“A brilliant analysis of the political trajectory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,

together with a fair and sensible assessment of the policy dilemma that
this poses. How should the West approach a group that has abandoned
al-Qaeda but models itself on the Taliban? That is the question that

THE AGE OF

AL
Aaron Zelin takes up in this illuminating study.”

PO LI T IC
–COLE BUNZEL, Hoover Fellow, Hoover Institution, and
editor, Jihadica

Aaron Y. Zelin
“In this comprehensive study, Aaron Zelin captures the complexity of HTS

M
and its recent transformations, and explores the thorny question of

H A D IS
whether the group should be delisted from international terrorism lists.

JI
An important read for those interested in understanding the evolution of
HTS and the current state of affairs in northwest Syria.”

–ORWA AJJOUB, senior analyst, COAR Global Ltd.

THE AGE OF POLITICAL JIHADISM

AARON Y. ZELIN is the Richard Borow Fellow at The
Washington Institute, a visiting research scholar in the

AL-SHAM
Department of Politics at Brandeis University, and the

d y o f H AYAT TA HRIR
A Stu
founder of Jihadology.net. He is author of the book Your Sons
Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (Columbia
University Press), along with the recent Institute study
Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism.

A ARON Y. ZELIN

The Washington Institute for

Near East Policy
1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036 Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
202 452 0650 4501 Forbes Boulevard
WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG Lanham, MD 20706
301 459 3366 | WWW.ROWMAN.COM
THE AGE OF POLITICAL JIHADISM
A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Aaron Y. Zelin
Published in association with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Published by Rowman & Littlefield

An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, MD 20706
www.rowman.com

6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom

©2023 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic
or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written
permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Information available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN 978-1-5381-8292-5 (hardcover)

ISBN 978-1-5381-8292-5 (paperback)
ISBN 978-1-5381-8294-9 (electronic)

∞™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials. ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
www.washingtoninstitute.org

Source for cover photo (video removed at time of publication): https://jihadology.

net/2020/08/01/new-video-message-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5rir-al-shams-abu-
mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-jawlani-visiting-an-idp-camp-to-look-into-their-requests-and-
meet-them/
 Contents

List of Imagesiv
Abbreviationsv
Acknowledgmentsvi

1 Introduction1

2 The Development of Political Jihadism 7

3 Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism 16

4 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 25

5 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage 52

6 External Operations, Guidance, and Inspiration 60

7 The Terrorism Designation Question 69

8 Conclusion77

Appendix: Legal Criteria for a Terrorism Designation 80

 Images

Uthman bin Affan Quranic school, October 2021 9

Khalid bin al-Walid Quranic school, October 2021 9

Abd al-Rahim Atun lecturing in Idlib, September 2021 12

Jawlani discussing bread prices with Syrian Salvation

Government26

Jawlani distributing gifts on Eid al-Fitr, June 2018 30

Jawlani inaugurating expanded Aleppo–Bab al-Hawa Road

with SSG prime minister 31

Confirmation voting for Prime Minister Keda, December 2021 35

Sawaid al-Khayr members promoting appearance rules

for women 38

Banner from SSG’s “Guardians of Virtue” campaign 39

Individual receiving press card from SSG, June 2021 41

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra members at Eid al-Adha,

October 2013 53

Rocket launch against Alawites, Latakia governorate,

August 2013 55

HTS member explaining “Bilad al-Sham,” Jisr al-Shughour 63

 Abbreviations

AQ al-Qaeda
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CT counterterrorism
E.O. Executive Order
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization
HASI Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyah
HD Huras al-Din
HSM Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedin
HTS Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
IDP internally displaced person
IS Islamic State
ISI Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
JFS Jabhat Fatah al-Sham
JN Jabhat al-Nusra
JNIM Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
KG Khorasan Group
SNC Syrian National Council
SSG Syrian Salvation Government
TIP Turkestan Islamic Party
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
 Acknowledgments

This paper would not be in its current shape without the help of many
individuals. Foremost is Richard Borow, who endows my position at The
Washington Institute. Likewise, Matthew Levitt, who directs the Institute’s
Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence (CTI), provides
me the freedom to pursue a diverse array of intellectually stimulating
topics. My CTI teammate, Katherine Bauer, provided crucial feedback on
all issues related to terrorism designations and sanctions, which helped
strengthen the final product. I would also like to thank Calvin Wilder, who
helped with research and provided feedback on an early draft. In a similar
vein, I would like to acknowledge Aymenn Al-Tamimi, who read over and
helped fact-check the study. Of course, any remaining errors or omissions
are my own. Finally, I would like to thank the editing and publications team
at The Washington Institute, in particular Jason Warshof and Maria Radacsi,
without whom the paper would not sound or look as nice as it does.
 1

Introduction

Pause for a moment, and try to imagine Osama bin Laden taking a selfie with
residents of Afghanistan. Or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi serving a hot meal of ful
(stewed fava beans) to locals at a restaurant in Iraq. This is not easy, given
the low profile each figure kept. Yet in early August 2020, Abu Muhammad
al-Jawlani, leader of the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), did both
openly in Idlib and without worrying about operational security from potential
drones overhead.1 This was a long way even from Jawlani’s own initial media
release in late January 2012, when he did not show his face. The situation
changed in late July 2016, when he announced that his group at the time,
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), was becoming Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), a group con-
nected to no “outside entity.” He thus outwardly broke ties with al-Qaeda (AQ).2
This paper seeks to analyze HTS’s current status and provide a mul-
tifaceted look at the question of whether it should be removed from the
Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), as some
have suggested. It will also examine how HTS’s transition in recent years
fits within the broader trajectory of the jihadist movement. The paper will
explore the evolution of Jawlani’s public appearances and his evolving rhe-
torical focus, highlighting how HTS’s actions suggest the shift is more than
mere talk. From there, it will explore the group’s evolution from a traditional
terrorist group to an entity more akin to other authoritarian leaderships in
the region. It will also highlight the problematic views the group continues
to hold, despite no longer identifying or associating with the Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI) or AQ. To conclude, it will return to the question of whether HTS
should remain on or be removed from the terrorism list.
2 The Age of Political Jihadism

While many still view HTS through the lens of JN, the group has actually
operated as HTS longer than it did as JN—that is, not part of AQ and no
longer interested in global jihad. Therefore, it makes sense to consider its
actions since 2017 as more representative of its actual views and current
operating status. This statement should not be interpreted as an endorse-
ment of the group or a minimization of its past transgressions. However,
the challenge that HTS presents now is different and more complex from
the one it presented when it was part of the ISI or AQ.
The fact that Jawlani can freely move about Idlib to meet with various
actors and residents is evidence of a new stage in the jihadist movement’s
progress toward its goal of sustainable governance, and in many ways signals
de facto acceptance by certain international actors. In spring of 2021, the
former U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Ambassador
James Jeffrey, admitted that Washington had stopped directly targeting
Jawlani in August 2018.3 This remains U.S. policy today. HTS now poses the
same type of policy dilemma that has vexed Western governments vis-à-vis
other violent Islamist groups in power, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the
Taliban. Yet unlike Hezbollah and Hamas (Iran), but like the Taliban with
Pakistan and Qatar, HTS has a foreign backer (Turkey) that is a U.S. ally,
further complicating the policy conundrum.
In recent years, HTS broke ties with AQ and backed a civilian-led Syrian
Salvation Government (SSG) in northern Idlib and western Aleppo. Conse-
quently, some researchers who have spent time in HTS territory and have
met Jawlani suggest that, through engagement and assuming continued
changes in the group’s behavior, HTS should be considered for removal
from the U.S. list of designated terrorists.4 They argue that this approach
could be a model for dealing with other jihadist groups around the world
and could help end the seemingly endless “war on terror.” By contrast,
some Syrian researchers—as well as many local activists in HTS-controlled
territories—have rejected these calls, noting that “the experiences of local
victims in Syria should be of some account in the definition of political ter-
ror” and not purely framed “in relation to Western security needs” abroad.5
As for HTS itself, Jawlani has stated that he primarily wants two things from
the United States and the West: “There is no need for you to classify people
 Introduction 3

as terrorists and announce rewards for killing them...What we might have in

common would be putting an end to the humanitarian crisis and suffering that
is going on in the region, and putting an end to the masses of refugees that flee
to Turkey or to Europe.”6 Further, according to Taqi al-Din Omar, HTS’s head of
public relations, Washington’s decision to remove the Uyghur-led Turkestan
Islamic Party (TIP)7—an HTS ally in Idlib—from the terrorism list will provide
an opportunity for the United States to also reconsider its designation of HTS.8
Yet the decision to delist TIP may have had more to do with power competition
maneuvers vis-à-vis China than with Syria.
Based on the evidence presented in this paper, HTS still warrants its
designation as a terrorist group, although the case is less straightforward
now than it was before. Initially, HTS was listed as an alias within the JN
designation.9 In early May 2014,10 the State Department separated its Decem-
ber 2012 listing of JN as an alias of al-Qaeda in Iraq.11 In other words, since
May 2014, JN’s designation as an FTO has been independent of any formal
connection to another group. Thus, there is no need to update it now, since
it does not mention anything related to al-Qaeda, even if the group was then
still part of AQ. Thus, HTS’s separateness from AQ averts any problems due
to the idiosyncrasies of the May 2014 JN designation update.
HTS remains problematic because it continues to espouse extremist
beliefs that glamorize terrorism abroad and it shoots rockets into civilian
areas controlled by the Assad regime, even if it has stopped conducting
suicide attacks. Moreover, the territory that HTS controls is one where
other designated groups affiliated with HTS operate, such as Jamaat Ansar
al-Islam, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, and Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad, as
well as other nondesignated foreign fighter groups.12 HTS also shot at U.S.
Special Forces when they conducted their most recent operation, in early
2022, to capture and kill Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the leader of
the Islamic State—a group HTS also views as an enemy.
Therefore, the most prudent course of action for the United States is to
maintain the status quo and monitor the evolution of HTS to determine
whether it falls below the legal threshold for being considered a terror-
ist organization. By law, the State Department is required to review FTO
designations at least every five years.13 This process could provide HTS an
4 The Age of Political Jihadism

avenue to be removed from the list at some future point if it makes certain
changes, which are discussed in the conclusion of the paper. In the review,
the United States could present its findings on the group’s ongoing terror-
ist activities or ties to other terrorist groups. Yet even if HTS is no longer
legally considered a terrorist group, it still could be sanctioned under other
authorities related to human rights abuses in the Syrian war, because of
authoritarian tendencies and human rights violations.
This paper does not specifically address how HTS has survived in recent
years; rather, it is limited to discussing the group’s current status and desig-
nation. These issues would be irrelevant, however, if Turkey were not sending
troops into Idlib and creating a frontline barrier to the Assad regime and
Russia, as well as using its drone force to deter further regime and Russian
action against the territories in which HTS operates. In August 2018, Turkey
designated HTS as a terrorist group,14 illustrating the country’s complicated
relationship with the group even as Turkey has become its de facto protector.
 Introduction 5

Notes

1. “A Timeline of Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani’s Appearances,” Jihadology,

last updated March 22, 2022, https://jihadology.net/2020/05/27/a-
timeline-of-abu-muhammad-al-jawlanis-appearances.
2. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Declaration of the Support Front
(Jabhat al-Nusrah): For the People of Syria from the Mujahidin of
Syria in the Fields of Jihad,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for
Media Production, January 24, 2012, https://bit.ly/3qS7Xuj; Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Announcing the Formation of Jabhat Fatah
al-Sham,” July 28, 2016, https://bit.ly/3iQfbur.
3. Martin Smith, “Interview: James Jeffrey,” Frontline, March 8, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/james-jeffrey.
4. Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, “The Consolidation of a (Post-
Jihadi) Technocratic State-let in Idlib,” Project on Middle East
Political Science, Study 42, Frozen Conflicts (2020), 42–47, https://
pomeps.org/the-consolidation-of-a-post-jihadi-technocratic-
state-let-in-idlib; and Dareen Khalifa and Noah Bonsey, “In Syria’s
Idlib, Washington’s Chance to Reimagine Counter-Terrorism,”
International Crisis Group, February 3, 2021, https://www.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/
syria/syrias-idlib-washingtons-chance-reimagine-counter-terrorism.
5. Rahaf Aldoughli and Azzam Al Kassir, “Empower Syrians Not
Warlords: Against the Re-Branding of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,” Atlantic
Council, July 15, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
menasource/empower-syrians-not-warlords.
6. Martin Smith, “The Jihadist: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Frontline,
February 1 and February 14, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani.
7. U.S. Department of State, “In the Matter of the Designation of the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement Also Known as ETIM as a
‘Terrorist Organization’ Pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended,” Federal Register 85,
no. 215, Public Notice 11252 (November 2020), https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/05/2020-24620/in-the-
matter-of-the-designation-of-the-eastern-turkistan-islamic-
movement-also-known-as-etim-as-a.
6 The Age of Political Jihadism

8. “‘Tahrir al-Sham’ Tantadhar Shitbaha min Luwaih al-Irhab: Tsnif

Siyasi,” al-Modon, November 15, 2020, https://bit.ly/36Kd2OD.
9. U.S. Department of State, “Amendments to the Terrorist Designations
of al-Nusrah Front,” May 31, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
amendments-to-the-terrorist-designations-of-al-nusrah-front/index.
html.
10. U.S. Department of State, “In the Matter of the Designation of Al-Nusrah
Front Also Known as Jabhat al-Nusrah Also Known as Jabhet al-Nusra
Also Known as The Victory Front Also Known as Al Nusrah Front for
the People of the Levant Also Known as Al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon
Also Known as Support Front for the People of the Levant Also Known
as Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat
al-Jihad as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to Section 219 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended,” Public Notice 8734,
Federal Register 79, no. 94 (May 2014): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2014-05-15/pdf/2014-11217.pdf.
11. U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah
Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” December 11, 2012,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201759.htm.
12. U.S. Department of State: “State Department Terrorist Designation
of Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari,” March 22, 2018, https://2017-2021.
state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designation-of-katibat-al-
imam-al-bukhari/index.html; “Terrorist Designation of Katibat al
Tawhid wal Jihad,” March 7, 2022, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-
designation-of-katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad; and “Foreign Terrorist
Organizations: Designation of Ansar al-Islam (Al), Redesignation
of Three Others,” March 22, 2004, https://www.state.gov/
foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
13. For the legal basis, see https://bit.ly/3EoDqd2.
14. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, “Birlesmis Milletler Guvenlik
Konseyinin 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) ve 1989 (2011) Sayili
Kararlariyla Listelenen Kisi, Kurulus veya Organizasyonlarin
Tasarrufunda Bulunan Malvarliginin Dondurulmasi Hakkindaki
30/9/2013 Tarihli ve 2013/5428 Sayili Bakanlar Kurulu Kararinin Eki
(1) Sayili Listede Degisiklik Yapilmasına Iliskin Karar (Karar Sayisi:
50),” Resmi Gazete 30521 (August 31, 2018), https://www.resmigazete.
gov.tr/eskiler/2018/08/20180831-4.pdf.
 2

The Development of Political Jihadism

Although the Syrian regime, led by President Bashar al-Assad, espouses the
goal of retaking all territory controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group
has survived and controlled territory without stirring up the same level of
international anxiety as when Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedin (HSM) seized
parts of southern Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took
over parts of southern Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
took parts of northern Mali, or the Islamic State took parts of western Iraq,
north-central Libya, and eastern Syria. It is important to understand why
this is so, and an analysis reopens debates about the difference between
jihadist “strategists” and “doctrinaires.” As the Norwegian scholar Brynjar
Lia noted, the debate is over “the general dilemma of how to strike a balance
between ideological purity and political utility.”1 HTS’s maneuvering over
the past few years could be the strongest and most successful jihadist case
seen thus far for a more pragmatic approach to day-to-day politics, auguring
what could be a trend of political jihadism over a more theologically forward
jihadist-Salafism. It should not be surprising that the Syrian war birthed
another variant within the broader jihadist camp. As the British scholar
Shiraz Maher has articulated in his book Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an
Idea, “All the major ideational shifts [within the jihadist movement] have
come in response to war.”2
In some respects, HTS and Jawlani are following the path forged by their
fellow Syrian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Suri, more than fifteen years ago in his
1,600-page treatise, The Global Islamic Resistance Call. This text discusses
al-Suri’s objections to Salafism as professed by many jihadists and calls it a
8 The Age of Political Jihadism

self-defeating theology because of its excessive emphasis on doctrinal

purity and failure to unite ranks in the face of the war on Muslims by the
so-called Mongols of the age (i.e., Americans and “Zionists”). “In its defini-
tive form,” the text explains, “it constitutes a door of division, factionalism,
and jurisprudential partisanship that is by extension an ideological move-
ment in nature, as well as the cause of internal war inside the ranks of the
Muslims and in the midst of the resistance.”3 While there is no public proof
that HTS is taking guidance from al-Suri’s past work,4 Jawlani alluded to
some of these points in his February 2021 Frontline interview with Martin
Smith, during which he stated that “to limit the description of the HTS to
only being a Salafist or jihadist [group], I believe, needs a long discussion.
And I don’t want to comment on that now, because it would take a lot of
research and study.”5 Yet in an HTS video released in February 2022 that
showed the group’s leadership honoring the top students in its military
battalion leadership course, HTS’s head military official, Abu al-Hassan
al-Hamawi, said, “The battle, my brothers, is an advanced line of defense
of the Sunnis...there is no solution except through jihad, and fighting in the
way of God.”6 This illustrates the importance of listening to what Jawlani
and HTS are saying to their local audience and not merely following their
public pronouncements aimed at the West.
Through field research conducted in Idlib in recent years, Jerome Drevon
and Patrick Haenni found that, unlike AQ or the Islamic State—which have
tried to implement only their Salafi aqidah (creed) in the territories they
control—at mosques and within the sharia faculty at Idlib University, “the
Salafi religious aqidah is taught, but [other] schools of jurisprudence are also
emphasized, with a specific role of the Shafi‘i madhhab (school of law), as it
is the most common in Idlib.”7 Interestingly, Ansar al-Islam, a jihadist group
aligned with HTS, supports an Imam Shafi‘i Institute in Idlib.8 Nonetheless,
there is a risk in finding too deep a dichotomy between Salafi and traditional
madhabs. Plus, on April 19, 2022, Idlib University hosted a Zoom lecture with
the Jordanian jihadist ideologue Iyad Qunaibi.9 Moreover, at the primary
education level, the HTS-run Dar al-Wahi al-Sharif Quranic school is free—and
also provides free school uniforms—constituting a favorable comparison with
public primary school, which actually costs money, and giving the group an
 The Development of Political Jihadism 9

Schoolchildren at the Uthman bin Affan Quranic school, October 2021.

Schoolchildren at the Khalid bin al-Walid Quranic school, October 2021.

advantage in shaping how children grow up to view the world based on HTS’s
interpretations of Islam.10
Jawlani’s comment related to Salafists and jihadists echoes an earlier
statement by leading jihadist ideologue Abu Qatada al-Filistini in October
2018, after rival ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi criticized him for
10 The Age of Political Jihadism

mourning the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by jihadists as

connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore an ideological enemy: “I
am not a jihadi, or a salafi, and those who wish to wrap me in their ideologi-
cal robe in spite of me will not succeed.”11 In essence, the context of Abu
Qatada’s response was a call for a more inclusive movement, in contrast to
what is perceived as a more rigid movement inspired by the ideas of Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi.
Thus, it is not surprising that following HTS’s destruction of al-Qaeda’s
revamped Syrian branch, Huras al-Din, in June 2020,12 HTS disavowed
Maqdisi: “We disavow him and his manhaj [methodology], he is not of us
and we are not of him and we are not on his way...this imposes upon us
the obligation of advising the abandonment of his books and fatwas, and
not adopting him as a reference for the fatwa, let alone his being a theorist
on a case of jihad. And it has become clear to all the essence of the way he
pursues, and the fact he is closest to the way of the khawarij,13 their manhaj,
interpretations, and pronouncements.”14

How the Jihadist Movement Got to This Point

Since the initial crystallization of contemporary jihadist ideology and its

subsequent mobilization in various groups over time, the movement has
essentially sought to redress the elimination of the Caliphate by the Turkish
Republic in 1924 by reestablishing it and implementing Islamic law (accord-
ing to its interpretations). In more general rhetorical terms, jihadist groups
tend to talk about the supposed humiliation of the Muslim umma (nation),
the supremacy the enemy has gained over the umma and its attempts to
erase the umma’s Islamic identity, and the need to revive the umma’s past
glory and might through jihad. Even if HTS has downplayed the idea of
establishing an Islamic state and the rhetoric about reviving the umma’s glory
in its messaging to the West, these themes can still easily be found in the
group’s internally directed propaganda. In one video released by the group’s
Amjad Media in August 2021, Jawlani addressed a group of graduates from
the special forces course and stated that when HTS conquers Damascus,
 The Development of Political Jihadism 11

the group would create “the rule of Islam.” This underscores the hope of
an Islamic state as the group’s ultimate goal.15 In the video released in
February 2022, Jawlani spoke of the humiliation of the umma in the present
era, the attempts to erase its identity, and the hope for a revival of its past
glory through the mujahedin.16 Moreover, one of HTS’s senior ideologues,
Yahya bin Tahir al-Farghali (Abu al-Fatah al-Farghali), produced a video
series from 2019–20 titled The Road to the Caliphate: History of the Jihadist
Movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Shami Jihad.17 The formation of
HTS is portrayed as a new stage and chapter in the fifth generation of those
working to revive the caliphate,18 suggesting that the revival of the caliphate
is a project to which HTS subscribes even if it does not purport to be the
group that represents the Caliphate. This is in contrast to the Islamic State’s
own assumption of this authority.
Since the 1960s and 1970s, the jihadist movement has advanced in its
capabilities and capacities. This has allowed it to pass through various stages
that have built off one another over time. The stages have not necessarily
been mutually exclusive once the next phase has begun. The stages can be
divided as follows:

• Mid-1960s: clandestine terrorist groups focused on overthrowing

local Arab regimes
• Mid-1980s: the beginning of the transnational foreign fighter
phenomenon and insurgencies
• 1990s: international terrorism
• 2000s: hybridization between local and global terrorism
• 2010s: the growth of dawa (outreach) and governance projects

It is plausible that the 2020s will witness an emerging diplomatic element in

the jihadist movement’s repertoire. The Taliban’s successful negotiation of
the United States’ exit from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the prior talks
that occurred in Doha, Qatar, provide a potential example of new strategies
that jihadist groups might employ to further their ultimate goals.19 There
are already signs that AQIM’s branch in Mali, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin (JNIM), is beginning to conduct high-level negotiations after
12 The Age of Political Jihadism

already being involved in communal-level talks.20 HTS alluded to this pos-

sibility in a recent lecture given by one of its senior ideologues, Abdul Rahim
Atun (Abu Abdullah al-Shami) in Idlib on September 15, 2021. Analyzing
the similarities and differences between HTS and Hamas and the Taliban
in one part of the lecture, he noted that both have “developed networks with
foreign powers to achieve their goals.”21
It is thus not surprising that, according to Ambassador Jeffrey, HTS has
sought to let Washington know through back channels that “we want to
be your friend. We’re not terrorists. We’re just fighting Assad...We’re not a
threat to you.”22 Yet the Biden administration has discontinued the Trump
administration’s policy of communicating with HTS through back channels.
However, with the strengthening hand of HTS and other jihadist groups
in different regional theaters, alongside a greater American and Western
policy focus on great power competition and a public interested in moving
beyond the 9/11-era wars, the potential for dialogue, negotiations, and
diplomatic efforts is likely to increase in some policy corners.23 In light
of these developments, it is worth examining how HTS and Jawlani have
changed over the past decade.

Abdul Rahim Atun lectures in Idlib, September 2021. His talk is titled “Jihad and
Resistance in the Islamic World: The Taliban as a Model.”
 The Development of Political Jihadism 13

Notes

1. Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Strategists and Doctrinarians,” in Self-Inflicted

Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within al-Qa’ida and Its Periphery, ed.
Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (Combating Terrorism Center
at West Point, 2010), 101, available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/
ADA536531.pdf.
2. Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (London: Hurst,
2016), 208.
3. Omar Abd al-Hakim (Abu Musab al-Suri), Dawat al-Muqawama
al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah [The global Islamic resistance call] (2004),
1060, https://archive.org/details/setsuko_20151004/page/n1059/
mode/2up
4. As context, though, some of al-Suri’s works on the Algerian jihad were
previously printed and distributed by Jabhat al-Nusra’s dawa offices.
5. Martin Smith, “The Jihadist: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Frontline,
February 1 and February 14, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani.
6. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Honoring the Top Students in the Battalion
Leadership Course, in the Presence of the Leadership of the
Group,” Amjad Foundation for Media Production, February 5, 2022,
previously available at https://bit.ly/3LAu94l.
7. Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, How Global Jihad Relocalises and
Where It Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria (Fiesole,
Italy: European University Institute, 2021), https://bit.ly/3NzSN6J.
8. See YouTube video, 47:11, posted by “Adbullah human,” August 12,
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEwFW4VgEsM.
9. See https://www.facebook.com/idleb.univ1/posts/
3286350128250457.
10. Mohammed Hardan, “Jihadist Group Seeks Influence in Syria’s Idlib
via Religious Schools,” Al-Monitor, February 9, 2022, https://www.
al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/jihadist-group-seeks-influence-
syrias-idlib-religious-schools.
11. Cole Bunzel, “Abu Qatada al-Filastini: ‘I Am Not a Jihadi, or a Salafi,’”
Jihadica, October 26, 2018, http://www.jihadica.com/abu-qatada-al-
filastini-i-am-not-a-jihadi-or-a-salafi.
14 The Age of Political Jihadism

12. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Living Long Enough to See Yourself Become

the Villain: The Case of Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi,” Jihadica,
September 9, 2020, http://www.jihadica.com/living-long-enough.
13. A reference to an early Islamic sect known for its rigid orthodoxy and
eagerness to use violence against other Muslims.
14. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “The Reality of Isam al-Barqawi aka Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” October 10, 2020, https://bit.ly/3uFjHSd;
for the translation, see https://aymennjawad.org/2020/10/
hayat-tahrir-al-sham-general-sharii-council.
15. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Graduation of a Special Forces Course in
the Presence of the Leadership of the Group,” Amjad Foundation for
Media Production, August 21, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qTgL3k.
16. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Honoring the Top Students in the Battalion
Leadership Course,” https://bit.ly/3LAu94l.
17. Yahya bin Tahir al-Farghali, Al-Tariq ila al-Khilafah: Tarikh al-Harakat
al-Jihadiyah min al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin ila al-Jihad al-Sham [The road
to the Caliphate: History of jihadist movements from the Muslim
Brotherhood to the Shami Jihad] (Istanbul: Dar al-Kitab al-Alami,
2020); for the original video series, see https://bit.ly/3NEQsHC.
18. Ibid., 187–88.
19. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Turkey Calls for Recognition of the Taliban’s
Islamic Emirate,” Policy Alert, March 18, 2022, https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkey-calls-recognition-
talibans-islamic-emirate.
20. David Baché, “Mali: Government Mandates the High Islamic Council
to Negotiate with Ag Ghaly and Koufa,” Radio France Internationale,
October 19, 2021, https://bit.ly/3DuLuZG.
21. Sheikh Abu Abd Allah al-Shami (Abdul Rahim Atun), “Jihad and
Resistance in the Islamic World: The Taliban as a Model,” Amjad
Foundation for Media Production, September 17, 2021, https://bit.
ly/3LvdbnP.
22. Martin Smith, “Interview: James Jeffrey,” Frontline, March 8, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/james-jeffrey.
23. See, e.g., recent calls in relation to JNIM and al-Shabab: Mohammed
Ibrahim Shire, “​​Now Is the Time to Engage al-Shabaab,” War on
the Rocks, October 19, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/
now-is-the-time-to-engage-al-shabaab-religious-leaders-and-clan-
 The Development of Political Jihadism 15

elders-can-help; “Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition

JNIM,” International Crisis Group, December 10, 2021, https://www.
crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/306-mali-enabling-dialogue-
jihadist-coalition-jnim; Sam Mednick, “Can Local Dialogues with
Jihadists Stem Violence in Burkina Faso?” The New Humanitarian,
December 16, 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-
​​
feature/2021/12/16/local-dialogues-with-jihadists-violence-
Burkina-Faso; Hassane Koné and Ornella Moderan, “Dialogue
with Jihadists: Mauritania Offers Lessons for the Sahel,” Institute
for Security Studies, April 1, 2022, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/
dialogue-with-jihadists-mauritania-offers-lessons-for-the-sahel; and
Sam Mednick, “Burkina Faso to Support Local Talks with Jihadists: A
Q&A with the Minister of Reconciliation,” New Humanitarian, April 27,
2022, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2022/04/27/
dialogue-with-jihadists-interview-with-burkina-fasos-minister-of-
reconciliation.
 3

Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism

Although Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani originally led Jabhat al-Nusra—a

predecessor group of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—as a project of the Islamic State
of Iraq and subsequently as al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria,1 Jawlani has
built his own alternative jihadist outlook. Part of this might be ascribed to
the fact that Jawlani had a “better understanding of the Syrian environment
when compared with IS” or AQ, as the Syrian dissident-intellectual Yassin
al-Haj Saleh surmised in his 2017 memoir of the Syrian revolution.2
Unlike the typical modus operandi of jihadists at the time, Jawlani in
2012 began to build up JN in Syria as something more than a clandestine
organization; the group also sought to work with other insurgents fighting
against the Assad regime. By defending people from Assad, providing social
services, and refraining from targeting ideological rivals in the early years of
the war, JN successfully embedded itself within the local social fabric. The
initial fruits of this success were seen when the Syrian opposition and rebels
continued to back JN even after the United States designated the group as
an FTO and an extension of ISI in December 2012.3
As a consequence of JN’s popularity, and because Jawlani was ignor-
ing then ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s requests to begin liquidating
opposition activists and rebel factions deemed un-Islamic—meaning most,
if not all, from ISI’s perspective—Baghdadi announced the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham in April 2013 to show he was behind JN’s successes and
to end what he saw as Jawlani’s insubordination.4 Instead of caving in to
Baghdadi’s attempt to subsume JN under his authority, Jawlani pivoted and
ostensibly “renewed” his baya (an oath of allegiance to a higher religious/
 Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism 17

political authority) to AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.5 Through this move,

Jawlani moved JN outside the ISIS orbit, as he hoped to obtain a ruling from
Zawahiri that would rubber-stamp JN’s independence from ISIS—a ruling
Zawahiri granted. This dispute ultimately caused one of the biggest rifts in
the jihadist movement as infighting emerged between the rebels and ISIS by
the start of 2014, and AQ formally disavowed ISIS.6 Already in 2013, before
the infighting began, a number of more hardline local members of JN and
foreign fighters had defected to ISIS.
For its part, JN continued to work with others within the anti-Assad-
regime rebellion, especially Islamist and Salafi factions like Harakat Ahrar
al-Sham al-Islamiyah (HASI), which had been JN’s biggest enabler within the
broader rebellion. The JN split with ISIS, too, gave it more gravitas among the
rebels, despite JN’s now open declaration of an AQ affiliation. Yet to secure its
future—in part because the United States was helping the more nationalist
factions in the anti-Assad camp to delegitimize JN and turn the tide toward
nonextremist elements—in summer and fall of 2014, JN began to go after
these forces to take greater control of the anti-Assad fight and eliminate
internal problems. The most prominent cases were JN’s elimination of the
Syrian Revolutionaries Front in October 2014 and Harakat Hazm in March
2015.7 This marked the beginning of a policy by JN and its successor groups
to either dismantle or forcibly absorb enemies, competitors, or spoilers.
In late March 2015, JN teamed up with a number of other local Islamist
and Salafi forces in a joint operations room called Jaish al-Fatah to take over
Idlib province,8 which has become the epicenter of the rebellion against the
Assad regime. Since JN and these factions now controlled territory, calls
arose for unity.9 One idea behind Jaish al-Fatah was to create a unified
military and political administration that would do away with factional
differences. JN’s status as AQ’s official branch in Syria proved to be a larger
problem, however,10 and an obstacle to wider unification efforts, especially
after Russia overtly entered the conflict in fall of 2015.11 In late 2015 and
throughout 2016, there was a growing sense that if the insurgency were to
survive, more serious efforts at unification would have to be made.
In July 2016, JN decided to break publicly with AQ without having first
consulted with Zawahiri about it.12 Instead, Zawahiri’s deputy in Syria,
18 The Age of Political Jihadism

Ahmad Hasan Abu al-Khayr, approved the measure in the context of

further embedding JN within the local milieu, contingent upon Zawahiri
later approving it.13 Atun explained the thinking behind the move as a
transitional stage in which Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) would retain secret
ties with Zawahiri, paving the way for a larger merger with other factions
that would constitute a full breaking of ties, but would also be acceptable to
Zawahiri.14 As part of this transitional stage, JN changed its name to Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham.
However, when Zawahiri found out about this plan, he rejected it.15 Even
before Zawahiri had indicated his rejection of JFS, some AQ veterans within
JN—most notably, the Jordanians Abu Julaybib and Abu Khadijah—had been
unhappy about the lack of consultation with Zawahiri on the formation of
JFS, and they disassociated themselves from the group.16 If Atun’s account
is to be believed, some of the AQ veterans who were against the formation
of JFS had influenced AQ leader Saif al-Adel’s view of JFS, and in turn Saif
al-Adel gave Zawahiri the wrong impression of JFS as a project that was
intended to break ties with AQ. Further, according to Atun, subsequent
communications occurred in which Zawahiri indicated his rejection of the
idea of a secret allegiance on account of the experience with IS, and that any
real resolution involving a breaking of ties would require a proper merger
with other factions. It would seem that among the factions that would have
to sign on to the merger for a consideration of endorsement by Zawahiri
was the aforementioned JN/JFS ally HASI.
Thus, during the JFS period, it would seem that achieving a merger with
HASI became a primary objective of Jawlani and the JFS leadership. HASI’s
mainstream leadership, however, ultimately shied away from merging with
JFS, likely out of concern that the merger would effectively mean being
subsumed under Jawlani’s leadership and that it would jeopardize ties with
Turkey. In December 2016, a breakaway faction from HASI called Jaish al-
Ahrar and led by Hashem al-Sheikh was created,17 which, alongside other
groups, would form the backbone of what became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
in January 2017.18 This counter-move helped sustain JFS’s future. In a bid
to show its alleged maturity and concession toward criticism, al-Sheikh
became the first leader of HTS.19 This decision was reversed in October
 Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism 19

2017 back to Jawlani, since HTS dropped the pretense of having al-Sheikh
as the effective leader of the group.20
In the view of both its proponents and critics, the creation of HTS marked
the final breaking of ties with AQ. Any remaining AQ elements who had
decided to remain with JFS for the sake of maintaining unity in the ranks
broke off and refused to sign on to HTS. The most notable example was Sami
al-Uraydi, who denounced what he saw as insubordination to Zawahiri.21
The jihadist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was also critical
of HTS’s move away from AQ. He viewed their decision as diluting the
group’s original manhaj (methodology) as it pertained to living up to strict
adherence to AQ and the jihadist movement’s traditional views on tawhid
(monotheism).22 In the late fall of 2017, HTS arrested some of the AQ veterans
who had complained about Jawlani’s maneuvers.23 After their eventual
release, some of these figures became involved in the creation of a new AQ
branch in Syria called Huras al-Din (HD), whose existence was first publicly
announced in February 2018.24 In October 2018, HD set up the Wa Harid
al-Mouminin (And Incite the Believers) Operations Room in conjunction
with two smaller jihadist groups, Jabhat Ansar al-Din (which had broken off
from HTS) and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam (an Iraqi group that now primarily
operates in northwest Syria).
However, since HTS was controlling the areas that HD operated in, HTS
expected HD not to run afoul of HTS’s authority and policies, in return for
which HTS tolerated the group and perhaps even provided logistical sup-
port for some the frontline positions maintained by HD. According to Abu
al-Laith al-Halabi, who described himself as an HTS fighter and has run
one of the more well-known pro-HTS channels on Telegram, “HTS provides
expenditures of food and ammunition for [HD] on a daily basis.”25 In this
way, HTS initially attempted to shape HD’s activities to prevent HD from
going outside the bounds of what HTS was attempting to accomplish. As this
author wrote in September 2019, “If [HD] were to grow significantly stronger,
HTS may try to suppress it and arrest its leaders in order to preserve its own
power base. In that sense, HD’s local growth potential is somewhat limited.”26
In many ways, this is what occurred. On June 12, 2020, HD, alongside its
two partners in the Wa Harid al-Mouminin Operations Room, established a
20 The Age of Political Jihadism

new operations room called “Fa-thbutu” (So Be Steadfast) that also included
the groups Tansiqiyat al-Jihad and Liwa al-Muqatilin al-Ansar.27 The leaders
of the latter two groups, Abu al-Abd Ashida and Abu al-Malik al-Talli, respec-
tively, had falling-outs with HTS over the direction of the jihad, relations with
Turkey, and corruption issues. Similarly, ahead of this announcement, Abu
Salah al-Uzbeki, the leader of the Uzbek Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad that was
aligned with HTS, switched his allegiance from HTS to Jabhat Ansar al-Din,
thereby adding further strength to this alternative jihadist bloc.
As a consequence of these shifting alliances and the bolstering of the HD-
led alternative jihad, HTS arrested Uzbeki on June 17 and Talli on June 22,
2020. This led the new Fa-thbutu Operations Room to warn HTS that it would
“bear the consequences in this world and the hereafter” if it did not release
its leaders or submit to a religious court.28 HTS retroactively claimed, in a
circular by its Higher Follow-Up and Supervision Committee, that individuals
needed authorization to either leave the group or join other groups.29 HTS
saw the formation of this new operations room and the defections as an
unacceptable challenge to its authority. The same rationale of asserting its
authority and control had prompted the group to crack down on nonjihadist
rivals in 2017–19. These included HASI, which ultimately agreed to accept
HTS authority in northwest Syria, and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, which
broke off from HTS after initially joining the group and maintained its own
fiefdom in the west Aleppo countryside that was then dismantled by HTS.
HTS’s arrests of Uzbeki and Talli and the perceived lack of transparency
behind them led to infighting between HTS and the Fa-thbutu Operations
Room in the communities of Arab Said, al-Hamamah, al-Yaqubiyah, Jday-
dah, Armanaz, Kuku, and Sheikh Bahar over the next few days until truces
were brokered as HTS overpowered HD and its allies.30 This led HTS on
June 26, 2020, to proclaim a ban on establishing any new factions or new
military operations rooms, and that the only military efforts that could be
conducted would be via its own al-Fatah al-Mubin (The Clear Conquest)
military operations room.31 As a result, HTS shut down HD’s military bases,
and the Fa-thbutu operations room was effectively dissolved. Since then,
there has been no evidence publicly that HTS has continued to provide HD
any operational support. HD’s only operations since then have been covert
 Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism 21

attacks conducted elsewhere in Syria well outside of Idlib and its environs.
Of the other factions in the Fa-thbutu operations room, only Jamaat Ansar al-
Islam reached an understanding with HTS that has permitted it to continue
conducting military operations on the front lines.
The takedown of AQ’s de facto branch in Syria highlights the differences
between HTS and the Taliban. The latter effectively ignores the issue of
AQ in Afghanistan and attempts to deceive everyone about AQ’s presence
and/or its connections to the Taliban. In contrast, HTS has gone after AQ in
Syria, even though its primary motives for doing so were asserting HTS’s
own authority rather than a desire to prove its counterterrorism bona fides
to the West. Therefore, while some might try to draw similar conclusions
about the two groups, their approaches to AQ are very different.
Since the crackdown on HD, HTS has also gone after other independent
foreign fighters and their related groups that did not submit to its authority.
Most notably, HTS dismantled the independent Junud al-Sham led by Muslim
Shishani and Jundallah led by Abu Fatimah al-Turki in October 2021.32
Muzamjir al-Sham, a Syrian Islamist critic of HTS, calls the group’s current
prison system “Idlib’s Guantanamo” since at least 170 foreign fighters are
allegedly imprisoned by the group.33
At the same time, there are other foreign fighters and designated foreign
terrorist groups that have submitted to HTS’s writ.34 This shows that foreign
fighters and foreign groups remain an issue for the United States, even if
HTS has challenged other foreign fighters and foreign terrorist groups that
are America’s enemies.
22 The Age of Political Jihadism

Notes

1. Rania Abouzeid, “The Jihad Next Door,” Politico, June 23, 2014,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-
syria-108214; Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “About the Fields of
al-Sham,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media Production,
April 10, 2013, https://bit.ly/3IRSMrf.
2. Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian
Tragedy (Chicago: Haymarket, 2017), 185.
3. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Rally ’Round the Jihadist,” Foreign Policy, December
11, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/11/rally-round-
the-jihadist.
4. Abu Bakr al-Hussayni al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, “Announcement
of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” al-Furqan Foundation for
Media Production, April 9, 2013, https://bit.ly/3tVnbRq.
5. Jawlani, “About the Fields of al-Sham,” https://bit.ly/3IRSMrf.
6. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Inside Baseball on Syrian Rebel Infighting,” War on
the Rocks, February 7, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/
inside-baseball-on-syrian-rebel-infighting; Aaron Y. Zelin, The War
Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,
Research Note 20 (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2014),
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-war-
between-isis-and-al-qaeda-for-supremacy-of-the-global-jihadist.
7. Liz Sly, “The Rise and Ugly Fall of a Moderate Syrian Rebel Offers
Lessons for the West,” Washington Post, January 5, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-rise-and-ugly-fall-of-a-
moderate-syrian-rebel-offers-lessons-for-the-west/2015/01/04/
3889db38-80da-4974-b1ef-1886f4183624_story.html; Liz Sly, “Syrian
Rebel Group That Got U.S. Aid Dissolves,” Washington Post, March 1, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-fighter-group-that-got-
us-missiles-dissolves-after-major-defeat/2015/03/01/286fa934-c048-
11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html.
8. Jaish al-Fatah, “Message to Our People in Idlib,” March 24, 2015,
https://bit.ly/387IqH3.
9. Charles Lister, “The Syria Effect: Al-Qaeda Fractures,” Current Trends
in Islamist Ideology, December 11, 2019, https://www.hudson.org/
research/15533-the-syria-effect-al-qaeda-fractures.
 Jawlani’s Path to Political Jihadism 23

10. Charles Lister, “How al-Qa’ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate: The
Inside Story,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 2 (February 2018), https://ctc.usma.
edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story.
11. Andrew Osborn and Phil Stewart, “Russia Begins Syria Air Strikes
in Its Biggest Mideast Intervention in Decades,” Reuters, September
30, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia/
russia-begins-syria-air-strikes-in-its-biggest-mideast-intervention-
in-decades-idUSKCN0RU0MG20150930.
12. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “‘Announcing Its Formation,’” July 28,
2016, https://bit.ly/3iQfbur.
13. Sheikh Ahmad Hasan Abu al-Khayr, “A Word,” al-Manarah al-Bayda
Foundation for Media Production, July 28, 2016, https://bit.ly/3JZeHOB.
14. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham–al-Qaeda
Dispute: Primary Texts (II),” December 10, 2017, https://www.
aymennjawad.org/2017/12/the-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-qaeda-
dispute-primary-1.
15. Cole Bunzel, “Abandoning al-Qaida: Tahrir al-Sham and the Concerns
of Sami al-Uraydi,” Jihadica, May 12, 2017, http://www.jihadica.com/
abandoning-al-qaida.
16. “Abu Julaybib wa Abu Khadija al-Urduniyan Yanshaqqan an Fatah
al-Sham” [Jordanian Abu Julaybib and Abu Khadija Split from Fatah
al-Sham], Arabi 21, August 22, 2016, https://bit.ly/3Dpx6BP.
17. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
and Wider Tensions in the Syrian Insurgency,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 2
(February 2017), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-formation-of-hayat-tahrir-
al-sham-and-wider-tensions-in-the-syrian-insurgency.
18. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” January
28, 2017, https://bit.ly/3JZUuYX.
19. Al-Shaykh, “First Words,” https://bit.ly/3LpXEFC.
20. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Administrative Decision,” October 1, 2017,
https://bit.ly/372KAqQ.
21. Bunzel, “Abandoning al-Qaida,” http://www.jihadica.com/
abandoning-al-qaida.
22. Cole Bunzel, “Diluting Jihad: Tahrir al-Sham and the Concerns of
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” Jihadica, March 29, 2017, http://www.
jihadica.com/diluting-jihad.
23. Lister, “How al-Qa’ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate,” https://ctc.
usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story.
24 The Age of Political Jihadism

24. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Huras al-Din: The Overlooked al-Qaeda Group

in Syria,” PolicyWatch 3188, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 24, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/huras-al-din-overlooked-al-qaeda-group-syria.
25. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hay’at Tahrir al­Sham: Interview,”
January 10, 2019, previously available at http://www.aymennjawad.
org/2019/01/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-interview. The author retains a
full copy of this interview.
26. Zelin, “Huras al-Din,” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/huras-al-din-overlooked-al-qaeda-group-syria.
27. “So Be Steadfast” Operations Room, “Founding Statement,” June 12,
2020, https://jihadology.net/2020/06/12/new-release-from-so-be-
steadfast-operations-room-founding-statement.
28. “So Be Steadfast” Operations Room, “On the Assaults of Hay’at Tahrir
al-Sham upon the ‘So Be Steadfast’ Operations Room,” June 22, 2020,
https://bit.ly/3IVV9cJ.
29. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “A Circular from the Follow-Up and Higher
Supervision Committee,” June 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/3tW1xwe.
30. “Agreement Between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the ‘So Be Steadfast’
Operations Room Concerning the Village of Arab Sa’id,” June 26,
2020, https://bit.ly/3IVvAZa; “A Truce Agreement Between Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham and Huras al-Din in the Areas of al-Hamamah,
al-Ya’qubiyah, and Jdaydah,” June 26, 2020, https://bit.ly/3wQx2K7;
“A Third Agreement Between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Huras al-Din
in the Haram Region (Armanaz, Kuku, and Shaykh Bahar),” June 26,
2020, https://bit.ly/3DsqUZK.
31. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “On Uniting the Military Effort,” June 26, 2020,
https://bit.ly/3iTNIYN.
32. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Urgent Clarification Regarding the
al-Turkman Events,” October 26, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qTG710.
33. Aaron Y. Zelin, “‘Idlib’s Guantanamo’: Foreign Fighters in HTS
Prisons,” Syrian Jihadism, June 11, 2021, https://syrianjihadism.
com/2021/06/11/idlibs-guantanamo-foreign-fighters-in-hts-prisons.
34. “Foreign Fighters: Their Relation with HTS,” Levant 24, April 3, 2022,
https://levant24.com/articles/2022/04/foreign-fighters-their-
relation-with-hts.
 4

From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals

“The liberated areas have begun, by the permission of God

(Almighty and Exalted Is He), with a strategic plan for economic
development in the liberated areas. It began in the first stage in the
preservation of human resources, and thus were the universities
established in the liberated areas, and the priority of the liberated
areas in terms of interest in the schools and education is to preserve
human resources because they are the foundational pillar upon
which any economic growth arises.”
—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “The Participation of the Leader Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani in the Emergency Session of the General
Shura Council,” Amjad Foundation for Media Production,
November 24, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qTAUGt.

Reading the words above, one might think they were uttered by a nation’s
Finance Ministry official. In fact, these are Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani’s
opening remarks at an emergency session of the HTS Syrian Salvation
Government’s General Shura Council in November 2021, wherein he com-
mented on the aftermath of Turkey’s lira crisis and its effect on the price
of bread in Idlib.
These words are a far cry from Jawlani’s fiery speech when he announced
Jabhat al-Nusra’s creation in late January 2012 to “return God’s authority
to the Earth and take revenge for the violated chastity and bloodshed, and
bring a smile to children and widows.”1 Yet while Jawlani now focuses on
26 The Age of Political Jihadism

Jawlani discusses the crisis associated with bread prices with the Syrian Salvation
Government’s General Shura Council.

a wider array of issues, when it comes to fighting, he still uses a tone that
easily fits that of a leader of the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. In February 2020,
for example, he said this to a group of elite HTS fighters:

The enemies of God (Almighty and Exalted Is He) are striving

against the Sunnis, in order to exterminate them, displace them,
and wipe them out from this land. And the consequences of losing
this battle in the land of al-Sham are very big, not only for the people
of al-Sham, but also for all the Sunnis in all the region. Therefore,
my brothers, you are not just defending 12 million displaced people
and refugees, and a million martyrs, and blood, and land, and the
women violated in the prisons of this regime. No. Rather, you are
defending an umma in its entirety.2

Therefore, even if HTS has moved away from using takfir (pronouncements
of apostasy) and focuses on local rather than global jihad,3 the worldview
of its leadership and members remains extreme. But unlike before, when
HTS was more purist and blindingly loyal to minutiae in its ideology, today
the group and Jawlani recognize limits to following the path of entities like
AQ or IS. For Jawlani, the ideal of implementing sharia is a comprehensive
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 27

administrative project and not merely a matter of carrying out criminal

hudoud penalties. As Jawlani stated in a video released in May 2020 address-
ing HTS fighters, “Some people limit the issue of implementing the rule of
the sharia to just imposing some of the hudoud punishments, chopping off
hands, stoning whomever, whipping someone who drinks alcohol, and so
on. But this is a very basic part of the very big concept of implementing the
rule of the sharia.”4
Jawlani is clearly no longer just a leader of a terrorist group or insurgent
faction; he is also the head of an inchoate polity. With that comes responsibil-
ity and a more multi-faceted approach beyond the martial realm. Of course,
Jawlani should not be given credit for such a speech in of itself, especially
since his group has developed a monopoly over Idlib’s economy, and most
people in the territory it controls are poor and barely able to survive.5 But
the interest in and rhetorical emphasis on these topics illustrate the more
complex nature of Jawlani and HTS. Since he came onto the scene in Syria
a decade ago, Jawlani went from secrecy, to engaging locals, to engaging the
Arab region, to now attempting to engage Western audiences.
Jawlani’s earliest public statement was audio only, and was manipulated
to disguise his voice. This was the subject of a major critique by long-time
London-based Syrian jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who had been
involved in the jihad against the Hafiz al-Assad regime in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. On January 24, 2012, in response to questions by several
“brothers” on Tartusi’s thoughts in reaction to Jawlani and JN’s first video
message on his Facebook page “al-Muardah al-Islamiyah lil-Nizam al-Suri”
(Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime), Tartusi had reservations about
the group.6 One of Tartusi’s strongest critiques was about the fact that the
men in the video, and specifically Jawlani, were all masked, while Syrians
had removed their fear of the Assad regime by defying the taghut (false idol
and tyrant). Based on his lived experience, Tartusi implied that the regime
might be using JN as a way to mislead and entrap people, recalling how it
apparently used the likeness of Adnan Uqla—a Fighting Vanguard leader
who fought against Hafiz al-Assad in the late 1970s and early 1980s—to
capture dozens of people. Therefore, the obligation on those claiming to
be mujahedin supporting the Syrian people should be to reassure them
28 The Age of Political Jihadism

about their true identity. Tartusi understood that for the mujahedin’s safety
some have to cover their faces, but those representing the group should
show themselves and reveal their identity—something that would hopefully
help the masses sympathize with the group’s cause. However, Jawlani’s
modus operandi would remain intact until he appeared unmasked when
announcing JN’s disaffiliation with AQ and becoming JFS, before eventually
becoming HTS.7
By the time the United States designated JN as a terrorist group, Tartusi’s
reservations about the group were irrelevant to actors on the ground. The
Syrian National Council (SNC), which was then the face of the revolution,
released a statement rejecting the U.S. designation. The SNC, which at
the time had considerable influence in opposition politics, countered that
the Assad regime’s massacres were the true terrorism in Syria.8 The Syr-
ian Muslim Brotherhood’s deputy leader also stated that the decision to
designate Jabhat al-Nusra was “very wrong.”9 The chief of staff of the Free
Syrian Army at the time, Brig. Gen. Salim Idris, added that Jabhat al-Nusra
was not a terrorist organization, and depended on young, educated Syrians
for its efforts.10 More than a hundred different revolutionary Facebook
pages issued a statement denouncing the American designation of Jabhat
al-Nusra as a terrorist group. The statement called for naming the following
Friday—the day on which Syrian revolutionaries would protest weekly—as
“No to American intervention—we are all Jabhat al-Nusra.”11
After garnering the support of locals in 2012, Jawlani’s interview with
Frontline in spring 2021 can be seen as an entree into influencing more
Western publics. It is a natural extension of his public diplomacy to gain
acceptance within the Arab sphere outside Syria with his appearances on
Al Jazeera between 2013 and 2016. These interviews provided a larger
platform and other forms of legitimacy to Jawlani’s cause. In his first
appearance in December 2013, one can see echoes of his vision even
though he was still within the IS and AQ orbit: “This isn’t just about sha-
ria (Islamic law) courts, but also a sharia vision for the distribution of
municipal services...for a functioning state that performs normal state
functions effectively: delivering electricity, building hospitals, issuing
marriage licenses, etc.”12
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 29

Another milestone in Jawlani’s attempts to ingratiate himself and his

group with his local constituency came in December 2015, when he coopted
the language of revolution in addition to jihad in messaging at a press confer-
ence with supportive journalists.13 In August 2017, HTS sharia official Anas
al-Khatab wrote a treatise legitimizing the use of the term “revolution,”
rebuffing Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who had criticized group members
for using such language.14 The group has gone even further since then,
attempting to frame itself as an intrinsic part of the revolution, even if the
group had nothing to do with the original revolutionary protest movement
in 2011. Jawlani demonstrated his awareness of the limitations of his group
monopolizing the revolution when he said in January 2019 that “we are part
of this revolution, but we are not the whole revolution.”15 The actions of the
group against revolutionary elements indicate a poor record, even to this
day. Thus, while Jawlani might state that “we are not the whole revolution,”
many revolutionary activists, especially those who have been imprisoned
or killed by HTS and its predecessor groups, would argue this rings hollow.
This is partly why Jawlani has recently been appearing publicly with
various actors in the areas that HTS controls to garner more support and
sympathy and to show that his group is listening to what residents want or
need. This public diplomacy campaign can be traced to Eid al-Fitr in June
2018, when Jawlani distributed gifts at a party for children of martyrs and
visited the injured as a consequence of the war.16 Interestingly, this period
coincides with the time when the United States stopped actively target-
ing Jawlani in its drone campaign. In subsequent years, Jawlani would
also publicly meet with military leaders and foot soldiers, foreign fighters
from Saudi Arabia and Kurdistan, tribal elders, elites and notables, regular
residents, and individuals in internally displaced person (IDP) camps. He
also attended ​​a competition for Qur‘anic memorizers.
Many of the meetings that Jawlani attends are part of his and the group’s
effort to show that it is responsive to governance issues and concerns. In
August 2020, for example, in a meeting with IDPs from Halfaya, Jawlani
acknowledged that HTS is not a “big state” and has limited ability to help
people, but it would direct its resources where it could. One way to do this,
he said using a theme raised a few times, is self-sufficiency.17 In May 2021,
30 The Age of Political Jihadism

Jawlani distributes gifts at an event for children of martyrs, Eid al-Fitr, June 2018.

while meeting a delegation of tribal sheikhs, Jawlani stated that “the current
stage is one of preparation and institution building” that will pave the way
for an eventual victory. “Every institution we build in the liberated areas
represents a step toward Damascus...Our battle is on every level. It’s not
just a military battle, because construction is harder than war. There are
many hardships.”18 Thus, it was not surprising to see Jawlani appear at the
January 2022 inauguration of a widened road that connects Bab al-Hawa
to Aleppo, explaining that these projects are building blocks to a better life
for local residents. “Freedom comes from military strength...and dignity
comes from economic and investment projects, through which the people
and the citizens live a dignified life that befits Muslims.”19

Limitations

There is no doubt that HTS and its civilian governing body, the Syrian Salvation
Government, are implementing public works projects to improve the lives of
people residing in their territories. However, there are limitations to what they
can do to improve people’s lives on account of the limited economic assets
in HTS’s territory (in contrast to the earlier years when JN had influence in
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 31

Jawlani inaugurates expanded Aleppo–Bab al-Hawa Road with SSG prime

minister Ali Keda.

oil-rich Deir al-Zour province), but also because the value of the Syrian pound
and the Turkish lira has dropped precipitously in recent years.20 While some
claim that the SSG “cannot be considered an offshoot of the management of
HTS,”21 others like Nisreen Al-Zaraee and Karam Shaar note that the SSG “is
no more than a tool to provide the ‘legal’ and administrative frameworks for
HTS’s takeover of the region’s economy and resources.”22
The fact that Jawlani is increasingly appearing as part of the SSG’s
work—for example, in late January 2022 at an emergency session related
to winter conditions at IDP camps to announce the “Your Warmth Is Our
Duty” campaign23—underscores the fig leaf nature of the SSG, which was
originally created to obscure the role of HTS as having ultimate control
of everything. While HTS does not micromanage all levers of the SSG, the
government would not be permitted to execute a decision that ran afoul of
HTS.24 It is not surprising, then, that following his speech introducing “Your
Warmth Is Our Duty” at IDP camps in Sarmada and Deir Hassan, Jawlani
stated that HTS would be leading the campaign alongside the SSG.25
Likewise, key figures such as Mazhar al-Ways and Anas Ayrut, the former
a key HTS ideologue and the latter a member of the HTS-backed Supreme
32 The Age of Political Jihadism

Fatwa Council, are members of the SSG’s Ministry of Justice’s Supreme

Judicial Committee and the SSG’s Ministry of Endowments, Dawa, and
Guidance, respectively.26 There are also rumors that Jawlani’s own brother,
Hazim, has been a judge in Sarmada, the head of finances for the General
Zakat Commission, and a leader in HTS’s news agency Ibaa when it was
active.27 It is likely that there are many other lesser-known individuals within
HTS that are also active within the SSG.
As a consequence of this dynamic, rather than providing economic
freedom to local people attempting to make a living, HTS is increasingly
monopolizing different sectors.28 HTS and members of the group control
the following entities in these sectors:

• Financial: General Monetary Agency for Cash Management and

Consumer Protection and Sham Bank29
• Border: Crossing Management Body and General Administration of
Crossings
• Energy: Watad Petroleum, Kaf Business Company, and al-Shahba
• Internet: Public Telecommunications Corporation of the SG and SYR
Connect
• Media and Advertising: Creative Inception
• Telecommunication: Syria Phone

In addition, locals complain of HTS seizing territory under its own ver-
sion of eminent domain to take property and gentrify areas for the benefit
of their leaders.30 In July 2021, for example, HTS and the SSG allegedly
decided to demolish the bazaar in Darat Izza and turn it into a shopping
center, sparking local protests.31 Eventually, the bazaar was demolished
and a mall was built on the site. HTS leaders are also involved in a number
of construction projects. Because the civilian SSG is a component of HTS’s
statecraft, those in key positions are able to exploit that relationship at the
expense of regular residents in areas controlled by HTS. “The majority of
investment operations and projects owned by HTS leaders are carried out
through civilian intermediaries close to the leaders, who act as fronts behind
which the real investors hide.”32
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 33

According to the International Crisis Group, this has led to “HTS’s eco-
nomic activity...creat[ing] a network of Syrians throughout the northwest
dependent on the group and vested in its survival.”33 This is why even though
in Jawlani’s address about the economic situation in Idlib following the fall
of the Turkish lira in November 2021, in which he promised that bread
would be subsidized,34 this does not solve the long-term issue and further
degrades the quality of life of the people in the area, since they become ever
more reliant on HTS to survive.
This monopolization of different industries has led to protests, since HTS
can control the price of different commodities. For example, in mid-October
2021, after the HTS-affiliated Watad fuel company raised the price of gas
cylinders for the fifth time in a month, local residents came out in al-Saa
Square in central Idlib to demonstrate against price gouging.35 One sarcastic
slogan among the many shouted during the protest was “We are drowning
in your salvation!” in reference to HTS’s civil administration.36
Likewise, measures that ostensibly would help HTS’s SSG fund various
projects in the areas in which it operates are punitive to the point that it
could severely limit people’s livelihoods. For instance, the SSG’s General
Directorate of Transport issued a decision in early 2018 requiring that all
motorcycles be registered within one month, with a penalty of doubling the
registration fees and impounding the motorcycle.37 As a follow-up, on April 4,
2021, the SSG ruled that unregistered vehicles would be confiscated.38 This
led individuals like Dioub, as reported by Jalal Suleiman, to register the[ir]
motorcycle and pay a fine, but to do so he “will have to borrow the money”
and therefore go into debt.39 This is a hardship for people like Dioub, whose
situation is typical of many in HTS territories, since his motorcycle was his
only means of transportation and without it he would not be able to work
and provide for his wife and six children.40
The situation in HTS territory is so dire that it has become the norm to see
children toiling in the streets.41 Some of them are coerced into engaging in
smuggling activities, while others sell napkins, chewing gum, sweets, corn,
and hummus on the sidewalks of cities, villages, and IDP camps.42 On top of
the economic pressures, HTS also forces children to attend its training camps
to become child soldiers. A video entitled “Generation of Conquerors,” likely
34 The Age of Political Jihadism

only meant for internal use, which this author accessed, shows children doing
military drills at an HTS training camp in late November 2020.43 The video
also included a speech around a campfire by HTS ideologue ​​Sharih al-Himsi.
This is not mere propaganda. In late May 2020, on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr,
Jawlani greeted a group of children to celebrate the end of the holiday. During
his speech, he told the children, “we are all on the path to martyrdom.” In the
same video, among other gifts for children, he gave a small child a toy gun.44
At the conclusion of his speech, Jawlani said that the martyrs have “preceded
us to paradise,” but that he and the rest of the audience are, “God willing,
right behind them.”45 These remarks illustrate the militarized approach that
Jawlani and HTS take with children in the territory it controls.
Overall, the more that Jawlani shifts to focusing on governing territory
in addition to the military activities that HTS is already engaged in, the
more he is likely to become embroiled in local battles for legitimacy if HTS
is unable to improve people’s lives over the long term. Consequently, HTS
appears increasingly to resemble a traditional Arab government in terms
of its activities among the local population.

Authoritarianism

Beyond the economic realm, there are limitations on the degree to which
local people can act without harassment or being jailed. HTS’s SSG is not
a democracy, a form of government that the group continues to reject.46
There is no true check on HTS’s or Jawlani’s power. Although the SSG holds
elections for its technocratic ministries and the Shura Council, the list of
eligible candidates is pre-selected, and only certain people are allowed to
vote. No women are allowed to vote or hold any senior-level positions in the
SSG.47 Consequently, the process is elite and male-driven, and most residents
in HTS territory have no role in it or in who decides on the rules of society.
Local residents live at the whim of this small cohort.
Furthermore, this system benefits the local Sunni population, to the
detriment of minorities residing in the territories HTS controls. Much of
Jawlani’s messaging is about the existential threat that Sunnis face and his
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 35

Confirmation voting for SSG prime minister Ali Keda, December 2021.

group’s role in protecting them. In one of Jawlani’s first appearances after

announcing that his group had left AQ in 2016, he told Al Jazeera, “The
cause of the people of al-Sham...is a cause of Islam, religion and preserving
the Sunnis.” He added, “Today, we have entered a stage of defending our
existence. That is the state of the Sunni people in al-Sham. If, God forbid, the
rawafidh [derogatory term for Shia] project hostile to the Sunnis succeeds, if it
succeeds in al-Sham, this will extend to transgress on the Sunnis in the entire
region.”48 Furthermore, during Eid al-Adha in 2018, Jawlani stated, “know
that the interests of the Sunnis, the protection of them, providing them with
security and a dignified life, under the protection of the benevolent sharia:
this is indeed the foremost of our priorities.”49 Even after the formation of
HTS, Jawlani has continued to tie the battles in Syria to the fate of all Sunnis
in the region, as he illustrated when he spoke to members of HTS’s elite
military forces in February 2020: “You are not just defending 12 million
displaced [Sunni] people and refugees, and a million martyrs, and blood,
and land, and the women violated in the prisons of this regime. No. Rather,
you are defending the umma in its entirety.”50
In line with this, in June 2021, senior HTS ideologue Abu al-Fatah al-
Farghali released a series of fatwas on Telegram in response to questions from
36 The Age of Political Jihadism

British researcher Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi on the group’s understanding

of different minorities that live in its territory. Christians are considered
mustamin (a non-Muslim considered to be residing in Islamic lands temporar-
ily with security guarantee despite not paying the jizya), while Alawites and
Druze are deemed apostates.51 While the ruling on Christians might appear
tame compared to that for Alawites and Druze, HTS has still confiscated at
least 550 properties from Christians, including homes and shops, which have
not been returned since the practice began in 2015.52 Even worse, HTS has
forcibly converted the Druze from the villages of the Jabal al-Summaq area
of the north Idlib countryside to Sunni Islam. HTS has also confiscated the
properties of those outside the area.53 In June 2015, at least twenty Druze
individuals were massacred amid a dispute about confiscation of land in the
village of Qalb Lawzah.54 Today, Uyghur members of the HTS-allied, Uyghur-
led foreign fighter outfit Katibat al-Ghuraba al-Turkestan occupy many of
the properties in Qalb Lawzah that were owned by Druze who are outside the
area, and locals claim that these Uyghurs are hostile and abusive toward the
original Druze inhabitants.55 In addition, HTS and other armed groups have
confiscated properties in the villages of al-Fua and Kefraya, whose inhabitants
were Twelver Shia and were evacuated from the villages in 2018.56
While the situation is dire for minorities, many within the Sunni popula-
tion also express discontent about the limited nature of the political process.
Some have different ideological views from those of HTS and its allies about
how society should be run. According to the March 2021 report by the United
Nations Human Rights Council on arbitrary imprisonment and detention
in Syria, there have been seventy-three documented cases of detention of
activists, journalists, and media workers who criticized HTS.57 The report
also identifies sixty-four cases of individuals being “disappeared” by the
group.58 For example, Samer al-Salloum was disappeared on December 25,
2017, and according to his brother Mohamed, HTS executed Samer in 2019
alongside nineteen others for criticizing the group.59
Many residents in HTS territory have criticized the lack of transparency in
these processes for failing to provide reasons for arrests, holding kangaroo
trials, and for the treatment of prisoners.60 According to a lawyer in Idlib,
“Death sentences are carried out in secret prisons without trial...Detainees
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 37

don’t get to have a public trial or to know the evidence on which the decision
was made against them.”61 This picture of a lack of legal transparency is
corroborated in an article by Abu al-Yaqdhan al-Masri, an Egyptian cleric
who was previously in HTS, who also discussed torture in prisons.62 One of
the many protests by locals was held in the Mashhad Ruhin IDP camp in
Idlib countryside on August 20, 2021, where protesters called for the release
of detainees held by the group.”63 Similar protests occurred in Atarib and
al-Baraka IDP camp in late October 2021, and in Deir Hassan in late January
2022.64 In response, individuals involved in protests or comments online
have allegedly been forced to publish videos of themselves apologizing to
HTS and its leader Jawlani.65
While Jawlani claims that “there is no torture” in the HTS prison system,66
the UN Human Rights Council points to evidence that the group has “tar-
geted dissenting civilians and routinely tortured and subjected them to
ill-treatment in detention facilities.”67 The most notorious for ill-treatment
and torture according to the report are the Shahin section of the Idlib central
prison, the Harem central prison, and the al-Uqab prison, which consists
of caves and underground cells in the Jabal al-Zawiya region.68 Based on
113 direct accounts of torture or inhumane treatment, “victims described
detention in overcrowded and unhygienic cells that, compounded by the
lack of medical care, allowed for the spread of communicable diseases.”69
On top of this, torture methods included “severe beatings, placing detainees
in a ‘coffin,’ in a dulab (tire), or suspending them by their limbs.”70 Even
more disturbing, several male former detainees, according to the report,
“described being sexually harassed, forced to strip naked, electrocuted on
their genitals and raped in HTS facilities.”71 Other reporting has also provided
strong evidence that women are being abducted, tortured, and raped in
HTS prisons.72 Based on this and other data in the UN report, the Human
Rights Council concluded that HTS actions in its prison system amounted
to “crime(s) against humanity of torture.”73
Beyond regular activists, HTS also conducts these types of activities
against its jihadist rivals in AQ and IS. According to Muzamjir al-Sham, al-
Badiyah prison in Idlib city specializes in dealing with AQ prisoners, while
al-Zanbaqi prison in western Idlib governorate is where IS members are
38 The Age of Political Jihadism

held.74 Those imprisoned in these facilities have allegedly endured different

types of torture: “ghosting” (left hanging from a ceiling or doorframe for
days), breaking limbs, use of electricity, and pulling out nails.75 One of these
prisoners, the American Bilal Abd al-Karim, who has since been released,
has published a video series on how the torture is undertaken.76 HTS has
also allegedly tortured the wives of these jihadist prisoners too.77
In relation to women beyond the jihadist movement, one of the instru-
ments that HTS uses to control or hamper women’s lives is its hisbah (moral
policing) apparatus. Of course, hisbah can be done against men too, but a
large part of it consists of policing women in public. HTS’s hisbah entity has
gone through various phases, from Sawaid al-Khayr, which was formed in
June 2017,78 to al-Falah Center in May 2020.79 Since August 2021, it has been
subsumed into the SSG’s Ministry of Endowments, Dawah, and Guidance.
As part of this shift, the Ministry launched a campaign called “Guardians of
Virtue,” which led to events, competitions, and various billboards being put
up on the streets to reinforce a message that defines a woman’s appearance
and manner in a narrow and misogynistic sense.80 The images below illus-
trate the through line between the various eras, since the type of messaging

Sawaid al-Khayr members use a billboard to promote rules on women’s

appearance, including the necessity of full niqab.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 39

Banner from the SSG’s “Guardians of Virtue” campaign, September 2021.

Such notices contain Quranic content urging women to dress modestly and avoid
wearing makeup.

has not changed even if HTS wants to give the appearance that it has, since
it is now under its civilian governing body.
According to Syrian journalist Mohammed Hardan, some of the tasks of
the hisbah are to “prevent men and women from mixing in public places by
erecting control points on university campuses and in parks, preventing men
from selling women’s clothes, banning the display of mannequins at shops,
monitoring wedding halls, and banning music and smoking. In addition, it
is known to interfere with women’s clothing and accessories and forcing
humanitarian organizations to separate their staff by gender.”81 This has
given free rein to HTS hisbah patrols to beat up, flog, or imprison violators.
In the aforementioned UN Human Rights Council’s report, it documented
many cases of women being detained by HTS for traveling without a male
member of their family (mahram) or for being inappropriately dressed.82
These are just a few examples:

• Attacks on girls in the Idlib city market occurred in June 2017.83

• A female hisbah member beat up the female director of exams at
Idlib University due to a dispute over her outfit.84
40 The Age of Political Jihadism

• Bus drivers affiliated with an NGO called Violet Organization were

arrested, while teachers and students at al-Oruba High School, the
Pythagoras Institute, and the Center for Development and Technol-
ogy were beaten under the pretext of illicit mixing by men and
women.85
• The hisbah forces brought moral charges against a woman and a
male merchant for being inside the shop alone, without a mahram.
They also blamed the merchant for not hiring a female shop assis-
tant for such situations.86
• The hisbah patrol stopped a woman walking around Idlib’s Public
Park because she was wearing an allegedly “eye-catching tight
dress.” Hisbah agents then scolded her for more than ten minutes in
front of everyone in the park.87

These types of actions are accepted even among those less extreme in their
religious beliefs due to a culture of toxic masculinity, Syrian researcher
and professor of pedagogy Raymond al-Maalouli argues. “Authorities in
the north rely in their decisions on strict fatawa (plural of fatwa) that have
nothing to do with the essence of Islam but are in line with society’s toxic
masculinity,” as he explains it. “They produce restrictions out of wrong
jurisprudence, old social customs, and masculine culture standards that
help men feel righteous and in control over the women in their lives.”88 This
is why women have a difficult time performing the most basic functions
such as driving. Even though, based on a report from Hadia
​​ Mansour, “there
is no law or circular preventing women from driving in northwest Syria,
society continues to enforce restrictions on women, claiming driving to
be a men’s right only.”89 Asma al-Mahmoud, an NGO worker in the region,
explained that she “encountered lots of harassment by security elements
on checkpoints and was frequently questioned about why she was driving
without a legal male escort.”90
These frustrations around HTS’s treatment of the local population have
led to dissent by opposition media to varying degrees over time. Most notori-
ous is the case of Radio Fresh, a station run by local activists in the town of
Kafr Nabl, created in 2013 following the revolutionary uprising. In January
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 41

2016, HTS’s predecessor group JN stormed the facilities of Radio Fresh for
its alleged “secular tendencies and support of apostates.”91 This resulted
in the arrests of Radio Fresh’s founder Raed Fares and Hadi al-Abdullah as
well as the station being taken off the air, its equipment confiscated, and
its archives wiped clean.92 As a consequence of Fares continuing to critique
HTS, he and his colleague Hamoud Junaid, were assassinated by HTS in
November 2018. According to Fares, a year prior to his assassination, Bilal
al-Shawashi, a Tunisian foreign fighter and HTS’s head sharia official in
Kafr Nabl, harassed him and tried to exile him from his hometown.93 This
came after numerous failed attempts by HTS and its predecessor groups to
assassinate Fares in years prior.94
Less violent but just as relevant, on August 24, 2021, HTS shut down
opposition news channel Orient TV’s office in Idlib on account of the vague
reasoning of “the channel’s bias and hostile policy toward local factions.”95
This is in some ways a culmination of HTS’s policies to try to rein in dissent
by requiring all journalists that work in its territory to get press cards.96 While
this decision is no doubt a way to formalize HTS’s governing structures that
might be seen in any country, it is also a bureaucratic tool to block certain
actors from gaining access to a press card. In turn, if such an individual tried

An individual receives a press card from the SSG’s General Directorate of

Information, June 2021.
42 The Age of Political Jihadism

to report without one, HTS could penalize the individual with fines or jail,
thereby silencing journalists who are perceived to be an irritant for HTS.
Of course, many individuals have still been able to receive press cards,97
but others like those still affiliated with Radio Fresh, such as the station’s
current chief executive, Abdullah Klido, are in a bureaucratic black hole.
“We need 100 approvals.”98
Lastly, there is the case of the pseudonymous pro-AQ HTS critic, called
Radd Udwan al-Bughat on Telegram, which was run by an individual who
calls himself Abu Abd Allah al-Shami. On November 16, 2021, he announced
that he was closing his Telegram account due to intimidating messages
sent from HTS officials, which allegedly threatened to reveal the identities
and locations of Radd Udwan al-Bughat’s relatives who lived in Assad-
regime-controlled areas of Syria.99 This would have meant putting them
in danger of arrest or worse. The case illustrates how far HTS would go to
undermine its active critics. Such actions were formalized in late February
2022 through the creation of HTS’s official cyber entity called the Electronic
Jihad Army.100 It would not be surprising if HTS has also used similar tactics
against nonjihadist activists.
In view of the above, it is evident that while Jawlani and HTS are attempt-
ing to distance themselves from their past associations with AQ and IS, they
have turned in many ways into a local regime that acts like other regional
authoritarian states. The question for policymakers is whether Washington
should overlook this as it does with its allies in the region.
Before addressing this question, it is worth reexploring actions taken by
HTS and its predecessor groups. It would be poor policy for Washington or
any European capital to completely ignore major transgressions by Jawlani
and HTS. If HTS is serious about wanting to engage with the United States
and the West, it must be held to account as well as provide restitution to
those whom it has wronged.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 43

Notes

1. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Declaration of the Support Front (Jabhat

al-Nusrah): For the People of Syria from the Mujahidin of Syria in
the Fields of Jihad,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, January 24, 2012, https://bit.ly/3qS7Xuj.
2. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “A Session with Inghimasis of the Red
Bands in West Aleppo,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, February
4, 2020, https://bit.ly/3NxBpQ4.
3. Hassan Hassan, “Sunni Jihad Is Going Local,” Atlantic, February
15, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/
sunni-jihad-turns-away-transnational-terrorism/582745.
4. “Visit of the Commanders to [Their] Mujahidin Sons on a Blessed Id
al-Fitr,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, May 26, 2020, https://bit.
ly/3wPnDlS.
5. Nisreen Al-Zaraee and Karam Shaar, “The Economics of Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham,” Middle East Institute, June 21, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/
publications/economics-hayat-tahrir-al-sham.
6. Facebook post by “Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime,”
January 24, 2012, previously available at http://www.facebook.com/
moaradaislamiya/posts/311812605527435. The author retains
a copy in his archive, and message content is available at https://
justpaste.it/tartusijnjanuary2012.
7. Jawlani, “Announcing Its Formation,” https://bit.ly/3iQfbur.
8. “Suriya Tantafidh dhid Wasaf Amrika li-Jabhat al-Nusra bi-l-Irhab”
[Syria is rising up against America’s description of Jabhat al-Nusra
as terrorists], al-Watan Voice, December 11, 2021, https://www.
alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2012/12/11/342117.html.
9. “U.S. Blacklisting of Islamist Opposition Group ‘Very Wrong:’ Syrian
Brotherhood,” Al Arabiya, December 11, 2012, https://english.
alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/11/254534.
10. “Jaish al-Suri al-Hur Yu’lin Rafadhahu al-Qarar al-Amriki dhid Jabhat
al-Nusra wa-Ahli Halab wa-Idlib Yukharajun fi Mudhaharat Mindadah”
[The Free Syrian Army announces its rejection of the United States’
decision against Jabhat al-Nusra, and the people of Aleppo and Idlib
demonstrate in condemnation], al-Watan Voice, December 11, 2021,
https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2012/12/11/342123.html.
44 The Age of Political Jihadism

11. “Bal-asma: Akthar min 100 Mawqa lil-Thawrah al-Suriyah Tu’lin

al-Jumuah al-Qadimah Kulnah Jabhat al-Nusra’” [The United States’
decision to designate Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist group drew
widespread condemnation from all Syrian military and revolutionary
sectors, in addition to popular rejection and Syrians’ declaration
of support for the group], Wakalat al-Anba al-Islamiyah—al-Haqq,
December 11, 2012, https://www.dd-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.
​​
php?t=157803.
12. “‘Today’s Meeting’ with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani: Al-Nusrah
and the Future of Syria,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3wSzgsl.
13. Jabhat al-Nusra, “Press Conference with the Conquering Shaykh Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, December 13, 2015, https://bit.ly/3JXwfL7.
14. Anas Khatab, “Research Message: The Term (Revolution) Between
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Leaders of the Mujahidin,” August 19,
2017, https://bit.ly/376QPu1.
15. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “The Dialogue #2: Internal Fighting and the
Future of the Field with Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani,” Amjad
Foundation for Media Production, January 14, 2019, https://bit.
ly/375jWO3.
16. For a full archive of Jawlani’s public appearances, see https://
jihadology.net/2020/05/27/a-timeline-of-abu-muhammad-al-
jawlanis-appearances.
17. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Visiting an IDP Camp to Look into Their
Requests and Meet Them,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, August
1, 2020, https://bit.ly/36Z1nv4; Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Visiting
Residents of the Halfaya IDP Camp to Follow Up and Meet Their
Needs,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, August 6, 2020, https://
bit.ly/3DuVdPj.
18. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “A Meeting of the Leader Abu Muhammad
al-Jawlani with Shaykhs of Tribes on the Blessed Day of Id al-Fitr,”
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, May 15, 2021, https://bit.
ly/3NOiJvN.
19. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Speech at the Opening Event of the
Aleppo–Bab al-Hawa Road,” Amjad Foundation for Media Production,
January 8, 2022, https://bit.ly/3wYIEed.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 45

20. Khaled al-Khateb, “Deteriorating Turkish Lira Hurts Residents in

Syria’s Idlib,” Al-Monitor, November 24, 2021, https://www.al-monitor.
com/originals/2021/11/deteriorating-turkish-lira-hurts-residents-
syrias-idlib.
21. Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, How Global Jihad Relocalises and
Where It Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria (Fiesole,
Italy: European University Institute, 2021), https://bit.ly/3NzSN6J.
22. Al-Zaraee and Shaar, “The Economics of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,”
https://www.mei.edu/publications/economics-hayat-tahrir-al-sham.
23. Administration of the Liberated Areas, “An emergency session of
the liberated leadership in order to support our displaced people
in the various regions of the liberated north,” January 31, 2022,
Aaron Y. Zelin (@azelin), “HTS/SG has an emergency session with
the ‘liberated leadership’ (Jawlani, Head of Majlis al-Shura, and
the SG Prime Minister) in order to support IDPs in their territories.
They are launching the ‘Your Warmth Is Our Duty” campaign,” post
on Twitter, January 31, 2022, 8:21 a.m., https://twitter.com/azelin/
status/1488140300329574407.
24. According to Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, “The health sector
has been mostly supervised by international NGOs while education is
organized by independent religious institutes and foreign-supported
organizations.” See “The Consolidation of a (Post-Jihadi) State-let,”
https://pomeps.org/the-consolidation-of-a-post-jihadi-technocratic-
state-let-in-idlib.
25. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Participation in the Inspection of the
Affected IDP Camps After the End of the Emergency Session,” Amjad
Foundation for Media Production, February 1, 2022, https://bit.
ly/3uKUeGN.
26. Salvation Government Ministry of Justice, “The Minister of Justice,
Judge Anas Mansour al-Sulaiman, and a Member of the Supreme
Judicial Council, Dr. Mazhar al-Ways, Inaugurated the Specialized
Criminal Judicial Session for Penal Judges and Heads of the Public
Prosecution Office in the Ministry of Justice, in Order to Develop and
Advance Judicial Work” (in Arabic), September 23, 2021, https://
syriansg.org/19882; and Dr. Anas Ayrut, “House of Righteous #3,”
Salvation Government Ministry of Endowments, Dawa, and Guidance,
January 17, 2022, https://syriansg.org/25385.
46 The Age of Political Jihadism

27. “Al-Jawlani al-Thani fi al-Hukumah al-Inqadh’” [al-Jawlani is second

in the Salvation Government], Syria.TV, April 26, 2021, https://bit.
ly/3NBQq3g.
28. Al-Zaraee and Shaar, “The Economics of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,”
https://www.mei.edu/publications/economics-hayat-tahrir-al-sham;
and Khaled al-Khateb, “Jihadi Group Seeks Command of Media,
Advertising in Northwest Syria,” Al-Monitor, November 22, 2021,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/jihadi-group-
seeks-command-media-advertising-northwest-syria.
29. To clarify, the “Sham Bank” referred to here is different from its
Assad-affiliated namesake, which is under U.S. sanctions.
30. Khaled al-Khateb, “How Syrian Jihadi Group Is Laundering Money
in Idlib,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/
originals/2021/08/how-syrian-jihadi-group-laundering-money-idlib.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report 197
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.
org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/197-best-
bad-options-syrias-idlib.
34. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Jawlani’s Participation in Emergency
Session,” https://bit.ly/3qTAUGt.
35. Khaled al-Khateb, “Protests Break Out in Syrian City Controlled
by Jihadist Faction,” Al-Monitor, October 21, 2021, https://www.
al-monitor.com/originals/2021/10/protests-break-out-syrian-city-
controlled-jihadist-faction.
36. Ibid.
37. Jalal Suleiman, “Opposition-Led Government in Syria’s Idlib
Increases Taxes on Motorcycles,” Al-Monitor, December 29, 2021,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/12/opposition-led-
government-syrias-idlib-increases-taxes-motorcycles.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Khaled al-Khateb, “Idlib’s Children Become Breadwinners
Amidst Rising Poverty,” Al-Monitor, November 28,
2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/
idlibs-children-become-breadwinners-amidst-rising-poverty.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 47

42. Ibid.
43. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Generation of Conquerors,” November 30,
2020, https://bit.ly/3qSarZQ.
44. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Greeting the Children of the Martyrs on
the Occasion of Id al-Fitr,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, May 26,
2020, https://bit.ly/3qRnSsX.
45. Ibid.
46. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “A Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Perspective
on Democracy,” February 9, 2019, https://www.aymennjawad.
org/2019/02/a-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-perspective-on-democracy.
47. For more on these obstacles, see Hadia Mansour, “Women Excluded
from Administrative Representation in Northern Syria, Says Female
Activists,” Enab Baladi, April 1, 2022, https://english.enabbaladi.
net/archives/2022/04/women-excluded-from-administrative-
representation-in-northern-syria-says-female-activists.
48. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, “Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani in an
Exclusive Interview with al-Jazeera,” September 17, 2016, https://bit.
ly/3uG05gN.
49. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Congratulations on the Occasion of
the Blessed Id al Adha 1439 H,” Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Media Office,
August 21, 2018, https://bit.ly/36IeO2I.
50. Jawlani, “A Session with Inghimasis,” https://bit.ly/3NxBpQ4.
51. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Abu al-Fatah
al-Farghali on Minority Sects,” June 17, 2021, http://www.aymennjawad.
org/2021/06/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-abu-al-fatah-al-farghali-on.
52. Al-Zaraee and Shaar, “The Economics of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,”
https://www.mei.edu/publications/economics-hayat-tahrir-al-sham;
and Khalifa and Bonsey, “In Idlib, Washington’s Chance to Reimagine
Counter-Terrorism,” https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-
africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syrias-idlib-washingtons-
chance-reimagine-counter-terrorism.
53. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Druze
Clues,” Foreign Affairs, October 5, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/syria/2015-10-05/druze-clues; and Aymenn Jawad
Al-Tamimi, “Additional Notes on the Druze of Jabal al-Summaq,”
October 6, 2015, https://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/10/additional-
notes-on-the-druze-of-jabal-al-summaq.
48 The Age of Political Jihadism

54. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Tunisian Jihadists Assassinated

by the Americans in Idlib,” September 16, 2020, https://www.
aymennjawad.org/2020/09/the-tunisian-jihadists-assassinated-by.
55. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Guest Post: The Uyghur Jihadist
Scoundrels Occupying Homes in Qalb Lawze,” August 14, 2021,
http://www.aymennjawad.org/2021/08/guest-post-the-uyghur-
jihadist-scoundrels.
56. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Situation in Kafariya:
Interview,” March 24, 2021, https://aymennjawad.org/2021/03/
the-situation-in-kafariya-interview.
57. UN Human Rights Council, “Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention—
Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Syrian Arab Republic,”
March 11, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/
Pages/Detention-report.aspx.
58. Ibid.
59. Martin Smith, “Interview: Mohamed al Salloum,” March 11, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/mohamed-al-salloum.
60. Khaled al-Khateb, “Jihadi Group in Syria’s Idlib Faces Criticism over
Unfair Trials, Death Sentences,” Al-Monitor, August 25, 2021, https://
www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/jihadi-group-syrias-idlib-
faces-criticism-over-unfair-trials-death-sentences.
61. Ibid.
62. Abu al-Yaqdhan al-Masri with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, ed., “The
Ruling of Torturing the Accused,” September 26, 2020, https://
aymennjawad.org/2020/09/guest-post-sheikh-abu-al-yaqdhan-al-
masri-on-use.
63. Khateb, “Jihadi Group in Idlib Faces Criticism,” https://www.
al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/jihadi-group-syrias-idlib-faces-
criticism-over-unfair-trials-death-sentences.
64. Khaled al-Khateb, “Syrian Jihadist Group Mandates Apologies, or
Imprisonment, for Criticism,” Al-Monitor, November 11, 2021,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/syrian-jihadist-group-
mandates-apologies-or-imprisonment-criticism; and “Residents of
Syria’s Idlib Protest Against HTS Policies, Forced Disappearances,”
The New Arab, January 22, 2022, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/
residents-syrias-idlib-protest-against-hts-repression.
65. Khateb, “Syrian Jihadist Group Mandates Apologies,” https://www.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 49

al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/syrian-jihadist-group-mandates-
apologies-or-imprisonment-criticism.
66. Martin Smith, “The Jihadist: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Frontline,
February 1 and February 14, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani.
67. “Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention—Report on Syria,” https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Detention-report.
aspx.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Alaa Nassar, “Like Being in Assad’s Prisons: Female Survivors Recall
Their Ordeals in HTS Cells,” Syria Direct, January 7, 2021, https://
syriadirect.org/like-being-in-assads-prisons-female-survivors-recall-
their-ordeals-in-hts-cells-2.
73. “Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention—Report on Syria,” https://www.
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Detention-report.aspx.
74. See a full thread by Muzamjir al-Sham on HTS’s prison system:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1477315507334361089.html.
75. Ibid.
76. All videos are available in Bilal Abd al-Karim’s OGN TV YouTube
channel archive: https://www.youtube.com/c/OGNTV/videos.
77. “Umm Maymouna: ‘HTS Detained & Beat Me,’” YouTube video, 30:25,
posted by “OGN TV,” August 24, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QAp3zrgElEA.
78. Hasan Arfeh, “‘Sawa’id Al-Khair’ Interferes with Humanitarian Work
in Idlib,” Atlantic Council, March 9, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/blogs/syriasource/sawa-id-al-khair-interferes-with-
humanitarian-work-in-idlib.
79. Mohammed Hardan, “Syrian Jihadist Group in Idlib Replaces
Security Squad with ‘Moral Police,’” Al-Monitor, September
13, 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/09/
syrian-jihadist-group-idlib-replaces-security-squad-moral-police.
80. Salvation Government, “Guardians of Virtue,” Ministry of
Endowments, Dawa, and Guidance, September 1, 2021, https://
​​
syriansg.org/18725.
50 The Age of Political Jihadism

81. Ibid.
82. “Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention—Report on Syria,” https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Detention-report.
aspx.
83. Hardan, “Jihadist Group Replaces Security Squad with ‘Moral
Police,’” https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/09/
syrian-jihadist-group-idlib-replaces-security-squad-moral-police.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Zeinab Masri, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Guards ‘Virtue’ by Imposing
Restrictions on Women in Syria’s Idlib,” Enab Baladi, October 24,
2021, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/10/hayat-tahrir-
al-sham-guards-virtue-by-imposing-restrictions-on-women-in-
syrias-idlib.
87. Ibid.
88. Jana al-Issa and Diana Rahima, “Caught Between Rigid Beliefs and
Toxic Masculinity: Women in Northwestern Syria,” Enab Baladi,
November 7, 2021, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/11/
caught-between-rigid-beliefs-and-toxic-masculinity-women-in-
northwestern-syria.
89. Hadia Mansour, “Women Drivers in Idlib Defy Society-Based
‘Mahram’ Law,” Enab Baladi, November 28, 2021, https://english.
enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/11/women-drivers-in-idlib-defy-
society-based-mahram-law.
90. Ibid.
91. Maya Gebeily, “Qaeda in Syria Briefly Abducts Prominent Media
Activists,” Agence France-Presse, January 10, 2016, available at
https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/qaeda-abducts-media-
activists-syria-rebel-town-105055383.html.
92. Haid Haid, HTS’s Offline Propaganda: Infrastructure, Engagement
and Monopoly (London: International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, 2019), https://icsr.info/2019/09/18/htss-offline-
propaganda-infrastructure-engagement-and-monopoly.
93. Interview with Raed Fares, November 7, 2017.
94. Oula Alrifai, “In Memoriam: Raed Fares and the Banners of
Kafranbel,” Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, December 12,
2018, https://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2018/12/12/in-memoriam-
raed-fares-and-the-banners-of-kafranbel.
 From Secrecy to Engagement with Locals 51

95. “Lajnah Daam al-Sahafiyin Tu’abr an Qalaq Balagh li-Tadhur

al-Huriyat al-Ialamiyah fi Minatiq Saytarah Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
fi Suriya ma Aqfal Maktab Qunah Uriyint” [The Journalists Support
Committee expresses deep concern about the deterioration of media
freedoms in the areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria
with the closure of the Orient TV office], Lajnah Daam al-Sahafiyin,
August 27, 2021, https://journalistsupport.net/article.php?
id=377108.
96. Ibaa News Agency, “Hukumat al-Inqadh Tusadir Bitaqat li-Dhabat
al-Amal al-Sahafi fi al-Shamal al-Muharar” [Salvation Government
issues cards to control journalistic work in the liberated north], July
2, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20210127002254/https://ebaa.
news/news/news-details/2020/07/69336.
97. “Syrian Journalists in Idlib Face Crackdown from Jihadist-Affiliated
Government,” Al-Monitor, October 26, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.
com/originals/2020/10/syria-idlib-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-permits-
journalists-freedom.html.
98. Kareem Fahim, “Former al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria Seems to Soften Its
Brand,” Washington Post, January 2, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/2022/01/02/syria-idlib-hts-qaeda-militants.
99. Radd Udwan al-Bughat, “Important Announcement,” November 16,
2021, previously available at https://t.me/atiocxz. The account is no
longer active due to the threats.
100. Khaled al-Khateb, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Fights Opponents on Social
Media,” Al-Monitor, March 4, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/
originals/2022/03/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-fights-opponents-
social-media.
 5

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage

The previous chapter highlighted the many ways in which Hayat Tahrir al-
Sham and its predecessor groups imposed their will, including by forcibly
converting Druze to Sunni Islam, confiscating property from Christians,
and assassinating the Syrian revolutionary icon Raed Fares. This chapter
will identify other reprehensible actions perpetrated by HTS’s predecessor
groups. Especially noteworthy are their provision of the initial space for
the Islamic State to operate and become what it became, their conduct of
a military campaign that sought to ethnically cleanse Alawites (includ-
ing civilians) from parts of the Latakia countryside, and their kidnapping,
imprisonment, and torture of two Western journalists.

How Jabhat al-Nusra Helped Facilitate the Rise

of the Islamic State

It is commonly known among experts that Jabhat al-Nusra, HTS’s prede-

cessor group, was originally created as a branch of the Islamic State’s own
predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq. Even as HTS leader Abu Muhammad
al-Jawlani rebuffed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham in April 2013, he praised Baghdadi for having
helped provide essential resources when JN was created, calling him “that
honorable Shaykh who gave the people of al-Sham their right...he aided
us...despite the hard days that [ISI] was enduring.”1 In mid-December 2013,
before ISIS was ejected from many Syrian rebel enclaves later that month
 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage 53

and in early January 2014, Jawlani explained in an interview with Al Jazeera

that the situation between JN and ISIS was “a conflict between individuals
within the same house.”2 This illustrates the framework within which Jawlani
still viewed ISIS.
While JN initially tried to stay out of the rebel infighting with ISIS, the
differences became irreconcilable once al-Qaeda released a statement
on February 2, 2014, disaffiliating itself with ISIS and later, on February
23, with the assassination of key AQ liaison and HASI senior leader Abu
Khalid al-Suri.3 Regarding the latter, Jawlani appeared to denounce ISIS
for hypocrisy, likening Abu Khalid’s killers to the sahawat (“awakening
councils”) in Iraq that turned away from AQ in favor of the United States.
“The sahawat in Iraq are those who abandoned fighting America and the
rafidah [derogatory term for Shia], and exchanged this for fighting the
mujahedin with the enemy. And in al-Sham, who is the one who has aban-
doned fighting the nusayris [a derogatory term for Alawites], and started
fighting those who fight the nusayris?”4 Likewise, two days after Abu Khalid’s
assassination, JN released an essay clarifying its manhaj (methodology) in
contradistinction to ISIS.5
Nevertheless, by then it was too late, since ISIS had successfully built
itself up in the previous ten months or so within Syria. Not only did the

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra members come together at Eid al-Adha, October 2013.
54 The Age of Political Jihadism

space that JN gave to ISIS provide the latter with new fighters, weapons, and
greater financial stability; it also helped undermine the fight by nonjihadist
rebels against the Assad regime. A large portion of the territory that had
previously been under nonjihadist rebel control would fall under ISIS and
its successor group, the Islamic State, in the months and year to come.
Likewise, a large part of ISIS’s campaign and initial dispute with JN was
over Jawlani and JN’s refusal to do Baghdadi’s bidding and assassinate
key Syrian activists and rebel leaders given that ISIS viewed them all as
apostates.6 From that point forward, ISIS was able to use its new resources
to take territory in Iraq, which in turn helped it consolidate its control in
eastern Syria.
In many ways, the initial entrance of JN into the Syrian conflict, which in
turn provided the space for ISIS to enter, helped seal the fate of the Syrian
opposition and rebellion, ending any chance it may have had to topple the
Assad regime. It is plausible that the opposition and revolutionaries still
would have eventually failed due to the sheer barbarity of the regime, but
the entrance of jihadists and their foreign fighter cohort reduced any chance
of outside help that could have facilitated the fall of the Assad regime, lest
the country fall into the hands of either JN or ISIS.

Campaign Against Alawites

Beginning on August 4, 2013, the first day of Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end
of Ramadan, JN, ISIS, and other Salafi insurgent groups began a campaign
against Alawite territories in rural Latakia. This campaign was active through
August 18, 2013. On the first day, according to Human Rights Watch, 190
civilians were slaughtered as these groups took over ten villages. “Most of
these individuals were either intentionally or indiscriminately killed” and
“the crimes were premeditated and organized.”7 Therefore, Human Rights
Watch concluded, “the killings, hostage taking, and other abuses commit-
ted...rise to the level of crimes against humanity.”8 While JN and other groups
described it as the “Battle to Liberate the Coast in Rural Latakia,” ISIS called
it “Cleansing of the Coast Operations.”9
 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage 55

One of many rocket attacks against Alawite population centers, Latakia

governorate. This launch occurred in August 2013.

The violations Human Rights Watch documented on the first day of the
campaign were broadly indicative of attacks that JN would conduct against
Alawite civilians militarily and ideologically. During the days of JN, Jawlani
would consistently refer to Alawites as nusayris, which is degrading at the
lowest level—the equivalent of calling a black person the N-word in America.
In his comments, he did not distinguish civilians from the regime, in part
because much of the upper echelons and decisionmaking therein were from
the Alawite sect. “For sure, Bashar al-Assad does not kill by himself, he kills
with them [nusayris].”10
However, the massacre of women and children and the arbitrary targeting
of civilian villages was still egregious, even if the crimes committed by the
Assad regime were far worse and on an industrial scale. It still does not
excuse the actions taken by JN, such as its “eye for an eye” campaign in the
aftermath of the Assad regime’s horrendous chemical weapons attack against
civilians in the Ghouta area of the Damascus suburbs. In announcing the
campaign, Jawlani exclaimed that “the revenge for the blood of your sons
is a debt in our necks and the neck of every mujahid, and we won’t be free
56 The Age of Political Jihadism

from it until we make them taste what they made our sons taste since it has
been legalized for us to punish in the same way.”11
While Jawlani’s rage is legitimate, responding in kind with war crimes,
even if not on the same level of brutality as the Assad regime, illustrates the
bankruptcy of his and his group’s worldview. This particular campaign lasted
until September 14, 2013.12 And while some of the attacks conducted in this
campaign were against military targets, they also included the assassination
of an Alawite cleric and random bombings of the Alawite village of Bahlouliya
(as shown in the earlier image).13 The examples discussed in this section on
an ideational and military level are merely the tip of the iceberg regarding
actions taken against Alawite civilians.14

Imprisoning and Torturing Western Journalists

Most people became aware of the reemergence of ISIS through its beheading
campaign against Western and Japanese journalists and humanitarian
workers in the fall of 2014. Yet ISIS was not the only group that kidnapped
foreigners. While JN never conducted such theatrically sadistic acts as ISIS,
it still kidnapped individuals, including Western journalists. Some examples
were the cases of American journalists Theo Padnos and Matthew Schrier,
even though Jawlani feigned ignorance in his interview with Martin Smith.
“We never had American prisoners, in the first place, not during the Nusra
time or even now. This is the first time I hear about it.”15 However, Padnos,
who was imprisoned longer than Schrier since he escaped, was held by one
of Jawlani’s top lieutenants, Abu Mariya al-Qahtani,16 which illustrates the
caveats one has to take into account when analyzing Jawlani’s interview
with Frontline.
Padnos ended up being released via an alleged ransom payment by
the Qatari government. Following their return to the United States, both
journalists wrote memoirs of their experiences as prisoners of JN. Both go
into great detail on their torture. The techniques used against them were
similar to ones described earlier that HTS continues to use against activists
and jihadist enemy prisoners. According to Padnos, torture had a particular
 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage 57

stench, and they knew when it was coming: “When there is torture, they reek
of the patchouli oil the men in black put in their beards. Every time you smell
the oil, you know those men are on their way into the cell block.”17 Ahead of
Schrier’s escape, he quipped that “in an hour and a half we [he and Padnos,
who was unable to escape] would either be free, dead, or wishing they’d kill
us to end the torture.”18 This highlights the level of torture that Schrier knew
JN to be capable of based on their experiences while imprisoned. Unlike the
cases with ISIS, both Padnos and Schrier survived. However, they showcase
the crimes directly committed by JN against American citizens.
Although this chapter is not an exhaustive discussion of crimes commit-
ted by JN, it is useful to remember some of the better-known cases when
contemplating future policy related to the group in its current form. The
failure to procure an admission of guilt or justice for the victims ahead of
any prospective policy change would give the current leadership of HTS an
unwarranted pass.
58 The Age of Political Jihadism

Notes

1. Muhammad al-Jawlani, “About the Fields of al-Sham,” al-Manarah

al-Bayda Foundation for Media Production, April 10, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3IRSMrf.
2. “‘Today’s Meeting’ with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani: Al-Nusrah
and the Future of Syria,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3wSzgsl.
3. Al-Qaeda, “On the Relationship of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham,” al-Sahab Foundation for Media Production,
February 2, 2014, https://bit.ly/3JRapc5; “Syria Rebel Leader Abu
Khaled al-Suri Killed in Aleppo,” BBC, February 24, 2014, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26318646.
4. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “I Wish You Were Eulogizing Me,”
al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media Production, February 24,
2014, https://bit.ly/3JSNayi.
5. Jabhat al-Nusra, “Words on the Manhaj: About What We Believe and
What We Owe God,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, February 25, 2014, https://bit.ly/35sJCE5.
6. “Asrar dawlah al-baghdadi #daish,” WikiBaghdady, December 14,
2013–June 13, 2014, archived at https://docs.google.com/document/
d/1wEQ0FKosa1LcUB3tofeub1UxaT5A-suROyDExgV9nUY; originally
posted on Twitter: https://twitter.com/wikibaghdady.
7 ‘You Can Still See Their Blood’: Executions, Indiscriminate Shootings, and
Hostage Taking by Opposition Forces in Latakia Countryside, Human Rights
Watch, October 10, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/10/
you-can-still-see-their-blood/executions-indiscriminate-shootings-
and-hostage.
8. Ibid.
9. Jabhat al-Nusra, “Beginning of the Battle to Liberate the Coast
in Rural Latakia,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, August 9, 2013, https://bit.ly/3NDcDOv; and Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham, “On the Operations ‘Cleansing of the Coast’ in
the State of Latakia,” al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production,
August 11, 2013, https://jihadology.net/2013/08/11/new-statement-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-on-the-operations-
cleansing-of-the-coast-in-the-state-of-al-ladhakiyyah-latakiya.
 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Historical Baggage 59

10. “Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, Part 1,” Al Jazeera, May
27, 2015, https://bit.ly/3K1ult0.
11. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “An Eye for an Eye,” al-Manarah al-Bayda
Foundation for Media Production, August 25, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3wQnyOP.
12. “Three New Statements from Jabhat al-Nusrah,” al-Manarah al-Bayda
Foundation for Media Production, September 14, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3qOrpIj.
13. “Four New Statements from Jabhat al-Nusrah,” al-Manarah al-Bayda
Foundation for Media Production, August 26, 2013, https://bit.
ly/3DHjCBH; and “Four New Statements from Jabhat al-Nusrah,”
al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media Production, August 28,
2013, https://bit.ly/3wQoliL.
14. Another case includes the Ishtabraq massacre: Aymenn Jawad
Al-Tamimi, “The Ishtabraq Massacre in Idlib: Interview,” May 1, 2020,
https://aymennjawad.org/2020/05/the-ishtabraq-massacre-in-
idlib-interview.
15. Martin Smith, “The Jihadist: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Frontline,
February 1 and February 14, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani.
16. Theo Padnos, Blindfolded: A Memoir of Capture, Torture, and
Enlightenment (New York: Scribner, 2021).
17. Ibid., xi.
18. Matthew Schrier, The Dawn Prayer (Or How to Survive in a Secret Syrian
Terrorist Prison) (Dallas: BenBella Books, 2018), 256.
 6

External Operations, Guidance,

and Inspiration

As U.S. Syria representative James Jeffrey noted, HTS has sought to let
Washington know that “We want to be your friend. We’re not terrorists.
We’re just fighting Assad...We’re not a threat to you.”1 While such rhetoric
may appear desperate or odd, it partly aligns with Jawlani’s policies when
he led JN. In a May 27, 2015, interview with Al Jazeera, Jawlani claimed, “We
are only here to accomplish one mission: to fight the regime and its agents
on the ground, including Hizb Allah and others. Jabhat al-Nusra has no
plans or directives to target the West. We received clear orders [from Ayman
al-Zawahiri] not to use Syria as a launching pad to attack the United States
or Europe so as not to sabotage the true mission against the regime. Maybe
al-Qaeda does that [elsewhere], but not here in Syria.”2
Some may counter that the so-called Khorasan Group, which was embed-
ded within JN over the 2013–16 period, was interested in planning external
operations abroad. While this assessment contains some truth, the dynamic
between JN’s historical leadership and those involved in the Khorasan
Group must be disaggregated based on newer information that illuminates
differences and disagreements between these two entities. Although from the
outside these gaps appeared to be trivial, they were actually a harbinger of
subsequent events. In many ways, the Khorasan Group was a proto-version
of Huras al-Din.3
Following the split between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in April
2013, JN was officially an AQ branch and no longer just an IS subsidiary.
Yet according to Muzamjir al-Sham, “al-Jawlani was completely unknown
[to AQ’s senior leadership] and his baya to al-Qaeda occurred suddenly and
 External Operations, Guidance, and Inspiration 61

without complete coordination.”4 This was in contrast to a series of histori-

cal AQ leaders whom Zawahiri knew and sent to Syria from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iran over the ensuing years to shore up support in light of the
Islamic State’s war against al-Qaeda and its branches. That cohort became
known colloquially as the Khorasan Group because of its region of origin. The
arrival of these AQ leaders created tensions within JN’s leadership starting
in 2013–14, as AQ pressed JN to accommodate leaders within the JN shura
council. In addition, figures such as Sami al-Uraydi, Samir Hijazi (aka Abu
Hamam al-Suri), and Radwan Namus (aka Abu Firas al-Suri) acquired senior
leadership positions within JN.5
Jawlani was also allegedly uncomfortable with the more purist theologi-
cal positions of these figures. Related frictions allegedly led to a potential
coup plot by AQ leader Abd al-Muhsin Abd Allah Ibrahim al-Sharikh (aka
Sanafi al-Nasr) against Jawlani in late 2014.6 While that plot, if it existed,
was unsuccessful, according to Saleh al-Hamawi, one of JN’s founding lead-
ers, Zawahiri tried to isolate Jawlani in late 2015 by appointing Abdullah
Muhammad Rajab Abdulrahman (Abu al-Khayr al-Masri) as the leader of
JN. Abdulrahman had recently arrived to Syria from Iran after a prisoner
exchange between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.7 This move
backfired, however, and in retrospect it could be one of the reasons Jawlani
and JN decided to break ties with AQ about a half-year later.
Both these internal dynamics and the sparing of JN’s original leadership
by the U.S. drone campaign suggest that, unlike Khorasan Group figures, JN
likely was not plotting international attacks. Thus, the situation was far more
complicated than it appeared from the outside during the 2014–16 period.
Nevertheless, it is possible that, because of the accessibility of propaganda
by Jawlani and JN or more recent content from HTS, the group could still
inspire someone in the West to plot an attack at home. For example, when
looking at the pre-HTS period, a number of occasions emerge when Jawlani
describes America as an enemy that is conspiring against JN, conduct-
ing a war against the so-called mujahedin, and disparaging Syrian rebel
groups that have taken assistance from Washington.8 Other, more recent
problematic issues from the U.S. perspective include Jawlani’s rhetorical
support for the Taliban and perception of it as a model—even if the Syrian
62 The Age of Political Jihadism

and Afghan contexts are different9—his backing of Hamas terrorism in the

Gaza-based group’s ongoing war against Israel, denunciation of alleged
cases of blasphemy against the Muslim prophet Muhammad within HTS,
and HTS leaders’ current discourse that could inspire attacks in the West
even if the group is not directly calling for them.10

Israel and Hamas

This section highlights the ways in which HTS frames the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict to local constituents and how it may be understood by those
in the West who are viewing HTS’s online media and know that Western
countries are allied with Israel. This section does not intend to get into
the deep and complicated history between Israel and the Palestinians or
Hamas in particular.
In the most recent Hamas-Israel war in May 2021, HTS issued a statement
illustrating the group’s thinking vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause in terms
of the Muslims of historical Bilad al-Sham (greater Syria) and the global
Muslim community (umma). This belies the notion that HTS is solely a
Syrian nationalist group;11 rather, it sees itself as part of a solution related
to the issue. Jawlani explained that “what happened the past three days
renewed the Islamic spirit across the Islamic world in a clear and major
way.”12 Similarly, senior HTS ideologue Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, posting
on Twitter a video of rockets launched by Hamas from Gaza and shot into
civilian areas in Israel, attached the following note: “These scenes delight
the believers and make the hypocrites sad...Today, the lions of Gaza are
turning the night of the Zionists into day. May God bless the lions of Qassem
in bombing them.”13 This was further reinforced by HTS’s Manarat al-Huda
Dawa Center, which created an exhibition titled “Al-Aqsa, Our Cause,” and
was shown in Idlib, Jisr al-Shughour, Atme, and al-Dana in June 2021.14
The exhibition was attended by students, tribal figures, and members of
the HTS-backed Salvation Government, among other locals.
Additionally, HTS ideologue Abu Mariya al-Qahtani and online HTS
influencer Abdulrahman al-Idrisi have promoted Hamas-backed terrorist
 External Operations, Guidance, and Inspiration 63

A member of HTS’s Manarat al-Huda Dawa Center explains historical

“Bilad al-Sham” in Jisr al-Shughour.

attacks against civilians such as the one in Jerusalem on November 21,

2021, that killed one individual and injured three others. In reaction to the
attack, Qahtani stated, “the Palestinian people teach the umma sacrifice
and redemption. At a time when the defeated rush to disbelief (kufr), and
race to vice and humiliation, we see men who sell themselves to God and
race to heaven. And from here I greet our people in Palestine in general
and Jerusalem in particular.”15 Similarly, Idrisi exclaimed, “The umma is
awake and has not slept, its blood is flowing and its heart is beating! The
#al-Quds_Operation implementer (may God have mercy on him), during
his inghimasi attack on a group of the Zionist occupiers.”16
While not directly inciting an attack, this statement creates an atmosphere
that may inspire a supporter of HTS in the West to take things into their
own hands and potentially attack a synagogue or a visibly Jewish individual
because of their own anti-Semitism, even if those targets have nothing
specifically to do with Israel, as has been seen in other cases in the West.17
The barrier to committing such an act is not very high compared with other
types of violence, since nonjihadists also attack Jews, and such attacks spike
whenever there is a conflagration between Israel and its enemies.18
64 The Age of Political Jihadism

Blasphemy

In a similar vein, the issue of blasphemy as it relates to the Prophet Muham-

mad is a sensitive topic that has led states and individuals to take perceived
slights as sanction to call for an act of violence. Jihadists have been involved
in attacks against those they deemed to have blasphemed. The most notable
among them was perpetrated against the Danish cartoons and the French
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.19 In relation to the latter, a French school-
teacher, Samuel Paty, was beheaded in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, France,
on October 16, 2020. He had shown the Charlie Hebdo issue with the cartoons
in his moral and civic education class about freedom of speech, yet before
showing them, he allowed any Muslim student to leave beforehand if they
wanted to.20
The last contact of the perpetrator, Abdoullakh
​​ Abouyedovich Anzorov,
an eighteen-year-old Chechen immigrant, was allegedly Farouk al-Shami,
a Tajik member of HTS based in Idlib. French investigators believe he may
have influenced Anzorov to conduct the attack.21 It is unlikely that HTS as
an organization had anything to do with the attack, yet it illustrates that
individuals living in its territory could entrepreneurially link up with those
abroad and incite them to act. This is why having other smaller groups that
are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or foreign fighters in
general, in HTS territory is likely problematic from the U.S. perspective and
hinders Washington’s interest in considering the group for removal from
the FTO list. Nor does it help that HTS’s civilian governing body, the SSG,
released a statement “calling on everyone to shoulder their responsibilities
in defending Muhammad” in relation to France and President Emmanuel
Macron in the aftermath of the attack, which was an implicit threat in the
context of HTS’s worldview.22
Looking beyond Israel or blasphemy, in August 2021 senior HTS ideologue
Abu al-Fatah al-Farghali praised an attack conducted by its rival Huras al-Din
against the Assad regime in Damascus, calling it “a blessed operation.”23
He added: “May God reward the best of those who carried it out.”24 And
while this author has no sympathy for the Assad regime, all of the above
illustrates that the issue of HTS and terrorism is not black-and-white, even
 External Operations, Guidance, and Inspiration 65

if the group tries to portray it as such. One of HTS’s auxiliary media outlets,
Shamukh, still features old audio messages from al-Qaeda leaders Osama
bin Laden and Abu Yahya al-Libi as well as Abdullah Azzam,25 illustrating
that while they may have broken away from AQ’s current version of itself,
those within HTS’s network still hold onto that historical heritage from the
broader jihadist movement.
66 The Age of Political Jihadism

Notes

1. Martin Smith, “Interview: James Jeffrey,” Frontline, March 8, 2021,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/james-jeffrey.
2. “Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani on al-Jazeera, Part 1,”
posted May 27, 2015, https://bit.ly/3K1ult0.
3. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Huras al-Din: The Overlooked al-Qaeda Group
in Syria,” PolicyWatch 3188, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 24, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/huras-al-din-overlooked-al-qaeda-group-syria.
4. Daniele Garofalo and Riccardo Valle, “The Syrian Jihad, al-Qaida,
and Salafi-Jihadism: An Interview with Muzamjir al-Sham,”
Jihadica, September 23, 2021, http://www.jihadica.com/
the-syrian-jihad-al-qaida-and-salafi-jihadism.
5. Charles Lister, “Twenty Years After 9/11: The Fight for Supremacy in
Northwest Syria and the Implications for Global Jihad,” CTC Sentinel
14, no. 7 (September 2021), https://ctc.usma.edu/twenty-years-
after-9-11-the-fight-for-supremacy-in-northwest-syria-and-the-
implications-for-global-jihad.
6. Ibid.
7. Saleh al-Hamawi, “Intellectual Differences and the Future of the
Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” Jihadology,
October 27, 2021, https://jihadology.net/2021/10/27/guest-post-
intellectual-differences-between-the-taliban-al-qaeda-isis-and-the-
hayat-tahrir-al-sham.
8. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Oh People of al-Sham We Sacrifice
Our Souls for You,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, December 27, 2012, https://bit.ly/36LpptB; Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani, “Victory from God and Conquest Is Close,”
al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media Production, April 1, 2015,
https://bit.ly/3tXcT3h; “Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani,
Part 2,” Al Jazeera, June 3, 2015, https://bit.ly/3qR6AMu; Jabhat
al-Nusra, “Press Conference with the Conquering Shaykh Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani,” al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for Media
Production, December 13, 2015, https://bit.ly/3JXwfL7.
9. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Blessing to the Taliban and the Afghan
People,” August 18, 2021, https://bit.ly/36DJVww.
 External Operations, Guidance, and Inspiration 67

10. Aaron Y. Zelin, “From Global Jihad to Local Regime: HTS Builds
Different Forms of Legitimacy,” PolicyWatch 3519, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, August 6, 2021, https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/global-jihad-local-regime-
hts-builds-different-forms-legitimacy.
11. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “Palestine Is Our Cause and the Cause of Every
Muslim,” May 11, 2021, https://bit.ly/3qWK30Z.
12. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “A Meeting of the Leader Abu Muhammad
al-Jawlani with Shaykhs of Tribes on the Blessed Day of Id al-Fitr,” Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham Media Office, May 15, 2021, https://bit.ly/3NOiJvN.
13. See Abu Mariya al-Qahtani’s tweet here: https://twitter.com/
BnMaysara/status/1392277657048526850.
14. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, “An Electronic Copy of the Brochure ‘Palestine
Is Our First Cause’ for Those Who Were Not Able to Obtain a Copy at
the Exhibition ‘Al-Aqsa, Our Cause,’” Manarat al-Huda Dawa Center,
June 18, 2021. Author retains a copy in his archive.
15. See tweet by Abu Mariya al-Qahtani on November 21, 2021, https://
twitter.com/BnMaysara/status/1462375526266552327.
16. See tweet by Abd al-Rahman al-Idrisi on November 21, 2021, https://
twitter.com/Edrissitn/status/1462371550766714881.
17. Mitchell D. Silber, “Terrorist Attacks Against Jewish Targets in the
West (2012–2019): The Atlantic Divide Between European and
American Attackers,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 5 (May/June 2019), https://
ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-attacks-jewish-targets-west-2012-2019-
atlantic-divide-european-american-attackers.
18. Anti-Defamation League, “Following Start of Mideast Violence,
Antisemitic Incidents More Than Double in May 2021 vs. May 2020,”
June 7, 2021, https://www.adl.org/blog/following-start-of-mideast-
violence-antisemitic-incidents-more-than-double-in-may-2021-
vs-may.
19. Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons That Shook the World (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2009); and Jytte Klausen, Western Jihadism: A Thirty
Year History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
20. Kim Willsher, “Teacher Decapitated in Paris Named as Samuel Paty,
47,” Guardian, October 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2020/oct/17/teacher-decapitated-in-paris-named-as-
samuel-paty-47.
68 The Age of Political Jihadism

21. Jean-Michel Décugis and Jérémie Pham-Lê, “‘I Beheaded the

Teacher’: The Last Contact of the Killer of Samuel Paty Identified in
Syria” (in French), Le Parisien, March 8, 2021, https://www.leparisien.
fr/faits-divers/j-ai-decapite-le-prof-le-dernier-contact-du-tueur-de-
samuel-paty-identifie-en-syrie-08-03-2021-8427609.php.
22. Salvation Government Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement of
Condemnation” (in Arabic), October 25, 2020, https://syriansg.
org/9075.
23. Huras al-Din, “The Second Raid of Hardship,” August 4, 2021, https://
bit.ly/389Y7NW.
24. See Abu al-Fatah al-Farghali’s tweet: https://twitter.com/yelfarghaly/
status/1422937291673190404.
25. See the following: https://bit.ly/3IXykFC; https://bit.ly/3DtJn88;
https://bit.ly/35udvnm; https://bit.ly/3uPMi7e.
 7

The Terrorism Designation Question

For much of the post-9/11 era, decisions related to jihadist groups have been
relatively straightforward. This is not surprising, since both al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State have represented extremists that espouse a Manichean
worldview, are unwilling to compromise on their ideology, and continue
to conduct terrorist activities. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is more complicated.
While ostensibly still a militant group, it governs and controls territory
and therefore behaves like a state actor even if it is not recognized by the
international community. Violence targeting civilians committed by nonstate
groups is more likely to be labeled as terrorism, while similar abuses by
states are more commonly called human rights violations. Of course, states
can be sponsors of terrorism—even though no evidence suggests that HTS
and its Syrian Salvation Government are sponsoring other entities to conduct
terrorism outside its territory, let alone against Western targets.
HTS is not the first terrorist group to control territory or engage in gov-
ernance; thus, this dilemma is not unique. Yet in the context of the jihadist
community over the past two decades, the way HTS is positioning itself
and attempting to show it has moved out of the AQ and IS orbit differs from
anything seen so far. Therefore, it is incumbent on the United States to decide
how it classifies HTS and how forward leaning it wants to be in encouraging
HTS or other jihadist groups to move away from terrorism as a tactic.
The realist angle appears to reflect U.S. Syria representative James Jef-
frey’s approach when he began back-channel talks with HTS. As he put it,
“They are the least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one
of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important
70 The Age of Political Jihadism

places right now in the Middle East.”1 During the Biden administration,
however, based on this author’s understanding of current policy, there has
been no desire to engage with HTS.
The State Department has established three legal criteria for a terrorism
designation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 Within it
are a number of subcategories also considered in potential designations. Based
on these criteria, since HTS broke ties with AQ, five parts of the legal definition
can still apply (see annex for the full version of these legal preconditions):

• It must be a foreign organization.

• The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue
to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person
(including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing
any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained.
• An assassination.
• The use of any explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property.
• Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.

The first of these five parts is self-explanatory. The second relates to the
imprisonment and torture of political activists as well as the seizure of
Christian and Druze property. The assassination of Raed Fares would fall
under the third. The fourth could apply to continued rocket launches against
civilian Alawite communities or HTS’s shooting at protesters demonstrat-
ing against its rule. The fifth is a reiteration of actions already described.
Therefore, it does make sense for Washington to continue to designate
HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Yet it is worth considering, even if
farfetched in the near term, what other authorities there could be to sanction
HTS if it did move below the legal threshold for being a terrorist group in a
potential future five-year review window.
 The Terrorism Designation Question 71

Alternative Sanctions Regime?

If Washington deemed that HTS no longer reached the full legal threshold
for designation, alternative sanctions could still be applied to hold the
group and its leaders accountable for their actions. One is Executive Order
13572, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights
Abuses in Syria,”3 signed by former president Barack Obama in late April
2011. The Treasury Department could consider designating HTS under the
following clause: “any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, to be responsible for or complicit
in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or to have
participated in, the commission of human rights abuses in Syria, including
those related to repression.”4 If E.O. 13572 or other human rights sanctions
authorities are applied, the Treasury Department could also issue new
or update existing licenses related to humanitarian activities that would
facilitate the flow of additional aid to populations in need in Idlib. Although
individually designated terrorists would still be present in Idlib, the advan-
tage of pursuing non-counterterrorism (CT) sanctions against HTS would
be that they do not carry criminal material-support liability, meaning that a
U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control license may be sufficient to encourage
humanitarian actors to expand activities. Furthermore, it may encourage
HTS to sideline individuals designated under CT authorities.
One way to also split the difference would be to have the Treasury Depart-
ment sanction particular HTS leaders, thus blunting those individuals’ abili-
ties to take advantage of a changed sanctions regime. Likewise, similar to the
process followed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
those specifically advocating terrorism and those particular individuals and
leaders involved in past and current human rights abuses could still be held
to account while allowing the rest of society and more forward-leaning HTS
leaders within its territory to move forward.5
However, such a decision would likely create a political issue domestically,
especially in Congress. Most recently, the controversy over designating,
undesignating, and potentially redesignating the Iran-backed Yemeni mili-
tant group the Houthis illustrates these political complications. Of course,
72 The Age of Political Jihadism

the actions of HTS these days are far less egregious than those perpetrated
by the Houthis against the Yemeni population as well as its drone and mis-
sile attacks against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore,
if this were a sanctions regime that could be used as an alternative in the
future, HTS would have to continue to show progress in rooting out foreign
fighters and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations locally—including those
allied with HTS—as well as ceasing to glorify terrorism abroad or launch
rockets into civilian areas.
Beyond the political ramifications in the United States, there are other
potential consequences worth considering when providing such leeway with
a changed type of sanction. HTS could use the opening on humanitarian
licensing to monopolize the delivery of humanitarian aid—as it has been
doing in other sectors—and also levy taxes on international NGOs for being
in its territory.6 Regarding the former, according to humanitarian aid scholar
Natasha Hall, “some aid workers already reported pressures to positively
review projects, target certain beneficiaries, hire NGO employees linked
with HTS, and ensure favored contractors win tenders offered by NGOs.”7
Local Syrian NGOs also worry about data privacy.8 Thus, enhancing HTS’s
power would make it more likely over time that HTS will be seen as the sole
interlocutor in the same way that international actors are now approach-
ing the Assad regime with respect to the humanitarian catastrophe in the
regime’s territories. In many ways, arguments about legitimizing HTS are the
same as those related to normalization with the Assad regime: this particular
actor won and is in charge, residents under him are suffering, therefore it
is necessary to work with and through him to help those suffering under
the yoke of both regimes.
Alternatively, Hall suggests that “a more collective donor and UN approach
to negotiating with HTS leaders over regulatory frameworks for the aid
response would protect humanitarian space and even allow for a shift to
assistance promoting greater resilience.” It would therefore be wise for
U.S. agencies, if the terrorism designation is changed to a different type of
sanction regime, to collaborate and coordinate with key humanitarian actors
internationally and locally that have operated in Syria and would seek to
do more in the future if the environment for humanitarian aid improved.
 The Terrorism Designation Question 73

If such an alternative came to pass, this would hopefully create a united

front to undermine HTS’s ability to take advantage of the aid coming into its
territory in the same way that the Assad regime has abused humanitarian
aid over the course of the Syrian war. Instead, it would actually help those
most in need and not those in power trying to cynically exploit the situation.
Of course, these are a lot of “ifs,” since Washington could easily keep HTS’s
current terrorism designation for the foreseeable future.

Potential Conditions

If Washington were interested at some future date in changing HTS’s terror-

ism designation to a sanctions regime more specific to its actions during the
Syrian war, it would be wise—through a possible reopening of back-channel
communications—to outline potential steps HTS could take to allay fears that
this change would only further consolidate the group’s authoritarian grip
over the territories where it operates. The United States may have its own
checklist of specific actions related to the designation criteria described
earlier. Beyond these criteria, the following are some markers that Wash-
ington should consider requesting from HTS, even though the group would
likely view some of them as absurd. At the same time, it would be almost
farcical for HTS to expect the United States to change its designation without
gaining anything in return.

• Allow human rights organizations to inspect prison facilities and

independently report findings. In Jawlani’s Frontline interview,
he announced, “Perhaps some human rights organizations could
come and supervise the prisons and supervise—or take a look at the
prisons. Our institutions are open to everyone. Organizations are
welcome.”9 It would be worthwhile to test this and possibly to gain
something positive, such as improving HTS’s prison system.
• Release political prisoners and provide restitution. If any individ-
uals have been killed or died while held in prison by HTS, the group
should provide monetary assistance to affected family members.
74 The Age of Political Jihadism

• Form a truth and reconciliation commission. This would be an

important step to show that HTS is serious about accounting for its
past and current human rights violations. It would also show that
it is a serious and more mature actor capable of self-criticism and
would allow the population to move forward once such a commis-
sion was established, allowed to independently operate and investi-
gate past crimes, and have actual coercive measures to bring people
that have been in HTS and its predecessor groups to justice once a
dossier and report are filed publicly and online.
• Open up the SSG’s shura council and prime ministerial elections
to the entire population—including women. This would create a
fairer system whereby everyone in society has a voice.
• Allow the United States and other governments to fund civil
society and pro-democratic entities in HTS-controlled areas. A
“snapback” sanctions mechanism should be put in place if actions
are taken against activists.
• Dissolve HTS and completely subsume its infrastructure into the
Syrian Salvation Government. It is unlikely that HTS would accept
this step, but it would be a smart opening position for any U.S. nego-
tiations with the group. Civilian control of armed forces is one of the
most fundamental features of a stable, functioning government. If
HTS is serious about wanting to be delisted, HTS should disband
and act as a normal government would by not having a military
structure that is outside the bounds of the legal governing body.
HTS’s fighting forces would be placed under a potential Ministry
of Defense. Currently, there is no equivalent structure within the
SSG, highlighting the problematic nature of HTS’s apparent attempt
to engage in “formal distancing” from its authority on the ground
through the SSG, when in reality HTS has true control from behind
the scenes on the most sensitive issues. A defense ministry would
also effectively fall under the SSG’s prime minister who would
lead independently without Jawlani having to legitimize the SSG’s
activities. Conversely, if he really wanted to lead in a public manner,
Jawlani should run for prime minister in an election.
 The Terrorism Designation Question 75

• Top HTS historical leadership should voluntarily resign, serve

prison terms for past crimes, and then retire once their terms
have been served. This is a corollary to the above request. Ideally,
those leading the group in the past decade would be brought to
account to provide some degree of justice to the victims of HTS
and its predecessor groups. It is possible to consider aspects of the
model applied to the Cali Cartel in Columbia whereby some of the
leaders voluntarily handed themselves in, served a prison sentence,
and then retired. In this case, because of Turkey’s unstated alliance
with HTS, putting key HTS leaders involved in past human rights
violations into Turkish prisons makes comparative sense, since the
Assad regime does not follow the rule of law. Even though Turkey
unofficially works with HTS, the Turkish government has designated
HTS as a terrorist group. After serving their prison sentences, these
leaders could remain in Turkey and no longer be involved in HTS
or SSG activities. This option would potentially provide a way to
legitimize the SSG and its work as well as the actors involved in its
structures.

While these potential markers could be a starting point in possible negotia-

tions, the appetite for arriving at any type of arrangement within the U.S.
government is limited at best. It is also worth underscoring the points made
by Syrian researchers Rahaf Aldoughli and Azzam Al Kassir, who along with
many other Syrians inside and outside HTS territories would view any type
of accommodation as poor policy “driven by either a humanitarian idealism
or sheer geostrategic realism” as well as undermining the “the hope of
building sustainable peace in a unified Syrian state.”10 This author believes
that the smartest policy would be to continue with the current designation
until HTS makes more changes. Still, it would be worthwhile to test whether
HTS is more willing to open up its political system and be held accountable
for past crimes—however unlikely it is to do so. In summary, then, changing
HTS to a different sanctions regime is not plausible at this point, even if it
is worth laying out potential policy tools Washington could use depending
on its priorities.
76 The Age of Political Jihadism

Notes

1. Martin Smith, “Interview: James Jeffrey,” Frontline, March 8, 2021,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/james-jeffrey.
2. See U.S. Department of State: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,”
Bureau of Counterterrorism, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
organizations, and “Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212,”
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 8, 2008,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103399.htm. For the
definition, see “Internationally protected person,” https://www.law.
cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=
true&def_id=18-USC-216574708-1528478296&term_occur=999&
term_src, and U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989: Terrorism Definition,”
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism April 8, 2008,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103401.htm.
3. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Executive Order 13572—
Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights
Abuses in Syria,” April 29, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
​​
gov/the-press-office/2011/04/29/executive-order-13572-blocking-
property-certain-persons-respect-human-ri.
4. Ibid.
5. U.S. Department of State, “Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Additional
Terrorist Designations,” November 30, 2021, https://www.state.gov/
revocation-of-the-terrorist-designations-of-the-revolutionary-armed-
forces-of-colombia-farc-and-additional-terrorist-designations.
6. Natasha Hall, Rescuing Aid in Syria (Washington DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2022), 25, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/rescuing-aid-syria.
7. Ibid., 26.
8. Ibid.
9. Martin Smith, “The Jihadist: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Frontline,
February 1 and February 14, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani.
10. Aldoughli and Al Kassir, “Empower Syrians Not Warlords,” https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/empower-syrians-not-warlords.
 8

Conclusion

Whether Washington decides to take action on Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani’s

requests for delisting of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a Foreign Terrorist Organi-
zation remains to be seen. As the United States shifts resources to focus
more on China and Russia and less on the jihadist challenge, Washington
may prefer the status quo since, from a strategic perspective, HTS and the
areas it controls are not seen as important compared with other issues in
the broader region, let alone globally.
That said, HTS’s evolution into a more politically than theologically
focused jihadist group is worth understanding, since similar dynamics
could play out elsewhere. Of course, each context and group is different,
and a detailed understanding of those dynamics is key to comprehending
any shifts that may be occurring. Nevertheless, jihadist groups that are
increasingly focusing on diplomacy and negotiations—in addition to their
better-known insurgent, terrorist, and local governance activities—illustrate
the greater complexity that adversarial governments and actors must con-
sider when trying to isolate, deter, or defeat these groups.
It is also worth highlighting that other groups have begun to disavow
external operations in Western countries, notwithstanding skepticism
about the sincerity of these remarks. Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb—and likely its subsidiaries in Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Mus-
limin—and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also have said recently that
such external operations are no longer their interest and focus. It is possible,
however, that these groups could still see attacks against Western targets
in their own regional enclaves as legitimate, which would discourage any
78 The Age of Political Jihadism

Western government from engaging with them. For example, in June 2021
AQIM leader Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi said that France was “deceiving”
its citizens by saying that the country’s operations in Mali were necessary
to protect France from jihadist attacks at home, because there has never
been an attack on French soil by a Malian or orchestrated by Mali-based
jihadists.1 More recently, TTP spokesperson Muhammad Khurasani released
a statement saying that the group has no global agenda and that its war is
limited to Pakistan.2 Interestingly, he asked in the statement for the “United
States to support the TTP in fighting against the Pakistani state for the rights
of the oppressed tribes.”3 Even between those groups, there are gradations
in how they frame this issue.
Thus, it is likely that the HTS-related issues presented in this paper will
increasingly become larger policy dilemmas that Washington must address
in relation to certain jihadist groups. Having a policy to potentially deal with
these vexing and likely uncomfortable issues is worth thinking through even
if, in the end, the United States and other governments decide to retain a
wholly securitized approach to groups that have changed at the edges. This
is due not only to jihadist groups gaining strength as local governments
weaken, but also to Washington’s greater focus on power competition with
Russia and China. Therefore, less worry about jihadist groups than in the
immediate 9/11 aftermath could be viewed as an opportunity to concentrate
resources elsewhere. It is important to remember that these jihadist groups
are ideologically opposed to Washington and the West’s interests in promot-
ing a more liberal world order. As a consequence, any potential changes
would be transactional at best. Washington will have to calculate the costs
and benefits of changing its current policy course with HTS.
Whatever the United States decides in the end, at the very least, viewing
Jawlani and HTS through the al-Qaeda prism is disconnected from reality
and will lead to incorrect assessments of the group. A flawed understand-
ing of the group’s current nature, however extreme and authoritarian it
continues to be, could create other problems in the future. Regardless of
next steps from Washington, the age of political jihadism is here.
 Conclusion 79

Notes

1. Sheikh Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi, “And God Will Surely Support
Those Who Support Him,” al-Andalus Foundation for Media
Production, June 20, 2021, https://bit.ly/3iToSsj.
2. See Abd. Sayed (@abdsayedd), “TTP spokesman Muhammad
Khurasani rejects all claims about its links with AQ/IS. He adds TTP
does not have any global agenda, & its war is limited to Pakistan
alone. He asks ‘the U.S. to support the TTP in fighting against the
Pakistani state for the rights of oppressed tribes,’” post on Twitter,
February 12, 2022, 4:37 a.m., https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/
status/1492432632784863232.
3. Ibid.
 Appendix

Legal Criteria for a Terrorism Designation

Legal criteria for a terrorism designation under Section 219 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act:1

1. It must be a foreign organization.

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section
212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as
defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
a. Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)): defines
“terrorist activity” to mean: any activity which is unlawful under
the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if com-
mitted in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the
following:2
i. The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an
aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
ii. The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or
continue to detain, of another individual in order to compel a
third person (including a governmental organization) to do or
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the individual seized or detained.
iii. A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as
defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or
upon the liberty of such a person.
 Legal Criteria for a Terrorism Designation 81

1. Section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code means a

Chief of State or the political equivalent, head of govern-
ment, or Foreign Minister whenever such person is in a
country other than his own and any member of his family
accompanying him; or any other representative, officer,
employee, or agent of the United States Government, a
foreign government, or international organization who at
the time and place concerned is entitled pursuant to inter-
national law to special protection against attack upon his
person, freedom, or dignity, and any member of his family
then forming part of his household.3
iv. An assassination.
v. The use of any—
1. biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or
device, or
2. explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent
to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.
vi. A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
b. Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)) defines “terrorism”
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandes-
tine agents.”4
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the secu-
rity of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign
relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
82 The Age of Political Jihadism

Notes

1. See here: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations.

2. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Immigration and
Nationality Act Section 212,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2008,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103399.htm.
3. See here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?wi
dth=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=18-USC-216574708-
1528478296&term_occur=999&term_src.
4. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989: Terrorism Definition,”
U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/
ct/rls/fs/08/103401.htm.
 Index

Abdullah, Hadi al- 41 Hamas 2, 12, 62–63

Abdulrahman, Abdullah Hamawi, Abu al-Hassan al- 8
Muhammad Rajab 61, 62 Hamawi, Saleh al- 61
Adel, Saif al- 18 Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyah
Alawites 36, 54–56 (HASI) 17–18, 20, 53
Anzorov, Abdoullakh Abouyedovich Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki 20
64 Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedin
Aldoughli, Rahaf 75 (HSM) 7
al-Qaeda (AQ) 1–3, 17–19, 21, 28, Hardan, Mohammed 39
37, 53, 61, 77–78 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 77–78
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQ, relationship with 19–21
(AQAP) 7 authoritarianism within 34–42
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb blasphemy, issue of 64–65
(AQIM) 7, 78 evolution of 1–4, 10–12
Ashida, Abu al-Abd 20 expansion 25–30
Assad, Bashar al- 7, 12, 55 humanitarian aid, monopolizing
Assad regime 3–4, 16, 17, 27, 72–73
54–56, 64, 72–73 and Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Atun, Abdul Rahim 12, 12, 18 62–63
authoritarianism in HTS 34–42 limitations of 30–34
Ayrut, Anas 31 prison system 21, 37, 73
Azzam, Abdullah 65 political jihadism and, concept of
7–10
Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al- 1, 16, 52, 54 public diplomacy campaign 29
Biden administration 12, 70 smuggling activities 33
bin Laden, Osama 65, 65 terrorism designation question
blasphemy, issue of 64–65 and 69–75
Bughat, Radd Udwan al- 42 Turkey, designated as terrorist
organization 4
Charlie Hebdo 64 U.S. list of designated terrorists,
Christians 36, 52, 70 potential removal from 2
Hezbollah 2
Drevon, Jerome 8 Hijazi, Samir 61
Druze 67, 70 Himsi, Sharih al- 34
hisbah 38–40
Fares, Raed 41, 52, 70 human rights organizations 73
Farghali, Abu al-Fatah al- 11, 35, 64 human rights violations 4, 69, 74, 75
Filistini, Abu Qatada al- 9 Human Rights Watch 54–55
Huras al-Din (HD) 10, 19–21, 60
Haenni, Patrick 8
Halabi, Abu al-Laith al- 19 Idrisi, Abdulrahman al- 62, 63

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures.

84 Index

International Crisis Group 33 Libi, Abu Yahya al- 65

Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 1, 16, 52 Liwa al-Muqatilin al-Ansar 20
Islamic State (IS) 52–54
and Jabhat al-Nusra members 54 Maalouli, Raymond al- 40
JN, break with 17 Macron, Emmanuel 64
kidnapping foreigners 56 Maher, Shiraz 7
Israel 62–63 Mahmoud, Asma al- 40
Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad al- 9, 10,
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) 1–3, 60–61 19, 29
campaign against Alawites 55–56 Masri, Abu al-Yaqdhan al- 37
Islamic State, relationship with
52–54 Namus, Radwan 61
political jihadism and, concept of
16–18 Obama, Barack 71
U.S. citizens, crimes against 57 Omar, Taqi al-Din 3
U.S., designated as terrorist
organization by 28 Padnos, Theo 56–57
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) 1, 18, 28
Jaish al-Ahrar 18 Qahtani, Abu Mariya al- 56, 62–63
Jaish al-Fatah 17 Quraishi, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal- al- 3
Muslimin (JNIM) 3, 11
Jawlani, Abu Muhammad al-, 1–2, Revolutionary Armed Forces of
26, 30–34, 30, 31, 53–56, Colombia (FARC) 71
60–62, 74
expanding HTS 25–30 Salloum, Samer al- 36
limitations of 30–34 Schrier, Matthew 56–57
criminal hudoud penalties, 27 Shaar, Karam 31
militarized approach, with Sham, Muzamjir al- 21, 31, 60
children, 35 Shami, Abu Abdullah al- 12, 12
political jihadism, 7–8, 16–21 Shami, Farouk al- 64
sharia, idea of implementing, Sharikh, Abd al-Muhsin Abd Allah
26–27 Ibrahim al- 61
Jeffrey, James 2, 60 Shawashi, Bilal al- 41
Sheikh, Hashem al- 18–19
Karim, Bilal Abd al- 38 Shishani, Muslim 21
Kassir, Azzam Al 75 Smith, Martin 8, 56
Katibat Imam al-Bukhari 3 Suleiman, Jalal 33
Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad 3, 20 Suri, Abu Khalid al- 53
Keda, Ali 31, 35 Suri, Abu Musab al- 7–8
Khashoggi, Jamal 10 Syrian National Council (SNC) 28
Khatab, Anas al- 29 Syrian Salvation Government (SSG)
Khayr, Ahmad Hasan Abu al- 18 2, 30–35, 74, 75
Khorasan Group 60–61
Khurasani, Muhammad 78 Taliban 2, 11, 12, 21, 61
Klido, Abdullah 42 Talli, Abu al-Malik al- 20
 Index 85

Tamimi, Jawad al- 36 Uzbeki, Abu Salah al- 20

Tansiqiyat al-Jihad
Tartusi, Abu Basir al-, 27 Violet Organization (NGO) 40
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
77–78 Ways, Mazhar al- 31
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) 3 Western journalists, imprisoning
Turkey 4, 10, 18, 20, 25, 75 and torturing 56–57
Turki, Abu Fatimah al- 21 women 34–35, 38–40, 55, 74

UN Human Rights Council 36, 37, 39 Zakat Commission 32

United States, 2–4, 11, 16, 17, 21, Zaraee, Nisreen Al- 31
29, 53, 61, 71–74, 77–78 Zawahiri, Ayman al- 17–19, 60–61
designated JN as terrorist ties with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham
organization 28 (JFS) 18
Taliban negotiation 11 JN break with AQ 17
Uraydi, Sami al- 19, 61
“A brilliant analysis of the political trajectory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,
together with a fair and sensible assessment of the policy dilemma that
this poses. How should the West approach a group that has abandoned
al-Qaeda but models itself on the Taliban? That is the question that

THE AGE OF

AL
Aaron Zelin takes up in this illuminating study.”

PO LI T IC
–COLE BUNZEL, Hoover Fellow, Hoover Institution, and
editor, Jihadica

Aaron Y. Zelin
“In this comprehensive study, Aaron Zelin captures the complexity of HTS

M
and its recent transformations, and explores the thorny question of

H A D IS
whether the group should be delisted from international terrorism lists.

JI
An important read for those interested in understanding the evolution of
HTS and the current state of affairs in northwest Syria.”

–ORWA AJJOUB, senior analyst, COAR Global Ltd.

THE AGE OF POLITICAL JIHADISM

AARON Y. ZELIN is the Richard Borow Fellow at The
Washington Institute, a visiting research scholar in the

AL-SHAM
Department of Politics at Brandeis University, and the

d y o f H AYAT TA HRIR
A Stu
founder of Jihadology.net. He is author of the book Your Sons
Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (Columbia
University Press), along with the recent Institute study
Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism.

A ARON Y. ZELIN

The Washington Institute for

Near East Policy
1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036 Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
202 452 0650 4501 Forbes Boulevard
WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG Lanham, MD 20706
301 459 3366 | WWW.ROWMAN.COM