TORTS AND DAMAGES

1st Semester, SY 2024-2025

Course Outline

Reference:
TORTS AND DAMAGES by Timoteo B. Aquino, 2024

I. Introduction

II. Preliminary Considerations

A. Sources of Philippine Tort Law
B. Purposes and Fundamental Purposes of Tort Law
C. Classification of Torts
D. Difference between Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa contractual and Crime
E. Difference between Fault (culpa) and Dolo (deceit)
F. Elements of Quasi-delict
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate cause
G. Negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
1. Quasi-delict = whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
H. Negligence under Article 1173 of the Civil Code
1. Omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place.
I. Criminal Negligence under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code

III. NEGLIGENCE
A. DEFINITION AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE
Cases:
1. PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, September 29, 1989
- Sps Esteban filed a case for damages for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran
over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. PLDT denies liability on the
contention that the injuries sustained by respondent sps were the
result of their own negligence and that the independent contractor
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 should also be held liable to which PLDT filed a 3rd party
complaint since as per agreement, PLDT should in no manner be
answerable for any accident.
- RTC ruled in favor of the Sps.
- CA dismissed the complaint and absolved PLDT from liability.
- SC: Sps were negligent. Mr Esteban should have exercised
reasonable care and prudence to avoid the injurious
consequences of his act. As opined in some quarters, the omission to
perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the
said omitted act would have prevented the injury. Furthermore,
respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident; As a resident of Lacson Street,
he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of
the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is
solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
- Independent contractor rule

2. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, GR No. 53401,

November 6, 1989
- Isabel Lao Juan allegedly died of circulatory shock electrocution
due to damaged electric lines touching the flood waters of typhoon
“Gening”. Petitioners pointed out that, without their knowledge,
deceased installed a burglar deterrent by connecting wire from the
main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus,
charging the latter with electric current. The switch, probably, was
left on and the deceased was electrocuted when she tried to open
the gate.
- CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.
- CA ruled in favor of the deceased.
- SC: Petitioners theory about the burglar deterrent was not
backed up with evidence and ruled in favor of the deceased.
While it is true that flood is a fortuitous event, the petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public. Petitioner failed to exercise high degree of diligence and
care. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of
the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" .
- The latin churva

3. Picart (horse) vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809

- In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the
defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages
alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the

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 defendant. As he was riding on his pony over the charlatan bridge
in La Union, he saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other side. the defendant, instead of veering to the right while
yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he
had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his
car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of
the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing.
- SC: Mr. Smith is liable passing the contron of the situation to him
because it is his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop.
- The TEST:
o Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
o Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct
or guarding against its consequences.
- When both parties are negligent, the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
- Contributory negligence could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages.

4. People vs. Delos Santos, 355 SCRA 415 (2001)

- The accused hit several trainees of the PNP with an Isuzu Elf
resulting to 12 deaths. Other PNP trainees suffered from severe
to minor injuries. The trial court convicted Glenn of complex crime
of murder , multiple frustrated murder, and multiple attempted
murder.
- SC : complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
o 1st: PAGASA – absolutely no break in the thick clouds, no
stars or moon.
o 2nd Trainees wore black shirt and short, no reflectorized
vests or gloves.
o 3rd. Glenn was driving on the proper side of the road, the
right lane. Trainees occupied the wrong lane, the right
lane, and were facing the same direction as Glenn’s truck
such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming
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 vehicles from behind.
- He should have applied the brakes or served to a safe place
immediately upon hearing the first bump.
- Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; and if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

5. Evelyn Acuna vs. Rodolfo A. Alventara, Sheriff IV, RTC,

Br.50, Villasis, Pangasinan (A.M. No. 01-1463, March 20,
2001)
- Complainant averred that, in implementing the writ,
respondent sheriff had failed to take the necessary
precautions in protecting the attached property.
Respondent entrusted the flatboats to a relative of plaintiff
Ocampo under whose care one of the flatboats
submerged. Later, the flatboats were turned over by
respondent to the Philippine Coast Guard of Sual,
Pangasinan, in which custody the flatboats were totally
damaged due to several typhoons that visited the area.
- SC: respondent was negligent in taking care of the boats
because he turned over possession thereof to the son of
the plaintiff. His reason that the Coast Guard did not
accept the boats because he had no court order can not
exonerate him. In view of the Coast Guard's refusal, what
respondent should have done under the circumstances
was to assign a disinterested party, at the expense of the
plaintiff, to take care of the boats. Even then, this error
could have been rectified if respondent immediately
asked the court for an order to transfer custody of the
boats to the Coast Guard. Respondent did this only when
one of the boats had already sunk.

6. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping M.V., et.al. vs.

Phil. Insurance Co., In., GR No. 14133, June 5, 2002
- CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V 'Anangel Sky'
at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold
Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned
to the Philippine Steel Trading Corporation. On July 28,
1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and,
within the subsequent days, discharged the subject cargo.
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 Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order.
- SC: Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance
with respect to the safety of the goods and the passengers
they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to
render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to
use all reason[a]ble means to ascertain the nature and
characteristics of the goods tendered for shipment, and to
exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including
such methods as their nature requires."14 The
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods
are unconditionally placed in the possession of and
received for transportation by the carrier until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, to the consignee or to
the person who has a right to receive them. Owing to this
high degree of diligence required of them, common
carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at
fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated
or got lost or destroyed.18 That is, unless they prove that
they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the
goods.19 In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or
damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that
they observed such diligence. mere proof of delivery of the
goods in good order to a common carrier and of their
arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima
facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no
adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration,
the loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the
transporter shall be held responsible.
- Include exemptions sa common carriers (floods, etc..)

B. UNREASONABLE OR UNDUE RISKS & FORSEEABILITY

Cases:
7. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 (1987)
• Immediate and proximate cause of the injury
• Foreseeable intervening causes
• Idd.notes: foreseeability – ultimate test of negligence

8. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil 398 (1958)

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 • Antecedent negligence

9. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals and

Ernest E. Simke, G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988
• Immunity of suit of state
• Gross negligence

Idd.notes: reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of
its provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist; undue risk is the
product of negligence.

C. PROBABILITY
Cases:
10. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 30 (1998)
• Gavino was assigned to conduct docking maneuvers of MV
PAVLODAR owned and operated by FESC with the master
of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, but the anchor did not take
hold as expected causing considerable damage to the pier
and the vessel itself. Hindi gali okay, pero wala gd nagsugid
si master.
• Compulsory pilotage - the norm under which it is compulsory
for a vessel to be operated and controlled by a licensed pilot
unless the vessel itself falls under the category of exempted
ones. (google)
• Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under
compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and
had complete control in the navigation and docking of the
vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of a ship and his
orders must be obeyed in all respects connected with her
navigation. Consequently, he was solely responsible for the
damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of
the vessel.

• SC: It has been held that such vessel must exhaust every
reasonable possibility which the circumstances admit and show
that in each, they did all that reasonable care required. 50 In the
absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault
attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object
and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel.
• He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care,
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 but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care
demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstancesm, a
pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
• Prudence required that he, as pilot, should have made sure that
his directions were promptly and strictly followed. (wala daw
nhulog daun ang anchor)
• An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a
reasonable person in the position of the actor would recognize as
necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm
to another. 62 Those who undertake any work calling for special
skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what
they do but also possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability. 63
• Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses,
with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employments
where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same
employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a
species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on his
public profession.
• extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the
more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care.
• It was only at 8:34 o'clock, or four (4) minutes, after the anchor
was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his reaction was even
(haphazard) because instead of arresting fully the momentum of
the vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered merely
"half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to order a "full-
astern". By then, it was too late. Patently, Gavino miscalculated.
Gavino failed to order the other anchor dropped immediately.
• The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt.
Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. His
unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of
troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
• it is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's
employee Capt. Kavankov was no lesss responsible for as
master of the vessel he stood by the pilot during the
man(eu)vering procedures and was privy to every move the
latter made, as well as the vessel's response to each of the
commands. His choice to rely blindly upon the pilot's skills, to
the point that despite being appraised of a notice of alert he
continued to relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino, shows
indubitably that he was not performing his duties with the
diligence required of him and therefore may be charged with
negligence along with defend;int Gavino. It is the duty of the
master to interfere.
• The stark incompetence of Kavankov is competent evidence to
prove the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It has been held that
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 the incompetence of the navigator, the master of the vessel or
its crew makes the vessel unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince
versus United States of America, 584 F. 2nd, page 1151). Hence,
the Appellant FESC is likewise liable for the damage sustained
by the Appellee.
• In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by
his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel,
and to third parties for damages sustained in a collision.
Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort. 87 At common law, a shipowner
is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligence
of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. 88 The
exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply if the
pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is
responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot
be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the
default of others, 89 or, if there be anything which concurred
with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel
master and owners are liable.
• Nonetheless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot and the
master of the vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus
share the blame for the resulting damage as joint tortfeasors,
98 but only under the circumstances obtaining in and
demonstrated by the instant petitions.

• It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to

render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an
injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one
or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury.

Idd.notes: if there is a probability and risk that damage will result, a person is
negligent if he did not exercise due diligence in the face of such great probability.

D. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY AFFECT THE DETERMINATION OF

NEGLIGENCE:
a. Time
b. Place
c. Emergency
d. Gravity of Harm to be Avoided
e. Alternative Cause of Action
f. Social Value or Utility of Activity
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g. Person Exposed to the Risk

Cases:
11. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8
(1910)
• The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the
city of Manila.
• Taylor and other boys entered the premises in the footbridge
and found caps or detonators intended for use in blasting a
well. The children lit up the caps using a match and suffered
from more or less serious injuries. No measures seems to
have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or
prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended,
• Manila electric it was the owner of the material used in these
operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent
acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this
work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to
whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be
applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of
caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by
counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact,
and in the absence of such proof we think that the other
evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary,
and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that
the caps found on its premises were its property, and were left
where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.
• SC: under the generally accepted doctrine in the United
States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery,
must establish by competent evidence:
•
• (1) Damages to the plaintiff.
•
• (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
•
• (3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
• It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not
the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they
were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in
keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his
own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's

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 premises, and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on
its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open
one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
• But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's
youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's
premises, and the intervention of his action between the
negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should
not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident,
which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where
they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate
cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained
by him.
• Torpedo and turntable doctrine
• "the principle of proportional damages, - Distinction must be
made between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing to his own proper hurt. under the doctrine
thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act
in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover."
• We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's
action in picking up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps,
the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect
between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of
the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender
years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but
whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief
that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age
and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up
the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we
neither discuss nor decide.
•
12. United States vs. Bonifacio, 34 Phil. 65 (1916)
Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was traveling along the railroad track,
and as the said Castillo did not get off of the said track in spite of the
whistle or warnings given by the accused, the engineer, the accused
did maliciously and criminally cause the said train to run over the
said Castillo, thereby killing him instantly; an act committed with
violation of law.

The accused claimed that he was travelling at the maximum speed

permitted under the railroad regulations.
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 But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down,
unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot
which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such person
could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside.

Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an engine driver under such
circumstances is that he give warning of his approach, by blowing his whistle
or ringing his bell until he is assured that the attention of the pedestrian has
been attracted to the oncoming train.

But an engine driver may fairly assume that all persons walking or standing on
or near the railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of the
danger to which they are exposed; and that they will take reasonable
precautions to avoid accident, by looking and listening for the approach of
trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed to
an oncoming train.

the accident must be attributed wholly to the reckless negligence of the

deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking the necessary
precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind.

Mere conjecture, and inferences unsupported by satisfactory evidence, are not

sufficient to establish a material finding of fact upon which a finding of guilt,
beyond a reasonable doubt, can be sustained.

This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills
another he is criminally liable therefor, if at the moment he happens to be guilty
of a violation of some petty regulation (reglamento). The injury or death must
have resulted from some "imprudence or negligence" (imprudencia o
negligencia) on his part. True it need only be slight negligence, if accompanied
by a violation of the regulations, but the relation of cause and effect must exist
between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted.
If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from the violation of the
regulations, or the negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs no criminal
liability under the provisions of this article.

The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses
that even if the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum
speed prescribed in the regulations, that fact had no causal relation to the
accident and in no wise contributed to it.

13. Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 (1996)

Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela parked along a sidewalk upon noticing that she had a
flat tire. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".

Defendant Li alleged that in order to avoid the oncoming vehicle with full bright
lights, he swerved to the right and bumped plaintiff’s car which was midnight
blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was
poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's
car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer
portion of the right lane. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that
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plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.

The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident
report and the sketch of the three cars involved in the accident, testified that
the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember
whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there
was an early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora
Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e.
"things can be seen".

According to the witness, he noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very

fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was zigzagging",
although there were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg
of the plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care,
causing its destruction.

After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.

SC: Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the
road if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Li's
failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he
was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was
under the influence of alcohol.

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is

confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes
stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective
care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.15

Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue

risk of harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
Company,25 that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.

that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.

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There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in
connection with official matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes
required him to perform work outside the office as he has to visit buyers and
company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came
from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the company" (pp.
25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company car was partly required by
the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a
"benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his position.

Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the
discharge of their respective duties, the basis of which liability is not
respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater familias, which theory bases
the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in
the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School
vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the
acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme
Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time
of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to
impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer" (at p. 645).

In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that
since defendant Li was authorized by the company to use the company car
"either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can be considered as
using the company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as assistant
manager; using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit,
one of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a
showing that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of the
employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of
the company's business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. The
imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial
Corporation must therefore fail.

We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately
falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this
point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is
jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24,
1990.

13
 14. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932)
Julian del Rosario’s son died from a shock from a wire used by the
defendant for the transmission of electricity. At the time that message was sent
at 2:25pm, the wire had not yet parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio
Bingao, one of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire
was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went
home. Among these was Alberto del Rosario, of the age of 9 years who was a
few paces ahead of two other boys, all members of the second grade in the
public school. Saturnino yielded to this admonition and desisted from his
design, but Alberto del Rosario, who was somewhat ahead, said, I have for
some time been in the habit of touching wires ("Yo desde hace tiempo cojo
alambres"). Jose Salvador rejoined that he should into touch wires as they
carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the
matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire. He immediately fell face
downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre". The end of the wire remained in contact
with his body which fell near the post. A crowd soon collected, and some one
cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's Hospital
the child was pronounced dead.

It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the

deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child
would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the
deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not,
in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, — a proposition
upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the
determining cause of the accident.

E. STANDARD OF CONDUCT: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY

Cases:
15. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932)
16. Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, 163 SCRA 697, July
29,1988

Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered

eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal on
October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside
a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be
buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes,
private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to
continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was
one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino
alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out
the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private
respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while
he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent
wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could
get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone."
14
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids,
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able
to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the
concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a
standing position. 3 days later, he died.

Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176
of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their son's death while
the complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school is founded on
Article 2180 of the same Code.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:

Art. 2180. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.

SC: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for
the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not
a school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their
students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only
the head of the school who can be held liable. In the same case, We
explained:

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic
as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words
"pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the
word "apprentices."

15
 Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent
Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he
heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as
clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did
not give any instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can
be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of
the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to
take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from that
provided for in Article 2180.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde.
Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court
did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree
of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree
of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average
conduct of persons of his age and experience. 5 The standard of conduct to
which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. 6 Bearing
this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

17. Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co. vs. Phil. Motors
Corporation, 55 Phil. 129 (1930)
the trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the
defendant the sum of money.
The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations
In January, 1925, Cranston, the representative of the plaintiff in the City
of Manila, decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the Gwendoline
(a motor schooner owned by the plaintiff used in fishing trade in the
Philippine Islands) changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the
boat. With Phil Motors thru Quest, its manager.
The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business
as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had authority to deal in
all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate,
buy and sell the same and the equipment thereof. Quest, as general
manager, had full charge of the corporations in all its branches.
In this work Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of
the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves
under Quest's directions.
For this purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on
deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the
engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing,
16
which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected
with the tank. Owing to this fact the fuel mixture leaked from the tank and
dripped sown into the engine compartment.
This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly
of the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well,
the flooding would disappear.
As the boat was coming in from this run, at about 7:30 p.m. and when
passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be
made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done
the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new
mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber.
This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the
carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which
the members of the crew were unable to subdue.
The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150.
The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found,
was P10,000.

SC: the loss of this boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of
skill of Quest.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of
the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions
to avoid.

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds

himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill
of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.

even supposing that our theory as to the exact manner in which the
accident occurred might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the
origin of the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it
was casus fortuitus.

As regards the bailee issue: Quest’s employment contemplated the

installation of new parts in the engine only,

17
18. Dr. Ninevetch Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188 (1997)
Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care.
They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps
or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes
of judgment.

Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" 10 in her uterus,
and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23,
1991. After the operation, Lydia BP dropped and her unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be
connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo
District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other
relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Upon
Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the
operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because
there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. 19 The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr.
Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo
that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient. While the
petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died.

The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending
anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged with
"reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide"

the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a
decision of guilty against the petitioner and hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs.. (lack
of skill)

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC prompting the petitioner to file a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with modification
that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death.

SC:
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., 27 this

Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having
the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing
in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients.

18
 Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions
are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence
of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by
other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The
prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr.
Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified
as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on
the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.

For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill
and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter
of expert opinion.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of

establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as
well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. ----proximate cause.

According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an

operation are: (1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel;
(2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent
loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a
clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the
autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any
untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or
suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the
hemorrhage.

This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by
both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than
contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which,
as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault
or negligence.

The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during
trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt.

Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia
Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.

19. E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No.
7760, October 1, 1914
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of
Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along
which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the
street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night
mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to
enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing
19
 the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from
the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of.
t is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the
night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties
upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6
inches or more above the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks
as described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in
that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that
he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication
was the primary cause of the accident.

ISSUE: whether the negligence of plaintiff contributed t the 'principal

occurrence' or 'only to his own injury.'

SC: It seems clear that plaintiff's intoxication contributed to the fall; if he

had been sober, it can hardly be doubted that he would have crossed
the track safely, as he had done a hundred times before."

It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the
vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad
tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel,
this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what
his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober
man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a
conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.

F. STANDARD IN DECIDING NEGLIGENCE CASES

Cases:
20. Preciolita V. Corliss vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA
674 (1969)
complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita
V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the
tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep
he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila
Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957.
He died of serious burns.

Lower Court: he became the victim of his own miscalculation (kay

gusto niya tani mag cross).

The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the lower court.

20
In Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 11 Manresa was cited to
the following effect "'Among the questions most frequently raised and
upon which the majority of cases have been decided with respect to
the application of this liability, are those referring to the determination
of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the
person responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable factors
in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice
there can be no liability, and although this element is present no
indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some person's fault or
negligence'."

"Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines
negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other
person suffers injury."

Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. 14 Thus: "Negligence is want of the

care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
under the circumstances."

To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to

defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-appellee must
necessary fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion
that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not
arisen.

Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if

not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually
pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place."

In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court follows: "A
person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a
regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and
that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately
upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the
purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of
railroads and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one
approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and
hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and
carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a
reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the
track." The Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between
21
 an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: "It may be
said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing
toward which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and
avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the exigencies
of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the
motorman has a right to presume that such duty will be performed."

21. Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre vs. Philippine National Railways,
G.R. No. L-29889, May 31, 1979

Facts:
On the night of October 5, 1963, the plaintiffs attended a birthday party in United Housing
Subdivision, Parañaque, Rizal. After the party ended around 11 PM, they headed home in their
car, driven by Victorino Cusi. As they approached a railroad crossing, they noticed the crossing
bar was raised, no flashing red light, and no audible train whistle. Assuming it was safe, Cusi
slowed down and attempted to cross the tracks. However, a train bound for Lucena crossed at
the same time, leading to a collision. The plaintiffs were thrown from their vehicle, which was
severely damaged.

The warning devices at the railroad crossing were manually operated, with only two shifts of
guards: from 7:00 AM to 3:00 PM and from 3:00 PM to 11:00 PM. On the night of the accident,
the Lucena-bound train was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 PM, and the warning devices
were inactive because no one was manning them. Additionally, the train driver did not blow the
whistle, as noted by the lower court. The driver failed to take the precaution of blowing the
whistle from 50 to 10 meters before the crossing. The train was moving at full speed and,
despite applying emergency brakes, did not stop until it had traveled around 100 meters.

The judicial pronouncement below that the gross negligence of defendant-appellant was the
proximate cause of the collision has been thoroughly reviewed by this Court and we fully affirm the
same.

Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts 3d ed sec. 1324 3 as "the failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." By
such a test, it can readily be seen that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care
and vigilance is measured, it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself
so situated.

All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence
expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.

Thus, it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling device at a crossing to give
warning of the approach of a train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
evidence of negligence.

As for contributory negligence, the SC find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on his
faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.

22
The Cusi spouses knew of the railroad crossing, having safely crossed it earlier when no
warnings were active. On their return, the only difference was the absence of a guard.
Believing the crossing was still safe, Victorino Cusi slowed down and proceeded at a proper
speed. The defendant failed to prove the train driver used a whistle to warn motorists. Since
Cusi was not driving recklessly, he was found not negligent and was entitled to damages from
the defendant.

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Burden of proof
Presumptions:
Article 2184, NCC -
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving
or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

If the owner fails to exercise the required diligence, he is solidarily liable with his
driver in case an accident would happen causing damage to another.

Article 2185, NCC

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
(n)

23
Article 2188, NCC
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the
death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business. (n)

Res Ipsa Loquitor Applicability of the Rule Cases:

Ma-ao Central Co., Inc. vs. C.A. (1990)
FACTS:
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of
Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed
(comes off the railway tracks). He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell
on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot.

Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by
protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish
plates.

The trail court rules in favor of FAMOSO but deducted the SSS pension from the awarded
damages and that corresponding to her husband’s contributory negligence.

The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the
ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all.

CA: Sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased
and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.

RULING:
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing
derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged.
According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its
train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times
when such derailments were reported every hour. 3 The petitioner should therefore have taken
more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because
of its negligence.

The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were
never there at all to begin with or had been removed long before.

At any rate, the absence of the fish plates – whatever the cause or reason – is by itself alone proof
of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently
in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 4 thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.

The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it

24
has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot
agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in
maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every
hour." Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms
reporting derailments-which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments
is-not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.

Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary
care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the
proximate cause of the
injury." 5 It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of
an impending danger to health and body." 6 There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso
was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or
signs of impending danger.

Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
FACTS: This is a damages case under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. On March
18, 1948, a fire broke out at a Caltex service station in Manila during the transfer of gasoline
from a tank truck to an underground storage. The fire spread to nearby houses, destroying
personal properties. The affected homeowners, including the petitioners, sued Caltex (Phil.),
Inc., the station owner, and Mateo Boquiren, its agent in charge, alleging their negligence
caused the fire.

Leandro Flores - "Before loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading
was going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is
about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was
almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the
"manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."

ISSUE: The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees.

RULING: The trial cout court and the CA refused to apply the doctrine.
While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence,
or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his
injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principal that "where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having
such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation,
that the injury arose from defendant's want of care."

And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is
known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly
applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to be on the
highway, and the electric wire was under the sole control of defendant company.

It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on the

25
Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a reason for not applying the particular doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of
which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it
arises almost invariably from some act of man.

res ipsa loquitur - Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.

"It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to
the public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved ... we think it is the generally
accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and
continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially
simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability.'

The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline service station is also used by its
operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding
another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this already small but crowded gasoline station.
These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of
the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those
which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.

Failure:
1. their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from
leaping over it.
2. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height
it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple
and melt when subjected to intense heat.
3. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of
the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. Al., G.R. No. L-52732, August 29,
1988

FACTS: The petitioner’s furniture manufacturing shop in Caloocan City was located next to the
private respondents' residence. In August 1971, Gregorio Mable, one of the respondents,
repeatedly requested the petitioner's plant manager, Eric Cruz, to build a firewall between the
shop and their house, but the requests were ignored. On September 6, 1974, a fire broke out in
the petitioner’s shop. Despite efforts by the shop’s employees to extinguish it, the fire spread to
the respondents' house, and both structures were destroyed. The cause of the fire was unknown,
and an investigation found no traces of inflammable substances.
26
ISSUE: applicability of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,

RULING: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner objects
to, may be stated as follows:

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal
course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.

petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as
required by a city ordinance

Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp.,

G.R. No. L-21749, September 29, 1967

FACTS: On the afternoon of August 17, 1960, a barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation was being pulled down the Pasig River by two tugboats, also owned by the same
company. Due to strong river currents caused by heavy rains on the previous days, the barge
crashed into a wooden post of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge, damaging the posts and causing
the bridge to tilt.

RULING: it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant,
rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its
employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a
thing does not happen if proper care is used.

force majeure - must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.

The appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up and down the river everyday, could not safely
ignore the danger posed by these allegedly improper constructions that had been erected, and in
place, for years.

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 59

FACTS: same ni sa babaw.

On June 20, 1980, the M/V Pavlodar, a Soviet ship, arrived at the Port of Manila. The
Philippine Port Authority assigned Captain Roberto Abellana to supervise the docking of the
vessel, while Senen Gavino, a pilot from the Manila Pilots' Association, was responsible for
guiding it safely to Berth 4.

Gavino boarded the ship and was briefed by the ship's master, Victor Kavankov. As the vessel
approached the pier, Gavino gave orders to stop the engine and drop the left anchor, but the

27
anchor failed to hold, and the ship's speed didn’t decrease. A commotion occurred among the
crew, but Kavankov reassured Gavino it was nothing serious.

Realizing the anchor wasn’t working, Gavino ordered the engines to go in reverse, but the ship
continued moving too quickly toward the pier. Despite efforts to drop another anchor, the ship's
bow crashed into the pier, causing significant damage to both the pier and the vessel.

RULING:
We quote the findings of the lower court with approval.
Firstly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best expounded upon in the landmark case
of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA 279) establishes the presumption that in
the ordinary course of events the ramming of the dock would not have occurred if proper
care was used.

Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCR 334 (1996)

FACTS: Dr. Batiquin, a Resident Physician and acting head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department at Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, performed a caesarean section on Mrs.
Villegas on September 21, 1988. After delivering her first child, Mrs. Villegas was discharged
on September 28 and paid Dr. Batiquin a professional fee. However, soon after, she began
experiencing abdominal pain, fever, and loss of appetite. Dr. Batiquin prescribed medications,
but the symptoms persisted.

Mrs. Villegas consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at Holy Child's Hospital on January 20, 1989, due
to worsening symptoms. Dr. Kho found an abdominal mass and suggested surgery. During the
operation, Dr. Kho discovered an ovarian cyst on each ovary, pus, and a piece of rubber
material, likely from a surgeon's glove, inside Mrs. Villegas' abdomen. This foreign object
caused the infection and the post-surgery complications Mrs. Villegas had been suffering from.

RULING:

Black's Law Dictionary - Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuctable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the]
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident
happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it
lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under [the]
management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer. . . . Under [this] doctrine
. . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff
produces substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if reasonable care had been used.

The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement

28
of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall
be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty
of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light,
the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of
the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say,
does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence.

Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other
operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands
to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising
from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving
behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects
thereof.

Cases (when doctrine held inapplicable)

28. S.D. Martinez, et.al. vs. William Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L- 5691, December 27, 1910

FACTS: On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a horse-drawn
carromata on Calle Real in Manila. As her driver noticed a fast-moving delivery wagon coming
from the opposite direction, he pulled over close to the sidewalk and stopped to let it pass.
However, instead of passing safely, the wagon and its horses crashed into the carromata,
overturning it. This caused Martinez to suffer a serious head injury and also damaged the
carromata.

The defendant claimed that their driver was trustworthy and that the accident happened because
the horses got scared when another vehicle passed by and cracked a whip. The driver was in the
back unloading fodder and couldn’t control the horses when they ran off, leading to the
collision with Martinez’s carromata.

RULING: The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious
and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened
into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason
why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents
itc -alf

sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury,
the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the
reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and that only in the
absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is
something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears.

it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise

29
it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of
the accident.

the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him
SC: reversed.

29. Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Dev. Co., C.A.- G.R. No. L-3240-R, September 20,
1949

30
30. Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
4478, August 29, 1986
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and
transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities
of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the
petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in
the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without
the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by
the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the
private Respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its
employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages
are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive the general
public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In
most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,
since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the
presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

PLAINTIFF’S OWN NEGLIGENCE AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
Article 2179, NCC

Cases:
31. PLDT vs. SPOUSES ESTEBAN
32. KIM vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI, CO., 58 Phil. 838 (1933)

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Cases:
33. M.H. RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY,
G.R. No. L-1719, January 23, 1907

31
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987

FORTUITOUS EVENT
Cases:
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C.
RAYO, et al., 222 SCRA 415, G.R. Nos. 103442-45, May 21, 1993
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. No. 126389, July 10, 1998

ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Requisites Kinds:
Express Waiver of the Right to Recover
Implied Conditions
Cases:

TRANSPORTO vs. MIJARES (1961)

PRESCRIPTION
Computation of Period Article 1146, NCC

CAUSATION
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Definition
Cases:
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 83, 1998)
Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 243 SCRA 619(1991)
Syjuco vs. Manila Railroad Company, CA- G.R. No. 22631-R, December 17, 1959
Prospero Sabido vs. Carlos Custodio, 124 Phil. 516, 1966
Fransisco Vinluan vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-21477- 81, April 29, 1966

Tests of Proximate Cause Cause-In-Fact Tests Cases:

Consolacion Gabeto vs. Agaton Araneta, 42 Phil. 252 (1921)

32
Pilipinas Bank vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 435, 1994

Cause and Condition

Cases:
Phoenix Construction vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Rodrigueza, ET AL. VS. The Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 15688, November 19, 1921

Efficient and Intervening Cause

Definition and Concept Cases:
McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (211 SCRA 517)
Vda. De Bataclan, et al. vs. Mariano Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957)
Mercedes M. Teague vs. Elena Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181 (1973)
The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No.
L-4195, February 18, 1908
Filomeno Urbano vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Definition
Plaintiff’s Negligence is the Cause Compound Cases
Part of the Same Causal Set
Defendant’s Negligence is the Only Cause

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Elements and Conditions of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine

Cases:
PLDT vs. CA
Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May 18, 1989
Phoenix Construction, Inc. Vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65295, March 10, 1987
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Maricar Bascos Baesa, et al., G.R. Nos. 79050-51,
November 14, 1989
LBC Air Cargo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 619 (1995)

33
When Doctrine is Not Applicable

HUMAN RELATIONS: INTENTIONAL TORTS

Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code

Cases:
Grand Union Supermarket vs. Jose J. Espino, Jr., G.R> No. L- 48250, December 28, 1979
Enrique J.L. Ruiz, et.al. vs. The Secretary of National Defense, G.R. No. L-15526, December
28, 1963
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 (1989)

Abuse of Rights Elements Cases:

University of the East vs. Romeo A. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
Arturo P. Valenzuela, et.al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et.al., G.R. No. 83122,
October 19, 1990

Acts Contra Bonus Elements

Breach of Promise To Marry General Rule Exception
Cases:
De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866
Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 (1964)
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals, et.al., February 19, 1993
Apolonio Tanjanco vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Araceli Santos,
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966

Seduction and Sexual Assault Cases:

Cecilio Pe, et al. vs. Alfonso Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

Desertion by a Spouse Cases:

Pastor B. Tenchaves vs. Vicenta F. Escano, et al., G.R. No. L-19671, July 26, 1966

34
Trespass and Deprivation of Property Articles 451, 448 and 456
Cases:
Cogeo Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100727,
March 18, 1992

Disconnection of Electricity or Gas Service Cases:

Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30, 1980
Manial Electric Company, et al. vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L- 39019, January 22, 1988

Abortion and Wrongful Death Cases:

Antonio Geluz vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

Malicious Prosecution Definition

Elements Cases:
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August
25, 1989
Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211 (1997)
Manila Gas Corp vs CA (1980)

Public Humiliation Cases:

Rafael vs. The Honorable Oscar Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Jose J. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L- 48250, December 28, 1979

HUMAN DIGNITY
Article 26

Privacy
Constitutional Right to Privacy
a. Scope of Protection: Bill of Rights Sec. 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 & 17

35
Interference with Family and Other Relations Cases:
Tenchavez vs. Escano, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Vexation and Humiliation

TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

Articles 32, 33 & 34

Article 32: Violation of Civil and Political Rights Rationale

How Committed Persons Liable
Superior Officers Subordinate Officers
Cases:
Rogelio Aberca, et. Al. vs. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. L-69866

Article 33: Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries Defamation, Definition

Requisites
Persons Liable (Article 360, RPC) Proof of Truth (Article 361, RPC) Defenses:
Absolutely Privileged Matters
Qualified Privilege
Cases:
Arturo Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999
Esteban C. Manuel vs. The Hon. Ernani Cruz-Pano, G.R. No. L-46079, April 17, 1989

Fraud Cases:
Elenita Ledesma Silva, et al. vs. Esther Peralta, G.R. No. L- 13114, November 25, 1960

Physical Injuries Article 34: Neglect of Duty

36
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
Persons Liable
What is included in Civil Liability Circumstances Affecting Civil Liability
Justifying and Exempting Circumstances Case:
Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil 672 (1952)
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances Extinction and Survival of Liability
Effect of Death Effect of Pardon
Case:
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994)
Prejudicial Question

THE DEFENDANTS
Article 2176, NCC Joint Tort-feasors
Article 2194,NCC Motor Vehicle Mishaps
Article 2184, NCC
Vicarious Liability (Imputed Negligence) Statutory Provision:
Article 2180, 2181 and 2182, NCC
Articles 101, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD No. 603)

Parents & Other Persons Exercising Parental Authority: Liability for Acts of Minors
Basis of Liability Persons Liable Nature of Liability
Liability for Acts of Children of Majority Age Civil Liability Ex Delicto, Article 101 of the RPC
Defense of Exercise of Due Diligence Cases:

37
Cuadra, et al. vs. Alfonso Monfort, 35 Phil. 160 (1970)
Macario Tamargo, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 209 SCRA 518 (1992)
Cresencio Libi, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 214 SCRA 16 (1962)

Liability of Guardians of Incapacitated Adults Rule 92, Revise Rules of Court

Articles 38 and 39, NCC

Schools, Teachers and Administrators Article 218, Family Code Article 2180, NCC
Article 103, RPC Persons Liable
Supervision, Instruction or Custody

Cases:
Jose S. Amadora, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Phil. School of business Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 729 (1992)

Employers
Article 2180, NCC
Article 103, RPC Innkeepers and Hotelkeepers
Article 102, RPC

STRICT LIABILITY
Article 2183 and 2193 of the New Civil Code

ANIMALS
Case:
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
74431, November 6, 1989

FALLING OBJECTS
Article 2193

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS

38
Article 1711 and 1712 of the Civil Code

NUISANCE
Definition
Kinds
Strict Liability and Persons Liable
Abatement Cases:
Velasco vs. Manila Electric Company, 40 SCRA 342
(1971)

DAMAGES
Definition
Damnum Absque Injuria Case:
Spouses Cristino and Brigida ustodio, et al. vs Court of Appeals, et al., 253 SCRA 483
Kinds of Damages Article 2197
Actual or Compensatory, Articles 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2205,
2206
Case:
Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 823
Moral Damages
Nominal and Temperate Damages Articles 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224 and 2225
Cases:
Rogelio Ramos vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
Araneta vs. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 114 (1971)
Liquidated Damages
Articles 2226, 2227 and 2228
Exemplary or Corrective Damages
Articles 2230, 2231, 2232, 22333, 2234 and 2235

39