1.

The core fallacies

1. The fallacy of equivocation is an argument which exploits the ambiguity of a term or
phrase which has occurred at least twice in an argument, such that on the first occurrence it
has one meaning and on the second another meaning. A familiar example is:
The end of life is death.
Happiness is the end of life.
So, death is happiness.
‘The end of life’ first means ceasing to live, then it means purpose. That the same set of
words is used twice conceals the fact that the two distinct meanings undermine the continuity
of the reasoning, resulting in a non-sequitur.
2. The fallacy of amphiboly is, like the fallacy of equivocation, a fallacy of ambiguity; but
here the ambiguity is due to indeterminate syntactic structure. In the argument:
The police were told to stop drinking on campus after midnight.
So, now they are able to respond to emergencies much better than before
there are several interpretations that can be given to the premise because it is grammatically
ambiguous. On one reading it can be taken to mean that it is the police who have been
drinking and are now to stop it; this makes for a plausible argument. On another reading
what is meant is that the police were told to stop others (e.g., students) from drinking after
midnight. If that is the sense in which the premise is intended, then the argument can be said
to be a fallacy because despite initial appearances, it affords no support for the conclusion.
3 & 4. The fallacies of composition and division occur when the properties of parts and
composites are mistakenly thought to be transferable from one to the other. Consider the two
sentences:

a. Every member of the investigative team was an excellent researcher.

b. It was an excellent investigative team.
Here it is ‘excellence’ that is the property in question. The fallacy of composition is the
inference from (a) to (b) but it need not hold if members of the team cannot work
cooperatively with each other. The reverse inference from (b) to (a)—the fallacy of division
—may also fail if some essential members of the team have a supportive or administrative
role rather than a research role.
5. The fallacy of begging the question (petitio principii) can occur in a number of ways. One
of them is nicely illustrated with Whately’s (1875 III §13) example: “to allow everyman an
unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it
is highly conducive to the interest of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a
liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments.” This argument begs the question
because the premise and conclusion are the very same proposition, albeit expressed in
different words. It is a disguised instance of repetition which gives no reason for its apparent
conclusion.
Another version of begging the question can occur in contexts of argumentation where there
are unsettled questions about key terms. Suppose, for example, that everyone agrees that to
murder someone requires doing something that is wrong, but not everyone agrees that capital
punishment is a form of ‘murder’; some think it is justified killing. Then, should an arguer
gives this argument:
Capital punishment requires an act of murdering human beings.
So, capital punishment is wrong.
one could say that this is question-begging because in this context of argumentation, the
arguer is smuggling in as settled a question that remains open. That is, if the premise is
accepted without further justification, the arguer is assuming the answer to a controversial
question without argument.
Neither of these versions of begging the question are faulted for their invalidity, so they are
not charged with being non-sequitors like most of the core fallacies; they are, however,
attempted proofs that do not transparently display their weakness. This consideration, plus its
ancient lineage back to Aristotle, might explain begging the question’s persistent inclusion
among fallacies. But, given our allegiance to the modern conception of logic as being solely
concerned with the following-from relation, forms of begging the question should be thought
of as epistemic rather than logical fallacies.
Some versions of begging the question are more involved and are called circular reasoning.
They include more than one inference. Descartes illustrated this kind of fallacy with the
example of our belief in the Bible being justified because it is the word of God, and our
belief in God’s existence being justified because it is written in the Bible. [2] The two
propositions lead back and forth to each other, in a circle, each having only the support of the
other.
6. The fallacy known as complex question or many questions is usually explained as a fallacy
associated with questioning. For example, in a context where a Yes or No answer must be
given, the question, “Are you still a member of the Ku Klux Klan?” is a fallacy because
either response implies that one has in the past been a member of the Klan, a proposition that
may not have been established as true. Some say that this kind of mistake is not really a
fallacy because to ask a question is not to make an argument.
7. There are a number of fallacies associated with causation, the most frequently discussed
is post hoc ergo propter hoc, (after this, therefore because of this). This fallacy ascribes a
causal relationship between two states or events on the basis of temporal succession. For
example,
Unemployment decreased in the fourth quarter because the government eliminated the
gasoline tax in the second quarter.
The decrease in unemployment that took place after the elimination of the tax may have been
due to other causes; perhaps new industrial machinery or increased international demand for
products. Other fallacies involve confusing the cause and the effect, and overlooking the
possibility that two events are not directly related to each other but are both the effect of a
third factor, a common cause. These fallacies are perhaps better understood as faults of
explanation than faults of arguments.
8. The fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, or irrelevant conclusion, is indicative of misdirection in
argumentation rather than a weak inference. The claim that Calgary is the fastest growing
city in Canada, for example, is not defeated by a sound argument showing that it is not the
biggest city in Canada. A variation of ignoratio elenchi, known under the name of the straw
man fallacy, occurs when an opponent’s point of view is distorted in order to make it easier
to refute. For example, in opposition to a proponent’s view that (a) industrialization is the
cause of global warming, an opponent might substitute the proposition that (b) all ills that
beset mankind are due to industrialization and then, having easily shown that (b) is false,
leave the impression that (a), too, is false. Two things went wrong: the proponent does not
hold (b), and even if she did, the falsity of (b) does not imply the falsity of (a).
There are a number of common fallacies that begin with the Latin prefix ‘ad’ (‘to’ or
‘toward’) and the most common of these will be described next.
9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the
fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who
is taken to be an authority but is not really an authority. This can happen when non-experts
parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence—when, for example,
celebrities endorse commercial products or social movements. Similarly, when there is
controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to base one’s view on the authority of
just some of them. (See also 2.4 below.)
10. The fallacy ad populum is similar to the ad verecundiam, the difference being that the
source appealed to is popular opinion, or common knowledge, rather than a specified
authority. So, for example:
These days everyone (except you) has a car and knows how to drive;
So, you too should have a car and know how to drive.
Often in arguments like this the premises aren’t true, but even if they are generally true they
may provide only scant support for their conclusions because that something is widely
practised or believed is not compelling evidence that it is true or that it should be done. There
are few subjects on which the general public can be said to hold authoritative opinions.
Another version of the ad populum fallacy is known as “playing to the gallery” in which a
speaker seeks acceptance for his view by arousing relevant prejudices and emotions in his
audience in lieu of presenting it with good evidence.
11. The ad baculum fallacy is one of the most controversial because it is hard to see that it is
a fallacy or even that it involves bad reasoning. Ad baculum means “appeal to the stick” and
is generally taken to involve a threat of injury of harm to the person addressed. So, for
example,
 If you don’t join our demonstration against the expansion of the park, we will evict you
from your apartment;
So, you should join our demonstration against the expansion of the park.
Such threats do give us reasons to act and, unpleasant as the interlocutor may be, there seems
to be no fallacy here. In labour disputes, and perhaps in international relations, using threats
such as going on strike, or cutting off trade routes, are not normally considered fallacies,
even though they do involve intimidation and the threat of harm. However, if we change to
doxastic considerations, then the argument that you should believe that candidate X� is the
one best suited for public office because if you do not believe this you will be evicted from
your apartment, certainly is a good instance of irrelevant evidence.
12. The fallacy ad misericordiam is a companion to the ad baculum fallacy: it occurs not
when threats are out of place but when appeals for sympathy or pity are mistakenly thought
to be evidence. To what extent our sympathy for others should influence our actions depends
on many factors, including circumstances and our ethical views. However, sympathy alone is
generally not evidence for believing any proposition. Hence,
You should believe that he is not guilty of embezzling those paintings; think of how much
his family suffered during the Depression.
Ad misericordiam arguments, like ad baculum arguments, have their natural home in
practical reasoning; it is when they are used in theoretical (doxastic) argumentation that the
possibility of fallacy is more likely.
13. The ad hominem fallacy involves bringing negative aspects of an arguer, or their
situation, to bear on the view they are advancing. There are three commonly recognized
versions of the fallacy. The abusive ad hominem fallacy involves saying that someone’s view
should not be accepted because they have some unfavorable property.
Thompson’s proposal for the wetlands may safely be rejected because last year she was
arrested for hunting without a license.
The hunter Thompson, although she broke the law, may nevertheless have a very good plan
for the wetlands.
Another, more subtle version of the fallacy is the circumstantial ad hominem in which, given
the circumstances in which the arguer finds him or herself, it is alleged that their position is
supported by self-interest rather than by good evidence. Hence, the scientific studies
produced by industrialists to show that the levels of pollution at their factories are within the
law may be undeservedly rejected because they are thought to be self-serving. Yet it is
possible that the studies are sound: just because what someone says is in their self-interest,
does not mean it should be rejected.
The third version of the ad hominem fallacy is the tu quoque. It involves not accepting a
view or a recommendation because the espouser him- or herself does not follow it. Thus, if
our neighbor advises us to exercise regularly and we reject her advice on the basis that she
does not exercise regularly, we commit the tu quoque fallacy: the value of advice is not
wholly dependent on the integrity of the advisor.
We may finish our survey of the core fallacies by considering just two more.
14. The fallacy of faulty analogy occurs when analogies are used as arguments or
explanations and the similarities between the two things compared are too remote to support
the conclusion.
If a child gets a new toy he or she will want to play with it;
So, if a nation gets new weapons, it will want to use them.
In this example (due to Churchill 1986, 349) there is a great difference between using
(playing with) toys and using (discharging) weapons. The former is done for amusement, the
latter is done to inflict harm on others. Playing with toys is a benign activity that requires
little justification; using weapons against others nations is something that is usually only
done after extensive deliberation and as a last resort. Hence, there is too much of a difference
between using toys and using weapons to conclude that a nation, if it acquires weapons, will
want to use them as readily as children will want to play with their toys.
15. The fallacy of the slippery slope generally takes the form that from a given starting point
one can by a series of incremental inferences arrive at an undesirable conclusion, and
because of this unwanted result, the initial starting point should be rejected. The kinds of
inferences involved in the step-by-step argument can be causal, as in:
You have decided not to go to college;
If you don’t go to college, you won’t get a degree;
If you don’t get a degree, you won’t get a good job;
If you don’t get a good job, you won’t be able to enjoy life;
But you should be able to enjoy life;
So, you should go to college.
The weakness in this argument, the reason why it is a fallacy, lies in the second and third
causal claims. The series of small steps that lead from an acceptable starting point to an
unacceptable conclusion may also depend on vague terms rather than causal relations. Lack
of clear boundaries is what enables the puzzling slippery slope arguments known as “the
beard” and “the heap.” In the former, a person with a full beard eventually becomes
beardless as hairs of the beard are removed one-by-one; but because the term ‘beard’ is
vague it is unclear at which intermediate point we are to say that the man is now beardless.
Hence, at each step in the argument until the final hair-plucking, we should continue to
conclude that the man is bearded. In the second case, because ‘heap’ is vague, it is unclear at
what point piling scattered stones together makes them a heap of stones: if it is not a heap to
begin with, adding one more stone will not make it a heap, etc. In both these cases apparently
good reasoning leads to a false conclusion.
Many other fallacies have been named and discussed, some of them quite different from the
ones mentioned above, others interesting and novel variations of the above. Some of these
will be mentioned in the review of historical and contemporary sources that follows.