Today is Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of
complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
amounted to P8,542.00.
1
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Slight Physical Injury." The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or
person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws,
rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to
avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla
bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing
damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the
aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol
suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that
nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
:
 Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the
"quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and
sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant,
Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542),
Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
4

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical
injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is
not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988,
p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in
Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical
expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief.
However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE
THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE
ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH
ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND
EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT
IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9

xxx xxx xxx

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR

LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN
THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE
BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE

THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT
WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS
:
 GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH
PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY
SOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the
ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the
ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that
there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex
crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of
six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in
filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the
lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57
SCRA 363, 365).

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the
instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos
graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six
months as imposed by the lower courts."

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two
months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the
date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light
offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already
extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117,
Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's
motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial
Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight
physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore,
only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this
:
 time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor,
pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14
which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex"
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to
penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two
separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction
to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of
this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was
a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15

The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period
here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant to
People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in
joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano
v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless
imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations
were filed — one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for
damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that
Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to
property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v.
Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would
either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to

property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to the quasi offenses in question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on
appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

:
 Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30
days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed
under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article
365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public
censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph
of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this
case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act
committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave
felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have
been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that
prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than
that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty
next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period
or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4
months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition
of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the
rules prescribed in article 64."

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is
:
 deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying
the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in
Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony —
not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised
Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The
resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave
felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting
from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in
one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50
Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing
a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones
menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363,
365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage,
the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit:
(1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she
pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for
each of them. 29

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.
:
 The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof."

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and
the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court
has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had
jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the
contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place
offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within
the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which
is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and
with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4
months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of
Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the
running of the prescriptive period.

Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall
:
 commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for
preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even
with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and
Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a
violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized
by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under
Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial
proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the
proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and
the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular
mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's
defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had
no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Original Record (OR), 131.

2 Id., 1.

3 Annex "C" of Petition, Rollo, 52-56. Per Judge Job B. Madayag.

4 Rollo, 56.
:
 5 Id.

6 Rollo, 35.

7 Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, 27-49. Per Mabutas, Jr., R., J., with Elbinias, J., and Valdez, Jr., S., JJ.,
concurring.

8 Annex "D" of Petition, Rollo, 57-69.

9 Id., 58.

10 Id., 60.

11 Erroneously cited by the trial court as People v. Aguiles.

12 89 SCRA 632, 636 [1979].

13 211 SCRA 277 [1992].

14 115 SCRA 82 [1982].

15 160 SCRA 302 [1988].

16 172 SCRA 415, [1989].

17 A.M. MTJ-91-559, 13 October 1993.

18 Supra note 14.

19 57 SCRA 363 [1974].

20 Supra note 12.

21 Supra note 15.

22 Supra note 17.

23 Supra note 16.

24 Supra note 14.

25 Art. 71 of the Revised Penal Code; People v. Leynez, 65 Phil. 608, 610-611 [1938].

26 Art. 3, Revised Penal Code.

27 Supra note 12 at 635-636.

28 Sec. 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court.

29 See also People v. Conte, 247 SCRA 583 [1995].

30 People v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 [1996].

31 This Section has been amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which was approved by President
Fidel V. Ramos on 25 March 1994. As amended, the provision now reads in part as follows:

"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
:
 imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

32 86 Phil. 617 [1950].

33 People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 [1967].

34 122 SCRA 538 [1983].

35 Supra note 16.

36 Now Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, which reads in part as follows:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be
either by complaint or information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered
Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.

37 Zalvidia v. Reyes, supra note 13 at 284.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

: