Argument

An argument is a series of sentences, statements, or propositions some of which are called

premises and one is the conclusion.[1] The purpose of an argument is to give reasons for
one's conclusion via justification, explanation, and/or persuasion.

Arguments are intended to determine or show the degree of truth or acceptability of another
statement called a conclusion.[2][3] The process of crafting or delivering arguments,
argumentation, can be studied from three main perspectives: the logical, the dialectical and
the rhetorical perspective.[4]

In logic, an argument is usually expressed not in natural language but in a symbolic formal
language, and it can be defined as any group of propositions of which one is claimed to
follow from the others through deductively valid inferences that preserve truth from the
premises to the conclusion. This logical perspective on argument is relevant for scientific
fields such as mathematics and computer science. Logic is the study of the forms of
reasoning in arguments and the development of standards and criteria to evaluate
arguments.[5] Deductive arguments can be valid, and the valid ones can be sound: in a valid
argument, premisses necessitate the conclusion, even if one or more of the premises is false
and the conclusion is false; in a sound argument, true premises necessitate a true
conclusion. Inductive arguments, by contrast, can have different degrees of logical strength:
the stronger or more cogent the argument, the greater the probability that the conclusion is
true, the weaker the argument, the lesser that probability.[6] The standards for evaluating non-
deductive arguments may rest on different or additional criteria than truth—for example, the
persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability claims" in transcendental arguments,[7] the
quality of hypotheses in retroduction, or even the disclosure of new possibilities for thinking
and acting.[8]

In dialectics, and also in a more colloquial sense, an argument can be conceived as a social
and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least contend with, a conflict or difference of
opinion that has arisen or exists between two or more parties.[9] For the rhetorical
perspective, the argument is constitutively linked with the context, in particular with the time
and place in which the argument is located. From this perspective, the argument is evaluated
not just by two parties (as in a dialectical approach) but also by an audience.[10] In both
dialectic and rhetoric, arguments are used not through formal but through natural language.
Since classical antiquity, philosophers and rhetoricians have developed lists of argument
types in which premises and conclusions are connected in informal and defeasible ways.[11]

Etymology
The Latin root arguere (to make bright, enlighten, make known, prove, etc.) is from Proto-Indo-
European argu-yo-, suffixed form of arg- (to shine; white).[12]

Formal and informal

Informal arguments as studied in informal logic, are presented in ordinary language and are
intended for everyday discourse. Formal arguments are studied in formal logic (historically
called symbolic logic, more commonly referred to as mathematical logic today) and are
expressed in a formal language. Informal logic emphasizes the study of argumentation;
formal logic emphasizes implication and inference. Informal arguments are sometimes
implicit. The rational structure—the relationship of claims, premises, warrants, relations of
implication, and conclusion—is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must be
made explicit by analysis.
Standard logical account of
argument types

Argument terminology

There are several kinds of arguments in logic, the best known of which are "deductive" and
"inductive." An argument has one or more premises but only one conclusion. Each premise
and the conclusion are truth bearers or "truth-candidates", each capable of being either true
or false (but not both). These truth values bear on the terminology used with arguments.

Deductive arguments
A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the
premises: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. It would be self-contradictory
to assert the premises and deny the conclusion because the negation of the conclusion is
contradictory to the truth of the premises. Based on the premises, the conclusion follows
necessarily (with certainty). Given premises that A=B and B=C, then the conclusion follows
necessarily that A=C. Deductive arguments are sometimes referred to as "truth-preserving"
arguments. For example, consider the argument that because bats can fly (premise=true),
and all flying creatures are birds (premise=false), therefore bats are birds (conclusion=false).
If we assume the premises are true, the conclusion follows necessarily, and it is a valid
argument.

Validity
In terms of validity, deductive arguments may be either valid or invalid. An argument is valid, if
and only if (iff) it is impossible in all possible worlds for the premises to be true and the
conclusion false; validity is about what is possible; it is concerned with how the premises and
conclusion relate and what is possible.[1] An argument is formally valid if and only if the
denial of the conclusion is incompatible with accepting all the premises.

In formal logic, the validity of an argument depends not on the actual truth or falsity of its
premises and conclusion, but on whether the argument has a valid logical form. The validity
of an argument is not a guarantee of the truth of its conclusion. A valid argument may have
false premises that render it inconclusive: the conclusion of a valid argument with one or
more false premises may be true or false.

Logic seeks to discover the forms that make arguments valid. A form of argument is valid if
and only if the conclusion is true under all interpretations of that argument in which the
premises are true. Since the validity of an argument depends on its form, an argument can be
shown invalid by showing that its form is invalid. This can be done by a counter example of
the same form of argument with premises that are true under a given interpretation, but a
conclusion that is false under that interpretation. In informal logic this is called a counter
argument.

The form of an argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form,
there is a corresponding statement form, called a corresponding conditional, and an
argument form is valid if and only if its corresponding conditional is a logical truth. A
statement form which is logically true is also said to be a valid statement form. A statement
form is a logical truth if it is true under all interpretations. A statement form can be shown to
be a logical truth by either (a) showing that it is a tautology or (b) by means of a proof
procedure.

The corresponding conditional of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible
worlds) and so the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical
necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether
the premises are true. If the conclusion, itself, is a necessary truth, it is without regard to the
premises.
Some examples:

All Greeks are human and all humans

are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are
mortal. : Valid argument; if the
premises are true the conclusion must
be true.
Some Greeks are logicians and some
logicians are tiresome; therefore, some
Greeks are tiresome. Invalid argument:
the tiresome logicians might all be
Romans (for example).
Either we are all doomed or we are all
saved; we are not all saved; therefore,
we are all doomed. Valid argument; the
premises entail the conclusion. (This
does not mean the conclusion has to
 be true; it is only true if the premises
are true, which they may not be!)
Some men are hawkers. Some hawkers
are rich. Therefore, some men are rich.
Invalid argument. This can be easier
seen by giving a counter-example with
the same argument form:
Some people are herbivores. Some
herbivores are zebras. Therefore,
some people are zebras. Invalid
argument, as it is possible that the
premises be true and the
conclusion false.
In the above second to last case (Some men are hawkers ...), the counter-example follows the
same logical form as the previous argument, (Premise 1: "Some X are Y." Premise 2: "Some Y
are Z." Conclusion: "Some X are Z.") in order to demonstrate that whatever hawkers may be,
they may or may not be rich, in consideration of the premises as such. (See also: Existential
import).

The forms of argument that render deductions valid are well-established, however some
invalid arguments can also be persuasive depending on their construction (inductive
arguments, for example). (See also: Formal fallacy and Informal fallacy).

Soundness
An argument is sound when the argument is valid and argument's premise(s) is/are true,
therefore the conclusion is true.

Inductive arguments
An inductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by the probability
of the premises. For example, given that the military budget of the United States is the largest
in the world (premise=true), then it is probable that it will remain so for the next 10 years
(conclusion=true). Arguments that involve predictions are inductive since the future is
uncertain. An inductive argument is said to be strong or weak. If the premises of an inductive
argument are assumed true, is it probable the conclusion is also true? If yes, the argument is
strong. If no, it is weak. A strong argument is said to be cogent if it has all true premises.
Otherwise, the argument is uncogent. The military budget argument example is a strong,
cogent argument.

Non-deductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the
conclusion but do not entail it. Forms of non-deductive logic include the statistical syllogism,
which argues from generalizations true for the most part, and induction, a form of reasoning
that makes generalizations based on individual instances. An inductive argument is said to
be cogent if and only if the truth of the argument's premises would render the truth of the
conclusion probable (i.e., the argument is strong), and the argument's premises are, in fact,
true. Cogency can be considered inductive logic's analogue to deductive logic's "soundness".
Despite its name, mathematical induction is not a form of inductive reasoning. The lack of
deductive validity is known as the problem of induction.
Defeasible arguments and
argumentation schemes
In modern argumentation theories, arguments are regarded as defeasible passages from
premises to a conclusion. Defeasibility means that when additional information (new
evidence or contrary arguments) is provided, the premises may be no longer lead to the
conclusion (non-monotonic reasoning). This type of reasoning is referred to as defeasible
reasoning. For instance we consider the famous Tweety example:

Tweety is a bird.
Birds generally fly.
Therefore, Tweety (probably) flies.
This argument is reasonable and the premises support the conclusion unless additional
information indicating that the case is an exception comes in. If Tweety is a penguin, the
inference is no longer justified by the premise. Defeasible arguments are based on
generalizations that hold only in the majority of cases, but are subject to exceptions and
defaults.

In order to represent and assess defeasible reasoning, it is necessary to combine the logical
rules (governing the acceptance of a conclusion based on the acceptance of its premises)
with rules of material inference, governing how a premise can support a given conclusion
(whether it is reasonable or not to draw a specific conclusion from a specific description of a
state of affairs).

Argumentation schemes have been developed to describe and assess the acceptability or the
fallaciousness of defeasible arguments. Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns
of inference, combining semantic-ontological relations with types of reasoning and logical
axioms and representing the abstract structure of the most common types of natural
arguments.[13] A typical example is the argument from expert opinion, shown below, which
has two premises and a conclusion.[14]
Argument from expert opinion

Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.

Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).

Conclusion: A is true (false).

Each scheme may be associated with a set of critical questions, namely criteria for assessing
dialectically the reasonableness and acceptability of an argument. The matching critical
questions are the standard ways of casting the argument into doubt.

By analogy
Argument by analogy may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular. An
argument by analogy may use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar
particular truth in the conclusion. For example, if A. Plato was mortal, and B. Socrates was
like Plato in other respects, then asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an example of
argument by analogy because the reasoning employed in it proceeds from a particular truth
in a premise (Plato was mortal) to a similar particular truth in the conclusion, namely that
Socrates was mortal.

Other kinds
Other kinds of arguments may have different or additional standards of validity or
justification. For example, philosopher Charles Taylor said that so-called transcendental
arguments are made up of a "chain of indispensability claims" that attempt to show why
something is necessarily true based on its connection to our experience,[15] while Nikolas
Kompridis has suggested that there are two types of "fallible" arguments: one based on truth
claims, and the other based on the time-responsive disclosure of possibility (world
disclosure).[16] Kompridis said that the French philosopher Michel Foucault was a prominent
advocate of this latter form of philosophical argument.[17]
World-disclosing
World-disclosing arguments are a group of philosophical arguments that according to
Nikolas Kompridis employ a disclosive approach, to reveal features of a wider ontological or
cultural-linguistic understanding—a "world", in a specifically ontological sense—in order to
clarify or transform the background of meaning (tacit knowledge) and what Kompridis has
called the "logical space" on which an argument implicitly depends.[18]

Explanations
While arguments attempt to show that something was, is, will be, or should be the case,
explanations try to show why or how something is or will be. If Fred and Joe address the
issue of whether or not Fred's cat has fleas, Joe may state: "Fred, your cat has fleas. Observe,
the cat is scratching right now." Joe has made an argument that the cat has fleas. However, if
Joe asks Fred, "Why is your cat scratching itself?" the explanation, "... because it has fleas."
provides understanding.

Both the above argument and explanation require knowing the generalities that a) fleas often
cause itching, and b) that one often scratches to relieve itching. The difference is in the
intent: an argument attempts to settle whether or not some claim is true, and an explanation
attempts to provide understanding of the event. Note, that by subsuming the specific event
(of Fred's cat scratching) as an instance of the general rule that "animals scratch themselves
when they have fleas", Joe will no longer wonder why Fred's cat is scratching itself.
Arguments address problems of belief, explanations address problems of understanding. In
the argument above, the statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is up for debate (i.e. is a claim), but
in the explanation, the statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is assumed to be true (unquestioned
at this time) and just needs explaining.[19]

Arguments and explanations largely resemble each other in rhetorical use. This is the cause
of much difficulty in thinking critically about claims. There are several reasons for this
difficulty.
People often are not themselves clear
on whether they are arguing for or
explaining something.
The same types of words and phrases
are used in presenting explanations
and arguments.
The terms 'explain' or 'explanation,' et
cetera are frequently used in
arguments.
Explanations are often used within
arguments and presented so as to
serve as arguments.[20]
Likewise, "... arguments are essential
to the process of justifying the validity
of any explanation as there are often
 multiple explanations for any given
phenomenon."[19]
Explanations and arguments are often studied in the field of information systems to help
explain user acceptance of knowledge-based systems. Certain argument types may fit better
with personality traits to enhance acceptance by individuals.[21]

Fallacies and non-arguments

Fallacies are types of argument or expressions which are held to be of an invalid form or
contain errors in reasoning.

One type of fallacy occurs when a word frequently used to indicate a conclusion is used as a
transition (conjunctive adverb) between independent clauses. In English the words therefore,
so, because and hence typically separate the premises from the conclusion of an argument.
Thus: Socrates is a man, all men are mortal therefore Socrates is mortal is an argument
because the assertion Socrates is mortal follows from the preceding statements. However, I
was thirsty and therefore I drank is not an argument, despite its appearance. It is not being
claimed that I drank is logically entailed by I was thirsty. The therefore in this sentence
indicates for that reason not it follows that.

Elliptical or ethymematic
arguments
Often an argument is invalid or weak because there is a missing premise—the supply of
which would make it valid or strong. This is referred to as an elliptical or enthymematic
argument (see also Enthymeme § Syllogism with an unstated premise). Speakers and writers
will often leave out a necessary premise in their reasoning if it is widely accepted and the
writer does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: All metals expand when heated,
therefore iron will expand when heated. The missing premise is: Iron is a metal. On the other
hand, a seemingly valid argument may be found to lack a premise—a "hidden assumption"—
which, if highlighted, can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness reasoned: Nobody
came out the front door except the milkman; therefore the murderer must have left by the back
door. The hidden assumptions are: (1) the milkman was not the murderer and (2) the
murderer has left (3) by a door and (4) not by e.g. a window or through an 'ole in 't roof and (5)
there are no other doors than the front or back door.

Argument mining
The goal of argument mining is the automatic extraction and identification of argumentative
structures from natural language text with the aid of computer programs.[22] Such
argumentative structures include the premise, conclusions, the argument scheme and the
relationship between the main and subsidiary argument, or the main and counter-argument
within discourse.[23][24]

See also

Philosophy
portal

Abductive reasoning
Argument map
Argumentation theory
Bayes' theorem
Belief bias
Boolean logic
Cosmological argument
Critical thinking
Dialectic
Evidence
Evidence-based policy
Inquiry
Logical reasoning
Practical arguments
Proof (truth)
Soundness theorem
Syllogism
Notes

1. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Fogelin, Robert

J. (2015). Understanding arguments: an
introduction to informal logic. Cengage
advantage books (9 ed.). Australia; Brazil;
Mexico; Singapore; United Kingdom;
United States: Cengage Learning.
ISBN 978-1-285-19736-4.
2. Ralph H. Johnson, Manifest Rationality: A
pragmatic theory of argument (https://ww
w.taylorfrancis.com/books/97811356912
02) (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum,
2000), 46–49.
3. This is called "argument-as-product",
distinguished from "argument-as-process"
and "argument-as-procedure." Wenzel, J.
W. (1987). The rhetorical perspective on
argument. In F. H. van Eemeren, R.
Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard
(Eds.), Argumentation. Across the lines of
discipline. Proceedings of the conference
on argumentation 1986 (pp. 101–109).
Dordrecht-Providence: Foris.
4. Wagemans, Jean H. M. (2 December
2021), Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (ed.), "The
Philosophy of Argument" (https://www.ca
mbridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781
108698283%23CN-bp-31/type/book_par
t) , The Cambridge Handbook of the
Philosophy of Language (1 ed.),
Cambridge University Press, pp. 571–589,
doi:10.1017/9781108698283.032 (http
s://doi.org/10.1017%2F9781108698283.0
32) , ISBN 978-1-108-69828-3,
S2CID 244088211 (https://api.semanticsc
holar.org/CorpusID:244088211) ,
retrieved 2 May 2022
5. Copi, Irving M.; Cohen, Carl; McMahon,
Kenneth (9 September 2016). Introduction
to Logic (https://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781
315510897) .
doi:10.4324/9781315510897 (https://doi.
org/10.4324%2F9781315510897) .
ISBN 9781315510880.
6. "Deductive and Inductive Arguments" (htt
p://www.iep.utm.edu/ded-ind/) , Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
7. Charles Taylor, "The Validity of
Transcendental Arguments",
Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995),
20–33. "[Transcendental] arguments
consist of a string of what one could call
indispensability claims. They move from
their starting points to their conclusions
by showing that the condition stated in
the conclusion is indispensable to the
feature identified at the start ... Thus we
could spell out Kant's transcendental
deduction in the first edition in three
stages: experience must have an object,
that is, be of something; for this, it must
be coherent; and to be coherent it must be
shaped by the understanding through the
categories."
8. Kompridis, Nikolas (2006). "World
Disclosing Arguments?". Critique and
Disclosure. Cambridge: MIT Press.
pp. 116–124. ISBN 0262277425.
9. Walton, Douglas N. (August 1990). "What
is Reasoning? What Is an Argument?" (htt
p://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=
Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=j
phil_1990_0087_0008_0399_0419&svc_id
=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection) . The
Journal of Philosophy. 87 (8): 399–419.
doi:10.2307/2026735 (https://doi.org/10.
2307%2F2026735) . JSTOR 2026735 (htt
ps://www.jstor.org/stable/2026735) .
10. van Eemeren, Frans H.; Garssen, Bart;
Krabbe, Erik C. W.; Snoeck Henkemans, A.
Francisca; Verheij, Bart; Wagemans, Jean
H. M. (2021), van Eemeren, Frans H.;
Garssen, Bart; Verheij, Bart; Krabbe, Erik C.
W. (eds.), "Informal Logic" (https://doi.or
g/10.1007/978-94-007-6883-3_7-1) ,
Handbook of Argumentation Theory,
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 1–
45, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6883-3_7-1 (h
ttps://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-94-007-688
3-3_7-1) , ISBN 978-94-007-6883-3,
retrieved 2 May 2022
11. Wagemans, Jean H.M. (2016).
"Constructing a Periodic Table of
Arguments" (https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/s
srn.2769833) . SSRN Electronic Journal.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2769833 (https://doi.or
g/10.2139%2Fssrn.2769833) .
ISSN 1556-5068 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/issn/1556-5068) .
12. Harper, Douglas. "Argue" (https://www.ety
monline.com/word/argue) . Online
Etymology Dictionary. MaoningTech.
Retrieved 15 June 2018.
13. Macagno, Fabrizio; Walton, Douglas
(2015). "Classifying the patterns of
natural arguments" (https://scholar.uwind
sor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&
context=crrarpub) . Philosophy &
Rhetoric. 48 (1): 26–53.
doi:10.5325/philrhet.48.1.0026 (https://do
i.org/10.5325%2Fphilrhet.48.1.0026) .
14. Walton, Douglas; Reed, Chris; Macagno,
Fabrizio (2008). Argumentation Schemes.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
p. 310.
15. Charles Taylor, "The Validity of
Transcendental Arguments",
Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995),
20–33.
16. Nikolas Kompridis, "Two Kinds of
Fallibilism", Critique and Disclosure
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 180–183.
17. Nikolas Kompridis, "Disclosure as
(Intimate) Critique", Critique and
Disclosure (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006),
254. In addition, Foucault said of his own
approach that "My role ... is to show
people that they are much freer than they
feel, that people accept as truth, as
evidence, some themes which have been
built up at a certain moment during
history, and that this so-called evidence
can be criticized and destroyed." He also
wrote that he was engaged in "the
process of putting historico-critical
reflection to the test of concrete
practices ... I continue to think that this
task requires work on our limits, that is, a
patient labor giving form to our
impatience for liberty." (emphasis added)
Hubert Dreyfus, "Being and Power:
 Heidegger and Foucault (http://socrates.b
erkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.
html) " and Michel Foucault, "What is
Enlightenment?" (http://foucault.info/doc
uments/whatIsEnlightenment/foucault.w
hatIsEnlightenment.en.html)
18. Nikolas Kompridis, "World Disclosing
Arguments?" in Critique and Disclosure,
Cambridge: MIT Press (2006), 118–121.
19. Osborne, Jonathan F.; Patterson, Alexis
(23 May 2011). "Scientific argument and
explanation: A necessary distinction?".
Science Education. 95 (4). Wiley Online
Library: 627–638.
Bibcode:2011SciEd..95..627O (https://ui.a
dsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2011SciEd..95..62
7O) . doi:10.1002/sce.20438 (https://doi.
org/10.1002%2Fsce.20438) .
20. Critical Thinking, Parker and Moore
21. Justin Scott Giboney, Susan Brown, and
Jay F. Nunamaker Jr. (2012). "User
Acceptance of Knowledge-Based System
Recommendations: Explanations,
Arguments, and Fit" 45th Annual Hawaii
International Conference on System
Sciences, Hawaii, January 5–8.
22. Lippi, Marco; Torroni, Paolo (20 April
2016). "Argumentation Mining: State of
the Art and Emerging Trends" (https://dl.a
cm.org/doi/10.1145/2850417) . ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology. 16
(2): 1–25. doi:10.1145/2850417 (https://d
oi.org/10.1145%2F2850417) .
hdl:11585/523460 (https://hdl.handle.net/
11585%2F523460) . ISSN 1533-5399 (htt
ps://www.worldcat.org/issn/1533-5399) .
S2CID 9561587 (https://api.semanticscho
lar.org/CorpusID:9561587) .
23. "Argument Mining - IJCAI2016 Tutorial" (ht
tps://web.archive.org/web/20210418083
659/https://www.i3s.unice.fr/~villata/tuto
rialIJCAI2016.html) . www.i3s.unice.fr.
Archived from the original (https://www.i3
s.unice.fr/~villata/tutorialIJCAI2016.htm
l) on 18 April 2021. Retrieved 9 March
2021.
24. "NLP Approaches to Computational
Argumentation – ACL 2016, Berlin" (http://
acl2016tutorial.arg.tech/) . Retrieved
9 March 2021.

References

Shaw, Warren Choate (1922). The Art

of Debate (https://archive.org/details/a
rtdebate00shawgoog) . Allyn and
Bacon. p. 74 (https://archive.org/detail
s/artdebate00shawgoog/page/n92) .
"argument by analogy."
Robert Audi, Epistemology, Routledge,
1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6,
which explores the relationship
between knowledge, inference and
argument.
J. L. Austin How to Do Things With
Words, Oxford University Press, 1976.
H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation in
The Logic of Grammar, Dickenson,
1975.
Vincent F. Hendricks, Thought 2 Talk: A
Crash Course in Reflection and
Expression, New York: Automatic Press
/ VIP, 2005, ISBN 87-991013-7-8
R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J.
Perlis, Social Processes and Proofs of
Theorems and Programs (https://www.i
cs.uci.edu/~pattis/misc/socialproofs.p
df) , Communications of the ACM, Vol.
22, No. 5, 1979. A classic article on the
social process of acceptance of proofs
in mathematics.
Yu. Manin, A Course in Mathematical
Logic, Springer Verlag, 1977. A
mathematical view of logic. This book
is different from most books on
mathematical logic in that it
emphasizes the mathematics of logic,
as opposed to the formal structure of
logic.
Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca,
The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame, 1970.
This classic was originally published in
French in 1958.
Henri Poincaré, Science and
Hypothesis, Dover Publications, 1952
Frans van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst, Speech Acts in
Argumentative Discussions, Foris
Publications, 1984.
K. R. Popper Objective Knowledge; An
Evolutionary Approach, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972.
L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to
Logic, Methuen and Co., 1948. An
account of logic that covers the classic
topics of logic and argument while
carefully considering modern
developments in logic.
Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A
Handbook for Critical Argumentation,
Cambridge, 1998.
Walton, Douglas; Christopher Reed;
Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation
Schemes, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
Carlos Chesñevar, Ana Maguitman and
Ronald Loui, Logical Models of
 Argument, ACM Computing Surveys,
vol. 32, num. 4, pp. 337–383, 2000.
T. Edward Damer. Attacking Faulty
Reasoning, 5th Edition, Wadsworth,
2005. ISBN 0-534-60516-8
Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of
Argumentation. 1989.
Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation
and the Social Grounds of Knowledge
(https://philpapers.org/rec/WILAAT-2
2) . 1982.

Further reading

Salmon, Wesley C. Logic. New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall (1963). Library of
Congress Catalog Card no. 63–10528.
Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics.
Ed. and trans. John Warrington.
London: Dent (1964)
Mates, Benson. Elementary Logic. New
York: OUP (1972). Library of Congress
Catalog Card no. 74–166004.
Mendelson, Elliot. Introduction to
Mathematical Logic. New York: Van
Nostran Reinholds Company (1964).
Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of
Arithmetic. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press (1980).
Martin, Brian. The Controversy Manual
(http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/14cm/14c
m.pdf) (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene
Publishing, 2014).
External links

Wikimedia Commons has media

related to Arguments.
Argument (https://philpapers.org/brow
se/argument) at PhilPapers
Argument (https://www.inphoproject.o
rg/idea/1437) at the Indiana
Philosophy Ontology Project
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina. "Argument
and Argumentation" (https://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/argument/) . In Zalta,
Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
McKeon, Matthew. "Argument" (http://
www.iep.utm.edu/argument) . Internet
 Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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