DNV RULES FOR

CLASSIFICATION OF DP SYSTEMS
Development, present focus areas and future directions
MTS DP 2013 Luncheon presentation

Aleks Karlsen
Houston October 2013
 Agenda
 Background
 DNV Rule development process
 DNV Rules and Standards related to DP
 Development within DP rules
 Present challenges influencing DP rule development
 Possible future rule development
 Present focus areas, incl. power systems operating with closed bus-ties
 Summary

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 Rule development
 Safeguarding life property and the environment (MTS: Incident free operations)
 Support the industry:
- Technically (to support safe operations)

 Cooperation
- Industry
- Authorities
- Universities and other research institutions

 Manageable pace:
- Not to fast DNV Rules for
classification
- Not to slow of ships

 Incidents and accidents

 Politics
 IMO and other regulators
 Consistency and transparency is very important

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 DNV Rule development process
Need for rule
change identified
Get Funding
Write proposal
Internal hearing
Internal comments
concluded
Update proposal
External hearing
External comments
concluded
Update proposal
Approval
Typically of ruleRules
proposal
published
15 to 24 months Rules in force
(0,5 year after publ.)

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Chris Jenman, Global Maritime (London), UK, “DP Past, Present and Future”; MTS
Dynamic Positioning conference October 11-12, 2011:
Typical characteristics for such class 2 systems from the early days:
No single fault shall cause a catastrophic failure
Never exceed vessel’s capabilities
Capable personnel
FMEA
Withstand the loss of one thruster
Withstand the loss of one diesel generator
Withstand the loss of one switchboard
No failure to full thrust allowed for any propeller (note, almost all where CCP, and would
typically have such a failure mode anyway)
Three position references: 2 on line + one standby
Redundant DP control system, or non-redundant + Joystick

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 If one should make an attempt to update the same list of characteristics based on
today’s high end class 2 and 3 standards it might look something like this:

 No single fault shall cause a loss of position or heading (to avoid catastrophic events)
 Never exceed vessel’s sub failure capabilities, which is to be continuously monitored by the automatic DP
control system Consequence Analysis
 Capable certified personnel and higher focus on operational aspects
 Designated workstations for DP operations
 FMEA, generally to a higher standard and often based on more than one “technical system operational
mode” with inherent different integrity towards loss of position
 Withstand the worst case relevant failure mode
 Systems split in more than two redundancy groups
 More complex power systems
 Desire to operate with closed bus-ties
 No failure to full thrust allowed for any propeller (RPM control is the state of the art and the failure mode is
easier mitigated on these thrusters as compared to CPP)
 (At least) Three position references: All on line
 Redundant DP control system + Joystick + Manual levers
 Back-up non-redundant DP control system for DP class 3

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 Todays DNV DP rules and other DP related standards

DYNPOS
DPS
(DNV main DP notations)
(IMO Minimum ER
requirements)
Enhanced Reliability
ISDS
(DNV new DP principles)
(Integrated Software
Enhanced
Dependent Systems)
System verification
RP for DP design
(HIL-IS and HIL-DS)
RP for DP Operations
RP for FMEA
of redundant systems

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 DP Industry and market, some present challenges…
 Constant development (at a high pace):
- More suppliers of DP equipment and DP vessels
- New operations being performed on DP, often in new and challenging environments (e.g. Artic)
- New designs and new technology (e.g. to be environmental friendly)
- New ways to apply existing technology
- More integration and automation
- Closed bus-ties
- New verification tools and methods
- Complex and flexible systems, verification and testability is a challenge
- Fight between being safe and environmental friendly
- New rules and standards
- …

 Growth
- Both in high-end and low-end
- High-end set very strong requirements on class
- Other parts of the market are more focused on “getting the certificate”

 Clear and up-to-date rules, being consistently applied

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 Future? Some predictions/guesses…
 “All” vessels have automatic capabilities (can provide safer and more
environmental friendly operations)
 This will probably also include DP capabilities
 Some functions will be standardized, others will be even more specialized
 Existing propuls./thruster/steering control vendors may implement such standard
automatic functions
 More specialized DP control system vendors?
 DP 0 and 1 Notations disappears?, since the standard functions will always be
delivered?, => part of main class?
 Capacity assessment will become more important and requested -> new standards
 More involvement from Flag states (IMO)
 Even more use and further focus on development of redundant system designs
and notations

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 Possible future rule development focus/trends
 Introduction of new verification tools and methods
 Continue focus and development on systems designed for close bus-tie(s), operation
with generators belonging to different redundancy groups running in parallel
 New standards for DP Capacity verification (also during failure conditions including
WCF conditions)
 Higher focus on FMEA verification and testing
 Higher focus on Online Consequence Analysis, must reflect flexibility and limitations
 More vessel/vessel type specific requirements
 Rules for new technologies (e.g. use of batteries…)
 High focus on integration of control systems and software dependent systems
 Class scope for annual trials; better correlation with industry/IMO guidelines
 Very often such new initiatives will be introduced to the market in form of
recommended practices or other guideline documents.
- Voluntary additional class notations
- Main class
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 New verification tools and methods, ESV
Background:
DNV sees the need for basic research and further development on
verification methodologies and services

 Why this need?

- Completely different conditions
(this is well known...)

 But equally important…

- Completely different toolbox

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 What provides valuable verification benefit?, «test smarter»

Main Class
FMEA
IEC 61508
HIL
ISO 17894
FSA - Risk

CMMI - RP Product
Risk based ver

Process
Performance

ISDS
Safety case

SQALE Complex system Model Me

MBE SCM

12

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 DP Power system trends

Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator

Protection Protection Protection Protection Protection Protection

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 DP Power system trends

Generator Generator Generator Generator

Protection Protection Protection Protection

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 DP Power system trends

Generator Generator Generator Generator

Protection Protection Protection Protection

= =
=

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 Example traditional DP-3 notation
Fweather = Fwind + Fwaves + Fcurrent

FThrusters = FA + FB + FC + FD = Fweather

A A60 B A60 C A60 D

Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries

A60 & A60 A60

WT & WT & WT
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 Example DYNPOS-ER system
Fweather = Fwind + Fwaves + Fcurrent

FThrusters = FA + FB + FC + FD = Fweather

A A60 B A60 C A60 D

Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries Auxiliaries

A0 & A0 & A0 &

WT WT WT
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 Closed bus power system integrity
100% DP-3 open bus-ties
DP-3 closed bus 2013
This gap must be so small that
the IMO 645 intention of
equivalent integrity is achieved.
Expected and wanted development
U
for DP-2 power system integrity A X B

DP-2 Variable U

closed bus integrity DP-2 closed bus specification 2013

1A1

0%

(Illustrations are not scaled)

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Failure Modes: Minimum analysis and test requirement DP-2 (DP-3 has extensive additional requirements):
Short circuits, earth failures: Selectivity between generator breakers and bus-tie on short circuit, in form of a discrimination analysis.
DP-3: Generator Protection (GP) systems
Over load: Overload required to be handled by functionality in control systems (PMS, DP, Switchboard logic), control system
A system to detect failures not addressed by
documentation, FMEA and functional testing at DP/PMS/FMEA trials. (Can I/O failure between DP/PMS/SWB be a
traditional generator and switchboard
hidden failure?)
protection systems and to take appropriate
Governor failures: Power failure, speed pick-up failure, over speed, isochronous load sharing lines. Analyse and test all these.
action to prevent black-outs must be installed.
Overvoltage and AVR, Over excitation/expiation break-down/under excitation, to be analysed in the FMEA analysis. FMEA test
failure scenario: requirement: loss of excitation (power or no output), loss of sense or over excitation (disconnect CT feedback or
increase excitation).
Failures related to PMS and Analysis, functional testing. FMEA test: Power failure, network failure (disconnect), PMS I/O failure testing
active load sharing: required as found necessary in FMEA analysis, load sharing line failure (disconnect).

Transient under voltage The FMEA must analyse the effect of transient voltage dips in the system and identify measures necessary to
(short circuit ride through): avoid problems with:
(In electrical systems •unintended tripping of frequency converters
transient voltage dips may •unintended deselecting of thrusters from DP control (e.g. loss of ready signal from drives to DP control system)
occur, e.g. due to short •unintended tripping of motors and other important components, like auxiliary system pumps (tripping of motor
circuits and subsequent starters and/or contactors)
intended opening of feeder •unintended activation of under voltage protection systems
or bus-tie breakers for •DC control power systems, e.g. dual feeding through diodes or automatic change-over
disconnection of the faulty In relation with the above items, functionality must be checked in order to verify the potential effect of this failure
equipment. In connection mode.
with operation with closed The requirement is that the equipment DP-3: Live short
not belonging circuitsgroup
to the redundancy must beaffected
directly introduced
by the failure
bus such transients will shall ride through the transient periodatandthebe main switchboard
immediately level.
available, without Short
operator circuit
intervention, when the
affect the whole connected system voltage is re-established. tests may be required for all power systems
distribution system.) Measures must be implemented as found (AC,necessary
DC, UPS) through
if analysis.
these are crossing the
No “short circuit test”-requirements to verify the conclusions.
redundancy groups:
(Additionally, or as an alternative, verification of the above mentioned items may also be based on testing. Such
• Short circuit 3-phase
testing should be based upon non-destructive methods for simulating the transient low voltage period in the
system. ) • Short circuit 1-phase
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• Earth faults
 More additional DP-3 failure modes:
Examples of failure modes to consider can be found in DNV FMEA RP-D102:

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 Summary
 Keep up with the development in the industry:
- Technically
- Operationally
- Political

 Push and pull in the direction of improved minimum

requirements

 Be active and cooperate with the industry in setting

new standards

 Consistency and transparency

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 Safeguarding life, property
and the environment

www.dnv.com

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