FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-48237. June 30, 1987.]

MADRIGAL & COMPANY, INC. , petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO

B. ZAMORA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and MADRIGAL CENTRAL
OFFICE EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-49023. June 30, 1987.]

MADRIGAL & COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER

OF LABOR and MADRIGAL CENTRAL OFFICE EMPLOYEES
UNION, respondents.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J : p

These are two petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
petitioner, the Madrigal & Co., Inc. The facts are undisputed.
The petitioner was engaged, among several other corporate objectives,
in the management of Rizal Cement Co., Inc. 1 Admittedly, the petitioner and
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. are sister companies. 2 Both are owned by the same
or practically the same stockholders. 3
On December 28, 1973, the respondent, the Madrigal Central Office
Employees Union, sought for the renewal of its collective bargaining
agreement with the petitioner, which was due to expire on February 28,
1974. 4 Specifically, it proposed a wage increase of P200.00 a month, an
allowance of P100.00 a month, and other economic benefits. 5 The
petitioner, however, requested for a deferment in the negotiations.
On July 29, 1974, by am alleged resolution of its stockholders, the
petitioner reduced its capital stock from 765,000 shares to 267,366 shares. 6
This was effected through the distribution of the marketable securities
owned by the petitioner to its stockholders in exchange for their shares in an
equivalent amount in the corporation. 7
On August 22, 1975, by yet another alleged stockholders' action, the
petitioner reduced its authorized capitalization from 267,366 shares to
110,085 shares, again, through the same scheme. 8
After the petitioner's failure to sit down with the respondent union, the
latter, or August 28, 1974, commenced Case No. LR-5415 with the National
Labor Relations Commission on a complaint for unfair labor practice. 9 In due
time, the petitioner filed its position paper, 10 alleging operational losses.
Pending the resolution of Case No. LR-5415, the petitioner, in a letter dated
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 November 17, 1975, 11 informed the Secretary of Labor that Rizal Cement
Co., Inc., "from which it derives income" 12 "as the General Manager or
Agent" 13 had "ceased operating temporarily." 14 In addition, "because of the
desire of the stockholders to phase out the operations of the Madrigal & Co.,
Inc. due to lack of business incentives and prospects, and in order to prevent
further losses," 15 it had to reduce its capital stock on two occasions "As the
situation, therefore, now stands, the Madrigal & Co., Inc. is without
substantial income to speak of, necessitating a reorganization, by way of
retrenchment, of its employees and operations." 16 The petitioner then
requested that it "be allowed to effect said reorganization gradually
considering all the circumstances, by phasing out in at least three (3) stages,
or in a manner the Company deems just, equitable and convenient to all
concerned, about which your good office will be apprised accordingly." 17
The letter, however, was not verified and neither was it accompanied by the
proper supporting papers. For this reason, the Department of Labor took no
action on the petitioner's request.
On January 19, 1976, the labor arbiter rendered a decision 18 granting,
among other things, a general wage increase of P200.00 a month beginning
March 1, 1974 plus a monthly living allowance of P100.00 monthly in favor of
the petitioner's employees. The arbiter specifically found that the petitioner
"had been making substantial profits in its operation" 19 since 1972 through
1975. The petitioner appealed.
On January 29, 1976, the petitioner applied for clearance to terminate
the services of a number of employees pursuant supposedly to its
retrenchment program. On February 3, 1976, the petitioner applied for
clearance to terminate 18 employees more. 20 On the same date, the
respondent union went to the Regional Office (No. IV) of the Department of
Labor (NLRC Case No. R04-2-1432-76) to complain of illegal lockout against
the petitioner. 21 Acting on this complaint, the Secretary of Labor, in a
decision dated December 14, 1976, 22 found the dismissals "to be contrary
to law" 23 and ordered the petitioner to reinstate some 40 employees, 37 of
them with backwages. 24 The petitioner then moved for reconsideration,
which the Acting Labor Secretary, Amado Inciong, denied. 25
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Office of the President.
The respondent, the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, affirmed with
modification the Labor Department's decision, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

1. Eliseo Dizon, Eugenio Evangelista and Benjamin Victorio

are excluded from the order of reinstatement.
2. Rogelio Meneses and Roberto Taladro who appear to have
voluntarily retired and paid their retirement pay, their cases are left to
the judgment of the Secretary of Labor who is in a better position to
assess appellant's allegation as to their retirement.

3. The rest are hereby reinstated with six (6) months

backwages, except Aleli Contreras, Teresita Eusebio and Norma
Parlade who are to be reinstated without backwages.
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 SO ORDERED. 26
xxx xxx xxx

On May 15, 1978, the petitioner came to this court. (G.R. No. 48237.)
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1977, the National Labor Relations Commission
rendered a decision affirming the labor arbiter's judgment in Case No. LR-
5415. 27 The petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On June 9, 1978,
the Secretary of Labor dismissed the appeal. 28 Following these successive
reversals, the petitioner came anew to this court. (G.R. No. 49023.)
By our resolution dated October 9, 1978, we consolidated G. R. No.
48237 with G.R. No. 49023. 29 We likewise issued temporary restraining
orders. 30
In G.R. No. 48237, the petitioner argues, that
xxx xxx xxx

I. SAID RESPONDENTS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS

NO VALID COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT.

II. SAID RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE

IS NO LOCKOUT HERE IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION, MUCH LESS FOR
UNION-BUSTING PURPOSES.
III. RESPONDENT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ERRED IN
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE REST OF AFFECTED MEMBERS
OF RESPONDENT UNION WITH SIX (6) MONTHS BACKWAGES, EXCEPT
ALELI CONTRERAS, TERESITA EUSEBIO AND NORMA PARLADE WHO
ARE TO BE REINSTATED WITHOUT BACKWAGES.

IV. RESPONDENT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ERRED IN

LEAVING TO THE JUDGMENT OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY THE CASES
OF ROGELIO MENESES AND ROBERTO TALADRO WHO HAD
VOLUNTARILY RETIRED AND PAID THEIR RETIREMENT PAY. 31

xxx xxx xxx

while in G.R. No. 49023, it submits that:

xxx xxx xxx
1. RESPONDENT MINISTER ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION EN BANC OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
DESPITE CLEAR INDICATIONS IN THE RECORD THAT THE AWARD WAS
PREMATURE IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEADLOCK IN NEGOTIATION AND
THE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE LABOR ARBITER TO RESOLVE THE
MAIN IF NOT ONLY ISSUE OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN, THEREBY
DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DEADLOCK IN
NEGOTIATION, RESPONDENT MINISTER ERRED NEVERTHELESS IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS GRANTED IN THE FORM OF
SALARY INCREASES ARE UNFAIR AND VIOLATIVE OF THE MANDATORY
GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 525 AND
IGNORING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT PETITIONER HAD VIRTUALLY
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 CEASED OPERATIONS AFTER HAVING TWICE DECREASED ITS CAPITAL
STOCKS AND, THEREFORE, NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO ABSORB
SUCH AWARD OF BENEFITS. 32
xxx xxx xxx

There is no merit in these two (2) petitions.

As a general rule, the findings of a administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but even finality. 33 This is especially true with
respect to the Department of Labor, which performs not only a statutory
function but carries out a Constitutional mandate as well. 34 our jurisdiction,
as a rule, is confined to cases of grave abuse of discretion. 35 But for
certiorari to lie, there must be such arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, or that discretion was exercised despotically. 36
In no way can the questioned decisions be seen as arbitrary. The
decisions themselves show why.
Anent Case No. R04-2-1432-76 (G.R. No. 48237), we are satisfied with
the correctness of the respondent Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs'
findings. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In urging reversal of the appealed decision, appellant contends
that (1) its letter dated November 17, 1975, constitute "substantial
compliance with the clearance requirement to terminate;" and (2)
individual appellees' dismissal had no relation to any union activities,
but was the result of an honest-to-goodness retrenchment policy
occasioned by loss of income due to cessation of operation.

We find the first contention to be without merit. Aside from the

fact that the controversial letter was unverified, with not even a single
document submitted in support thereof, the same failed to specify the
individual employees to be affected by the intended retrenchment. Not
only this, but the letter is so vague and indefinite regarding the manner
of effecting appellant's retrenchment plan as to provide the Secretary
of (sic ) a reasonable basis on which to determine whether the request
for retrenchment was valid or otherwise, and whether the mechanics in
giving effect thereto was just or unjust to the employees concerned. In
fact, to be clearly implied from the letter is that the implementary
measures needed to give effect to the intended retrenchment are yet
to be thought of or concretized in the indefinite future, measures about
which the office of the Secretary "will be apprised accordingly." All
these, and more, as correctly found by the Acting Secretary, cannot
but show that the letter is insufficient in form and substance to
constitute a valid compliance with the clearance requirement. That
being so, it matters little whether or not complainant union or any of its
members failed to interpose any opposition thereto.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose in requiring a

prior clearance by the Secretary of Labor, in cases of shutdown or
dismissal of employees, is to afford said official ample opportunity to
examine and determine the reasonableness of the request. This is
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 made imperative in order to give meaning and substance to the
constitutional mandate that the State must "afford protection to labor,"
and guarantee their "security of tenure." Indeed, the rules require that
the application for clearance be filed ten (10) days before the intended
shutdown or dismissal, serving a copy thereof to the employees
affected in order that the latter may register their own individual
objections against the grant of the clearance. But how could this
requirement of notice to the employees have been complied with,
when, as observed by the Acting Secretary in his modificatory decision
dated June 30, 1977 "the latter of November 17, 1975 does not even
state definitely the employees involved' upon whom service could be
made."

With respect to appellant's second contention, we agree with the

Acting Secretary's findings that individual appellee's dismissal was an
offshoot of the union's demand for a renegotiation of the then validly
existing collective bargaining Agreement.

xxx xxx xxx

The pattern of appellant's acts after the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in Case No. LR-5415 has convinced us that its sole objective
was to render moot and academic the desire of the union to exercise its
right to bargain collectively with management, especially so when it is
considered in the light of the fact that under the said decision the
demand by the union for wage increase and allowances was granted.
What renders appellant's motive suspect was its haste in terminating
the services of individual appellees, without waiting the outcome of its
appeal in Case No. LR-5415. The amount involved by its offer to pay
double separation could very well have been used to pay the salaries
of those employees whose services were sought to be terminated, until
the resolution of its appeal with the NLRC, since anyway, if its planned
retrenchment is found to be justifiable and done in good faith, its only
liability is to answer for the separation pay provided by law. By and
large, therefore, we agree with the Acting Secretary that, under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, "respondent's action [was] a
systematic and deliberate attempt to get rid of complainants because
of their union activities."
We now come to the individual cases of Aleli Contreras, Teresita
Eusebio and Norma Parlade. It is appellant's claim that these three (3)
should not be reinstated inasmuch as they have abandoned their world
by their continued absences, and moreover in the case of Contreras,
she failed to oppose the application for clearance filed against her on
October 24, 1975. However, appellant's payrolls for December 16-31,
1975, January 1-15, 1976 and January 16-31, 1976, show that the three
(3) were "on leave without pay." As correctly appreciated by the Acting
Secretary, these "payrolls prove, first, that `leave' has been granted to
these employees, and, second, that it is a practice in the company to
grant `leaves without pay' without loss of employment status, to those
who have exhausted their authorized leave." As regards, Norma
Parlade, the records show that she "truly incurred illness and actually
underwent surgery on Oct., 1975." As to Aleli Contreras, there is no
showing that the Secretary of Labor or appellant ever acted on the
clearance. If we were to follow the logic of appellant, Contreras should
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 not have been included in the application for clearance filed or Feb. 3,
1976. The fact that she was included shows that up to that time, she
was still considered as a regular employee. It was for these reasons,
coupled with the length of service that these employees have rendered
appellant, that the Acting Secretary ordered their reinstatement but
without backwages. 37

xxx xxx xxx

With respect to Case No. LR-5415 (G.R. No. 49023), we are likewise
content with the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant now points that the only issue certified to compulsory
arbitration is "refusal to bargain" and it is, therefore, premature to
dictate the terms of the CBA on the assumption that there was already
a deadlock in negotiation. Appellant further contends that, assuming
there was deadlock in negotiation, the economic benefits granted are
unreasonable and violative of the guideline prescribed by P.D. 525.
On the other hand, it is the union's stance that its economic
demands are justified by the persistent increase in the cost of living
and the substantial earnings of the company from 1971 to 1975.
It bears to stress that although the union's petition was
precipitated by the company's refusal to bargain, there are glaring
circumstances pointing out that the parties also submitted "deadlock"
to arbitration. The petition itself is couched in general terms, praying
for arbitration of the union's "dispute" with the respondent concerning
proposed changes in the collective bargaining agreement." It is
supported with a copy of the proposed changes which just goes to
show that the union, aside from the issue concerning respondent's
refusal to bargain, sought determination of the merit of its proposals.
On the part of the appellant company, it pleaded financial incapacity to
absorb the proposed economic benefits during the initial stage of the
proceedings below. Even the evidence and arguments proferred below
by both parties are relevant to deadlock issue. In the face of these
factual environment, it is our view that the Labor Arbiter below did not
commit a reversible error in rendering judgment on the proposed CBA
changes. At any rate, the minimum requirements of due process was
satisfied because as heretofore stated, the appellant was given
opportunity, and had in fact, presented evidence and argument in
avoidance of the proposed CBA changes.
We do not also subscribe to appellant's argument that by
reducing its capital, it is made evident that it is phasing out its
operations. On the contrary, whatever may be the reason behind such
reductions, it is indicative of an intention to keep the company a going
concern. So much so that until now almost four (4) years later, it is still
very much in existence and operational as before.
We now come to the question concerning the equitableness of
the economic benefits granted below. It requires no evidence to show
that the employees concerned deserve some degree of upliftment due
to the unabated increase in the cost of living especially in Metro
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 Manila. Of course the company would like us to believe that it is losing
and is therefore not financially capable of improving the present CBA to
favor its employees. In support of such assertion, the company points
that the profits reflected in its yearly Statement of Income and
Expenses are dividends from security holdings. We, however, reject as
puerile its suggestion to dissociate the dividends it received from
security holdings on the pretext that they belong exclusively to its
stockholders. The dividends received by the company are corporate
earnings arising from corporate investment which no doubt are
attended to by the employees involved in this proceedings otherwise, it
would not have been reflected as part of profits in the company's
yearly financial statements. In determining the reasonableness of the
economic grants below, we have, therefore, scrutinized the company's
Statement of Income and Expenses from 1972 to 1975 and after
equating the welfare of the employees with the substantial earnings of
the company, we find the award to be predicated on valid justifications.
The salary increase we herein sanction is also in keeping with the
rational that made imperative the enactment of the Termination Pay
Law since in case the respondent company really closes down, the
employees will receive higher separation pay or retirement benefits to
tide them over while seeking another employment. 38

What clearly emerges from the recorded facts is that the petitioner,
awash with profits from its business operations but confronted with the
demand of the union for wage increases, decided to evade its responsibility
towards the employees by a devised capital reduction. While the reduction in
capital stock created an apparent need for retrenchment, it was, by all
indications, just a mask for the purge of union members, who, by then, had
agitated for wage increases. In the face of the petitioner company's piling
profits, the unionists had the right to demand for such salary adjustments.
That the petitioner made quite handsome profits is clear from the
records. The labor arbiter stated in his decision in the collective agreement
case (Case No. LR-5415):
xxx xxx xxx
A clear scrutiny of the financial reports of the respondent [herein
petitioner] reveals that it had been making substantial profits in the
operation.
In 1972, when it still had 765,000 common shares, of which
305,000 were unissued and 459,000 outstanding capitalized at
P16,830,000.00, the respondent made a net profit of P2,403,211.58. Its
total assets were P70,821,317.81.
In 1973, based on the same capitalization, its profit increased to
P2,724,465.33. Its total assets increased to P83,240,473.73.
In 1974, although its capitalization was reduced from
P16,830,000.00 to P11,230,459.36, its profits were further increased to
P2,922,349.70. Its assets were P78,842,175.75.
The reduction in its assets by P4,398,297.98 was due to the fact
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 that its capital stock was reduced by the amount of P5,599,540.54.
In 1975, for the period of only six months, the respondent
reported a net profit of P547,414.72, which when added to the surplus
of P5,591,214.19, makes a total surplus of P6,138,628.91 as of June 30,
1975. 39

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner would, however, have us believe that it in fact sustained
losses. Whatever profits it earned, so it claims were in the nature of
dividends "declared on its share holdings in other companies in the earning
of which the employees had no participation whatsoever." 40 "Cash
dividends," according to it," are the absolute property of the stockholders
and cannot be made available for disposition if only to meet the employees'
economic demands." 41
There is no merit in this contention. We agree with the National Labor
Relations Commission that "[t]he dividends received by the company are
corporate earnings arising from corporate investment." 42 Indeed, as found
by the Commission, the petitioner had entered such earnings in its financial
statements as profits, which it would not have done if they were not in fact
profits. 43
Moreover, it is incorrect to say that such profits — in the form of
dividends — are beyond the reach of the petitioner's creditors since the
petitioner had received them as compensation for its management services
in favor of the companies it managed as a shareholder thereof. As such
shareholder, the dividends paid to it were its own money, which may then be
available for wage increments. It is not a case of a corporation distributing
dividends in favor of its stockholders, in which case, such dividends would be
the absolute property of the stockholders and hence, out of reach by
creditors of the corporation. Here, the petitioner was acting as stockholder
itself, and in that case, the right to a share in such dividends, by way of
salary increases, may not be denied its employees.
Accordingly, this court is convinced that the petitioner's capital
reduction efforts were, to begin with, a subterfuge, a deception as it were, to
camouflage the fact that it had been making profits, and consequently, to
justify the mass layoff in its employee ranks, especially of union members.
They were nothing but a premature and plain distribution of corporate assets
to obviate a just sharing to labor of the vast profits obtained by its joint
efforts with capital through the years. Surely, we can neither countenance
nor condone this. It is an unfair labor practice.
As we observed in People's Bank and Trust Company v. People's Bank
and Trust Co. Employees Union: 44
xxx xxx xxx
As has been held by this Court in Insular Lumber Company vs.
CA, et al., L-23875, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 371, retrenchment can
only be availed of if the company is losing or meeting financial reverses
in its operation, which certainly is not the case at bar. Undisputed is
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 the fact, that the Bank "at no time incurred losses." As a matter of fact,
"the net earnings of the Bank would be in the average of
P2,000,000.00 a year from 1960 to 1969 and, during this period of nine
(9) years, the Bank continuously declared dividends to its
stockholders." Thus the mass lay-off or dismissal of the 65 employees
under the guise of retrenchment policy of the Bank is a lame excuse
and a veritable smoke-screen of its scheme to bust the Union and thus
unduly disturb the employment tenure of the employees concerned,
which act is certainly an unfair labor practice. 45

Yet, at the same time, the petitioner would claim that "the phasing out
of its operations which brought about the retrenchment of the affected
employees was mainly dictated be the necessity of its stockholders in their
capacity as heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal to partition the estate left
by him." 46 It must be noted, however, that the labor cases were tried on the
theory of losses the petitioner was supposed to have incurred to justify
retrenchment. The petitioner cannot change its theory in the Supreme Court.
Moreover, there is nothing in the records that will substantiate this claim. But
what is more important is the fact that it is not impossible to partition the
Madrigal estate — assuming that the estate is up for partition — without the
petitioner's business closing shop and inevitably, without the petitioner
laying off its employees.
As regards the question whether or not the petitioner's letter dated
November 17, 1975 47 was in substantial compliance with legal clearance
requirements, suffice it to state that apart from the Secretary of Labor's valid
observation that the same "did not constitute a sufficient clearance as
contemplated by law," 48 the factual circumstances show that the letter in
question was itself a part of the "systematic and deliberate attempt to get
rid of [the union members] because of their union activities." 49 Hence,
whether or not the said letter complied with the legal formalities is beside
the point since under the circumstances, retrenchment was, in all events,
unjustified. Parenthetically, the clearance required under Presidential Decree
No. 850 has been done away with by Batas Blg. 130, approved on August 21,
1981.
During the pendency of these petitions, the petitioner submitted
manifestations to the effect that certain employees have accepted
retirement benefits pursuant to its retrenchment scheme. 50 This is a matter
of defense that should be raised before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
To do away with the protracted process of determining the earnings
acquired by the employees as a result of ad interim employment, and to
erase any doubt as to the amount of backwages due them, this court. in line
with the precedent set in Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 51 affirmed in a long line of decisions that came later, 52 hereby
fixes the amount of backwages at three (3) years pay reckoned at the
increased rates decreed by the labor arbiter in Case No. LR-5415 without
deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Subject to the
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 modification as to the amount of backwages hereby awarded, the challenged
decisions are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED. With
costs against the petitioner.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano a n d Gancayco, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 48237, 10, 18, 20-21.
2. Id., 10.
3. Id., 20.

4. Id., 21.
5. Id., 29.
6. Id., 18, 30.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Rollo, G.R. No. 49023, 4.
10. Id., 25-29.
11. Id., G.R. No. 48237, 18-20.
12. Id., 18.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id., G.R. No. 49023, 32-37.

19. Id., 34.
20. Id., G.R. No. 48237, 3, 84.
21. Id.

22. Id., 20-28.

23. Id., 27.
24. Id., 28.

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 25. Id., 29-36.
26. Id., 60-61.
27. Id., G.R. No. 49023. 64-76.
28. Id., 78-80.
29. Id., 86-A1.

30. Id., 85-86; id., G.R. No. 48237, 77-78.

31. Id., G.R. No. 48237, 6.
32. Id., G.R. No. 49023, 8.
33. Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union San Miguel Corp.,
Nos. L-51002-06, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 557 (1983), citing International
Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo, No. L-57429, October 28,
1982, 117 SCRA 967 (1982), Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong, No. L-
48687, July 2, 1979, 91 SCRA 311 (1979), and Dy Keh Beng v. International
Labor, No. L-32245, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 161 (1979).
34. Int'l. Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogard v. supra.
35. Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel
Corp., supra, citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, No. L-47752, July 31,
1978, 84 SCRA 469 (1970), Scott v. Inciong, No. L-38868, December 29,
1975, 68 SCRA 473 (1975), and San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, No. L-
39195, May 26, 1975, 64 SCRA 56 (1975).
36. Busier v. Leogardo, Jr., No. L-63316, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 151 (1984),
citing Palma and Ignacio v. Q & S, Inc., No. L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA
97 (1966) and Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Lucero, No. L-
32550, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 337 (1983).
37. Id., G.R. No. 48237, 55-57, 58-59.

38. Id., G.R. No. 49023, 65-67.

39. Id., 34-35.

40. Id., 53.

41. Id.
42. Id., 67.

43. Id.

44. Nos. L-39598 and 39603, January 13, 1976, 69 SCRA 10 (1976).
45. Supra, 25-26.

46. Id., G.R. No. 48237, 144.

47. Id., 18-19.

48. Id., 25.

49. Id., 26.

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 50. Id., 118-122, 141-145.

51. No. L-23557, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694 (1974).

52. Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC, No. L-53453, January 22, 1986, 141 SCRA
169 (1986); Akay Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment, No. L-
59651, December 6, 1985, 140 SCRA 381(1985); Magtoto v. National Labor
Relations Commission, No. L-63370, November 18, 1985, 140 SCRA 58
(1985); Panay Railways, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-
69416, July 11, 1985, 137 SCRA 480 (1985); Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company v. Encarnacion, Nos. L-67002-03, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 256
(1985); Medical Doctors, Inc. (Makati Medical Center) v. NLRC, No. L-56633,
April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 1 (1985); Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC,
No. L-49071, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 697 (1985); Flexo Manufacturing
Corp. v. NLRC, No. L-55971, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 145 (1985);
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, No. L-64809, November 29, 1983, 126
SCRA 223 (1983); Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation v. Lazaro,
No. L-63779, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 463 (1983); Capital Garment
Corporation v. Ople, No. L-53627, September 10, 1982, 117 SCRA 473
(1982); Litex Employees Association v. CIR, No. L-39154, September 9, 1982,
116 SCRA 459 (1982); Yucoco v. Inciong, No. L-49061, March 29, 1982, 113
SCRA 245 (1982); People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and
Workers Org. (FFLU) v. People's Industrial and Commercial Corp., No. L-
37687, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 440 (1982); Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa
Camara Shoes v. Camara Shoes, No. L-50985, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
477 (1982); Pepito v. Secretary of Labor, No. L-49418, February 29, 1980, 96
SCRA 454 (1980); Citizens' League of Free-Workers v. CIR, No. L-38293,
February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 225 (1980); Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union
v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., No. L-33987, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 391 (1979);
Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor, supra; Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Court
of Industrial Relations, No. L-26136, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 27 (1978);
L.R. Aguinaldo & Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-31909, April
3, 1978, 82 SCRA 309 (1978); Danao Development Corporation v. NLRC, Nos.
L-40706 & 40700, February 16, 1978, 81 SCRA 487 (1978); Monteverde v.
Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-32975, September 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 259
(1977); Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-Natu v. Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd., No. L-25291, March 10, 1977, 76 SCRA 50 (1977);
People's Bank and Trust Company v. People's Bank and Trust Co. Employees
Union, supra; Luzon Stevedoring v. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-34300,
November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 154 (1974); Feati University Faculty Club
(Paflu) v. Feati University, No. L-31503, August 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 395
(1974).

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