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The document discusses the evolution of dynamic positioning (DP) vessel innovation, particularly in power distribution networks over the last five years. It emphasizes the need for DP Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) providers and vessel owners to adapt to these innovations, which require enhanced collaboration and knowledge sharing among stakeholders. The accuracy of DP FMEA is critical for innovative designs, as omitting or misunderstanding components can lead to significant operational failures.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
3 views

reliability_sierdsma_pp

The document discusses the evolution of dynamic positioning (DP) vessel innovation, particularly in power distribution networks over the last five years. It emphasizes the need for DP Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) providers and vessel owners to adapt to these innovations, which require enhanced collaboration and knowledge sharing among stakeholders. The accuracy of DP FMEA is critical for innovative designs, as omitting or misunderstanding components can lead to significant operational failures.

Uploaded by

xamauvt
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Return to Session Menu

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONFERENCE


October 14-15, 2014

RELIABILITY

Innovation in DP Design and the Need for FMEA and


Trial Practitioners to Embrace Innovation

Peter Sierdsma
Global Maritime
The need for DP FMEA, DP trials
providers and vessel owners to
embrace innovation

© Global Maritime 2013 1


2014 – Where are we with DP vessel innovation?

 Particularly in the last 5 years we have seen an increase in “innovative” power distribution
networks on particularly high-end DP support vessels.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6

L1
L1:C1
ME Port SG1 Control Panel
Busbar P16
SG1 DP Task Appropriate SG2
4000kW 8Q1 No. 1 I1 1000VDC
L1:L2 W3 L1:L1
Mode (TAM) PTI G1 L1 F21
AC-motor BT1 5Q1 B+
W4 F36
L2 F22
1600kW 1600kW B-
F37 G1 G2 G3 G4
MP T6 9Q1 L3 F23
2400A
440V Propulsion MSB G2 1600A
1000A
I6 Main Switchboard
DG1 W1
L6
W1
NO L2
F46
B+ T3
Bus AA Bus BB L2:C1 F47 M Q5
Busbar No. 1 Busbar No. 2
ST1 10Q1 B-
3
2400A Q7 Q1 Q2 Q6 Q4
660kW 660kW DG3
Busbar
No. 2
11Q1 I2
L2:L2 L2:L1
G3 L1 F24 W1
W4 F38
15Q1 F25 B+ AFE AFE AFE AFE
Bow L2
B-
F39
Azimuth T5 L3 F26 690V 690V AFE
12Q1 2400A
800kW G4 1600A
690V
TQ
W1 W2
BT1 BT2 DG2 690V 440V
440V
ST2 C2.1-6 C2.7-12

T1 T4 T5 T2
Generator / Main Switchboard Cable / Transformer Redundant Drive Retractable Azimuth Thruster (T3)
DG4 690V MCC1 690V MCC2
T3
AG1 AG2 AG3 690 V Feeder SWBD 690 V Feeder SWBD
PORT STBD
MP T7 BT2 Busbar No. 3 Busbar No. 4
910kW 910kW 910kW 4000kW Busbar No. 5 Busbar No. 6
NC NC PTI Q3
440V MSB AC-motor
690V 690V
690V
230 V Main Switchboard
ME Starboard SG2 M M M M
3~ 3~ 3~ 3~
Bus A NO Bus AB NO Bus B 230V
230V 230V
Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster
Control Control
EG
3~ 690V 230V
10K1 10K2 Panel Emergency Switchboard Panel
EG

G1 G2 690V Distribution G3 G4

690V
Portside NC NC NC NC Starboard 220V

220V SWB D 220V SWB C in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS

440V ESB
Bus A1 Bus B2

NC NC
440V / 220V in DP OPS
T1
in DP OPS
DG1 DG2
T2

T3
LLC1 LLC2
SG1

SG2

NC NC Battery Bank Battery Bank


220V ESB in DP OPS in DP OPS 65kwtt/480V 65kwtt/480V

T4 T5

= = ~ = ~ = = =
Bus A2 Bus B1
Starboard
ME Port

FUSE

FUSE
FUSE

FUSE
ME

NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 800VDC SWITCHBOARD
NC
in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS
in DP OPS
(N/O) (N/O)

~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ =
Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ = ~ =

Control Control

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE
FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE

FUSE
MAIN PROPULSION PS COOLING P/P 1

MAIN PROPULSION SB COOLING P/P 1

MAIN PROPULSION SB COOLING P/P 2


MAIN PROPULSION PS COOLING P/P 2

DC SWBD SW COOLING P/P


M M M M T3 M M M
T4 T5 M M T4 M M M

COOLING CABINET P/P 1

COOLING CABINET P/P 2


COOLING CABINET P/P 1 (PS)
T3

COOLING CABINET P/P 2 (PS)

MAIN PROPULSION SB 830KW


MAIN PROPULSION PS 830KW
COOLING P/P 1
COOLING P/P 2

COOLING P/P2
DC SWBD SW
DC SWBD SW

DC SWBD SW
DG3 DG4

T2 T1

1
(SB)

(SB)
400KW 415V/3PH/

Main Azimuth Main Azimuth 50HZ

Propulsion Propulsion (N/C) (N/C)

EDG
PDB 11 PDB 5 PDB 1 PDB 3 PDB 2 PDB 4 PDB 6 PDB 12

VFD

VFD
EMERGENCY
GENERATOR 125KW
415V/3PH/50HZ
415VAC SWITCHBOARD

© Global Maritime 2013 2


T1 T2

415VAC EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD (PS)


The next 15 minutes;

Are FMEA providers and vessel owners keeping up with the innovation
in the DP FMEA and DP annual trials?

© Global Maritime 2013 3


2014 – Where are we with DP vessel innovation?

First of all, what do we mean with “innovative”?

When compared to the last 2 decades, since 2010 we experience a shift in power distribution
networks. For example;
Innovative Conventional

1. Localized controllers protecting individual 1. Vessel Management Systems monitoring and


components such as a switchboard section, a controlling complete systems.
thruster drive etc.
2. Thrusters with an option to be supplied by
2. Thrusters continuously supplied from two split either side of a split switchboard.
switchboard sections.
3. Switchboard protection based on selective
3. Switchboard protection based on PLC based coordination of circuit breakers
black out prevention systems
4. Split bus tie operation
4. Closed bus tie operation with the use of
isolation transformers
© Global Maritime 2013 4
Embracing Innovation

DP FMEA’s have increased in quality over the last decade due to increased awareness and
the publication of supporting guidelines produced by IMCA, MTS and classification societies
like DNV and ABS.

Reviewing DP FMEA’s, DP trials and reviewing the operational aspects of “innovative” DP


vessels suggest that innovation is challenging some of the DP FMEA providers.

We suggest that producing DP FMEA’s for innovative power distribution networks requires an
increased level of interaction and knowledge sharing between stakeholders when compared
to conventional designs.

Only then stake holders can expect accurate DP FMEA’s, supporting the design process AND
supporting the vessel operation.

The accuracy of DP FMEA is particular crucial when it pertains innovative power distribution
networks.
© Global Maritime 2013 5
Embracing Innovation Continued

Innovative power distribution networks contain multiple components working independent


of each other or interacting to each other.

Omitting a single component or misunderstanding the functionality of components will


typically lead to failure results a described in the DP FMEA not aligned with the reality.

Innovative vessel design typically comes with multiple options of configurations that should
be specified in the DP FMEA.

DP trails (FMEA proving and DP annual) should be adjusted to “cope” with the innovative
components.

© Global Maritime 2013 6


From Conventional to Innovative power distribution networks

© Global Maritime 2013 7


From Conventional to Innovative Power Distribution

ME Starboard

ME Starboard
SG1 SG2
Propulsion Switchboard

NC NO NC
415V Bus Bar C 415V Bus Bar D

NC NC

G1 G2
BT1 BT2
ST1

NC NC
Main Switchboard
415V Bus Bar A 415V Bus Bar B

NO

EG

415V Emerg. Switchboard


T1 T2
T3 T4
230V Emerg. Switchboard

230V Switchboard
© Global Maritime 2013 8
NO
From Conventional to Innovative Power Distribution

ME Starboard

ME Starboard
SG1 SG2
Propulsion Switchboard

NC NO NC
415V Bus Bar C 415V Bus Bar D

NC NC

G1 G2
BT1 BT2
ST1

NC NC
Main Switchboard
415V Bus Bar A 415V Bus Bar B

NO

EG

415V Emerg. Switchboard


T1 T2
T3 T4
230V Emerg. Switchboard

230V Switchboard
© Global Maritime 2013 9
NO
From Conventional to Innovative Power Distribution

ME Starboard

ME Starboard
SG1 SG2
Propulsion Switchboard

NC NO NC
415V Bus Bar C 415V Bus Bar D

NC NC

G1 G2
BT1 BT2
ST1

NC NC
Main Switchboard
415V Bus Bar A 415V Bus Bar B

EG

415V Emerg. Switchboard


T1 T2
T3 T4
230V Emerg. Switchboard

230V Switchboard
© Global Maritime 2013 10
NO
DC SWBD SW

M
COOL ING P/P 2 FUSE

~ =
FUSE

= =
Bank
Battery
DC SWBD SW

M
COOL ING P/P 1 FUSE

65kwtt/480V

~ =

PDB 11
50HZ
M
MAIN PROPULSION PS COOLING P/P 2 FUSE

EMERGENCY
~ =

415V/3PH/50HZ
GENERATOR 125KW
400KW 415V/3PH/

EDG
M

DG3
FUSE

~ =
MAIN PROPULSION PS COOLING P/P 1

PDB 5
M
FUSE

~ =

415VAC EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD (PS)


COOL ING CABINET P/P 2 (PS)
FUSE
DG1

~ =

M
FUSE

~ =
COOL ING CABINET P/P 1 (PS)

PDB 1

© Global Maritime 2013


FUSE

T3
~ =
VFD

T1
MAIN PROPULSION PS

FUSE

~ =

PDB 3
(N/O)

(N/C)
(N/C)
800VDC SWITCHBOARD

Two way island drives


(N/O)

415VAC SWITCHBOARD
FUSE
~ =

VFD

T2
MAIN PROPULSION SB FUSE

T4
~ =

PDB 2
COOL ING CABINET P/P 1
(SB)
M
FUSE
~ =

PDB 4
DG2

FUSE
~ =

DG4
M

FUSE
~ =

PDB 6
COOL ING CABINET P/P 2
(SB)
M

FUSE
~ =

PDB 12
MAIN PROPULSION SB COOL ING P/P 1
M

FUSE
~ =

MAIN PROPULSION SB COOL ING P/P 2


M

FUSE
~ =

DC SWBD SW COOLING P/P


1
M

DC SWBD SW FUSE
~ =

COOL ING P/P2


FUSE
= =
Bank
Battery

65kwtt/480V
From Conventional to Innovative Power Distribution

11
Challenges affecting “real world” operation

DP FMEA’s not covering all (innovative) components of a power distribution can result in;

Unable to raise the confidence amongst stakeholders that vessel is able to safely operate
in certain modes.

Vessel is operating with an assumed post failure capability not in alignment with real
post failure capability.

At times post failure capability is lower then as described in the DP FMEA.

At times post failure capability is better than as described in the DP FMEA.

© Global Maritime 2013 12


Examples from the field, “missed innovation” (1A)

G1 G2 G3 G4

Main Switchboard
Component was missed
Busbar No. 1 Q5 Busbar No. 2
in DP FMEA.
Q7 Q1 Q2 Q6 Q4

AFE AFE AFE AFE


PLC based protection
module located inside
690V 690V AFE
690V
TQ

switchboard.
440V 690V 440V

T1 T4 T5 T2

690V MCC1 690V MCC2

DP trials not as
T3
690 V Feeder SWBD 690 V Feeder SWBD
PORT STBD

expected.
Busbar No. 3 Busbar No. 4
Busbar No. 5 Busbar No. 6
Q3
690V 690V
690V
230 V Main Switchboard
M M M M

Barriers to isolate faults


3~ 3~ 3~ 3~

230V 230V 230V

EG
3~ 690V 230V
in dual supplied thruster
drive requires detailed
10K1 10K2 Panel Emergency Switchboard Panel

690V
analyses in order to
gain confidence 13
220V

© Global Maritime 2013


Examples from the field, “missed” innovation (1B)

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Thruster drive supplied from two
L1 redundancy groups.
L1:C1
Control Panel
Busbar P16

Detailed analysis required to define


8Q1 No. 1 I1 1000VDC
F21 L1:L2 W3 L1:L1
G1 L1 W4 F36
5Q1 F22 B+
L2

barriers in place preventing fault


F37
B-
L3 F23
9Q1 2400A
G2

transfer.
1600A
1000A
I6
L6
F46 W1 W1
L2 B+ T3
L2:C1 F47 M
B-
10Q1
2400A 3
Busbar
11Q1 No. 2 I2
L2:L2 L2:L1
G3 L1 F24 W1
W4 F38
15Q1 F25 B+
L2 F39
B-
L3 F26
12Q1 2400A
G4 1600A
W1 W2

C2.1-6 C2.7-12

Generator / Main Switchboard Cable / Transformer Redundant Drive Retractable Azimuth Thruster (T3)

© Global Maritime 2013 14


Examples from the field, “missed” innovation (2A)

G1 G2 690V Distribution G4

Wartsila LLC power


G3

Portside NC NC NC NC Starboard

distribution network.
in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS

Bus A1 Bus B2

4 bus sections split by


NC T1
NC
in DP OPS in DP OPS
T2

bus ties, isolation


T3
LLC1 LLC2

NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS transformers and
breakers.
T4 T5

Bus A2 Bus B1

NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC
in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS
in DP OPS

T4 T5
T3

T2 T1
© Global Maritime 2013 15
Examples from the field, “missed” innovation (2B)

G1 G2 690V Distribution G3 G4

Portside NC NC NC NC Starboard DP FMEA missed 4 bus


sections and system
in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS

Bus A1 Bus A2

was analyzed as 2 bus


T1

T2
section network
VFD Feeders rated for 50%
T3 maximum Drive Amps

Subsequent post failure


results in DP FMEA were
T4 T5

lower then reality


NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC showed in DP trials.
in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS in DP OPS
in DP OPS

T4 T5
T3

© Global Maritime 2013 16


T2 T1
Examples from the field, “missed” innovation (3)

G1 G2 690V Distribution G3 G4

Portside NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS NO
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
Starboard DP FMEA missed 50%
Bus A1
in DP OPS
Bus B2 thruster 2 (T2) power
NC NC
reduction while
operating in open bus
T1
in DP OPS in DP OPS
T2
VFD Feeders rated for 50%

tie while thruster drive


T3
LLC1 maximum Drive Amps LLC2

NC
in DP OPS NO
NC
in DP OPS breakers remain closed
on both sides.
T4 T5 in DP OPS

Bus A2 Bus B1

NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
NC
in DP OPS
Vessel operating for 2
years without this
in DP OPS

knowledge.

T4 T5
T3

© Global Maritime 2013 17


T1 T2
Examples from the field, “missed” innovation (4)

DG1
Power Management
DG2 DG3 DG4

690V MSB 1 690V MSB 2 component functionality


missed, resulting in
clash between DP bus
limitation and power
management system
VFD for VFD for VFD for VFD for
load reduction.
(T1) (T4) VFD for (T4)
(T5)
(T3)

Final result; loss of one


side of switchboard.

690V Section 1 690V Section 3 Three years after start


690V ESB operations
450V Section 1 450V Section 3

© Global Maritime 2013


230V Section 1 230V Section 3 230V ESB 18
 DP vessel with Innovative power distribution networks typically allow for
multiple configurations.

All with different failure results

Some results within WCFDI

Some results outside WCFDI

© Global Maritime 2013 19


Examples from the field, “missed” configuration (5)

DP Critical Activity
SG1 SG2 SG1 DP Task Appropriate SG2
Mode (CAMO)
Mode (TAM)
1600kW 1600kW 1600kW 1600kW

Vessel decides to
440V Propulsion MSB 440V Propulsion MSB

NO NO
Bus AA Bus BB Bus AA Bus BB

change configuration
660kW 660kW 660kW 660kW

800kW 800kW
BT1 BT2 BT1 BT2
away from DP FMEA.
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG1 AG2 AG3

NO 910kW 910kW 910kW NO 910kW 910kW 910kW

Annual trials do not


NC NC
440V MSB 440V MSB
NC NO
Bus A Bus AB Bus B Bus A NO Bus AB NO Bus B

confirm in which
Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster
Control Control Control Control

EG EG

440V ESB
220V SWB D NO 220V SWB C
440V ESB
220V SWB D 220V SWB C
configuration vessel is
440V / 220V 440V / 220V
operating in. Vessel is
220V ESB 220V ESB
annually trialed as per
FMEA.
SG2
SG1

Starboard
ME Port

ME

New failure results were


ME Port SG1

Main Azimuth Propulsion


Portside
Azimuth Thruster Azimuth Thruster
Control Control DG1 / AE1

DG2 / AE2

DG3 / AE3
T5
BT1 BT2
not understood until 2
years after change
Main Azimuth Starboard

Main Azimuth Main Azimuth ME Starboard SG2


Propulsion Propulsion

© Global Maritime 2013 20


Examples from the field, “missed” configuration (6)

ME Port SG1

Design philosophy list 6


4000kW
PTI
AC-motor BT1
MP T6

configuration of which 2
DG1

ST1
DG3

specific for DP.


Operating
Bow
Azimuth T5
Off ME Port SG1
DG2
ST2 4000kW
PTI
AC-motor BT1
DG4
MP T6
MP T7 BT2
4000kW DG1
PTI

Vessel DP FMEA does


AC-motor

ME Starboard SG2 ST1


DG3

Bow
Azimuth T5 ` not list specific
configuration.
DG2
ME Port SG1
ST2
4000kW
PTI
AC-motor BT1
MP T6
DG4

DG1

Crew select
MP T7 BT2
ST1
4000kW
DG3 PTI
AC-motor

configuration that set’s


Bow
Azimuth T5 ME Starboard SG2

DG2

up for drift off.


ST2

DG4

MP T7 BT2
4000kW
PTI
AC-motor

ME Starboard SG2

© Global Maritime 2013 21


In conclusion

DP FMEA’s and DP annual trial programs covering innovative vessel regularly fail to
describe and cover the functionality of ALL components in a power distribution network.

 This typically can be contributed due to


I. Manufacturers not coming forward with the detailed information of specific
components
II. Breakdown in communication lines between DP FMEA provider, shipyard, designers
and manufacturer
III. FMEA provider not specifying the request for information
IV. Using test programs originally set up for conventional vessels

© Global Maritime 2013 22


This typically results in

Key functionalities of protection system missed

Failure results incorrectly assessed

Proving trials and / or Annual DP trials not aligned with vessel design

Post failure thruster and / or power generation capability as described in DP FMEA not
aligned with reality. At times more capability and at times less capability as described.

© Global Maritime 2013 23


Is Innovation good in DP vessel power distribution
switchboards?

Innovation should be embraced as it can result in an increase in reliability and an increase in;
1. post failure power generation
2. post failure propulsion capability
and often can result in both when compared with conventional DP vessels.

However innovation will only be embraced if confidence can be instilled in owners and end-
users (charterers).

Confidence will only be instilled when correct DP FMEA’s, proving trials and annual trials are
being defined and subsequently when vessel owners operate their vessels as per the design
intent.

Innovation will not be stopped by regulation, industry guidelines or a conservative culture.


History has proven that over and over. Stifling innovation by outdated regulations, culture or
industry guidelines is not healthy.
© Global Maritime 2013 24
Questions?

© Global Maritime 2013 25

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