ADVOCATES ACT

1. VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBHANSHI V. STATE OF UP (2011)

Introduction

The case explores two critical aspects:

1. Professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961, when advocates misuse
their legal knowledge or position.
2. The implications of filing false and malicious complaints against public officials
under penal laws.
It raises the issue of whether advocates, who are expected to uphold the dignity of
the legal profession, can be held accountable under the Advocates Act for filing false
complaints to harass others.

Facts of the Case

Vishram Singh Raghubanshi, an advocate, filed a complaint alleging corruption by a

public servant in Uttar Pradesh.
The complaint was later found to be false and made with the intention of harassing
the public official.
The aggrieved public servant contended that the false complaint tarnished his
reputation, obstructed his official duties, and amounted to defamation.
The advocate's conduct was called into question, especially regarding his professional
obligations under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Issue

Whether filing a false and malicious complaint by an advocate constitutes

professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961, in addition to being
punishable under criminal law.

Arguments Advanced

Petitioner (Vishram Singh Raghubanshi):

Petitioner argued his right to report alleged corruption under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution (freedom of speech and expression).
He claimed the complaint was made in public interest and that errors or
misjudgement in complaints should not attract penalties or disciplinary actions under
the Advocates Act.
He asserted that his actions were part of his duty as a vigilant citizen and were not
intended to harm anyone maliciously.
Respondent (State of UP/Public Servant):
Argued that the advocate abused his position and legal expertise to file a frivolous
and defamatory complaint, causing harm to the public servant's dignity and
reputation.
Contended that such malicious acts amount to professional misconduct under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which governs disciplinary actions for
advocates.
Respondent stressed that permitting such behaviour would erode public trust in the
legal profession and damage the sanctity of the judicial process.

Relevant Provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961

1. Section 35:
Deals with professional misconduct by advocates.
Allows State Bar Councils to initiate disciplinary proceedings if an advocate’s actions
are proven to be unethical or improper.
2. Section 49:
Empowers the Bar Council of India to frame rules ensuring advocates uphold the
dignity and ethical standards of the profession

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court made the following observations and rulings:

The court noted that as an advocate, Vishram Singh was expected to use his legal
knowledge responsibly.
Filing a baseless complaint against a public servant for malicious purposes amounted
to a clear abuse of the profession.
The court held that the advocate’s conduct violated the ethical standards required
under the Advocates Act, 1961.
It emphasized that lawyers must maintain the integrity of their profession and
refrain from using their position to harass or defame others.
The court directed the Bar Council to take cognizance of the advocate’s misconduct
and initiate proceedings under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
It held that advocates guilty of professional misconduct could face suspension or
disbarment.
While analysing the criminal liability, the court held that filing a false complaint with
malicious intent attracts provisions under the IPC, including defamation (Section 500)
and giving false information (Section 182).

Conclusion- This case focuses on how the case reinforced the importance of
professional ethics and accountability under the Advocates Act, 1961.
2. NORATANMAL CHAURASIA V. M.R MURLI

Introduction

This case discusses the scope of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 and raises an important question:
 Can an advocate be held accountable for misconduct that occurs outside their
professional role?

Facts of the Case

Parties Involved
1. Noratanmal Chourasia: The complainant, who filed a disciplinary complaint.
2. M.R. Murli: The respondent, a practicing advocate accused of professional
misconduct.

The dispute arose during rent control proceedings where M.R. Murli acted as a
litigant, representing himself rather than as an advocate.
During the proceedings, Murli physically assaulted the complainant, kicking and
intimidating him to prevent him from pursuing the case.
Noratanmal Chourasia filed a complaint with the Bar Council against Murli, accusing
him of professional misconduct due to his violent behaviour.
The complainant alleged that Murli’s conduct, though in his personal capacity, was
unethical, unbecoming(unsuitable) of an advocate, and tarnished the image of the
legal profession.

Legal Framework

1. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

Empowers the Bar Council to take disciplinary action for misconduct committed by
advocates.
Misconduct is not explicitly defined but includes any behavior, professional or
otherwise, that reflects poorly on the integrity of the profession.

2. Role of Advocates
 Advocates are not just legal professionals but also officers of the court.
 They must maintain the highest standards of ethics, both in their professional
and personal lives, as their behavior directly impacts the reputation of the
legal system.
Issue

1. Whether an advocate’s misconduct outside their professional role can be classified

as "professional misconduct" under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
2. Does the term "misconduct" include behavior that tarnishes the legal profession’s
reputation, even if it occurs in a personal capacity?
3. Extent of the Bar Council’s authority to discipline advocates for non-professional
behavior.

Arguments Advanced

By the Complainant (Noratanmal Chouraria)

Advocates are held to a higher standard of conduct as members of a noble
profession.
Any act of violence or intimidation by an advocate, even in personal matters,
undermines public trust in the legal system.
Murli’s conduct reflected poorly on the entire legal profession. The Bar Council has a
duty to preserve the dignity of the profession by disciplining members whose actions
tarnish its reputation.

By the Respondent (M.R. Murli)

Murli argued that his actions occurred outside his professional duties and were
unrelated to his role as an advocate.
He claimed that the Advocates Act does not apply to personal disputes.
Contended that the Bar Council cannot extend its disciplinary powers to acts that do
not involve professional conduct or legal representation.
Claimed that the Advocates Act does not apply to personal disputes.
Judgement of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled against M.R. Murli, holding him guilty of professional
misconduct. The Court's key observations were:

1. Broad Scope of "Misconduct":

The Court emphasized that the term "misconduct" is not limited to professional
activities.
Misconduct includes any behavior—personal or professional—that damages the
reputation of the legal profession.
Acts involving moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing, or ethical breaches fall within
this definition.

2. Responsibility Beyond Courtroom:

Advocates are officers of the court, and their actions must uphold the dignity of the
profession, whether inside or outside the courtroom.
Murli’s violent and intimidating behavior during the rent control dispute
demonstrated a failure to uphold these ethical standards.

3. Professional Standards Apply in Personal Matters:

The Court rejected Murli’s defence that his actions occurred in a personal capacity.
It ruled that personal misconduct, if it reflects poorly on the legal profession, can still
be subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Advocates Act.

4. Authority of the Bar Council:

The Court upheld the Bar Council’s authority to discipline advocates for misconduct,
even when unrelated to their professional duties.
Section 35 of the Advocates Act gives the Bar Council broad powers to act in cases
where an advocate’s behavior undermines the integrity of the profession.

Conclusion-
This landmark judgment reinforced that advocates must act as custodians of the law
and uphold ethical principles at all times. The decision sends a strong message that
any behavior undermining the dignity of the legal profession will not be tolerated,
ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice.

3. S J CHAUDHARY V. STATE OF DELHI

Introduction

This case is about the importance of finishing criminal trials in sessions courts
without unnecessary delays.
It also focuses on the responsibility of lawyers to attend trials daily once they take up
a case.
The judgment aims to stop delays, make trials faster, and ensure fair treatment for
both the prosecution and the defence.

Facts of the Case

1. Petitioner: Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary filed the case seeking modification of an earlier
order of the Supreme Court.
2. Respondent: State (Delhi Administration)

The Supreme Court, in an earlier order, directed that the trial in the petitioner’s case
must continue day-to-day without unnecessary breaks.
The petitioner’s lawyers argued that they could not attend the trial daily because it
was expected to last a long time.
The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to change its earlier order and remove the
rule for daily hearings.
The petitioner filed a modification application, arguing that his advocates were
unable to attend the trial on a day-to-day basis as the trial was expected to be
prolonged.

Issue

Whether criminal trials should mandatorily proceed from day-to-day once

commenced, and whether an advocate can decline attendance based on the
prolonged nature of the trial.

Arguments Advanced

Petitioner (Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary):

The petitioner argued that his advocates were unable to attend the trial continuously
because of the trial’s likely long duration.
He sought the removal of the day-to-day trial directive from the Supreme Court’s
earlier order.
Respondent (State/Delhi Administration):
The prosecution argued that day-to-day trials are necessary to ensure swift and fair
justice.
It prevents undue delays, reduces manipulation, and ensures that evidence and
testimony remain fresh.
Advocates who accept a brief in a criminal case must attend the trial regularly.
Non-attendance amounts to a breach of professional duty and undermines the
judicial process.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, re-establishing the importance of day-to-
day trial proceedings.
The Court emphasized that sessions trials must not be conducted in a piecemeal
manner.
Once the trial begins, it should proceed uninterrupted to ensure judicial efficiency
and fairness for all parties involved.
Adjourning trials unnecessarily leads to procedural delays, encourages misuse of the
judicial process, and hampers justice.
Before starting a trial, the Sessions Judge must ensure that all evidence, witnesses,
and necessary materials are ready.
If essential materials are unavailable, the judge can postpone the trial, but only for
the shortest possible period and under compelling circumstances.

The Court stated that it is the duty of every advocate who accepts a criminal case to
attend the trial from day-to-day.
Accepting a brief implies a commitment to the case, and failure to attend constitutes
a breach of professional responsibility.
Continuous trials are in the interest of both prosecution and defense, ensuring a fair
and expeditious conclusion.
The Court stressed that advocates have a critical role in maintaining this balance by
fulfilling their responsibilities without delay.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court emphasized that criminal trials must proceed daily to ensure
timely justice, prevent delays, and maintain judicial efficiency. Advocates have a
professional duty to attend trials regularly once they accept a case, as failing to do so
disrupts the legal process and delays justice for all parties involved.

4. CHANDRA SHEKHAR SONI V. BAR COUNCIL OF RAJASTAN (1983)

Introduction

This case highlights professional misconduct by a lawyer, raising questions about

ethics and accountability in the legal profession. The petitioner, Advocate
Chandrashekar Soni, was accused of unethical behavior, including bribery and
switching sides in a case he was handling.

Facts of the Case

Advocate Chandrashekar Soni represented a complainant, Bania, and his wife, who
had been victims of harassment, physical assault by the accused, causing significant
injuries, including a damaged skull of the wife.
While representing the complainant, the advocate approached the accused and
offered to manipulate evidence (an X-ray report) in the accused’s favour in exchange
for a bribe of ₹300.
Additionally, Mr. Soni further suggested that the accused should hire him as their
counsel, thereby switching sides, effectively abandoning the complainants’ case.
The matter was reported to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
Rajasthan, which found Mr. Soni guilty of professional misconduct.
Nature of Allegations:
 The advocate’s actions included offering a bribe and attempting to betray his
client by switching sides, which amounted to grave professional misconduct.
 The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Rajasthan took cognizance of
the matter and initiated proceedings.

Issue

Whether Advocate Chandrashekar Soni’s actions constituted professional misconduct

under the Advocates Act, 1961, and whether the punishment imposed by the Bar
Council was appropriate.

Arguments Advanced

Arguments by the Petitioner (Advocate Chandra Shekhar Soni):

Mr. Soni denied offering a bribe of Rs. 300 and claimed that it was merely Rs. 20,
which was meant for “advertisement and promotion” purposes, not as a bribe.
He argued that there was no substantial evidence to prove that his actions were
aimed at securing personal benefits by betraying his client.
He argued that his actions did not amount to professional misconduct and requested
leniency due to his status as a junior member of the Bar.
Arguments by the Respondent (Bar Council of Rajasthan):
The Bar Council argued that Mr. Soni had committed grave professional misconduct
by attempting to bribe and switch sides, betraying his client’s trust.
It contended that his behavior violated the ethical standards expected from
advocates and sought strict disciplinary action.
The Council maintained that offering a bribe and attempting to manipulate evidence
demonstrated a complete lack of professional ethics and integrity.
It was emphasized that such actions tarnish the image of the legal profession and
violate the trust placed in advocates by their clients and the judicial system.
The Disciplinary Committee had already suspended Mr. Soni from practicing for three
years under Section 35(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Bar Council of Rajasthan, confirming
Mr. Soni’s suspension for three years.
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal filed by Advocate Chandra Shekhar
Soni.
The Court, however, refrained from imposing harsher penalties, citing the petitioner’s
inexperience as a junior lawyer.

The Court strongly criticized Mr. Soni’s actions, calling them "shameful" and
completely against the ethics of the legal profession.
It reminded that lawyers are officers of the court and must always follow the highest
standards of honesty and integrity.

The Court upheld the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
Rajasthan, which found him guilty of professional misconduct.
The advocate was suspended from practicing law for three years, but the Court took
a lenient view due to his inexperience, stating that stricter action might have been
warranted for a senior lawyer.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court condemned Mr. Soni's actions as unethical and harmful to
the legal profession. It emphasized that lawyers must maintain high standards of
honesty and integrity, as they are officers of the court.

5. EX- CAPTAIN HARISH UPPAL V. UOI (2003)

Introduction:
The case Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India is a landmark judgment where the
Supreme Court of India addressed the issue of lawyers' strikes and their impact on
the judicial system.
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal, a retired army officer, had faced delays in his legal redressal
process due to a lawyers' strike.
This led him to file a petition challenging the right of lawyers to strike.
The case dealt with the balance between lawyers' rights and their responsibilities
towards the administration of justice.

Facts of the Case

 Petitioner: Ex-Captain Harish Uppal, a retired army officer.

 Respondents: Union of India and others, including the Bar Council.

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal had been dismissed from the army after facing allegations of
embezzlement during his time in Bangladesh in 1972.
He was court-martialled, imprisoned, and dismissed from service.
He attempted to seek legal redress, but his efforts were delayed and hindered by
strikes called by lawyers, leading to the misplacement of important documents.
Frustrated by these delays, he filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, challenging
the legality of lawyers' strikes, which he argued disrupted the delivery of justice.

Issues Raised

The primary issues in this case were:

1. Whether lawyers have a constitutional right to strike under Article 19(c) of the
Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to form associations.

2. The legality of lawyer strikes and their impact on the administration of justice and
the rights of clients.

3. Whether a complete ban on lawyer strikes is justified, balancing the interests of

lawyers with the functioning of the legal system.

4. Defining “rare or rarest cases” where strikes by lawyers might be permissible.

5. Ensuring the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

Arguments Advanced

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner (Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal):

The petitioner argued that lawyer strikes are unlawful as they disrupt court
proceedings and delay the judicial process, which violates the fundamental right to a
speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
He emphasized that lawyers are officers of the court and their duty is to ensure the
smooth functioning of the justice system.
Strikes by lawyers harm their clients' interests and compromise the administration of
justice.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents (Union of India and Bar Council):

The respondents, including the Union of India, argued that lawyers, like any other
group, have the constitutional right to strike under Article 19(c) of the Constitution,
which guarantees the freedom to form associations.
The respondents contended that lawyers, as professionals, have the right to protest
against grievances and demand improvements in the legal system.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court ruled that lawyers do not have the constitutional right to strike or
boycott courts.
It stated that lawyers, as officers of the court, have a significant role in the judicial
process, and their strikes disrupt the delivery of justice.
The Court emphasized that lawyer strikes affect the right of citizens to a speedy trial,
which is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court advised lawyers to explore alternative means of protest that do not harm
the functioning of the courts, such as peaceful demonstrations or press releases.
The judgment stressed that lawyers should prioritize their duty to the judicial system
and their clients, rather than using strikes as a means of protest.
The Court encouraged lawyers to find other, non-disruptive ways to express
grievances, ensuring that the justice delivery system is not affected.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while lawyers have the right to voice their concerns, the Ex-Capt.
Harish Uppal judgment made it clear that this should not come at the cost of justice
delivery. The case reinforced the principle that lawyers must uphold the dignity of
their profession and prioritize their responsibilities to the court and clients above
personal grievances.

6. JOHN D’SOUZA V. EDWARD ANI (1994)

Introduction
This case revolves around allegations of professional misconduct by an advocate,
John D’souza.
Edward Ani, the son-in-law of Mrs. Mary Raymond, complained that John D’souza
refused to return a will that Mrs. Raymond had entrusted to him for safekeeping.
Despite two requests, the lawyer did not return the will, which led to the legal action.
The issue was whether John D’Souza violated his professional duties by withholding
the will.

Facts of the Case:

Parties Involved:
Appellant: John D’Souza, an advocate.
Respondent: Edward Ani, the son-in-law of Mrs. Mary Raymond.

Mrs. Mary Raymond had executed a will and entrusted it to the appellant, John
D’Souza, for safe custody.
The appellant gave her a receipt acknowledging the safe-keeping of the will.
After Mrs. Raymond’s death, her husband, was to be appointed as the executor of
her estate.
However, Edward Ani, the son-in-law, claimed that he was the rightful legal
representative of her estate.
Edward Ani made two requests for the return of the will, but John D’Souza refused to
return it.
He argued that the request had to be made through the executor, Mrs. Raymond’s
husband.
As a result of the refusal, Mrs. Mary Raymond was forced to create a new will with
the assistance of another lawyer.

Complaint:
Edward Ani filed a complaint with the Karnataka State Bar Council against John
D’souza, accusing him of professional misconduct for withholding the will.
The Bar Council initially dismissed the complaint, stating no prima facie case of
misconduct.
However, the disciplinary committee temporarily suspended this decision.
John D’souza appealed to the Supreme Court, which eventually found the advocate
guilty of professional misconduct.

Issue

Whether the Supreme Court was correct in deciding that John D'souza was guilty of
professional misconduct for refusing to return the will to the rightful party, despite
repeated requests?
Arguments Advanced

Appellant (John D'souza):

The appellant argued that he was not obligated to return the will to Edward Ani
directly, as the executor of the will, Mr. Raymond, was the rightful person to request
and receive it.
He claimed that his actions did not amount to professional misconduct, as the refusal
to return the will was based on a legal standpoint and proper procedure.

Respondent (Edward Ani):

The respondent argued that the advocate was holding onto the will without valid
justification.
Edward Ani claimed that two formal requests were made, and the advocate’s refusal
to comply with these requests was unprofessional.
He emphasized that the refusal to return the will interfered with the rightful legal
process, and that it led to Mrs. Raymond having to create a new will.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that John D’souza was guilty of professional misconduct.
The Court noted that the advocate had violated his professional duty by refusing to
return the will, despite repeated requests from the legal heir.
The refusal to return the will without valid legal reasons was deemed to be a breach
of professional conduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
The Court emphasized that advocates, as officers of the court, must adhere to their
professional responsibilities, including fulfilling the duties of safe-keeping legal
documents entrusted to them by clients.
Supreme Court upheld the principle that lawyers have a duty to their clients and
must act in good faith, especially when entrusted with important legal documents
such as a will.
It was held that the complainant, Edward Ani, had successfully proven that the
appellant’s actions amounted to misconduct, and the appellant had breached his
obligations as a legal professional.

Conclusion- This judgment serves as a reminder that advocates are not just legal
representatives but also custodians of the trust placed in them by clients, and their
misconduct can have serious legal consequences.

7. NARAIN PANDEY V. PANNALAL PANDEY (2013)

Introduction:
This case deals with the professional misconduct of an advocate, Pannalal Pandey,
who was accused of forging signatures and submitting fraudulent documents in
court.
The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh had initially debarred him for seven years for his
actions.
The matter was further contested and brought before the Supreme Court after a
modification in punishment by the Bar Council of India (BCI).

Facts

Narain Pandey, the complainant, accused Pannalal Pandey (the respondent) of

forging and fabricating documents, including vakalatnamas (documents authorizing
an advocate to represent a client) and compromise deeds, without the consent of the
parties involved.
The respondent had a prior history of professional misconduct, including being
reprimanded by the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India in a previous case
for similar fraudulent activities.
The complainant presented testimony from seven witnesses, who confirmed that
they had never engaged the respondent, and their signatures on the documents were
forged.
The respondent did not present any evidence in his defence or cross-examine the
complainant's witnesses.

Issue:

Whether the respondent, Pannalal Pandey, committed professional misconduct by

forging documents and filing them in court, and what punishment is appropriate for
his actions under the Advocates Act, 1961?

Arguments Advanced

Appellant (Complainant’s) Arguments:

The complainant argued that the respondent had forged signatures on vakalatnamas
and compromise documents to file fraudulent claims in court, affecting the interests
of the parties involved.
The complainant presented documentary evidence and witness testimony, all of
which supported the allegations of forgery and misconduct.
The complainant also referenced the respondent's past disciplinary record to show
that his actions were not an isolated incident.
Respondent’s Arguments:
The respondent denied the allegations, claiming that the complaint was filed out of
personal enmity.
He also denied forging signatures or filing false documents, arguing that the
allegations were baseless.
The respondent did not present any witnesses or evidence to counter the
complainant’s claims and did not cross-examine the complainant’s witnesses.

Decision of the Court:

The case was initially decided by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
Uttar Pradesh, which found the respondent guilty of serious professional misconduct
and debarred him from practicing law for seven years.
The respondent appealed this decision to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India, which reduced the punishment to a reprimand and imposed a cost
of Rs. 1,000.

However, the Supreme Court of India, after reviewing the case, disagreed with the
Bar Council of India's decision.
The Court found that the respondent had indeed committed serious professional
misconduct by forging documents and filing them without authority.
The Court emphasized that the respondent’s actions were a grave violation of
professional ethics, and the decision by the Bar Council of India to reduce the
punishment was flawed.
The Supreme Court restored the original decision by the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh,
which had imposed a seven-year debarment.
The Court emphasized the seriousness of the misconduct, noting that fraudulent
actions by an advocate undermine the integrity of the legal profession.
The Court reaffirmed the need for strict punishment in such cases to uphold the
dignity of the legal profession and maintain public trust in the judicial system.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court restored the Disciplinary Committee's decision to debar the
respondent for seven years due to serious professional misconduct, including forging
signatures and filing fictitious documents.
The Court emphasized that such misconduct threatens the integrity of the legal
profession, and the punishment must reflect the severity of the offense to maintain
the profession's dignity and public trust.

8. D SAIBABA V. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA (2003)

Introduction:
The case involves the legal interpretation of Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961,
which prescribes a 60-day time limit for filing a review petition before the Bar Council
of India (BCI).
The central issue was whether the 60-day period for filing a review petition should
start from the date of the order or from the date the petitioner is made aware of the
order. The appellant, D. Saibaba, challenged the Bar Council's decision to debar him
and the constitutionality of Section 48AA.

Facts of the Case:

D. Saibaba, a lawyer, was running a telephone booth allotted to him under a

handicapped person's quota.
His wife, Smt. D. Anuradha, filed a complaint alleging professional misconduct.
However, the State Bar Council dismissed the complaint, and the wife filed a second
complaint, which was similar to the first one.
In response, D. Saibaba claimed that the complaint was malicious, made by his wife
out of personal grievance.
The BCI later directed Saibaba to surrender the STD booth, which was under his
name, but being operated by his family members.
Despite requesting more time to clear dues, he failed to surrender the booth, and the
BCI advised the State Bar Council to remove his name from the list of advocates.
Saibaba later filed a review petition, but the BCI rejected it as time-barred, arguing
that the 60-day limitation started from the date of the order, not from the date of
communication of the order.
The petitioner then filed an original petition, challenging the constitutionality of
Section 48AA on the grounds that it was impractical and unworkable.
The case was brought before the Supreme Court for interpretation.

Issues:

1. Interpretation of Section 48AA:

The main issue was whether the 60-day period for filing a review petition starts from
the date of the order or from the date the petitioner is notified about the order.

2. Constitutional Validity of Section 48AA:

The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 48AA, arguing that it
was unreasonable and unworkable.

Arguments Advanced

Petitioner (D. Saibaba):

The 60-day limitation period for filing a review petition should begin from the date
the petitioner is informed of the order, not from the date the order is made.
Section 48AA is unconstitutional as it is impractical and unreasonable.
The review petition should have been allowed, as there was no wilful negligence on
his part.

Respondent (Bar Council of India):

The 60-day period for filing a review petition starts from the date of the order and
not from the date of communication.
The Bar Council had no power to entertain the review petition as the time limit had
expired.
Section 48AA is constitutionally valid and clear in its language.

Decision of the Court:

The Court noted that the Bar Council of India (BCI) could have exercised its review
power to correct a harmless mistake by the petitioner.
The Court further noted that if the BCI had exercised its review powers, it would have
likely taken a sympathetic view and not penalized the appellant for the technical
lapse.
The Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, setting aside the orders of the BCI,
restoring the appellant's enrolment as an advocate, and allowing the review petition
to be considered on merits.
The Court interpreted the 60-day period for filing a review petition as starting from
the date of communication or knowledge of the order, not the date of the order
itself.
The Court emphasized that legal provisions should be interpreted in a way that makes
it practical for the person to avail of the remedy and for the authority to exercise its
powers effectively.
On the constitutional challenge, the Court dismissed the petition against the
constitutionality of Section 48AA, finding that the provision was neither unworkable
nor unreasonable.
The Court held that the BCI’s review power is discretionary and can be exercised even
after the 60-day period, but only in exceptional circumstances, such as correcting a
mistake apparent on the face of the record.

Conclusion- The Supreme Court ruled that the 60-day period for filing a review
petition under Section 48AA starts from when the petitioner is informed of the order.
It also allowed the Bar Council of India to review cases beyond this period in
exceptional circumstances. The Court reinstated D. Saibaba as an advocate, focusing
on fairness and justice over technical errors.
9. A S MOHAMMED RAFI V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2011)

Introduction:
The case discusses the legality of a resolution passed by the Coimbatore Bar
Association barring its members from defending police officers accused of assaulting
lawyers.
This raised s questions about the right to legal representation and professional ethics.
The Supreme Court of India ruled on the basis of the constitutional and ethical
principles involved.

Facts of the Case

In Tamil Nadu (2010), ongoing tensions between lawyers and police escalated into
physical clashes.
Some lawyers were assaulted by police personnel, leading to deep mistrust between
the two groups.
Following the assault incidents, the Coimbatore Bar Association passed a resolution
prohibiting its members from representing the accused police officers in court.
The accused police officers filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court,
arguing that the resolution violated their fundamental rights under the Constitution
and the professional ethics of the legal profession.

Issue

Was the resolution by the Coimbatore Bar Association legal?

Did it violate:
1. Article 22(1): The right of every accused to be defended by a legal practitioner of
their choice.
2. Article 14: Equality before the law.
3. Article 21: Right to life and liberty, which includes the right to a fair trial.
4. Professional ethics and duties: The obligation of lawyers to represent any client
who approaches them unless there is a conflict of interest.

Arguments advanced

Appellants (Police Officers)-

The resolution contradicted Article 22(1), which guarantees the right to legal
representation for all accused persons.
Article 14 ensures that all persons are treated equally under the law, and denying
legal representation to police officers violates this principle.
The denial of legal representation breached the principle of audi alteram partem ("let
the other side be heard"), a cornerstone of natural justice.
Lawyers have a duty to defend anyone willing to engage their services.
Personal biases or fear of unpopularity cannot justify denying legal aid.

Respondents (Coimbatore Bar Association)-

The resolution was a result of and stemmed from genuine fears for the safety of
lawyers who might represent the accused police officers.
The clashes between lawyers and police officers led to mistrust and emotional stress,
making it difficult for lawyers to defend the accused impartially.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court, presided over by Justice Markandey Katju, ruled:

The resolution was declared wholly unconstitutional as it violated the accused's

fundamental rights and the principles of professional ethics.
Every accused, regardless of the nature of the allegations, has the right to be
defended by a legal practitioner of their choice under Article 22(1).
Lawyers are duty-bound to represent all clients without bias. Refusing a brief based
on personal judgment of the client's actions is against the ethics of the legal
profession.
Denying representation deprives the accused of a fair trial, as required by Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution.
The Bar Council of India’s rules mandate that lawyers must accept any case unless
there is a clear conflict of interest.
The resolution by the Bar Association was a direct violation of these rules and
undermined the dignity of the legal profession.

The Court emphasized that even the most despised individuals deserve a fair trial.
Without legal representation, the justice system cannot function effectively.
The legal profession’s nobility lies in its impartiality and commitment to justice.
Lawyers must defend clients without fear of public backlash or personal bias.

Conclusion:
The judgment re-established the duty of lawyers to uphold professional ethics and
the fundamental right to a fair trial, ensuring justice and the rule of law prevail.