Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform

EN EN
1. RATIONALE AND SCOPE

Security sector reform (SSR) is the process of transforming a country’s security system 1 so
that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable
security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and
the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the
heart of power relations in a country. It needs to be nationally driven and requires political
commitment and leadership, inter-institutional cooperation and broad stakeholder
participation to achieve the widest possible consensus.

Conflict, insecurity, and instability are widespread, including in countries directly

neighbouring the EU.2 They lead to human suffering, forced displacement and dire
development outcomes3, as recognised by EU development policy4, in work on security and
development in general and in the United Nations Resolution Transforming our world: the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Goal 165 and its security-related targets.

Insecurity and instability are frequently generated or exacerbated by a lack of effective and
accountable security systems. Helping partner countries to reform their security systems
supports the EU’s objectives of peace and stability, inclusive and sustainable development,
state-building and democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international
law.6 As recognised in the 2015 European Agenda on Security7, which emphasises the strong
link between the EU’s internal and external security, conflict and insecurity in partner
countries, sometimes associated with violent extremism, also affect the EU’s internal security,
and that of EU citizens and EU trade and investment interests abroad.

The EU’s engagement on SSR to date is assessed in the Joint Staff Working Document 8
accompanying this Joint Communication, which summarises the findings from various
evaluations, ‘lessons identified’ reports, studies and consultations with stakeholders over the
past 15 years. The assessment concludes that there is room for improvement in the coherence,
complementarity and coordination of the EU’s capacities and instruments. It also underlines
that in-depth SSR is complex and requires long-term commitment, without prejudice to the
shorter-term initiatives that might be needed to address immediate security threats.
1
In line with the OECD-DAC’s SSR guidelines, a national security sector is seen as including the law
enforcement institutions (police, gendarmerie, customs, border guards, etc.), the criminal justice system (i.e.
penal courts, prosecutor’s office, corrections), the armed forces, the intelligence services, the institutions that
provide political, financial and judicial oversight (line ministries, parliamentary committees, court of
auditors, the judiciary, etc.) and non-state security actors, including customary authorities, traditional courts,
guerrillas and liberation armies, private military and security companies. See The OECD DAC handbook on
security system reform: supporting security and justice (OECD Publishing, Paris)
2
JOIN(2015) 50, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy
3
43% of those living in absolute poverty reside in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
4
COM(2011) 637 and Council conclusions Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for
Change, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012
5
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies
for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive
institutions at all levels’
6
In line with the provisions in the EU Treaties for the EU’s external action in general (Articles 21-22 TEU),
CFSP/CSDP (Articles 23-46 TEU), development cooperation policy (Articles 208-211 TFEU) and other
cooperation policies (Articles 212-213 TFEU).
7
European Agenda on Security, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2015) 185)
8
SWD(2016) 221
2
The EU’s diplomatic and financial, military and civilian, short-term and long-term
interventions should be anchored more securely in a single EU-wide SSR support framework
that takes account of the interlinkages between politics, security, justice, humanitarian
response9, development, conflict and fragility. Particularly in fragile, developing and
transition countries, SSR requires political, financial and technical support from international
partners. With its global reach, wide-ranging external policies, instruments, tools and well-
established presence and experience, the EU is well placed to support partner countries in this
respect, in coordination with other international actors, including the UN.

This Joint Communication10 provides elements for such a framework, as set out in the May
2015 Council conclusions11, including also for guiding the EU’s work on capacity building in
support of security and development12 (CBSD). It reflects the ‘comprehensive approach’ to
external conflict and crisis13 in bringing together common security and defence policy (CSDP)
and all other relevant common foreign and security policy (CFSP) tools, external action
instruments and freedom, security and justice actors, thus merging and updating two
previously separate EU policy concepts for SSR support 14. It will contribute to the
effectiveness of the Global Strategy on foreign and security policy15 and of the European
Agenda on Security16. It also takes account of relevant OECD-DAC decisions17 and, where
applicable, OECD-DAC directives in the field of peace and security.

This framework:

 applies to all EU actors and instruments: political/diplomatic, external action

instruments, crisis response18 and CSDP civilian and military actors at all levels. EU
Member States are encouraged to frame their bilateral SSR programmes within it,
inter alia through joint programming exercises, in line with the Council conclusions
on ‘stepping up joint programming’19;

 will guide the identification, planning and/or implementation/execution of all

EU SSR-related external action instruments/programmes/projects, including
CSDP tools with specific and/or partial mandates involving SSR-related activities.
While the focus is on EU support to security sectors in other countries, this Joint

9
In line with JOIN(2013) 30 final, humanitarian aid is to be provided in accordance with its specific modus
operandi, respectful of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, solely on the
basis of the needs of affected populations.
10
Initiative No 21 in Annex I of the Commission’s 2016 Work Programme (COM(2015) 610 final)
11
Council conclusions on CSDP, Council of the European Union (document 8971/15, May 2015)
12
JOIN(2015) 17 final, Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to
prevent and manage crises
13
JOIN(2013) 30 final, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises
14
A concept for European Community support for security sector reform, Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (SEC(2006) 658); and EU concept for ESDP
support to SSR (Council 12566/4/05), which was produced on the basis of the European Security Strategy - A
Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the European Council on December 2003
15
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign
and Security Policy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, June 2016
16
COM(2015) 185 final, The European Agenda on Security
17
For example the agreement to ‘update and modernise the ODA reporting directives on peace and security
expenditures’; see high-level meeting final communiqué (OECD DAC, 19 February 2016)
18
For the purpose of this Communication, crisis response does not encompass humanitarian aid.
19
See Council document 8831/16.
3
 Communication recognises the interdependence of security and justice. The
principles it sets out can also be applied to justice actors, where their roles and
functions have clear implications for the security sector.

 applies in all contexts, not only in conflict and post-conflict situations20, and is
sufficiently broad to allow adaptation to the needs of each specific situation.

2. WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE

The overarching goal of this EU-wide strategic framework is to help to make states more
stable and individuals more secure. To this end, it aims to enhance the EU’s effectiveness in
promoting and supporting:

A. partner countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state; and
B. the legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector of
partner countries.

A. ENSURING SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE

To be effective, a national security sector must:

 benefit from a clear and appropriate legal framework;

 be guided by appropriate security and justice policies and strategies; and
 consist of well-coordinated and cooperative institutions, each of which should be
properly structured and organised, with a clearly defined role, appropriate
procedures, skilled staff and resources.

It must take account of existing informal or non-governmental providers of security and

uphold the rule of law.

Human security

The first objective of a national security system must be to ensure the security of individuals,
as perceived and experienced by them. This involves upholding their fundamental freedoms 21
and properly assessing, in a participatory way, the security needs of different groups,
including the most vulnerable. The system should address the specific security needs of
women, minors, the elderly and minorities.

Reform efforts must be gender-sensitive22, to ensure that women and men have effective and
equal access to judicial and security services. To this end, the formulation or review of
national security policies should be informed by gender-based analysis. In addition, support
for victims of violence should be accompanied by preventive measures (e.g. legislation,
gender awareness-raising in police and military structures, tackling perpetrator impunity).

20
While the principles outlined in this Joint Communication also apply to enlargement countries, the accession
process involves different measures and procedures to ensure that the countries meet the accession criteria.
21
Starting with freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.
22
See Council conclusions on the 2016-2020 Gender Action Plan (document 13201/15)
4
Preventing and addressing transnational security threats

National security systems must also be effective in countering transnational security threats,
such as terrorism and organised crime in all its forms. Responses must include the
establishing or strengthening of international cooperation.

B. LEGITIMACY23, GOOD GOVERNANCE, INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles24

Security actors must respect and uphold human rights, without discrimination, for the general
population and their own members. The security sector must be subject to effective
democratic control and oversight25. It should operate within a clear and unambiguous legal
framework approved by the national legislator, including effective civilian control. Its budget
should be an integral part of the national budget and be discussed and approved by the
legislature, which must be able to exercise effective oversight. Consulting and involving civil
society should be standard practice in the development and monitoring of security and justice
policy and activities.

Good governance principles26

Transparency and openness should apply and legal guarantees be put in place to prevent
arbitrary decision-making. Recruitment and promotion procedures and appointments to senior
positions in the security structure should be based on clearly defined, publicly available
criteria. Official chains of command must be respected. The classification and dissemination
of, and access to, security sector documents (including procurement processes) should be
subject to officially agreed and predictable procedures. Information should be public, so as to
enhance transparency and understanding. Limitations to openness and transparency may be
justified on grounds of clearly defined public policy (e.g. data protection), but should always
be kept to a minimum.

The participation of all stakeholders in the reform process implies that national security
policies and strategies are developed through inclusive consultation processes. In particular,
women’s participation should be ensured in line with relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions27.

The security sector itself should be inclusive. Security forces should not exclude or
discriminate against any particular group. To avoid generating tension, resource allocation
should be public, justified and reflect legally defined roles/tasks. Women should have equal
opportunities and be empowered within the security forces.

23
For the purposes of this document, a security sector is deemed legitimate when: i. it respects internationally
accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles; ii. it applies the good governance principles
of transparency and openness, participation and inclusivity, and accountability; and iii. it fights corruption.
24
This is in line with Articles 3 and 21c TEU, which require the Union, in its relations with the wider world, to
uphold and promote its values and interests, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU’s policies,
including those on external relations, are in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
25
In the specific case of the judiciary, the separation of powers should be ensured so that judicial independence
is guaranteed and the courts are not subject to improper influence from the other branches of government or
from private or partisan interests.
26
See European Governance: A White Paper (COM(2001) 428); two other good governance principles
(effectiveness and coherence) are outlined under objective A and in chapter 3 respectively.
27
UNSC S/RES/1325 (2000); UNSC S/RES/2242 (2015) on women and peace and security
5
Effective internal accountability systems, such as internal inspection services and audits,
should be in place within individual security institutions, which should also be subject to
external financial and operational conduct control by the national court of auditors and other
oversight or equivalent bodies. Mechanisms such as vetting, codes of conduct, independent
complaints bodies and scrutiny by civil society also contribute to accountability. To avoid
impunity, it is important to uphold the principle of equality before the law, avoidance of
arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency when a security actor is brought to
justice. The remit of any separate military justice system should be clear and circumscribed;
in all cases, civilians should be tried by civilian courts.

Integrity and the fight against corruption

Trust between the population and security actors is crucial for the effectiveness of the security
sector. It is undermined by any instance of bribery, extortion, embezzlement of funds,
cronyism and nepotism. The financial resources allocated to the security sector should be
managed on the basis of the same good governance principles that apply to other public
sectors. Like other public procurement processes, the procurement of military and police
equipment and services should be subject to appropriate procedures, constraints and scrutiny.
Nationwide anti-corruption strategies should equally apply to security actors.

Sustainability

To be applicable and effective, security legislation, institutions and procedures should be

developed on the basis of nationally owned processes, in line with the ‘whole of society’
approach28. The commitment of key political, security and justice stakeholders, and the
support of civil society are essential.

In principle, levels of staffing, investment and financial resources should be based on proper
planning and be fiscally sustainable, so as not to jeopardise the provision of other essential
public services.

3. HOW WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IT

EU engagement in the security sector is based on a set of key elements and principles,
including the aid effectiveness principles29, which apply to security as much as to other areas
of cooperation.

Understand the security sector in its wider context

EU engagement in the security sector of a partner country or region will involve

understanding and factoring in the formal and informal rules that govern how security and
justice actors operate. Similar appreciation is needed for the interactions and power relations
between security, justice and non-security actors, and for existing conflict dynamics. 30
Political, socio-economic, cultural and historical awareness is key.

28
As outlined in the HORIZON 2020 - Work Programme 2016–2017, Societal Challenge 7: Secure societies –
Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens and Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing
world - inclusive, innovative and reflective societies.
29
See OECD-DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008);
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation; Fourth High-Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness
(Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011).
30
See the joint EEAS-Commission services Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU
external action.
6
The EU should base its political dialogue and action on prior analysis of a country’s security
sector and how it is situated within this wider context. EU Delegations have been instructed to
analyse and report on the security sector using existing reporting mechanisms. When a CSDP
mission is present, such analysis and reporting will be joint, in line with the ‘comprehensive
approach’. Member State embassies, in particular those with security and/or defence attachés,
will be invited to contribute information and expertise.

Where large-scale SSR support is envisaged, the EU will carry out a structured context
assessment (e.g. a political economy analysis) covering all stakeholders (e.g. security and
justice actors, including expected sources of resistance, drivers for change and groups
traditionally excluded from the security and justice institutions, such as women, young people
and minorities). This assessment should focus on security needs as perceived and experienced
by key demographic groups and how the security sector is addressing them.

The assessment should include analysis of existing national policies/strategies and budget,
local security and judicial practices, sources of insecurity and instability, potential risk factors,
observance of democratic governance and human security principles, how effectively
individuals’ security is protected, existing international cooperation and coordination, and
opportunities for support. It should identify specific security problems that EU assistance
could prioritise and the process of change to which the assistance can contribute. The EU
should promote shared analysis by involving relevant local and international actors and
sources of expertise. Wherever possible, national authorities will be involved in and, ideally,
lead such assessments. Peer review expertise may be mobilised.

In addition to informing the design of SSR support, such assessments will serve to establish
baselines against which to monitor the impact of EU engagement. They will be updated
regularly to keep track of changes and retain their usefulness for the implementation of
support.

Action box
As instructed, EU Delegations will include analysis of the security sector in their regular
reporting (together with CSDP missions where present). The EU should launch deeper
security sector assessments where significant engagement is envisaged.
Building on existing methodological documents, EEAS/Commission services will provide
guidance on how to carry out security sector analyses.

Enable broad national ownership

‘National ownership’ goes beyond a government’s acceptance of international actors’

interventions. Reform efforts will be effective and sustainable only if they are rooted in a
country’s institutions (including through budgetary commitment), owned by national security
and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole. This means that national
actors should steer the process and take overall responsibility for the results of interventions,
with external partners providing advice and support. It also means that all (state and non-
state) stakeholders, including marginalised groups, should be involved in efforts gradually to
build consensus around intervention in the security sector on the basis of nationally owned
and accepted strategies, where applicable. This is a challenge, as actors will have divergent
interests and some will resist reform.

In a crisis situation or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, when state institutions may be
weak or absent, the early stages of EU support should pave the way for national ownership on
the basis of a participatory process which includes civil society.

7
Action box
When engaging in SSR support activities, the EU should:
- assess political commitment to reform, likely sources of resistance and ways in which its
support can build constituencies that may come to support the change process;
- base its support on national policies, plans and strategies, and priority issues, where
relevant building on national processes or ongoing action; and
- involve all stakeholders, including non-state and civil society actors, from the
identification stage, to build the greatest possible consensus around interventions.

See the bigger picture

Security sector governance reflects the general governance situation of the country in question
and should be developed in the context of wider governance initiatives. The EU should
encourage partner governments and civil society to embed security sector issues in nationwide
multiannual development strategies and to link them as far as possible to ongoing or planned
governance efforts in other sectors. Equally, policy dialogues on public finance management
and transparency/budget oversight have to include the security sector.

SSR support should anticipate the impact it will have across the security sector and beyond.
The criminal justice chain and border management are clear examples of a strong
interconnection between various security and justice actors that calls for a holistic approach.
This does not mean that EU support must encompass the entire security sector of the partner
country; it may be most effective when it targets selected entry points that are more
accessible, susceptible to positive development and/or that maximise leverage.

To tackle identified security challenges, the EU may consider adopting a problem-solving

approach by developing programmes composed of different sets of interventions. It may be
that not all of them involve security and justice actors directly, but seek to engage a range of
stakeholders from different sectors. For instance, urban security programmes may include
support for local security services, urban planning and vocational training for young people.

Where feasible, effective and cost-efficient, budget support operations based on national
policy or strategy and clear and achievable security-related indicators should be encouraged
so as to strengthen national ownership and governance, in full compliance with the relevant
budget support guidelines.31

Systematic political and policy dialogue

SSR-related intervention should be systematically accompanied by broad sectoral dialogue

and supported by high-level political engagement. There must be read-across to political and
policy dialogue(s) on human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance issues, and
compliance with international obligations, inter alia in the field of international humanitarian
law. Progress in this respect will be monitored and evaluated throughout the intervention.
Political and policy dialogue can also serve to promote national ownership.

Action box
Where there is significant engagement, the EU and the partner country may discuss and
agree benchmarks and relevant mechanisms for regular review in order to measure progress
31
Budget Support Guidelines. Programming, Design and Management – A modern approach to Budget
Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European
Commission, September 2012
8
in security sector governance and effectiveness. These may take the form of a non-binding
instrument entailing political commitments32; specific arrangements will be made case by
case.

Coordinate EU support

In line with the ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflict and crisis, all EU diplomatic,
development and CSDP support action should be coherent, coordinated, complementary,
properly sequenced and in line with legal, policy and institutional frameworks. The aim is to
promote the effectiveness of EU SSR support. Where significant EU intervention in the
security sector is planned, the EU and the Member States should map SSR activities,
preferably with other international actors. This will enable information-sharing so as to
develop a common understanding of context and gather lessons identified and
recommendations to be fed into political and policy dialogue, adjustments to ongoing
programmes, the formulation of planned intervention, and programming processes.

This mapping could also form a basis on which EU actors jointly define common objectives
and develop a ‘coordination matrix’ (coordinated in the field by the EU Delegation), which
would enable them to identify appropriate links and sequencing between political dialogue,
cooperation activities/instruments and possible CSDP missions/operations. The coordination
matrix would be a living document, building, where relevant, on existing political frameworks
for crisis approach (PFCAs) and/or country programming frameworks and strategies,
including in the context of joint programming.

EU instruments are subject to different programming and decision-making procedures and

regulatory constraints, which stem from their respective legal bases. EU coordination matrices
at country level will not amend these rules but rather reflect a common understanding among
all EU actors as to priorities, objectives and their possible roles.

Such “coordination matrices” will identify risks, mitigating measures and, to the extent
possible, an exit strategy that is coherent with the partner country’s longer-term national plan
and financial capacity. They will form the basis for a monitoring and evaluation system
allowing measurement of progress and the impact of EU support. Where a single support
strategy is developed, such elements will be discussed directly and agreed at that level.

Action box
A comprehensive EU ‘coordination matrix’ will be developed in at least two countries in the
two years following adoption of this Joint Communication, in coherence with any existing
joint programming donor matrices.

Coordinate with other international actors

The EU in coordination with the Member States should seek synergies with other
international actors and seek to build consensus with them in line with Article 210 TFEU. To
this end, close cooperation will be sought with the UN, regional and other international
organisations (in particular those with a security mandate), bilateral partners active on
security-related issues and, where appropriate, specialised international NGOs. The security
sector should be an inherent part of in-country coordination among international
actors/donors. Where possible and applicable, international actors should consider framing
their actions around a nationally owned, single support strategy for security sector
development.

32
For example memoranda of understanding, joint statements, arrangements, etc.
9
Action box
Building on the ‘coordination matrix’, the EU in coordination with the Member States and
other international partners will promote a comprehensive international engagement around
a single security sector support strategy to be developed together with the partner country.

Be flexible and balance long-term systemic change and immediate security needs

Transforming any security sector involves a lengthy process that must take account of specific
institutional cultures and sensitivity to change. It requires long-term vision and engagement.
In each specific context, the EU needs to find the proper balance and coherence between such
long-term efforts and the need to meet individuals’ more pressing, often immediate, security
needs.

As the operational environment may change rapidly, especially in fragile states or

post-conflict, some actions may come to a standstill, or human rights or governance principles
may be violated. SSR support programmes will need to be adaptable.

Action box
When engaging in SSR-related activities, the EU should:
- set incremental and achievable targets;
- engage in short-term activities to build the confidence of security and justice actors, open
doors for future cooperation and sustain political and policy dialogue;
- adapt to rapidly changing operational conditions, especially in fragile or post-conflict
states. Where appropriate the intervention will be implemented using the flexibility under
the Union’s financial rules and procedures; and
- plan CSDP missions in support of SSR to reflect the need for long-term and sustainable
involvement in the security sector and entail close cooperation with the EU Delegations.

Measure progress: monitor and evaluate

The general monitoring and evaluation principles for projects and programmes apply to all
security sector interventions; in particular, it is important to:

- define baselines from the outset;

- establish clearly defined, feasible and time-bound targets and impact indicators
linked to clear criteria to measure the achievement of results and objectives; and

- allocate sufficient human and financial resources for internal monitoring.

Monitoring and evaluation activities should include qualitative and quantitative data-gathering
and analysis to integrate community and individual perceptions of change in line with people-
centred human security approaches.

Robust monitoring and regular evaluations of ongoing interventions will allow the EU (and
non-EU active partners) to take stock of progress, draw lessons and review activity.

10
Action box
The EEAS/Commission services will prepare joint monitoring and evaluation guidelines,
including indicators for security capacity-building and SSR-related activities applicable to all
external action instruments and missions.

Manage risk

SSR support entails risks which must be anticipated and for which mitigation measures must
be drawn up; these include:

i. insufficient national political commitment to change

Political commitment to reform may be insufficient or superficial; it may fade over
time. The EU must be equipped to gauge the real level of commitment on the side of
the partner country and plan its engagement accordingly. In some contexts, it could
start with small interventions that aim to foster confidence and national political
commitment and scale up at a later stage. Engagement with civil society may be an
entry point.

ii. negative unintended consequences

No intervention is neutral and support to the security sector demands a ‘do no harm’
approach33 that factors in underlying sources of conflict. Context analysis will help
EU actors to avoid unintended negative impacts on conflict dynamics, for example
by:
 inadvertently replicating or amplifying existing tensions, e.g. by reinforcing
patterns of domination and exclusion;
 introducing reforms and resources that favour vested interests or become
entangled in corruption and patronage systems and in turn generate new
grievances/instability.

iii. reputational risk

Security actors supported by the EU may act in a biased, discriminatory or abusive
way towards the population; this will have an indirect negative effect on the EU’s
reputation. Also, assets may fall into the wrong hands. Working with other
international actors to assess reputational risk and draw up realistic mitigating
measures will be part and parcel of designing SSR support. Where applicable and on
the basis of careful case-by-case analysis, derogations can be applied to the visibility
rules for EU external action programmes/tools.

iv. risk of non-intervention

It is the duty of any state to protect its civilians. In some cases, its failure to do so
may lead to serious violations of human rights or democratic principles, human
suffering or loss of life, including atrocity crimes. When considered useful to prevent
such extreme occurrences and help deal with them where they could arise, on the
basis of a UNSC resolution or a bilateral agreement with the partner state, the EU
may decide to engage in SSR support activities even in the absence of important
conditions, such as real commitment to change.

33
COM(2010) 126, Humanitarian Food Assistance
11
Action box
The EEAS/Commission services will prepare a dedicated risk management methodology for
EU support. This will include mitigating measures drawing inter alia on the ‘risk
management framework mechanism for budget support operations’.34
As provided for in its 2015-2019 Action plan for human rights and democracy 35, the EU has
to develop a ‘human rights due diligence policy’ outlining measures to ensure that EU and
Member States’ support to the security sector is in compliance with/contributes to the
promotion, protection and enforcement of international human rights and international
humanitarian law, and is consistent with the EU’s human rights policies.

Make best use of EU SSR expertise

The EU should mobilise staff with the appropriate expertise and experience and with a strong
understanding of technical and political issues relating to SSR. It must draw on the expertise
of the Member States and, in specific areas where they bring clear added value, relevant EU
agencies (e.g. Europol, CEPOL, FRONTEX) subject to their respective mandates, priorities
and resources.

This EU-wide SSR policy framework envisages strong coordination and cooperation between
EU actors and Member States to foster synergies and complementarities between instruments
and missions in a ‘whole EU’ approach. It also provides for coordination with the activities of
international and regional organisations and relevant NGOs.

At headquarters

The Commission and the HR will establish a permanent informal inter-service SSR task
force, with representatives from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services, which
will advise and support EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP
missions. It will contribute to ensuring coherence and complementarity of EU SSR activity
and support the planning and design of SSR development cooperation projects and CSDP
planning documents. Its role should also be reflected in the next edition of the crisis
management procedures. It will develop methodological tools, standards, procedures and
practices for EU SSR activities and provide training, inter alia by supporting the European
Security and Defence College (ESDC). The task force will oversee the monitoring,
evaluation, learning framework and risk management mechanisms.

In the field

Responsibility for the coordination of security sector support on the ground rests with the
Head of the EU Delegation in the partner country or region in question. Where a CSDP
mission is present in the country, the Council is invited to ensure that its mandate allows it to
assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues. In this respect, the head of the mission will be
available to advise the Head of Delegation.

EU Delegations and Member State diplomatic missions should share information and
analysis, participate in joint analysis and contribute to the formulation of SSR coordination
matrices.

34
Budget Support Guidelines: Programming, Design and Management – A modern approach to Budget
Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European
Commission, September 2012
35
JOIN(2015) 16
12
Where the EU has a particularly significant and diversified security sector engagement and
relevant coordination structures are not in place, it will seek to establish coordination task
forces for security sector support at country level (with the political and operational sections
of EU Delegations, CSDP missions, Member States and, where possible, relevant partners
such as the UN, the World Bank and non-EU countries involved in the security sector).

Action box
A permanent informal inter-service SSR task force will be established to oversee EU SSR
activities.
The ESDC’s SSR training curricula should be updated to take account of this EU-wide
strategic framework. Also, cooperation between the ESDC and relevant Commission training
services should be strengthened to reflect the EU-wide approach.
Instructions to Heads of Delegation will include the task to ensure the local coordination of
all EU stakeholders in security sector dialogue and support. This will not impact on the
CSDP missions’ line of command.
The mandate of CSDP missions should include the provision of technical advice to EU
Delegations.
In countries where the EU has a significant SSR commitment, it should be ensured that the
Delegation has appropriate security sector expertise.

4. AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT

The EU may support all components of the security sector, including the military, within the
limits of EU legislation through the following activities (non-exhaustive list):

 Institutional support
Support for security and justice institutions includes assistance in developing partner
countries national defence, security and justice policies and strategies, national
coordination mechanisms, administrative, communication and operational
procedures, internal accountability mechanisms, human resources planning and
management, information and data, and budgeting and financial management
systems, in full compliance with human rights principles and compliance with
international humanitarian law.

Institutional support may include assistance in the planning of reforms which should
be tailored and context-sensitive and aim to help partner states assess their own
needs, and express and achieve their vision by setting realistic short-, medium- and
long-term outcomes. It should help them allocate human, technical and financial
resources as appropriate. In so doing the EU will also engage with non-state and civil
society actors.

The EU should ensure that its efforts to strengthen institutions generate direct
short-term benefits for the population in terms of improved security service
provision.

 Training
EU support includes building the capacity of national or regional training
institutions. This may include technical assistance and mentoring, assessing training
needs, developing new curricula and ‘training the trainers’. EU training assistance
will specify the knowledge, skills and/or attitudes it is intended to pass on, so as to
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 promote behavioural change in security sector personnel, units and institutions. It
will also seek to ensure that training is valued in terms of career perspectives and that
staff perform the duties for which they have been trained.

Support may be linked to dialogue on and support for national human resource
management systems involving the identification of profiles needed by security and
justice institutions, fair and transparent recruitment and promotion, etc.

Where there is a need to restore basic justice and security services rapidly, the EU
may provide training directly, in particular through CSDP missions. As far as
possible, it will do this in cooperation with national training institutions, with a view
to strengthening them and eventually handing over responsibility for the training.

 Equipment
The EU can provide non-lethal equipment36 to security sector actors. This will be
done within a broader security support framework for the country. The EU will need
to seek appropriate guarantees that equipment will not be used to violate human
rights, fundamental freedoms or the rule of law. To avoid the risk of equipment
becoming unserviceable, abandoned, unaccounted for or misused, the existence and
functioning of logistical support and registry/tracing chains will be assessed and,
where required, support will be provided to improve their effectiveness. The
development of basic good practice in the area of equipment management will be an
integral part of any equipment package to ensure its maintenance, re-supply and
disposal.

 Support for oversight mechanisms

The EU should support the establishment or strengthening of effective civilian
control and oversight, inter alia by:
 promoting and supporting the formulation and enforcement of relevant
legislation and procedures; and
 increasing the capacity of independent complaints and civilian oversight
institutions and mechanisms.

Beneficiaries may be national legislative bodies and independent or quasi-

independent bodies such as ombudsmen, human rights institutions or commissions,
anti-corruption commissions, independent police complaints commissions, and
judicial authorities in their role of overseeing law enforcement agencies, etc.

The EU should promote the active participation of civil society in these oversight
mechanisms and, where relevant, support civil society initiatives to monitor the
conduct of the security forces. It will also promote the freedom of the media and
strengthen its capacity to report responsibly on the security sector.

 Community security
Where violence and conflicts are linked to political, social and economic issues that
are strictly local or national security forces are unable to provide vital security
services, the EU can finance support initiatives whereby the population is provided
with security and justice benefits through a community security approach, involving
(official and/or traditional) local authorities, where possible, the residents of the
communities and neighbourhoods in question and local security forces. The aim will
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JOIN(2015) 17 final
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 be to improve the security of local communities, resolve conflict and address local
root causes of violence, and ultimately to ensure that national authorities are able to
address security and conflict problems at local level.

 Links between SSR and other areas of engagement

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) refers to a set of interventions
in a process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups by disarming and
disbanding non-state groups or downsizing armed forces and reintegrating them into
civilian life37. DDR processes should respond to immediate security needs and help
lay the foundations for longer-term stability in a country or region. They should
therefore link in with an overall peace process and preferably with a broader SSR. In
conflict and post-conflict contexts, EU SSR and DDR support will balance the need
to restore basic security services as an urgent stabilisation measure with the need to
avoid hindering longer-term stability by, for instance, legitimising non-inclusive
security forces.

Transitional justice
Transitional justice encompasses “the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation”.38 Transitional justice measures should ultimately help to re-establish
and strengthen the rule of law.

In post-conflict and transition countries, SSR as a component of institutional reform

can contribute to prevent conflict from flaring up again; it thus helps to ensure
accountability and respect for human rights and prevent future violations. The
Council conclusions on support to transitional justice 39 underline the importance of
SSR.

Small arms and light weapons (SALWs)

The availability of SALWs is often a key factor in triggering and spreading
insecurity. ‘Residual conflicts’ sustained by the illicit spread of SALWs often blur
the dividing line between armed conflict and criminality 40. SALW control is
intrinsically linked to SSR efforts, not least in limiting the perceived or actual need
or propensity of individuals or communities to provide for their own defence.

5. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated. Each
year an inter-service team composed of EEAS and Commission representatives, with the
support of external consultants where needed, will review the EU’s overall engagement in the
security sector in at least one priority country.

37
EU concept for support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), approved by the
Commission on 14 December 2006 and by the Council of the European Union on 11 December 2006
38
UN Security Council, document S/2004/616
39
Council conclusions on the EU’s support to transitional justice, 16 November 2015 (13576/15)
40
EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, Council
conclusions (5319/06)
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The evaluation criteria will be based on the objectives and principles outlined in this Joint
Communication, on the shared monitoring and evaluation guidelines and on the actual
implementation of the relevant risk management framework.

The relevance of the EU’s engagement will also be evaluated, on the basis of criteria such as:

- the quality and comprehensiveness of its analysis of the security sector;

- its responsiveness to urgent crises and emerging opportunities; and

- consistency between EU support, broader EU security and development goals and

the security goals of partner countries.

Evaluations will be made publicly available. Recommendations will be drafted and follow-up
action will be monitored. The evaluations will also be used to gather best practices and
lessons identified, to be fed into EU staff training and reflections on EU financial instruments.
This will help to improve internal procedures and the efficiency of the support.

The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years’ time.

The European Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and
the Council to endorse and support the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to
engage fully in the move towards more coherent and effective EU engagement in assisting
SSR in its partner countries.

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