G.R. No.

L-16808 January 3, 1921

ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff,

Fisher and DeWitt for plaintiff.

MALCOLM, J.:

Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court to determine the right of the plaintiff and
of the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
District.

The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the following: Andres
Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, effective
July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date. On February, 25,
1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was
appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.

Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of
First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the night. (Sec. 154.) The oath of
office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered
upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of
Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration
cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative
Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall
be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of
another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only
if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or
inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)

The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative
intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be
accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and
those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this
fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction is, if possible, to
be adopted, as will give effect to all provision of the statute. (2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code,
the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are
appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippines
Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these
positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed
through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct
judicial offices.
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the
usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be
construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the
nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or
destroy the main provisions of the statute. A proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview or
body of an Act is inoperative and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically,
the leading cases of McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac., 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.],
1207; McCormick vs. West Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N.W., 128; Idaho Power & Light
Co. vs. Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho, 222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these
principles concerning provisos are applied.)

To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled that the
law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are detailed to try land
registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge of first instance shall be required to
do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned." The keyword to the proviso
which follows is "appointed." This word should here be given its usual signification. Many of the
decisions follow the definition of "appoint" found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia.
"Appoint" is there defined as "to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or authoritatively assign, as
far a use, or to a position or office." All the authorities united in saying that the term "appoint" is well-
known in law and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the
nomination or designation of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public
office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.)

The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the
sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee.
Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel
a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L. 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a
judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he
has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be
placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an
appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the
language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the
law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district
an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district.

Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a
meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be
recalled that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. Moreover,
impeachment proceedings, as conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction,
conferred upon the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States, which, it has
uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. (We make no ruling on this point because unnecessary
for the resolution of the case.) But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of the
Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to
conceive how this power could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A
judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the insistence of
the disgruntled party, be removed from one district, demoted, and transferred to another district, at
possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of the judicial officer. The only recourse of the
judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the office and leave
the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment section of the Administrative Code, and thus
possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Organic Law,
section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it consistent therewith.
What we have said is reinforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early decision of
Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court of the United States, in
unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the Judiciary in enforcing the Constitution as the
Supreme Law of the Land and held that the President of the United States had no power to remove
a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said that
"When the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable, and
cannot be annulled: it has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the
executive is to be exercised, until the appointment has been made. But having once made the
appointment, his power over the office is terminated, in all cases where, by law, the officer is not
removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute
unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it." The great jurist further or observed that "It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is"

In State of Louisiana vs. Downes ([1869], 21 La. Ann., 490), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said
that a judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State, only be removed from office by
impeachment, by address of the Legislature, or by proceeding under the intrusion act. It was held
that the appointment and commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office which
has legally been filled, without the vacancy being first declared according to law, was an absolute
nullity.

The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us, and which, if any
lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove that. This law is Act No. 396, enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate and distinct from the other provisions of the Act,
and not tacked on as a proviso, provided that "any judge of a Court of First Instance . . . may be
transferred from one judicial district to another by order of the Civil Governor, with the advice and
consent of the Commission. Any judge so transferred shall, upon such transfer, cease the
performance of judicial duties in the district to which he was originally appointed, and shall be the
regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which he as been so assigned." But Act No. 396 was
thrice repealed by the Philippine Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No.
2347, the Judiciary Reorganization Act, and subsequently, expressly by the Administrative Code of
1916 and the Administrative Code of 1917. Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of section 4
of Act No. 396, the Legislature merely included the proviso to which we have alluded. It cannot,
therefore, admit of doubt that the members of the Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of
the Philippine Commission and preferred, not to perpetuate the old law, but to insert language of
their own. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature was clearly to safeguard the interests of the
judiciary, and this laudable purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.

Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent in
popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A history of the struggle for a
fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of
consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the
judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more
fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice
by the American people. The American people considered it necessary "that there should be a
judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all corrupting or
perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the
government." (Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was
such a conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the
American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government
and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.

The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration, quotes the last
preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The number of authoritative replies to the
proposition advanced by the law officer of the government relative to the intention to establish an
independent judiciary in these Islands, is limited only by space in which to quote them. Possibly we
can do no better than to make our own the language of Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for a unanimous
court, in Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negro ([1910], 16 Phil.,
366, 384), when he said: "This governments in the United States, now possesses a complete
governmental organization, with executive legislative, and judicial departments, which are exercising
functions as independent of each other as the Federal or State governments." (For the legislative
version of the same idea, see Administrative Code, sec. 17.)

On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory of the
division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as "one of the chief merits of the
American system of written constitutional law" (Kilbourn vs. Thompson [1881], 13 Otto, 168), and
has unhesitatingly refused to interfere with the official acts of the Governor-General or to intrude on
the rights and privileges of the Philippine Legislature (In the Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93;
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra; In re McCulloch
Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41; U.S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1;
Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886.) As an instance of this
class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in
considering the right of the Philippine Senate to be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its elective members, said:

The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives,
respectively is full, clear, and complete. . . . The judiciary, with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the legislature to
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is
made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this
tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.

Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the court
has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment.
(Ocampo vs. Cabañgis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guariña [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir
[1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the
latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the
court, said:

The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco
Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and
effectiveness is necessary to the present form of Government. . . . It is
clear . . . that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty
imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or
entity ought to do or must do in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has
the power to maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end,
courts may do or order done. But the right to live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small
matter. The mere right to breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore,
courts have not only the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make
that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by
appropriate means, do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to
make the judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent
power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the
administration of justice. This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its
essential attributes, or if any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any
person or official, then independence disappears and subordination begins. The power to
interfere is the power to control, and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The
 sovereign power has given life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can
take it away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really
essential for the administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the
efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign
power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator
did not itself subordinate them.

A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision which
will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing in the
Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a
far cry from this premise to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of
military discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of
the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to
perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-
respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
government. We are pleased to think of judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three
centuries ago, was removed from office because when asked "if in the future he would delay a case
at the King's order," replied: "I will do what becomes me as a judge."

For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the
proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary
Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave
from for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another
district only with his consent.

It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office
of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that
the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by
the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the
court. So ordered.