1. LTO v.

v. City of Butuan – Jan 20, 2000 – Vitug, J Relying on the foregoing provisions of the law, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Butuan, passed an
Ordinance which regulates the operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing its mechanism for the
FACTS: As a response to the mandate of the law to the policy that territorial and political subdivisions issuance of franchise, registration, imposing violations and penalties.
shall enjoy local autonomy (Art. 10, Sec. 2),, RA 7160 or LGC, states that territorial and political
subdivisions of the state shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy in order to attain the Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of national government that has been transferred to
fullest development, self-reliant, and effective partners of the national goals. LGU is the franchising authority over tricycle-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) but not authorizes the LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue
In this case, the court were asked to resolve the issue of whether under the present set up of the power license.
of LTO to register tricycles as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to
LGUs. In order to settle the both positions, the City of Butuan represented by its Mayor Plaza, a petition for
"prohibition, mandamus, injunction with a prayer for preliminary restraining order ex-parte" seeking
Arguments: the declaration of the validity of Ordinance No. and the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-
RTC: Butuan city held that the authority to register tricycles, franchising, issuance of driver’s license, hire and the issuance of licenses by the LTO.
and collection of fees had all been vested in LGUs The Court of Appeals [has] erred in sustaining the validity of the writ of injunction issued by the trial
CA: Sustained the trial court court which enjoined LTO from (1) registering tricycles-for-hire and (2) issuing licenses for the driving
thereof since the Local Government Code devolved only the franchising authority of the LTFRB.
LTO: Filed an review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of CA affirming the permanent Functions of the LTO were not devolved to the LGU's.
writ of injunction of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the power of LTO to register tricycles as well as to issue licenses for the driving
Respondent Butuan: LGC’s salient provision is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to thereof, has likewise devolved to LGUs.
collect registration fees or charges and issuance of license for the driving of tricycles.
RULING: No. The court explains that these two powers (taxation and police power) may be related
The 1987 Constitution provides: but are not the same. Just because one power is granted doesn’t automatically mean the other is granted
as well. In the case of tricycles, Section 133 of the Local Government Code deals with taxes, but the
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
LTO’s power to register motor vehicles and issue driver’s licenses should not be limited by this.
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue The law gives LGUs the power to regulate tricycles and grant franchises, but this doesn't take away the
exclusively to the local governments.5 LTO's authority to ensure that all motor vehicles are registered and drivers are licensed. The LTO’s role
is about road safety and ensuring vehicles are safe and drivers are qualified.
Sec. 129 and Section 133 of the Local Government Code read:
The court has ruled that the earlier decision, which prevented the LTO from enforcing registration and
Sec. 129. Power to Create Sources or Revenue. — Each local government unit shall exercise its power
licensing requirements for tricycles, is wrong. As a result, the court has canceled that decision, and the
to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to the provisions
LTO can now require registration and driver’s licenses for tricycles.
herein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government units. Notes:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless otherwise Police power is aimed at public welfare and safety.
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following: Taxation is about raising money for government functions.

xxx xxx xxx

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of
licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles. 2. Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Gopuco, G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 located in the need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
vicinityof the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.No appeal was taken, and the judgment of condemnation subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power.
became final and executory.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Thereafter,absolute title to Lot No. 72 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.Subsequently, Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority
when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug Airportwas ordered closed is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
by then President Corazon C. Aquino in a Memorandum of 29 November1989. Lot No. 72 was thus condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the
virtually abandoned. defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right
to compensation for the taking.
Gopuco wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport,seeking the
return of his lot and offering to return the money previously received by him aspayment for the The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that "private property shall not be taken for public
expropriation. This letter was ignored. use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible
abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
In the same year, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6958 creating the Mactan- enforced.
CebuInternational Airport Authority (MCIAA) and in part providing for the transfer of the assets ofthe
Lahug Airport thereto. Consequently, ownership of Lot No. 72 was transferred to MCIAA.Apolonio When real property has been acquired for public use unconditionally, either by eminent domain or by
Gopuco, Jr. filed an amended complaint for recovery of ownership of Lot No. 72against the Air purchase, the abandonment or non-use of the real property, does not ipso facto give to the previous
Transportation Office and the Province of Cebu with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Cebu. owner of said property any right to recover the same (Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil.
28)
He maintained that by virtue of the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the
property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had
therefore reverted to him.
Role of the constitution in the exercise of the inherent powers of the State:
Gopuco further alleged that when the original judgment of expropriation had been handed down, and
before they could file an appeal thereto, the CAA offered them a compromise settlement whereby they  The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an balance/equilibrium between authority and
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted
were assured that the expropriated lots would be resold to them for the same price as when it was
with due deference to rights.
expropriated in the event that the Lahug Airport would be abandoned.

Gopuco claims to have accepted this offer. However, he failed to present any proof on this matter, and 3. Lucena Grand Terminal vs. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005
later admitted that insofar as the said lot was concerned, no compromise agreement was entered in to
FACTS: Jac Liner filed a petition against City of Lucena Mayor in the RTC that Ordinance No. 1631
by the government and the previous owners.
and 1778 are unconstitutional on the ground that, it constitute invalid exercise of police power, undue
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that he had come across several announcements in the papers that the Lahug taking of private property, violation of constitutional provisions against monopolies.
Airport was soon to be developed into a commercial complex, which he took to be ascheme of the
Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his property. The trial court rendered a Ordinance 1631:
Granting the Lucena Grand Terminal, INC., a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate and
Decision dismissing the complaint and directing the herein respondent to pay the MCIAA exemplary
maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal in Lucena. (25yrs renewable)
damages, litigation expenses and costs. Gopuco appealed to the Court of Appeals, which overturned
Ordinance 1778: Buses, mini bus, jeepneys are prohibited from entering the city. Terminals are
the RTC decision, ordered the herein petitioners to reconvey Lot No. 72 to Gopuco upon payment of
inoperable.
the reasonable price asdetermined by it, and deleted the award to the petitioners of exemplary
damages, litigationexpenses and costs To minimize traffic caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city., the
ordinances in question prohibit all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena City, allowing only one
NATURE: Eminent domain is generally described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
common terminal outside the city, for which the petitioner holds the franchise. This forces carriers,
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
including the respondent who had an existing terminal, to close their operations and use the petitioner’s
nature of a forced purchase by the State.32 Also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
facilities. The petitioner filed a petition for review, challenging the decision and resolution of the Court
frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and
of Appeals before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted various international human rights law instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).
RULING: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the LEB and its power to administer a nationwide law school
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means admission test (PhiLSAT) violates the Supreme Court’s exclusive prerogative over the practice of law.
employed are reasonably necessary for the a ttainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 (Sec. 7 c and e) and the
subject and lawful method. creation of the Legal Education Board (LEB), emphasizing that its powers must be reasonable and
respect academic freedom and the right to education. The Court clarified that regulating legal
Traffic congestion is a public concern, not just a private one. In Calalang v. Williams, the court ruled education is within the State’s power, while admission to the practice of law is under the Court's
that laws regulating traffic on national roads were aimed at public welfare and safety, as the National control. It found that measures like the PhiLSAT for law school admission are appropriate for ensuring
Assembly sought to alleviate traffic congestion, which poses a threat to public safety. Similarly, the quality education, but must be applied in a reasonable and non-restrictive way to support, not hinder,
ordinances in question, aimed at easing traffic congestion in Lucena City, serve the public interest and access to legal education.
justify state interference, meeting the first requirement for the exercise of police power.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises
But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for admission to the bar
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the
practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as “The Local Government Code”. City Ordinance No. 1778 Petitions are partly granted. LEB over legal education is upheld.
is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from
an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power. NOTES:

Petition denied Commonwealth v. Alger – Police power "the power vested in legislature by the Constitution, to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
4. Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019
Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and
public interest;181 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health,
FACTS: The case arose from the petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 7662 or the public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant;182 to preserve public order and
Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, which established the Legal Education Board (LEB). The said to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of good
act aimed to improve the system of legal education in the Philippines. The LEB issued several orders, manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights.
including memorandum order no. 7 of 2016, which mandate a nationwide PhiLSAT or the Philippine
Law School Adission Test.

Arguments:

The petitioners argued that LEB’s new standard of legal education infringe upon the SC’s exclusive
rule-making power over the practice of law and violates the academic freedom of educational
institutions and the right to education of law students pursuant to Sec. 5 (5), Art. 8 of the Constitution.
After the issuance of TRO by SC, motions and interventions were filed, some of the petitioners were
students whose enrollment was affected by PhiLSAT. The SC discussed the right to education under
 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 150824, February 2. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding LBP's mortgage right and interest over the land
4, 2008. valid and subsisting under the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of the obligation of
contracts.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not awarding LBP the relief it prayed for in its cross-claim
FACTS: against Lourdes Farms, Inc., specifically ordering Lourdes Farms to pay its outstanding
obligation or provide a substitute collateral for the land covered by the supposedly null and
 OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969, in favor of Angelito C. void TCT No.
Bugayong, based on Sales Patent No. 4576 (issued September 22, 1969), for land in RULING: The Court ruled that there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee of non-
Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City, covering 41,276 sqm. impairment of contracts, as the State's restriction on forest land ownership is a valid exercise of police
 The land was marshy, periodically underwater, and was part of a dry riverbed near power. This power, aimed at preserving forests for the general welfare, is not subject to contract rights
the mouth of the Davao River. when the public interest is at stake. The Court also found that the cross-claim filed by Land Bank of
 The land was subdivided into four lots (Lot Nos. 4159-A, 4159-B, 4159-C, and the Philippines (LBP) against Lourdes Farms, Inc. could not be resolved due to a lack of factual
4159-D) under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-139511, approved on April 23, 1971. evidence and proper procedural handling. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Regional Trial
 OCT No. P-2823 was canceled, and new TCTs were issued in Bugayong’s name. Court for further proceedings to address the cross-claim.
 Bugayong sold the four lots, with Lot 4159-A (TCT No. T-32769) sold to spouses
Lourdes and Candido Du, who later subdivided it into two lots and sold one to
spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola (TCT No. T-45586).
 The other lot, TCT No. T-45587, was retained by the Du spouses, who later
transferred it to Lourdes Farms, Inc., which was issued TCT No. T-57348.
 Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged the property to Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) on April 14, 1980. 6. Zabal vs. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019.
 In 1981, local residents petitioned the Bureau of Lands, prompting an investigation
that revealed:
FACTS: The case arose when the government gave Boracay its much-needed rehabilitation because it
1. The land was still within the forest zone when Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued.
has been disrespected and abused by both local and tourist. However, the process of rehabilitation was
2. The land was not alienable until March 25, 1981.
contradicted by the petitioners in this case (Zabal, Jacosalem, Bandiola) against respondents President
3. The land was marshy, under water during high tide, and Bugayong was never in actual
Rodrigo Duterte et al.
possession.
 The Bureau of Lands concluded that the sales patent was issued improperly and Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who were earning a living from the tourist activities
without jurisdiction. therein. Zabal claims to build sandcastles for tourist while Jacosalem drives tourists and workers in the
 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor island. Bandiola, for his part, claims to occasionally visit Boracay for business and pleasure. The three
General (OSG), filed a complaint before the RTC for the cancellation of the title petitioners based their locus standi on firect injury and also from the transcendental doctrine.
and reversion of the land to the public domain. Respondents are being sued in their capacity as officials of the government.
 LBP (as a mortgagee in good faith) cross-claimed, requesting that if TCT No. T-
57348 is annulled, Lourdes Farms, Inc. should pay its outstanding obligations or Arguments:
provide new collateral.
Petitioners argue that a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy for addressing constitutional
ISSUES: issues, particularly whether President Duterte exceeded his powers in ordering the closure of Boracay
and infringing on rights to travel and due process. They claim Proclamation No. 475 represents an
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing Land Bank of the Philippines’ (LBP) mortgage invalid exercise of legislative power, as it restricts travel without meeting constitutional requirements.
right and interest over the land covered by TCT No. T-57348 as valid and subsisting, despite They also assert the proclamation unlawfully deprived them of their livelihood and violated their due
LBP being an innocent purchaser (mortgagee) for value and in good faith. process rights. Petitioners argue the closure cannot be justified by police power, which should be
exercised by legislative bodies. They further contend that the proclamation undermines local autonomy
by directing LGUs to enforce the closure. Ultimately, petitioners claim the case concerns the extent of delegation lacked clear guidelines and that the increase in contributions was unjustified since it did not
executive power, and that rehabilitation does not justify an abuse of power. correspond to an increase in benefits. Petitioners also argue that the increase is an invalid exercise of
police power and unfairly burdens workers, particularly with the change in the contribution ratio
Respondents argue that President Duterte should be dropped as a party-respondent due to immunity between employers and employees. They seek to halt the premium hike, citing its detrimental effect on
from suit, and that the petition should be dismissed for lack of basis. They claim that prohibition is workers' earnings and basic needs.
improper since the closure of Boracay is already ongoing and mandamus does not apply as they have
not neglected their duty. They also contend there is no justiciable controversy, as Proclamation No. 475 (1) (1) Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 - the SSS members' contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%;
does not infringe on the right to earn a living. Respondents argue that the proclamation is a valid and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to P16,000.00. The increase
exercise of executive and delegated legislative powers, and is in line with the Constitution. They assert was made subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.
that the restriction on travel and the alleged due process violations are justified in the interest of public (2) Circular No. 2013-010 - the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the 0.6%
welfare, and that local autonomy is not violated as national government intervention was necessary. increase in contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37%
Finally, respondents argue that petitioners aim to re-open Boracay prematurely, which would worsen (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).
environmental degradation.
ISSUE: Whether the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of police power for not being
ISSUE: Whether the closure of Boracay Island or the ban against petitioners, tourists, and non- reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive
residents therefrom to be unconstitutional and invalid exercise of police power. on the labor sector.

RULING: Police power, one of the state's fundamental inherent powers, allows the government to RULING: The Court rejects petitioners' argument that the increase in contributions is an unlawful
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote public welfare. While exercise of police power. Police power allows the government to enact laws that may interfere with
expansive, it is not without limits, as it must be exercised within bounds that are lawful, necessary, and personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare. For such power to be valid, it must be
not unduly oppressive. In this case, Proclamation No. 475, which temporarily closed Boracay for exercised for a lawful subject and through lawful means. In this case, the increase in contributions is
rehabilitation, is a valid exercise of police power, aimed at addressing the environmental and health deemed necessary to fulfill the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under the Social
concerns arising from over-tourism and ineffective enforcement of laws. The closure was necessary to Security Act. The increase is aligned with the goal of establishing a sound, viable, and tax-exempt
allow for critical rehabilitation work, which could not have been effectively carried out with tourists social security system and is considered reasonable given past increases and the public interest
present. Given the urgency of the situation, the six-month closure was seen as a reasonable period to involved.
begin these efforts. The Court found that the closure was not oppressive, and petitioners' challenge to
the proclamation based on the right to travel was dismissed, as the measures taken were deemed The court holds that the increases in the Social Security System (SSS) contributions are reasonably
necessary for the public good. necessary to promote social justice under the Social Security Act, aiming to establish a viable and
sustainable social security system. The Social Security System and the Social Security Commission are
empowered to adjust contribution rates and salary credits as needed. The court also rejects the
petitioners' argument that the revised contribution ratio is inconsistent with previous schemes, noting
that there is no law mandating a 70%-30% employee-employer split, and judicial interference in the
executive's decision-making would amount to judicial legislation.

8. Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, February
20, 2006.

FACTS: On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156
7. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500. April 2, 2019. entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle
development program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision prohibits the
importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or
FACTS: This case involves a petition challenging the validity of the Social Security System (SSS)
the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.
premium hike, which took effect in January 2014. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other petitioners argue that
the increase, approved by the President and implemented by the Social Security Commission, was Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy
based on an unlawful delegation of power and violated the Social Security Act. They claim the Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of
 Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO); RUBEN, N.
EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L. ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO B. ABAS;
and REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, petitioners,
The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes vs.
an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; REX TANTIONGCO;
proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and HONESTO DE JESUS; ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VICENTE
Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. LUKBAN, respondents.
The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for
the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor
vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the
exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void. DAVIDE, JR., J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President's quasi- May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and manage the
legislative power. affairs of an electric cooperative?
RULING: Yes. Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional This is the key issue in this original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
limits, to promote the order, safety, heaith, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged Court wherein the petitioners seek to (a) annul and set aside Memorandum Order No. 409 of the Office
primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be of the President dated 3 December 1996 constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to take over and manage
exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all the affairs of the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., (hereafter CANORECO) "until such time
municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi- as a general membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said
legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored"; and (b) prohibit the respondents from performing
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law acts or continuing proceedings pursuant to the Memorandum Order.
and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites:
The factual backdrop of this case is not complicated.
 Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
 It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D. No. 269,
 It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree, as amended by P.D. No. 1645.
 It must be reasonable
On 10 March 1990, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No.
The Court ruled that Executive Order (EO) 156 had constitutional and statutory bases and was issued 6939. The former is the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, while the latter created the Cooperative
in accordance with prescribed procedures. However, the importation ban exceeded the authority Development Authority (CDA) and vested solely upon the CDA the power to register cooperatives.
granted by law, as it applied to the Subic Bay Freeport, which is considered outside the domestic
Article 122 of the Cooperative Code expressly provides that electric cooperatives shall be covered by
customs territory. The Court found the order unreasonable since the Freeport is outside the scope of the
the Code. Article 128 of the said Code and Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939 similarly provide that
domestic industry protection intended by the EO. As a result, the Court declared the provision of EO
cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, shall have three years within
156 applying to the Freeport Zone void, while maintaining its validity for the rest of the Philippine
which to qualify and register with the CDA and that after they shall have so qualified and registered,
territory. Thus, used motor vehicles can be stored, used, or traded within the Freeport but cannot be
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. No. 1645 shall no longer be applicable to them. These
imported into the rest of the country.
Sections 3 and 5 read as follows:
9. Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Torres, G.R. No. Sec. 3. Section 5(a), Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended by adding sub-
127249, February 27, 1998. paragraph (6) to read as follows:

G.R. No. 127249 February 27, 1998 (6) To authorize the NEA Administrator to designate, subject to the confirmation of the Board
Administrators, an Acting General Manager and/or Project Supervisor for a Cooperative where
vacancies in the said positions occur and/or when the interest of the Cooperative and the program so
requires, and to prescribe the functions of said Acting General Manager and/or Project Supervisor, Leonida Z. Manalo — OIC GM/Ex-Officio
which powers shall not be nullified, altered or diminished by any policy or resolution of the Board of
Directors of the Cooperative concerned. On 28 May 1995, Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, and Felicito Ilan held a special
meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the meeting
xxx xxx xxx
President Norberto Ochoa
Sec. 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Vice President Antonio Obias
Sec. 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. — In the exercise of its power of supervision and control
over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered Secretary Felicito Ilan
to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct Treasurer Luis Pascua
investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and
other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities. Thereupon, these newly elected officers approved the following resolutions:

xxx xxx xxx 1) Resolution No. 27, c.s. — confirming the election of the new set of officers of the Board of
Directors of CANORECO
Finally, the repealing clause (Article 127) of the Cooperative Code provides:
2) Resolution No. 28, c.s. — recalling Resolution No. 22, c.s. appointing Mr. Reynaldo V. Abundo as
Provided, however, That nothing in this Code shall be interpreted to mean the amendment or repeal of permanent General Manager in view of the fact that such appointment was in violation of the
any provision of Presidential Decree No. 269: Provided, further, That the electric cooperatives which provisions of R.A. 6713; declaring the position of General Manager as vacant; and designating Mr.
qualify as such under this Code shall fall under the coverage thereof. Oscar Acobera as Officer-in-Charge
CANORECO registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6939. On 8 March 3) Resolution No. 29, c.s. — authorizing the Board President, or in his absence, the Vice-President,
1993, the CDA issued a Certificate of Provisional Registration (T-003-93) to CANORECO effective countersigned by the Treasurer, or in his absence, the Secretary, to be the only officers who can transfer
for two years. 1 On 1 March 1995, the CDA extended this provisional registration until 4 May funds from savings to current accounts; and authorizing the Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Acobera, to issue
1997.2 However, on 10 July 1996, CANORECO filed with the CDA its approved amendments to its checks without countersignature in an amount not to exceed P3,000.00 and in excess thereof, to be
Articles of Cooperation converting itself from a non-stock to a stock cooperative pursuant to the countersigned by the President and/or the Treasurer
provisions of R.A. No. 6938 and the Omnibus Implementing Rules and Regulations on Electric
Cooperatives. On the same date the CDA issued a Certificate of Registrations 4) Resolution No. 30, c.s. — hiring the services of Atty. Juanito Subia as retainer-lawyer for
CANORECO.6
Previously, on 11 March 1995, the Board of Directors of CANORECO 4 approved Resolution No. 22
appointing petitioner Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General Manager. The Board was composed The petitioners challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing with the CDA a
of Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers with Prayer for
Issuance of Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order, which the CDA docketed CDA-CO Case No. 95-
Ruben N. Barrameda — President 010.
Elvis L. Espiritu — Vice president In its Resolution of 15 February 1996, 7 the CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners and
Merardo G. Enero, Jr. — Secretary decreed as follows:

Marcelito B. Abas — Treasurer WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board Meeting of May 28, 1995, participated by the
respondents, and all the Resolutions issued on such occasion, are hereby declared NULL AND
Antonio R. Obias — Director VOID AB INITIO.

Luis A. Pascua — Director Likewise, the election of respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis Pascua,
as President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of CANORECO is hereby declared
Norberto Z. Ochoa — Director NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Hence, respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis Pascua are hereby ordered Presidential Assistant on Energy Affairs
to refrain from representing themselves as President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer,
respectively, of CANORECO. The same respondents are further ordered to refrain from acting as HONESTO DE JESUS — Member
authorized signatories to the bank accounts of CANORECO. Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
Further respondent Felicito Ilan is hereby ordered to refrain from exercising the duties and functions of ANDRES IBASCO — Member
a member of the Board of CANORECO until the election protest is resolved with finality by the proper
forum. In the meantime, the incumbency of petitioner Merardo Enero, Jr. as Director of the Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
CANORECO Board is hereby recognized.
TEODULO M. MEA — Member
A status quo is hereby ordered as regards the position of General Manager, being held by Mr.
National Electrification Administration Nominee
Reynaldo Abundo, considering that the recall of his appointment was done under a void Resolution,
and that the designation of Mr. Oscar Acodera as Officer-in-Charge, under the same void Resolution, VICENTE LUKBAN — Member
has no force and effect.
National Electrification Administration Nominee
Finally, respondents Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luisito Pascua, and petitioners Ruben
Barrameda, Elvis Espiritu, Marcelito Abas and Merardo Enero, Jr. are hereby ordered to work together, The said Committee shall have the following functions:
as Board of Directors, for the common good of CANORECO and its consumer-members, and to
1. Designate the following upon the recommendation of the Chairman:
maintain an atmosphere of sincere cooperation among the officers and members of CANORECO.
1.1 an Acting General Manager who shall handle the day-to-day operations of the Cooperative. In the
On 28 June 1996, in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and with the active
meantime, the General Manager shall be deemed to be on leave without prejudice to the payment of his
participation of some officials of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the group of
salaries legally due him; and
Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis Pascua forcibly took possession of the offices
of CANORECO and assumed the duties as officers thereof.8 1.2 a Comptroller who shall handle the financial affairs of the Cooperative.
On 26 September 1996, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate issued by the CDA, the 2. Ensure that:
petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to perform their respective
functions.9 xxx xxx xxx

On 3 December 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. The AD HOC Committee shall submit a written report to the President, through the Office of the
40910 constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of Executive Secretary, every two (2) weeks from the effectivity of this Order.
CANORECO. It reads as follows:
A General Membership Meeting shall be called by the AD HOC Committee to determine whether or
To efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte Electric not there is a need to change the composition of the membership of the Cooperative's Board of
Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people Directors. If the need exists, the AD HOC Committee shall call for elections. Once composition of the
who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity, an AD HOC Committee is hereby Board of Directors is finally settled, it shall decide on the appointment of a General Manager in
constituted to take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO until such time as a general accordance with prescribed laws, rules and regulations. Upon the appointment of a General Manager,
membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and the Committee shall become functus officio.
normalcy in operations is restored. Further, if and when warranted, the present Board of Directors may
This Memorandum Order shall take effect immediately.
be called upon by the Committee for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of their per
diems as may be authorized by existing rules and regulations. On 11 December 1996, the petitioners filed this petition wherein they claim that
The AD HOC Committee shall be composed of the following: I. THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE OVER AND MANAGE OR TO ORDER THE
TAKE-OVER OR MANAGEMENT OF CANORECO.
REX TANTIONGCO — Chairman
II. [THE] TAKE-OVER OF CANORECO BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE IS UNLAWFUL We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
DESPITE DESIGNATION OF CANORECO CONSUMERS AS MEMBERS OF AD
HOC COMMITTEE. Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said laws. Article 38 of R.A. No.
III. [THE] RELEGATION OF PETITIONERS AS MERE ADVISERS TO THE AD 6938 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and management of the affairs of cooperatives, and
HOC COMMITTEE AMOUNTS TO REMOVAL FROM OFFICE WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS Article 39 provides for the powers of the board of directors. These sections read:
NO POWER TO DO. MOREOVER, PETITIONERS' REMOVAL VIOLATES PETITIONERS'
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Art. 38. Composition of the Board of Directors. — The conduct and management of the affairs of a
cooperative shall be vested in a board of directors which shall be composed of not less than five (5) nor
IV. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKEWISE WITHOUT POWER TO DESIGNATE OR ORDER THE more than fifteen (15) members elected by the general assembly for a term fixed in the by-laws but not
DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING GENERAL MANAGER FOR CANORECO AND TO CONSIDER exceeding a term of two (2) years and shall hold office until their successors are duly elected and
THE INCUMBENT REYNALDO V. ABUNDO TO BE ON LEAVE. qualified, or until duly removed. However, no director shall serve of more than three (3) consecutive
terms.
The petitioners assert that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even
impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to lake over or order the take-over of electric Art. 39. Powers of the Board of Directors. — The board of directors shall direct and supervise the
cooperatives. Although conceding that while the State, through its police power, has the right to business, manage the property of the cooperative and may, by resolution, exercise all such powers of
interfere with private business or commerce, they maintain that the exercise thereof is generally limited the cooperative as are not reserved for the general assembly under this Code and the by-laws.
to the regulation of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the
power to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. Accordingly, the creation As to the officers of cooperatives, Article 43 of the Code provides:
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and void. Art. 43. Officers of the Cooperative. — The board of directors shall elect from among themselves only
The petitioners further claim that Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from their positions as the chairman and vice-chairman, and elect or appoint other officers of the cooperative from outside of
members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President does not have the authority to the board in accordance with their by-laws. All officers shall serve during good behavior and shall not
appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of directors of a private enterprise including be removed except for cause and after due hearing. Loss of confidence shall not be a valid ground for
electric cooperatives. He cannot rely on his power of supervision over the NEA to justify the removal unless evidenced by acts or omissions causing loss of confidence in the honesty and integrity
designation of an acting general manager for CANORECO under P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. of such officer. No two (2) or more persons with relationship up to the third degree of consanguinity or
1645, for CANORECO had already registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. 6938 and R.A. No. affinity shall serve as elective or appointive officers in the same board. 12
6939; hence, the latter laws now govern the internal affairs of CANORECO Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive power, which
On 3 January 1997, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of directors and to remove them for
Order. cause. Article 51 thereof provides for removal of directors and officers as follows:

On 9 January 1997, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the Court that on 8 Art. 51. Removal. — An elective officer, director, or committee member may be removed by a vote of
January 1997 respondent Rex Tantiongco notified the petitioners that the Ad Hoc Committee was two-thirds (2/3) of the voting members present and constituting a quorum, in a regular or special
taking over the affairs and management of CANORECO effective as of that date. 11 They reiterated general assembly meeting called for the purpose. The person involved shall be given an opportunity to
their plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order because the Ad Hoc Committee has taken be heard at said assembly.
control of CANORECO and usurped the functions of the individual petitioners. Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power
In the Resolution dated 13 January 1997, we required respondents to comment on the petition. to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit
temporarily. Considering that (1) the take-over will be "until such time that a general membership
Despite four extensions granted it, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to file its Comment. meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in
Hence, in the resolution of 16 July 1997 we deemed the OSG to have waived the filing of its Comment operations is restored, and (2) the date such meeting shall be called and the determination of whether
and declared this case submitted for decision. The OSG's motion to admit its Comment, as well as the there is a need to change the composition of the membership of CANORECO's Board of Directors are
attached Comment, belatedly filed on 24 July 1997 was merely noted without action in the resolution exclusively left to the Ad Hoc Committee, it necessarily follows that the incumbent directors were, for
of 13 August 1997. We also subsequently denied for lack of merit its motion for reconsideration. all intents and purposes, suspended at the least, and removed, at the most, from their office. The said
Memorandum did no less to the lawfully appointed General Manager by directing that upon the followers "to cease and desist from acting as the Board of Directors and Officers of Camarines Norte
settlement of the issue concerning the composition of the board of directors the Committee shall decide Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) and to refrain from implementing their Resolution calling for the
on the appointment of a general manager. In the meantime, it authorized the Committee to designate District V Election on August 17 and 24, 1996." 13 Consequently, the said decision of the CDA had long
upon the recommendation of the Chairman an Acting Manager, with the lawfully appointed Manager become final and executory when Memorandum Order No. 409 was issued on 3 December 1996. That
considered on leave, but who is, however, entitled to the payment of his salaries. Memorandum cannot then be considered as one reversing the decision of the CDA which had attained
finality.
Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the
"suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors and the officers thereof. Under Section 15, Chapter III of Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), decisions of administrative agencies become final and executory fifteen days after receipt of a
It must be pointed out that the controversy which resulted in the issuance of the Memorandum Order copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or
stemmed from a struggle between two groups vying for control of the management of CANORECO. judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration is allowed. A final
One faction was led by the group of Norberto Ochoa, while the other was petitioners' group whose resolution or decision of an administrative agency also binds the Office of the President even if such
members were, at that time, the incumbent directors and officers. It was the action of Ochoa and his agency is under the administrative supervision and control of the latter.
cohorts in holding a special meeting on 28 May 1995 and then declaring vacant the positions of
cooperative officers and thereafter electing themselves to the positions of president, vice-president, We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully
treasurer, and secretary of CANORECO which compelled the petitioners to file a petition with the as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that
CDA. The CDA thereafter came out with a decision favorable to the petitioners. proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta
movere prescribes that what had already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this
Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is principle does not commend itself to sound public policy.14
explicit on how the dispute should be resolved; thus:
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409.
Art. 121. Settlement of Disputes. — Disputes among members, officers, directors, and committee Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable, be settled amicably in accordance promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the
with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms embodied in the by-laws of the cooperative, and in legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
applicable laws. President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including
Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a court of competent the barangay.16 Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and
jurisdiction.ℒαwρhi ৷ 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938,
R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any
Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, which provides: other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative. Article 98 of R.A.
6938 instead provides:
Sec. 8. Mediation and Conciliation. — Upon request of either or both or both parties, the [CDA] shall
mediate and conciliate disputes with the cooperative or between cooperatives: Provided, That if no Art. 98. Regulation of Public Service Cooperatives. — (1) The internal affairs of public service
mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non- cooperatives such as the rights and privileges of members, the rules and procedures for meetings of the
resolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper general assembly, board of directors and committees; for the election and qualification of officers,
courts. directors, and committee members; allocation and distribution of surpluses, and all other matters
relating to their internal affairs shall be governed by this Code.
Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue
an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory that the CDA is an agency under xxx xxx xxx
its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the President could not in this case, motu
proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA. The record does not We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no constitutional and statutory
disclose that the group of Norberto Ochoa appealed from the decision of the CDA in CDA-CO Case basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that
No. 95-010 to the Office of the President as the head of the Executive Department exercising cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons
supervision and control over said agency. In fact the CDA had already issued a Cease and Desist Order elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy
dated 14 August 1996 ordering Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, Felicito Ilan and their
set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a ORDINANCE No. 192
policy of non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives. Series of 1994

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and Memorandum Order No. 409 of the President ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND WALLS IN THE
is hereby declared INVALID. MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA

WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative body of the municipality to "x
x x Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
G.R. No. 161107 March 12, 2013 municipality, x x x";

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City, WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its economic and physical development,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City coupled with urbanization and modernization, makes imperative the adoption of an ordinance which
Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina shall embody up-to-date and modern technical design in the construction of fences of residential,
City, Petitioners, commercial and industrial buildings;
vs. WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA, Philippines, does not adequately provide technical guidelines for the construction of fences, in terms of
INC., Respondents. design, construction, and criteria;
DECISION WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall provide more efficient and effective
MENDOZA, J.: enforcement of laws on public safety and security;

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that high fences or walls did not actually
to set aside the December 1, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75691. discourage but, in fact, even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements from the view of
outsiders once they have gained ingress into these walls, hence, fences not necessarily providing
The Facts security, but becomes itself a "security problem";
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA- WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts earlier
Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with enumerated, and as guardian of the people of Marikina, the municipal government seeks to enact and
principal offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, implement rules and ordinances to protect and promote the health, safety and morals of its constituents;
Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.2
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green Program" of the government, lowering of
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square fences and walls shall encourage people to plant more trees and ornamental plants in their yards, and
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. when visible, such trees and ornamental plants are expected to create an aura of a clean, green and
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine beautiful environment for Marikeños;
Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The
property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people planted on sidewalks to "beautify" the
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements. 3 façade of their residences but, however, become hazards and obstructions to pedestrians;

The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered "un-neighborly" preventing community
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,4 entitled "Regulating the members to easily communicate and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-in" mentality among the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. populace;
2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and comments on this proposal, and as a requirement
is reproduced hereunder, as follows: of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the Sangguniang Bayan of Marikina invited
presidents or officers of homeowners associations, and commercial and industrial establishments in Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose existing fences and walls do not conform
Marikina to two public hearings held on July 28, 1994 and August 25, 1994; to the specifications herein are allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this Ordinance
within which to conform, as follows:
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed ordinance were fully presented to the
attendees and no vehement objection was presented to the municipal government; (1) Residential houses – eight (8) years

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUINANG BAYAN OF MARIKINA IN (2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years
SESSION DULY ASSEMBLED:
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots
classified or used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special purposes. (4) Educational institutions – five (5) years8 (public and privately owned)

Section 2. Definition of Terms: Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the provisions of this Ordinance shall be demolished
by the municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot or structure.
a. Front Yard – refers to the area of the lot fronting a street, alley or public thoroughfare.
Section 9. The Municipal Engineering Office is tasked to strictly implement this ordinance, including
b. Back Yard – the part of the lot at the rear of the structure constructed therein. the issuance of the necessary implementing guidelines, issuance of building and fencing permits, and
demolition of non-conforming walls at the lapse of the grace period herein provided.
c. Open fence – type of fence which allows a view of "thru-see" of the inner yard and the
improvements therein. (Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice, cyclone wire) Section 10. Repealing Clause. All existing Ordinances and Resolutions, Rules and Regulations
inconsistent with the foregoing provisions are hereby repealed, amended or modified.
d. Front gate – refers to the gate which serves as a passage of persons or vehicles fronting a street,
alley, or public thoroughfare. Section 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons, local executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof in conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed and/or modified
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows: accordingly.
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one Section 12. Effectivity. This ordinance takes effect after publication.
(1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; and
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
(2) Fences on the side and back yard – shall be in accordance with the provisions of P.D. 1096
otherwise known as the National Building Code. (Emphases supplied)

Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas specifically reserved or classified as parks. On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park .9 On April 26,
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial 2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive.10 In response,
establishments and educational and religious institutions.7 the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the
Section 6. Exemption. subject ordinance.

(1) The Ordinance does not cover perimeter walls of residential subdivisions. Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina,
(2) When public safety or public welfare requires, the Sangguniang Bayan may allow the construction Branch 273 (RTC), docketed as SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK.11
and/or maintenance of walls higher than as prescribed herein and shall issue a special permit or
exemption. The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing
Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That
demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at least
1,808.34 square meters, worth about ₱9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02 square
meters, worth roughly ₱9,770,100.00, along East Drive. It would also result in the destruction of the The RTC also found untenable the petitioners’ argument that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or
garbage house, covered walk, electric house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards’ room, guards’ curative statute intended to correct the defects of buildings and structures, which were brought about
post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi- by the absence or insufficiency of laws. It ruled that the assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor
purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The respondents, thus, asserted that curative in nature, considering that at the time the respondents’ perimeter wall was built, the same was
the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an appropriation of valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any previous legislation that it sought to correct.
property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their
property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter lawless The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to expropriate the subject property through
elements and criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient eminent domain.
protection for many years.12 The RTC, thus, disposed:
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety, health, respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994,
morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.13 as amended, on petitioners’ property in question located at Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the petitioners from No pronouncement as to costs.
implementing the demolition of the fence at SSC’s Marikina property.14
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the RTC
Ruling of the CA
On the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision,15 dated October 2, 2002, granting the petition and
ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC
enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property. decision.

The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners to demolish the fence at the SSC The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not justify the exercise of
property in Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of property police power, as it did not only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the respondents’
which could only be done through the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the petitioners could not property without due process of law. The respondents were bound to lose an unquantifiable sense of
take the respondents’ property under the guise of police power to evade the payment of just security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a total of 3,762.36 square meters of property . It,
compensation. thus, ruled that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it clearly invaded the personal
and property rights of the respondents and "[f]or being unreasonable, and undue restraint of trade." 17
It did not give weight to the petitioners’ contention that the parking space was for the benefit of the
students and patrons of SSA-Marikina, considering that the respondents were already providing for It noted that although the petitioners complied with procedural due process in enacting Ordinance No.
sufficient parking in compliance with the standards under Rule XIX of the National Building Code. 192, they failed to comply with substantive due process. Hence, the failure of the respondents to attend
the public hearings in order to raise objections did not amount to a waiver of their right to question the
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement could run counter to the respondents’ right to validity of the ordinance.
privacy, considering that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine sisters, who were
entitled to some sense of privacy in their affairs. It also found that the respondents were able to prove The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter setback provision for parking was a legal
that the danger to security had no basis in their case. Moreover, it held that the purpose of easement, the use and ownership of which would remain with, and inure to, the benefit of the
beautification could not be used to justify the exercise of police power. respondents for whom the easement was primarily intended. It found that the real intent of the setback
provision was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that such would cease
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, provided for retroactive application. to be for the exclusive use of the school and its students as it would be situated outside school premises
It held, however, that such retroactive effect should not impair the respondents’ vested substantive and beyond the school administration’s control.
rights over the perimeter walls, the six-meter strips of land along the walls, and the building, structures,
facilities, and improvements, which would be destroyed by the demolition of the walls and the seizure In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a curative statute, the CA found that the
of the strips of land. petitioner failed to point out any irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of the National Building
Code that required correction or cure. It noted that any correction in the Code should be properly agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 22 of the Local
undertaken by the Congress and not by the City Council of Marikina through an ordinance. Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause, 23 which has two
branches. "The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact
The CA, thus, disposed: ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.1âwphi1 The discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as
October 2, 2002 Decision and the January 13, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and
Marikina City, Branch 273, granting petitioners-appellees’ petition for Prohibition in SCA Case No. proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
2000-381-MK are hereby AFFIRMED. municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property."24

SO ORDERED.18 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the test of a valid ordinance:

Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now before this Court presenting the The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
following held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
THAT CITY ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
POWER; with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.26
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police
THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE POWER OF power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
EMINENT DOMAIN; ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the
Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE CITY VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994; AND challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and
APPLICATION.19
on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.27
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must
setback requirement is, as held by the lower courts, invalid. 20 Nonetheless, the petitioners argue that
be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More
such invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, series of 2000. They also
importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
contend that Section 3, relating to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, must be complied with, as it
remains to be valid. Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:28
Ruling of the Court
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short,
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." 21 The there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject - interest of the public and lawful means –
State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as reasonable not oppressive.29
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.30 obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably
necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows: may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. 33 The Court, thus,
(1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents
of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of
xxx xxx xxx Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was properly cured by Zoning
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial Ordinance No. 303,34 Series of 2000, which classified the respondents’ property to be within an
establishments and educational and religious institutions. institutional zone, under which a five-meter setback has been required.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1) demolish their The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the case at hand.
existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3)
build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area. The Court notes with displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first time on appeal in this
Court in the petitioners’ Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was enacted on December 20,
Setback Requirement 2000, the petitioners could very well have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002. The settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change the legal theory of this case under which the
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence to
controversy was heard and decided in the trial court. It should be the same theory under which the
provide for a parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to
review on appeal is conducted. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to
be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its students and
the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as
faculty, and that its use by the public on non-school days would only be incidental. In their Reply,
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This will be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being repugnant to the
justice, and due process.35
Constitution.31
Furthermore, the two ordinances have completely different purposes and subjects. Ordinance No. 192
The Court agrees with the latter position.
aims to regulate the construction of fences, while Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning ordinance which
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the classifies the city into specific land uses. In fact, the five-meter setback required by Ordinance No. 303
parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive does not even appear to be for the purpose of providing a parking area.
use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of
By no stretch of the imagination, therefore, can Ordinance No. 303, "cure" Section 5 of Ordinance No.
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property
192.
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
In any case, the clear subject of the petition for prohibition filed by the respondents is Ordinance No.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will continue to
192 and, as such, the precise issue to be determined is whether the petitioners can be prohibited from
remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total
enforcing the said ordinance, and no other, against the respondents.
destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. 32 The Court is of the view that the implementation of
the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting
respondents’ private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-
Constitution. thru, should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.

The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.

For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable relation Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 cannot be enforced against the respondents,
between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for it is no longer necessary to rule on the issue of retroactivity. The Court shall, nevertheless, pass upon
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private the issue for the sake of clarity.
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.36
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to
prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to
ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal
necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see- that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts
thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with.
criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed premises Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive." 41
could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to
bypass and breach. It also appears that the respondents’ concrete wall has served as more than The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192 is a curative statute as it aims to correct or cure a defect
sufficient protection over the last 40 years. ` in the National Building Code, namely, its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the
construction of fences. They ultimately seek to remedy an insufficiency in the law. In aiming to cure
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may not, this insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking provisions to the National Building Code. This
under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic is not what is contemplated by curative statutes, which intend to correct irregularities or invalidity in
appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster the law. The petitioners fail to point out any irregular or invalid provision. As such, the assailed
"neighborliness" between members of a community. ordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.

Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency in the National Building Code with respect to parking
a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how provisions in relation to the issue of the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of the Rules and
best to protect their property. Regulations of the said code requires an educational institution to provide one parking slot for every
ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts, the respondents provide a total of 76 parking slots for
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their their 80 classrooms and, thus, had more than sufficiently complied with the law.
right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the
property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative statute which may be applied
Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the retroactively.
right to be let alone,37 as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of its citizens.38 It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Separability
Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.39 Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the respondents’ the respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the
enforced against the respondents. invalid, may stand and be enforced."42 Thus, the other sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid
and enforceable.
No Retroactivity
Conclusion
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 by including the regulation of
educational institutions which was unintentionally omitted, and giving said educational institutions five Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of
(5) years from the passage of Ordinance No. 192 (and not Ordinance No. 217) to conform to its their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in
provisions.40 The petitioners argued that the amendment could be retroactively applied because the affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently
assailed ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive in nature. desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in
Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the petitioners' property in question located in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.