Journal of Economic Literature 2017, 55(4), 1311–1345

https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151189

Immigration in American Economic

History †
Ran Abramitzky and Leah Boustan*

The United States has long been perceived as a land of opportunity for immigrants.
Yet, both in the past and today, US natives have expressed concern that immigrants fail
to integrate into US society and lower wages for existing workers. This paper reviews
the literatures on historical and contemporary migrant flows, yielding new insights on
migrant selection, assimilation of immigrants into US economy and society, and the
effect of immigration on the labor market. (JEL J11, J15, J24, J61, N31, N32)

1. Introduction In this essay, we address three major

questions in the economics of immigration:

T he United States has long been per-

ceived as a land of opportunity, a place
where prospective immigrants can achieve
whether immigrants were positively or neg-
atively selected from their sending coun-
tries; how immigrants assimilated into the
prosperity and upward mobility.1 Yet, both US economy and society; and what effects
in the past and today, US natives have immigration may have had on the economy,
expressed concern that immigration lowers including the effect of immigration on native
wages and that new arrivals fail to assimilate employment and wages. In each case, we
into US society. These fears have influenced present studies covering the two main eras
historical immigration policy and are echoed of US immigration history—the Age of Mass
in contemporary debates.2 Migration from Europe (­ 1850–1920) and
the recent period of renewed mass migration
* Abramitzky: Stanford University and NBER. Boustan: from Asia and Latin America.
Princeton University and NBER. We thank Steven Durlauf Reviewing the historical and contempo-
(editor), Matthias Blum, George Borjas, David Card,
Giovanni Peri, Gavin Wright, and seven referees for helpful rary evidence side by side yields a number
comments and encouragement. We are grateful to Santiago of insights. First, the nature of migration
Perez for excellent research assistance.
†
selection appears to have changed over
Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151189 to visit the
article page and view author disclosure statement(s). time. Whereas in the past, migrant selection
1 Ellis Island in New York Harbor served as the entry patterns were mixed, with some migrants
point for millions of immigrants arriving from Europe in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
Statue of Liberty, which has come to be a symbol of the that “America’s current immigration debate often sounds
country’s openness to new arrivals, was extolled in Emma a lot like the debate that raged early in the twentieth
Lazarus’s 1883 poem, “A New Colossus,” for beckoning century. Once again many American workers see immi-
“­world-wide welcome.” grants as an economic threat. … Once again the great
2 Jencks (2001) describes the parallels between his- majority of Americans would prefer to keep the country
torical and contemporary immigration debates, writing homogeneous.”

1311
1312 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

positively and others negatively selected Mexico and China today.4 However, there
from their home countries on the basis of was a substantial degree of heterogeneity
skill, migrants today are primarily positively in immigrants’ skills and earnings across
selected from source-country populations, at sending countries, including some immi-
least on observable characteristics.3 The rise grant groups that outearned natives from the
in income inequality in the United States can outset. We also argue that, when evaluating
help explain the increasingly positive selec- the pace of immigrant assimilation, meth-
tion of immigrants seeking to take advan- ods matter. Studies based on ­cross-sectional
tage of the high returns to skill in the United data, which are less w ­ ell-suited to studying
States. But the fact that recent immigrants assimilation than are panel data, often pro-
are not negatively selected—even from des- vide an ­overly optimistic sense of immigrant
tinations that are more unequal than the convergence.
United States, as would be predicted by the Third, both then and now, immigrants
classic Roy model of s­ elf-selection—may be appear to reduce the wages of some natives,
explained by the growing selectivity of US but the evidence does not support the view
immigration policy over time, or by rising that, on net, immigrants have negative effects
costs of (often undocumented) entry due to on the US economy. Instead, new arriv-
strict immigration restrictions. als created winners and losers in the native
Second, both in the past and today, the evi- population and among existing immigrant
dence is not consistent with the common per- workers, reducing the wages of ­low-skilled
ception of the “American dream,” whereby natives to some degree, encouraging some
immigrants arrived penniless and eventually native born to move away from immigrant
caught up with US natives. L ­ ong-term immi- gateway cities, and either spurring or delay-
grants in both periods have experienced ing capital investment. In the past, these
occupational or earnings growth at around investments took the form of new factories
the same pace as natives. As a result, immi- geared toward mass production, whereas
grants who held l­ower-paid occupations than today immigrant-receiving areas have slower
natives upon arrival to the United States did rates of skilled-biased investments (e.g.,
not catch up with natives over a single gen- computerization).
eration. The major difference between the The main goal of this paper is to review the
past and present is that, circa 1900, typical historical evidence on key issues of concern
­long-term immigrants held occupations sim- to the economics of immigration today. We
ilar to the native born, even upon first arrival, explicitly address the set of topics covered in
whereas today the average immigrant earns Borjas’s (1994b, 2014) reviews of the litera-
less than natives upon arrival to the United ture, which include immigrant selection and
States. Smaller earnings gaps in the past assimilation and the effect of immigrants on
are consistent with the fact that immigrants native workers, and we add in each case the
primarily hailed from European countries
­ insight that comes from comparison with the
that, though poorer than the United States, historical evidence. Our focus is on the labor
were not as dissimilar in development to the and applied microeconomics research, rather
United States as are sending countries like than on more macroeconomic approaches

4 US GDP per capita is over five times higher than

Mexico or China today, whereas the United States had
3 We discuss exceptions to this broad pattern in the cor- GDP per capita that was only t­wo to three times higher
responding section. than European sending countries circa 1900.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1313

to this topic. Hatton and Williamson (2005) 2. Immigration Regimes in US History

and Ferrie and Hatton (2014) provide com-
plementary reviews of the role of immigra- The history of immigration to the United
tion in global economic history. There are a States has been shaped both by changes in
number of important historical topics that the underlying costs and benefits of migra-
we do not cover here. These include inter- tion and by substantial shifts in immigration
nal migration within the United States,5 the policy. The high cost of crossing the Atlantic
involuntary migration of slaves,6 migrations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
to destinations outside of the United States,7 gave rise to a long period of indentured immi-
or the effect that ­out-migration might have gration (c. 1­ 600–1800).9 With revolutions in
on sending countries.8 Furthermore, our shipping technology10 and a growing reliance
coverage of the literature on the modern on a network of migrant finance,11 migration
period is only partial. costs declined in the m ­ id-nineteenth cen-
tury, ushering in a sustained Age of Mass
Migration from Europe. This period ended
with the imposition of a literacy test for
5 Classic references on internal migration in US history
entry in 1917 and strict immigration quotas
are Steckel (1983), Hall and Ruggles (2004), and Ferrie
(2005). Collins and Wanamaker (2014) use linked census in 1921, which were modified (although not
data to evaluate the selectivity and returns to migration eliminated) in 1965. Most recently, the relax-
for black and white migrants leaving the US South before ation of immigration quotas has allowed for
1930. Boustan (2009) and Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor
(2010) study the effect of internal migrants on existing
workers in destination areas. Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak
(2011) address the more recent decline in the rates of
internal migration in the United States.
6 Curtin (1972); Menard (1975); Fogel (1994); and Eltis,
Lewis, and Richardson (2005) discuss effects of the slave 9 The majority of voluntary migrants who settled in the
trade on US population and markets. Nunn (2008) consid- American colonies before 1775 arrived on indentured ser-
ers the effect of slave trade on the source countries. vants’ contracts (Smith 1947; Tomlins 2001). Indenturing
7 Hatton and Williamson (1994) include chapters on arose as a solution to the high costs of migration in the
migration to Argentina, Australia, and Canada, the three seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Galenson 1981a,
largest receiving countries in the period outside the United 1981b, 1984). Most indentured servants were young men
States. Green, MacKinnon, and Minns (2002) compare from the United Kingdom or Germany (Gemery 1986).
British migrants who chose to settle in the United States Servants worked for a defined period of time, often seven
versus Canada, and Balderas and Greenwood (2010) com- years, in exchange for passage from Europe to the New
pare the determinants of migration to Argentina, Brazil, World (Grubb 1985, 1986, 1988). The market rewarded
and the United States. Green and Green (1993), Green servants who arrived with more skills in the form of shorter
and MacKinnon (2001), and Dean and Dilmaghani (2016) periods of indenture (Galenson 1981a, 1981b). Abramitzky
study the assimilation of European immigrants into the and Braggion (2006) suggest that, relative to the West
Canadian economy. Fares to Australia and New Zealand Indies, the mainland American colonies appeared to have
were higher than to other destinations in this period, attracted servants with higher levels of human capital.
and information about these economies was scarcer 10 As wooden hulls and paddle wheels were replaced
(McDonald and Shlomowitz 1991). Hudson (2001) dis- by iron sides and compound steam engines, t­rans-Atlantic
cusses these effects of these impediments on migration to travel time declined from one month in the ­mid-eighteenth
New Zealand. Pérez (2017) constructs panel data to study century to eight days by 1870 (Hugill 1995; Cohn 2005).
the selection and assimilation of immigrants to Argentina On the industrial organization of the steamship industry at
during the Age of Mass Migration. its height, see Keeling (1999).
8 There has been surprisingly little work done on the 11 See Grubb (1994) on the relationship between
effect of emigration on the sending regions considering migrant financing and the decline in indentured servi-
the dramatic rates of o­ ut-migration from Europe during tude. The demise of indenturing in the United States may
the Age of Mass Migration. Boyer, Hatton, and O’Rourke also have been tied to the growth of the slave population
(1994) and Hatton and Williamson (1998, chapter 9) study (Galenson 1984). Indeed, indenturing was widely used to
the labor-market effects of o­ ut-migration in Ireland and transport Asians, primarily from India and China, after
Sweden. Karadja and Prawitz (2015) study the effect of the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean sugar islands and
emigration on local political development in Sweden. South America in the 1830s (Engerman 1986).
1314 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

a period of constrained mass migration, pri- with the business cycle; annual ­in-migration
marily from Asia and Latin America.12 rates varied between 0.4 and 1.6 percent of
The rise of mass migration was associated the population. Spitzer (2015) explains this
with the shift from sail to steam technology pattern in the context of a dynamic model
in the m
­ id-nineteenth century, and a corre- in which prospective migrants optimally
sponding decline in the time of t­ rans-Atlantic time their moves to the New World; in this
passage. As travel costs fell and migrant case, high migration rates during economic
networks expanded from 1800 to 1850, booms can generate f­ollow-on migration via
the number of unencumbered immigrants migrant networks, thereby augmenting busi-
entering the United States increased sub- ness cycle swings.
stantially.13 Annual i­n-migration rose from Alongside this growth in migrant numbers,
less than one per 1,000 residents in 1820 falling migration costs also facilitated a shift
to 15 per 1,000 residents by 1850 (panel A in the typical mix of sending countries toward
of figure 1).14 Throughout the Age of Mass poorer countries on the European periphery
Migration, about 55 million immigrants left (figure 2). In 1850, over 90 percent of the
Europe, with the United States absorbing migrant stock hailed from Northern and
nearly 30 million of these arrivals (Hatton Western Europe, particularly from Great
and Williamson 1998).15 As a result, the Britain, Ireland, and Germany. The share
foreign-born share of the population rose
­ of migrants from Southern and Eastern
from 10 percent in 1850 to 14 percent in Europe began to rise in 1890; by 1920,
1870, where it remained until 1920 (panel B 45 percent of the migrant stock was from the
of figure 1).16 Another notable feature of “old” sending countries, while 41 percent
this era is the fluctuation of migration flows was from the “new” regions. Immigrants
from Southern and Eastern Europe were,
on average, younger, more likely to be male
12 We borrow this periodization in part from Chiswick
and Hatton (2003).
and unmarried, and less likely to settle per-
13 Shorter ­
trans-Atlantic voyages reduced the cost of manently in the United States (Hatton and
migration in part by lowering the mortality risk of the jour- Williamson 1998). According to official sta-
ney. In the 1840s, the mortality rate during the crossing
was one in one hundred (Cohn 1984). Mortality risk was
tistics on return migration, first collected
especially high for children (Cohn 1987). Once migrant in 1908, around 30 percent of European
communities were established in US cities and rural migrants returned to their home countries
areas, many prospective migrants were able to travel on
prepaid tickets financed by friends or family, thereby
­
(Gould 1980; Wyman 1993); recent work
lowering borrowing costs (Hatton and Williamson 1998; by Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo (2013)
Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath 1996). See also ­suggests that the return rates from certain
Kobrin (2012) on the role of immigrant banks in facilitating
migration.
countries may have been much higher.17
14 To compare immigration flows over time, note that Immigrants clustered by region in the
Figure 1A does not include undocumented immigrants, United States (Dunlevy and Gemery,
which represented an additional 650,000 entrants per 1977). Figure 3 uses the complete count of
year during the first decade of the 2000s (Hanson 2006).
Adding undocumented immigrants would double contem- the 1920 census to map the most numer-
porary immigrant ­in-flows, making immigration rates more ous ­ country-of-origin group among the
comparable today to the Age of Mass Migration.
15 Other important receiving countries were Argentina,
Canada, and Brazil. 17 Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo compare the counts of
16 Migrants represented a larger share of the labor force migrant inflows from n ­ ewly digitized passenger manifests
than the population during the Age of Mass Migration to the stock of ­foreign-born residents in the census and
(20 percent versus 14 percent). Today the gap between the attribute the difference to return migration. This method
foreign-born share of the population and the labor force is implies that 6­ 0–75 percent of migrants returned to Europe
smaller (13 percent versus 16 percent). in the 1900s and 1910s.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1315

Panel A. Forign-born flow as percentage of the US population (1820–2010)

1.8

1.6

1.4

1.2
Percent

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
00
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
00
10
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
Panel B. Forign-born stock as percentage of the US population (1850–2010)
16

14

12

10
Percent

0
50

60
70
80

90
00

10
20

30
40
50

60

70

80

90
00
10
18

18
18
18

18
19

19
19

19
19
19

19

19

19

19
20
20

Figure 1.

Note: Immigrant flows in panel A include only legal entrants, leading to an undercount, particularly after 1965.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on US Historical Statistics (panel A) and Integrated Public-Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) samples of US census (Ruggles et al. 2010) (panel B).

foreign born by county. The map illus- lower Midwest; Italians were prevalent in
trates some ­ well-known patterns in US New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
history: Scandinavians were the largest Migration within the Americas was also size-
­foreign-born group in the upper Midwest; able, with Canadians representing the largest
German-speaking migrants represented
­ ­country-of-origin group in Maine and along
the largest share of the foreign born in the parts of the northern border, and Mexicans
1316 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%
N/W Europe
20% Asia
S/E Europe
Latin America
10% North America + Oceania
Africa
0%
1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010

Figure 2. Sending Regions within the Foreign-Born Population, 1850–2010

Sources: Authors’ calculations based on IPUMS samples of US Census (Ruggles, et al., 2010).

dominating through most of Texas, Arizona, cent of the population in certain counties
New Mexico, and Southern California. in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Upstate
Settlement patterns in the south were far New York. Norwegians were equally numer-
less cohesive, primarily reflecting the fact ous in the northern tip of Minnesota and in
that the immigrant share of the population much of North Dakota.
in southern counties was very low. Rising migrant numbers and, especially,
Immigrant enclaves are easier to observe the shift towards new sending countries,
in figure 4, which presents the share of the ­contributed to the growing political pressure
county’s population in 1920 made up of to restrict immigrant inflows.18 Congress
immigrants from particular sending coun-
tries. For illustration, we consider three
18 The ­anti-immigration movement scored early victo-
groups—Austrians and Germans, Italians,
ries with targeted bans against smaller immigrant groups,
and Norwegians. The largest clusters of including the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, restrictions
German immigrants (as a share of the total against the criminal and the “insane” in 1891, and the 1908
population) were in Wisconsin, central Gentleman’s Agreement limiting immigration from Japan.
In 1880, there were around 100,000 Chinese immigrants in
Minnesota, and Iowa, and in Pennsylvania the United States (representing 3 percent of ­foreign-born
and Texas. Italians represented over ten per- males between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five). These
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1317

Largest Ancestry: 1920

Austria & Germany

Canada
Denmark & Sweden
England
Ireland
Italy
Mexico
Norway
Poland
Russia
Others

Figure 3. Largest Country-of-Origin Group among Foreign Born by County, 1920

Source: Authors’ calculations from complete-count data of 1920 Census.

convened the Dillingham Commission in were passed over the next decade and the
1907 to study the effect of immigration on era of open borders came to an end.
the US economy and society. The commis- A literacy test for entry into the United
sion’s report, published in 1911, advocated States was passed over President Wilson’s
for a set of additional regulations, including veto in 1917. In 1921 (amended in 1924), a
limits on the number of immigrant arrivals, set of c­ountry-specific immigration quotas
quotas by ­county of origin, and restrictions were imposed. From over a million annual
against immigrants who were illiterate or entrants in the late 1910s, immigrant arrivals
penurious. All but the wealth requirement were capped at 150,000 by 1924. Allocation
of quota slots was based on the size of migrant
stocks from each country of origin in 1890
(King 2000).19 This early benchmark favored
­re-Exclusion Act migrants formed ethnic enclaves
p
(Chinatowns) in many American cities (Carter 2013). After
the immigration ban, many Chinese immigrants instead 19 Legislation passed in 1921 limited immigrant arrivals
settled in South America and the Caribbean. to 357,000 and allocated slots on the basis of migrant stocks
1318 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

Panel A. Ancestry Share: Austria and Germany, 1920

Share of county population

< 0.6%
0.6%–1.7%
1.7%–3.0%
3.0%–5.1%
> 5.1%

Panel B. Ancestry Share: Italy, 1920

Share of county population

< 0.7%
0.7%–2.6%
2.6%–5.6%
5.6%–9.8%
> 9.8%

Figure 4. Share of County Population from Particular Countries of Origin, 1940

(Continued)
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1319

Panel C. Ancestry Share: Norway, 1920

Share of county population

< 0.8%
0.8%–3.1%
3.1%–6.5%
6.5%–12%
> 12%

Figure 4. Share of County Population from Particular Countries of Origin, 1940 (Continued)

Source: Authors’ calculations from complete-count data of 1920 Census.

countries in northern and western Europe, Southern vote away from open immigration
especially the United Kingdom, over the was decisive in allowing Congress to override
“new” sending countries from southern and the presidential veto.22
eastern Europe.20 Support for immigration Following the imposition of strict immi-
restriction was based on concerns about gration quotas, the foreign-born share of the
labor-market competition, as well as xeno- US population declined from 14 percent in
phobia and antipathy toward new immi- 1920 to 5 percent in 1970 (see panel B of
grant arrivals (Goldin 1994).21 A shift in the figure 1). The flow of ­low-skilled immigrants
dropped substantially after 1921, due to both
in the 1910 census. These restrictions were tightened in
1924 and further amended in 1929.
20 Swings in US immigration regimes mirror simi- areas were the most consistent supporters of immigration
lar policy shifts in ­ immigrant-receiving countries over restriction. Rural voters may simply have been xenophobic
time. Timmer and Williamson (1998) document a gen- or may have worried about the competition that immigrants
eral shift toward restrictive border policy in many posed for their children, many of whom were moving to
­immigrant-receiving countries in the early twentieth cen- urban areas. On the role of nativism in depressing immi-
tury, which Williamson (1998) attributes in part to the gration flows in the 1850s, see Cohn (2000). Higham (2002
political pressure of ­low-skilled native voters. [1955]) is the classic reference on nativism in US history.
21 Goldin (1994) finds that congressional districts with 22 Few immigrants moved to the South. Indirectly,
­mid-sized immigrant communities (as opposed to large or immigration affected southern interests by providing a
small concentrations of the foreign born) and districts fac- steady supply of workers in northern factories, which may
ing stagnant wages were the most likely to support restric- have forestalled the move of southern black workers to
tion. Nationally, organized labor and residents of rural northern cities (Collins 1997).
1320 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

a change in the ­country-of-origin mix and to mented” immigrants living in the United
increased selectivity within sending countries States increased, reaching 27 percent of
(Massey 2013). Specific immigrant groups, the total stock of immigrants by 2011 (and
including Jewish refugees during World War a larger share of the annual flow). In the
II and Eastern Europeans allowed entry by first decade of the 2000s, estimates suggest
the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, contributed that around 650,000 undocumented immi-
to this shift in migrant selection (Blum and grants arrived each year, mainly from Mexico
Rei 2015). The imposition of quotas also (Hanson 2006).25
reduced the phenomenon of temporary Policy makers have attempted to counter-
migration, especially among unskilled and act undocumented migration by expanding
agricultural workers (Greenwood and Ward the policing of the southern border; expen-
2015). An exception is the temporary migra- ditures on border control rose ­tenfold from
tion of more than four million Mexican farm the 1980s to the 2000s (Gathmann 2008).26
laborers authorized by the Bracero program Since 2001, Congress has repeatedly intro-
(­1942–64) (Massey and Liang 1989). duced (but failed to pass) the DREAM Act
Immigration quotas remained in place to create a path to permanent residency for
until the 1960s. The Immigration and the children of undocumented immigrants.27
Nationality Act of 1965, passed in the midst In 2012, the Obama administration passed
of the civil rights movement, eliminated the an executive order to offer temporary work
­country-specific quota system and increased permits to such children and expanded this
the immigration cap from 150,000 to 270,000 deferred-action program to other undoc-
entrants per year.23 The c­ountry-specific umented immigrants in 2014. An immi-
allocation was replaced by preferences for gration reform bill passed by the Senate in
close family members of US citizens or legal June 2013 (but not brought to a vote in the
permanent residents and for individuals House) offered a “tough but fair” pathway
with specific skills and employment spon- to citizenship for the estimated 11 million
sorship. Another route to legal migration, undocumented immigrants living in the
albeit in small number, is through refugee or United States. The reform was intended
asylum-seeker status. Currently, the global to provide a wider set of employment and
immigration quota is 620,000.24 educational opportunities to immigrants
The ­foreign-born share of the population and their children, and at the same time
increased from 5 percent in 1970 to 14 per- set stronger enforcement tools to prevent
cent in 2010, returning to a level last seen more illegal immigrants from coming to the
during the previous Age of Mass Migration. United States. Immigration reform was a
In 2010, 51 percent of the migrant stock was
from Latin America and 28 percent was from
Asia. Given that demand for immigration to 25 See facts at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.
the United States now outstrips available pdf
26 Policing the border has an ambiguous effect on the
slots, the number of “illegal” or “undocu- total number of undocumented migrants living in the
United States; fear of apprehension reduces the inflow of
new undocumented migrants, but also discourages exist-
23 King (2000, p. 247) argues that the 1965 policy ing migrants from returning home (Angelucci 2012b;
change was “not designed to open the United States to Gathmann 2008; Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999).
increasing numbers of immigrants but simply to end ineq- 27 Woolston (2015) compares the educational attain-
uities in the selection of immigrants” (on this point, see ment of undocumented immigrants who arrived in the
also Massey and Pren 2012). United States as young children with their younger siblings
24 The assignment of immigration slots by hemisphere who were born in the United States and shows that US
ended in 1978, in favor of a single, worldwide quota. citizenship has a positive effect on educational outcomes.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1321

central topic in the 2016 presidential cam- Selection patterns during the Age of Mass
paign and has been a signature issue for the Migration are consistent with a basic Roy
Trump presidency.28 model. Migration to the United States was
positively selected from some European
countries and negatively selected from oth-
3. Migrant Selection
ers, with differences in selection lining up
International migration is a selective pro- with differences in the relative returns to
cess, with some residents choosing to leave skill across sending countries. In the recent
their country of birth and others choosing period, migrants to the United States from
to stay. Who moves depends on the costs many sending countries appear to be posi-
and benefits of migration, which can vary tively selected on the basis of education and
across individuals for both systematic and other observable dimensions of productiv-
idiosyncratic reasons. In a simple Roy model ity. Such positive selection may be a result
in which migration costs are assumed to be of immigration policy that favors education
the same for everyone, prospective migrants and skill.
possessing skills that are highly valued in the
3.1 Migrant Selection in the Past
destination economy can expect the high-
est return to migration and are thus most Given available information on the income
likely to move. Specifically, if the destination distribution of European sending countries
country offers higher labor-market rewards in the ­mid-nineteenth century, an applica-
for skill relative to the sending country, the tion of the Roy model would predict neutral
migrant flow will be positively selected on selection from western Europe and nega-
the basis of skill. If, instead, the destination tive selection from the European periphery.
economy offers lower rewards for skill rel- At this time, the United States exhibited a
ative to the sending area, the migrant flow similar income distribution to many western
will be negatively selected on the basis of European countries, in which case we would
skill.29 By positive (or negative) selection, we expect n ­eutrally selected migration from
mean that migrants have more (less) produc- countries like Great Britain (Lindert 2000;
tive skills than residents who stay behind in Lindert and Williamson 2014).30 Although
the source country. In practice, skills can be evidence on the income distribution in other
indexed by observable attributes (like educa- European counties is limited, scattered data
tion) or p­ remigration wages, which provide suggest that the United States was more equal
a measure of otherwise unobserved skills than countries on the European periphery in
rewarded in the labor market. the late nineteenth century.31 In these cases,

30 Lindert and Williamson’s (2014) new inequality esti-

28 Contemporary survey evidence finds that l­ow-skilled mates for the United States in 1860 are based on “social
workers are less favorable toward an open immigration tables,” or counts of the population in ­one-digit occupa-
policy than their ­higher-skilled counterparts, although the tions, matched with information on labor and property
underlying cause of this association—whether concerns income by occupation category.
about labor-market competition or an association between 31 See Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012) for a
skill level and nativist attitudes—is unclear (Scheve and comparison of the US and Norwegian income distributions
Slaughter, 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hainmueller in 1900. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) and Atkinson, Piketty,
and Hiscox, 2007). See Citrin et al. (1997) for an alterna- and Saez (2011) provide a broader set of ­cross-country
tive reading of the survey evidence. comparisons. We caution that the Atkinson et al. series
29 This logic is drawn from Roy’s (1951) model of begin circa 1920 and focus on the share of income earned
­self-selection into occupations, as applied to the migration by workers at the top of the income distribution, both of
decision by Borjas (1987); see Borjas (2014, pp. ­8–25) for a which may reduce the applicability to the Age of Mass
useful summary of this application. Migration.
1322 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

low-skilled workers would have the most to Spitzer and Zimran (2017) compare the stat-
gain from moving to the United States and ure of Italian migrants entering the United
we would expect negative selection. States, logged in Ellis Island arrival records,
Indeed, as a basic Roy model would pre- with the stature of Italian males conscripted
dict, historical evidence suggests that migra- into the armed forces as a proxy for child-
tion from western Europe to the United hood health conditions. Migrants were neg-
States was neutrally selected. Passenger atively selected on the basis of height from
lists of emigrants leaving the German region the overall Italian population, due entirely
of ­ Hesse-Cassel in the 1850s reveal that to higher migration rates from the poorer
­mid-skill-level artisans were overrepresented southern provinces.33
in the migrant flow, as opposed to poor labor- The direction of migrant selection is closely
ers or rich farmers (Wegge 2002). British related to the motivations of prospective
immigrants in the 1860s and 1870s were also migrants. An extensive literature in economic
more likely to have been raised by a father history studies the determinants of aggregate
in a s­emi-skilled profession, as opposed to migration flows, drawing either on national
an unskilled or white-collar father; Long and time series (e.g., Hatton 1995 for the United
Ferrie (2013a) observe this pattern in census Kingdom; Hatton and Williamson 1998 for
data matched between the United States and Ireland) or provincial differences in emigra-
the United Kingdom.32 tion rates (e.g., Hatton and Williamson 1998
In contrast, migrants to the United States for Ireland and Italy; ­Sanchez-Alonso 2000
from countries in the European periph- for Spain).34 In general, the size of the migra-
ery (including Ireland, Norway, and Italy) tion flow increases with the relative wage and
appear to have been negatively selected. employment rates in the destination country,
Irish migrants from the ­ pre-famine and as well as with the size of the migrant net-
famine periods held ­lower-paid occupations work, suggests that prospective migrants are
than men who remained at home and were aware of and responsive to economic condi-
more likely to report a ­round-numbered age; tions.35 Improvements in relative economic
such age heaping is often used as a proxy opportunities in the destination country are
for a lack of numeracy (Mokyr and Ó Gráda also associated with more positive migrant
1982; Cohn 1995). Norwegian migrants in a selection (Covarrubias, Lafortune, and
linked census sample were more likely than Tessada 2015).
nonmigrants to be raised by fathers who
­ The Roy model implicitly assumes that
did not own land and who held ­lower-paid migrants are seeking to optimize lifetime
occupations (Abramitzky, Boustan, and
­ income, but in some cases, migration may
Eriksson 2012). Abramitzky et al. also find also be prompted by flight from persecution
a higher return to migration within pairs of or pursuit of political and social freedoms.
brothers than in the population as a whole,
suggesting that naïve estimates of the return 33 Kosack and Ward (2014) use heights to assess the
to migration are biased downward by nega- selection patterns of Mexican migrants into the United
tive selection for men leaving urban areas. States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Their
results suggest positive selection: migrants from Mexico
were, on average, four to five centimeters taller than
Mexican conscripts. See also Greenwood (2007, 2008) on
32 Cohn (1992) instead finds that, during the antebel- migrant selection by age and gender.
lum period, British migrants were drawn from both the 34 Hatton (2010) provides a thorough review of this lit-
richest occupations (farmers) and the poorest (laborers), erature (see p. ­942–49).
with the skilled artisans underrepresented in the migrant 35 See Moretti (1999) on the role of social networks on
flow. migration from Italy during the Age of Mass Migration.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1323

There has been less work done on the role Moraga 2011; Ambrosini and Peri 2012;
of ­noneconomic factors such as political Kaestner and Malamud 2014). Differences
upheavals or persecution in driving migra- in the two sets of studies could be due
tion flows during the Age of Mass Migration. to ­ under-enumeration of undocumented
Boustan (2007) and Spitzer (2015) show Mexican immigrants in the US census
that Jewish o­ ut-migration from the Russian (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007) or to differ-
empire reacted to ­ anti-Jewish violence ential selection patterns by observed skill
(pogroms), but that economic fundamentals (education) versus labor-market productivity
continued to drive much of the migration (wages).37
patterns in this case. Research into other The common finding of positive selection
cases, including the German revolutions of in contemporary migration flows has led to
1848, the Irish struggles for independence, various attempts to adapt the standard Roy
and the role of various famines and natural model framework, including modifying the
disasters, could prove rewarding. utility function and incorporating individual
variation in migration costs. Grogger and
3.2 Migrant Selection in the Present
Hanson (2011) argue that positive migrant
Unlike in the past, recent empirical evi- selection can be rationalized with the use
dence on migrant selection to the United of a linear (rather than logarithmic) utility
States appears to be at odds with predictions function. In this case, the migration deci-
from the basic Roy model. In particular, sion depends on absolute rather than per-
migrants to the United States from many centage wage differences. Hence, given that
sending countries are positively selected in rich countries tend to exhibit larger absolute
their education and other observable skills, differences between the wages of low- and
regardless of the differentials in returns high-skilled workers, immigrants that move
to skill between destination and source from developing to developed countries will
(Jasso et al. 2004; Feliciano 2005; Kennedy, tend to be positively selected in terms of
McDonald, and Biddle 2006; Grogger and skills.
Hanson 2011). Alternatively, the costs of migration (and
The case of Mexican immigrants has been not only the benefits) may vary by skill level.
analyzed most closely. A high level of income First, skilled workers may find it easier to
inequality in Mexico suggests that the adapt to the new location, for example, by
migrant flow out of Mexico should be neg- learning a new language, navigating bureau-
atively selected. Instead, early work found cratic hurdles at entry, and searching for
that migrants were drawn from the middle housing and employment in the destination.
of the educational distribution (Chiquiar and Second, the low skilled may have a harder
Hanson 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005).36 time accessing credit to finance their move,
More recent work based on Mexican panel “pricing out” the poor from migration oppor-
data finds some evidence of negative selec- tunities. Finally, under the existing immi-
tion from Mexico, in the sense that migrants gration regime, ­ highly educated workers
earned less than ­nonmigrants in the period
before their trip (see ­ Fernandez-Huertas 37 Gould and Moav (2008) argue that patterns of
migrant selection can differ across skill categories.
Education, in particular, may reflect “general” skills, while
36 Caponi (2011) uses a structural approach to esti- other labor-market skills may be “­country-specific.” They
mate the skill distribution of Mexican immigrants into the show that Israeli emigrants are positively selected in terms
United States. He finds that Mexican immigrants into the of education but are drawn from the middle of the distri-
United States are positively selected in terms of ability. bution of unobserved skills, as proxied by residual wages.
1324 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

may have greater access to legal avenues of skilled, migration costs could help explain
­immigration, such as employer sponsorship, the positive selection puzzle. Today, around
leaving lower-skilled migrants to face the 20 percent of entry slots in the United States
high costs of illegal entry.38 are reserved for immigrants sponsored by an
employer; these openings tend to be filled by
3.3 History Can Inform Current Debates
high-skilled immigrants. Legal immigrants
­
on Migrant Selection
are then able to sponsor family members
Changes in the economic environment to join them through family reunification.
would predict the observed shift over time Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000) docu-
toward positive migrant selection. The diver- ment that the average skills of new green-
gence in absolute income between the United card holders have been increasing relative to
States and the developing world and the wid- the native born since the 1970s and attribute
ening of the US income distribution might these changes to an increasing preference
increasingly attract h ­igh-skilled migrants for skilled workers over time.39 Furthermore,
seeking to take advantage of the high returns even as travel costs have declined, the actual
to skill in the United States. However, a puz- cost of entering the United States for many
zle remains: why is there positive selection ­low-skilled workers, often illegally with the
today, even from sending countries that are help of a smuggler, has increased.
more unequal than the United States (e.g., Immigrants from Europe in the Age of
Nigeria and Brazil)? Mass Migration did not face legal barriers
Historical evidence can help adjudicate to entering the United States and, perhaps
between proposed explanations for the pos- as a result, were negatively selected from
itive selection puzzle. Some explanations for their home-country population in some
this puzzling fact are not consistent with the cases. Today, a few immigrant groups are
negative selection of migrants from some able to migrate to the United States without
European sending countries in the past. For restriction, including residents of US territo-
example, if the h­ igher-skilled are simply bet- ries like Puerto Rico.40 Puerto Rico is more
ter able to navigate the migration process unequal than the United States (compare a
and adapt to a new culture, we would expect Gini coefficient of 0.55 in Puerto Rico and
positive selection in both the past and the 0.48 in the US mainland) and thus, accord-
present. Similarly, a model of linear, rather ing to a basic Roy model, we would expect
than logarithmic, utility, as in Grogger and migration from the island to be negatively
Hanson (2011), predicts that migrants from selected. Indeed, Puerto Ricans who move
poorer to richer countries would have been to the mainland are negatively selected on
positively selected in the past, which is con-
trary to evidence from Ireland, Italy, and 39 Jasso and Rosenzweig (2008) and Antecol,
Norway. ­ obb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) compare the immigrant
C
In a basic Roy model, the cost of migra- selection system in the United States to those used in
Australia and Canada.
tion is the same for everyone. If, instead, 40 Selection patterns of internal migrants who can move
restrictive immigration policy renders migra- at will also shed light on migrant selection in the absence
tion costs particularly high today for the low of policy restrictions. Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2011)
and Malamud and Wozniak (2012) find that college gradu-
ates are more likely to move across state lines; this pattern
would be consistent with the Roy model if these highly
38 Members of different skill groups may also have dif- skilled migrants tend to settle in states where the return
ferent valuation of ­US-specific amenities, including cul- to skill is high (Dahl 2002). See also Robinson and Tomes
tural diversity and political freedoms like the right to vote (1982); Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992); and Abramitzky
(see Vigdor 2002 for one application of this idea). (2009).
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1325

the basis of ­educational attainment and earn- time could be due to measurement issues.
ings ability (Ramos 1992; Borjas 2008).41 First, there is a wide array of measures of
The role of migration costs in generating skills used in the literature, including liter-
positive selection need not imply that the acy, years of schooling, proxies for numer-
poor are priced out of migration because of a acy, earnings, wealth, unobserved ability,
lack of credit or financing for their trip. Both health, and height. Although these measures
in the past and the present, there is evidence are most likely correlated, this relationship
that immigrant networks can alleviate such might be weak in some cases. Second, his-
financial constraints. Wegge (1998) compares torical work is more likely to measure the
“networked” migrants in 1850s Germany flow of new migrants into the United States
who shared a surname with other migrants using passenger lists, whereas the contem-
from their village with their “­non-networked” porary literature often analyzes the stock of
counterparts. Networked migrants held sub- immigrants observed in the US census at
stantially less wealth at departure, suggesting a point in time (e.g., Chiquiar and Hanson
that migrant networks served as an effective 2005). These two methods need not produce
substitute for ­ self-financing. Further evi- the same answer if return migration is also
dence that financing was not a barrier to selective (existing evidence suggests that this
migration can be found in Norway. In 1900, is the case; see, for example, Lubotsky 2007;
when mass migration was already underway, Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014;
individual wealth was a deterrent to (rather Ward 2017).
than a facilitator of ) migration (Abramitzky,
3.4 Future Research Directions
Boustan, and Eriksson 2013). Men who grew
up in households with assets, particularly Despite our speculation that shifts in
those who could expect to inherit their fam- immigration policy may explain changing
ily’s land by virtue of birth order and sibling selection patterns over time, there is lit-
composition, were less likely than others tle work directly assessing the relationship
to migrate.42 A similar pattern holds today: between migrant selection and prevailing
Mexican migrants from communities with immigration restrictions. We view the con-
strong migration networks are less wealthy nection between immigration policy and
than are migrants from communities with migrant selection to be a crucial area of
weak migration networks (McKenzie and future research, especially given the ongo-
Rapoport 2007, 2010).43 ing political debates about immigration
In addition to underlying changes in the reform. Shifts in the immigration regime
costs of migration, some of the observed also encourage the involvement of different
differences in selection patterns across institutions in the immigration process—
including immigrant banks and immigrant
aid societies in the past and universities and
41 In contrast, migrants from the Federated States
firms as the sponsors of student or worker
of Micronesia (FSM), an associated state of the United
States, are positively selected on educational attainment visas today. Little is known about the role
and premigration earnings, despite moving from a more that these institutions have played in shaping
unequal sending location (Akee 2010). both migrant selection and assimilation.
42 In contrast, Angelucci (2012a) finds that an exoge-
nous increase in wealth induced by the Mexican program A recent explosion in the availability of
Oportunidades increased the probability of migrating to historical census micro data from a number
the United States.
43 Relatedly, Spitzer (2015) argues that migrant net-
of European sending countries, including
works helped Jews flee waves of a­ nti-Jewish violence in the Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Russian empire. Kingdom, opens up the possibility for new
1326 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

work on the role of local conditions in shap- the skills necessary to succeed in the United
ing migrant selection. To date, most work States (see, for example, Borjas 2014 for a
on migrant selection has analyzed national clear formalization of this idea). Immigrants
trends, but there may be substantial varia- facing discrimination in the labor market may
tion in who leaves from different regions of still be able to catch up with the native born
sending countries. Micro data also allow for if they can “pass” as natives—for example, by
the analysis of international migration along- changing their names or losing their accents.
side internal migration within sending coun- Both during the Age of Mass Migration
tries from rural to urban areas. Building new and today, immigrants experienced some
panel data sets is particularly important to earnings convergence with natives as they
the study of both contemporary and histor- spent more time in the US labor market, but
ical migration flows. this convergence process is slow. As a result,
Finally, we emphasize that a proper immigrants do not experience complete
understanding of migrant selection is ­catch-up in a single generation, either in the
necessary for generating unbiased esti- past or the present.
mates of the economic gains to migration.
Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012); 4.1 Earnings Convergence between
and McKenzie, Stillman, and Gibson (2010) Immigrants and Natives
have made this point for historical and con-
temporary immigration flows, respectively. A 4.1.1 Contemporary Patterns and
comparison of their estimates suggests that Methodological Developments
the return to migration has increased sub-
stantially over time, perhaps as a result of Much of the contemporary literature on
quotas that artificially restrict the supply of immigrant assimilation has been focused
immigrant workers. However, these studies on solving methodological issues in order
are based on very specific cases—migration to properly measure changes in immigrant
from Norway to the United States and from earnings with time spent in the United States.
Tonga to New Zealand, respectively—and so In early work on this topic, Chiswick (1978)
additional estimates of the economic returns found that immigrants in the 1970 census
to migration for larger migration flows and earned less than natives upon first arrival, but
at various points in time would be welcome. rapidly caught up and were able to overtake
natives after spending fi
­ fteen to twenty years
in the United States. A smaller earnings gap
4. Immigrant Assimilation in
between natives and immigrants who have
the United States
spent more time in the United States in a
How do immigrants perform in the US single cross-section may reflect immigrants’
labor market? Do n ­ ewly arrived immigrants earnings growth, but may also be driven by
fare worse than the native born and, if so, declining skill levels of immigrants across
do they catch up with natives over time? We arrival cohorts and n
­ egatively selected return
might expect immigrants to earn less than migration. By following immigrant arrival
the native born if they start out with fewer cohorts across census waves, Borjas (1985)
productive skills than natives or if they are documents that around half of the conver-
discriminated against at the workplace. gence observed in a single cross section can
Immigrants held back by an initial lack of be attributed to declining skills across arrival
­US-specific skills may be able to close their cohorts. The extent of convergence is smaller
earnings gap with natives by investing in yet in panel datasets that follow individual
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1327

immigrants over time, thereby controlling immigrants can be attributed to a widen-

for selective return migration (Lubotsky ing gap in educational attainment with the
2007).44 Figure 5 provides a succinct graphi- native born. Furthermore, Hispanic immi-
cal illustration of the conceptual issues asso- grants experience ­slower-than-average rates
ciated with inferring earnings convergence of earnings convergence with natives, sug-
from ­cross-sectional data and the benefits of gesting that the earnings gap is likely to per-
using panel data in this context. sist over at least one generation (Lubotsky
In recent years, initial earnings gaps and 2007). In contrast, Chinese and Japanese
the speed of convergence between immi- immigrants enjoyed similar labor-market
grants and natives have varied by arrival outcomes to natives in the 1970 census
cohort. Earnings at entry relative to natives (Chiswick 1983). More recent evidence sug-
have fallen from a gap of around 20 log gests that first-generation Asian immigrants
points in the arrival cohort of 1­ 965–69 to a fare worse than comparable whites, but this
gap of around 35 log points for the arrival difference vanishes in the second generation
cohort of 1­985–89, before stabilizing or (Duleep and Sanders 2012; Arabsheibani
improving slightly (Chiswick 1986; Smith and Wang 2010; see also Hilger 2017).
2006; Borjas and Friedberg 2009). Newer Less is known about the earnings assimila-
cohorts also experience slower earnings tion of highly educated immigrants who work
growth across census waves (Borjas 2015). in the ­high-tech industry or pursue grad-
The decline in immigrants’ relative earn- uate degrees and stay in the United States
ings can be attributed, in part, to a general upon graduation. Parey et al. (2015) show
widening of the income distribution, which that German college graduates who settle in
has adversely affected earnings of the low the United States, relative to other destina-
skilled (Lubotsky 2011). Immigrants in tion areas, are positively selected, consistent
recent arrival cohorts may also be suffer- with predictions from the Roy model. Even
ing from lower levels or slower acquisition among this positively selected pool, the most
of ­US-specific human capital, particularly successful of ­US-educated foreign PhDs tend
English language, or from a declining trans- to remain in the United States (Grogger and
ferability of skills across countries (Duleep Hanson 2015). H ­ ighly skilled immigrants are
and Regets 2002; Borjas 2015).45 more likely to start companies than natives
Earnings patterns also vary by immigrant with a similar degree of education, and they
country of origin. Mexican immigrants have tend to earn higher wages, and to patent and
earned less than natives in every year since publish more (Hunt 2011), although these
1910 and this disparity has increased over outcomes depend on country of origin.46
time, reaching a 40 percent earnings disad-
4.1.2 ­Immigrant–Native Convergence
vantage by 1990 (Feliciano 2001). Some of
during the Age of Mass Migration
the decline in relative earnings for Mexican
As for the current period, studies of
44 Other panel analyses of immigrant assimilation using immigrant assimilation during the Age
data from various countries include Borjas (1989); Hu of Mass Migration also find evidence
(2000); Edin, LaLonde, and Aslund (2000); Duleep and
Dowhan (2002); Constant and Massey (2003); Eckstein
and Weiss (2004); and Kim (2003). 46 Mattoo, Neagu, and Ozden (2008) argue that, unlike
45 The more rapid assimilation of cohorts arriving in the educated immigrants from Asian countries and Western
1960s, when the foreign-born share of the labor force was Europe, educated immigrants from Latin America and
small, is consistent with the idea that immigrants compete Eastern Europe do not hold jobs commensurate with their
more readily with other immigrants. Assimilation may be skill level. They attribute this pattern to differences in the
slower in periods of mass migration. quality of education across sending countries.
1328 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

Wage

A and B arrive A1900 A1920

100
B1900 B leaves
80

60 C and D arrive C1920

40 D1920

1895 1900 1909 1915 1920 Year

Census Census

Data

Estimated assimilation
Wage
100 A1920 100 100 A1900
A1920 A1920
90 90 90
A,B1900 A,B1900

50 C,D1900 50 C,D1900 50 C,D1900

5 25 5 25 5 25
Years in the US
(I) (II) (III)
1920 cross section Repeated cross section Panel

Figure 5. Inferring Assimilation from Cross-Sectional and Panel Data

Notes: The top graph depicts the earnings of four hypothetical migrants. For illustrative purposes, we assume
that natives earn 100 in every year. Migrants A and B arrived in 1895 and earn 100 and 80 respectively.
Migrant B returns to his home country in 1909. Migrants C and D arrived in 1915 and earn 60 and 40 respec-
tively. The bottom row of graphs depicts inferred assimilation profiles from a series of hypothetical datasets
containing subsets of these migrants. With a single cross-section of data (say, the 1920 census), a researcher
would compare the earnings of immigrants C and D (who arrived in 1915) to the earnings of immigrant A
(who arrived in 1895) and infer that immigrants fully close the earnings gaps with natives after 25 years in the
United States. With repeated cross sections, a researcher would follow the cohort that arrived in 1895 (immi-
grants A and B), say between the 1900 and 1920 census. As immigrant B leaves the United States, the average
earnings of the cohort increase despite the fact that, by construction, they are constant over time for each indi-
vidual immigrant. A panel dataset allows researchers to measure the true pace of earnings growth over time.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1329

of substantial earnings convergence States. Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson

between immigrants and natives in cross- (2014) build a panel dataset of natives and
sectional data, but produce more t­empered immigrants from sixteen sending European
­conclusions in new panel ­datasets.47 Using countries from 1900 to 1920. The average
published tabulations from the Dillingham ­long-term immigrant in the panel data held
Commission reports, initial work in this similarly paying occupations to the native
­
area documented that, circa 1900, the aver- born upon first arrival and moved up the
age immigrant earned substantially less occupational ladder at the same rate, nei-
than the average ­native-born worker (Higgs ther converging with nor diverging from the
1971; McGouldrick and Tannen 1977; Blau native born.50 This pattern is at odds with a
1980).48 In c­ross-sectional sources, immi- view commonly held today that, in the past,
grants appear to make up all or most of European immigrants who arrived with few
this gap within a generation (studies by skills were able to invest in themselves and
Eichengreen and Gemery 1986 and Hanes succeed in the US economy within a single
1996 are exceptions). Hatton (1997) and generation.51
Hatton and Williamson (1998) analyze sur- The labor-market performance of a “typ-
veys of workers in particular industries in ical” immigrant in the United States masks
Michigan and California and find that immi- substantial heterogeneity by sending coun-
grants enjoyed faster wage growth than try. Immigrants from sending countries with
natives. Minns (2000) uses the 1900 and real wages above the European median, such
1910 censuses—which allow him to control as England and France, held significantly
for changes in the average skills of different higher-paid occupations than US natives
­
arrival cohorts—and finds that, outside the upon first arrival, while immigrants from
farm sector, immigrants moved up the occu- sending countries with b­ elow-median wages
pational ladder at a faster pace than natives.49 (e.g., Norway, Portugal) started out in equal
Cross-sectional data overstates the con-
­ or l­ ower-paid occupations (Abramitzky,
vergence of immigrants to natives in the Boustan, and Eriksson 2014).52 Yet, immi-
past, both because of declines in the skill
levels of arrival cohorts and because immi- 50 However, the average immigrant in the c
­ ross-sectional
grants who returned to Europe were less data, which included many temporary migrants, did earn
skilled than those who stayed in the United less than the native born, consistent with the general find-
ing of lower immigrant earnings in this period.
51 Contemporary studies have data on individual earn-
ings, whereas studies using historical census data rely on
47 Immigrants experienced a notable degree of upward ­occupation-based earnings measures. We replicated the
mobility in the antebellum period. Ferrie (1994, 1997, analysis in Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014) using
1999) links passenger lists from ship registers to the cen- the ­1970–90, ­1980–2000, and ­1990–2010 census repeated
suses of 1850 and 1860. More than half of immigrants who cross-sections and document two facts: First, the initial
arrived in unskilled occupations moved up the occupa- occupational earnings penalty faced by immigrants is not
tional ladder over twenty years. Immigrants’ wealth also fully closed in the repeated cross-section in any of the
increased by an average of 10 percent with each year spent periods. Even after more than twenty years in the United
in the United States. Ferrie does not compare immigrants States, the average immigrant earns about ­5–10 percent
to natives directly. less than the average native. Second, this initial difference
48 Hannon (1982) finds a similar pattern in has been growing, from 10 percent in the 1970s to more
individual-level earnings data from the copper mining
­ than 15 percent in the most recent sample.
industry in Michigan. 52 Chiswick (1991, 1992) argues that Jewish immigrants
49 Moving into farming was a more frequent ave- faced an initial disadvantage in occupational status in this
nue of upward mobility for natives than for immigrants period, but were able to catch up with the native born
(Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2014). Hence, exclud- after around fifteen years in the United States; this con-
ing the farm sector can bias the results toward finding vergence rate is typical of what is commonly found using
faster relative income growth for immigrants. ­cross-sectional data.
1330 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

grants from all sending countries converged Broader analyses of immigrant outcomes
with natives slowly or not at all, thereby across two or three generations find ­stability
maintaining existing gaps between immi- in the degree of correlation between immi-
grants and natives for at least a generation. grant fathers and sons over time. Borjas
(1994a and Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000)
4.1.3 Convergence across Generations
estimate i­ ntergenerational correlations
Differences between immigrants and between cohorts of immigrant parents and
the native born can persist into the second their ­native-born children over two periods
generation if children inherit ability or skills (­
1940–70 and ­ 1970–2000). Borjas (1994a)
from their parents, or from their broader extends this analysis to three generations,
ethnic environment.53 However, we would using the censuses of 1910, 1940, and 1980.
expect these gaps to diminish across genera- These papers find that intergenerational
tions, both due to regression to the mean and correlations in earnings are strong (around
because, unlike their parents, many children 0.4) and remarkably stable across immigrant
of immigrants are educated in US schools and cohorts. The relationship between the earn-
exposed to US cultural norms. Studying the ings of fathers and sons is mediated, in part,
children and grandchildren of migrants who by educational attainment; controlling for
arrived during the Age of Mass Migration education reduces the correlation between
is especially useful for gaining insight into the earnings of father and son cohorts to
the process of ­ intergenerational conver- around 0.15.
gence, given that enough time has gone by
4.2 Investments that Facilitate
for multiple generations to be observed into
Labor-Market Assimilation
adulthood.
During the Age of Mass Migration, immi- Immigrants work toward earnings conver-
grant advantage (or disadvantage) relative gence with natives by making investments in
to natives persisted across generations. ­US-specific skills, including English fluency.
Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014) Bleakley and Chin (2004, 2010) find a large
find that if ­first-generation immigrants from return to knowing English in the contem-
a sending country ­ outperformed natives porary period, both in the labor market and
(e.g., immigrants from England or Russia), along other dimensions of assimilation (e.g.,
so too did the second generation, whereas marriage, fertility). They identify the effect
if the first generation held l­ower-paid occu- of English fluency by comparing immigrants
pations than natives (e.g., immigrants from from English- and n ­on-English-speaking
Norway or Portugal), the second generation countries who arrived in the United States
did as well. Yet, the partial convergence in at different ages. Ward (2015) estimates a
the past was faster than i­ntergenerational smaller return to knowing English in the early
convergence for some ­ country-of-origin twentieth century using a similar research
groups today. Mexican immigrants are con- design. This pattern is consistent with the agri-
verging more slowly than did southern and cultural and manufacturing base of the his-
eastern Europeans across generations, in torical economy; Chiswick and Miller (2010)
large part because their rates of educational find that English has lower returns today in
attainment have lagged behind those of the occupations that rely more heavily on manual
native born (Perlmann 2005). rather than ­communication-based skills.
In the past, immigrant parents appear
to have learned English from their chil-
53 See Borjas (1992) on the concept of “ethnic capital.” dren, who are more adept at learning lan-
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1331

guages, but current immigrants are more In that case, moving to a more integrated
likely to rely on their children to navigate neighborhood could be a form of labor-market
the ­English-speaking world (Kuziemko and investment. To our knowledge, economic his-
Ferrie 2014; Kuziemko 2014). School curric- torians have not studied how residential seg-
ulum can influence children’s ability to learn regation affected the labor-market outcomes
English. Some states passed laws in the 1910s of immigrants in the past.58 Contemporary
and 1920s requiring that public-school classes data suggest that immigrants who choose to
be taught in English only.54 ­Lleras-Muney live in immigrant neighborhoods have lower
and Shertzer (2015) find that this language earnings capacity but that, correcting for this
policy had modest effects on the literacy of selection, ­living in an enclave can improve
children of ­non-English-speaking parents.55 labor-market performance.59
Choosing a labor market or a neighbor- Investments in ­US-specific skills may have
hood with greater access to employment a limited effect on earnings growth if immi-
offers another opportunity for immigrants grants face discrimination in the labor mar-
to increase their earnings potential. Upon ket.60 However, in this case, immigrants may
first arrival, many immigrants settle in ethnic be able to mitigate discrimination by chang-
enclaves. I­ mmigrant–native residential segre- ing their s­elf-presentation to d
­ e-emphasize
gation remained stable and modest from 1910 their foreign roots. Immigrants change
to 1950, with a dissimilarity index of around their own names and choose less foreign
40; thereafter, segregation between immi- names for their children as they spend more
grants and natives rose (dissimilarity = 55 in time in the United States (Carneiro, Lee,
2000) (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008).56 and Reis 2015; Abramitzky, Boustan, and
In theory, living in an enclave could enhance Eriksson 2016). Biavaschi, Giulietti, and
employment opportunities if immigrants Siddique (2013) find that immigrants who
receive job referrals or other assistance from changed their names between filing their
their compatriots (Munshi 2003; Lafortune first and second papers for naturalization in
and Tessada 2013). However, immigrant the 1920s experienced more occupational
neighborhoods could also limit employment upgrading, perhaps because Americanized
opportunities if residents are isolated from names shielded them from d ­ iscrimination.
information about the broader labor market.57 Likewise, ­ children of immigrants who

54 Bandiera et al. (2015) show that compulsory school- job referrals to new arrivals, but they also may compete
ing laws were first introduced in US states that received with each other over employment in an occupational niche.
more immigrants from countries that lacked compulsory 58 Collins and Margo (2000) study the effect of segrega-
schooling rules. tion on a number of socioeconomic outcomes for African
55 Today, policy makers debate the benefits of teaching Americans from 1940 to 1990. They find little or no evi-
immigrant children in English immersion classrooms or in dence of negative effects of segregation prior to 1980.
separate bilingual settings; Chin, Daysal, and Imberman 59 Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) and Damm
(2013) find that ­English-language learners are equally well (2009) analyze refugee settlement policies in contempo-
served by both methods, but bilingual education bene- rary Sweden and Denmark, respectively, in which residen-
fits native English speakers by limiting their contact with tial location is q
­ uasi-randomly assigned. See also Cutler,
­non-English-speaking peers. Glaeser, and Vigdor (2008) on the effect of living in an
56 The dissimilarity index can be interpreted as the immigrant enclave.
share of immigrant households that would need to move 60 Moser (2012) exploits a change in attitudes toward
such that each neighborhood would reflect the overall a particular immigrant group—­German Americans after
immigrant share in the population. In the context of racial the outbreak of World War I—to evaluate the effect of
segregation, a dissimilarity index of 35 is considered low, discrimination on immigrants’ economic opportunities.
while an index value of 55 is considered moderate. She shows that, during (but not before) the war, men of
57 Beaman (2012) argues that members of an ethnic German ancestry were more likely to be excluded from
network face a trade-off: network members may provide seats on the New York Stock Exchange.
1332 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

received less ­ foreign-sounding names cultural persistence.61 Other examples of

enjoyed better labor-market outcomes, “­
incomplete” assimilation include immi-
although the disparity is likely picking up dif- grants’ consumption patterns and name
ferences in family background (Abramitzky, selection for children. Using an early version
Boustan, and Eriksson 2016; Goldstein and of the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Logan
Stecklov 2016). and Rhode (2010) document that immigrants
continued to purchase foods that were rela-
4.3 Beyond Labor-Market Assimilation
tively abundant (and therefore inexpensive)
Both in the past and the present, public at home, even at higher prices in the United
support for immigration restriction is often States.62 Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson
tied to the perception that immigrants fail (2016) find that immigrants selected more
to assimilate into US society, instead main- native-sounding names for their children
­
taining their distinct cultural norms, by con- after spending more time in the United
tinuing to speak foreign languages and live States, but that some gap with native house-
in enclave communities. Therefore, docu- holds remained even after a generation. In
menting and understanding the speed and contrast, immigrants appear to completely
extent of immigrants’ cultural assimilation assimilate to native incarceration patterns,
is a potentially important input into policy with recent arrivals less likely than natives to
debates. Contemporary studies find that be arrested but rapidly converging to natives
immigrants maintain some of their distinc- over time (Moehling and Piehl 2009, 2014).63
tiveness because their norms and behavior
4.4 Future Research Directions
were shaped by experiences in their home
countries or by ethnic enclaves in the United The existing literature on immigrant
States (see Fernandez and Fogli 2009; assimilation has established a set of patterns,
Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Luttmer and estimating the speed of income convergence
Singhal 2011; Blau et al. 2013). Yet, as immi- between immigrants and natives from dif-
grants spend more time in the United States, ferent sending countries and at different
they begin to resemble natives along a num- points in time. A promising next step in this
ber of dimensions, including health, educa- literature could be identifying the social
tional attainment, homeownership, fertility, and economic factors that can explain such
and political preferences.
Often, full adoption of the behaviors 61 More broadly, Guest (1982) and Morgan, Watkins,
common to US natives takes more than a and Ewbank (1994) find that the fertility levels of
single generation (Watkins 1994). In one ­immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
example of this phenomenon, Guinnane, tury were higher than those of natives, but that this dif-
ference decreased in the second generation. Morgan, et
Moehling, and Ó Gráda (2006) study the al. also document substantial differences in fertility rates
fertility patterns of Irish immigrants in the across immigrant groups, with “new” immigrants exhibit-
United States. Irish immigrants converged ing higher fertility levels.
62 Immigrants also converged with natives in marriage
toward US fertility norms, having fewer behavior. Foley and Guinnane (1999) show that, after
children than either rural or urban house- controlling for relevant ­socioeconomic characteristics, the
holds in Ireland. Yet, Irish immigrants had marriage patterns of Irish immigrants were similar to those
of the native born. Sassler and Qian (2003) find a decline in
more children than otherwise similar native the “ethnic dispersion” in the age at first marriage through-
households and this fertility gap remained out the twentieth century.
63 Bell, Fasani, and Machin (2013) study the criminal
into the second ­generation, suggesting some
behavior of immigrants in a contemporary setting, using
variation in immigrant share and in crime rates across
regions in the United Kingdom.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1333

variation in convergence and assimilation. of refugee migrants and the comparison of

These aids (or impediments) to immigrants’ the ­ long-term outcomes of refugees and
ability to assimilate and to their assimilation ­economic migrants are a promising direction
choice could include the strength of immi- for new research. Because refugee migration
grant networks, the extent of discrimination is hardly a recent phenomenon, the study
or ­anti-immigrant enforcement in the work- of refugees in historical settings may prove
place, or investments in public education useful.
and health, among others. Differences in
these factors across states or labor markets
5. The Effects of Immigration on Natives
may generate disparities in immigrant per-
and the US Economy
formance across space.
Furthermore, the speed of immigrant There is a long and still-unresolved debate
assimilation might be influenced by the pre- in the contemporary literature about the
vailing immigration-policy regime. In an era effect of immigration on native wages. A
of open borders, the initial selection into series of early empirical papers found negli-
immigration was less favorable on the basis of gible effects of immigration on the wage and
skill and immigrants needed to contend with employment outcomes of native workers, in
more competition from other recent arrivals seeming contrast to predictions from a sim-
in the labor market. Both of these mecha- ple model of the labor market. This puzzle
nisms suggest that immigrant assimilation prompted a generation of new studies that
may have been hindered by open immigra- proposed either new empirical methods or
tion policy. On the other hand, ­less-skilled adjustments to the underlying economic
people who move for better opportunities model.
might have particularly strong incentives to We argue that historical cases can help to
succeed in their new destination. Ultimately, adjudicate between potential explanations
the effect of immigration policy on the trajec- for limited effects of immigration on native
tory of immigrant assimilation is an empirical wages today. Historical immigration patterns
question. differed from contemporary flows in a num-
Finally, immigrants who were propelled ber of potentially useful ways. First, in the
from their home country by political unrest or past, immigrants were more substitutable
persecution may experience a different tra- with the native born, both in terms of skills
jectory in the United States than immigrants and legal status. Previous waves of immi-
who arrived in order to pursue economic grants worked in a set of occupations similar
opportunity. For example, unlike economic to those held by native workers (Abramitzky,
migrants who often return to their home Boustan, and Eriksson 2014), whereas today,
countries, refugees often have nowhere to immigrants are more likely than natives to be
return to. Refugees may thus have a stron- drawn from the very bottom or the very top of
ger incentive to invest in c­ountry-specific the educational distribution.64 Furthermore,
human capital in order to assimilate in their a sizable number of immigrants today are
new destination (Cortes 2004). Today, there undocumented, and therefore often not
are millions of refugees around the world.
Host countries are often concerned with the
speed of refugee assimilation and possible 64 In 2010, 17.5 percent of immigrants aged ­twenty-five
negative impacts of refugees on natives. Yet, to sixty-five report having less than a ninth grade educa-
tion and 11.3 percent report having more than a college
there has been very little economic research degree, compared to 1.9 percent and 10.6 percent of native
on this population. We believe that the study workers.
1334 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

subject to the same set of labor-market effect of immigration on native workers.67

institutions (such as the m ­ inimum wage) Other papers augmented the underlying
although, in the past, immigrants and natives model of the labor market to add capital
received similar (and, overall, much lower) adjustment, multiple types of labor input, or
levels of labor-market protection. Second, total factor productivity. Examples of these
the historical economy was more reliant on papers include Lewis (2011), which argues
agriculture and manufacturing, whereas that cities with larger inflows of unskilled
the contemporary economy is centered on immigrants were slower to adopt l­ abor-saving
services. Agriculture and manufacturing technologies, thereby preserving the demand
are less dependent on communication and for ­low-skilled workers; Ottaviano and Peri
team-based production, which may have
­ (NBER version in 2006, published in 2012),
narrowed the potential channels through which suggests that immigrants and natives
which immigration influenced production in are somewhat imperfectly substitutable in
the past.65 production, even within skill categories;68
We start this section with a very brief over- and Peri and Sparber (2009), which contends
view of the work on immigration and native that immigration increases total factor pro-
workers in the modern economy. The con- ductivity by facilitating specialization across
temporary literature on the effect of immi- tasks (see also Peri 2012 and Ottaviano, Peri,
gration on the US economy is too large for us and Wright 2013).
to cover in full here; for recent surveys, see Given the greater substitutability between
Hanson (2009) and Kerr and Kerr (2011).66 immigrants and natives in the past, we would
The first empirical studies on this topic expect to find larger effects of immigrant
relied on variation in the flow of immigrants arrivals on native wages during the Age of
into a particular location (e.g., Card, 1990 Mass Migration. Indeed, historical immigra-
on the Mariel Boatlift into Miami) or into a tion flows appear to have a larger effect on
larger set of metropolitan areas (Altonji and the wages and employment opportunities
Card, 1991; Card, 2001) and found limited of native workers than those found in con-
effects of immigrant arrivals on native out- temporary geographic studies (subject to the
comes. Geographic variation may understate caveat of differences in outcome variables
the true effect of immigration if immigrants and research design). Using c­ ross-city vari-
choose to settle in areas that experience pos- ation in migrant flows in the 1910s, Goldin
itive labor demand shocks or if immigrant (1994) estimates that a one percentage point
arrivals encourage s­ imilarly skilled natives to
move elsewhere. Borjas (2003) instead ana-
67 Boustan (2009) adapts the national skill ­group-based
lyzed the effect of immigration on national
approach to study the effect of internal black migration
skill groups and found a sizeable negative from the South on the wages of existing black and white
workers in the North in the ­mid-twentieth century.
68 Ottaviano and Peri (2012) use national, s­kill-group
variation as in Borjas (2003). However, we view this paper’s
main contribution to be its modification of the standard
65 Despite the heavily agricultural and manufacturing- assumption of perfect substitutability between immigrants
based economy, Ager and Brückner (2013) find that a and natives. Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) question
higher level of cultural fractionalization was associated the methods in the working paper version of this study.
with higher-output growth at the county level during the Recent work by Doran, Gelber, and Isen (2014) shows
Age of Mass Migration, although, somewhat puzzlingly, that firms that are unable to hire a ­high-skilled immigrant
cultural polarization (which is highly correlated with frac- because they lost the H ­ -1B lottery experience no declines
tionalization) had the opposite effect. in patenting rates, suggesting that native and foreign work-
66 Earlier, ­now-classic reviews of the literature include ers are good substitutes, at least at the upper end of the
Borjas (1994) and Friedberg and Hunt (1995). skill distribution.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1335

increase in the f­ oreign-born share of the pop- 2009). Unskilled immigrants appear to have
ulation reduced the wages of unskilled labor- been complementary with investments
ers and artisans by around 1.5 percent, with in a­ ssembly-line machinery (Lafortune,
larger effects in the tradeable sector (cloth- Tessada, and Lewis 2015). Kim (2007)
ing manufacturing and foundries).69 Boustan, shows that firms located in counties with a
Fishback, and Kantor (2010) find that inter- higher share of foreign born in 1920 were
nal ­in-migration in the 1930s had no effect larger, more productive, and more likely to
on the wages of local workers, but did reduce be organized as factories; he uses the settle-
work opportunities and access to relief jobs, ment pattern of immigrants in 1850, as well
a pattern that is consistent with the presence as distance from the port of New York, as
of sticky wages during the Great Depression. instruments for the later immigrant share of
They create an instrument for migrant arriv- the population. Yet, Hatton and Williamson
als that relies on “push factors” from sending (2006) argue that land was a more important
labor markets, including New Deal generos- input in production in the past, and hence
ity and extreme weather events.70 capital mobility was less effective in dampen-
As in the present, immigration to cit- ing the wage effects of migration.72
ies encouraged native o­ ut-migration in the Historical immigration was also associ-
past, meriting some caution in the use of ated with higher rates of both trade and
geographic variation to identify the effect innovation, which may have contributed to
of immigration on native wages. Hatton and ­economic growth.73 Dunlevy and Hutchinson
Williamson (1998) estimate that over the (1999) find that immigrants increased trade
1880–1910 period, 40 natives left their state flows between the United States and Europe
per each additional 100 immigrants, sug- in the early twentieth century, perhaps by
gesting that immigrants partially crowded providing information about, and network
out the native labor force.71 Collins (1997) connections to, their home markets (see
shows that cities that absorbed large num- also O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999, chap-
bers of European migrants had correspond- ter 13). Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2014)
ingly low rates of black ­in-migration from the analyze one immigrant flow that would be
rural South. particularly expected to increase innovation
In the ­long run, the effect of immigration in the US economy: the arrival of Jewish sci-
on native wages is moderated by the pace of entists forced to flee Nazi Germany in the
new capital investments. Historical immigra- 1930s.74 US patenting in categories associ-
tion flows contributed to the transformation
of American manufacturing from s­ mall-scale
artisanal shops to large factories engaged in
mass production (Hirschman and Mogford 72 This observation is in line with the Malthusian idea
that, in an economy without capital, a higher population
depresses income.
69 Biavaschi (2013) finds much smaller effects at the 73 Munshi and Wilson (2010); ­Rodriguez-Pose and von
state level over a long period (­1900–1950). Hatton and Berlepsch (2014); and Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian (2017)
Williamson (1998) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) argue that European migration had ­long-lasting effects on
use time series data instead to estimate the effect of mass economic activity at the local level through its effects on
migration on wages. institutions and culture.
70 See also Hornbeck (2012) and Long and Siu (2016) 74 Hornung (2014) studies another forced h ­ igh-skilled
on migration responses to the Dust Bowl. immigration—that of the Huguenots from France
71 In contrast, Carter and Sutch (2008) argue that immi- to Prussia in the seventeenth century. The arrival of
grants did not crowd out natives during this period because Huguenots, who carried with them specialized knowledge
native- and f­ oreign-born workers migrated to the same set of textile manufacturing, was associated with higher pro-
of counties. ductivity in the local manufacturing sector.
1336 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (December 2017)

ated with the dismissed scientists increased

by 30 percent after 1933.75 (­1850–1913) and a more recent period of
We believe that there is a large scope for constrained mass migration, primarily from
future work on the historical effects of immi- Asia and Latin America (­ 1965–present).
grant arrivals on the US economy and society. Many of the same topics that concern the
Recent studies of contemporary immigration economics of immigration today—including
flows have introduced improved identifica- migrant selection and assimilation and the
tion strategies to study the effect of immi- effect of immigrant arrivals on native work-
grants on native workers; these empirical ers—were also relevant in the past. We argue
innovations have yet to be fully incorporated that comparing the research findings across
into work on the Age of Mass Migration. these two periods can illuminate contempo-
Dramatic shifts in immigration regime in the rary debates.
1920s, 1940s, and 1960s present potentially In particular, our reading of the literature
useful opportunities to design ­well-identified suggests that migrant selection, which is pri-
studies of the effect of immigration on the marily positive today, was decidedly mixed
economy in this era. Indeed, since we first in the past, with cases of negative migrant
started working on this review essay, a num- selection from some European sending
ber of working papers have done just that countries. Changes in migrant selection over
(Abramitzky, Boustan, and Cohen 2017; time are consistent with rising bureaucratic
Ager and Hansen 2017; Clemens, Lewis, and costs of migration, which may price out the
Postel 2017; Tabellini 2017). Furthermore, poor, and with growing income inequality
we suspect that, beyond their effects on in the United States, which would attract
the economy, immigrant voters influenced a ­higher-skilled set of immigrants. Upon
important policy choices, including, per- arrival, the average ­long-term immigrant in
haps, the design of social welfare programs the past held a similar set of occupations to
in the 1930s. Making connection to the liter- the average native worker, and moved up
ature on diversity and public goods provision the occupational ladder at the same pace.
would be useful here as well (a classic ref- The pace of economic convergence between
erence is Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). immigrants and natives was relatively slow
in both the past and the present, with the
notable difference that, today, the average
6. Conclusion
immigrant starts out with a larger earnings
US history is characterized by two epi- gap to overcome (although there is substan-
sodes of mass i­ n-migration—an era of tial variation in initial earnings by sending
unrestricted migrant arrivals from Europe country). It appears that historical estimates
of the effect of immigrant arrivals on native
wages are larger than comparable estimates
75 A number of papers study the relationship between
for today, which may be due to the fact that,
immigration and innovation in the contemporary period.
Hunt and G ­ authier-Loiselle (2010) and Kerr and Lincoln in the past, immigrants and natives held a
(2010) find that ­ college-educated or H1-B immigrants similar set of skills. However, comparisons of
increase patent rates. The influx of foreign doctoral stu- these magnitudes over time are complicated
dents has also positively influenced scientific output in
US academic departments (Stuen, Mobarak, and Maskus by methodological differences, and could be
2012). Yet, Borjas and Doran (2012) show that the sudden improved with a new round of w ­ ell-identified
arrival of Russian mathematicians into the US academy historical studies on the effect of immigra-
after the fall of the Soviet Union reduced the output of
competing American mathematicians, leading to no net tion on labor markets.
increase in overall output.
 Abramitzky and Boustan: Immigration in American Economic History 1337

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