SHS Model United Nations Conference 2023

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Background Guide
Agenda: DELIBERATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT
AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

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Table of Contents
1. LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
2. ABOUT THE COMMITTEE
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA
a. Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction
b. Historical Use of WMD
c. Actions Taken by the United Nations
4. THE CURRENT ISSUE
5. THE CHALLENGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
6. IDEAS FOR ACTION
a. TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO RENEW SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION
b. START CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE P5 ON NUCLEAR ISSUES
c. ANTICIPATE FUTURE CHALLENGES
d. IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST
e. LINK TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES TO INCENTIVES
7. QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
8. IMPORTANT LINKS

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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear delegates,
It gives us great pleasure to welcome you all to the academic
simulation of the UNGA DISEC at SHSMUN 2023. We hope this
experience enriches your public speaking skills and that you learn
about a pressing world issue that complicates the lives of many
people around the world. Before coming to the conference, it is
very important to break the larger agenda into smaller subtopics
and ask questions to yourself about the agenda. It is also crucial to
enhance your leadership skills and lobbying capacity since we
would give importance to overall participation in the committee.
Our agenda is ‘Deliberation on the Development and Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, and this background guide is not
exhaustive in scope. This guide aims to provide you with
foundational knowledge and concrete real-world examples. We
hope that this guide will be treated as a starting point for your
research.
Sincerely,
Sehajpreet Singh
(Chairperson)

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ABOUT THE COMMITTEE

General Assembly 1, or the Disarmament and International Security Committee
(DISEC), was created under Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter, and it
remains one of the main GA committees. As the First Committee of the General
Assembly, DISEC deals with many issues resulting from heightened tensions, such
as nuclear warfare, disarmament, and international conflict. These conflicts destroy
peace and create instability in the world. DISEC was at first a political committee
but was later adapted to be a peacetime and disarmament committee. Today, the
First Committee on Disarmament and International Security provides a forum for
states to discuss their differing perspectives on disarmament matters and work
together to reach compromises or pass resolutions that provide tools to better
understand and approach disarmament and international security concerns. The
committee affords states the opportunity to reach a consensus on issues. It aims
to provide solutions so that states no longer ensure "security" for themselves by
increasing the size of their arsenals but rather negotiate cooperative security
arrangements that reduce weapon spending, arms production, trade, and stockpiles.
DISEC also provides suggestions to the Security Council on issues that need to be
discussed. Warfare and security threats are constantly evolving along with modern
technologies, and DISEC continues its goal in providing general principles of
cooperation to promote international peace. Issues surrounding weaponry and
warfare can be challenging, but it is important to keep international peace at the
forefront of debate.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA

● Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The proliferation of WMDs is the general term for the spread of these weapons
globally. There are three types of WMDs: biological, chemical, and nuclear.
Biological WMDs are microorganisms that are purposefully released to bring harm
in the form of illness or death to people. Examples include viruses, bacteria,
anthrax, etc. The use of these microorganisms is known as bioterrorism and is used
on both the group and individual level.' Chemical WMDs are defined as "any toxic
chemical that can cause death, injury, incapacitation, and sensory irritation." This
type of WMD is often difficult to distribute to a large group but is very impactful
when distributed in small, contained spaces. Examples include ricin, arsenic, tear
gas, nerve agents, choking agents, etc. The final WMD type is nuclear; nuclear
WMDs require a lot of advanced thinking and planning not only to be assembled
properly but also to be used effectively. The process of nuclear fission and/or
fusion causes an explosion of energy that causes irreversible and extreme damage.

● Historical use of WMD

The most well-known, broad use of nuclear WMDs was the bombings of Nagasaki
and Hiroshima in August 1945. The development of nuclear weapons, however,
began during the 1940s. In 1942, the Manhattan Project was established in the
United States to develop the first nuclear weapon, and the first nuclear test was
conducted in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. In the years following the bombings of
Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the USSR and Great Britain began conducting nuclear
weapons testing. France tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960 and China followed
in 1964. In 1958, approximately 10,000 scientists petitioned the UN Secretary-
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General to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons
development continued to spread. India joined the group of nuclear weapons
holders in 1974. The spread of nuclear weapons to each of these countries is largely
attributed to the fact that when one country obtained nuclear weapons production
capacity, others were motivated, usually out of fear and defense, to also develop
these weapons.' Currently, nine countries have nuclear weapons: the US, UK,
Russian Federation, Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Israel, and France.
Despite the willingness of many nations to decrease spending on nuclear weapons
and/or eliminate spending completely, total 2019 spending on nuclear weapons was
$72.9 billion, a $7.1 billion increase from 2018. This spending is made up of nine
countries: the USA, the UK, the Russian Federation, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel,
India, France, and China. Although these countries have all spent billions on
nuclear weapons, their capabilities in terms of the usage of these weapons vary
greatly. Unfortunately, there is not a recent comprehensive spending or usage
breakdown on chemical and biological WMDs since nuclear WMDs tend to receive
the most attention from the international community. Under no circumstance does
this mean that chemical and biological WMDs are any less effective than nuclear
and should
not China North be treated as such? See below the section titled "Actions Taken by
the United Nations" for information regarding treaties and resolutions about WMDs
In addition to the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, well-known uses of
chemical WMDs occurred in Iraq in the 1990s and in Syria within the last decade.
In 1988, a small town in northeastern Iraq, Halabja, was bombarded by Iraqi and
Iranian chemical weapons. Halabja was mostly inhabited by Kurds and is a
historically significant moment due not only to the magnitude of the bombings and
resulting deaths (approximately 50,000), but also because of the long-lasting birth
defects and structural damage that are still seen. Additionally, these attacks
displaced nearly one million Kurdish people. The Kurds are the largest ethnic
group in the Middle East without their own country, so their displacement led to

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massive immigration to surrounding cities and countries. Sporadic bombings

continued in Halabja throughout 1988 and eventually led to what is known as the
Iraqi-Kurdish civil war in 1994."

Turning to Syria, in 2012 it was discovered that Syria has a stockpile of chemical
WMDs and in late 2012, the first allegation against Syria came out when seven
people were killed in Homs by what was suspected to be poisonous gas.
Additionally, in March of 2013, chemical weapons attacks were reported in 2
Syrian cities: Aleppo and Damascus, which propelled the investigation launched by
the UN in conjunction with the WHO and the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). President Assad of Syria only allowed the UN
inspection team to investigate their three suspected uses of chemical weapons.
After it was concluded that chemical weapons had been used, a second UN Security
Council meeting was held. Resolution 2118 was passed in September 2013 and
authorized that, in the event of non-compliance with chemical weapons by Syria,
the UN Security Council should impose necessary measures to maintain peace.
Over the next few years, several resolutions were drafted but each one ultimately
failed due to Russia vetoing them. Despite the removal of chemical weapons from
Syria in 2014, the country was still able to produce chemical weapons as the
country legally had chemical compounds (which can be used in creating fertilizers
or by the manufacturing industry) that could be manufactured into chemical
weapons. In terms of the use of biological weapons, the 2001 anthrax attacks
following 9/11 forever altered the response of law enforcement and governmental
agencies and was a never-before-seen type of event in the United States. However,
in other parts of the world, Japan experienced the use of biological WMDs in 1995
and the Soviet Union did in 1979.3 In 1995, a cult known as the Aum Shinrikyo
carried out a Sarin attack that killed 13 people and injured thousands. The cult
released the Sarin on the Tokyo subway and it immediately spread, showing its

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effects. This is one significant example of the use of biological WMDs by non-state
actors.

● Actions Taken by the United Nations

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was established in
1998 and "fosters disarmament measures through dialogue, transparency, and
confidence-building on military matters, and encourages regional disarmament
efforts. " Disarmament refers to the decrease and withdrawal of weapons and is
most often discussed when considering future plans regarding WMDs.
Disarmament and nonproliferation often go hand in hand. The most recent
disarmament treaty was crafted in 2017 but has yet to enter into force and, previous
to this, the UNODA had not signed a treaty into force since 1963. A resolution
concerning nonproliferation was passed in 2004 (UN Security Council Resolution
1540) and prohibits states from providing support in any manner to non-state actors
that engage in the usage or production of WMDs. The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark treaty that was signed in
1968 and put into effect in 1970. This comprehensive treaty attempted to both
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and foster safe uses of nuclear energy.
However, this treaty only talks about and is applicable to nuclear WMDs. The
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is composed of a
comprehensive set of prohibitions regarding nuclear weapon activities. This treaty
was adopted on July 7, 2017, but has not yet entered force. There are $3 signatory
states, all of whom are nonnuclear states. The countries that have nuclear weapons
oppose this treaty. Another important treaty to remember is the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT was drafted in August 1996 and was
opened for signing in September 1996." An integral portion of the CTBT is the
verification regime, which consists of an international monitoring system,
international data center, global communications infrastructure, consultation and

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clarification, on-site inspection, and confidence-building measures. The

international monitoring system is crucial as it has 337 total facilities that monitor
the planet for any sign of a nuclear explosion, which decreases the ability of
countries to try to secretly test nuclear weapons.

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THE CURRENT ISSUE

In addition to the treaties mentioned in this background guide, there have been
several that have been drafted and signed by the UN but have yet to be put into
effect. Many of the treaties contain important information about
counterproliferation and non-proliferation of WMDs and disarmament in general.
This has left many nations in a comfortable state of being able to possess different
types of WMDs because there is little to no enforcement for the treaties and
resolutions that ban this UN Security Council 1540 prohibits states from providing
aid to any non-state actors that engage in the usage or production of WMDs but
there has been little recent research done regarding this matter. Furthermore, the
majority of research for state and non-state actors has been conducted about nuclear
WMDs, while chemical and biological WMDs are not receiving the same amount
of attention. This is partially due to the fact that it is more difficult to verify
compliance per the BWC compliance treaty since biological and chemical weapons
have dual-use technology. In other words, many chemicals can be used for the legal
production of substances like medications. It is prudent to find a way to verify
compliance by possibly creating a list of compliance measures such as reporting
exact uses of biological toxics, regardless of their possible dual use technology.
Furthermore, the BWC prohibits the use and possession of biological agents for
offensive military needs but allows their possession for "peaceful scientific,
therapeutic, and defensive purposes.’’ The dual use technology aspect of biological
and chemical weapons makes it essentially impossible to detect violations in the
same manner that can be done for nuclear weapons. The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The
international community suspects that the DPRK has a secret biological weapons
program, which would violate the BWC, but there is no definitive evidence to back
up this claim. The DPRK's ability to produce biological weapons began in the

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1960s, and recent estimates predict that the DPRK has many pathogen samples that
could be weaponized. The DPRK has not signed onto the CWC and also refuses to
answer whether or not it currently possesses any chemical weapons. While the
DPRK has signed the Geneva Convention, which prohibits the usage of chemical
weapons in warfare, it does not prohibit possession of chemical weapons.?? The
fact that the DPRK is suspected to have these weapons, in addition to their nuclear
weapons, has caused fear among other nations and might lead these other nations to
have the desire to have their own weapons out of fear. It could also lead to the
DPRK possibly selling weapons which would increase the spread of WMDs to
other countries.

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THE CHALLENGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION
1. In contrast to other transnational security challenges, the United Nations has
a long history of involvement in efforts to combat the danger posed by
weapons of mass destruction.' Many powerful tools for containing
proliferation and effecting disarmament already exist, including strong
institutions (from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security
Council) and norms (from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 to the Chemical
Weapons Convention of 1993).
2. The priority today is to renovate and reinforce these tools and to adapt them
to a changing technological and political context.
3. Developments in biological, chemical, and nuclear technologies, each with
the potential for dual use, pose new challenges to nonproliferation regimes
aimed at preventing a possible military use of these technologies. The
revolution in biotechnology, for instance, carries the risk that new kinds of
weapons will be created through genetic recombination. Technological
innovation also creates possibilities for the militarization of new chemical
agents.
4. These challenges are particularly acute in the nuclear field. In the context of
climate change and the search for new energy sources, a significant
expansion of the civilian nuclear industry is anticipated by many analysts.
According to the scenarios developed by the IAEA, nuclear electricity
generation may grow by 15 to 45 percent by 2020 and by 25 to 95 percent by
2030, with much of the future growth expected to take place in the
developing world.? The prospects of this "nuclear renaissance" raise the
question of how to ensure the civilian nature of these activities.

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5. However, the main difficulty resides in the gap between existing treaties and
collective security needs in relation to WMDs.In particular, these treaties do
not adequately account for states that already possess, or are suspected of
developing WMD technologies and capabilities:
6. Three nuclear-armed states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) remain outside the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and one (North Korea) decided to withdraw from it
in 2003. Within the NPT, the current crisis with Iran shows the complexity of
effectively addressing the issue of compliance with the treaty. Among the
thirty-one states that remain outside the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) and the nine that are outside the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), some are suspected of having capabilities that these
treaties restrict.
7. In recent years, specific steps toward disarmament have stalled. Within the
CWC, the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is lagging behind
schedule. In the nuclear field, progress toward implementing Article VI of the
NPT on disarmament--for which there is no evaluation or verification
mechanism-has been limited. Many states argue that the NPT, as it is
currently implemented, privileges nonproliferation over disarmament, to the
advantage of those who already possess nuclear capabilities. The
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not yet in force and the
negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has not yet begun.
8. There is increasing frustration with, and distrust in, the verification
mechanisms. The failure of inspections to detect hidden nuclear programs in
Iraq (in the late 1980s), Libya, and in Iran has undermined confidence in
existing verification and inspection arrangements. More recently, questions
raised by the IAEA about the Dair Al Zour site in Syria have remained
unanswered. Efforts to establish a verification mechanism for biological
activities have failed, and there is still no agreement on this issue.

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9. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement gives the agency
increased authority to conduct inspections, but a number of states with
significant nuclear activities and plans for such activities have not yet signed
and implemented it. Concerns have been expressed about the ability of the
agency to continue to carry out its responsibilities and take on new ones with
existing resources. Many states are also reluctant to accept any new
constraints on fuel-cycle activities, which they believe would increase the
discriminatory nature of the NPT.
10. The role of the Security Council in addressing WMD issues remains
complex. In the 1990s, the Council oversaw the successful dismantlement of
Iraq's WMD programs. But its initial lack of reaction to North Korea's
decision to withdraw from the NPT, its divisions in dealing with Iraq, and its
apparent lack of leverage over Iran have raised doubts about its ability to
ensure nonproliferation.
11. The gaps in the existing multilateral regimes and the lack of recent
progress in nonproliferation and disarmament illustrate the high premium that
states continue to attach to the possession of WMDs. For states that possess
WMDs- as well as for those that are trying to acquire these weapons remain
key to their security interests, either to affirm their global or regional status or
to deter aggression (including conventional attacks).
12. The current strategic context, marked by the transition from America's
dominance to the progressive emergence of a multipolar world, has not
lessened the strategic and political value of WMDs and may, in some cases,
have increased it. In fact, over recent years, most nuclear powers—whether
recognized by the NPT or not--have continued modernizing their weapons
and their means of delivery. Suspicions remain about biological and chemical
programs, in particular in the Middle East. If the current proliferation crises
in North Korea and Iran are not resolved, several countries may be tempted to
reconsider their non-nuclear status.

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13. The challenge for the United Nations and other international bodies is
to find ways to better address these security needs. States are willing to
adhere to nonproliferation or disarmament instruments only when they can
trust that their security is better ensured without weapons than with them.
Specific action is required to reinforce and adapt the existing instruments and
restore trust in them.
But progress on WMD issues depends foremost on what larger progress can
be achieved in easing global and regional tensions, and on what contribution
the multilateral system can make in supporting this goal.
14. Another important challenge arises from attempts by terrorist groups to
acquire weapons technology and expertise, as well as from the involvement
of nonstate actors in their trafficking. This was illustrated by experiments
conducted by al-Qaida in Afghanistan before 2002 (and by terrorist networks
in Western Europe more recently) to develop biological and chemical
weapons. The use of chlorine in attacks conducted by insurgents in Baghdad
in 2007 is another example of how nonstate actors are attracted to
nonconventional weapons, even with rudimentary technology.
15. Steps have been taken to prevent proliferation involving non-state
actors, such as the reporting arrangements under United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540.3 But these mechanisms have been criticized by
some for having led to "paper compliance." Not enough is being done to
address concretely the risks of WMD use by terrorist groups. Adjustments
may be required to ensure the ongoing legitimacy and effectiveness of these
arrangements.
16. There may be an opportunity for the UN to reframe the issues relating
to WMDs as transnational security challenges, implying the involvement of
non-state actors, and not just as international challenges, involving only
states. This would lead the UN and other international bodies to work more
closely with new partners-including actors in the industry or in the scientific

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community to address these problems. Such cooperation would, for instance,

be useful in raising awareness about steps needed to avoid the misuse of dual
technologies.
17. Changing attitudes toward nuclear, chemical, and biological
technologies, especially in light of climate change and the need to reduce
carbon emissions, suggest an increased role for these industries in years to
come. But it remains unclear how the international community can support
the potential positive contribution of each industry to sustainable
development while effectively addressing the proliferation risks linked to
them.

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IDEAS FOR ACTION

1. TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO RENEW SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION
a. Build new momentum: There is a need for new momentum to
promote both disarmament and nonproliferation. Efforts should be
made to reduce the dissonance between those who believe that too
much has been done in the nonproliferation field and not enough to
encourage disarmament, and those who make nonproliferation their
priority but neglect their commitment to disarmament. One should not
have to choose, as both are urgently needed.
b. Explore ways to move beyond current stumbling blocks: Informal
discussion among policy experts and opinion makers would help to
identify how to move forward globally. The Shultz et al. initiative may
provide an opportunity to embed the disarmament discussion in
nuclear-weapons states in a way that has not been possible for many
years.* Such discussion would prepare the way for more formal
consultations among the P5 on nuclear issues (see below).
At the regional level, track II contacts may also be useful to promote
confidence-building measures and to explore the possibilities of
specific regional arrangements.
Resolve the stalemates over three key international issues: The
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA Additional
Protocol, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. In the short term, this
should be a top priority to help restore confidence in the
nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Efforts should be redoubled
to convince the non-NPT states to support these key instruments. Three
key steps need to be taken:

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i. Ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and

completion of its verification mechanism. The CTBT has been
signed by 178 states and ratified by 144. But it will enter into
force only when forty-four nuclear-capable states listed in the
treaty have ratified it. Nine of these forty-four countries have not
yet done so: India, North Korea, and Pakistan still have not
signed the treaty, and China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and
the United States have signed but are yet to ratify it. If one of
these signatories decides to ratify the treaty, others may follow.
These countries may also be encouraged by the fact that the
verification mechanism already in place has proved its reliability
by successfully detecting the North Korean test in 2006. The
position of the new US administration and Congress will be
essential in this regard. A ratification by the United States could
be followed by matching steps by those countries-including some
non-NPT states--willing to demonstrate a responsible attitude. To
further encourage the remaining countries to join the CTBT,
nuclear suppliers could make nuclear exports to them conditional
on their ratification of the treaty.
ii. Universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Eighty-eight
states have concluded and brought into force additional protocols,
which provide the IAEA with the authority to verify declared and
undeclared activities. However several countries with significant
nuclear activities (such as Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil,
Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, the United States, and
Venezuela) have not yet signed or implemented the additional
protocol. Adherence of these states--including non-NPT states--to
the strengthened safeguard system remains essential for
nonproliferation efforts. Here also, a move by some of these

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countries, and in particular the United States, could help

transform the prevailing dynamic. Nuclear suppliers could also
make implementation of the additional protocol a condition for
their exports (see below).
iii. Opening of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
Little progress has been achieved since the UN General
Assembly recommended in 1993 the negotiation of a verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons. Such a treaty remains a priority. In conjunction with the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it would effectively
limit the development of new weapons and the expansion of
nuclear arsenals. Efforts should continue to remove preconditions
and to start without delay negotiations of the FMCT in the
Conference on Disarmament. Meanwhile, all nuclear powers
should establish an immediate moratorium on the production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Work toward consensus at the NPT 2010 Review Conference:
New momentum should also come from the preparation of the
NPT Review Conference which will take place in New York in
spring 2010. States should make extra efforts to rebuild a
consensus and restore confidence in the regime. Nuclear powers
should reiterate concretely their commitment to disarmament. But
cross-regional coalitions of states, combining nuclear-weapons
states and non-nuclear-weapons states could also drive forward
specific agendas, in particular access to civilian use of nuclear
energy.

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2. START CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE P5 ON NUCLEAR

ISSUES
a. Renew the NPT commitment: The five nuclear powers
recognized by the NPT should renew their commitment to nuclear
disarmament. Further reductions in nuclear arsenals are needed,
and bilateral Russian-American negotiations will remain pivotal in
this process, as the two countries possess more than 95 percent of
global stockpiles.
b. Identify the key issues and build trust: In the short term, the P5
should start consultations on nuclear issues. These consultations
could help to progressively build trust between nuclear-armed
states and ultimately identify steps to move toward nuclear
disarmament while preserving global stability and security. They
could include the following:
i. Develop an understanding of doctrines: A dialogue on
nuclear doctrines could be a first step to starting substantive
consultations on nuclear issues among the P5. This could
include an exchange of views on deterrence, as well as on
related issues, such as missile defense and strategic
conventional weapons areas where mistrust remains high.
ii. Bring transparency to nuclear stockpiles: Due to the very
nature of deterrence, authoritative and precise data on nuclear
arsenals are seldom available. Distinctions by some states
between their strategic and tactical forces, and between their
operational and reserve warheads, also add to the complexity
of the issue. Greater transparency is needed to better assess
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the current situation, evaluate past efforts at arms reduction,

and identify a way forward.
iii. Reduce risks of accidental nuclear war: The "de-alerting" of
nuclear weapons (i.e., the removal of weapons from high-
alert status, thus allowing for more time for authorities to
decide on the use of weapons) has long been advocated as a
way to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. How to
combine "de-alerting" with strategic stability is less clear,
and consultations among the P5 on this topic are needed. As
a first step, efforts to promote better information sharing
about ballistic missile launches, such as the project of a US-
Russia Joint Data Exchange Center, should be accelerated
and could be extended to all P5 countries. This issue could
also be part of a larger dialogue among the P5 on nuclear
doctrines.
iv. Assess verification needs: P5 members should engage in
discussions of ways to verify effectively nuclear
disarmament. Dialogue on this issue could start with an
assessment of past and current measures for arms reduction
or dismantlement of facilities. The P5, in conjunction with
nonnuclear states, should then start exploring the
requirements for an international verification regime for
nuclear disarmament.
v. Engage non-NPT states: In parallel to P5 consultations,
nuclear-armed states that are not party to the NPT should be
encouraged to consider steps toward arms control and
disarmament, including the adoption of transparency
measures and confidence-building measures.
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3. ANTICIPATE FUTURE CHALLENGES

a. Clarify how existing WMD norms apply to the new realities of
a resurgent nuclear industry: States could work on such
clarification through informal discussion and independent policy
research, through the NPT Review Conference, or through the
Security Council. This may include clarification of how the
acquisition and development of specific nuclear technologies are
treated under the NPT (or, for that matter, outside the treaty in the
case of India, as provided for by the recent Indian-US nuclear
agreement and by similar arrangements between India and other
nuclear suppliers).
b. Involve industry actors in the process of developing or
clarifying norms: Industry actors should work with UN member
states and with the IAEA to better assess the prospects of a
"nuclear renaissance," and to consider what frameworks for safety,
training, waste disposal, and other Issues should be in place.
Industry actors could be encouraged to view support for
nonproliferation and disarmament as part of their efforts to
demonstrate corporate social responsibility.
Develop regional cooperation: States, the industry, and the IAEA
could collaborate on developing regional and other international
mechanisms for providing states with safeguarded access to
nuclear fuel, enrichment, supervision, management, and disposal
arrangements. Regional arrangements may be particularly
important here. States could also consider articulating specific
disarmament arrangements at the regional level, for example,
through nuclear-weapons-free zones or enrichment-and-
processing-free zones.
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c. Anticipate crisis scenarios: Drawing lessons from the North

Korean crisis, the international community needs to examine how
it would react to a state announcing its decision to withdraw from
the NPT. Informal and discreet reflection among members of the
Security Council is needed concerning such a scenario. A state that
would withdraw from the NPT should be held accountable for
violations committed prior to its withdrawal. Thought should also
be given to the legal consequences of a withdrawal. For instance,
the nonproliferation regime does not specify how the equipment
and material acquired by a state prior to its withdrawal from the
NPT should be treated. This gap needs to be addressed.
d. Keep a close focus on biological and chemical issues: Efforts
should be pursued in the chemical and biological fields to ensure
that international regimes keep up with the evolutions of
technologies and their potential dual use. Industry and science
actors should be involved to better assess the need for adaptation
of norms and for resources to implement them.
e. Encourage a universal ethic against biological and chemical
weapons: Efforts should be stepped up to promote universal
adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and to
the Chemical Weapons Convention. The number of states that
currently remain outside these conventions (thirty-one and nine
respectively) is a worrisome sign that there is not yet a universal
taboo surrounding the possession of these weapons.

4. IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST

a. Promote transparency: Greater transparency is needed to restore
confidence in the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes. On
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the arms-control side, this means bringing greater transparency to

nuclear stockpiles and to defense doctrines (the nuclear weapons
states should open a dialogue on these topics, [see above]). On the
nonproliferation side, this means bringing greater transparency to
research and industry activities.
b. Strengthen verification and inspection arrangements: Efforts
are needed to increase political, as well as financial, support for
existing nonproliferation verification and inspection arrangements.
In particular, nuclear suppliers could promote improved
verification mechanisms by making the supply of materials and
equipment contingent on the signature of the IAEA Additional
Protocol and on its implementation. In cases of noncompliance, the
IAEA needs to be granted more robust verification rights that go
beyond the Additional Protocol. States should provide the agency
with appropriate resources to allow it to effectively carry out its
verification activities.
c. Improve information sharing within the United Nations
system: States should work with the relevant international bodies
(including UNODC, the IAEA, the Organization on the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention's implementation support unit, and the 1540
Committee) to find mechanisms to build a safer and otherwise
improved method of information sharing:
i. On illegal trafficking: Better information sharing can be an
important tool in the fight against the illegal trafficking of
sensitive material or expertise. Appropriate mechanisms
could be devised to make it easier for relevant authorities in
member states to alert their counterparts in cases of theft or
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disappearance of sensitive materials or equipment.

Specialized UN bodies could play a role in supporting such
information sharing, building on the experience of the
IAEA's illicit trafficking database for nuclear or radiological
materials. Means of enhancing information sharing on the
trafficking of precursor materials for chemical and biological
weapons could also be explored.
ii. On global proliferation trends: There also may be a need to
improve information sharing on developments in the field of
proliferation between the Security Council the IAEA and the
OPCW. Thought should be given to ways to improve such
dialogue while respecting the mandate of each of the
institutions.
5. LINK TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES TO INCENTIVES
a. Alleviate reporting fatigue: The prospects for greater
transparency will be increased if the costs of transparency
arrangements and reporting are reduced--and even more so if they
are linked to positive incentives. Improved information sharing
among the various UN subsidiary bodies would help.
b. Strengthen the role of the 1540 Committee: The Security
Council could consider how reporting under resolution 1540 could
be more closely linked to capacity-building assistance and other
positive incentives. Resolution 1810, which extended the mandate
of the 1540 Committee in April 2008, has opened new possibilities
in this field. More could be done to-
i. Facilitate capacity building: States should support the 1540
Committee by giving it (in coordination with other Security
Council committees concerned) a greater role as a
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"switchboard," matching capacity-building needs with

available supplies from donor states or assistance by relevant
international bodies (such as UNODC or the IAEA).
ii. Ensure real compliance: The 1540 Committee reporting
process could be revisited to ensure real and effective
compliance, rather than just paper compliance. This may
require considering how the 1540 Committee can better
access information held by member states, UNODC, IAEA.
and others to identify illicit trafficking. It may also require
encouraging visits to member states by the experts of the
1540 Committee (if possible, coupled with visits by experts
from other relevant Security Council committees).
iii. Involve member states: The 1540 Committee should also
continue to develop its outreach toward the general
membership of the UN, for example by allowing member
states to sit in as observers or by engaging in peer-review
processes.

QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
1. Can current ideas found in treaties and resolutions be updated and put into
action, rather than creating new ones?
2. Considering most of the attention regarding WMDs is usually put on non-
state actors, should/how should resources and efforts be placed onto state
actors in order to prevent their usage and attainment of WMDs?

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3. What have been the faults of previous treaties and negotiations and how can
this committee work to fix these issues so that they do not present themselves
again in the future?
4. Based on the most recent Conference on Disarmament, to which areas of
WMDs should the most resources be dedicated? How will this be mandated
and agreed upon?

IMPORTANT LINKS
1. https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/
2. https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/transparency-and-outreach/un-press-
releases.shtml

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3. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/ fi les/2023-
10/2022_treaty_booklet_E.pdf
4. https://www.iaea.org/topics/npt-review-conferences

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