November 2024

European Gas Market

Supply & Demand:
Winter Outlook 2024/25

1. Introduction: skating on thin ice

News that Russian gas supply to Austria’s OMV has been suspended following an arbitration ruling
against Gazprom Export is hardly a surprise – bringing to an early close another tranche of Ukraine
transit volumes to central Europe. Prompt TTF’s rally to a new year high on the headlines is a timely
reminder that Europe’s gas market remains fundamentally vulnerable to the aftershocks of the Ukraine
crisis, even years after the initial supply crunch. As the bulk of the winter months stretch out ahead, our
analysis shows declining European indigenous supply combined with limited upside flexibility for
imported pipeline gas means that storage withdrawals and spot LNG will be the key balancing items.
After two years of mild European winters, the 2024/25 season is set to be chillier as La Niña takes hold,
bringing with it colder, wetter and stormier conditions across Europe’s key gas demand zones. Despite
a third year of overall contraction in gas demand in the EU-27 plus UK, we expect gas demand over
the winter months to rise 10 Bcm year-on-year, as colder temperatures drive space heating and power
demand, with short-term gas demand volatility exacerbated by ever-rising volumes required to cover
renewables intermittency. This forecast assumes a normal winter – a cold winter could more than
double that increment.
The demand bump comes as Europe’s domestic gas production continues to slide, pulled back by
falling UK output. Meanwhile, pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan are nearly
topped out and remaining Russian transit gas via Ukraine is expected to halt at the end of December,
leaving a shortfall to be filled by higher LNG flows. Given that global LNG balances are tight, Europe
will have to pay a premium to draw additional cargoes, a fresh driver for higher prices over the winter
months. New US-based LNG projects are starting up but the ramp-up of both Plaquemines and the
Corpus Christi expansion is unlikely to materially loosen balances this winter. The LNG market context
outside Europe is not helping either: China, OECD Asia and Emerging Asian buyers have all increased
their LNG imports in 2024, balanced by softer European demand. The winter demand surge changes
that picture sharply, with price alone set to decide which is the real premium market.
European storage is perhaps the silver lining – representing the most responsive source of short-term
supply over the winter. European regulators have kept storage fill mandates in place since the 2022
crisis and while shippers may not have been quite as zealous at injecting storage this past summer,
European storage was still nearly full at the start of the winter. Historical data suggests that storage is
easily sufficient to meet realistic market scenarios for the winter, even if temperatures are colder than
normal. But whatever is withdrawn will need to be replenished in summer 2025 – the main reason why
price curves through next year’s summer are robust and only soften when the new wave of LNG starts
to show up late in the year.

SHORT PAPER: Author

Energy Insight: 159 Bill Farren-Price, Anouk Honoré, and Jack Sharples, OIES
2. No upside flexibility for European gas production amid UK decline
Europe’s gas production continues its gentle downwards slope, curbed last year by the halt in
production at Groningen in the Netherlands and this year by UK declines. This means there is little
scope for a short-term supply response if balances tighten further during winter 2024/25. Since May
2023, European gas production charted a range of 150-174 MMcm/d, with a winter plateau of 170-174
MMcm/d from October 2023 to March 2024.
With EU-27 monthly gas production virtually flat at around 86-92 MMcm/d since May 2023, the UK
accounts for most of the month-on-month fluctuation in production. In our scenario for winter 2024/25,
EU-27 production remains flat year-on-year (90-92 MMcm/d) while UK production is 10 MMcm/d lower
year-on-year, in a continuation of the trend seen over the past 12 months. This scenario offers UK
production of 70-72 MMcm/d during winter 2024/25 and total European production of 160-164 MMcm/d.
Figure 1: European monthly gas production (MMcm per day)
300

250

200

150

100

50

UK Netherlands Italy Romania RestofEU Total

Source: Data from National gas Transmission (UK) and Eurostat (EU-27). Graph by the author. Gas production in
Netherlands and Rest of EU in October-November 2024 are estimates based on preliminary data.

3. Pipeline gas imports set to decline as Ukrainian transit ends

Non-Russian pipeline supply
In terms of pipeline imports, supply from Norway returned to its normal winter range of 335-355 MMcm/d
at the start of winter 2024/25. In four of the past five winters, Norway has sustained monthly average
pipeline volumes in that range for between four and six of the winter months between October and
March. Winter 2023/24 was an exception, with the peak monthly volumes reaching 360 MMcm/d in
December 2023 and 356 MMcm/d in January 2024. The latest planned maintenance data from Gassco1
suggests Norway’s full production capacity of 360 MMcm/d will be reached in mid-November. A mid-
range scenario could see an average of 350 MMcm/d in December-January, and 345 MMcm/d in
November, February and March. If Europe experiences a surge in demand, Norwegian supply could
nudge the top of its capacity envelope at 355-360 MMcm/d as it did in 2023/24, absent unplanned
outages.

1
Gassco, 2024. Urgent Market Messages (UMM). https://umm.gassco.no/ [updated 7 November 2024]

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 2
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 2: European daily pipeline imports by source since 1 October 2022 (MMcm per day)
400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

-
01 Oct 22 01 Jan 23 01 Apr 23 01 Jul 23 01 Oct 23 01 Jan 24 01 Apr 24 01 Jul 24 01 Oct 24

Russia Norway North Africa Azerbaijan

Source: Data from ENTSOG Transparency Platform, 1 October 2022 to 16 November 2024.2 Graph by the author.

North Africa’s gas supply is less predictable, particularly Algerian supply to Italy via the Transmed
pipeline, with flow fluctuations seen on a daily and monthly basis. Setting aside the heavy impact of
maintenance in September 2024, monthly flows via Transmed between October 2023 and October
2024 were in the range of 43-68 MMcm/d at an average of 56 MMcm/d. The key factor in daily flows is
the relatively wide range of flexibility in offtake nominations under the contracts between Sonatrach and
Italian buyers. Edison (1 Bcma), Enel (3 Bcma) and Eni (9 Bcma) all have contracts with Sonatrach that
expire in 2027/28, plus the ability to purchase additional spot volumes from Sonatrach over and above
their long-term contract offtake commitments.3 4 Italian imports via the Transmed pipeline totalled just
over 20 Bcm in 2021 and over 22 Bcm in 2022 and 2023, which suggests Italian buyers have been
exercising their right to purchase additional spot volumes from Sonatrach. A tight market this winter
suggests that pattern will continue.5
In the same period, other North African gas flows to Europe remained within a narrower and more
predictable envelope over the past year. Monthly Algerian flows to Spain via the Medgaz pipeline
averaged 27 MMcm/d in a range of 21-31 MMcm/d, while Libyan flows to Italy via the Green Stream
pipeline averaged 5 MMcm/d in the past year, stable at 2-3 MMcm/d since June 2024. Overall, total
supply from North Africa, which averaged 94 MMcm/d in October and 1-12 November, could continue
in the range of 90-95 MMcm/d, with potential to rise to 95-100 MMcm/d, especially if Algerian flows to
Italy are boosted by higher nominations and spot purchases.

2
ENTSOG, 2023. Transparency Platform. https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/map
3
S&P Global, 2019. Algeria's Sonatrach renews long-term gas sales contract with Italy's Edison. Commodity Insights, 12
November. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/111219-algerias-
sonatrach-renews-long-term-gas-sales-contract-with-italys-edison
4
S&P Global, 2021. Sonatrach Italian partners buying spot Algerian gas on top of long-term volumes: sources. Commodity
Insights, 16 April. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/041621-
sonatrach-italian-partners-buying-spot-algerian-gas-on-top-of-long-term-volumes-sources
5
Data from ENTSOG Transparency Platform. https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/map

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 3
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Monthly European imports from Azerbaijan via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – as measured on the
border between Turkey and Greece – have been consistent in the 31-35 MMcm/d range over the past
year, so we are assuming a flat rate of 34 MMcm/d throughout the winter.

Russian pipeline supply

The most significant shift in pipeline supplies this winter will be driven by Russian supply. Europe’s
pipeline imports from Russia are sourced via two routes: the Turkish Stream pipeline and subsequent
transit via Turkey supplies South-Eastern Europe, while transit via Ukraine supplies Central Europe.
Since November 2023, monthly gas transit via Ukraine (as measured on the Ukraine-Slovakia border)
has been in the range of 37-42 MMcm/d. The contract for Russian gas transit expires on 31 December
2024 and we expect flows will cease at that point. Over the past 12 months, monthly Russian pipeline
gas supply to South-Eastern Europe via Turkish Stream has been in the range of 39-46 MMcm/d,
averaging 43 MMcm/d.6
In Central Europe, the Russian gas transited via Ukraine exits Ukraine exclusively into Slovakia at a
rate of 35-45 MMcm/d. That supply into Slovakia is augmented by 5-10 MMcm/d of net Slovak imports
from Hungary. Of that volume, 5-15 MMcm/d is supplied to the Slovak market, 25-30 MMcm/d is
delivered onwards to Austria, and the remainder (5-15 MMcm/d) is re-exported from Slovakia to the
Czech Republic, as illustrated in the graph below.
Figure 3: European daily pipeline imports by source since 1 October 2022 (MMcm per day)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
-
(5)
(10)
(15)
(20)
(25)
(30)
(35)
(40)
(45)
01 Jan 01 Feb 01 Mar 01 Apr 01 May 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov
2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024

Net Ukraine to Slovakia Net Czechia to Slovakia Net Hungary to Slovakia

Net Austria to Slovakia Supply to Slovakia

Source: Data from ENTSOG Transparency Platform. 7 Graph by the author. Positive values indicate supply to
Slovakia, and negative values indicate exports from Slovakia or supply to the domestic Slovak market.

Therefore, the cessation of Russian gas transit via Ukraine will primarily impact Slovakia and Austria,
where SPP and OMV (respectively) still hold long-term contracts with Gazprom. A knock-on impact will
be felt in the Czech Republic and Italy, where some volumes continued to be traded across the border,
albeit with the Czech and Italian buyers not purchasing gas from Gazprom directly. When the Ukrainian
transit stops, we would expect to see: 1) an uptick in storage withdrawals; 2) a rise in Slovakia and
Austria hub prices above those in the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Hungary; 3) gas traders
taking advantage of that premium to sell volumes across those borders; and finally, 4) hub prices in the
Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Hungary consequently facing some upward pressure.

6
This excludes June 2024, which saw the Turkish Stream pipeline taken offline for five days of maintenance.
7
ENTSOG, 2023. Transparency Platform. https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/map

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 4
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
OMV announced on 13 November that its German trading subsidiary, OMV Gas Marketing & Trading
GmbH (OGMT) had succeeded in its arbitration case against Gazprom Export and had been awarded
EUR 230 million in damages. OMV announced that it would take steps to enforce the award ‘with
immediate effect’ by offsetting this sum against invoices for supply under its contract with Gazprom
Export. In doing so, OMV acknowledged that “it is expected that there may be a deterioration of the
contractual relationship under the Austrian supply contract of OGMT with Gazprom Export, including a
potential halt of gas supply”.8 9Two days later, the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) reported that
Gazprom Export had informed OMV that it would reduce its supplies OMV under its contract to supply
gas to Austria from 16 November. The volume affected (7,400 MWh per hour, or 178 GWh/d) equates
to 16.4 MMcm/d (6 Bcma).10
The first three days of the suspension of Gazprom supplies to OMV (16-18 November) saw flows from
Ukraine to Slovakia and Slovakia to Austria continue at broadly similar levels. It remains to be seen
whether this is the result of SPP raising its daily nominations under its own contract with Gazprom, and
then re-selling the volumes to Austrian buyers, or if it is the result of Gazprom selling spot volumes to
non-OMV buyers delivering to Austria. In any case, the situation is likely to change again in six weeks’
time, when the contract for transit via Ukraine expires.
Figure 4: Daily pipeline flows in South-Eastern Europe since 1 October 2023 (MMcm per day)
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
-
01 Oct 23 01 Dec 23 01 Feb 24 01 Apr 24 01 Jun 24 01 Aug 24 01 Oct 24

TR-BG BG-RS RS-HU BG-RO

Note: TF-BG (Turkey to Bulgaria); BG-RS (Bulgaria to Serbia); RS-HU (Serbia to Hungary); BG-RO (Bulgaria to
Romania). Daily flows are represented by solid lines and daily capacities by dotted lines.
Source: Data from ENTSOG Transparency Platform, 1 October 2023 to 16 November 2024.11 Graph by the
author.

8
OMV, 2024. OMV successfully receives arbitral award in relation to its German gas supplies from Gazprom Export. Press
Release, 13 November. https://www.omv.com/en/news/241113-omv-successfully-receives-arbitral-award-in-relation-to-its-
german-gas-supplies-from-gazprom-export
9
The arbitration concerned a shortfall in in Gazprom supplies to OGMT in Germany in 2022
10
CEGH, 2024. Information on gas supplies under Gazprom Export contract for Austrian Market Area East. CEGH REMIT
platform for publication of inside information, 15 November. https://www.gashub.at/remit/details.xhtml?id=52028-2-2024
11
ENTSOG, 2023. Transparency Platform. https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/map

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 5
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
As illustrated in the graph above, the ability of Gazprom to send additional gas into South-Eastern
Europe to offset the loss of transit via Ukraine is limited. On the Turkey-Bulgaria border, the daily
capacity is 53.5 MMcm/d (585 GWh/d), which suggests only 10 MMcm/d of spare capacity relative to
flows over the past year, and just 7-8 MMcm/d of spare capacity relative to flows in the period July-
October 2024. The ability to bring these additional volumes north into Central Europe, from Bulgaria to
Hungary via Serbia, is also constrained by the capacity to move gas across the border from Serbia to
Hungary (23 MMcm/d), which has been more or less fully utilised since March 2024. The ability to flow
more Russian gas to Hungary via Romania is also capped by cross-border capacity at Csanadpalota
(79 GWh/d, or 7.2 MMcm/d), which was fully utilised from late May until the end of October, before a
decline in utilisation in early November.
Overall, pipeline imports into Europe are therefore expected to be in a range of 340-350 MMcm/d from
Norway, 85-95 MMcm/d from North Africa, 33 MMcm/d from Azerbaijan, giving a non-Russian total of
458-478 MMcm/d. Russian supply via Turkish Stream is expected in a range of 40-50 MMcm/d, while
transit via Ukraine of 37-42 MMcm/d is expected to cease on 31 December 2024. Therefore, total
European pipeline imports are expected to be in a range of 535-570 MMcm/d in November-December,
falling to 498-528 MMcm/d in January-March 2025.
Given the expected end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, it is also worth noting that Ukraine’s gas
imports since November 2023 have been limited and sourced almost exclusively from Hungary. Since
October 2023, the ‘commercial’ and ‘physical’ exit flows across the border to Slovakia reported by the
Ukrainian TSO (TSOUA) have been identical, which suggests that Ukraine has not been utilising
backhaul (‘virtual reverse flow’) to import gas from Slovakia over the past year. However, it is notable
that on 1 November 2024, Ukraine’s gas storage stocks (87.0 TWh) were notably lower than on the
same date in 2023 (125.9 TWh) and 2022 (105.3 TWh). 12 These lower stocks increase the possibility
that Ukraine will need imports during the winter, but an absence of transit means that backhaul will not
be an option, while the tighter Central European market means that physical imports will be more
expensive.

4. European LNG imports

Given the lack of upside flexibility from European production and limited upside flexibility from pipeline
imports, LNG imports will be the main non-storage source of supply-side flexibility this winter. That
flexibility exists both in the ability to increase monthly supply – in line with seasonal demand – by
attracting additional cargoes and the ability to increase daily supply by flexing sendout.
In summer 2022 and winter 2023/24, Europe’s LNG import growth and demand reduction equally offset
the decline in pipeline supply from Russia. But as European demand continued to decline year-on-year,
LNG imports stabilised in summer 2023 before falling in winter 2023/24 and summer 2024. Monthly
LNG sendout ranged from 420 to 470 MMcm/d in winter 2022/23 (November to March) and 339-430
MMcm/d in winter 2023/24.

12
Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2024. Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) - Ukraine. https://agsi.gie.eu/data-
overview/VGS--UGS-UKRAINE/UA/21X0000000013279

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 6
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 5: EU-27 plus UK daily LNG sendout (MMcm per day)
600

500

400

300

200

100

-
01 Jun 2023

01 Jun 2024
01 Nov 2022
01 Dec 2022

01 Apr 2023
01 May 2023

01 Apr 2024
01 May 2024
01 Jan 2023

01 Aug 2023

01 Nov 2023
01 Dec 2023

01 Aug 2024

01 Nov 2024
01 Feb 2023
01 Mar 2023

01 Sep 2023

01 Jan 2024
01 Feb 2024
01 Mar 2024

01 Sep 2024
01 Oct 2022

01 Oct 2023

01 Oct 2024
01 Jul 2023

01 Jul 2024
Source: Data for 1 October 2022 to 16 November 2024 from GIE ALSI13 and National Gas Transmission (UK).14
Figure 6: European LNG sendout by region (MMcm per day)
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
-

Iberia Mediterranean NE Europe NW Europe UK Total

Source: Data from GIE ALSI15 and National Gas Transmission (UK).16 Graph by the author. 17

13
GIE, 2023. Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI). https://alsi.gie.eu/#/historical/1
14
National Gas Transmission, 2023. Gas Transmission Data. https://data.nationalgas.com/find-gas-data
15
GIE, 2023. Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI). https://alsi.gie.eu/#/historical/1
16
National Gas Transmission, 2023. Gas Transmission Data. https://data.nationalgas.com/find-gas-data
17
The regions are Iberia (Spain, Portugal), Mediterranean (Italy, Croatia, Greece), NW Europe (France, Belgium, Netherlands,
Germany), NE Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Finland), and UK. Sendout data for Sweden, Malta, and Gibraltar is not available.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 7
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
In terms of Europe’s regasification capacity, new Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs)
were added at Eemshaven (Netherlands), Wilhelmshaven, Lubmin, Brunsbüttel (Germany), Le Havre
(France), Piombino (Italy) and Inkoo (Finland) in 2022-23.
Ahead of winter 2024/25, the Lubmin FSRU was relocated 40km north to Mukran and its capacity more
than doubled with the addition of a second FSRU. The first post-expansion cargo was received on 28
August. No cargoes then arrived in the following six weeks, before two in quick succession on 17 and
28 October. Sendout at Mukran exceeded 100 GWh/d for the first time on 4 November.18 Those German
FSRUs are seemingly foreclosed to Russian LNG supplies. On 14 November, the German Economy
Ministry instructed the operator of the Brunsbüttel FSRU, Deutsche Energy Terminal, not to accept a
Russian cargo that had reportedly been destined for the facility.19 In Greece, the Alexandroupoli FSRU
began commercial operations on 1 October. 20
Germany is awaiting two additional FSRUs, namely a second for Wilhelmshaven and one for Stade. As
we noted in our most recent Quarterly Gas Market Review, the FSRU Excelsior (destined for
Wilhelmshaven) remains at the Spanish port of Ferrol but is expected to begin operations at
Wilhelmshaven before the end of 2024. The FSRU Energos Force arrived at Stade on 15 March but is
not yet ready for commercial operations and no timescale for start-up has been confirmed.
In the year to date, growth in global LNG supply has been limited while growth in non-European LNG
demand has been robust, with lower European LNG imports helping to balance the market. Looking
ahead to winter 2024/25, this tight market could see a temperature-driven surge in northern hemisphere
demand. Therefore, the key issues to watch will be any delays in the ramp up at Plaquemines or Corpus
Christi, any curtailments at other liquefaction plants (such as the Freeport shut-in that lasted from mid-
January to early May 2024) and any seasonal surge in LNG demand in North-East Asia.
For this reason, our Winter Outlook scenario assumes sendout from European LNG regasification
terminals in winter 2024/25 will be: 350 MMcm/d in November (up from the average of 332 MMcm/d in
1-16 November), rising to 422 MMcm/d in December (the mid-point between the monthly averages for
December 2022 and December 2023). Thereafter, we estimate sendout in Q1 2025 at 450 MMcm/d in
January, 440 MMcm/d in February and 430 MMcm/d in March – slightly higher than levels seen in Q1
2023 and an average of 75 MMcm/d higher than the levels seen in Q1 2024, as Europe seeks to offset
the loss of Russian supply via Ukraine.
Assuming stable year-on-year LNG supply from existing projects and the two US projects starting on
schedule (albeit with limited contribution to global supply in Q1 2025), the extent to which any surge in
European LNG demand will drive higher prices depends on the strength of LNG demand outside
Europe.

18
Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2024. Aggregated LNG System Inventory (ALSI) – Mukran LNG Terminal. https://alsi.gie.eu/data-
overview/37W000000000114D/DE/37X000000000265F
19
Rashad, M., and Wacket, M., 2024. Germany rejects arrival of Russian LNG shipment at Brunsbuttel terminal, sources say.
Reuters, 14 November. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-tells-ports-reject-russian-gas-cargoes-ft-reports-
2024-11-14/
20
Gastrade, 2024. Commercial Operations of Gastrade’s Alexandroupolis LNG Terminal begins. Press Release, 1 October.
https://www.gastrade.gr/en/2024/10/01/commercial-operations-of-gastrades-alexandroupolis-lng-terminal-begins/

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 8
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
5. Global LNG market tightness
On the supply side, the majority of Europe’s LNG imports in winter 2024/25 will be sourced from the
United States, Qatar, Russia and Algeria.
Figure 7: EU-27 plus UK LNG imports by source (MMcm per month)
16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

United States Qatar Russian Federation Algeria Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago Other

Source: Data from Kpler LNG Platform.21 Graph by the author.22

The only notable new supply from those sources in winter 2024/25 will be the 20 mtpa Plaquemines
project led by Venture Global and Cheniere’s 10 mtpa expansion of its Corpus Christi liquefaction plant.
On 6 November, Reuters reported that US Federal Regulators have given Venture Global permission
to introduce gas into the plant as part of the commissioning process. 23 Data from Kpler shows two LNG
carriers controlled by Venture Global – the Venture Gator and Venture Bayou – anchored close to the
mouth of the Mississippi River, ready to receive the first cargoes. 24 The plant consists of thirty-six
‘midscale’ trains of 0.626 mtpa, arranged in eighteen blocks (two trains per block). Each 10 mtpa of
capacity will consist of nine blocks. The project is expected to begin commercial operations by the end
of the year, with capacity growing as blocks are brought online.
At Corpus Christi, Cheniere operates three trains with a total capacity of 15 mtpa. The 10 mtpa
expansion project consists of seven ‘midscale’ trains of 1.429 mtpa each, which will be launched
sequentially. In its Q3 2024 results, Cheniere said it expects first production from the expansion project
by the end of 2024, but that substantial completion of the seven trains will take place between H1 2025
and H2 2026.25

21
Kpler, 2023. LNG Platform. https://lng.kpler.com/
22
Note that these are gross LNG imports, and therefore do not account for re-exports.
23
Reuters, 2024. Federal regulators give Venture Global permission to introduce natural gas into LNG plant. Reuters, 6
November. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/federal-regulators-give-venture-global-permission-introduce-natural-
gas-into-lng-2024-11-06/
24
Kpler LNG Platform [subscription required]
25
Cheniere, 2024. Cheniere Reports Third Quarter 2024 Results and Raises Full Year 2024 Financial Guidance. Press
Release, 31 October. https://lngir.cheniere.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/308/cheniere-reports-third-quarter-2024-
results-and-raises-full

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 9
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
In the case of both Plaquemines and Corpus Christi, even if both launch commercial operations before
the end of 2024, the ramp-up of capacity through the sequential launching of the midscale trains means
that new supply available to Europe in Q1 2025 will be limited.
In this context of limited new supply, year-on-year declines in European LNG demand since September
2023 have offset growth in LNG demand in China, Emerging Asia (mostly India, plus Thailand in late
2023), Developed Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), and Other (mostly Egypt, and to
a lesser extent, Central and South America). This growth in non-European LNG demand over the past
year means that the ‘base level’ of non-European LNG demand going into winter 2024/25 is higher than
it would have been without the past year’s growth.
Figure 8: Year-on-year change in global LNG imports by destination (MMcm per month)
12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

(2,000)

(4,000)

(6,000)

(8,000)

Europe China Developed Asia Emerging Asia Other (inc Turkey) Total

Source: Data from Kpler LNG Platform.26 Graph by the author.27

In terms of winter peaks, it is worth noting that China and the developed economies of North-East Asia
have the strongest seasonality of demand (along with Turkey). Conversely, there are no such
December-February peaks in LNG demand in the emerging economies of South-East Asia, the Middle
East or South & Central America. Therefore, a key factor in the volume of LNG available to Europe
during winter 2024/25 – and the price that European buyers will have to pay to secure those cargoes –
will be the extent of winter peak demand in China and the rest of North-East Asia.
The expectation that market tightness will continue through the coming winter and into 2025 is illustrated
by forward prices for TTF as illustrated below. The lack of storage injections in October, an early start
to storage drawdown, the probable cessation of Russian gas transit via Ukraine and anticipation of
substantial gas demand for storage replenishment amid a tight global LNG market in summer 2025
have contributed to expectation for firm prices throughout winter and into summer.

26
Kpler, 2023. LNG Platform. https://lng.kpler.com/
27
Note that these are gross LNG imports, and therefore do not account for re-exports.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 10
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 9: Historic front-month and forward prices for TTF (USD per MMBtu)
18.00

16.00

14.00

12.00

10.00

8.00

6.00
01 Apr 23 01 Oct 23 01 Apr 24 01 Oct 24 01 Apr 25 01 Oct 25 01 Apr 26 01 Oct 26

TTF Front-Month Actual Forward (11 Oct 2023) Forward (02 Apr 2024)
Forward (16 Oct 2024) Forward (15 Nov 2024)

Source: Data from EIKON Refinitiv (S&P Global). Graph by the author.

6. Higher and more volatile European gas demand this winter

After two mild winters, La Niña phenomenon is expected to bring colder temperatures in Europe in the
coming months. This will increase gas use for heating, but nothing out of the ordinary for the region.
While the overall level of demand remains low by historical standards, short-term spikes in gas demand
are to be expected, especially when cold snaps combine with low availability of renewables in the power
sector. These episodes will require flexible and rapidly available gas supply, notably from storage.

Early winter gas demand remains muted despite timid industrial sector rebound
Gas demand in Europe remains well below pre-crisis levels. 28 Observed gas demand in EU-27 plus
UK dropped to an annualized 385 Bcm at the end of October, roughly 103 Bcm lower than pre-crisis
gas demand in 2021. In the first ten months of 2024, it was down by 2 per cent year-on-year despite
lower year-on-year gas prices (at least until May and for most of October).
Signs of a rebound have been clearly visible in the industrial sector since mid-2023 driven by the
petroleum and fertilizer sectors, while gas demand for other gas-intensive sectors remained weak. In
2024, gas use in the industrial sector rose by over 5 per cent year-on-year over the period that runs
from January to the end of October but remains nonetheless well below historical levels. Low
manufacturing output, a Manufacturing PMI 29 below 50 (the twenty-eighth consecutive months of

28
Gas demand is driven by a combination of factors and the biggest difficulty to analyse the impact of these drivers comes from
the lack of timely, detailed and consistent data that would allow for an accurate analysis of drivers and trends. When
detailed data is available, there are also differences in methodologies and definitions, which complicates comparison
between national markets and between sectors. The charts in this section are based on various sources of publicly available
statistics and this author’s calculations to complete and make the data uniform. The conclusions and outlook presented here
are based on the author’s analysis of this data.
29
PMI = Purchasing Managers Index is a measure of the prevailing direction of economic trends in manufacturing. The HCOB
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI is compiled by S&P Global from responses to monthly questionnaires sent to survey panels of
manufacturers in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland and Greece, totalling around 3,000 private
sector companies. The headline figure is the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which is a weighted average of the

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 11
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
contraction) and the still rather gloomy economic outlook will continue to place a cap on the recovery
of industrial gas demand. Price-responsive demand reductions in industrial sectors, which compete
globally, may emerge if gas prices keep on rising, although large industrials are likely to have hedged
their price risk earlier this year when prices were lower.
A similar picture seems to emerge for gas use in the commercial sector, although analysis is limited by
the quality of short-term data which does not differentiate between residential and commercial gas
demand. As a whole, gas use in the residential and commercial sector increased by 5.4 per cent year-
on-year in January-October, and the commercial sector was likely the main driver behind the 7 per cent
year-on-year demand growth in Q2 and an important share of the 23 per cent year-on-year growth in
Q3, especially for July and August. Rising gas prices over the winter will hit the commercial sector
harder than large industrials as risk mitigation strategies may not be as widespread.
Aside from the fragile and relatively small rebound in the industrial and commercial sectors, gas demand
in Europe this winter is expected to be mainly influenced by temperature and the availability of
renewables in the power sector.

Winter temperatures critical to residential heating demand

Weather remains the biggest risk for gas demand in winter in Europe. Temperature impacts gas use
across all sectors, but it is particularly true in the residential and commercial sector, which account for
almost half of winter demand. Five straight weeks of colder temperatures from early September kicked
off gas use for heating earlier this year in several countries, boosting gas demand in the residential and
commercial sector by 35 per cent year-on-year in September and by 19 per cent year-on-year in
October, driving it to pre-crisis levels, as illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Gas demand in the residential and commercial sector in EU-27 plus UK, 2019-2024
(Bcm per month)

Source: Data from author’s calculations based on various sources, including IEA, Eurostat, ENTSOG, GRTgaz,
Terega, THE, SNAM, Enagas and NGT. Graph by the author.

following five indices: New Orders (30%), Output (25%), Employment (20%), Suppliers’ Delivery Times (15%) and Stocks of
Purchases (10%). For the PMI calculation the Suppliers’ Delivery Times Index is inverted so that it moves in a comparable
direction to the other indices. The index varies between 0 and 100, with a reading above 50 indicating an overall increase
compared to the previous month, and below 50 an overall decrease. https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-
area/manufacturing-pmi

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 12
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
After two consecutive winters with warmer-than-average weather, early indications show a high
probability that Western and Central Europe will be hit by colder temperatures due to La Niña
phenomenon (although temperatures may still be warmer than the long-term average). The buildout of
alternative heating systems (such as heat pump installations) across Europe is slow and the impact on
gas demand this winter will still be marginal. A normal winter (as opposed to the two mild winters of
2022/23 and 2023/24) could boost total gas demand by at least 8-10 Bcm and a cold one by at least
20-25 Bcm compared to last year.
The level of demand response will also be a key determinant on how much gas is used in the coming
months. While consumers’ willingness to reduce their energy for heating is still higher than pre-crisis, it
also appears to be eroding. A change in behaviour driven by record-high prices and energy-saving
campaigns had clear impacts on gas use in winter 2022/23 (and accounted for a reduction of at least
10 to 15 Bcm year-on-year). Last winter, consumer demand restraint continued to some degree but
clearly eroded during episodes of colder temperatures. This winter, judging from the past few weeks of
relative cold temperatures in September and October, it may be that consumers have taken another
step toward old habits as heating was turned on even during these episodes of not very cold
temperatures compared to what can traditionally be seen in January and February. If this trend
continues, it will boost gas demand further this winter.

More frequent short term peak demand driven by the power generation sector
Taking into account the timid industrial rebound, colder temperatures this winter (albeit still above
historical standards) and continued lower demand in the power sector, we anticipate a rise of just over
10 Bcm year-on-year this winter, which is not unusual for Europe and should not cause any major
tightness in the market, although it will increase storage draws for space heating. But the devil might
be in the detail.
Figure 11: Year-on-year change in gas demand in the EU-27 plus UK in the three major sectors
(Bcm per month and per cent)

Source: Data from author’s calculations based on various sources, including IEA, Eurostat, ENTSOG, GRTgaz,
Terega, THE, SNAM, Enagas and NGT. Graph by the author.

The power sector has been the main driver of lower gas demand in Europe since late 2022 [Figure 11].
This year, the 14 per cent year-on-year decline in January-October was due to the combination of
improved nuclear availability (French nuclear generation is back to historical levels), hydro power back

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 13
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
at normal levels, and strong expansion of renewables, which have pushed fossil fuels down the merit
order most of the time, including gas-power plants.
The continued build-out of wind and solar capacity is pushing structural changes, with renewables
consistently covering almost 50 per cent of monthly electricity generation in 2024. However,
dispatchable generation capacity remains essential to integrate such a large share of intermittent
renewables and gas plants in particular still play a major role in balancing power grids. At the regional
level (national pictures are more varied), the daily generation mix clearly shows a correlation between
renewables (wind in particular) and gas generation: when wind availability is good, the use of gas plants
is low, and conversely, when wind is limited, gas plants ramp up to make up for the shortfall [Figure 12].
Variable weather conditions bringing renewable power generation up and down in winter are normal
and to be expected, and days of low wind generation will invariably lift the call on gas-fired power plants,
which continue to act as the main back-up capacity to wind. This in turn will trigger short-term spikes in
gas demand. When this happens during episodes of cold temperatures (which increase both gas and
electricity demand for heating), spikes in gas use can be important, as seen for a couple of weeks in
January, and again at the beginning of November [Figure 12]. These episodes bolstered the call on gas
storage by about 10 Bcm in January (from 6 to 19 January) and 2 Bcm in November (from 3 to 10
November).
Strong seasonality, sudden and short-term spikes in gas demand over the winter and the need to use
storage are also nothing new in Europe. But the market has evolved over the past two-three years and
the flexibility on the demand side has deteriorated and seems rather limited this winter. First, most of
the low hanging fruit of energy savings have probably been harvested after three years of low gas
demand. Second, the greatest source of flexibility in winter and the most price-responsive segment of
gas consumption came from the ability to switch between coal and gas plants in the power sector, which
is now rather limited by the fast decline of coal- and lignite-fired generation capacity across Europe. In
other words, gas demand in the power sector has become more volatile, somewhat less predictable
and importantly, less price responsive (i.e., when gas plants are used to back-up and/or balance the
system).
Figure 12: Daily gas demand and net storage withdrawals (MMcm per day) in EU-27 plus UK in
January 2024 and from 11 October to 10 November 2024, compared with power generation from
wind and gas (GWh per day)

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 14
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Note: Left axis: daily gas demand and net storage withdrawals in MMcm per day; right axis: electricity generation
from wind and gas in GWh per day

Source: Gas demand data from author’s calculations based on various sources, including IEA, Eurostat,
ENTSOG, GRTgaz, Terega, THE, SNAM, Enagas and NGT, Electricity generation based on ENTSOE data,
Storage data from GIE. Graphs by the author.

7. European storage starts winter lower

Storage remains the most flexible source of incremental European gas supply during the winter months
and withdrawals can be ramped up and down at short notice. At the start of winter 2024/25, the EU-27
has made significant use of storage supply through smaller injections and greater withdrawals. Net
injection between 1 October and 1 November 2024 (1.0 Bcm) was the second smallest since at least
2017, while the net withdrawal in the period 1-16 November 2024 (4.5 Bcm) was the largest since at
least 2017. Therefore, while EU-27 stocks on 1 October 2024 (99.9 Bcm) were just 0.8 Bcm lower year-
on-year, stocks on 16 November 2024 were 8.0 Bcm lower year-on-year.
At an EU-27 level, daily sendout capacity is not a constraint. Since 1 January 2017, EU-27 daily storage
withdrawal has never exceeded 60 per cent of daily withdrawal capacity and has rarely exceeded 50
per cent of sendout capacity.30 At present, EU-27 daily sendout capacity is roughly 1,840 MMcm/d. In
winter 2023/24, monthly net withdrawal peaked at 550 MMcm/d in January, shouldered by net
withdrawals of 377-304 MMcm/d in December and February, and lower levels of 127-139 MMcm/d in
November and March.
It is also unlikely that stocks will be fully depleted over the course of winter 2024/25, unless a major
supply disruption occurs. Since 1 January 2017, the lowest EU-27 stock level has been 17.8 Bcm, which
occurred on 31 March 2018. Getting back to that level would imply a net withdrawal of 78.6 Bcm in the
135 days from 17 November 2024 to 31 March 2025, at a flat rate of 582 MMcm/d. Although EU-27
monthly net withdrawals have exceeded that rate on three occasions since January 2017,31 withdrawals
since January 2017 have never exceeded 550 MMcm/d in consecutive months.

30
On three days in 2017, five days in 2018, and 11 days in January-February 2021
31
Reaching 716-757 MMcm/d in January 2017, February 2018, and January 2021

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 15
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 13: EU-27 storage net injection in October and net withdrawal in 1-16 November (Bcm)
7.0 6.4
6.0
5.0 4.2 4.4
3.9
4.0
3.0 2.3
2.0 1.3
1.0
1.0 0.6
-0.0
-
-1.0 -0.2
-0.7 -0.9
-2.0
-1.9
-3.0
-4.0 -3.3
-3.8
-5.0 -4.5
-6.0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Injection 1 October to 1 November Withdrawal 1-16 November

Source: Data from GIE Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI).32

Figure 14: EU-27 daily gas storage stocks (Bcm)
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-
01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 01 Feb 01 Mar 01 Apr 01 May 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep
Range 2017/18 to 2021/22 Average 2017/18 to 2021/22
2022/23 2023/24
Source: Data from GIE Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI).33

The main issues regarding storage are how much is withdrawn in winter 2024/25 and how much needs
to be replenished in summer 2025 ahead of the 2025/26 winter. The key metrics are: 1) start of winter
stocks relative to the start of winter 2023/24; 2) the volume of net storage withdrawal in winter 2024/25
relative to 2023/24; and 3) the end of winter stocks on 31 March 2025 compared to 31 March 2024.

32
GIE, 2023. Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI). https://agsi.gie.eu/#/
33
GIE, 2023. Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI). https://agsi.gie.eu/#/

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 16
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
On 1 November 2024, EU-27 stocks were 100.9 Bcm. Yet by 16 November 2024, EU-27 storage stocks
were 96.4 Bcm, down from 104.4 Bcm a year earlier (-8.0 Bcm year-on-year). On 31 March 2024,
stocks were 61.8 Bcm, implying a net withdrawal of 42.5 Bcm between 16 November 2023 and 31
March 2024. If the net withdrawal between 16 November and 31 March in winter 2024/25 is the same
year-on-year, end of winter stocks on 31 March 2025 will be 53.9 Bcm. That, in turn, would imply a
summer net injection of over 45 Bcm to get back to stocks of 100 Bcm on 1 November, or a net injection
of around 50 Bcm to get back to stocks of 104 Bcm (effectively full capacity).
A major influential factor on storage withdrawals and replenishment over the coming year is the
cessation of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, which is currently 1.2 Bcm per month (roughly 40
MMcm/d). If that loss in Q1 2025 is balanced exclusively by additional storage withdrawals, an additional
3.6 Bcm will be taken out of European storage. Moreover, the greater stock replenishment in Q2 and
Q3 2025 will take place in conditions of European pipeline gas supply continuing to be 1.2 Bcm per
month lower year-on-year, which equates to a loss of supply of 7.2 Bcm over six months in Q2-3.
If the volume of Russian gas not delivered via Ukraine in Q1 2025 is entirely offset by greater storage
withdrawals, then end of winter stocks could be 50.3 Bcm, thus requiring summer replenishment of 49.7
Bcm to get back to 100 Bcm by 1 November, or 54.7 Bcm to get back to full capacity (105 Bcm). For
comparison, EU-27 net storage injection between 31 March and 1 November 2024 was 39.0 Bcm.
In short, in a winter with storage withdrawal the same as in winter 2023/24 but starting from lower stocks
and offsetting the loss of Russian transit via Ukraine, in summer 2025 the EU-27 could need to inject
10-15 Bcm more year-on-year into storage. Given that, after two successive mild winters, a return to a
‘normal’ winter (not to mention a ‘cold’ winter) could see higher European gas demand, the storage
drawdown and subsequent need for replenishment in summer 2025 could be even greater than the 10-
15 Bcm year-on-year increase noted above. Indeed, the year-on-year change has already begun, with
Europe failing to match 2023 injections volumes in October 2024, and then starting a notable stock
draw in November 2024 that was not seen in November 2023.While the EU-27 is unlikely to experience
sustained capacity constraints on daily withdrawals or an insufficiency of stocks overall, the key point
is that the greater the storage withdrawal in winter 2024/25, the greater the need for replenishment in
summer 2025, under what appear set to remain tight market conditions. Indeed, by starting the winter
of 2024/25 with stocks lower year-on-year and anticipating the loss of Russian pipeline supply via
Ukraine from 1 January 2025, Europe will require a greater year-on-year stock replenishment in
summer 2025. The next four months will determine the size of that year-on-year increase in storage
replenishment requirement.

Conclusion: Winter scenario based on current trends in supply and demand

The scenario below combines the assumptions regarding supply and demand discussed above, with
storage withdrawals as the balancing item. The figures for October and the first half of November are
historic data for actual supply and demand, 34 while the figures for the period from mid-November 2024
to March 2025 are the result of our scenario. As noted in the previous section, any surge in demand or
curtailment of production or imports will most likely be met primarily by additional storage withdrawals,
and secondarily by higher prices attracting additional LNG cargoes, with the consequence being the
need for greater volumes of net storage injections in summer 2025. It is our assessment that the risk of
deviation from this scenario is in the direction of a tighter market with higher prices.
On the supply side, the risk of a tighter market is driven by the limited amount of potential extra supply
available from production and pipeline imports. Compared to our scenario, we could perhaps see an
additional 5-10 MMcm/d of Norwegian supply and 5-10 MMcm/d of North African supply over the course
of the winter. Conversely, any unexpected substantial curtailment in Norwegian supply could reduce
overall European supply by substantially more than that upside.

34
Gas demand data for November are our estimates based on preliminary data, as are the data for EU-27 gas production.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 17
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
If European demand surges beyond the potential upside from pipeline imports, European price
escalation could attract additional LNG cargoes. Here, the key issues are not the global availability of
LNG nor is it the availability of European regasification capacity, but how far European buyers need to
move up the price curve to secure additional spot cargoes. Europe remains exposed to a global LNG
market that is more likely to experience a surge in winter demand and/or unexpected curtailment in
supply than a market at risk of a supply surge and/or slump in demand.
On the demand side, Europe is on its way for another small decline in 2024 as a whole (-2 per cent), a
third consecutive year of contraction. The outlook for winter 2024/25 is a year-on-year gas demand
increase of about 10 Bcm, driven by colder temperatures, but overall, well within normal seasonal
fluctuations for the region. Any risks on the demand side are largely weather driven: temperature and
wind availability. Cold snaps could test the resilience of the system if they coincide with other market
tighteners like the end to Ukraine transit. Another risk, or uncertainty, comes from the growing exposure
to wind generation in the power sector, for which gas plants remain the main source of back-up in
Europe. This evolution triggers additional fluctuations in gas use, for which size and duration are hard
to predict.
The key outcome of our scenario, based on the supply and demand assumptions discussed above and
using storage as the balancing item, is that Europe could draw 57.3 Bcm from storage between 1
November and 31 March, thus ending the winter with stocks of 43.7 Bcm. That would imply a 17 Bcm
year-on-year increase in net storage injections between 1 April and 1 November 2025 to get stocks
back to 100 Bcm, or a 21 Bcm increase to get stocks back to full capacity (105 Bcm). Given the lack of
upside from non-LNG supply, that additional volume for storage replenishment will need to come from
a global LNG market that is already tight, is likely to see only marginal supply growth over the next six
months and could see continued growth in non-European LNG demand.
To conclude, in a context of limited upside flexibility from production and pipeline imports, any year-on-
year growth in European gas demand over winter 2024/25 will result in increased European call on
LNG supplies and/or year-on-year growth in storage withdrawals. The global LNG market is large
enough and flexible enough to accommodate this and Europe started winter 2024/25 with more than
100 Bcm of gas in storage. Therefore, a physical shortage in winter 2024/25 is not a risk. However, the
need to call upon additional LNG supply in a currently tight market will place upward pressure on prices,
while a greater call on storage will imply greater need for storage replenishment in summer 2025 in
what promises to remain a tight market, which will also push prices higher than they would otherwise
have been, all other things being equal. In short, Europe is well-placed to cope with the coming winter,
but the tightness of the market does mean that any substantial shifts on the supply or demand side are
both likely to be in the direction of increased tightness, and likely to result in upward pressure on prices.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 18
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 15: EU-27 plus UK gas supply and demand in winter 2024/25: a scenario (MMcm per
day)
1,800
1,618 1,710
1,600 1,466
1,343 572 1,306
1,400 478
347
1,200 955 277 202

1,000
332 407 450 440
282 430
800

94 97 95
600 95 93 90
85 93 90 45 45 45
400
330 345 350 350 345 345
200
162 164 164 164 162 160
- (31)

(200)
Oct 2024 Nov 2024 Dec 2024 Jan 2025 Feb 2025 Mar 2025

Production Norway Russia N Africa Azerbaijan LNG Storage Demand

Figure 16: EU-27 plus UK gas supply and demand in winter 2024/25: a scenario (Bcm per
month)
55 53
50
50
45 43
40 18 41
15
40
30 10 6
35 8

30 13
10 14 13
25 9 13

20 3 3 3
3 3
3 3 3 1 3 1
15 1
10 10 10 11 11 10 11
5
5 5 5 5 5 5
-
(1)
(5)
Oct 2024 Nov 2024 Dec 2024 Jan 2025 Feb 2025 Mar 2025

Production Norway Russia N Africa Azerbaijan LNG Storage Demand

Source: Historic data from various sources for 1 October to 16 November 2024.35 Scenario assumptions for mid-
November 2024 to March 2025 by the authors. Graphs by the authors.

35
Eurostat, National Gas Transmission (UK), ENTSOG Transparency Platform, Gas Infrastructure Europe (Aggregated Gas
Storage Inventory & Aggregated LNG Storge Inventory), and Kpler LNG Platform

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 19
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.
Figure 17: EU-27 plus UK actual gas supply and demand in winter 2023/24 (MMcm per day)
1,800 1,664

1,600 1,459
1,292 1,336
1,400 551
304 1,193
1,200 897 139 277
127
1,000
430 407 395 360 339
800 339
90 88 75 93
600 92 75
82 95 81 80 84
78
400
308 344 360 356 337 345
200
172 174 174 174 174 173
-
(127)
(200)
Oct 2023 Nov 2023 Dec 2023 Jan 2024 Feb 2024 Mar 2024

Production Norway Russia N Africa Azerbaijan LNG Storage Demand

Figure 18: EU-27 plus UK actual gas supply and demand in winter 2023/24 (Bcm per month)
55 52
50 45
45
39 17 39
40 9 37
4
35 28 8 4
30 13
13 12 11
25 11 10

20 3 2 3
3 3 3 2
2 2 3
15 2 2

10 10 10 11 11 10 11

5
5 5 5 5 5 5
-
(4)
(5)
Oct 2023 Nov 2023 Dec 2023 Jan 2024 Feb 2024 Mar 2024

Production Norway Russia N Africa Azerbaijan LNG Storage Demand

Source: Historic data from various sources for 1 October 2023 to 31 March 2024.36 Graphs by the authors.

36
Eurostat, National Gas Transmission (UK), ENTSOG Transparency Platform, Gas Infrastructure Europe (Aggregated Gas
Storage Inventory & Aggregated LNG Storge Inventory), and Kpler LNG Platform

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views 20
of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.