9TH Zeal Internal Moot Court Competition by Mauf
9TH Zeal Internal Moot Court Competition by Mauf
IN MATTERS OF
WRIT PETITION : 808 OF 2023
Versus
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................vi
ISSUES RAISED........................................................................................................................viii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................ix
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION MEANING
Art. Article
Anr Another
Ors. Others
Rs. Rupees
Sec. Section
Pvt. Ltd. Private Limited
UOI Union of India
CPC Code of civil procedure
SCC Supreme court cases
AIR All India reports
ICU Intensive care unit
& And
No. Number
y.o Year old
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
4. JSTOR
5. HeinOnline
6. Westlaw
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition under Article
226 of the Sokovian Constitution1,
which grants the High Courts the power to issue writs, directions, or orders, including those
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto, for
the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.
In the present case, the petitioners are invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble Court to seek redress for the violation of their son’s fundamental right to life and
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Sokovian Constitution2. The
respondents, through their gross medical negligence, have infringed upon the deceased
Drako Swift’s right to life, resulting in his death. The petitioners have exhausted all
available remedies before the Medical Council, which exonerated the respondents without
proper consideration of the facts, leaving the petitioners with no effective alternative
remedy.
This Hon'ble Court’s writ jurisdiction is invoked for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to
quash the decision of the Medical Council and a writ of mandamus directing a fresh
investigation into the matter of medical negligence. As held in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India3, a writ petition is maintainable for the enforcement of fundamental rights
even against non-state actors when the violation of such rights is evident. St. Vincent
Hospital, while a private entity, performs a public function by providing medical services,
thus making its actions subject to constitutional scrutiny under Article 21.
In light of the violation of fundamental rights and the absence of any adequate alternative
remedy, this Hon'ble Court is vested with jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this writ
petition under Article 226 of the Sokovian Constitution.
1
Article 226 of the Sokovian Constitution
2
Article 21 of the Sokovian Constitution
3
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 161]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr and Mrs Swift ('Plaintiff') are the parents of the deceased Draco Swift.
Dr Kendrick House and St. Vincent Hospital ('Defendant'), St. Vincent Hospital is a private
multispecialty hospital where Dr Kendrick House is a senior neurosurgeon.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Draco, a boy aged 16 years old, is a student at Sherman Oaks High. He was a bright and promising young
man with dreams of achieving great things. He was a diligent student, loved by the teachers and peers
alike. Drako's classroom was on the 1st floor of the school building and had large windows overlooking the
school football ground.
SITUATION THEREAFTER
After Dr. Kendrick House proceeded with the surgery he encountered a particularly deep shard beneath the
occipital bone, as he attempted to remove it, he ruptured a nerve, then this ruptured nerve lead to a blood
clot which Dr Kendrick House being a renowned neurosurgeon only noticed it after He surgery was
completed and then realized the clot posed a significant risk to Drako's recovery and could lead to serious
surgery to remove the blood clot, because of this blood cloth via the ruptured nerve, there was an urgent
need for a second surgery with very little time for performing
the surgery, Drako was kept in the Intensive Care Unit (I.C.U.). ON 1ST July 2024, Drako’s condition
began to deteriorate, and he succumbed to his injuries. So Dr Kendrick House didn't bring his mistake and
the second surgery to Draco's parent's knowledge and didn't get consent for the second surgery from
Draco's parent's
CAUSE OF ACTION
After Drako’s parents saw the autopsy report on 5th July, they got furious and lodged a complaint against
the St Vincent hospital and Dr. Kendrick House for medical negligence in the medical council on 8 th of
July 2024, after a thorough investigation the council declared that dr. house is not liable for medical
negligence, feeling dissatisfied by the decision of the medical council Drako’s parent approached the
hon’ble High Court to seek justice, the hon’ble High Court allowed writ petition.
CLAIMS
According to Mr. and Mrs. swift (Drako’s parents), medical negligence has been made by St. Vincent
Hospital (a private multi-speciality hospital) and Dr. Kendrick House (A senior neurosurgeon renowned
for his expertise in handling complex cases), due to which Mr. and Mrs. swift lost their son, Mr. and Mrs.
swift want to claim damage.
PETITION
Mr. and Mrs. Swift appealed to the Hon'ble High of Titan. The court will hear the petitioners’ contentions
on the decision and issues as follows on the 6th of October 2024.
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I
ISSUE II
ISSUE III
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Dr. Kendrick House is liable for medical negligence
under Section 106(1) of Sokovian Nyaya Sanhita. Dr. House acted negligently by performing a second
surgery on Drako Swift without informing or obtaining the consent of the patient's parents. The failure to
obtain informed consent is a breach of the fundamental duty of care owed to the patient, and the
subsequent deterioration of Drako's condition, resulting in his death, establishes a direct link between Dr.
House's actions and the tragic outcome.
The standard of care expected from a medical professional was not adhered to, and Dr. House's actions
demonstrate a failure to act with reasonable caution. Therefore, he is directly liable for medical negligence
under the relevant law.
ISSUE III: WHETHER ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL CAN BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS STAFF.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that St. Vincent Hospital is vicariously liable for the
actions of Dr. Kendrick House, as he was acting in his capacity as an employee of the hospital. The legal
doctrine of vicarious liability holds that employers are responsible for their employees' negligent acts
during their employment. Dr. House performed the surgery during his working hours, and the hospital
provided the environment and facilities for the procedure.
The hospital failed to exercise proper oversight and ensure that all necessary medical protocols, including
the obtaining of informed consent, were followed. As a result, the hospital is vicariously liable for Dr.
House’s negligent actions, which ultimately led to the death of Drako Swift.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is respectfully submitted that the appropriate writ in this case is a writ of certiorari, which can be issued
to quash the decision of the Medical Council exonerating Dr. Kendrick House. The Medical Council's
decision is a quasi-judicial order, and this Hon'ble Court has the power to review such orders if they are
passed without proper application of law or in violation of natural justice. In HARI VISHNU KAMATH
V. AHMAD ISHAQUE8, the Supreme Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued to quash decisions
of inferior courts or tribunals acting beyond the jurisdiction or without adhering to procedural fairness
the Medical Council's failure to hold Dr House accountable for performing a second surgery without
consent represents an error of law and a breach of natural justice, making it a fit case for the issuance of
certiorari to quash its findings.
in the case of A.K. KRAIPAK V. UNION OF INDIa 9, The Supreme Court held that the principles of
natural justice must be observed in administrative actions, and certiorari would lie to quash decisions
where these principles were violated. This case is significant because it highlights that certiorari can be
issued when a quasi-judicial body, like the Medical Council, denies the violation of fundamental rights.
Petitioner could argue that the Medical Council's investigation did not adequately consider all relevant
facts or that proper procedures were not followed.
In SAMIRA KOHLI V. DR. PRABHA MANCHANDA 11, the Indian Supreme Court held that informed
consent is a critical component of the right to life and personal liberty. The second surgery, performed
without the consent of Drako’s parents, violated his dignity and personal autonomy. Medical procedures
performed without obtaining proper consent are deemed to be a violation of Article 21, further justifying
the maintainability of the writ petition
Private hospitals, while not state entities, perform a public function by providing essential services like
healthcare. In Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel12, the Court held that private hospitals are bound by the
fundamental rights of patients when providing medical services. Thus, the actions of St. Vincent Hospital
and Dr. Kendrick House, which led to the death of Drako, must be scrutinized under Article 21. The
private nature of the hospital does not exempt it from being held accountable for violating constitutional
rights.
The petitioners have already filed a complaint with the Medical Council, exonerating Dr. Kendrick House.
This decision has left the petitioners without a meaningful remedy. As held in BANDHUA MUKTI
MORCHA V. UNION OF INDIA13, the existence of alternative remedies does not bar a writ petition when
the remedies are not effective in addressing fundamental rights violations. Here, the Medical Council's
findings are inadequate and do not address the gross negligence that caused Drako's death
. At the same time, the petitioners could potentially file a civil suit for damages or pursue criminal action
under Section 106(1) of Sokovian Nyaya Sanhita; these remedies do not address the constitutional
violation of Drako's right to life. In V. KRISHNA KUMAR V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU14, the
Supreme Court allowed the maintainability of a writ petition in a medical negligence case, stating that
when fundamental rights are violated, a writ petition is an appropriate remedy. The petitioners in this
case are similarly seeking relief for the violation of their son's fundamental rights, for which civil or
criminal remedies are insufficient
According to Winfield, The Essentials of Medical Negligence are as follows: (1) A legal duty to exercise
due care on the part of the party complained towards the party complaining about the former's conduct
within the scope of the duty, (2) Breach of the said duty, (3) consequential damage.
Duty of care is defined as the legal obligation to act with reasonable care to avoid harming others. The law
imposes a legal duty of care upon a person towards others while performing a certain act so that one would
take reasonable care to avoid such harms that the person could reasonably foresee.
According to the definition mentioned above of duty of care, Dr Kendrick House (a senior neurosurgeon
renowned for his expertise in handling complex cases) owed a duty of care to the deceased Drako Swift,
who did not perform the duty in his total capacity. The operation was delicate and required precision,
considering the sensitive nature of the injuries near the brain, which was not performed as necessary. Dr
House underperformed while performing the surgery; he was not at all focused. He encountered a
particularly deep shard beneath the occipital bone. As he attempted to remove it, he ruptured the nerve.
The rupture led to the formation of a blood clot, which Dr. House only noticed after the surgery was
Breach of Duty of care is defined as noncompliance with the legal obligation to act reasonably to avoid
harming others. The law imposes a legal duty of care upon a person towards others while performing a
certain act so that one would take reasonable care to avoid such harms that the person could reasonably
foresee.
"According to Charlesworth & Percy15 on Negligence (Tenth Edition, 2001), in current forensic speech,
negligence has three meanings. They are (i) a state of mind in which it is opposed to intention, (ii) careless
conduct, and (iii) the breach of duty to take care that is imposed by either common or statute law.
Observing Dr Kendrick House's methodologies, the counsel observes careless conduct and breach of duty
to take care, which are relevant to the current scenarios. Dr House's conduct was careless throughout the
procedure. Dr House had a duty to take care, which he failed to perform; he was negligent enough to notice
the rupture only after the surgery. There was no post-operative recheck to see if there might have been any
discrepancies with the patient. This immense carelessness by Dr House led to the sad and untimely death
of Draco Swift
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble High Court of Titan that in the case OF DR LAXMAN
BALKRISHNA JOSHI VS. DR TRIMBARK BABU GODBOLE AND ARS., A.I.R. 1969 SC 128 16 AND
A.S.MITTAL V. STATE OF U.P., A.I.R. 1989 SC 1570 17, it was laid down that when a patient consults a
doctor, the doctor owes to his patient-specific duties which are: (a) duty of care in deciding whether to
undertake the case, (b) duty of care in deciding what treatment to give, and (c) duty of care in the
administration of that treatment.
The counsel would humbly like to mention that Dr House is a SENIOR NEUROSURGEON renowned
for his expertise in handling complex cases. He voluntarily took the case of Draco, yet he performed
medical negligence, which amounted to his death. He should not have performed Draco's surgery if he was
unsure whether he could perform the surgery to his total capacity. The blood clot that occurred due to his
carelessness and underperforming
ability led to the untimely and sad demise of Draco Swift. Dr Kendrick House had total control of the
surgery. He performed the second surgery in haste without consulting Draco's parents. The counsel would
humbly like to state on the petitioner's behalf that he knew what he was doing, yet he performed medical
negligence. Firstly, he had no right to perform that surgery without his parent's consent; secondly, if he was
performing that surgery, he should have known what that surgery could lead to. The counsel would like to
tell the bench that despite Dr House's assurance that they were doing everything possible to ensure
Draco's speedy recovery, his condition worsened significantly and he succumbed to his injuries.
Dr Kendrick House performed the first and second surgery himself. He was administering the surgeries. He
had moral obligations to perform the surgeries to the best of his ability, yet he did not. During the first
surgery, he ruptured a nerve, and to undo the wrong, he performed the second surgery without Draco's
parents' consent. The second surgery was also unsuccessful as, despite his assurance, Draco's condition
began to deteriorate, and he succumbed to his injuries. This case is an example of medical negligence that
occurred twice
The concept of RES IPSA LOQUITOR is a Latin term meaning "the thing speaks for itself"
For u to determine whether Dr Kendrick House performed Medical Negligence, the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITOR assumes the following;
(1) The nature of the injury gives the clue that without negligence, it could not have happened.
(2) There was no involvement of the patient in the injury in any way.
(3) The injury happened under the circumstances of the supervision and control of the doctor.
The counsel would like to bring notice of the bench to a proven fact that During the first surgery, Dr
House encountered a particularly deep shard beneath the occipital bone. As he attempted to remove it,
he ruptured a nerve. This rupture led to the formation of a blood clot, which Dr House only noticed
after the surgery was completed. This unprofessionalism and negligence by Dr House led to the
death of Draco. If Dr house had been more careful and not negligent during the procedure and
proceeded carefully with removing the shard beneath the optical bone, Draco could have fully
recovered without needing a second surgery and would still have been alive.
It is a known fact that neither Drako nor Drako's parents signed the consent forms granting permission
to the doctors to carry out the medical procedure for the second surgery. This tells us that neither Draco
nor his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Swift, had any involvement in the performance of the second surgery by
Dr House. Dr Kendrick House operated a second time without consulting either of them.
The counsel would like to bring attention to the fact that Dr Kendrick House was in charge of the first
and second surgeries. He was in total control of the circumstances; he was unfocused while operating
during the first surgery, due to which the blood clot was formed, leading to the performance of the
second surgery. The second surgery was also under the control of Dr House, and the counsel humbly
put deep thought into the fact before the bench that Dr House assured that everything possible was
done to ensure his speedy recovery, yet Draco succumbed to his injureis
SANHITA APPLICABLE?
Section 106(1) of Sokovian Nyaya Sanhita states: Whoever causes death of any person by doing any rash
or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if such act is
done by a registered medical practitioner while performing medical procedure, he shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
The elements of section 106 (1): Death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide done by a registered medical practitioner while performing a medical procedure.
Here, Dr House is a senior Neurosurgeon whose act of underperformance and unprofessionalism amount to
a rash and negligent act that led to the sad and untimely death of the Plaintiff's son because if Dr house
could have been careful and professional enough, he would have performed the first surgery with utmost
care and thought. Due to his lack of concentration and duty of care towards the patient, he made an
unacceptable move, which led to the performance of the second surgery, which led to the death of Draco
Swift.
In SAMIRA KOHLI VS DR PRABHA MANCHANDRA & A.R.S 18., the Supreme Court held that
Clinical decisions and choices should be recognized from the worth decisions of the patients. The doctor
has a legitimate and moral obligation to give satisfactory data to the patient so the individual can deal
with the data and settle on proper choices.
Compared to Dr House's scenario, Dr house did not inform the plaintiff about the second surgery and went
In STATE OF HARYANA VS SMT. SANTRA19, Smt. Santra, a poor labourer woman who already had
many children and had opted for Sterilisation, developed pregnancy and ultimately gave birth to a female
child despite a sterilization operation, which, obviously, had failed.
This case law is similar in a way that in both cases, due to the medical negligence of the doctor, the patient
had to suffer future damages; in Smt. In Santra's case, she was pregnant again, while in Dr House's case,
Draco lost his life.
The High court of Punjab and Haryana granted relief to the plaintiff by compensating her.
ISSUE III: Whether St Vincent hospital can be held vicariously liable for
the actions of its staff?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble high court of titan in accordance with the doctrine of “Vicarious
Liability” under the Law of Torts, the hospital is vicariously liable for doctors actions. This doctrine is
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which translates as “let the superior be held responsible.” By
this doctrine, an employer can be held liable for the actions of its employees when those actions occur
within the scope of their employment.
In the case of Smt. Savita Garg vs. The Director, National Heart Institute (2004)20 centers on issues of
medical negligence and the responsibilities of healthcare institutions. Smt. Garg was admitted for heart
treatment and underwent surgery, but post-operative complications arose, leading her to allege that the
medical professionals failed to maintain a reasonable standard of care. She claimed negligence in both the
surgical procedure and post-operative care, resulting in significant health issues and emotional suffering.
The court assessed the evidence, including expert testimonies and medical records, and determined that
while complications can occur, the care provided did not meet acceptable medical standards. As a result,
the court found the National Heart Institute liable for the negligence, awarding Smt. Garg compensation for
her physical and emotional distress. This case underscores the importance of accountability in healthcare,
establishing a precedent for patient rights and the standards that medical professionals must uphol the
English Court in the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health reported in [1951] 2 K.B. 343 21. In this case, the
earlier decision in the case of Gold & Ors. v. Essex County Council reported in [1942] 2 All E.R.237 22
came up for consideration. Lord Denning, J. speaking for himself observed that a hospital authority is
liable for the negligence of doctors and surgeons employed by the authority under a contract for service
arising in the course of the performance of their professional duties. It was observed as follows:
In the present case, the doctor exhibited medical negligence during the surgery, resulting in a blood clot in
the plaintiff's head. It wasn't until 40 minutes later that In the present case, the doctor exhibited medical
negligence during the surgery, resulting in a blood clot in the plaintiff's head. It wasn't until 40 minutes
later that
the doctor recognized the presence of the blood clot in the plaintiff's brain and without obtaining consent
from the parents, the doctor proceeded to perform a second surgery.
Therefore, based on the contentions mentioned above, it is submitted that under the doctrine of “Vicarious
Liability” under the Law of Torts, the hospital is vicariously liable for the doctor’s actions, and the
Respondent is liable to compensate the petitioner.
[3.1] Did Dr. House perform the second surgery within the scope of his employment, or was it an
independent action outside his duties?
St. Vincent Hospital could potentially be held vicariously liable for the actions of its staff, depending on
several sub-issues related to vicarious liability.
Scope of Employment
: It must be established that the staff member was acting within the scope of their employment when the
alleged negligence or misconduct occurred. For instance, if a mistake was made while performing duties
typically associated with their role, this criterion might be satisfied
Case Law: The case of Baer v. Regents of the University of California, 1994 23, reinforces that an employer
can be held liable for any negligent acts committed by an employee as long as those acts occur within the
scope of employment. If Dr. House’s decision to operate was part of his role as a neurosurgeon at the
hospital, the hospital may be liable.
Judgement by court :
The court acknowledged the role of inherent risks associated with certain activities. The plaintiff had to
demonstrate that the injuries were due to negligence rather than the inherent risks related to the activity
involved. The ruling clarified the limits of sovereign immunity, stating that public entities could be held
liable for injuries caused by their negligence, particularly in the context of property maintenance.The court
Case law: STUART V. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM (1996)24: In this case, a
patient sued the hospital after a nurse administered an incorrect dosage of medication. The court found the
hospital vicariously liable because the nurse was acting within the scope of her employment when the
negligence occurred.
Judgement of court
The court emphasized the importance of informed consent in medical procedures. It established that
patients have a right to be fully informed about the risks and benefits of a procedure before undergoing it.
The court clarified that the standard for disclosure is based on what a reasonable patient would want to
know, which includes significant risks and alternatives to the proposed treatment. The judgment also
stipulated that for a claim of lack of informed consent to be valid, the plaintiff must prove that if they had
been properly informed, they would have chosen a different course of action. The ruling clarified that
healthcare providers could be held liable not only for wrongful acts in treatment but also for failing to
adequately inform patients, which can lead to not just medical injuries but emotional distress.
The Stuart case is significant because it reinforces the necessity for clear communication between
healthcare providers and patients, ensuring patients are fully aware of what to expect from medical
procedures. This ruling has implications for how informed consent is approached in Maryland and
potentially beyond, shaping standards for patient care and accountability within the medical field.
Case law: FRIEDMAN V. REITER (1994)25: A patient suffered harm due to a surgeon's negligence
during a procedure. The court held the hospital liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability, affirming
that hospitals are responsible for the actions of their employed physicians when those actions occur while
providing medical services. The judgments focused. The court reinforced the need for a duty of care and
established that emotional distress claims require proof that the defendant's conduct was negligent. The
ruling differentiated between direct claims of emotional distress arising from a personal injury versus
indirect claims related to witnessing harm to others. The court emphasized that plaintiffs must provide
substantial evidence connecting the emotional distress to the defendant's actions, ensuring that claims are
not based on mere speculation. These cases illustrate circumstances under which hospitals can successfully
defend against claims of vicarious
liability, particularly when the personnel involved are independent contractors or when the hospital does
not have sufficient control over their actions.
a reasonable provider would do under similar circumstances. The ruling emphasized the necessity for
medical professionals to deliver care that meets established medical and ethical
standards. The court highlighted the importance of expert testimony in establishing the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs must provide sufficient evidence through expert witnesses to
demonstrate how the healthcare provider deviated from the accepted standard. The judgment underscored
that plaintiffs must clearly link the provider’s alleged negligence and the injuries suffered. This entails
Tucker v. Hospital Authority (2007)30: The court ruled that the hospital breached its duty to monitor a
patient who was on a high-alert medication. The failure to conduct regular assessments led to a significant
adverse event, and the hospital was held responsible for its lack of proper monitoring protocols.
Judgement by the court :
The court confirmed that hospitals can be held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of their
employees if those actions occur within the scope of their employment. This principle upholds the
responsibility of hospitals to ensure their staff meets the appropriate standard of care. The court reiterated
the necessity to establish the standard of care for medical professionals within a specific speciality. The
ruling emphasized that expert testimony is crucial to demonstrate how the healthcare provider deviated
from this standard.The court highlighted the importance of demonstrating a causal link between the alleged
negligence and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs must provide sufficient evidence showing that
the negligence directly resulted in their harm.The court upheld a lower court’s decision regarding the
granting of summary judgment in favor of the hospital, indicating that if plaintiffs fail to produce sufficient
evidence to support their claims of negligence, the court could rule in favor of the defendants without
proceeding to a trial
the English Court in the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health reported in [1951] 2 K.B. 343 31. In this case,
the earlier decision in the case of Gold & Ors. v. Essex County Council reported in [1942] 2 All E.R.237 32
was considered. Lord Denning, J. speaking for himself observed that a hospital authority is liable for the
negligence of doctors and surgeons employed by the authority under a contract for service arising
.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised and arguments advanced, it is humbly prayed
that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and:
1. HOLD AND DECLARE that St. Vincent Hospital and Dr Kendrick House are liable for
medical negligence.
2. QUASH the decision of the Medical Council exonerating Dr. Kendrick House.
3. DECLARE the writ petition as maintainable.
AND/OR
Pass any other order, direction, or grant relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of
justice, fairness, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Applicants shall be duty bound forever.
32
Supra, Note 2.
33
Kailash Gahlot v. Vijendra Gupta & Ors. CS(OS) 403/2021 (2022).
34
Sh. Viresh v. Shri Dharamvir Singh Gahlan, CS. No. 121 (2023).
35
Atul Kumar Pandey vs Kumar Avinash, CS. No. 121 (2020).