EVIDENCE LAW TERM END CASE LAWS

Chapter VIII- ESTOPPEL CASE LAWS

1. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [(1952) 1 SCR

43]- the Municipal Corporation removed old markets from a certain site and vacated it in
the year 1865 upon the assurance of the Government who approved and authorized the
grant of another site to the Municipality. The Government also assured the Municipality
that no rent or land revenue shall be charged. The Municipality on the assurance of the
Government gave up the required site and erected new markets on the new site after
spending a sum of Rs. 17 lakhs. The Government thereafter in the year 1940 assessed the
new site to land revenues. The Municipality challenged the actions of the Government
and the Supreme Court held that the Government, under the circumstances of the case,
has lost its right to assess the land in question by reason of the equity arising in favour of
the Municipal Corporation because Corporation has taken possession of the land in terms
of assurance given by the Government. This is the first instance of doctrine of promissory
estoppel deployed against the Government by the Supreme Court where the Court did not
allow the Government to go back on its representation and charge the land revenues from
the Municipality.

2. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [ (1979) 2 SCC 409] - the
Government gave assurance to the Petitioner therein that it will be entitled to exemption
from sales tax for three years from date of commencement of production and based on the
assurance the Petitioner set-up a vanaspati plant after taking finance from various
financial institutions. The Supreme Court enforced the assurance given by the
Government by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government.

3. Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies [(1968) 2 SCR 366]- the Textile

Commissioner introduced an Export Promotion Scheme to encourage the export of
woollen goods by offering Import Entitlement Certificates. The petitioner relied on this
scheme, exporting goods based on assurances given. However, the Import Entitlement
Certificate issued was for a lesser amount than promised. The Supreme Court applied the
doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government, stating that the petitioner had
acted on the assurances given and therefore, the Commissioner was bound to fulfill the
promise made. Although the case didn't strictly fall under Section 115 of the Indian
Evidence Act, it was ruled that the Government could still be held accountable for
promises made, even without a formal contract as per Article 299 of the Constitution.
4. Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130- In
1937, Central London Property Trust Ltd (CLPT) leased a block of flats to High Trees
House Ltd (HTH) for £2,500 per year for 99 years. World War II caused under-
occupancy in 1940, prompting CLPT to agree to a reduced rent of £1,250, which was paid
until 1945. Upon full occupancy restoration, CLPT claimed full rent for the last two
quarters of 1945. The key issue was the legality of CLPT's agreement to the reduced rent.
The court held CLPT bound by their promise, applying promissory estoppel, preventing
them from seeking full rent during the occupancy downturn. However, once normal
conditions resumed, the original agreement could be enforced, allowing CLPT's claim for
full rent. The High Trees case solidified the principle of promissory estoppel in English
law, prohibiting reneging on promises relied upon, even without consideration, if deemed
unfair. Lord Denning clarified that estoppel's effect is only temporary suspension, not
permanent extinguishment of rights.

5. Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 KB 215-In this case, during divorce proceedings, a husband
pledged to pay his wife an annual tax-free sum of £100 as permanent maintenance,
despite his financial struggles. The wife, aware of his situation, did not pursue this
payment at the time. However, years later, she sought arrears based on their agreement.
The key issue revolved around the husband's ability to retract his promise, considering the
recent precedent set by Central London Property Trust LD v High Trees House LD,
which barred parties from reneging on promises. The court examined whether the wife
had provided consideration for the husband's promise and if she could claim the promised
sum despite not actively pursuing it for years. The court ruled that the wife could only
enforce the agreement if consideration was given, which was absent since she hadn't
applied for the maintenance as agreed. As the husband didn't ask her to forgo the
payment, the wife couldn't claim the money owed. Presence of consideration for
promissory estoppel ; there has to be a contract.

6. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India (2012) 11 SCC 1 - Honourable
Supreme Court of India has held that both Doctrines of Promissory Estoppel and Doctrine
of Legitimate Expectation are founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural
justice. Principles of legitimate expectation. As there are parallels between the doctrines
of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation because both these doctrines are
founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural justice, it is appropriate that
the principles of legitimate expectation are also noticed here only to appreciate the case of
the appellants founded on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation.
7. Pickard Vs. Sears [112 E.R. 179].- “But the rule is clear, that, where one by his words or
conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and
induces him to act to that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is
concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the
same time."

8. Sharat Chander Dey v Gopal Chander Laha (1892) 19 LA 203 - Representation of the
existence of a fact may arise in any way —a declaration, act or omission. The focus of
law of estoppel is the position in law of party who is induced to act. Thus, a person who is
estopped or prevented from denying his representation may not have intention to deceive
and may himself be acting under mistake or apprehension. The estoppel will nonetheless
operate in such cases also.

9. Soanes Vs. London and South Western Railway, (1919 120 LT 598), a railway
company allowed a man in the uniform of one of their porters to meet a passenger at the
entrance to Waterloo station, to take his bag and walk through the barrier on to a
departure platform, and there to remain in charge of the bag. When sued by the passenger
for the loss of the bag, the company was not allowed to prove (as was in fact the case)
that the man was not a porter employed by them at the station.

10. In R.K. Kawatra Vs. D.S.I.D.C [AIR 1992 Del 28], it was held that it is not necessary
to prove an intention to deceive or any fraudulent intention. The Party making the
representation will be nonetheless estopped if he himself was acting under a mistake or
misapprehension. It was also held that: “Gradually the modern doctrine of promissory
estoppel has developed to an extent that it is no longer necessary that the party seeking to
enforce the said principle must have suffered a detriment. It is enough if the promisee has
altered his position on the faith of the representation.”

Chapter II- ADMISSION CASE LAWS

1. State of Maharashtra v. Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari, (2013) 12 SCC

17 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 202- Admissibility, voluntariness and proof of confession.
—A confession is admissible only as against the person who has made it, unless it is
rendered inadmissible under some express provision i.e. Sections 24, 25 and 26. It
would be inappropriate to implicate a person on the basis of a statement made by
another. A person who has made the admission/confession should be a party to the
proceeding because that is the only way a confession can be used against him. Hence,
confessions which have been made by the accused (in another case) who are not the
accused in present case are inadmissible as admissions/confessions as such, and
evidence of such confessional statements recorded before witnesses (police officers)
would also be inadmissible within the scheme of admissions/confessions contained in
the Evidence Act,
 2. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 12 SCC 133 - An admission must be used
either as a whole or not at all,
3. S. Bhattacharjee, Plaintiff, v. Sentinel Assurance Co. Ltd., Defendant (AIR 1955
Cal 594)- A insured his property with X, an insurance company. A's property was
destroyed in fire accident. On approach of A, X-the insurer stated that they had
appointed B as their surveyor, and instructed A to submit all his information.
However, without approaching A, B had submitted his report. Can the report of B
bind A?
No. The Calcutta High Court held that B's report would not bind A under Section 20.

Chapter II-EXPERT OPINION AND RELEVANCY OF CHARACTER CASE LAWS-

1. Ganesh K. Gulve v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3068- The present case is
related with the murder. There was no mention of certain injuries in post-mortem
report that the dead body was dragged by accused person. Post-mortem report was not
speaking of injuries on back of deceased. Injuries on back of deceased were, however,
mentioned in inquest Panchanama. It was held by Supreme Court that theory of
dragging of the bodies could not be discarded only on account of non-mention of
injuries on back of bodies in the post-mortem report.

2. Murari Lal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 531,- The Supreme Court
has established guidelines for evaluating the reliability of expert opinion evidence:

a. There is no absolute rule stating that expert opinion must always be corroborated
to be valid, but caution should be exercised due to potential biases or limitations.

b. Reasons behind the expert's opinion must be thoroughly examined, and all
relevant evidence should be considered.

c. Corroboration may be necessary in some cases, but if the expert's reasons are
convincing and there's no conflicting evidence, their testimony can be accepted
without corroboration.

d. The reliability of expert opinion depends on factors like the expert's perception
and the maturity of the relevant scientific field.

e. Expert opinion should not be considered conclusive, and the court should maintain
its independence in forming judgments. Experts provide criteria for assessment,
but it's the judge's responsibility to decide based on the evidence.

f. Expert opinion should not override direct evidence when they conflict.

3. Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2200- a child was kidnapped.
The parent of the child received a handwritten post-card followed by an inland letter
 demanding Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 5,000, respectively as ransom for the child. The author
of the letters was traced and a handwriting expert testified the letters to be in the
handwriting of the accused. Solely on the basis of this evidence the accused was
convicted by the lower courts. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The
Supreme Court observed that:

"Both under section 45 and section 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a
scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from
frequent observations and experience. In either case, the Court must satisfy itself by
such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means is to
apply its own observation verify the opinion of the witness. This is not to say that the
Court may play the role of an expert, but to say that Court may accept the fact only
when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion
of the expert or the other witness."

4. Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 - it was held that
handwriting may be proved by evidence of a witness in whose presence the writing
was done and this would be direct evidence and if it is available the evidence of any
other kind is rendered unnecessary.

Chapter IX- OF WITNESSES CASE LAWS [ S. 118-134]

1. Nirmal Kumar v State of UP. AIR 1952 SC 1131- Child Witness- A child (even of
6 or 7 years) is a competent witness, unless he is unable to understand the questions or
is unable to give rational answers There is no provision in India by which
corroboration to the evidence of a child is required. It is a sound rule in practice not to
act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, but this is a rule of prudence, and not of
law.
2. Union of India v Savita Sharma A IR 1979 J & K 6)- If a witness is a relative of
the person who produces him, his statement cannot be discarded only for that reason,
unless it is shown that the statement is a tainted one and was given only to benefit the
person producing him. Partisanl Relation Witnesses (Interested Persons as Witnesses)
3. Aidan v State of Rajasthan, 1993 CrLJ 2413)- The credibility of the witness does
not get affected merely because he is related to the deceased or does not state the
incident in the same language or manner which in the opinion of the court is natural.
Where the testimony of the injured eye-witness was convincing and of sterling worth
and was also corroborated by medical evidence, his testimony could not be
disregarded only because he was related to the deceased.
4. Ram Bharose V. State of U.P. (AIR 1954 SC 704)- the accused was on his trial for
murdering a neighbour for the purpose of robbing some ornaments and then to present
them to his wife. While presenting them to his wife he said that he had gone to the
middle house (where the deceased lived), to get them. His wife then told the court that
 she saw one early morning her husband coming down the roof. He then went inside
the fodder store and had a bath. He put back the same clothes and came to her to
present the things. Held that what the husband said to his wife was not admissible, but
she could testify as to his conduct. Thus, A wife can testify as to what her husband
did on a certain occasion, though not as to what he said to her.
5. M.C. Verghese v T.J. Potman (AIR 1970 SC 1876) - the husband wrote certain
letters to his wife which contained defamatory imputation about his wife's father. His
father-in-law brought a suit on the evidence of these letters. The wife passed on the
letters to her father. The Supreme Court held that the letters are admissible in
evidence. It also held that except where the spouse to whom communication is made
is a witness and claim privilege (under Sec. 122), the evidence as to communication
between husband and wife is admissible, under any other provisions of the Act or on
the grounds of public policy.
6. State of Punjab v Sukhdev Singh Sodhi (AIR 1961 SC 493)- held that it is a matter
for the authority to decide whether disclosure would cause injury to the public
interest. However, the court would enquire into the question whether the evidence
sought to be excluded from production relates to State affairs.- S. 123. Council
meeting advises are protected.
7. State of UP v. Raj Narain (1975 )- the Court upheld the High Court’s decision to
treat unpublished documents as admissible evidence, stating that the court has the
authority to determine the potential impact of disclosure on public interest.
8. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149- The Supreme Court held that
since it is in the public interest its disclosure would not have been detrimental to the
public interest. Thus the Court held the decision of the Central Government to not
disclose the correspondence as not justified. Cited raj Narain case.
9. Yashwant Sinha vs CBI 2020 (2) SCC 338 - In this case, the Supreme Court
observed that section 123 applies to unpublished records only however, in this case,
the document was published in the newspaper. Therefore, the court held that the claim
of immunity or privilege was not maintainable
10. Franji Bhicaji v Mohan Singh Dhan Singh (1893) 18 Bom 263- The privilege
extends only to communications made to a lawyer confidentially and with a view to
obtaining professional advise
11. Suptd. & Remembrancer Legal Affairs, W.B. v S. Bhowmick AIR 1981 SC 917 -
The counsel has right to claim privilege and refuse to show the statement of witnesses
recorded by the court in extenso and supplied to him in order to prepare himself for an
effective cross-examination, if he has recorded instructions of his client on these
statements
12. Dagdu v State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 268 - S.133 Accomplice- There is no
antithesis between Sec. 133 and Sec 114, illustration (b), because the latter only says
 that the court ‘may’ presume a certain state of affairs. It does not seek to raise a
conclusive presumption. Sec. 133 is a clear authorization to the courts to convict on
the corroborated testimony of an accomplice, but since such a witness, being criminal
himself, may not always be trustworthy, the courts are guided by the Sec. 114,
illustration, that, if it is necessary the court should presume that he is unreliable unless
his statements are supported or verified by some independent evidence.

CONFESSION [ 24-30]

1. Pakala Narayan Swami v Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47- The definition of confession is
that it must either admit the guilt in terms or admit substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence. A mixed-up statement which, even though contains some
confessional statement, will still lead to acquittal, is no confession.
2. Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab- A statement that contains self-exculpatory matter
(e.g. killing done in private defence) which if true would negative the offence, cannot
amount to a confession. This is so because a confession must be accepted or rejected as a
whole, and the court is not competent to accept only inculpatory part (self-incriminating)
and reject exculpatory part. Palvinder was on trial for the murder of her husband; the
husband’s body was recovered from a well The post mortem could not reveal whether
death was due to poisoning or what. In her statement to the court, she said that her
husband, a photographer, used to keep handy photo developing material which is quick
poison; that on the occasion he was ill and she brought him some medicine; that the phial
of medicine happened to be kept nearby the liquid developer and the husband while going
for the medicine by mistake swallowed the developer and died; that she got afraid and
with the help of the absconding accused packed the body in a trunk and disposed it of into
the well.” The statement, thus, consisted of partly guilty and partly innocent remarks.
3. Nathu v state of UP- Nathu, Bhola and Ram Singh were the accused of murdering
Summer Singh, a boy aged 11 years. The prosecution alleged that Nathu told Bhola and
Ram Singh that they would get the boy Summer Singh in the mango garden on 17-05-
1952, and he would give them Rs. 5 to each of them, i.e., Bhola and Ram Singh, for their
work. Ram Singh and Bhola enticed the boy Summer Singh on 17-05- 1952 in the
evening to the mango garden, where Nathu was awaiting. As soon as the boy was
brought into the mango garden, Nathu killed the boy, and threw the dead body in the well.
Bhola and Ram Singh confessed before the Court. The Court convicted Nathu, Bhola and
Ram Singh based on their confessions of the Bhola and Ram Singh. Nathu-the Appellant
raised his objection in the Supreme Court that the confessions of Bhola and Ram Singh
were inadmissible in evidence against him and the conviction based thereon was illegal,
as they were uncorroborated.The Supreme Court held that such statements are not
evidence as defined in Section 3 of the The Evidence Act, and no conviction could be
founded thereon, but could be based if they referred to as the lending assurance to the
conclusion and fortifying it.
4. State of T.N. v Kutty- Confession of one co-accused cannot be used for the purpose of
corroborating the confession of another co-accused. The court can take into consideration
retracted confession against the confessing accused and his co-accused.
5. Dipakbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547- Confession made to a police
officer is made inadmissible by Section 25. Section 25 of Evidence Act declares in fact
that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of
any offence. Confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami,
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 and as accepted by the Supreme Court, may still be used as
admission under Section 21 of Evidence Act, subject to bar of admissibility under
Section 162 CrPC. However, in case a statement containing not a confession but
admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is made before investigation
commences, may be admissible.
6. Kottayya v Emperor- The scope of Sec. 27 is explained. In this case, the appellants
guilty of murder made some confessions in the police custody. The statement of one of
them was: “I, Kottaya, and others beat Sivayya and Subbaya to death. I hid the spear and
my stick in the rick of my village. I will show if you come. We did all this at the instance
of P. Kottaya”. The relevant article was produced from the place of hiding. The Court
observed: Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife
concealed in the roof of my house” docs not lead to the discovery of a knife. It leads to
the discovery of a fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his
knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of offence, the
fact discovered is very relevant But if to the statement the words “with which I stabbed
A” are added, these words are inadmissible because they do not relate to the discovery of
knife in the house of the informant. The part which relates as to Svhat he did to the
object* and not *what he did with the object*, is relevant under Sec. 27, because the latter
entails a remote connection with the fact Further, if there is no other evidence connecting
the knife with the crime and the only evidence is a statement coming under Sec. 27, then
the accused must be acquitted.Referring to the facts of the case, their Lordships held that
the whole of the statement except the passage “I hid it (spear) and my stick in the rick in
the village. I will show if you come”, is inadmissible. The above passage is admissible as
it served to connect the object discovered with the offence charged. The other portions of
the statement relates to the past history of the object produced, thus not admissible.
7. Satbir Singh v State of Punjab- The officer having stated to the accused that “now that
the case has been registered he should state the truth”, held that the statement would
generate in the accused’s mind some hope or assurance that if he told the truth he would
receive his support. In a case, the accused, a post- office clerk, under suspicion, fell at his
departmental inspector’s feet begging to be saved if he disclosed everything, and the
inspector replied that he would try his utmost to save him if he told the truth. The
confession was held to be inadmissible, as there was an inducement by the inspector.

8. Prabhu v State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 1113 - a statement leading to discovery of

bloodstained axe, clothes, etc. was held admissible, but a statement to the police that such
clothes belonged to him (accused) and the axe was used in the murder was held
inadmissible under Sec. 27. In another case, the accused stated to the police: “I have
buried the property stolen by me in the field. I will show it. The admissible part is “I have
buried the property in my field. I will show it. The inadmissible part is “stolen by me. The
underlying principle is that any self-incriminatory statement or whatever else said by the
 accused at the time of giving the information by way of giving introduction or narrative
or explanation must be rigorously excluded, as it leads to no discovery of facts.

BURDEN OF PROOF (101-114)

1. Chief Engineer Vs. MP Dwivedi, 2012 LLR 250 MP- The party, on whom the
burden of proof lies must, in order to succeed, establish a prima facie case. He cannot,
on failure to do so, take advantage of the weakness of his adversary’s case. He must
succeed by the strength of his own right and the clearness of his own proof. He cannot
be heard to say that it was too difficult or virtually impossible to prove the matter in
question.
2. Ranchhodbhai v. Babubhai- difference between the onus of proof and the burden of
proof. The latter shifts, the former stays constant. As a matter of law and pleading
burden of proof remains constant. However, as a matter of adducing evidence, burden
of proof shifts.
3. Rizan v State of Chattisgarh- plea of self defence on the accused to prove ; prove a
preponderance of possibilities
4. Rabindra Kumar Dey v State of Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233 - S.105 does not at all
indicate the nature and standard of proof required. The Evidence Act does not
contemplate that the accused should prove his case with the same strictness and
vigour as the prosecution; it is sufficient if he proves his case by the standard of
‘preponderance of probabilities’ envisaged by Sec. 5 as a result of which he
succeeds not because he proves his case to the guilt but because probability of the
version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, thus, the prosecution
cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Byrne v. Boadle- res ipsa loquitur- in case of negligence, burden of proof on the
person who was negligent and not on the plantiff
6. Shambhu Nath v State of Ajmer- Sec. 106 applies only to the parties to a suit or
proceeding. Sec. 106 is an exception to Sec. 101. It is designed to meet certain
exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or very difficult for the prosecution
to establish facts which are especially in the knowledge of the accused.
The general rule that a party' who desires to move the court must prove all facts necessary
for that purpose (S.101-105) is subject to two exceptions,
(a) he will not be required to prove such facts as are specially within the knowledge of the
other party (Sec 106);
(b) he will not be required to prove so much of his allegations in respect of which there is any
presumption of law (Secs. 107-113), or in some cases, of fact (Sec. 114) in his favour.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE [ 61-100]

1. Bank of Baroda, Bombay v Shree Moti Industries, Bombay- the Court has held that
the secondary evidence cannot be accepted without sufficient reason being given for non-
production of the original. The loss of original document must be established in order to
lead secondary evidence. Secondary evidence of the document can be allowed to be led
only where original is proved to have existed but was lost or misplaced. The document
 unless shown to have been compared with original one, mere copy of the document does
not become secondary evidence.
2. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty Ltd v. MMTC Ltd- The Supreme Court
discussed the concept of "patent ambiguity" and concluded that in this case, the three
crucial emails should be interpreted in light of the entire correspondence, negating the
application of the principle of patent ambiguity. However, latent ambiguity under section
95 of the Evidence Act could apply, allowing evidence to clarify the peculiar sense of
language used in documents.The Court emphasized the importance of interpreting all
documents exchanged in the performance of a contract as a connected whole, considering
the entirety of the correspondence between the parties.

3.

4. Rangataju v. Kannayal and ors [2012 SCC Online Mad. 138]- PUBLIC DOC/
PRIVATE DOC. 74/75
The High Court of Madras in this case after considering various other cases laid down a
few characteristics which are required in order to call a document as a public document.
The High Court stated that the public documents are prepared by the public servant in
discharge of his/her official duty. It also stated that public documents are those which are
made by the public officer in order to make it available to the public at large so that they
could use and refer to it as well.
If the public is interested in seeing such documents and refer it and if there is anything
wrong with it they could protest. The High Court further stated that when the public has
the right to inspect an official document it is considered as a public document and a
certified copy of the same shall be given to the person who has applied for it and also that
the certified copy of the public document so provided in court need not be proved by
calling a witness, it is admissible as evidence.

STATEMENT BY PERSONS WHO CANNOT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES[ 32-33]