, Fawcett Library, London; Marshall Papers, Kathleen Courtney to Catherine Marshall,
November 23, 1913.

98 The most important suffragist ministers were Simon and Lloyd George. The NUWSS
believed that if one Cabinet minister came out strongly for women’s suffrage, others would follow.
Marshall Papers, Eleanor Acland to Catherine Marshall, November 20, 1913.

99 Marshall Papers, Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall, November 9, 1913.

100 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins., December 18, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

101 An Account of the Northern Men’s Federation for Women’s Suffrage Deputation to Sir
Edward Grey, October 22, 1913, NUWSS pamphlet (n.p., n.d.).

102 Lloyd George Papers, C9/4/85, Catherine Marshall to David Lloyd George, July 26, 1913.
I am indebted to Professor Bentley Gilbert for calling my attention to the Marshall letters contained in
Lloyd George’s papers.
 103 Ibid. On November 24, 1911, Lloyd George addressed the National Liberation Federation
meeting at Bath and announced his support for women’s suffrage.

104 On August 8, 1913, a deputation from the NUWSS met with a number of ministers,
including Lloyd George, Birrell, Simon, Acland, Thomas Macnamara (Sec. to the Admiralty), Thomas
McKinnon Wood (Sec. for Scotland), and J. Ellis Griffith (Under Sec. to the Home Office), to discuss
women’s suffrage. The NUWSS was extremely disappointed with the interview. See Lloyd George
Papers, C9/5/10, Typescript account of the NUWSS deputation to the suffragist ministers, August 8,
1913; Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Circular letter from Millicent Garrett Fawcett to
“Gentlemen,” August 11, 1913, Fawcett Library, London.

105 Lloyd George Papers, C9/5/13, Catherine Marshall to David Lloyd George, August 11,
1913.

106 Lloyd George Papers, C9/5/20, Catherine Marshall to David Lloyd George, August 29,
1913.

107 Lloyd George Papers, Cll/1/68, Catherine Marshall to David Lloyd George, July 11, 1914;
Marshall Papers, Francis Acland to Catherine Marshall, November 21, 1913.

108 Tne Lloyd George Papers contain memoranda which give complete information on how
Liberal MP’s voted on the women’s suffrage bills and analyze the attitude toward women’s suffrage of
those Liberal candidates who had been selected to stand at the General Election. See the Lloyd George
Papers, C17/5/26, Memorandum on Liberal MPs marked “private and confidential,” December 1913;
C17/13/27, Memorandum on Liberal Candidates marked “private and confidential,” January 1914.

109 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 33-34; Lloyd
George Papers, C9/5/10, Typescript account of the NUWSS deputation to the suffragist ministers,
August 8, 1913.

110 NUWSS, Ex. com. mins, June 18, 1914, Fawcett Library, London. Marshall’s comment
that militancy “always tended to put him in a bad mood” is an understatement. There is no question that
Lloyd George took the militants’ activities very much to heart. The militants disliked him thoroughly, and
he returned their dislike in kind. Indeed, their behavior did much to estrange him from the whole
movement, and this was a great loss to the suffrage cause. Lloyd George may have been the most
important casualty of the militant campaign.

111 Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, H. H. Asquith to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, July 31,
1913, Fawcett Library, London.

112 The Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel allowed the Catholic Emancipation Bill to
pass in 1829, though they did not approve of this measure. In 1880, Lord Goschen temporarily withdrew
from party politics because he disapproved of the enfranchisement of agricultural laborers.

113 Asquith Papers, vol. 89 f. 47, Account of the NUWSS deputation to H. H. Asquith,
August 8, 1913.
 114 Asquith Papers, vol. 39 f. 126, Account of the East London Federation of Suffragists’
deputation to H. H. Asquith, June 20, 1914. George Dangerfield and Sylvia Pankhurst have argued that
at this interview, Asquith indicated that he had seen the light on women’s suffrage. This is not the case.
In June 1914, he simply stated that if women’s suffrage was enacted, it must be done in a
“thoroughgoing and democratic way.” This was very similar to the statement he had made in opposing
the Conciliation Bill in 1910. On both these occasions, Asquith was discussing the terms on which
women should be enfranchised if they were to gain the vote; he was not showing any support for the
suffrage cause. See George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, pp. 336–38, and E.
Sylvia Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement, pp. 575–77.

115 Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50, Box 1, Proceedings of the Half-Yearly
Council of the NUWSS, November 1914.

116 For a discussion of electoral reform in the 1906–14 period see Pugh, pp. 3–46. The
Liberal Government particularly wanted to abolish the system of plural votes. It would have succeeded
in doing this had not war broken out in August 1914, preventing the passage of the Plural Voting Bill.
This stroke of fate came as a boon to the Conservatives.

117 Correspondence of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, 1914, Circular
from the NUWSS executive committee, August 6, 1914, Fawcett Library, London.

118 London Society for Women’s Suffrage, Annual Report, 1914 (n.p., n.d.), p. 11.

119 C. C., July 31, 1914.

120 February 1914, there were 98,998 suffragists allied to the NUWSS: 52,336 of these were
subscribing members. It seems reasonable to suppose that this number exceeded 100,000 by August
1914, as the NUWSS was growing at the rate of 800 new members a month, not including FWS. No
firm figures are availabale for 1914, as the NUWSS did not issue a report. National Union of Women’s
Suffrage Societies, Annual Report, 1913, pp. 17–18 and 65. Archives, Manchester Public Library, M/50,
Box 1, Proceedings of the Half-Yearly Council of the NUWSS, November 1914.
 CONCLUSION

In 1918 the Representation of the People Act became law, thereby

enfranchising women over thirty who were either householders, wives of
householders, occupiers of property worth £5 per year, or university
graduates. The long campaign for votes for women had come to an end. and
some 8,479,156 were soon to register as parliamentary electors.1

The Great War had created a climate which was, in a multitude of

ways, much more conducive to the enactment of women’s suffrage than that of
the prewar period. In order to make it possible for members of the armed
services abroad to vote, the Government was forced to revise the franchise
laws, and thereby to resurrect the dormant issue of women’s suffrage.2
Snowden’s prediction of 1913 proved prescient, and it was soon apparent
that any Fourth Reform Act would include women. The war had abetted the
women’s cause not only by compelling the Government to take up the
question of electoral reform, but also by creating a political environment
which was favorable to women’s suffrage. The establishment of a Coalition
Government in 1915 put an end to a period of party strife in which the
politicians had perceived every issue, including women’s suffrage, as a
potential pawn in the struggle for political supremacy; as the political rivalry
at Westminster became less intense, and as cabinets drawing on all parties
were formed in 1915 and 1916, compromise and cooperation became easier.
The Coalition of May 1915 was also marked by the entry of a number of
steadfast supporters of women’s suffrage into the Government: Selborne,
Cecil, and Henderson had been good friends to the suffragists in the prewar
period and were to continue to be so during the War.3 The women’s suffrage
forces within the Government were again strengthened in December 1916,
when Lloyd George replaced Asquith as Prime Minister. Although the new
Prime Minister was hardly the champion of the women’s cause, he was
certainly more sympathetic to the enactment of women’s suffrage than his
predecessor had been. Also, the cessation of militancy after war was
declared undoubtedly gave Lloyd George and other politicians an incentive
to adopt a more positive attitude to the enfranchisement of women.4
 The War also helped marshall public opinion behind the cause of
women’s suffrage. As W. C. Anderson, chairman of the National Labour
Party Executive remarked, the War shook conservatism out of people and
made change, both political and social, seem less threatening.5 The women’s
contribution to the war effort challenged the notion of women’s physical and
mental inferiority and made it more difficult to maintain that women were,
both by constitution and temperament, unfit to vote. If women could work in
munitions factories, it seemed both ungrateful and illogical to deny them a
place in the polling booth.6 But the vote was much more than simply a
reward for war work; the point was that women’s participation in the war
effort helped to dispell the fears that surrounded women’s entry into the
public arena. A revolution within the private sphere—the family—did not
accompany the upheaval within the public—the factories, transport services,
and countless other areas in which women took the place of men. Thus, the
lugubrious predictions of the opponents of women’s suffrage were not
fulfilled.

To admit, however, that the War created a climate that was

favorable to the enactment of women’s suffrage does not imply that the
prewar labors of the NUWSS were not crucial to the enfranchisement of
women. If women’s suffrage had not already achieved some importance as a
political issue, if the suffrage cause had not succeeded in establishing a
strong organizational base in the country and in attracting public support, if
the supporters of women’s suffrage had not obtained considerable backing
for their cause in Parliament and established valuable contacts with leading
politicians, women’s suffrage would not have been included in the Reform
Bill of 1918. Because of the work of the NUWSS, these conditions had been
met.

The NUWSS, through its work at Westminster and in the

constituencies, was responsible for winning both public and parliamentary
support for women’s suffrage. In the process of taking its demand to the
British public, the NUWSS created a network of suffrage organizations
throughout Britain, and for the first time in the history of the British women’s
suffrage movement, it made a concerted, national effort to attract the support
of workers and to disabuse the populace of the notion that the women’s
suffrage issue was the exclusive property of the middle and upper classes.
Through its lobbying activities in the House of Commons—in particular, its
work for the Conciliation Bill and the women’s suffrage amendments to the
Franchise Bill—the NUWSS was responsible for welding together a group
of staunch parliamentary supporters of women’s suffrage. It cultivated the
friendships of party leaders and established good relationships with a
number of very influential politicians—Simon, Grey, Dickinson, Henderson,
Selborne, Cecil, Lloyd George, and Bonar Law—and their goodwill
ultimately proved valuable in winning the enfranchisement of women.7 More
important, however, than the concrete results of the NUWSS proselytizing in
the country and in Parliament was the intangible contribution which the
NUWSS made to the progress of the women’s suffrage movement. At a time
when the activities of the militants threatened to vitiate the women’s suffrage
cause and engender hostility to the very mention of women’s suffrage, the
work of the NUWSS succeeded in keeping women’s suffrage alive as an
issue. The WSPU’s progression from demonstrations to arson spelled
potential disaster for the suffrage movement. The NUWSS was able to
counter the militants’ influence and, despite the exploits of the WSPU, to win
support, both public and parliamentary, for the cause. The fact that there was,
in August 1914, still a movement for women’s suffrage, is perhaps the
greatest accolade that can be given to the NUWSS.

The metamorphosis of the NUWSS, though not spectacular like the

burgeoning of the WSPU, was very impressive. Between 1897 and 1914 the
NUWSS underwent a remarkable evolution. From a small organization of
seventeen societies, the NUWSS in seventeen years mushroomed into a well-
organized and well-financed national union of some five hundred branches,
no longer expounding the claims for women’s suffrage based on liberal
individualist ideology but arguing for the enfranchisement of women on the
basis of expediency. It also had a practical working force, the Election
Fighting Fund, aimed at convincing the Liberal Government that it would be
politically expedient to grant votes to women.

The severing of its ties to the Liberal Party was the political
counterpart of the NUWSS decision to jettison its liberal argument for votes
for women. Though its roots still bound it in some ways to the Liberal Party,
the NUWSS in 1914 had broken its ties with the Liberals and, firmly allied to
the Labour Party, was committed to a policy designed to reduce the number
of Liberals at Westminster. Though it had for many years been satisfied to
accept whatever crumbs the politicians were willing to give to the women—
a resolution for women’s suffrage or a private member’s bill—the NUWSS
had come to demand nothing less than a Government Bill for women’s
suffrage. And when the Liberals resisted the demand, the suffragists had
proved powerful enough to prevent the franchise reform which the
Government so desired. Inadvertently and ironically, the Liberal
Government’s obduracy over the women’s suffrage issue contributed to the
demise of the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party’s failure to enact a Fourth
Reform Bill on its own terms before the War was one of the reasons for its
decline.

Despite the many changes which the NUWSS underwent between

1897 and 1914, the organization still retained an aura of Victorian middle
class respectability. This static quality was as essential to the organization’s
success in winning support for the women’s cause as were the innovations of
the NUWSS in terms of its argument and its political policy. In an age in
which the credentials of class and kinship were of paramount importance,
and conformity to a certain code of behavior was the sine qua non of social
and political acceptance, the presence of women such as Millicent Garrett
Fawcett, Lady Frances Balfour, and Catherine Marshall in the councils of the
NUWSS was reassuring to both politicians and public. These women, and
others like them who, in a less grand fashion, led the branch societies
throughout Britain, were tangible proof that politics and intellectual pursuits
did not unbalance or unsex women; their championship of the women’s
suffrage movement made the cause itself less threatening and offered one
more piece of evidence that the boundaries of the public sphere could be
redefined without altering the structure of the private sphere. It may have
been the WSPU that first attracted the attention of the country by flouting the
staid convention of Victorian womanhood, but it was the suffragists of the
NUWSS who created sympathy for the cause of women’s suffrage by
outwardly conforming to the very image which the Pankhursts and their
colleagues rejected. In this respect the militants were a valuable foil for the
suffragists and made the adherents of the NUWSS appear deceptively
reasonable and moderate.
 The enfranchisement of women in 1918 was a somewhat tardy
epilogue to the prewar tale of the NUWSS as an organization fighting for
votes for women. The NUWSS nurtured the suffrage cause and injected
vitality into the suffrage movement—by giving it an organizational base, by
cultivating political friendships, by pursuing a variety of propagandistic
activities, by sheer hard work. It created an image of decency and fairness
which all men and women could respond to. Had it not been for its activitites
in the prewar years, the Representation of the People Act of 1918 might well
not have included votes for women.

_____________________

Notes
1 H. C. Deb. 4s, vol. 117, July 9, 1919, c. 1947. In 1928 the voting age for women was
lowered from thirty to twenty-one, and women were enfranchised on the same straightforward
residence qualification as men.

2 The existing law required male householders to have occupied a dwelling for at least one
year prior to the July 15 preceding an election; this resulted in the disenfranchisement of most soldiers
and sailors.

3 The Earl of Selborne became president of the Board of Agriculture; Lord Robert Cecil
became Minister of Blockade; and Arthur Henderson became president of the Board of Education.

4 On August 13, 1914, Emmeline Pankhurst suspended militancy for the duration of the War.
Andrew Rosen, Rise Up, Women! p. 248.

5 Marshall Papers, Report of a Meeting of Members of the NUWSS Executive Committee

with W. C. Anderson, August 13, 1915. This meeting with Anderson was held to discuss relations
between the NUWSS and the Labour Party. Martin Pugh, says that "after the outbreak of war the
National Union came to believe that it was tied to a declining force in the Labour Party and withdrew
from the alliance." This was not the case. See Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906–1918, p.
28.

6 For a discussion of women’s work in the war see Arthur Marwick, The Deluge; British
Society and the First World War (New York, 1965), pp. 87–94.

7 Sir John Simon, Sir Edward Grey, and W. H. Dickinson were members of the Speaker’s
Conference which was in charge of drafting a new measure of electoral reform. The conference met
from October 1916, to January 1917. The NUWSS was apprised of the conference’s thoughts on
women’s suffrage. See Papers of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Memorandum on a conference held with
Sir John Simon, W. H. Dickinson, and Henry Nevinson, December 15, 1916, Fawcett Library, London.
APPENDIX
 APPENDIX A

NATIONAL UNION OF WOMEN–S SUFFRAGE SOCIETIES:

NUMBER OF SOCIETIES — 1907–1913

________
Source: NUWSS Annual Reports, 1907–1913
 APPENDIX B

NATIONAL UNION OF WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE SOCIETIES

MEMBERSHIP — 1907–1913

________
Source: NUWSS Annual Reports, 1907–1913
 APPENDIX C

NATIONAL UNION OF WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE SOCIETIES:

ANNUAL RECEIPTS*— 1907–1913

__________
* - Annual receipts do not include receipts of the literature department and the Election Fighting
Fund. These figures are only for headquarters and do not include receipts of branch societies

Source: NUWSS Annual Reports, 1907–1913

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 (At the time the research for this study was done, the Fawcett
Library was located at 27 wilfred Street, London. The entire contents of the
Library have since been moved to the City of London Polytechnic. Thus,
some of the sources cited in this dissertation may have been recatalogued or
reclassified.
The Papers of Andrew Bonar Law and Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor
have been moved from the Beaverbrook Library to the House of Lords
Record Office.)

PRIMARY SOURCES

I. Manuscripts and Archives

A. Private Papers
Maud Arncliffe-Sennett Collection (British Museum, London).
Arthur, 1st Earl of Balfour Papers (British Museum, London).
Teresa Billington-Greig Papers (Fawcett Library, London).
Andrew Bonar Law Papers (Beaverbrook Library, London).
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman Papers (British Museum, London).
Robert, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers (British Museum, London).
Emily Davies Papers (Fawcett Library, London).
Emily Davies Papers (Girton College, Cambridge).
Dame Millicent Garrett Fawcett Papers (Fawcett Library, London).
Dame Millicent Garrett Fawcett Papers (Manchester Public Library, Manchester).
Herbert, Viscount Gladstone Papers (British Museum, London).
Edward, Viscount Grey of Falloden Papers (Public Record Office, London).
George Lansbury Papers (British Library of Political and Economic Science, London).
Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers (Beaverbrook Library, London).
Reginald McKenna Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge).
Catherine Marshall Papers (Cumbria County Record Office, Carlisle, Cumberland).
Laura Puffer Morgan Papers (Schlesinger Library, Cambridge, Mass.).
Henry WOodd Nevinson Journals (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
William waldegrave Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford).
C. P. Scott Papers (British Museum, London).
Jane, Lady Strachey Papers (Fawcett Library, London).
B. Archival Collections
Central National Society for Women’s Suffrage Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
Central Society for WOmen’s Suffrage Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
Fawcett Library Autograph Collection (Fawcett Library, London).
Hitchin, Stevenage, and District Society for Women’s Suffrage Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
Labour Party Archive (Transport House, London).
London Society for Women’s Suffrage Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
Oldham Women’s Suffrage Society Archive (Fawcett Library, London).
State Archives (Public Record Office, London):
1. Cabinet Papers: CAB 37, 41.
2. Home Office Papers, Series 45.
Suffragette Fellowship Papers (London Museum, London).
Women’s Suffrage Collection Archive (Manchester Public Library, Manchester).

II. Printed Materials of Women’s Suffrage Organizations

(All items are located in the Fawcett Library, London, unless otherwise noted.)

A. Collections of Materials
Cavendish Bentinck Collection.
Helen Blackburn Collection (Girton College, Cambridge).

B. Individual Reports, Leaflets

and Pamphlets
Actresses’ Franchise League. Annual Report, 1913.
Artists’ Suffrage League. Annual Reports, 1909–1911.
Bristol and West of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Report, 1899–1900.
Central and East of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1898–1900.
Central and Western Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1898–1900.
Central Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1889–1897.
Centra National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1889–1897.
Central Society for WOmen’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1901–1906.
Clapham Women’s Social and Political Union. Annual Report, 1913.
Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Association. Miscellaneous leaflets (British Museum,
London).
East Midland Federation. Annual Reports, 1911–1913.
Edinburgh National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1903, 1907, 1913–1914.
Forward Suffrage Union o f the Women’s Liberal Federation. Annual Report, 1911 (Cumbria County
Record Office, Carlisle, Cumberland).
Hitchin, Stevenage and District Society. Annual Reports, 1912–1914.
Jewish League for Woman Suffrage. Annual Report, 1913–1914.
Kentish Federation. Annual Report, 1913.
Lancashire and Cheshire Women’s Suffrage Society, Lancashire and Cheshire Women Textile Workers’
Committee, Manchester and Salford Women’s Trade and Labour Council. Joint Report of
Women’s Suffrage Work, 1905–1906.
Leeds Woman’s Suffrage Association. Report on the Conference of the International Woman’s
Suffrage Alliance held at Copenhagen, August 1906.
Leicester and Leicestershire Women’s Suffrage Society. Annual Report, 1912.
London National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Report, 1869.
London Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1907–1915.
Manchester and District Federation. Annual Reports, 1911–1917 (Manchester Public Library,
Manchester).
Manchester National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1868–1896 (Manchester Public
Library, Manchester).
Manchester Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1912–1914 (Manchester Public Library,
Manchester).
Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Report, 1912.
Men’s Political Union for Women’s Enfranchisement. Annual Report, [1910–1911].
National Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1872–1888.
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. Annual Reports, 1898, 1900, 1905–1913, 1915–1918.
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. Miscellaneous pamphlets and leaflets.
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. Scrap Book of Notices and Meetings, 1909–1913.
New Constitutional Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1910–1912.
North and East Ridings Federation. Annual Report, 1911–1912.
North Hertfordshire Society. Annual Report, 1909–1910.
North of England Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Reports, 1898–1911 (Manchester Public
Library, Manchester).
North–Eastern Federation of Women’s Suffrage Societies. Annual Report, 1912.
North–Eastern Society for Women’s Suffrage. Annual Report, 1909.
North–Western Federation. Annual Report, 1910–1911.
Petersfield Woman’s Suffrage Society. Annual Report, 1912.
South Western Federation. Annual Report, 1914.
Surrey, Sussex, and Hants Federation. Annual Reports, 1911–1913.
West Lancashire, West Cheshire, and North Wales Federation. Annual Reports, 1912–1913.
West Midland Federation. Annual Reports, 1911–1913.
West Riding Federation. Annual Reports, 1912–1913.
Women’s Emancipation Union. Annual Reports, 1892, 1894, 1896, 1899.
Women’s Freedom League. Annual Reports, 1907–1908, 1910–1911.
Women’s Freedom League. Miscellaneous pamphlets and leaflets.
Women’s Social and Political Union. Annual Reports, 1907–1914.
Women’s Social and Political Union. Miscellaneous pamphlets and leaflets.

III. Official Papers

Great Britain, Parliament. Journals of the House of Lords (1900–1914).
Great Britain, Parliament. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 4th and 5th series (1892–1919).

IV. Directories, Reference Works, and Year Books

Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage. London, 1911.
Calendar for 1898 with Women’s Suffrage Directory. Ed. Helen Blackburn. Bristol, 1897.
The Dictionary of Labour Biography. Eds. Joyce M. Bellamy and John Saville. London, 1972–1974.
The Dictionary of National Biography. London, 1901, 1908, 1912, 1937, 1949.
Pod’s Parliamentary Companion. London, 1881–1914.
Girton College Register, 1869–1946. Eds. R. T. Butler and H. I. MeMorran. Cambridge, 1948.
Lady Margaret Hall Register, 1897–1952. Ed. Christine Anson, n.p., 1955.
Somerville College Register, 1879–1959. Oxford, 1961.
The Suffrage Annual and Women’s Who’s Who. Ed. A. J. R. London, 1913.

V. Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals

(Rather than list the individual articles already cited in the
footnotes, I have listed only the periodicals in which they appeared.)

A. Dailies
Daily Chronicle. London, 1897–1914.
Daily Citizen. Manchester, 1912–1914.
Daily Express. London, 1900–1914.
Daily Mail. London, 1897–1914.
Daily Telegraph. London, 1897–1914.
Manchester Guardian. Manchester, 1897–1914.
Pall Mall Gazette, London, 1897–1914.
Standard. London, 1897–1914.
The Times. London, 1897–1914.

B. Weeklies and Monthlies

Christian Commonwealth. London, 1906–1914.
Common Cause. Manchester and London, 1909–1915.
Conservative and Unionist Women’s Franchise Review. London, 1909–1915.
Contemporary Review. London, 1866–1914.
Edinburgh Review Edinburgh, 1860–1914.
Englishwoman. London, 1909–1915.
Englishwoman’s Journal. London, 1858–1864.
Englishwoman’s Review. London, 1866–1910.
Fortnightly Review. London, 1865–1914.
I. L. P. News. London, 1897–1903.
Labour Leader. London, 1900–1904.
The Nation. London, 1907–1914.
National Review. London, 1883–1914.
Nineteenth Century. London, 1877–1914.
Quarterly Review. London, 1870–1914.
Queen. London, 1900–1914.
Review of Reviews. London, 1900–1914.
Suffragette. London, 1912–1914.
Victoria Magazine. London, 1863–1880.
Vote. London, 1909–1914.
Votes for Women. London, 1907–1914.
Westminster Review. London, 1860–1914.
White Ribbon. London, 1896–1914.
Woman’s Signal. London, 1895–1898.
Women’s Franchise. London, 1907–1909.
Women’s National Liberal Association Quarterly Leaflet. London, 1895–1910.
Women’s Suffrage. London, May–September, 1907.
Women’s Suffrage Journal. London, 1870–1890.
Women’s Suffrage Record. London, 1903–1906.

VI. Contemporary Books, Memoirs, Letters, etc.

The Amberley Papers. 2 vols. Eds. Bertrand and Patricia Russell. London: Hogarth Press, 1937.
Anderson, Louisa Garrett. Elizabeth Garrett Anderson, 1886–1917. London: Faber and Faber, 1939.
Balfour, Lady Frances. Ne Obliviscaris; Pinna Forget. 2 vols. London: Hodder and Stoughton, [1930].
Billington –Greig, Teresa. The Militant Suffrage Movement. London: Frank Palmer, 1912.
Black, Clementina. A New Way of Housekeeping. London: W. Collins Sons, 1918.
——. Married Women’s Work: Being the Report of an Enquiry Undertaken by the Women’s Industrial
Council. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1915.
——. A Handbook for Women Engaged in Social and Political Work. London: Edward Stanford, 1895.
——. Record of Women’s Suffrage. London: Williams & Norgate, 1902.
Brockway, A. Fenner. Inside the Left: Thirty Years of Platform, Press, Prison, and Parliament. London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1942.
Butler, Josephine E. Personal Reminiscences of a Great Crusade. London: Horace Marshall & Son,
1911.
The Case for Women’s Suffrage. Ed. Brougham Villiers. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907.
Cecil of Chelwood, Viscount. All the Way. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949.
Chamberlain, Austen. Politics from Inside. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.
Courtney, Kate. Extracts from a Diary During the War. London: Privately printed, 1927.
Davies, Emily. Thoughts on Some Questions Relating to Women, 1860–1908. Cambridge: Bowes and
Bowes, 1910.
Drake, Barbara. Women in Trade Unions. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1920.
Dugdale, Blanche E. C. Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour. 2 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1937.
——. Family Homespun. London: John Murray, 1940.
Fawcett, Henry, and Millicent Garrett Fawcett. Essays and Lectures on Social and Political Subjects.
London: Macmillan & Co., 1872.
Fawcett, Millicent Garrett. Political Economy for Beginners. London: Macmillan & Co., 1870.
——. Some Eminent Women of Our Times: Short Biographical Sketches. London: Macmillan, 1889.
——. What I Remember. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1924.
——. Women’s Suffrage: A Short History of a Great Movement. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1912.
——. The Women’s Victory and After: Personal Reminiscences, 1911–1918. London: Sidgwick &
Jackson, 1920.
Fawcett, Millicent Garrett, and E. M. Turner. Josephine Butler: Her Work and Principles and Their
Meaning for the Twentieth Century. London: Association for Moral & Social Hygiene, 1927.
Ford, Isabella Ormston. Industrial Women and How to Help Them. London: Humanitarian League,
[1900].
Ford, Isabella Ormston. Women and Socialism. London: Independent Labour Party, 1904.
Haldane, Richard B. An Autobiography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929.
Hamilton, Mary Agnes. Arthur Henderson. London: William Heinemann, 1938.
Hammond, J. L. C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1934.
Housman, Laurence. The Unexpected Years. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1936.
Journals of Lady Knightley of Fawsley. Ed. Julia Cartwright. London: John Murray, 1915.
Kenney, Annie. Memoirs of a Militant. London: Edward Arnold, 1924.
Lansbury, George. My Life. London: Constable, 1928.
Letters of Constance Lyttbn. Ed. Lady Betty Balfour. London: William Heinemann, 1925.
Linton, Elizabeth Lynn. Modern Women and What Is Said of Them. New York: J. S. Redfield, 1870.
Lowther, James W. A. Speaker’s Commentaries. 2 vols. London: Edward Arnold, 1925.
McKenna, Stephen. Reginald McKenna, 1863–1943. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948.
McLaren, Eva. The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement in the Women’s Liberal Federation,
n.p.: Women’s Liberal Federation, 1903.
McLaren, Lady. The Women’s Charter of Rights and Liberties. 4th ed. London: Grant Richards, [1909].
MacDonald, J. Ramsay. Margaret Ethel MacDonald. 3rd ed. London: Hodder & Stoughton, [1913].
Markham, Violet. Return Passage. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.
Martindale, Hilda. From One Generation to Another, 1839–1944. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1944.
Mason, Bertha. The Story of the Women’s Suffrage Movement. London: Sherratt & Hughes, 1912.
Metcalfe, A. E. Woman’s Effort. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1917.
Mill, John Stuart. The Subjection of Women. Intro, by Wendell Robert Carr. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1970.
Mill, John Stuart, and Harriet Taylor Mill. Essays on Sex Equality. Ed. and with an intro. by Alice S.
Rossi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Mitchell, Hannah. The Hard Way Up. London: Faber, 1968.
Montefiore, Dora. From a Victorian to a Modern. London: E. Archer, 1927.
Nevinson, Henry Woodd. More Changes, More Chances. London: Nisbet & Co., 1925.
Nevinson, Margaret Wynne. Fragments of Life. London: George Allen & Unwin, [1922].
Nevinson, Margaret Wynne. Life’s Fitful Fever: A Volume of Memories. London: A. C Black, 1926.
Oxford and Asquith, Countess of. The Autobiography of Margot Asquith. 2 vols. London: Thornton
Butterworth, 1922.
Oxford and Asquith, Countess of. More Memories. London: Cassell, 1933.
Oxford and Asquith, Earl of. Fifty Years of Parliament. 2 vols. London: Cassell, 1926.
——. Memories and Reflections, 1852–1927. 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1928.
Pankhurst, Christabel. Unshackled: The Story of How We Won the Vote. London: Hutchinson, 1959.
Pankhurst, E. Sylvia. The Life of Emmeline Pankhurst. London: T. Werner Laurie, 1935.
——. The Suffragette. New York: Sturgis Walton, 1911.
——. The Suffragette Movement: An Intimate Account of Persons and Ideals. London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1913.
Pankhurst, Emmeline. My Own Story. London: Eveleigh Nash, 1914.
Pethick-Lawrence, Emmeline. My Part in a Changing World. London: Victor Gollancz, 1938.
Pethick-Lawrence, F. W. Fate Has Been Kind. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1943.
Prison Letters of Constance Markievicz: Also Poems and Articles Relating to Easter Week by Eva
Gore-Booth and a Biographical Sketch by Esther Roper. London: Longmans Green & Co.,
1934.
Richardson, Mary R. Laugh a Defiance. London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953.
Sharp, Evelyn. Unfinished Adventures: Selected Reminiscences from an Englishwoman’s Life. London:
John Lane, 1933.
Simon, Rt. Hon. Viscount. Retrospect. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1952.
Smyth, Ethel. Female Pipings in Eden. London: P. Davies, 1933.
Snowden, Ethel. The Feminist Movement. London: Collins, 1913.
Snowden, Philip Viscount. An Autobiography. 2 vols. London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1934.
Spender, J. A., and Cyril Asquith. Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith. 2 vols.
London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932.
Stephen, Sir Leslie. Life of Henry Fawcett. 2nd ed. London: Smith, Elder, 1885.
Stevenson, Frances. Lloyd George: A Diary. Ed. A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Stocks, Mary D. Eleanor Rathbone. London: Victor Gollancz, 1949.
Stocks, Mary D. My Commonplace Book. London: Peter Davies, 1970.
Strachey, Ray. The Cause: A Short History of the Women’s Movement in Great Britain. London: G.
Bell & Sons, 1928.
Strachey, Ray. Millicent Garrett Fawcett. London: John Murray, 1931.
Swanwick, Helena M. The Future of the Women’s Movement. London: Bell & Sons, 1913.
Swanwick, Helena M. I Have Been Young. London: Victor Gollancz, 1935. Trevelyan, Janet Penrose.
The Life of Mrs. Humphrey Ward. London: Constable & Co., 1923.
The Woman Question in Europe. Ed. Theodore Stanton. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1884.
Women and the Labour Party. Ed. Marion Phillips. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920.
Wright, Sir Almroth. The Unexpurgated Case Against Women’s Suffrage. London: Constable, 1913.

VII. Contemporary Novels, Plays, Poems

Barrie, Sir James M. “The Twelve-Pound Look.” Contemporary One-Act Plays. Ed. B. Roland Lewis.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1922.
Black, Clementina. The Agitator. New York: Harper & Bros., 1895.
——. The Princess Desoree. London: Longmans & Co., 1896.
——. A Sussex Idyl. London: Samuel Tinsley, 1877.
Fawcett, Millicent Garrett. Janet Doncaster. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1875.
Ford, Isabella Ormston. Miss Blake of Monkshelton. London: John Murray, 1890.
Gissing, George. The Odd Women. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971.
Gore-Booth, Eva. Poems of Eva Gore-Booth. Intro. Esther Roper. London: Longmans Green, 1929.
Grand, Sarah. The Heavenly Twins. 3 vols. London: W. Heinemann, 1893.
Shaw, George Bernard. Mrs. Warren’s Profession. London: Constable & Co., 1927.
Wells, H. G. Ann Veronica. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1909.

SELECTED SECONDRY SOURCES

I. Books
Askwith, Betty. The Lytteltons. London: Chatto & Windus, 1975.
——. Two Victorian Families. London: Chatto & Windus, 1971.
Banks, J. A. Prosperity and Parenthood: A Study of Family Planning Among the Victorian Middle
Classes. London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1954.
Banks, J. A., and Olive Banks. Feminism and Family Planning in Victorian England. Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 1964.
Best, Geoffrey. Mid-Victorian Britain, 1851–75. St. Albans: Panther Books, 1973.
Blake, Robert. The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970.
——. The Unknown Prime-Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858–1923. London:
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955.
Blewett, Neal. The Peers, the Parties, and the People: The British General Elections of 1910. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1972.
Branca, Patricia. Silent Sisterhood: Middle-Class Women in the Victorian Home. London: Croom Helm,
1975.
Briggs, Asa. The Making of Modern England, 1783–1867: The Age of Improvement. New York:
Harper & Row, 1965.
Brittain, Vera. Pethick-Lawrence: A Portrait. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963.
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. Uncle of Europe. London: Collins. 1975.
Butler, David, and Jennie Freeman. British Political Facts, 1900–1968. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1969.
Churchill, Randolph S. Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2: 1901–1914. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967.
——. Winston S. Churchill. Companion vol. 2, Part 3. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967.
Clarke, P. F. C. Lancashire and the New Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Cross, Colin. The Liberals in Power, 1905–1914. London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1963.
——. Philip Snowden. London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1966.
Dangerfield, George. The Strange Death of Liberal England. New York: Capricorn Books, 1961.
Davidoff, Leonore. The Best Circles: Women and Society in Victorian England. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1973.
Emy, H. V. Liberals, Radicals, and Social Politics, 1892–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973.
Ensor, R. C K. England 1870–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Evans, Richard J. The Feminists: Women’s Emancipation Movements in Europe, America, and
Australasia. London: Croom Helm, 1977.
Fulford, Roger. Votes for Women. London: Faber and Faber, 1957.
Grigg, John. The Yound Lloyd George. London: Eyre Methuen, 1973.
Grimshaw, Patricia. Women’s Suffrage in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1972.
Halèvy, Elie. A History of the English People. Epilogue: vol. 2. London: Ernest Benn, 1934.
Hamer, D. A. Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
Harrison, Brian. Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England, 1815–1872. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1871.
——. Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain. London: Croom Helm, 1978.
Holroyd, Michael. Lytton Strachey: A Biography. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971.
Houghton, Walter E. The Victorian Frame of Mind. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
Hynes, Samuel. The Edwardian Turn of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
Jenkins, Roy. Asquith: Portrait of a Man and an Era. New York: Chilmark Press, 1964.
——. Mr. Balfour’s Poodle. London: Heinemann, 1954.
Jones, Thomas. Lloyd George. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.
Kamm, Josephine. Rapiers and Battleaxes. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966.
Koss, Stephen E. Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press,
1969.
Kraditor, Aileen S. The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965.
Lutzker, Edythe. Edith Pechey-Phipson, M.D.: The Story of England’s Foremost Pioneering Woman
Doctor. New York: Exposition Press, 1973.
McCormick, Donald. The Mask of Merlin: A Critical Study of David Lloyd George. London:
Macdonald, 1963.
Mackenzie, Midge. Shoulder to Shoulder. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.
Magnus, Philip. King Edward the Seventh. London: J. Murray, 1964.
Manton, Jo. Elizabeth Garrett Anderson. New York: Dutton, 1965.
Marquand, David. Ramsay MacDonald. London: Jonathan Cape, 1977.
Marwick, Arthur. The Deluge: British Society and the First World War. New York: W. W. Norton &
Co., 1965.
Matthew, H. C. G.The Liberal Imperalists: The Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973.
Mitchell, David J. The Fighting Pankhursts: A Study in Tenacity. London: Jonathan Cape, 1967.
——. Queen Christabel: A Biography of Christabel Pankhurst. London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977.
Morgan David. Suffragists and Liberals: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in England. Totowa, N. J.:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1975.
Newsome, Stella. The Women’s Freedom League, 1907–1957. London: n.p., 1958.
O’Neill, William L. The Woman Movement: Feminism in the United States and England. London: Allen
& Unwin, 1969.
Pelling, Henry. A Short History of the Labour Party. London: Macmillan, 1961.
Pétrie, Glenn. A Singular Iniquity. New York: Viking Press, 1971.
Playne, Caroline E. The Pre-War Mind in Britain. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1928.
Postgate, Raymond. The Life of George Lansbury. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1951.
Pugh, Martin. Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906–1918. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1978.
Raeburn, Antonia. The Militant Suffragettes. London: New English Library, 1974.
Ramelson, Marion. The Petticoat Rebellion: A Century of Struggle for Women’s Rights. London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1967.
Read, Donald. Edwardian England, 1901–15. London: Harrap, 1972.
Robb, Janet Henderson. The Primrose League, 1883–1906. New York: Columbia University Press,
1942.
Robbins, Keith. The Abolition of War: The Peace Movement in Britain During the First World War.
Cardiff: University of Wales, 1976.
——. Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Falloden. London: Cassell & Co., 1971.
Roberts, Charles. The Radical Countess: The History of the Life of Rosalind Countess of Carlisle.
Carlisle: Steel Bros., 1962.
Rose, Kenneth. The Later Cecils. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975.
——. Superior Person: A Portrait of Curzon and His Circle in Late Victorian England. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
Rover, Constance. Love, Morals and Feminism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
——. The Punch Book of Womens Rights. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1970.
——. Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Great Britain, 1866–1914. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1967.
Rowbotham, Sheila. Hidden from History. New York: Vintage, 1976.
Rowland, Peter. The Last Liberal Governments: The Promised Land, 1906–1910. London: Barrie &
Rockliff, 1968.
——. The Last Liberal Government: Unfinished Business, 1911–1914. London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1971.
Sanders, Charles Richard. The Strachey Family, 1588–1932. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press,
1953.
Scally, Robert J. The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialsim, 1900–
1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Soldon, Norbert C. Women in British Trade Unions: 1874–1976. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1978.
Speaight, Robert. Hilaire Belloc. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Cudahy, 1957.
Van Voris, Jacqueline. Constance de Markievicz. Old Westbury, N. Y.: Feminist Press, 1972.
White, Cynthia L. Women’s Magazines, 1693–1968. London: Joseph, 1970.
Zebel, Sydney H. Balfour: A Political Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

II. Articles
Blewett, Neal. “The Franchise in the United Kingdom, 1885–1918.” Past and Present, XI (1968), 95–
124.
DuBois, Ellen. “The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement: Notes Toward the Reconstruction
of Nineteenth-Century Feminism.” Feminist Studies, III (1975), 63–71.
Hale, T. F. “F. W. Pethick-Lawrence and the Suffragettes.” Contemporary Review, 225 (August 1974),
83–89.
Harrison, Brian. “State Intervention and Moral Reform in Nineteenth-Century England.” In Pressure
from Without in Early Victorian England. Ed. Patricia Hollis. London: Edward Arnold, 1974.
Hollis, Patricia. “Pressure from Without: An Introduction.” In Pressure from Without in Early Victorian
England. Ed. Patricia Hollis. London: Edward Arnold, 1974.
Horne, Grenda. “The Liberation of British and American Women’s History.” Bulletin of the Society for
the Study of Labour History, XXVI (1973), 28–39.
Jacoby, Robin Miller. “Feminism and Class Consciousness in the British and American Women’s Trade
Union Leagues, 1890–1925”. In Liberating Women’s History. Ed. Berenice A. Carroll. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1976.
Kanner, S. Barbara. “The Women o f England in a Century of Social Change, 1815–1914: A Select
Bibliography.” In Suffer and Be Still. Ed. Martha Vicinus. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1973.
Liddington, Jill. “Rediscovering Suffrage History.” History Workshop, 4 (1978): 192–202.
Martin, David. “Land Reform.” In Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England. Ed. Patricia
Hollis. London: Edward Arnold, 1974.
Millett, Kate. “The Debate Over Women: Ruskin vs. Mill.” In Suffer and Be Still. Ed. Martha Vicinus.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
Morgan, K. O. “Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908–16.” English Historical Review, LXXXV (1970), 502–
531.
Neale, R. S. “Working Class Women and Women’s Suffrage.” In Class and Ideology in the Nineteenth
Century. Ed. R. S. Neale. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.
Pugh, Martin. “The Politicians and the Women’s Vote, 1914–1918.” History, LIX (1974), 358–374.
Robson, A. P. W. “The Founding of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, 1866–1867.” Canadian
Journal of History (1973), no. 1: 1–22.
Weeks, Jeffrey. “The Women’s Movement.” Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History,
XXIX (1974), 55–59.
Weston, Corinne Comstock. “The Liberal Leadership and the Lords’ Veto, 1907–1910.” Historical
Journal, XI (1968), 508–537.
Wilson, Alexander. “The Suffrage Movement.” In Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England.
Ed. Patricia Hollis. London: Edward Arnold, 1974.

III. Unpublished Theses, Dissertations, and Manuscripts

Claus, Ruth Freeman. “Militancy in the English and American Woman Suffrage Movements.” Ph.D.
diss., Yale University, 1975.
Currell, Melville E. “Women in Politics.” Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 1965.
Jones, Donald J. “The Asquith Cabinet and Woman’s Suffrage, 1908–1914.” M.A. thesis, Memorial
University of Newfoundland, 1972.
Leventhal, Fred. “The Conciliation Committee.” Unpub. ms. Rosen, Andrew. “Emily Davies and the
Women’s Movement, 1862–1867.” Unpub. ms.
Walkowitz, Judith R. “We Are Not Beasts of the Field: Prostitution and the Campaign Against the
Contagious Diseases Acts, 1869–1886.” Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 1974.
INDEX
Acland, Eleanor, 215–16
Acland, Francis D., 175 n.127, 188, 197, 210, 215, 216–17, 218 n.104
Ampthill, Lord, 202 n.42
Anderson, Elizabeth Garrett, 7, 8 n.25
Anderson, Louisa Garrett, 53 n.89, 123 n.112
Anderson, W. C., 164, 225
Arnold, S., 161
Ashford, Mrs., 12 n.40
Arncliffe-Sennett, Maud, 32 n.17, 49, 115, 177
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 26, 43–47, 49, 52 n.85, 54, 58, 59 n.107, 61f, 64, 68, 73–76, 77 n.59, 82–92
passim, 96–101 passim, 106–7, 108f, 113–28 passim, 134, 140, 171, 172 n.123, 179–88 passim, 192,
199, 216, 220ff, 224
Asquith, Margot, 128, 131f
Atherly-Jones, L. A., 206

Baker, Harold, 158

Balfour, Arthur James, 38 n.37, 70, 84, 210, 214
Balfour, Lady Betty, 38 n.37, 67 n.21, 141 n.183
Balfour, Lady Frances, 11, 12 n.40, 14, 34, 38 n.37, 49–54 passim, 58, 64, 71, 84–85, 87, 92, 105, 131f,
134, 181 n.155, 227
Bamford-Slack, 23–24 n.80
Bamford-Slack, Lady, 74 n.47
Barnes, G. N., 209
Bartley, Sir George, 41 n.45
Bates, Colonel, 38
Baxter, Marie Louise, 7 n.24, 12 n.40
Beauchamp, Earl, 128 n.128
Becker, Lydia, 2ff, 9, 14, 20, 67 n.21
Beddoe, Mrs., 12 n.40
Begg, Faithful F., 5
Bell, J. N., 206
Belloc, Hilaire, 93
Bentham, G. J., 175 n.127
Best, Geoffrey, 13 n.42
Bigg, Miss, 12 n.40
Birrell, Augustine, 68 n.25, 71, 88, 91f, 99, 107, 128 n.128, 167, 218 n.104
Black, Clementina, 75 n.50
Blackburn, Helen, 12
Blair, Reginald, 166 n.l02
Blake, Robert, 151
Blewett, Neal, 63 n.9
Bonar Law, Andrew, 125, 169, 185 n.168, 210f, 213, 221, 226
Brailsford, H. N., 64–74, 76–78, 80, 82 n.73, 84, 85 n.85, 86f, 88 n.99–n100, 89–99 passim, 100 n.10,
101–106 passim, 111–30 passim, 135–41 passim, 146, 147–48, 155–56, 157, 167f, 172, 175 n.128,
 191
Brailsford, Jane, 64, 65 n.12
Bright, Jacob, 12
Bright, John, 12, 25 n.86
Broadly Reid, Mrs., 12 n.40, 74 n.47
Brown, R., 161
Bryant, Sophie, 75 n.50
Bulley, Arthur, 62
Burgoyne, Alan, 132–33
Burns, John, 43 n.53, 91, 128 n.128
Butler, Josephine, 12, 32 n.17
Buxton, Sydney, 26, 43 n.53, 128 n.128

Cameron, R., 206

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 24–26, 35 n.30, 44
Carson, Sir Edward, 169, 201
Catt, Carrie Chapman, 155
Cecil, Lady Eleanor, 126–27
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 104, 106
Cecil, Lord Robert, 126f, 129, 138, 145 n.7, 175–80 passim, 184–85, 210–14 passim, 224, 226
Chamberlain, Austen, 115, 128, 133
Chaplin, Sir Henry, 39–40
Chew, Ada Nield, 195
Churchill, Winston, 61f, 68 n.25, 71, 81–82, 83f, 91, 101, 109, 115, 117, 128–29, 130f, 137, 169, 182
Clynes, J. R., 204
Cobden Sanderson, Anne, 30 n.9
Cooke, Mrs. Russell, 12 n.40
Cooper, Selina, 195
Corbett-Ashby, Margery, 9 n.30, 43 n.56, 79 n.64, 154 n.49, 155 n.52, 216
Courtney, Kathleen D., 41 n.47, 115, 130, 134, 141, 147f, 167f, 188
Cowell, Alice Garrett, 8 n.25
Craig, E. Y., 161
Cromer, First Earl of, 213
Curran, Pete, 38
Currie, G. W., 206
Curzon, Lord, 201, 211, 221

Dale, Mrs. Hylton, 53 n.89

Dangerfield, George, 221 n.114
Davies, Emily, 25, 73, 75 n.50, 155 n.52
DeBroke, Lord Willoughby, 202 n.42
De la Warr, Muriel, Countess, 157
Denman, Richard, 87
Despard, Charlotte, 80 n.65
Dickinson, Willoughby H., 34–35, 37, 42 n.52, 99, 172–77 passim, 184f, 190 n.190, 199, 215, 226
Dilke, Sir Charles, 23–24 n.80
Dillon, John, 185
Douglas, C. M., 206
Dowson, Mrs. Enfield, 12 n.40
Dring, Miss, 205
Duncan, J. B., 41 n.45

Edwards, E., 161

Elibank, Master of, 161, 188
Ellis, R. G., 161
Ellis Griffith, J., 218 n.104
Elverston, H. L., 204
Evans, Richard, 194 n.7
Evans, Mrs. William, 12 n.40

Falconer, G., 41 n.45

Fawcett, Henry, 8
Fawcett, Millicent Garrett, 4, 7–11, 12 n.40, 13, 21, 30–31, 34, 42, 46–51, 53ff, 56 n.101, 58–68 passim,
69–72, 74–80, 89–93 passim, 105f, 109, 115–55 passim, 167f, 170, 172 n.123, 177, 179, 188f, 220,
222, 227
Finney, S., 161
Ford, Isabella, 36 n.33, 75 n.50
Francis, Mrs. Arthur, 12 n.40

Galsworthy, John, 154

Garrett, Agnes, 8 n.25
Garrett, Newson, 7–8
Gibb, T., 206
Gilbert, Bentley, 217 n.102
Gladstone, Herbert, 8, 43 n.53, 51, 52 n.85, 54, 58, 151
Goldman, C. S., 175 n.127
Gore-Booth, Eva, 12, 17 n.58, 18, 19 n.66
Goschen, Lord, 220
Goulding, E. A., 175 n.127
Grey, Sir Edward, 30 n.8, 43 n.53, 61, 68, 88, 91, 96, 98f, 107f, 116–30 passim, 138, 140, 143, 172–78
passim, 183f, 188, 193, 197, 215, 216–17, 226
Guinness, R., 41 n.45
Gulland, John W., 41 n.45, 163

Haldane, Richard B., 43 n.53, 62 n.4, 98, 107, 116, 128 n.128, 187
Hall, Miss S. E., 12 n.40
Hallett, Mrs. Ashworth, 12 n.40
Harcourt, Lewis, 26, 43 n.53, 62 n.4, 82 n.74, 91, 115, 128 n.128, 158, 179 n.142, 182
Hardie, Keir, 24 n.80, 25 n.85, 148, 150f
Hardicker, J. O., 206
Harley, Katherine, 80 n.65
Harrison, Brian, 14 n.44, 24 n.82, 37 n.36
Havelock Allan, Sir H., 204
Henderson, Arthur, 45f, 62 n.4, 148ff, 155, 164ff, 172f, 175 n.127, 178, 204, 209, 224, 226
Hobhouse, Charles, 158
Hodge, J., 158
Hogge, James, 93 n.122
Hollis, Patricia, 21 n.71
Holmes, J., 161
Holt, R. D., 38 n.39
Hope, J. A., 161
Hopkins, John, 93 n.122
House, Alderman W., 206
Houseman, Laurence, 157
Howard, Geoffrey, 25 n.85, 48 n.72, 49, 68, 69 n.28, 87, 89

Jacobs, Herbert, 93
Jenkins, Roy, 43
Jowett, F. W., 159

Kemp, Sir George, 100, 104

Kenney, Annie, 30 n.8, 55, 179
Kessack, James, 93 n.122
Kraditor, Aileen S., 18 n.60, 194 n.9

Lansbury, George, 149–50, 166

Lansdowne, Lord, 211
Leigh, Mary, 50 n.82, 54
Leventhal, Fred, 65 n.15
Levy, Maurice, 104 n.30
Linton, Eliza Lynn, 10
Lloyd George, David, 43 n.33, 51, 73, 82–88 passim, 99, 101, 105–9 passim, 112–15, 116–34 passim,
139ff, 175, 181, 184 n.167, 187f, 193, 214, 216, 217–20, 224–25, 226
Long, Walter, 115
Loreburn, Lord, 107, 128 n.128, 131
Lowther, James W., 186
Lunn, W., 161
Lyttelton, Alfred, 71, 175 n.127
Lyttelton, Mrs. Arthur, 12 n.40
Lytton, Lady Constance, 55, 65, 67 n.21, 131
Lytton, Victor, Second Earl of, 66f, 72, 89 n.105, 90–91, 96, 113, 118, 122, 127, 157, 211f, 214
Lytton, Rosina, Lady, 67 n.21

MacCallum Scott, A., 204

MacDonald, Murray, 175 n.127
MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 120, 148–49, 150–51, 152, 156, 163, 170, 208
McKenna, Reginald, 107, 128 n.128, 158
Mackinder, Halford, 93 n.122
McKinnon Wood, Thomas, 218 n.104
McLaren, Sir Charles, 20 n.68, 23 n.80, 25 n.85, 67
McLaren, Eva, 64, 67 n.22, 74 n.47
McLaren, Priscilla Bright, 12, 67 n.22
McLaren, Walter S. B., 67 n.22, 76, 145 n.7, 161
McLaren family, 12 n.39, 67 n.22
McLea, Miss J., 12 n.40
MacMillan, Chrystal, 65 n.13
McMillan, Margaret, 157
Macnamara, Thomas, 218 n.104
MacQuisten, F. A., 206
Mair, Miss, 12 n.40
Marsh, Charlotte, 54
Marshall, Catherine, 87 n.95, 157, 159, 164ff, 168, 178, 185, 197, 202–203, 209f, 212–14, 215, 217–20,
227
Martin, Joseph, 93 n.122
Mason, Bertha, 17 n.59, 74 n.47, 86, 88f
Mellor, Miss, 12 n.40
Menzies, Sir W., 206
Mill, John Stuart, 2, 8, 44
Mirlees, William, 93
Morgan, David, 115 n.71, 145 n.8, 171 n.121, 188 n.184
Morley, John, 43 n.53, 128 n.128
Morton, G., 206
Munro-Ferguson, A. C., 206
Murphy, H., 161
Murray, Flora, 53 n.89

Nash, Vaughan, 89
Nevinson, Mrs. Henry, 53 n.89
New, Edith, 50 n.82
Newton, Lord, 202

O’Grady, J., 158

Outhwaite, R. L., 161
Palliser, Edith, 7 n.24, 12 n.40, 106
Pankhurst, Christabel, 9, 17 n.58, 28, 30 n.8, 56, 66 n.18, 77ff, 100 n.10, 109, 121–22, 179F
Pankhurst, E. Sylvia, 25 n.83, 28, 198, 220, 221 n.114
Pankhurst, Emmeline, 9, 17 n.58, 28–29, 36, 56, 77ff, 100 n.10, 121, 179f, 225 n.4
Pankhurst, Richard, 28, 36
Pankhurst family, 28–29, 55
Parnell, Charles Stewart, 36
Pease, J. A., 128 n.128, 158
Pechey-Phipson, Edith, 34
Peel, Sir Robert, 220
Peel, W. R., 41 n.45
Peters, Arthur, 158, 162, 204, 209
Pethick-Lawrence, Emmeline, 31, 53, 55–56, 77f, 79 n.62, 179
Pethick-Lawrence, F. W., 180f
P hillips, Mrs. Wynford, 12 n.40
Pickles, W., 161
Ponsonby, Arthur, 197
Pugh, Martin, 212 n.80, 225 n.5

Rathbone, Eleanor, 12, 75 n.50, 126, 154 n.49, 155 n.52

Rea, R., 205
Reddish, Sarah, 19 n.66
Redmond, John, 85, 117, 135, 143, 164, 168ff, 171, 179, 182, 184
Richardson, T., 206
Rittner, G. H., 161
Robertson, John, 196
Robertson, Margaret, 157, 158 n.64, 196 n.18
Robins, Elizabeth, 31
Rolleston, Sir John, 175 n.127
Rollit, Albert, 43 n.55
Roper, Esther, 7 n.24, 12 n.40, 17 n.58, 18, 19 n.66
Rosen, Andrew, 137 n.171
Rover, Constance, 33 n.22
Runciman, Walter, 62 n.4, 88, 107, 128 n.128
Russell, Bertrand, 39–40, 46, 48 n.72, 56
Russell, Mrs. Bertrand, 74 n.47
Russell, Charles, 93

Samuel, Herbert, 62 n.4

Scott, C. P., 99, 113, 115, 117, 123 n.110, 130, 183, 184 n.167, 191
Seely, Col., 204
Selborne, William Waldegrave Palmer, Second Earl of, 125f, 138, 201–202, 211ff, 224, 226
Selborne, Maud, Countess of, 129, 202, 210 n.71, 211
Shackleton, David, 81, 86, 88
Shaw, George Bernard, 75 n.53
Simon, Sir John, 215, 216 n.98, 218 n.104, 226
Sinclair, John, 26
Smillie, Robert, 196
Smith, A., 204
Smith, F. E., 115, 133
Smith, Louisa Garrett, 8
Smith, Provost M., 206
Smith, Thorley, 19 n.66
Snowden, Ethel, 36 n.33, 75 n.50
Snowden,. Philip , 25 n.85, 35 n.30, 48–49, 62 n.4, 83, 150, 158, 162, 167–71 passim, 175 n.127, 183, 187,
204, 209, 224
Stead, W. T ., 9, 22
Steel-Maitland, Sir Arthur, 213f
Sterling, Frances, 32 n.17
Stevenson, Louisa, 12
Strachey, Philippa, 104 n.26
Strachey, Jane, Lady, 34, 36 n.33, 129
Streatfield, H., 206
Stuart, G. H., 206
Swanwick, Helena M., 115–16, 117–18, 122 n.106, 130, 169 n.113

Taylor, Mrs., 12 n.40

Taylor, J. W., 204
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 2
Thomas, J. H., 175 n.127
Tillotson, Miss, 12 n.40

Ward, Arnold, 213

Warren, W. R ., 41 n.45
Watson, W., 206
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 220
Wigham, Eliza, 12
Williams, Aneurin, 206, 207 n.57
Wilson, Guy, 41 n.45
Wilson, H. J ., 161
Wilson, John, 204
Wilson, P. W., 207–8
Wing, T., 204, 206
Wolstenholme-Elmy, Elizabeth, 2
Woodall, William, 3
York Stanger, Henry, 25 n.85, 42–43, 48 n.74, 54, 69

Zangwill, Israel, 157