2023 Mobile Banking Heists Report
2023 Mobile Banking Heists Report
Mobile Banking
Heists Report
29 Malware Families
Targeting 1,800 Mobile
Banking Apps
1
Index
Introduction 2
Executive Summary 3
New Banking Malware Families 3
New Capabilities in Emerging Banking Malware Families 4
Key Observations from Zimperium’s Research 5
Malware is Evolving; Our Defenses Need to Advance 6
Banking Trojans 6
What Is a Banking Trojan? 6
What's the Story Behind the Name? 7
What Is a Banking Malware Family? 7
What Makes Trojans So Successful? 7
Key Research Highlights 9
Research Summary 9
How Last Year's Malware Evolved 10
Top Banking Malware Families 11
Countries Targeted In Each Region 12
Top Targeted Banking Organizations By App Download 13
Top Targeted Mobile Banking Apps By Malware Family 14
References 33
Credits 34
2
Introduction
The mobile banking market is on a rapid ascent, projected to hit the $7 billion mark by 2032,1 fueled by
consumer demands for seamless and personalized banking experiences. As indicated below, mobile banking
is outpacing online banking across all age groups due to its convenience and our desire to have those apps at
our fingertips.
Age group % who primarily use online banking % who primarily use mobile banking
However, this surge is accompanied by a dramatic growth in financial fraud. According to LexisNexis’ 2022 True Cost of
Fraud Study, in the US, mobile fraud accounted for 32% and 37% of all fraud, respectively, an increase of 5% and 12%. The UK
witnessed a 17% rise in the last year alone and a 25% increase in fraud victims over two years.
Yet, amid these figures, a critical statistic stands out: one in every 20 fraud attacks can be traced back to a rogue mobile
application, underscoring a pivotal front in the battle against financial fraud and emphasizing the acute need for stringent
mobile app security measures.
The threat landscape, as detailed by Zimperium's threat intelligence, demonstrates the pressing nature of these risks.
Zimperium's monitoring of millions of Android devices has unveiled that about 9% have been affected by malware, with
banking trojans infecting a fifth of these devices, spanning 187 countries with over 24,000 unique samples identified. Such
alarming statistics serve as a clarion call for an escalated defense, especially as mobile banking trojans have become a
preferred tool for digital fraud, accounting for 16% of all such activities in the US.
This year, the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) stated that 94% of breaches remain financially driven,
making mobile banking a prime target for nefarious actors wielding sophisticated banking trojans. It further illuminates the
situation, identifying stolen credentials, phishing, and vulnerability exploitation as the foremost tactics used by attackers—
tactics at which banking malware excels.
In an era where mobile is the digital channel of choice for banking, understanding the anatomy, impact, and trends of
mobile banking malware is essential to building secure mobile banking apps that garner customer trust and thrive in a
hyper-competitive environment. This report aims to arm mobile security and product leaders with the knowledge to
develop mobile app security strategies that align with the sophistication of today’s malware. It is an essential read for
those at the forefront of combating threats on the mobile platform.
Executive Summary
Zimperium’s latest research explores a dynamic and expanding threat landscape by meticulously analyzing 29
banking malware families and associated trojan applications. This year alone,the research team identified 10 new
active families, signifying the continued investment from threat actors in targeting mobile banking applications. The
19 adversaries who persist from last year reveal new capabilities that show a relentless pursuit of financial
exploitation. Traditional banking applications remain the prime target, with a staggering 1103 apps —accounting for
61% of the targets—while the emerging FinTech and Trading apps are now in the crosshairs, making up the remaining
39%. It is undeniable that these sophisticated banking trojan threats have a global impact, with 61 countries
grappling with them.
Listed below are the ten new banking malware families Zimperium reviewed and some key characteristics.
Nexus Godfather Pixpirate Saderat Hook PixBankBot Xenomorph v3 Vultur BrasDex GoatRat
9 57 1 23 43 1 14 15 1 1
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted Targeted
Offered as Offered as Not offered as Not offered as Offered as Not offered as Offered as Not offered as Not offered as Not offered as
MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS MaaS
Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data Stolen Data
Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to: Exfiltrated to:
USA USA Brazil Thailand Russia Brazil USA USA Australia Brazil
Netherlands Turkey Philippines Poland
Turkey Spain Peru
Spain Canada
France
Germany
UK
Italy
Poland
*Zimperium customers using Zimperium Mobile Threat Defense and Zimperium Runtime SDK zDefend solutions are protected from these threats.
NETHERLANDS
RUSSIA
UK
GERMANY POLAND
CANADA
FRANCE
SPAIN ITALY
TURKEY
USA
PHILLIPINES
THAILAND
PERU BRAZIL
AUSTRALIA
4
Screen Sharing
The screen-sharing capability enables threat actors to remotely interact with and manipulate a device,
even without physical access. This capability was developed to help product vendors provide remote
customer support. However, threat actors are now repurposing it for malicious purposes.
Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS)
MaaS platforms offer a range of features optimized for malware authors, including pre-coded attack
vectors, customizable trojan templates, and evasion techniques like code obfuscation. These services
allow for quick adaptations, making it easier for malware authors to circumvent new security protocols,
sustaining the malware's effectiveness over time. Subscriptions to these platforms range from 3,000 -
7,000 USD per month, depending on the services offered.
5
Looking Back
Traditional Mobile App Security Measures Undermined
More than 50% of the malware families researched already have advanced keylogging, screen overlay,
accessibility, and SMS-stealing capabilities. The traditional security mechanisms employed by traditional mobile
banking apps —such as Strong Passwords, Domain-Based Security, One-Time-Passwords (OTP), and Multi-Factor
Authentication (MFA)—are increasingly being undermined on end-user mobile devices by banking malware.
Looking Forward
Regulatory Requirements Evolve and Become Prescriptive
Globally, mobile banking security regulatory frameworks are undergoing significant changes. New regional
regulations will mirror those in countries like Singapore, India, and Malaysia, where security requirements are
prescriptive and will mandate protections such as code protection, cryptographic key protection, anti-malware,
and other safeguards. As banking malware continues to increase globally, the zLabs team expects this regulatory
trend to accelerate.
• Threat Visibility: Provide real-time visibility into real-world threats across the install base
• Zero-Day Defense: Defend against known and zero-day threats detected on the device
• On-device Mitigation: Empower apps to respond immediately on-device to mitigate risk
• Adaptive Security: Receive real-time updates to threat detections and response without having to republish a
new app
Zimperium stands at the forefront of mobile app security, offering businesses the expertise and advanced solutions
needed to achieve a comprehensive, mobile-first security posture.
Banking Trojans
What Is a Banking Trojan?
Bank trojans are seemingly legitimate apps that contain
malicious software (malware) that exploits banking apps
installed on end-user mobile devices. It is designed to
steal banking credentials, financial information, and
personally identifiable information (PII) or facilitate
unauthorized payment transactions.
7
Based on Global Mobile Threat Report data from Zimperium, as well as the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG),
financial services is the most targeted sector, accounting for 23% of documented phishing attacks. Financial services
firms have been targeted 60% more than the next most targeted sector, Social Media.
Research Summary
29 1,103 (61%)
# Evolved Malware # FinTech/Trading
Families from 2022 Apps Targeted
19 704 (39%)
# New Malware # Countries
Families in 2023 Impacted
10 61
10
In 2022 In 2023
Spam Contacts Intercept Notifications
Novel Capabilities
Abuse Accessibility Services Bypass One-Time Passwords
Intercept MFA tokens Screen Make Code Open Source
Overlay Attacks Real Time Automatic Transfer System (ATS)
Screen Sharing Detect & Evade Emulators
Disable Anti-Malware Apps Domain Generation Algorithms(DGA)
Hide Trojan App Icons
Research conducted by the zLabs team clearly shows that the malware Zimperium highlighted in the 2022
Mobile Banking Heist report has evolved considerably in the last twelve months. Despite the high infection levels
already achieved, malware authors are constantly adding new features. Let’s take a look at how these new
capabilities undermine traditional security measures.
1. Intercepting Notifications: Undermines secure notification systems, requiring secure channels for alerts.
2. Bypassing One-Time Passwords: Weakens the effectiveness of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
3. Making Code Open Source: Accelerates malware evolution, making signature-based anti-malware
solutions less effective.
4. Leveraging Automated Transfer System (ATS): The ability to perform unauthorized transactions with
little to no user interaction.
5. Detecting & Evading Emulators: Challenges automated malware analysis systems and basic mobile
security Software Development Kits (SDKs), requiring more advanced threat detection capabilities.
6. Using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA): Makes denylisting domains ineffective, requiring advanced
Domain Name System (DNS) filtering solutions.
11
618
Banks Targeted
105
Banks Targeted
Hook Mysterybot
419
Banks Targeted
76
Banks Targeted
Godfather Medusa
414
Banks Targeted
53
Banks Targeted
Teabot Cabossous
400
Banks Targeted
41
Banks Targeted
Xenomorph Anubis
371
Banks Targeted
40
Banks Targeted
Exobot Coper
12
Countries Targeted In
Each Region
Listed below are the top countries targeted by the 29 malware families
the zLabs team analyzed this year.
AMERICAS
EUROPE
MIDDLE EAST
ASIA-PACIFIC
PhonePe Barclays
Country # Downloads
Country # Downloads
United States 100,000,000
United States 10,500,000
Country # Downloads
Country # Downloads
United States 11,200,000
Spain 11,000,000
* Approximate Number of Downloads: This value indicates the total downloads of the legitimate Android mobile banking app from app stores.
14
16
Malware Families Targeting the App
12
Malware Families Targeting the App
13
Malware Families Targeting the App
12
Malware Families Targeting the App
13
Malware Families Targeting the App
11
Malware Families Targeting the App
12
Malware Families Targeting the App
11
Malware Families Targeting the App
12
Malware Families Targeting the App
MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service)
What is MaaS?
In recent years Zimperium researchers have seen some cybercriminals establish themselves as
legitimate companies offering services to clients. The result was Malware-as-a-Service, where
one-time purchases, subscriptions, and profit-sharing options were available. Consequently, new
cybercriminals have had a much easier time entering the market. It enables easy deployment of
advanced attacks on mobile banking applications and transactions by providing individuals with
ready-made malicious toolkits for rent or subscription.
1
Distribution
Nexus makes itself available as MaaS by
advertising its offerings on various hacking forums.
Interested parties can subscribe or rent its services
for a specific period of time, much like purchasing a
software subscription. Its MaaS model
2
democratizes access to its advanced capabilities, Account Takeover
allowing even those with limited technical expertise One of Nexus' core capabilities is facilitating
to launch sophisticated cyber-attacks. account takeover attacks. It leverages overlay
attacks and keylogging to capture user credentials,
in addition to stealing SMS messages to bypass
two-factor authentication (2FA). It exploits
Android's Accessibility Services to glean
3
information from cryptocurrency wallets and
C2 Communication disable 2FA modules. This makes Nexus not just a
Nexus possesses an autonomous updating
banking trojan but a multi-faceted tool that can
mechanism. It communicates with its command-
target multiple types of secure accounts.
and-control (C2) server to check for updates on-
demand, allowing it to adapt and evolve in real-
time to match the banking app version currently
4
installed on the device. This makes Nexus
significantly more resilient to detection and Control
countermeasures, sustaining its effectiveness over A command-and-control server enables
longer periods. subscribers to access Nexus' functionalities via
payment and access credentials. Using this MaaS
setup, malware can be distributed and used more
easily, increasing its impact and reach.
16
How it works
The following is an explanation of how ATS works.
1 Credential Harvesting
After successful infiltration, the 3 Transaction Initiation
ATS either waits for the user to start a
5 Transaction Execution
With all the necessary
ATS module remains idle, transaction before modifying recipient information, the ATS will finalize
monitoring user activity in banking details or starts a transaction the transaction, sending funds to
apps. When the user logs into a automatically. It locates User Interface a predetermined account
banking app, it captures login (UI) components such as text fields for controlled by the attackers.
credentials, account numbers, and entering transfer amounts and account
other sensitive information. details and even buttons for initiating
transactions, interacting with them as if
they were real users.
2 Checks
Account Balance
4 MFA Token Capture
When a legitimate transaction is 6 Evasion and Cleanup
Finally, the ATS may delete
The ATS module hijacked, the user will enter MFA to transaction-related SMS alerts or
automatically queries authorize the transaction. If an app notifications, making it harder
account balances to decide unauthorized transaction is for the victim to detect the fraud
how much money to transfer initiated, an ATS module will trick immediately.
without raising suspicion. the user into entering an OTP, or
one time password, often by using
a pop-up claiming session
expiration and a OTP is needed.
17
Here's how zLabs researchers observed this ATS capability being used by PixPirate.
1
PixPirates uses familiar names and icons, posing
as a legitimate application to the victims.
2
Once the seemingly legitimate app is installed,
it asks users to grant Accessibility Services
permissions using deceptive pop-ups.
3
Once these permissions are granted, the
malware acts, activating its suite of malicious
functions.
4
It monitors changes made to the password
input field in the banking app, seizing any
credentials entered. It uses the Auto.js
framework to identify and interact with specific
elements on the screen.
5
Once it has the credentials, it reaches out to the
Command & Control (C2C) server for a PIX key.
This key is typically encrypted and sent securely
from the C&C to the malware residing on the
victim's device, enabling PixPirate to carry out
6
unauthorized money transfers on apps using the Once it has the PIX key, it uses the auto.js
PIX payment platform. framework to navigate to the banking app’s UI
screen concerning money transfers.
7
It initiates the ATS module by providing the
credentials, PIX key, and transfer details to initiate
and complete the unauthorized money transfer.
8
Once completed, it starts covering its tracks by
deleting or altering logs and SMS notifications.
Examples of Other
Banking Trojans Using
ATS Techniques:
GoatRat PixBankBot Xenomorph
18
How it works
The following is an explanation of how TOAD works.
1 Phishing Stage
A victim is lured into inputting
3 Malware Deployment
This seemingly benign software
5 Data Harvesting
With elevated permissions, the
sensitive details into a phishing is the malware, often a trojan, malware can then access
overlay screen disguised as a designed to compromise the sensitive data like passwords,
legitimate page, most often mobile device. It may even be a bank account details, and even
mimicking a banking application. legitimate remote-access tool MFA tokens, storing them or
In addition to the credentials, the repurposed for malicious intent. sending them to a remote server.
screen asks the users to set up
security questions and responses
during account registration.
Alternatively, the attacker can trick the victim into calling them
by setting up a deceptive website showing that the victim has
some problem with their bank account or some other service.
19
Here's how zLabs researchers observed this capability being used by Copybara.
1
Phishing Attack
Victims are targeted with social campaigns that
leverage sophisticated phishing kits. They facilitate
the automatic registration of phishing domains and
2
the creation of short links for distribution, simplifying Phone Call
the criminal’s operations. After getting personal During the call, victims are guided to install a malicious
information, the victim is informed that a support application that uses Accessibility Services to achieve
operator will contact them. various functions, such as uninstalling the legitimate
banking app to minimize detection risks.
3
Credential Theft
Once Copybara is installed, it uses its unique ability
to create fake input forms dynamically. After
receiving the field attributes for the form from the
Command & Control server, it uses Android native
UI frameworks to generate fake banking forms as
4
needed on the device. This amplifies data collection, Data Exfiltration
enabling more comprehensive fraud. Once the fake input forms are successfully overlaid on
the legitimate banking application, it captures
credentials and other details necessary for account
takeover. The data is encrypted and sent to the C&C
5
server for storage.
Account Takeover
Once the credentials are available, the malware
initiates an account login. If 2FA is involved, a
secondary fake form or an SMS intercept
mechanism is used to get the necessary codes to
complete the account takeover.
How it works
The following is an explanation of how Screen Sharing works:
1 Remote Control
After infecting a mobile device,
3 Command-and-
Control (C2)
5 Two-Factor 7 Continuous Monitoring The attacker can maintain the
Authentication Bypass
the banking trojan activates an Connection The real-time nature of Screen connection for an extended
embedded Screen Sharing server. The trojan connects to a remote Sharing enables attackers to period, waiting for the user to
This allows attackers to remotely command-and-control server, capture 2FA tokens as they access sensitive apps, thereby
view and control the infected effectively making the infected appear, making it possible to maximizing the potential for
device in real-time, essentially device a client. This connection is bypass this layer of security. financial gain.
giving them a "window" into the often encrypted to evade
victim's activities. detection.
2 Accessibility Exploitation
Before activating the Screen Sharing 4 Account Takeover
Using Screen Sharing, the
6 Data Exfiltration
The Screen Sharing
server, the trojan often exploits attacker can navigate the user
accessibility features to gain the interface can be used to
interface of banking apps, fill in open other applications,
required permissions, allowing it to text boxes, tap buttons, and navigate to settings, or even
interact with the user’s interface. As it essentially operate the app as a open a web browser to send
should be evident by now, accessibility legitimate user, all in real-time. data to a specific location.
services are a key element abused by
most banking trojans.
21
Here's how zLabs researchers observed this capability being used by Hook.
1
Infection
Initially, the victim might encounter Hook through a
phishing email, malicious ad, or rogue application. The
2
trojan is often disguised as a legitimate app or file to
trick the user into installing it. Initial Execution
Once downloaded and installed, the trojan usually
requests permissions that seem appropriate for its
purported function but are actually intended to facilitate
3
malicious activities.
Exploiting Accessibility Services
Hook specifically targets Android's accessibility
services, asking the user to grant permissions that
4
enable the trojan to interact with the user interface and
monitor activities on the device. Enabling Screen Sharing
With the necessary permissions granted, Hook activates
its embedded Virtual Network Computing (VNC) server,
thereby gaining the ability to remotely control the
5
C2 Communication victim's device. Through these capabilities, Hook can
The trojan establishes a connection with a C2 server perform overlay attacks, act as a keylogger, send and
operated by the attacker. In this way, the infected device steal SMS, and even steal crypto wallet seeds.
can be monitored and interacted with in realtime. Data is
6
encrypted using AES-256-CBC with a hardcoded key and
then encoded in Base64. Account Takeover and Fraud
Using Screen Sharing, the attacker can navigate
banking apps and websites just as a user would,
7
Data Exfiltration facilitating unauthorized transactions and potentially
Personal and financial data, along with login credentials, draining financial accounts. They could also intercept
may be sent back to the Command-and-Control server 2FA tokens to bypass security measures further.
for future exploitation or sale on the dark web.
9
Evasion and Persistence more resilient and challenging to remove.
Many banking trojans like Hook employ tactics to evade
detection by antivirus software and to persist on the device,
such as code obfuscation or hiding their icons from the
application drawer.
The combination of initial deception, exploitation of permissions, and use of advanced capabilities like Screen
Sharing make Hook a particularly potent and malicious threat in the realm of mobile banking trojans.
Fraudsters Scam
$37,400 From a Woman's
Life Savings
In May of this year, another Singaporean citizen lost her
life savings after seeing an ad for cheap durians, a spicy
fruit popular in Southeast Asia. She contacted the seller
on Facebook Messenger, who then contacted her via
phone. She was instructed to download an app and
enter her personal details to create a membership. She
was also instructed to enter a one-time password from
her bank into the app. Of course, this was all the
attackers with the discount fruit ads needed to empty
her bank account. These examples cited in the media
are hardly isolated incidents.
Malware-Related Scams
Cost Users $100,000
In June of this year, two Android users lost $99,800 from
their Central Provident Fund (CPFdue to malware scams.
The victims were lured by social media ads for groceries,
directing them to download an Android Package Kit (APK
for payment and ordering. These APK files were sourced
from third-party platforms rather than the Google Play
Store, making them susceptible to containing phishing
malware. Unbeknownst to the victims, the downloaded
apps granted scammers remote access to their devices,
leading to the theft of sensitive data, including Singpass
passcodes.
Impact on Consumers
1. Financial Loss: These advanced malware variants steal banking credentials and carry out unauthorized money
transfers. This not only leaves global consumers at an elevated risk of financial fraud but also places a burden on
them to protect themselves on their mobile devices. To build better cyber hygiene, consumers must educate
themselves about these risks and consider investing in mobile security solutions.
2. Data Privacy Concerns: Banking malware's ability to harvest a broad range of personal data—ranging from
banking credentials to personally identifiable information (PII)—expands the scope of identity theft. Global
consumers are not only vulnerable to immediate financial loss but also face long-term risks related to identity
theft and personal privacy invasion. The ITRC Aftermath report shows that 46% of identity theft victims are
dissatisfied with how financial institutions and credit unions handle their cases.
25
1
Given the rise in advanced tooling that enables threat actors to bypass rudimentary
code protections, mobile application security teams must prioritize advanced code
protection techniques. These protections should aim to impede the reverse engineering
and tampering of mobile applications. Malicious actors have a much harder time
dissecting an app when it combines multiple methods of app hardening and anti-
tampering. This not only deters the creation of targeted malware but also reduces the
likelihood of scalable fraud. The goal is to elevate the security posture to a point where
the cost and effort of attacking the application outweighs the potential gains for the
attacker.
2
development teams frequently operate in the dark, constrained by a limited
understanding of the mobile threats targeting their applications on end-user devices in
real-time. In these cases, mobile app teams must rely exclusively on standards and best
practices to implement security. Standards are a great starting point, but they aren't
sufficient. In reality, Zimperium found that most apps are not compliant with OWASP and
MASVS to a great extent. Attackers have an enormous attack surface and opportunity
because of the gap between real-world threats and current protections.
To bridge this gap, it's imperative for mobile application security leaders to enable
runtime visibility across various threat vectors, including device, network, application, and
phishing. This real-time insight allows for active identification and reporting of risks,
threats, and attacks. For security teams, it paves the way for continuous threat
monitoring and rapid response. For development teams, it facilitates accurate threat
modeling, allowing for the design of more resilient apps.
3 Response
While threat visibility is crucial, the ability to respond effectively and in real-time is equally
important. Mobile Application Security leaders should prioritize implementing on-device
protection mechanisms that enable apps to take immediate actions upon threat
detection. This ability to take action should be autonomous, requiring no dependency on
network connectivity or back-end server communication. The response will depend on
the severity and context of the threat; options include halting the application, changing
its behavior dynamically, or redirecting the user to educational material.
zShield has a number of protection capabilities to prevent malware authors from reversing and understanding the app’s
inner workings.
1. Code Obfuscation - Protects the code from being reverse-engineered and analyzed.
2. Integrity Protection - A set of measures that make it challenging to modify apps and repackage them.
3. Anti-Debug Protection - Detects and defends against debugging and hooking tools.
4. Root/Jailbreak Protection - Prevents the app from running on devices that have been jailbroken or rooted.
zShield offers banks a flexible approach to security, providing two distinct application methods tailored to an app's
specific security requirements. The 'Low Code' option gives banks precise control over protecting individual app
functions. At the same time, the 'No Code' method simplifies the process, allowing banks to upload the app to the
platform to enforce essential protections automatically.
Here are some key detection capabilities that the solution has to prevent malware abuse:
Accessibility permissions on Android are originally designed to assist users with disabilities, enhancing the usability of
devices and apps. They allow apps to interact with the user interface, read screen content, automate touch and
keystrokes, and perform other functions to make the device more accessible. Granting accessibility permissions can
be risky because these permissions can give apps broad control over a device's functionalities. Banking trojans often
ask for and then exploit accessibility features to automate transactions, capture sensitive data like passwords, or
overlay fake login screens on legitimate banking apps. Being cautious about granting such permissions limits the
potential attack surface for these malicious entities, thereby enhancing your device's security posture against
banking trojans.
Below are images of a fake Google Chrome application distributed through third-party stores. Based on the images, it
appears to be a legitimate application asking for accessibility permissions.
Consumers should be cautious when downloading Android apps from third-party app stores, as these platforms
often lack the rigorous security vetting found in official app stores. This lax security makes unvetted sources or third-
party stores fertile ground for banking trojans disguised as legitimate apps.
Moreover, these third-party stores are frequently used in malware phishing campaigns that deploy droppers—
initially benign-looking apps that later download malicious payloads. The absence of stringent security measures in
third-party stores makes these droppers more easily distributed, making these platforms central to sophisticated
banking trojan campaigns. Therefore, extra vigilance is advised when downloading apps from unofficial sources to
minimize the risk of financial compromise.
The following images show a malware dropper impersonating WiFi Auto Authenticator. During download, the dropper
asks permission to install from a third-party site. After installation, it asks for another malicious app called WiFi
Authorization to be downloaded.
Threat actors often reverse- engineer banking apps to steal logos, images, and user interface elements. This
meticulous imitation creates rogue apps or phishing websites resembling authentic banking platforms. Coupled
with using domains and URLs containing bank names, this increases the deception's credibility.
Mobile-powered businesses can leverage Zimperium’s Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) solution to secure Bring Your Own
(BYO) and Corporate-owned mobile devices accessing enterprise data and infrastructure. With MTD's integration with
Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions, businesses are
able to provide risk-based access and comprehensively protect their workforce from malware, network threats, and
phishing attempts.
31
This multidimensional
escalation in the
mobile threat
landscape necessitates
an equally
multidimensional
security strategy—one
that is comprehensive,
autonomous, and
relentlessly focused on
facing the threats of
today and tomorrow.
32
About Zimperium
Zimperium enables global businesses to realize the full potential of mobile-powered businesses by activating a Mobile-
First Security Strategy. Built for the demands of mobile business, Zimperium’s Mobile-First Security Platform™ delivers
unmatched security across both applications and devices. The Zimperium Mobile-First Security Platform unifies Zimperium
Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) and Zimperium Mobile Application Protection Suite (MAPS), and provides centralized access
to and management of Zimperium’s mobile app and endpoint security solutions.
Affiliations
Zimperium is a member of the App Defense Alliance and an active partner in the malware mitigation program,
which aims to quickly find Potentially Harmful Applications (PHAs) and stop them before they ever make it onto
Google Play.
Appendix
Indicators of Compromise
You can find the IOCs for banking trojans in the GitHub repository link below.
https://github.com/Zimperium/IOC/tree/master/2023-Banking-Heist
References
1. https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/mobile-banking-market
2. https://www.outseer.com/payment-security/outseer-report-fraudulent-banking/
4. Verizon DBIR
https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/2023/summary-of-findings/
5. 2022 LexisNexis® True Cost of Fraud™ Study: Financial Services and Lending
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20221116-study-finds-fraud-costs#:~:text=Attacks
%20and%20Costs%3A%20Fraud%20costs,every%20%241%20of%20fraud%20loss.
8. https://sifted.eu/articles/neobank-fraud-victims-revolut-monzo-starling
8. https://dataprot.net/statistics/mobile-banking-statistics/
10. https://www.pymnts.com/news/banking/2023/nearly-70-pct-consumers-prioritize-trust-over-convenience-
choosing-bank/
34
Credits
Researchers
Aazim Bill SE Yaswant
Francisco Bertona
Gianluca Braga
Nico Chiaraviglio
Vishnu Pratapagiri
Editors
Lisa Bergamo
Writers
Krishna Vishnubhotla
Nico Chiaraviglio
Reviewers
Jon Paterson
Georgia Weidman
Nico Chiaraviglio
Graphic Design
Tom Green
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