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 PMC8838118

Sensors (Basel). 2022 Feb; 22(3): 1032.

Published online 2022 Jan 28. doi: 10.3390/s22031032

PMCID: PMC8838118

PMID: 35161778

Game Theory in Defence Applications: A Review

Edwin Ho,1 Arvind Rajagopalan,2 Alex Skvortsov,3 Sanjeev Arulampalam,3 and Mahendra
Piraveenan1,*

Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer

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Abstract

This paper presents a succinct review of attempts in the literature to use game theory to model
decision-making scenarios relevant to defence applications. Game theory has been proven as a very
effective tool in modelling the decision-making processes of intelligent agents, entities, and players.
It has been used to model scenarios from diverse fields such as economics, evolutionary biology, and
computer science. In defence applications, there is often a need to model and predict the actions of
hostile actors, and players who try to evade or out-smart each other. Modelling how the actions of
competitive players shape the decision making of each other is the forte of game theory. In past
decades, there have been several studies that applied different branches of game theory to model a
range of defence-related scenarios. This paper provides a structured review of such attempts, and
classifies existing literature in terms of the kind of warfare modelled, the types of games used, and
the players involved. After careful selection, a total of 29 directly relevant papers are discussed and
classified. In terms of the warfares modelled, we recognise that most papers that apply game theory
in defence settings are concerned with Command and Control Warfare, and can be further classified
into papers dealing with (i) Resource Allocation Warfare (ii) Information Warfare (iii) Weapons
Control Warfare, and (iv) Adversary Monitoring Warfare. We also observe that most of the reviewed
papers are concerned with sensing, tracking, and large sensor networks, and the studied problems
have parallels in sensor network analysis in the civilian domain. In terms of the games used, we
classify the reviewed papers into papers that use non-cooperative or cooperative games,
simultaneous or sequential games, discrete or continuous games, and non-zero-sum or zero-sum
games. Similarly, papers are also classified into two-player, three-player or multi-player game based
papers. We also explore the nature of players and the construction of payoff functions in each
scenario. Finally, we also identify gaps in literature where game theory could be fruitfully applied in
scenarios hitherto unexplored using game theory. The presented analysis provides a concise
summary of the state-of-the-art with regards to the use of game theory in defence applications and
highlights the benefits and limitations of game theory in the considered scenarios.

Keywords: decision making, game theory, defence science, ground warfare, maritime warfare, aerial
warfare, tracking, sensing

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1. Introduction

Game Theory has become one of the conventional theoretical frameworks to model important
decision making processes in many aspects of our life. The well-known examples can be found in
economics, social sciences, finance, project management, computer science, civics, and
epidemiology (see [1,2,3,4,5] and references therein). Since the seminal work of John Von Neumann,
John Nash, and others [6,7,8], it has been well recognised that there is an optimal strategy in the
context of complex interactions (games) between two or more parties (players) that can lead to a
predictable outcome (payoff). In practical situations, this outcome can often be quantitative and
amenable to arithmetic operations (cost, number of infected people, number of vaccinated people
etc.), but often it can be qualitative in nature (such as risk, readiness level, health state etc.).

The application of game theory and related mathematical approaches have recently attracted ever-
increasing attention in the defence domain. This is due to two driving factors. First, game theory
provides a natural framework to promptly translate a high-level policy decision into optimal strategy
by framing it in quantitative terms such as payoff, cost, gain or loss, risk, etc. This creates a united
platform for defence decision-makers to support arriving at a particular decision. Second, it provides
a rigorous mathematical framework for the evaluation and optimisation of numerous scenarios in
accordance with predefined criteria. This prompt evaluation often becomes the critical success
factor in the defence operational context, leading to decision superiority under time pressure. This
also becomes the critical step in the development and deployment of various Artificial Intelligence
(AI) capabilities in defence operations.

The application of game theory in defence has a sustained and diversified history ranging from the
design of real-time military systems (e.g, applied in missile interception) to the support of strategic
decisions on large defence investments and acquisitions. There is extensive literature on specific
theoretical methods and tools and their defence applications. We believe that the review of this
literature is of interest to the community dealing with operational analysis and data-driven decision
support. This is the main motivation for the presented study.

Game theory [9,10] enhances military strategies and decision making processes with a holistic and
quantitative analysis of situations [11]. For the military, the potential scenarios amenable to game-
theoretic analysis include the rapidly growing applications of autonomous intelligent systems and
game theory provides a comprehensive mathematical framework that greatly enhances the
capabilities of decision making of the people who use these systems. Because of its potential,
research into game theory is burgeoning, with more than a few papers beginning to emerge in the
literature for this military research niche. This review aims to assist researchers in utilising the body
of knowledge in game theory to develop smarter and safer decision making systems for defence
practitioners. Given that the state of such research is still in an incipient phase, we do this by
drawing connections between existing military knowledge with the nascent possibilities that game
theory offers so that it can become a more widely understood and considered framework in military
control systems.

To understand the state-of-the-art in the field of game-theoretic applications in defence, and to

analyse the types of games used in such contexts, a review is needed. To the best of our knowledge,
such a review, spanning different applications of game theory in a variety of military domains, is
lacking. The goal of this paper is to present such a review that will provide a better understanding of
the multitude of defence problems in which game theory can be successfully applied. Moreover, the
multidimensional classification of the types of games used in different contexts will provide
researchers insights into new ways of applying game theory in related problems. Finally, we present
gaps in the literature which we hope will give rise to more research and development of novel game-
theoretic approaches to defence problems.

Although it is not overly extensive, the body of literature around the game theory in the military has
covered a notable portion of the different forms of engagement and combat. These papers cover
past, present and future scenarios: from predictive strategies in potentially hostile situations to
analytical assessments in hindsight of military standoffs thousands of years ago. Game theory has
demonstrated the capacity to be useful in any such military scenario. However, rapid technological
progress has led to consistently new frontiers of military engagement, each of these possessing its
own complex systems. The overarching areas that have been addressed are Tracking systems (across
all domains), Aerial combat, Ground combat, National Security issues, Cyberwarfare and Space
systems. Notably, applications of game theory in Naval warfare have been few, and an exploration
into the future research into areas like this will be discussed later in the review. Within each of these
areas, there are a myriad of possibilities for new and innovative systems: different agents, different
weapons, different control structures - and each of these could be enriched with game-theoretic
analysis. While Haywood’s and Thunholm’s treatises on the game theory used in military decision
making provide coverage of several different game types [12,13], there does not seem to be a paper
that addresses the use of game theory in the military across each of the respective fields in the new
context of military systems built on high-performance computing and complex algorithms. We aim
to present the literature in such a way that it addresses all of the functions of game theory in military
control systems in each key domain.

This review has considered in detail a total of 29 papers after careful selection. It highlights the
scope and utility of each analysed paper by presenting it in terms of the essential game-theoretic
concepts: players, game types, strategies and the key parameters of their payoff functions. It will act
as both an annotated bibliography as well as a framework to understand and plan further research
into the area. It will also lay out the fundamental tenets that are considered by players in every
military decision-making scenario, as well as how they impact the decisions that are made by
military personnel and systems, either while competing with hostile players or while cooperating
with friendly players. This will make it possible for most military scenarios to be viewed as games
and can provide, at the very least, an interesting new perspective on familiar military situations. The
29 papers reviewed here were selected from Scopus and Google Scholar, by a team of experts with
related backgrounds from defence, academia and industry who could offer diverse perspectives,
who identified the most pertinent papers based on diverse experience. Only papers written in
English were considered. While it is acknowledged that an exhaustive search was not performed, the
papers, to the best of our knowledge, cover a significant and representative section of the research
niche we discuss here, and sufficiently demonstrate the trends, overlaps and gaps in the literature in
this niche. It is confidently expected, therefore, that the presented analysis will provide a rigorous
comparison between the analysed papers and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each, while
also highlighting the overall pros and cons of utilising game theory to model decision making in
military contexts.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will discuss the basic defence principles
which are elaborated by the papers that we review, as well as introduce basic concepts of game
theory. Section 3 investigates and analyses the literature and summarises the findings and
associations in each of the papers. Section 4 elaborates our multi-dimensional classification of the
literature based on the observations made in the previous section, and also presents citation and
other metrics related to the papers reviewed. Section 5 identifies the gaps in the literature and
based on this, highlights opportunities for future research in this niche, particularly areas of defence
research that could benefit from the application of game theory where game theory has not been
often applied so far. Section 6 provides an in-depth discussion about the utility of the findings and
the presented review in general. Finally, Section 7 summarises our findings and classifications and
provides broad conclusions.

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2. Background

Ideologies, beliefs and knowledge about war have been shaping human knowledge and philosophy
for centuries. The great works of Sun Tzu, Homer and Machiavelli [14,15,16] have not only
established a foundation for knowledge etched into the essence of military decision making, but also
provided insight into sociology and social psychology [17]. The military forms a core power bloc for
many civilisations and is instrumental to both the growth of influence for existing nations, and the
birth of new nations [18]. The military deals with conflicts in real-time, plans for the future, as well as
reviews past engagements - and every single one of these activities has an impact on society [19].
This review therefore by necessity addresses many facets of military conflict across multiple physical
domains, and the major decisions that need to be made in each of these domains will be
summarised below. Across all of these domains, however, the value of targets, the value of
resources and the priority of objectives are usually the key parameters that shape the payoff
functions and strategies which in turn define the games that we use in modelling.

In this section, we discuss the concepts in defence science and technology, as well as game theory,
which are necessary to understand and analyse the literature in the presented niche. First of all, let
us consider the broad domains of defence and national security which are considered in this review.
They can be summarised, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1

Classification System used in this review.

Focus Area Command and Control Warfare

Mode Traditional (T) Modern (M)

Warfare Domain Land (L) Sea (S) Air (A) Cyber (C) Space (Sp)

Resource Allocation Warfare (RAW)

or
Information Warfare (IW)
Warfare Type or
Weapon Control Wafare (WCW)
or
Adversary Monitoring Warfare (AMW)

Non-Cooperative (NCo)
Game Theory Categorisation 1 or
Cooperative (Co)

Sequential (Seq)
Game Theory Categorisation 2 or
Simultaneous (Sim)

Discrete (D)
Game Theory Categorisation 3 or
Continuous (C)

Zero Sum (ZS)

Game Theory Categorisation 4 or
Non-Zero Sum (NZS)

2 player (2P)
or
Number of Players 3-player (3P)
or
More than three-player (NP)

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As shown in Table 1, in this review, the focus is primarily on ‘command and control’ warfare, where
decision making is critical. However, command and control warfare has applicability in traditional
domains of warfare, such as land, sea, and air warfare, as well as modern domains of warfare, such
as space and cyber warfare. At an orthogonal level, command and control warfare could also be sub-
divided into Resource Allocation Warfare (RAW), Information Warfare (IW), Weapons Control
Warfare (WCW), as well as Adversary Monitoring Warfare (AMW). Since these concepts are
extensively used in our classification of literature, let us briefly introduce them first.

2.1. Warfare Types

 1. Resource Allocation Warfare (RAW): the allocation of military resources to achieve military
objectives.

2. Information Warfare (IW): the manipulation of information to achieve military objectives.

3. Weapons Control Warfare (WCW): Control of weapons in achieving military objectives.

4. Adversary Monitoring Warfare (AMW): Tracking the behaviour of an enemy to fulfil military
objectives.

2.2. Warfare Domains

2.2.1. Land Warfare

Technology is a dictating force of warfare, and technology is not as imperative to land warfare as it is
to other domains [20]. The technology that has impacted land warfare has been relatively static and
avoids the exposure of human resources if possible [21,22]. Interpersonal combat at a physical level
is much less prevalent nowadays, making way for a greater focus on a positioning strategy. The
literature which applied game theory to ground warfare includes a strong repository of Weapon-
Target Allocation papers (which touch upon Weapon Control Warfare and Resource Allocation
Warfare in the modern context), as well as papers that address ancient ground engagements and
guerilla warfare. Where human lives are vulnerable, their protection is the most important element
of these games, and the next priority is the protection of ground-based assets.

2.2.2. Sea (Naval) Warfare

Given the importance of navies for the projection of power globally, there is a surprising paucity of
publicly available literature on naval warfare—with or without the application of game theory. There
is often mention of naval warfare in papers dealing with target tracking, but a discussion on military
naval strategy is limited to outdated literature or discussion of bare essentials [23,24]. We will
review the available papers in this regard, and highlight this as an area where there is a sizeable gap
in the literature.

2.2.3. Aerial Warfare

It was not long after the Wright Brothers invented the aeroplane that aerial warfare became a
critical factor in combat and military campaigns [25]. In a combat medium rarely impeded by
obstacles or dimensions, the nature of aerial combat is fast-paced, intuitive and incredibly
treacherous, with unpredictable ‘rules’ for engagement [26,27]. In the present day, the factors to
consider are vastly more complicated compared to a century ago, and there is no shortage of
resources available to military forces to conduct aerial combat- both human and machine [28,29,30].
The literature shows that as a result of this abundance of arsenal, the intrinsic and potential value of
both the targets and the resources used to engage is of particular importance in aerial warfare
scenarios. Decisions about those values for both sides of the conflict need to be made when
evaluating strategies for combat. As such, several papers deal with the use of game theory in aerial
warfare.

2.2.4. Cyber Warfare

Cybersecurity is the protection of IT systems and networks from being damaged/

disrupted/subjected to information theft. Cyberwarfare deals with the concept of Information and
Communication Systems being deliberately attacked to obtain a military advantage. While
Cybersecurity has been an important field in computer science for many decades now, literature
about cyber warfare as such is more scarce, and in any case, heavily overlaps with applications of
game theory in computer science in areas related to cybersecurity. This review presents and
analyses some papers which are specifically concerned with cyber warfare.

2.2.5. Space Warfare

While the notion of warfare in space has existed for almost a century, neither physical execution nor
a body of theoretical strategies for space warfare has been established [31]. Nevertheless, this has
not stopped military forces chasing the stars (literally and figuratively) [32,33] and has inevitably led
to concepts from game theory being used in space warfare strategic thinking. This is currently mostly
limited to satellite networks, where the key parameters of the game are optimised power use and
signal strength across the network. The field is still quite young, and further military development in
space seems to be inevitable, with which the corresponding literature dealing with applications of
game theory in space warfare will also grow.

2.2.6. Mixed/Other Warfare

Several papers address specific niches of defence applications of game theory, and yet cannot be
classified as papers analysing a certain type of warfare. In some of these papers, the focus is more on
the technology that is used: for example, target tracking. In others, the nature of the hostile actors
against whom the defence needs to be conducted changes: for example, national security
operations which target domestic terrorism threats rather than an opposing military force. Several
papers deal with the use of game theory in such scenarios.

Target tracking systems: Target tracking in the military is the observation of a moving target and the
surveillance of its position and manoeuvres [34,35,36]. Success in this domain relies on accuracy in
the observed metrics and data, as well as efficient distribution and processing of all collected
information [37]. With the advent of intelligent targets, the military must also incorporate predictive
methods to maintain ideal tracking performance. The literature reviewed in this regard covers topics
from tracking strike missiles to theatre ballistic missiles and tracking unknown intelligent agents to
enemy aircraft. Key considerations in this area that shape the games played involve whether or not
the target is ‘intelligent’/can take evasive action, whether or not the target will have an optimal
trajectory, and whether or not the target will have defenders [38]. Target tracking applications of
game theory mostly occur in aerial and naval warfare, including underwater surveillance.

National Security applications: Game theory often finds application in national security and anti-
terrorism related fields. This includes predicting and preparing for terrorist attacks, as well as
resource allocation scenarios for the protection of key personnel and landmarks/other potential
targets for terrorist activity. While the value of potential targets and the likelihood of attacks are
obviously key parameters governing the payoff functions of games in this niche, the subsequent
social, economic and political ramifications are equally instrumental in modelling games in this area
[39,40]. Few military conflicts have as much exposure as those on the home front [41], and the
fallout from terrorist attacks and their effect on public mood and confidence in the security
apparatus are often taken into account in modelling payoff functions in this area.

2.3. Game Theory

Game theory, which is the study of strategic decision making, was first developed as a branch of
microeconomics [6,10,42,43]. However, later it has been adopted in diverse fields of study, such as
evolutionary biology, sociology, psychology, political science, project management, financial
management and computer science [1,2,5,9,11,44]. Game theory has gained such wide applicability
due to the prevalence of strategic decision-making scenarios across different disciplines. Game
Theory provides insight into peculiar behavioural interactions like the cooperative interactions
within groups of animals [45], the bargaining and exchange in a marriage [46] or the incentivisation
of Scottish salmon farmers [47]. A game typically consists of two or more players, a set of strategies
available to these players, and a corresponding set of payoff values (also referred to as utility values)
for each player (which are usually presented as a payoff-matrix in the case of two-player games)
[44,48].

2.3.1. Pure vs. Mixed Strategies

A pure strategy in a game provides a complete definition of how a player will play a game. A player’s
strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player [10].

A mixed strategy is a combination of pure strategies where a particular probability p (where 0≤p≤1)
is associated with each of these pure strategies. Since probabilities are continuous, there are
infinitely many mixed strategies available to a player. A totally mixed strategy is a mixed strategy in
which the player assigns a strictly positive probability to every pure strategy. Therefore, any pure
strategy is actually a degenerate case of a mixed strategy, in which that particular strategy is
selected with probability 1 and every other strategy is selected with probability 0.

2.3.2. Nash Equilibrium

The concept of Nash equilibrium is fundamental to game theory. It is a state (a set of strategies) in a
strategic game from which no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally, in terms of payoffs.
Both pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria can be defined. A strategic game can often
have more than one Nash equilibrium [7]. Every game with a finite number of players in which each
player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies, it is proven [7].

The formal definition of Nash equilibrium is as follows. Let (S,f) be a game with n players, where Si is
the strategy set of a given player i. Thus, the strategy profile S consisting of the strategy sets of all
players would be, S=S1 × S2 × S3… × Sn. Let f(x)=(f1(x),…,fn(x)) be the payoff function for strategy set
x∈S. Suppose xi is the strategy of player i and x−i is the strategy set of all players except player i.
Thus, when each player i∈1,…,n chooses strategy xi that would result in the strategy set x=(x1,…,xn),
giving a payoff of fi(x) to that particular player, which depends on both the strategy chosen by that
player (xi) and the strategies chosen by other players (x−i). A strategy set x∗∈S is in Nash
equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player would return a higher utility for
that particular player [10]. Formally put, x∗ is in Nash equilibrium if and only if:

∀i,xi∈Si:fi(x∗i,x∗−i)≥fi(xi,x∗−i)

(1)

2.3.3. Non-Cooperative Games and Cooperative Games

Typically, games are taken to be played for the self-interest of the players, and even when the
players cooperate, that is because cooperation seems to them as the best strategy under the
circumstances to maximise the individual payoffs of the players. In such games, the cooperative
behaviour, if it emerges, is driven by selfish goals and is transient. These games can be termed ’non-
cooperative games’. These are sometimes referred to, rather inaccurately, as ‘competitive games’.
Non-cooperative game theory is the branch of game theory that analyses such games. On the other
hand, in a cooperative game, sometimes also called a coalitional game, players form coalitions, or
groups, sometimes due to external enforcement of cooperative behaviour, and competition, if it
emerges, takes place between these coalitions [7,8,9]. Cooperative games are analysed using
cooperative game theory, which predicts which coalitions will form and the payoffs of these
coalitions. Cooperative game theory focuses on surplus or profit-sharing among the coalition [49],
where the coalition is guaranteed a certain amount of payoff by virtue of the coalition being formed.
Often, the outcome of a cooperative game played in a system is equivalent to the result of a
constrained optimisation process [50].

2.3.4. Zero-Sum Games

Zero-sum games are a class of competitive games where the total of the payoffs of all players is zero.
In two-player games, this implies that one player’s loss in the payoff is equal to another player’s gain
in the payoff. A two-player zero-sum game can therefore be represented by a payoff matrix that
shows only the payoffs of one player. Zero-sum games can be solved with the mini-max theorem
[51], which states that in a zero-sum game there is a set of strategies that minimises the maximum
losses (or maximises the minimum payoff) of each player. This solution is sometimes referred to as a
‘pure saddle point’. It can be argued that the stock market is a zero-sum game. In contrast, most
valid economic transactions are non-zero-sum since each party considers that, what it receives is
more valuable (to itself) than what it parts with [10].

2.3.5. Perfect vs. Imperfect Information Games

In a perfect information game, each player is aware of the full history of the previous actions of all
other players, as well as the initial state of the game. In imperfect information games, some or all
players do not have access to the entirety of information about other players’ previous actions
[52,53].

2.3.6. Simultaneous Games and Sequential Games

A simultaneous game is either a normal-form game or an extensive-form game where on each

iteration, all players make decisions simultaneously. Therefore, each player is forced to decide
without knowing about the decisions made by other players (on that iteration). On the contrary, a
sequential game is a type of extensive-form game where players make their decisions (or choose
their strategies) in some predefined order [52,53]. For example, a negotiation process can be
modelled as a sequential game if one party always has the privilege of making the first offer, and the
other parties make their offers or counteroffers after that. In a sequential game, at least some
players can observe at least some of the actions of other players before making their own decisions
(otherwise, the game becomes a simultaneous game, even if the moves of players do not happen
simultaneously in time). However, it is not a must that every move of every previous player should
be observable to a given player. If a player can observe every move of every previous player, such a
sequential game is known to have ‘perfect information’. Otherwise, the game is known to have
‘imperfect information’ [10].

2.3.7. Differential Games

Differential Games are often extensive form games, but instead of having discrete decision points,
they are modelled over a continuous time frame [10]. In such games, each state variable evolves
continuously over time according to a differential equation. Such games are ideal for modelling
rapidly evolving defence scenarios where each player engages in selfish optimisation of some
parameter. For example, in missile tracking problems, the pursuer and the target both try to control
the distance between them, whereas the pursuer constantly tries to minimise this distance and the
target constantly tries to increase it. In such a scenario, iterative rounds of decision making are much
too discrete to model the continuous movements and computations of each player. Differential
games are ideal to model such scenarios.

2.3.8. Common Interest Games

Common interest games are another class of non-cooperative games in which there is an action
profile that all players strictly prefer over all other profiles [52]. In other words, in common interest
games, the interests of players are perfectly aligned. It can be argued that common interest games
are the antithesis of zero-sum games, in which the interests of the players are perfectly opposed so
that any increase in fortune for one player must necessarily result in the collective decrease in
fortune for others. Common interest games were first studied in the context of cold war politics, to
understand and prescribe strategies for handling international relations [54]. Therefore, it makes
sense to classify non-cooperative games into common interest games and non-common interest
games, just as much as it makes sense to classify them into zero-sum games and non-zero-sum
games, as these two concepts (zero-sum games and common interest games) represent extreme
cases of non-cooperative games.

2.3.9. Signaling Games

A signalling game [52] is an incomplete information game where one player has perfect information
and another does not. The player with perfect information (the Sender S) relays messages to the
other player (the Receiver R) through signals, and the other player will act on those signals after
inferring the information hidden in the messages. The Sender S has several potential types, of which
the exact type t in the game is unknown to the Receiver R. t determines the payoff for S. R has only
one type, and that payoff is known to both players.

The game is divided into the sending stage and the acting stage. S will send one of M={m1,m2,m3,
…,mj} messages. R will receive that message and respond with an action from a set A={a1,a2,a3,
…,ak}. The payoff that each player receives is determined by the combination of the Sender’s type
and message, as well as the action that the Receiver responds with. An example of the signalling
game is the Beer-Quiche Game [52], in which Player B, the receiver, chooses whether or not to duel
Player A. Player A is either surly or wimpy, and Player B would only like to duel the latter. Player A
chooses to have either a Beer or a Quiche for breakfast. While they prefer a quiche, a quiche signals
information from a stereotype that quiche eaters are wimpy. Player B must analyse how each
decision, duel or not duel, will give them a better payoff depending on which breakfast Player A
chooses.

2.3.10. Behavioural Game Theory

Behavioural Game Theory combines classical game theory with experimental economics and
experimental psychology, and in doing so, relaxes many simplifying assumptions made in classical
game theory which are unrealistic. It deviates from simplifying assumptions such as perfect
rationality [55], the independence axiom, and the non-consideration of altruism or fairness as
motivators of human decision making [56,57]. We will show in this review that the approaches
related to behavioural game theory are crucial in modelling military scenarios, such as in signalling
games.

2.3.11. Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory is an outcome of the adoptation of game theory into the field of
evolutionary biology [58]. Some of the critical questions asked in evolutionary game theory include:
which populations/strategies are stable? which strategies can ‘invade’ (become popular) in
populations where other strategies are prevalent? How do players respond to other players
receiving or perceived to be receiving better payoffs in an iterated game setting? etc. Evolutionary
games are often modelled as iterative games where a population of players play the same game
iteratively in a well-mixed or spatially distributed environment.

A strategy can be identified as an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if, when prevalent, it has the
potential to prevent any mutant strategy from percolating its environment. Alternatively, an ESS is
the strategy that, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any
alternative strategy. Hence, there is no benefit for a player to switch from an ESS to another
strategy. Therefore, essentially, an ESS ensures an extended Nash equilibrium. For a strategy S1 to
be ESS against another ‘invading’ strategy S2, one of the two conditions mentioned below needs to
be met, in terms of expected payoff E.

1. E(S1,S1)>E(S2,S1): By unilaterally changing strategy to S2, the player will lose out against
another player who sticks with the ESS S1.

2. E(S1,S1)=E(S2,S1) & E(S1,S2)>E(S2,S2): a player, by converting to S2, neither gains nor loses
against another player who sticks with the ESS S1, but playing against a player who has
already ‘converted’ to S2, a player is better off playing the ESS S1.

If either of these conditions are met, the new strategy S2 is incapable of invading the existing
strategy S1, and thus, S1 is an ESS against S2. Evolutionary games are typically modelled as iterative
games, whereby players in a population play the same game iteratively [52].

2.3.12. Other Recent Advances in Game Theory

It should be noted that there are several other branches of game theory that were not mentioned in
the above sub-sections, and there have been also several recent advances that have not been
mentioned. Game theory is used in increasingly more diverse scenarios and applications. For
example, game theory has been used to determine the market share of competitors in the
telecommunication industry [59], or implementation and construction of biogas plants [60]. In some
applications, payoffs of matrix games are constructed to contain fuzzy elements, which, it is argued,
makes the modelled scenarios more realistic [61,62]. Similarly, quantum game theory is an emerging
field [63,64], which introduces superposed initial states, quantum entanglement of initial states, and
superposition of strategies. Not all such advances can be summarised here. Therefore, this section
has provided a basic introduction to only those game-theoretic concepts which are often used in the
defence literature, and particularly in the papers that we review. Therefore, to the reader unfamiliar
with game theory, the above subsections presented an elementary introduction. Please see [10,52]
for more elaborate treatments of the concepts presented.

With this background, we now review the available literature which deals with the applications of
game theory in defence science and technology.

Go to:

3. Use of Game Theory in Defence Science and Technology Applications

As mentioned earlier, the primary parameters that influence the payoff matrix in games modelling
defence scenarios are the value of targets, the value of resources and the priority of objectives.
Other than this, the games used in defence applications can vary greatly, as we will see below. For
this reason, this section is structured based on the domain (type of warfare) each paper covers.
Where a paper covers more than one domain, it is included in the most relevant subsection/domain.
We however analyse in detail the type of games used, the way the payoff functions were structured,
the available strategies and equilibria etc for each paper.

3.1. Papers Dealing with Land Warfare

In Land warfare related applications of game theory, most studies focus on defensive warfare,
whereby the military makes decisions on how to best allocate their ground defences to multiple
threats. Some studies also focus on historical land-based conflicts and provide game-theoretical
analysis in hindsight, revealing how some decisions made from intuition in historical conflicts had a
rational and mathematical justification. Land warfare can result in very heavy casualties, so
understanding how to best minimise human losses is a key component (though not the only
objective) of land warfare. Quite often, prioritising military resources is also fundamental to success
and often features prominently in strategic decisions. Furthermore, often in scenarios involving
ground warfare, it is important to assess the knowledge about opponents, their possible tactics, or
terrain: it may become necessary to combat airborne forces being inserted at certain places, or it
may be needed to traverse uncertain territory. In each of these situations, understanding where a
force has imperfect information will help that force to make rational decisions.

Several papers use game theory to model land warfare in current and historical contexts. Bier et al.
[65] design a game to best assign defensive resources to a set of locations/resources that need to be
protected. The attacker must then decide how they choose to split their force to attack the different
targets. The game is modelled as a two-player game of normal form. The payoff in this game is
absolute, and an attack on a location i is either a success or a failure, where the attacker gains ai and
the defender loses di. Since orders for an attack are confirmed ahead of an attack, attackers must
use a set of pure strategies. The game can be played both simultaneously or sequentially. That is, the
game can be played depending on whether or not the attacker knows how the defender has
assigned their resources before making their decision. This leads to the ideal strategy of leaving
some targets undefended and strengthening defences in key areas by leaving some areas vulnerable.

The next paper we review is Gries et al. [66] which is a comprehensive investigation into the utility of
game theory principles in guerilla/destabilisation warfare. The significant factors they model are:
destabilisation insurgents often attack randomly, creating a continuous threat that must have a
continuous mitigation and detection strategy; the duration of a war is important to consider, and will
change the value that is assigned to targets and assets; time preferences play a critical role in setting
priorities, as judgements of value determine strategic decisions which in turn determine success or
failure. The game model they propose involves both a sequential non-cooperative game and a
simultaneous non-cooperative game, in each of which the two players are the guerilla force and the
government. For these conflicts, the economic and social impacts are much more significant than
military losses and gains and therefore play a much more significant role in calculating the value of
outcomes.

The game specifically models moments when each side looks to try and find peace or conflict with
the other. At each of these moments, the government forces must consider the financial cost of
each option, while the rebels examine the order of priority of the engagements, and what portion of
their fighting force they will make available for each engagement. Figure 1 demonstrates an example
of the decision tree to emerge from these moments in destabilisation warfare, where G represents
the Government decisions and R represents the Rebel decisions.
Figure 1

Destabilisation Warfare game [66], where the government and rebel decision points are highlighted.

Krisnamurthy et al. [67] investigate game-theoretic control of dynamic behaviour of an unattended

ground sensor network (UGSN) to acquire information about intruders. Each sensor in this network
is capable of receiving measurements, with specified accuracy, of the range and bearing of nearby
targets which they then transmit to a local hub for data fusion. In this framework, while more sensor
measurements and larger volumes of transmission of measurements may lead to better target
awareness, this also results in the undesirable effect of greater consumption of limited battery
power. Hence, the goal to which game theory is applied is to optimally trade-off target awareness,
data transmission and energy consumption using a two-time scale, hierarchical approach.

The authors demonstrate that the sensor activation and transmission scheduling problem can be
decomposed into two coupled decentralized algorithms. In particular, the sensors are viewed as
players in a non-cooperative game and an adaptive learning strategy is proposed to activate the
sensors according to their proximity to targets of interest. This turns out to be a correlated
equilibrium solution of this non-cooperative game. Next, the transmission scheduling problem, in
which each sensor has to decide at each time instant, whether to transmit data and waste battery
power or to wait and increase delay, is formulated as a Markov Decision process with a penalty
terminal cost. The main result of this formulation is to show that the optimal transmission policy has
a threshold structure which is then proved using the concept of supermodularity.

There are several studies that analyse historical conflicts, which occurred predominantly on land,
using a game-theoretic prism. For example, Cotton and Liu [68] describe two ancient Chinese
military legends and model them as signalling games. In both games, legendary military leaders are
faced with formidable opposing armies with much greater numbers and strength than their own, but
instead of retreating, they prepare to engage, acting as if they are setting up for an ambush. Their
opponents with imperfect information are left only with the messages they can infer from their
opponents’ actions; spooked by the perceived confidence and the reputation that these generals
carried, the opposing armies, though in actuality are of superior strength, choose not to engage.
Through a brave and ingenious bluff, both generals achieve an equilibrium solution in their favour by
standing their ground. They do this by creating deception without direct communication, which
follows the template of the aforementioned Beer-Quiche signalling game.
The first game described by Cotton and Liu is the “100 Horsemen” game. They describe a piece of
history where a hundred Han horsemen travelling alone encounter a large Xiongnu force numbering
in the thousands. Their available strategies are to retreat or engage. If they retreat, and the enemy
engage, they will very likely be run down and defeated; if they engage and the enemy also engage,
they will be eliminated in battle. The best outcome for them is to somehow force an enemy retreat.
The enemy is uncertain if the horsemen are travelling with a greater army. They see the horsemen
move to engage, and decide not to take the risk, and retreat. The situation is translated into a two-
player game, with two strategies. It is represented in the Figure 2 below:

Figure 2

The 100 Horsemen signaling game [68].

In Figure 2:

LG represents the decision point for General Li Guang, of the Han forces.

GenX represents the decision point for the opposing Xiongnu force.

Payoffs are listed as (LG, GenX)

λ∈(0,1) represents the Generals’ ability, as either strong or weak

α and β represent the proportion of Han horsemen killed in a retreat

w is a positive parameter

The second game is very similar to the first. In this game, a small city is guarded by the formidable
General Zhuge Liang. He learns that a great hostile army is approaching the city. He is faced with two
options. He could run, after which he would secede the city and likely be chased down by the
approaching army, or he could stay and defend the city. If he chose the latter, and the army were to
engage, he would likely lose his life, his army and the city. Faced with this dilemma, he orders his
men to hide out of sight, so that the city appears empty from the outside. He climbs to the top of the
foremost tower of the city and plays music. The opposing general, aware of General Liang’s
experience and prowess, suspects that the General has taken this unassuming position in the tower
in the empty city to ambush his army, and they move away from the city to avoid being ambushed.
General Liang sent effectively two signals here. The first was his reputation, a signal encompassing
his strategic and military strength. The second was his choice to stay and defend the city. With these
two pieces of information, and nothing else about the whereabouts or magnitude of General Liang’s
army, the opposing army chooses the safe option of zero loss and leaves. This piece of history is
modelled as another two-player signalling game, shown in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3

The Empty City signaling game [68].

In Figure 3:

ZL represents the decision point for the General Zhuge Liang

Payoffs are listed as (ZL, Opposing Army)

λ∈(0,1) represents the Generals’ ability, as either strong or weak

c represents the value of the city

w represents the gains if ZL’s army matched the opposing army

y represents the losses if ZL’s army is weaker than the opposing army, and y>c since it encompasses
losing the city

Both pieces of history represent distinguished military decision making in the face of near-certain
defeat, and are in fact examples of Generals with a strong understanding of the nuances of signals
and rational decision making in strategic interactions forcing an outcome that is favourable to
themselves.

3.2. Papers Dealing with Naval Warfare

Surprisingly, papers that directly and primarily deal with naval warfare by using game theory are
comparatively rare, even though naval warfare predates aerial warfare in human history by a
considerable margin. Levin [69] studies aspects of naval warfare in the previous centuries using
concepts from game theory. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the powerful nations of the time built
warships with cannons positioned along their sides. It meant that ships could attack typically only to
their sides. When sailing as an armada, the standard approach was to form a ‘line of battle’ i.e., a
column of allied naval ships sailing in a direction such that their sides would face the enemy, also
positioned in a line. The two parallel opposing fleets could then attack each other with a large
number of cannons. The ‘line of battle’ strategy is considered to be a Nash-equilibrium because
neither fleet would gain from performing raking (a tactic of the era, whereby an attacking ship would
attempt to sail across its adversary’s stern, concentrating cannon fire there while the enemy could
only respond minimally due to having fewer cannon placements in the stern. The attacking ship
would damage both the stern and some of the broadsides of its adversary). According to Levin [69]
raking was not preferred in a fleet as this would mean having to first sail ahead of its enemy and
then turn towards it—a challenging task when the ships’ speeds were roughly equal and
manoeuvring was difficult. As neither fleet would gain from turning towards the enemy and neither
would get ahead, Levine concludes that this strategy—forming a line of battle and sailing parallel to
the other fleet—was each fleet’s best response, and thus represented a Nash equilibrium.

Levine goes on to mention battles in which English fleets deviated from the above strategy and
sailed orthogonally towards a French and Franco-Spanish fleet. In the first battle Levine mentions, it
was likely unplanned. In the second—the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar—it was by careful design: the
English fleet divided itself into two columns, each of which sailed orthogonally to the Franco-Spanish
line, raking fire for about 45 minutes before crashing through it and beginning a general melee. The
English would go on to isolate the middle of the Franco-Spanish fleet to score a decisive victory.
Levine considers both battles to be counterexamples to his thesis. However, in the Battle of
Trafalgar, it is possible that the English strategy was a best response to the likely Franco-Spanish
strategy of forming an orthodox line of battle. The English admiral, Lord Nelson, desired to keep the
Franco-Spanish fleet from escaping—which they could if both fleets formed parallel lines of battle—
thus reducing the reward he would get for forming his own fleet into a line of battle. Moreover, he
may have estimated that the poor gunnery of the French and Spanish ships would lessen the effect
of the raking fire, thus reducing the negative reward he would get for directly charging the Franco-
Spanish fleet. In his eyes, this may have made the unorthodox option a better response to the likely
Franco-Spanish strategy than the orthodox line of battle. While Levine did not explicitly attribute
these strategies in naval battles of the era to game theory, the adopted strategies could nonetheless
be justified by game-theoretic analysis: an example of ’intuitive’ application of game theory without
formally studying it.

Maskery et al. 2007 (a) [70] study the problem of deploying counter-measures against anti-ship
missiles using a network-enabled operations (NEOPS) framework, where multiple ships
communicate and coordinate to defend against a missile threat. Here, the missile threats are
modelled as a discrete Markov process and they appear at random positions within a fixed physical
space and move towards the ships obeying some known target dynamics and guidance laws. The
ships which are equipped with counter-measures (CM) such as decoys and electromagnetic jamming
signals are modelled as the players of a transient stochastic game, where the actions of the
individual players include the use of CM to maximize their own safety while cooperating with other
players which are essentially aiming to achieve the same objective. The optimal strategy of this
game-theoretic problem is a correlated equilibrium strategy and is shown to be achieved via an
optimization problem with bilinear constraints. This is in contrast to the Nash equilibrium solution
proposed tepmaskery2007decentralized to a related problem but one without player coordination.
A noteworthy contribution of this paper is that it also quantifies the amount of communication
necessary to implement the NEOPS equilibrium strategy. This paper highlights the utility of game-
theoretic methods in analysing optimal strategies in network-enabled systems which are critical in
modern warfare.

In [71], Maskery et al. 2007 (b) consider the problem of network-centric force protection of a task
group against anti-ship missiles. The decision-makers in this model are the ships equipped with hard-
kill/soft-kill weapons (counter-measures) and these ships are also considered the players in the
formulation of this problem in a game-theoretic setting. The platforms must make critical decisions
independently on the optimal deployment of the counter-measures while they simultaneously work
towards a common goal of protecting the members of the task group. Essentially this is a
decentralised missile deflection problem in a naval setting which is formulated as a transient
stochastic game for which the ships may compute a joint counter-measure policy that is in Nash
equilibrium. Here, the ships play a game with each other instead of with a missile. This approach
naturally lends itself to decentralised solutions which may be implemented when full
communication is not feasible. Moreover, this formulation leads to an interpretation of the problem
as a stochastic shortest past game for which Nash Equilibrium solutions are known to exist.

Bachmann et al. [72] analyse the interaction between radar and jammer using a noncooperative
two-player, zero-sum game. In their approach, the radar and jammer are considered ‘players’ with
opposing goals: the radar tries to maximize the probability of detection of the target while the
jammer attempts to minimize its detection by the radar by jamming it. Bachmann et al. [72] assume
a Swerling Type II target in the presence of Rayleigh distributed clutter, for which certain utility
functions are described for cell-averaging (CA) and order-statistic (OS) CFAR processors in different
cases of jamming. This game-theoretic formulation is solved by optimizing these utility functions
subject to constraints in the control variables (strategies), which for the jammer are jammer power
and the spatial extent of jamming while for the radar the available strategies include the threshold
parameter and reference window size. The resulting matrix-form games are solved for optimal
strategies of both radar and jammer from which they identify conditions under which the radar and
jammer are effective in achieving their individual goals.

3.3. Papers Dealing with Aerial Warfare

Aerial combat is often a normal-form game where decisions about utilised resources are made
before the engagement, based on assumptions and knowledge about the strength of different
elements of the arsenal. For example, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense vehicles (SEADs) are
effective against ground-to-air defences and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), but will not be useful
against fighter aircraft. Therefore, when military personnel decide which resources to use in an
engagement, they need to weigh how valuable each of their resources is, as well as how important
the objective is to both sides of the conflict. If the attacking force values a target much more than it
is actually worth, then their increased resource expenditure may be detrimental to their military
campaign as a whole. With humans operating the aerial weaponry usually, their respective abilities
and skillsets, and the likelihood of them executing their mission, need to be considered.

There is limited literature on aerial combat modelled with game theory. Hamilton [73] provides a
comprehensive guide to applications of game theory on multiple Aerial warfare situations. Hamilton
suggests using game theory to devise strategies not only based on one’s own military options but
also expectations around enemy actions as well. Game theory accounts for different interactions
with the enemy, rather than simply considering which side had superior maximum-effort power.
Nowadays, many military forces can adapt to instantly changing situations and adjust their actions
based on those new circumstances. As such, Hamilton suggests first determining all of the tactical
options available to each side. As stated earlier, one of the most fundamental elements of using
game theory for the military is understanding exactly how much value each asset holds—and
detailing the inventory and strategic possibilities of both sides will best clarify all strategic options.
For each option, Hamilton suggests assigning a numerical value—a Measure of Effectiveness (MoE).
Decisions about MoEs are important because being accurate with MoEs will underpin the choices
that are made strategically. Incorrect MoEs can lead to incorrect strategic decisions, and perhaps
also result in poor understanding of why the decision was wrong. An example of this (although not in
the aerial warfare context) was the Vietnam War, where the early US strategy was maximising the
neutralisation of Viet Cong soldiers. Since the Northern Vietnamese leadership did not place great
emphasis on their infantry, the US strategy ultimately led to a loss in the war. Next, Hamilton
suggests calculating the combined value for all possible interactions between strategies of both sides
of the conflict. This will generate a matrix of payoffs, from which it is possible to derive the optimum
or dominant strategy for each player, and then an equilibrium solution. Thus, ahead of any
engagement a military leader may partake in, they have a well-formed idea of the expected result of
the game. A caveat that Hamilton adds to these guidelines is to consider the length of a military
campaign as a whole. The values that can be assigned to a resource for one battle or strike attack
may be small if they are cheap to replace or large in number. However, depending on the number of
such skirmishes throughout a campaign, those resources may become pivotal.

To illustrate these points, Hamilton applies them to a standard aerial warfare game of SEADs and
time-critical targets. In this combat, the ’Blue’ side is trying to eliminate some ground-based targets.
To do this, they use SEADs. In response, the ’Red’ side will fire SAMs, which SEADs struggle to avoid.
However, expecting this response, the Blue side also has Strike aircraft which can defend the SEADs
and counteract the SAMs but are unable to attack the targets. The questions for the Blue team are:
what is the value of the target and what ratio of SEADs and Strike aircraft should be deployed for the
targets? Likewise, for the Red team: how valuable is the target and how many, if any, SAMs should
be fired? Hamilton contends that the optimal Red strategy is to fire only for a fraction of
engagement which is equal to:

ValueofTargetValueofTarget+ValueofSEAD×Pks+ValueofSAM×PkA

(2)

and the optimal Blue Strategy is to assign a fraction of the planes as SEADs which is equal to:
ValueofSAM×PkAValueofSAM×PkA+ValueofSEAD×Pks+ValueofTarget

(3)

where

Pks is the probability of the SAMS destroying the SEADs

PkA is the probability of the Strike aircraft destroying the SAMs

This formulation gives a concise prediction of the likely outcome of an engagement given every
possible assignment of aircraft and missile launches. It must be noted that it is incredibly difficult in
practice to accurately quantify the numerical value of different targets and resources.

Garcia et al. 2019. [74] investigate the problem of defending a maritime coastline against two enemy
aircraft whose main objective is to invade the territory controlled by the defending aircraft. The
defender, on the other hand, attempts to prevent this by trying to intercept both enemy aircraft in
succession as far as possible from the border. This is a typical pursuit-evasion scenario and is
representative of many important problems in robotics, control and defence. In this paper, Garcia et
al. formulate this problem as a zero-sum differential game, where the defender/pursuer tries to
successively capture the two attackers/evaders as far as possible from the defended coastline while
the attackers cooperate and minimize their combined distance from the border before they are
confronted. Garcia et al. then find the optimal strategies for the attackers and the defender in this
one-defender two-attacker pursuit-evasion game by solving a set of nonlinear equations. The
cooperative strategy discussed in this paper provides an important coordination approach for less
capable (perhaps slower) agents when they are tasked to carry out a mission.

Garcia et al. 2017 [75] consider an air combat scenario where a target aircraft that is engaged by an
attacking missile utilises a defending missile to defend itself as it attempts to escape the attacker by
maximising the distance between itself and the attacker when the defender reaches as close at it can
to the attacking missile. The game is referred to as an active target defence differential game
(ATDDG). In the paper, the authors extend previous works performed on this three-party problem to
develop a closed-form analytical solution for the ATDDG where the Defender missile can defeat the
attacker if it enters within a capture circle with a specified radius rc > 0. Additionally, the closed-form
optimal state feedback solution demonstrated in the paper is supposed to work despite the attacker
employing an unknown guidance law rather than assuming it is Proportional Navigation (PN) or
pursuit (P). Finally, the authors provide the set of initial conditions for the target aircraft where its
survival is guaranteed if the target-defender team plays optimally despite the unknown guidance law
employed by the attacking missile.

Deligiannis et al. [76] consider a competitive power allocation problem in a Multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) radar network in the presence of multiple jammers. The main objective of the radar
network is to minimize the total power emitted by the radar while achieving a specific detection
criterion for each of the targets. In this problem, the radars are confronted by intelligent jammers
that can observe the radar transmitted power and thereby decide their jamming power to maximize
interference to the radar. Here Deligiannis et al. treat this power allocation problem as a non-
cooperative game where the players are the central radar controller and the jammers and solve this
using convex optimization techniques. Moreover, they provide proof for the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this scenario, where no player can further profit by changing
its power allocation.
Similarly, He et al. [77] consider the radar counter-measure problem in a multistatic radar network,
where a game-theoretic formulation of joint power allocation and beamforming is studied in the
presence of a smart jammer. The goal of each radar in this network is to meet the expected
detection performance of the target while minimizing its total transmit power and mitigating the
potential interferences. On the other hand, the goal of the jammer is to adjust its own transmit
power to interfere with the radar to protect the target from detection. First, He et al. study the
power allocation game with strategy sets of each player (radar and jammer) consisting of their
respective transmit powers. They then proceed to solve the corresponding optimization problems to
work out the best response function for the radar and the jammer and show the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibria. Next, they consider the joint power allocation and beamformer
design problem in the presence of jammers again as a non-cooperative game and propose a power
allocation and beamforming algorithm which is shown to converge to its Nash equilibrium point.

McEneaney et al. [78] investigate the command and control problem for unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs) against ground-based targets and defensive units such as Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)
systems. The motivation for this work arises from the requirement for operations planning and real-
time scheduling in an unmanned air operations scenario. The problem is modelled as a stochastic
game between blue players (UAVs) and red players that comprise the SAMs and ground-based
targets. There can be a number of objectives for each side: for an example, a blue player may try to
destroy a strategic target while minimizing damage to itself. The red players, on the other hand, may
attempt to inflict maximum damage on the UAV while protecting themselves from attack by the
UAVs.

The control strategies for the UAVs consist of a set of discrete variables that correspond to the
specific target or SAM to attack, while that for the SAMs are to switch their radar “on” or “off”. Note
that when the radar is “on”, the probability of the SAM causing damage to the blue players’
increases as does the probability of the blue players inflicting damage to the SAM. The solution to
this stochastic game is obtained via dynamic programming and illustrated using some numerical
examples. The main contribution of this work is the analysis of a risk-sensitive control-based
approach for stochastic games under imperfect information. In particular, this approach not only
handles noisy observations due to random noise but also deals with cases that include an adversarial
component in the observations.

Wei et al. [79] have developed a mission decision-making system for multiple uninhabited combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) working together. The UCAVs weapons are air-to-air missiles. In the paper, a
red-UCAV team consisting of an unmanned fighter-bomber flanked by two UCAVs attempts to strike
a blue-team ground target. The blue team has its own set of UCAVs that are directed to defeat the
red team. The success of a given missile against its chosen threat is determined by the distance
between the attacker and threats, their relative speed, and relative angles. The scenario is
represented as a simultaneous normal form game with the strategies for the team corresponding
with allocations of blue team entities against red-team entities and vice versa. In the paper, the
payoff for a red or blue team is based upon considering the effectiveness of a given allocation, which
in turn is dependant upon the relative geometry between the opposing team allocation groupings.
Dempster–Shafer (D-S) theory is applied where the D-S combinatorial formula is harnessed to
formulate the payoff. These payoffs, calculated for each strategy, for each team is then placed into
bi-matrices, i.e., one for each team and solved using a linear programming optimisation approach. If
an optimal Nash equilibrium is not present, a mixed strategy approach is applied and solved. The
authors then develop some mission scenarios with differing geometries and illustrate the use of
their game-theoretical allocation strategy. They use annotated diagrams of entity geometry
containing red and blue teams in proximity to one another to demonstrate that the allocation
strategy determined by their payoff formulation is satisfactory.

Ma et al. [80] have developed a game-theoretic approach to generate a cooperative occupancy

decision-making method for multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams engaged against each
other in a beyond-visual-range (BVR) air combat confrontation. BVR combat is enabled because of
developments in missile technology enabling long-range engagements. In the paper, the team on
each side first decides the occupancy positions (cubes in Cartesian space) of its UAV entities followed
by selecting targets for each UAV team member to engage. The goal is for each side to obtain the
greatest predominance while experiencing the smallest possible threat condition. A zero-sum
simultaneous bi-matrix game is applied to analyse the problem. For a given occupancy of a UAV,
height and distance predominance formulae that factor in the range and weapon
minimum/maximum performance criteria are used to generate payoff values for the utility
functions. As the scale of the game leads to an explosion in size (and thus strategy) as the number of
occupancy cubes and UAVs for each team is increased, the authors have chosen to augment the
Double Oracle (DO) algorithm that was designed to solve large scale zero-sum game problems in
earlier works, by combining it with a Neighbourhood Search (NS) algorithm into a Double Oracle
Neighbourhood Search (DO-NS). Through simulations, the authors illustrate that the results show
the DO-NS algorithm outperforming the DO algorithm in terms of computational time and solution
quality.

The work of Başpınar, Barış et al. [81] focuses on the modelling of air-to-air combat between two
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) using an optimization-based control and game-theoretic approach.
In this work, vehicle motion is expressed in terms of specific variables and any trajectory planning for
moving from one waypoint to another is solved by determining the smooth curves satisfying defined
conditions in flat output space. Following determination, all variables involved to describe the
smooth curve can be reverted to the original state/input space. The impact is a speed-up in the
solving of any trajectory optimization through reducing the number of variables required. Game
theory is then harnessed where the aerial combat between the two UAVs is modelled as a zero-sum
game using a minimax approach. That is, each party tries to maximise its payoff when the opponent
plays its best strategy. Here, The objective is for each UAV to get directly behind the other party and
within a range threshold to satisfy onboard weapon effective range constraints.

In [81], the authors provide cost functions associated with the degree of being in tail-chase to the
target based on aspect and bearing angles as well as the cost functions associated with generating a
maximum score when the opponent is within some threshold of the optimum shooting range. The
cost functions are multiplied together to create the total cost. The cost functions are put into a
receding horizon control scheme where the trajectory planning determined through selection of the
controls is performed for a given look-ahead time period where both players are utilising opposite
strategies. Each player considers its opponents as reachable sets within the horizon and uses this to
select its choice of controls to maximise its payoff. This process is repeated every few control steps.
Unlike most other works in this area, the authors use the full set of control inputs within the
performance envelope rather than a subset (e.g., turn, maintain hading, roll left at a particular angle,
immelman, split S or spiral dive), and thus point to generating a more optimal solution for each
player’s strategy. Two simulation scenarios are provided, with the first being the case where neither
UAV starts off in air-superiority position and then exercises the receding horizon cost function
optimisation to get into tail-chase with its opponent within optimum firing range. The authors show
that the speed, load factor and bank-angle when applying the controls do not violate bounds during
the flights and that feasible trajectories are generated. For the second simulation, the UAVs are
initially in a tail-chase except not satisfying the within shooting range criterion. The opponent being
chased manoeuvres to escape by applying the cost function while the chaser continues chasing. At
the end of the engagement, within shooting range criteria are met and the target is directly in front
but at a sub-optimal aspect, which leads to its escape. These scenarios are used to demonstrate the
validity of the control strategy developed and thus provide the automatic selection of combat
strategy for two unmanned aerial vehicles engaged in combat against one another.

Casbeer et al. [82], consider a scenario where an attacker missile pursuing an unmanned aerial
vehicle target is engaged by two defending missiles launched from entities allied to the target which
cooperate with the target. It extends from the typical three-party game scenario where there is only
one single defending missile engaging the attacker cooperating with the target. The author refers to
it here as an Active Target Defence Differential Game (ATDDG). Besides computing the optimal
strategy for the players in the extension to ATDDG, the paper attempts to determine the degree of
reduction in vulnerability of the target when it uses two defenders rather than one. A constrained
optimisation problem is formulated to solve this scenario. It is shown that the target through having
the choice to cooperate with either defender can more successfully escape the attacker.
Additionally, the presence of two defenders enables the attacker to be more easily intercepted.
When the two defender missiles are well-positioned, both can intercept the attacker.

Han et al. [83] present an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IADS) problem where Surface-to-Air-
Missile (SAM) batteries equipped with Interceptor Missiles (IM) engage the Attacker Missiles (AM)
targeting cities. The problem is cast as a simplified two-party zero-sum game with perfect
information and has three stages. The three stages correspond with the defender setting up their
allocation of SAMs to cities, followed by the attacker allocating their missile salvo against cities and
finally the defender in response allocating interceptor missiles to counter attacker missile salvo. The
simplifying assumptions made in this problem are that there is only one SAM allocated near a city
and only one installed per site. Additionally, no more than one interceptor is launched against each
attacking missile. Additionally, only one IM can be allocated to one DM, each SAM has the same
number and type of IMs, and AMs are identical and are fired in a single salvo. It is attempted to solve
the tri-level game using an extensive form game tree, α−β pruning and using the Double Oracle (DO)
algorithm for a six-city network that needs to be protected. The DO algorithm is a heuristic and is not
guaranteed to find the Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium (SPNE). The efficiency with which the
Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibrium is reached by each choice of algorithm is studied. For the game-
tree approach, the conclusion made is that the size of the strategy space is determined to increase
to an intractable size because of the combinatorial nature of the problem. When applying α−β
pruning, compared to the DO algorithm, the paper determines that determination of the number of
SAM batteries, AMs and IMs do not scale well in terms of computational time. However, the DO
algorithm does fail to find the SPNE in a small number of instances. The authors prefer the DO
algorithm despite this, as it is shown to not violate monotonicity (increase in payoff) and the solution
quality trends (non-exponential increase in computational time) even when increasing the size of the
problem from 6 cities to 55 cities.

3.4. Papers Dealing with Cyber Warfare

Papers that deal with applications of game theory in Cyber Warfare, as distinct from Cyber Security,
are few. Significantly among them, Keith et al. [84] consider a multi-domain (cyber combined with
air-defence) defence security game problem. Two players are engaging each other in a zero-sum
extensive form game, a defender, representing an integrated air-defence system (IADS) equipped
with cyber warfare protection, and an attacker, capable of unleashing air-to-ground threats (missiles,
bombs) as well cyber-attacks (against the IADS network). Here, the payoff has been selected as the
expected loss of life. The defender wants to minimise this while the attacker wants to maximise it.
The cyber security game problem to protect the IADS is nested within the physical security game
problem. The actions of the players correspond with allocations to activate IADS/cyber security
response nodes corresponding with population centres for the defender, and allocations to attack
IADS/associated cyber-security nodes by the attacker. The realism of the game is increased through
provisioning in imperfect information; that is, the defender and attacker are not fully aware of the
level of vulnerability of nodes. Additionally, the defender is only able to sense cyber attacks on
nodes probabilistically which implies that its allocation of cyber defence teams to particular IADS is
only effective probabilistically. For the attacker, it can also determine the effectiveness of its cyber-
attacks following physically attacking a node. This work is primed to advance the security game
literature by introducing the integrated domain, multiple periods for agent actions and enabling
continuously mixed form strategies by the players. The author considers it the first work where
Monte Carlo (MC), and discounted and robust Counterfactual Regret Minimisation (CRM)-based
approaches have been compared in security games. Initially, for a small-scale version of the
problem, the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a sequence-form linear program is determined for
the defender. Then, the problem is gradually scaled up to include additional population centres to be
defended up to an upper limit. Here, an approximate CRM algorithm is introduced to reduce
computation time while preserving the optimality of a particular strategy as much as possible. When
the scale is further increased, a discounted CRM is introduced which further reduces computation
time.

The parameter space of the problem and algorithm are explored to select the best choice of tuning
parameters and extract the best performance from the algorithms. The rationality of the players is
made limited by introducing bounded rationality so that they do not necessarily make the optimal
responses. They can only manage approximate robust best response moves. A robust best response
for a player is defined as the compromise between the completely conservative NE strategy and the
completely aggressive best response strategy. It introduces weaknesses in players’ strategies. With
respect to a player, the capability of their strategy to capitalise over an opponent’s strategy is
referred to as exploitation. Conversely, the vulnerability of their strategy with respect to an
opponent is referred to as exploitability. When running all the different algorithms introduced, the
results show that the Nash equilibrium solution is the safest strategy since the best moves are being
played which are not exploitable, however, it does not produce the highest utility for a player. The
performance charts show that the robust linear program generates the highest mean utility and
highest exploitation-to-exploitability ratio while also consuming the maximum computational time.
The Data biased CFR is seen to offer the best trade-off by offering a high mean utility, an
exploitation-to-exploitability ratio in favour of exploitation while running in the lowest
computational time.

3.5. Papers Dealing with Space Warfare

In the domain of space warfare, human resources and risks are much less prevalent, and so the focus
is more on network strength and interaction between independent autonomous agents, connected
or otherwise. Ultimately, warfare in these aspects will operate at a pace and in dimensions far
beyond human cognitive capacity. Since the rapidity and complexity of decisions within
engagements will almost certainly outscale military personnel’s understanding, the game theory will
take the place of decision-makers as part of the overall software and control system, and imbue
future technology to consider human/social factors when making calculations. With a greater focus
on connectivity and networking, the key to success in these areas relies on effective communication
channels and a shared goal across the system. In this nascent area of research, papers that apply
game theory are often concerned with satellite networks.

Zhong et al. [85] set the ambitious goal of optimising bandwidth allocation and transmission power
across a satellite network. They base their research on bargaining game theory and have to achieve
compromise across interference constraints, Quality of Service requirements, channel conditions,
and transmission and reception capabilities for satellites at every point in the network. Interference
constraints and bandwidth limitations are the surpluses that need to be negotiated in the bargaining
game, with each satellite using different strategies to improve its utility/share of resources. This
quickly escalates in complexity, with the most important takeaway from the model being the
mapping of a problem to the cooperative bargaining game framework.

Similarly, Qiao and Zhao [86] detail some key issues with the finite energy availability for the nodes
in satellite networks. Their paper offers a solution through a game-theoretical model of a routing
algorithm and uses it to find an equilibrium solution to the uneven network flow. The model locates
certain network hot spots, which are reserving a lot of energy and takes measures to evenly
distribute the resources. This is another case of a bargaining/cooperative game across multiple
players in a network.

3.6. Papers Dealing with Target Tracking

Since target tracking is an established research area, we found several papers applying game theory
tracking problems. Most of these have overlapping warfare domains and do not put too much
emphasis on demonstrating applicability in a particular domain. For example, Gu et al. [87] study the
problem of tracking a moving target using a sensor network comprising of sensors capable of
providing some position-related target measurements. Each sensor node has a sensor to observe the
target and a processor to estimate its state. While there is some communication available among
sensors, this ability is limited in the sense that each sensor node can only communicate with its
neighbours. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the target is an intelligent agent
capable of minimizing its detectability by the adversary and thereby has the potential to increase the
tracking error of the tracking agent. Gu et al. [87] solve this problem within the framework of a zero-
sum game, and by minimizing the tracking agent’s estimation error, a robust minimax filter is
developed. Moreover, to handle the limited communication capability of the sensor nodes, they
propose a distributed version of this filter for which each node only requires information in the form
of current measurement and estimated state from its immediate neighbours. They then
demonstrate the performance of their algorithm on a simulated scenario with an intelligent target
and show that while the standard Kalman filter errors diverge, the minimax filter which takes into
account the adversary’s noise, can significantly outperform the Kalman filter.

Qilong et al. [88] similarly address the issue of tracking an intelligent target, but they model a
scenario where the tracking players are also in pursuit, and the focus is on protecting the target.
Additionally, the target can fire a defensive missile at the attacker/tracker. The attacker has a line of
sight of both the target and the defensive missile. The target plans to allow the tracker to slowly
close the distance between itself and the target, all the while manoeuvring to develop an
understanding of how the attacker reacts. When the attacker is close to collision, the defensive
missile is released. The target and the missile then communicate, use the knowledge of the
attacker’s movement patterns, and adhere to an optimal linear guidance law to destroy the attacker.
This was modelled as a zero-sum competitive game between the attacker, the target, and the
defensive missile. However, the paper also focuses on the cooperative game played between the
target and the defensive missile, which is a non-zero-sum game. For them, the payoff is calculated by
minimised miss distance (which ideally equals zero—a collision with the attacker), as well as the
control effort required to guide the defensive missile.

Faruqi [89] discusses the general problem of applying differential game theory to missile guidance.
They state that missile trajectory follows Proportional Navigation (PN), a guidance law typically used
by homing missiles. The performance of these systems is measured by a Linear System Quadratic
Performance Index (LQPI). With respect to differential game theory, they model the missile guidance
problem by representing the missile navigation and trajectory with a set of differential equations.
The general form of this problem is

x˙––ij=Fx––ij(t)+Gu––i(t)−Gu––j(t)

(4)

and

J(…)=12x––Tij(tf)Sx––ij(tf)+12∫t0tf[x––TijQGu––i+u––TiRiu––i+u––TjRju––j]

(5)

where

x––ij(t)=xi(t)−xj(t): is the relative state of player i w.r.t player j

u––i(t): is the player i input

u––j(t): is the player j input

F): is the state coefficient matrix

G: is the player input coefficient matrix

Q): is the Performance Index (PI) weightings matrix for current relative states

S): is the PI weightings matrix for final relative states

Ri,Rj: PI weightings matrices on inputs

Faruqi mainly focuses on two-player and three-player games, while the utility functions are
modelled based on the relative distance vectors between missiles and targets. Faruqi shows that
game theory can be effectively used in missile guidance tasks involving PNs in modern missiles.

Evers [90] on the other hand analyses defence against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) using game
theory. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology has important consequences for
military conflict, where the cost of failure can lead to the destruction of entire cities. It can be hard
to pinpoint their launch as they have a big range, are very powerful, though their payload can vary
considerably. In combating this threat, the defending nation does have the advantage that there is
usually a long flight trajectory, typically split into three phases, during which the TBM can be
intercepted. The Boost phase marks launch and the majority of the TBM ascent. The end of the
boost phase is marked by the burn-out after which the TBM enters its midcourse phase. This phase is
the longest phase of the flight and affords the best opportunity for defenders to intercept the TBM.
After the midcourse phase, the TBM enters its terminal phase from re-entry into the atmosphere.
This is the last opportunity for defenders to intercept the missile. The flight path is illustrated in
Figure 4 below.
Figure 4

Flight path of Theater Ballistic Missiles.

The missile travels a long distance over a reasonably extended flight time. However, from its physical
geographical location, a defending military force or nation can only apply its resources to defend
against it in the termination phase of flight, where the risk is much higher and the cost of failure is at
its greatest. For this reason, Evers proposes a cooperative strategy, where the defending nation
forms alliances with nations around itself so that they too can attempt to intercept the TBM in its
earlier phases as it travels to the impact location. Therefore, the game is divided into two smaller
games: the first being a cooperative multiplayer game devising a set of strategies for the coalition of
nations to utilise throughout a TBM’s flight path, and the second is the bargaining and cooperation
game between the defending nations and potential allies.

The basis of the cooperative game to shoot down the TBM is a strategy called ‘shoot-look-shoot.’ It
relies on a set of N nations attacking the target using a set of strategies—their interceptor missiles—
M each of which has its own Probability of Interception Pi. As the TBM flies, each nation n in N will
fire its missile(s) mn to intercept the TBM, then look to see if it has successfully neutralised the
threat. If it has failed, the next nation’s missile(s) mn+1 will be fired. The game’s problem is then
reduced to optimising the probability of interception of the whole set of strategies, such that it has a
feasible likelihood of stopping the TBM. Game theory is useful here because the principles of
cooperative game theory provide a strong mathematical framework by which an equilibrium
solution can be reached for the set of cooperating nations.

The second game described by Evers is based on negotiating with other nations to form an alliance.
For these other nations, participation in this game is a risk because it makes them another potential
target for the attacking force. To solve this game, the defending nation must accurately evaluate the
interceptor cost savings, that is, how much there is to gain by preventing the impact of the TBM.
With these savings becoming the surplus that cooperating nations can share in, potential allies then
negotiate over how those savings will be shared, in proportion to what interception resources they
have to offer.

Shinar and Shima [91] continue the research of both pursuit-evasion games and ballistic missile
defence with a zero-sum game of a highly manoeuvrable ballistic missile avoiding an interceptor
missile. More specifically, it ties in an imperfect information element to the game, where the ballistic
missile knows it is being attacked by anti-missile missiles, but knows little about their trajectory or
launching locations. In this game, the two players are the ballistic missile and the interceptor. If the
ballistic missile uses a pure strategy, it will likely be hit because it either (a) cannot react quickly
enough to an opponent it has little information about or (b) will move predictably and allow for a
straightforward trajectory towards collision. Therefore, the best solution to the game for the ballistic
missile is in mixed strategies.

The mixed strategy will incorporate stochasticity in its flight pattern, assigning a probability
distribution over a set of pure strategies. These pure strategies will be based on essential
navigational heuristics, which will likely be known or easily discovered by the interceptor. By
applying a small number of rapid and random switches in strategy, the ballistic missile can maximise
its potential for avoiding interception, and force the complexity of timing calculation back onto the
interceptor.

Bogdanovic et al. [92] investigate a target selection problem for multi-target tracking using a game-
theoretic perspective. This is an important problem in a multi-function radar network as it needs to
perform multiple functions such as volume surveillance and fire control simultaneously while
effectively managing the available radar resources to achieve specified objectives. Thus, in effect,
they tackle a radar resource management problem in [92] and use non-cooperative game-theoretic
approaches to find optimal solutions for this problem. They formulate the problem in a framework
where each radar is considered to be autonomous; there is no central control engine informing the
radars of their optimal strategies nor is there any communication among the radars. First, they
consider a case where all radars share common interests with respect to the targets and for this
problem, they propose a distributed algorithm based on the best response dynamics to find the
Nash equilibria points. This problem is then extended to a more realistic case of heterogeneous
interests among radars and partial target observability. For this case, they employ the solution
concept of correlated equilibria and propose an efficient distributed algorithm based on regret
matching which is shown to achieve comparable performance to the more computationally intensive
centralized approach.

Finally, Parras et al. [93] examine a pursuit-evasion game, involving anti-jamming strategies for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The game operates within a continuous time frame and is
therefore dynamic, being solved with the help of differential Game Theory. In somewhat of a
culmination of the aforementioned work, it combines elements of communication optimisation,
sensor evasion and navigation. Given that UAVs require strong communication for control and the
relaying of information, this dependency makes UAVs incredibly susceptible to jamming attacks.
There are multiple strategies to both jam and anti-jam these communications, and this can be
considered a zero-sum game where the UAV must attempt to optimise its communication capacity.
There is usually uncertainty about the positioning and movement of the jamming agent, so the game
is an imperfect information differential game. The most important payoff for the UAV is avoiding
losing communication to jamming, and it can do this by manoeuvring to make approximations for
the distance of jamming agents and thus avoiding them.

3.7. Papers Dealing with National Security

The key components of homeland security addressed by game theory are cyber security, modelling
terrorism threats and defence contracts. With many applications in computer science the [94,95,96],
game theory fits well into cyber security problems. Game theory combines the strict mathematical
rigour of computer science, with more psychological and philosophical elements like attacker
incentives and mindset, as well as human vulnerabilities in cyber security. Terrorism modelling
similarly benefits from the psychological flavour of game theory, since so much of the impact of
terrorist activity is not easily quantifiable, including social, economic and other spheres affected by
terrorist threats, all of which are modelled in a game-theoretic setting. Finally, game theory is
suitable for a topic such as contracting and subcontracting because it captures interactions between
selfish individuals effectively [1,2], and this has been used to model the behaviour of defence
contractors.

The paper by Litti [97] provides a brief summary of how traditional network security heuristics can
be updated with more precision, and how game theory can help network security engineers design
strategies to properly predict, mitigate, and handle threatened networks. He develops a qualitative
method for valuing the potential risks and costs of attacks on networks. While a fairly short paper, it
does provide some cyber security situational examples of game theory in practice. For example, he
models a two-player zero-sum game to represent an attacker and a security system. The nodes have
their own interdependence, vulnerabilities and security assets, but cooperate to minimise the
attacker’s potential to compromise the system.

Jhawar et al. [98] offer a more specific approach of game theory, namely, Attack-Defence Trees
(ADTs), to model scenarios involving cyber security threats. Here ADTs are used to map potential
attack and defence scenarios on a system that is equipped with automatic defence protocols. The
system needs to be comprehensive in addressing all possible vulnerabilities, as well as generating
responses that adapt to the aggressively evolving situation of cyber security attacks. Currently, ADTs
only provide upfront system analyses. Having a reactive strategy for cyber security is important
because Attackers constantly change their attack strategies for offence, and so the timing of real-
time responses can make the difference between a successful and a failed defence of a system. In
Jhawar et al. [98] they model a simple game of Attacker and Defender—a hacker and a security
network administrator. The hacker attempts to breach the integrity of the system, and for each
move they make, the administrator will have devised a reactive strategy based on the attacker’s
attempt. The greatest utility of this method comes from the ability to convert long extensive form
games into a graphical layout for easier understanding and communication.

Gonzalez [99] clearly outlines a standard two-player competitive game of attacker and defender, and
then utilises Instance-Based Learning Theory and Behavioural game theory. The former compiles
cognitive information into a representation known as an instance. Each instance has a three-part
structure of situation, decision and utility—a standard game. However, it is the interaction between
instances that is critical to this approach. Instance-Based Learning Theory uses the learning from the
outcome of each instance to feedback into the situation of the next instance, hopefully leading to
better decisions in later iterations. This is notably similar to the reinforcement learning technique in
machine learning. On the other hand, Behavioural game theory involves devising a strategy where
we assess a variety of factors, to make more precise long term evaluations of targets and resources
so that utility scores more closely reflect real-life value. Once again, game theory facilitates access to
social information in cyber security applications and assesses how that will affect the behaviour of
both players in the game. Other critical factors include motivational factors of the players,
completeness of information for each player, and technological constraints and inefficiencies
between player and technology. Gonzalez stresses that the importance of accommodating these
factors in any cyber security model will help make more realistic and useful policies for cyber
defence.

One common use of cyber security is in the prevention of terrorism. Hausken et al. [100] cover both
terrorism and natural disaster modelling with some guiding game theory principles. Terrorism and
Natural Disasters are addressed by defending with anti-terrorism, anti-disaster, and anti-all-hazard
investments. Making projections about the likelihoods of each of these occurrences, defenders must
make strategic decisions towards the amount of investment dedicated to each defence. Costs to be
considered in the utility function of each of these situations include the intelligence of terrorists or
the randomness/ environmental control of natural disasters; the intensity of an attack/ disaster, and
differences in evaluation of target value between a terrorist and defender. The game-theoretic
approach used in this analysis captures the defender’s effort in combating each threat. Depending
on the likelihood of each event, combined with the costs of each defensive system, defenders can
derive an optimal division of funds.

Kanturska et al. [101] present a rigorous inspection of how transport network reliability can be
assessed using game theory when attack probability on different locations is unknown. The approach
favoured using a minimax algorithm to distribute risk across multiple paths as long as the travel costs
are small relative to potential losses incurred by an attack. This would be useful in assessing the
potential risk associated with safely escorting a VIP through a city. Game theory is helpful in this
situation because it can analyse network reliability when the attack probabilities are unknown.

Bier [102] presents useful game theory-based suggestions for policy insights and investment
decisions, insurance policy premiums and more. Her work discusses the weakest link model: a
strategy focusing all resources on preventing the worst utility scenario. This is generally not ideal in
practice, and she suggests instead to consider hedging those investments with a variety of defence
strategies for different potential targets. The paper considers terrorist/defender games, and how
security investments can change the landscape of attacker-defender interactions for the whole
community. This is mainly done through its own scoping study, with one of the key takeaways being
that terrorism mitigation systems can benefit from game theory because it adds an extra layer of
consideration of the terrorists’ response to any defence mechanisms. Hence, game theory,
combined with the holistic approach of risk and reliability analysis over all systems, can provide a
more comprehensive assessment of all the potential risks and vulnerabilities in counter-terrorism
strategies.

Cioaca [103] investigates a similar question to Bier et al. [65] as mentioned earlier but specifically
focuses on aviation security. The problem is summarised by targeting both the cost of security
measures for airports and the cost of maintaining a stable and resilient system of defence. Key
strategies are: preventing the attack or threat entirely (either by removing all access to the target
location or restricting airlines permissions if they fail to adhere to imposed guidelines); managing the
temporal dimension of the attack (the length of the attack and the subsequent time to recover from
it); understanding all direct and indirect losses (both casualties and related damages like
contamination or infection, compromised secondary security measures, or reputational/signal
ramifications); and the costs of mitigation, response and recovery.
The model is built around several factors and parameters. The first and most critical is human losses
and material damages C(H,Dbt). H refers to human losses, D refers to material damages and bt refers
to the budget allocated to the associated security system involved. The most obvious and direct
casualties of an attack, these two losses are highly negative payoffs in such an attack and are often
greater than any cost to prevent them. Human losses H are hard to numerically quantify, and
therefore when making proper assessments about resource division, understanding how to minimise
human losses across different groups of humans and in different dimensions is one of the most
difficult aspects of this problem. Material damages D can be monetarily quantified, but often the
run-on effects of such damages are where the significant losses are incurred. These losses can lead
to total infrastructure shutdowns, ceasing operation of the facility, loss of jobs of workers and even
potentially the slow decline and shutdown of the facility altogether. The second major factor in this
game is the budget allocated to security systems bt. Organisational and managing bodies will only
have a certain amount of resources allocated to a security system T. The next factor is the number s
of security system components as this will be how the budget is composed. Each of these
components are partitioned into one of n separate system sub-components. These components are
divided amongst a number of targets tik, and each one of these targets is assigned a probability of
being attacked ptkaj(btk) and a value wtik. This can be formally expressed as:

minC(H,Dbt)=∑j=1l∑i=1n∑k=1sptikaj⋅ptikvj⋅wtik

(6)

For any system of resource division, Ciaoca advocates establishing dimensions of measuring system
resilience. This is divided into static resilience, the efficient allocation of resources; dynamic
resilience, the recovery speed of the system after the shock, including long term investment in-
flows. These two forms of resilience signify the strength of a system both before, during, and after
an attack. With respect to game theory, Ciaoca’s study defines a game clearly and incorporates a
myriad of complex and interconnected parameters to outline an effective and calculable game
model.

The final paper we discuss on national security is by Gardener and Moffat [104]. This paper covers
the notion of developing a strategy to assess defence contractors and their potential performance/
ability to meet contractual obligations. In game-theoretic parlance, this problem can be expressed in
terms of cooperation and defection. Gardener and Moffat suggest quantitative methods through
which defence departments can more rigorously assess contracts and bidding scenarios, and
therefore wisely select contractors, and protect their budget. Gardener and Moffat further the
understanding of change requirements in project management at different bidding stages of defence
acquisition projects. The factor they focus on is the conspiracy of optimism, whereby projects spiral
out of control—past budget limits and necessary deadlines—due to irrational expectations of project
progress. Often this ’conspiracy’ is a drive towards making short term gains, and in fact leads to
overall losses. The bidding game that is played becomes less about the success of the project, and
more about profit capitalisation, and can further degenerate into a two-player game where the
relevant defence department is against the industry of contractors as a whole.

3.8. Papers Dealing with Other/Mixed Warfare

Some papers use game theory in defence settings, but cannot be easily classified into any of the
types mentioned above, or are concerned with mixed warfare. For example, Zhang and Meherjerdi
[105] investigate how groups of multiple unmanned vehicles can be used and controlled using game-
theoretic methods in different communication frameworks. Dividing a mission for a single
unmanned vehicle amongst multiple unmanned vehicles yields more effective task allocation and
performance. The separation of labour away from one powerful single vehicle to several smaller
vehicles provides flexibility, adaptability and improved fault tolerance. The uses of such a network
are surveillance, exploration, satellite clustering, combining Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)
and submarines, planes and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and cooperative robot
reconnaissance. As evident from this list, the strategy is incredibly powerful because of its ability to
combine resources across multiple domains. To be able to operate a cohesive unit of resources
across multiple unmanned systems for combat or exploration brings an unprecedented level of
information and control which would accelerate military performance tremendously.

Similarly, it could be noted that search is a ‘hide and seek’ game with a long history in military
applications [106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115]. The theory was pioneered by Koopman
[106] primarily in the military context (search for an escaping target), followed by developments by
Stone et al. [107]. The applications include submarine hunting, mine detection, rescue operations,
the risk for the first responders, and localization of a hazardous source
[106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115]. This framework provides the optimal a priori search
plan for a given detection model, target motion and the cost of the search. The cost of the search
may include time of the search, probability of escape (for a target), exposure risk (for a searcher),
information entropy, or situation awareness (map of probability of target location). The searcher can
be a moving platform (UAV, UUV, patrolling boats, helicopters, robots, people) and the targets can
be static, movable, blind, silent, or emitting. In this context the simultaneous localisation and
mapping (SLAM) algorithms are often used [116]. The new direction of research in this niche
(inspired by some biological applications) employs the ideas of infotaxis [117], or real-time control of
the searchers’ movement based on information (entropy) gain extracted from the environment
(sporadic measurements, forbidden areas, communication between searchers). Principles of game
theory could be applied in such contexts which can be modelled as ‘hide and seek’ games.

Go to:

4. Classification and Impact

4.1. Classification of Papers

In the previous section, it would have been noticeable that many papers have applicability in more
than one domain, and use myriad types of games and model a range of players. It is therefore
imperative to classify the reviewed papers in a principled manner. To do so, we use the classification
scheme already introduced in Table 1 in Section 2.

In particular, the reviewed papers could be classified based on (1) the domain or type of warfare (2)
the type of game or games used in the paper, and (3) the nature of players modelled in the paper.
The domain can be broadly classified into Traditional (T) or Modern (M), and more specifically into
Land warfare, Naval warfare, Aerial warfare, Cyberwarfare and Space Warfare. The type of games
used can also have a complex classification, based on whether the games were Non-cooperative or
cooperative, sequential or simultaneous, discrete or continuous, zero-sum or non-zero-sum. Finally,
the games can be two-player, three-player, or multi-player (more-than-three player) games. All of
this is succinctly captured in Table 1.

In Table 2, we provide a self-explanatory, elaborate classification of all the reviewed papers based on
the above-mentioned classification scheme.

Table 2
Classification of papers in the niche of game-theoretic applications in defence, using Table 1. A total
of 29 papers described here are classified.

Title Authors Classification Code Using Table 1

Game Theoretic analysis of T-N-IW-NCo-Sim-

Bachmann et al.
adaptive radar jamming -D-ZS-2P

Target selection for tracking in

T-A-AMW-NCo-
multifunction radar networks: Bogdanovic et al.
-Sim-D-ZS-NP
Nash and Correlated equilibria

Power allocation game

between
Deligiannis et al. T-A-IW-NCo-Sim-D-ZS-NP
a radar network
and multiple jammers

Strategies for defending

a coastline
Garcia et al. T-A-IW-NCo-Sim-C-ZS-3P
against multiple
attackers

A game theory approach to

target tracking Gu et al. T-L-IW-NCo-Sim-D-ZS-NP
in sensor networks

Joint Power allocation and

beamforming
between a
He et al. T-A-IW-NCo-Sim-D-ZS-2P
multi-static-radar
and jammer
based on game theory

Game theoretic situation

and transmission
T-L-(RAW & AMW)-
in unattended ground Krishnamurthy et al.
-NCo-Sim-D-ZS-NP
sensor networks: a correlated
equilibrium approach

Network enabled
T-N-(RAW & IW)
missile deflection: games and Maskery et al. 2007 a
-Co-Sim-D-NZS-NP
correlated equilibrium

Decentralised algorithms
for netcentric Force T-N-(RAW & IW)-
Maskery et al. 2007 b
Protection against -Co-Sim-D-NZS-NP
anti-ship missiles

T-(LSA)-AMW-NCo-
Search and Screening Koopman
-Slt-D-ZS-NP
Title Authors Classification Code Using Table 1

Optimal Strategy for

Target Protection with a T-A-WCW-
Qilong et al.
defender in the -NCo-Sim-C-ZS-3P
pursuit-evasion scenario

Differential game theory

T-A-(AMW,WCW)-
with applications to
Faruqi -NCo-Slt-C-ZS-
missiles and autonomous
-(2P,3P,NP)
systems guidance

A game theoretical interceptor

T-A-(AMW,WCW)-
guidance law Shinar et al.
-NCo-Slt-C-ZS-2P
for ballistic missile defence.

Pursuit-Evasion games:
T-A-(WCW,IW)
a tractable framework for Parras et al.
-NCo-Slt-C-ZS-2P
anti-jamming in aerial attacks

A simple game theoretic

approach to suppression of
T-A-(RAW,WCW)-
enemy defences and Hamilton et al.
-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-2P
other time-critical
target analyses

Choosing What to Protect:

Strategic Defence T-L-RAW-NCo-
Bier et al.
allocation against an -Slt-D-ZS-2P
unknown attacker

Considerations on Optimal
M-C-RAW-NCo
Resource allocation Cioaca
-Slt-D-ZS-2P
in avation security

Horsemen and the empty city:

A game theoretic
T-L-RAW-
examination of deception in Cotten et al.
-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-2P
Chinese military
legend

An Economic Theory of (T,M)-(IW,RAW)-

Gries et al.
Destabilisation War -NCo-Slt-D-ZS-NP

Game theoretic approach

towards network security: Litti M-C-IW-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-2P
A review

Automating cyber defence Jhawar et al. M-C-RAW-NCo-

responses using -Slt-D-ZS-2P
attack-defence trees and
Title Authors Classification Code Using Table 1

game theory

From individual decisions

M-C-IW-NCo-
from experience to Gonzalez
-Slt-D-ZS-2P
behavioural game theory

Game Theoretic Approaches

to Attack Surface M-C-IW-NCo-
Manadhata
Shifting. Moving -Slt-D-ZS-2P
Target Defense II

Improving reliability
through Multi-Path routing
M-C-RAW-
and Link Defence: Kanturska et al.
-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-2P
An Application of Game Theory
to Transport

Game Theoretic and Reliability’

M-C-RAW-
models in Bier et al.
-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-2P
counter-terrorism and security

(T,M)-
Changing behaviours in
-(L,A,S,C,Sp)-
defence acqusition: Gardener et al.
-IW-NCo-
a game theory approach
-Slt-D-ZS-NP

Joint Transmit Power and

Bandwidth Allocation
M-Sp-RAW-Co-
for Cognitive Satellite Network Zhong et al.
-Slt-D-NZS-NP
based on Bargaining
Game Theory

The Research and Simulation

M-Sp-WCW-
of a Satellite Routing Qiao et al.
-NCo-Slt-D-ZS-NP
Algorithm based on Game Theory

A survey of multiple unmanned

vehicles formation T-A-WCW-Co-
Zhang et al.
control and coordiation. -Slt-D-NZS-NP
Normal and fault situations

Open in a separate window

4.2. Impact-Related Metrics of the Papers Reviewed

We now consider the question of which of these papers have attracted the most interest in the
research community or resulted in follow-up or related work. One generally used metric to measure
such impact is citation count, though obviously this metric is biased towards earlier papers.
Nonetheless, in Table 3 we present the Google Scholar citation count of the 29 papers considered. It
is self-evident to the reader which papers have attracted the most citations, and we will not further
comment upon it. We stress, however, that citation count is not the only measure of impact, nor it is
necessarily the most effective to gauge the impact of a paper in the research field. However, it is a
readily available measure that conveys useful information.

Table 3

Google Scholar citation counts of the reviewed papers. Google Scholar citation data was accessed on
18 December 2021.

Google Scholar
Paper Country
Citation Count

Game Theoretic analysis of adaptive radar jamming

Australia 53
(Bachmann et al.)

Target selection for tracking in multifunction radar

Netherlands 10
networks: Nash and Correlated equilibria (Bogdanovic et al.)

Power allocation game between a radar network

UK 32
and multiple jammers (Deligiannis et al.)

Strategies for defending a coastline against multiple

US 7
attackers (Garcia et al.)

A game theory approach to target tracking

UK 72
in sensor networks (Gu et al.)

Joint Power allocation and beamforming

between a multi-static-radar and jammer China 3
based on game theory (He et al.)

Game theoretic situation and transmission

in unattended ground sensor networks: a correlated US 4
equilibrium approach (Krishnamurthy et al.)

Network enabled missile deflection: games and

US 9
correlated equilibrium (Maskery et al. 2007 a)

Decentralised algorithms for netcentric Force

Protection against anti-ship missiles US 18
(Maskery et al. 2007 b)

Search and Screening (Koopman) US 8

Optimal Strategy for Target Protection with a

China 1
defender in the pursuit-evasion scenario (Qilong et al.)

Differential game theory with applications to

Australia 7
missiles and autonomous systems guidance (Faruqi)

A game theoretical interceptor guidance law

Israel 34
for ballistic missile defence (Shinar et al.)
 Google Scholar
Paper Country
Citation Count

Pursuit-Evasion games: a tractable framework for

Spain 2
anti-jamming in aerial attacks (Parras et al.)

A simple game theoretic approach to suppression of

enemy defences and other time-critical target US 17
analyses (Hamilton et al.)

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defence

US 388
allocation against an unknown attacker (Bier et al.)

Considerations on Optimal Resource allocation

Romania 3
in avation security (Cioaca)

Horsemen and the empty city: A game theoretic

examination of deception in Chinese military US 9
legend (Cotten et al.)

An Economic Theory of Destabilisation War (Gries et al.) Germany 3

Game theoretic approach owards network security:

India 7
A review (Litti)

Automating cyber defence responses using

Netherlands 3
attack-defence trees and game theory (Jhawar et al.)

From individual decisions from experience to

US 9
behavioural game theory (Gonzalez)

Game Theoretic Approaches to Attack Surface

US 70
Shifting. Moving Target Defense II (Manadhata)

Improving reliability through Multi-Path routing

and Link Defence: An Application of Game Theory UK 13
to Transport (Kanturska et al.)

Game Theoretic and Reliability models in

US 99
counter-terrorism and security (Bier et al.)

Changing behaviours in defence acqusition:

UK 20
a game theory approach (Gardener et al.)

Joint Transmit Power and Bandwidth Allocation

for Cognitive Satellite Network based on Bargaining China 13
Game Theory (Zhong et al.)

The Research and Simulation of a Satellite Routing

China 2
Algorithm based on Game Theory (Qiao et al.)

A survey of multiple unmanned vehicles formation Canada 98

 Google Scholar
Paper Country
Citation Count

control and coordiation.

Normal and fault situations (Zhang et al.)

Open in a separate window

Table 3 also shows the country of origin for each paper considered, being defined as the country that
appears in the corresponding author’s first affiliation. It can be seen that the papers considered were
written by researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, China, Netherlands,
Canada, Israel, India, Germany, Spain and Romania. It appears that the primary interest in applying
game theory in defence science exists in the US, Europe (particularly Western Europe) and China,
while it is acknowledged that there may be several papers written in languages other than English
which we did not consider.

To understand whether there was sufficient cross-pollinating of ideas across the different domains
described in the above classification, we considered how many papers among the 29 reviewed
papers cited others from the same set. The citations, according to Google Scholar, are presented in
Table 4. Surprisingly, there was no paper that was cited more than twice by other papers which are
reviewed, and most papers are not cited by other papers in the set at all. This is despite the fact that
the overall citation count of the papers in the set is healthy—the reviewed papers are cited 34.97
times on average according to Table 3, and several papers are cited more than 50 times. Most of
these citations, however, seem to come from papers concerned with defence science and
technology which use various methods and tools to solve similar problems, and it is obvious that
there is little cross-pollination between researchers who use game theory in defence applications.
Therefore, quite apart from ‘gaps’ in the literature which we present below, which indicate potential
research opportunities, it should also be emphasized that awareness of similar works in the field
should increase, and this will likely result in ideas generated in a particular domain being re-used in
other domains and other applications related to defence.

Table 4

Citations among reviewed papers according to Google Scholar. Google Scholar citation data was
accessed on 18 December 2021. It is observable from this table that citing each other’s work is
extremely rare in the field.

Paper Country Cited By

Bogdanovic et
Game Theoretic analysis of al.,
Australia
adaptive radar jamming (Bachmann et al.) Deligiannis et
al.

Target selection for tracking in

multifunction radar networks: Netherlands He et al.
Nash and Correlated equilibria (Bogdanovic et al.)

Power allocation game between

UK He et al.
a radar network and multiple jammers (Deligiannis et al.)
Paper Country Cited By

Strategies for defending a coastline against multiple

US None
attackers (Garcia et al.)

A game theory approach to target tracking in

UK None
sensor networks (Gu et al.)

Joint Power allocation and beamforming between a

China None
multi-static-radar and jammer based on game theory (He et al.)

Game theoretic situation and transmission

in unattended ground sensor networks: a correlated US None
equilibrium approach (Krishnamurthy et al.)

Network enabled missile deflection: games and

US Bachmann et al.
correlated equilibrium (Maskery et al. 2007 a)

Decentralised algorithms for netcentric Force

US Bachmann et al.
Protection against anti-ship missiles (Maskery et al. 2007 b)

Search and Screening (Koopman) US None

Optimal Strategy for Target Protection with a

China None
defender in the pursuit-evasion scenario (Qilong et al.)

Differential game theory with applications tomissiles and autonomous

Australia None
systems guidance (Faruqi)

A game theoretical interceptor guidance law

Israel Faruqi
for ballistic missile defence (Shinar et al.)

Pursuit-Evasion games: a tractable framework for

Spain None
anti-jamming in aerial attacks (Parras et al.)

A simple game theoretic approach to suppression of

enemy defences and other time-critical US None
target analyses (Hamilton et al.)

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defence

US None
allocation against an unknown attacker (Bier et al. a)

Considerations on Optimal Resource allocation

Romania None
in avation security (Cioaca)

Horsemen and the empty city:

A game theoretic examination of deception in US None
Chinese military legend (Cotten et al.)

An Economic Theory of Destabilisation War (Gries et al.) Germany None

Paper Country Cited By

Game theoretic approach towards network security:

India None
A review (Litti)

Automating cyber defence responses using

Netherlands None
attack-defence trees and game theory (Jhawar et al.)

From individual decisions from experience to

US None
behavioural game theory (Gonzalez)

Game Theoretic Approaches to Attack Surface Shifting.

US None
Moving Target Defense II (Manadhata)

Improving reliability through Multi-Path routing

and Link Defence: An Application of Game Theory UK None
to Transport (Kanturska et al.)

Game Theoretic and Reliability models in

US Bier et al. a
counter-terrorism and security (Bier et al. b)

Changing behaviours in defence acqusition:

UK None
a game theory approach (Gardener et al.)

Joint Transmit Power and Bandwidth Allocation

for Cognitive Satellite Network based on Bargaining China None
Game Theory (Zhong et al.)

The Research and Simulation of a Satellite Routing

China None
Algorithm based on Game Theory (Qiao et al.)

A survey of multiple unmanned vehicles formation

control and coordiation. Canada None
Normal and fault situations (Zhang et al.)

Open in a separate window

Go to:

5. Opportunities for Further Research

The reviewed papers have shown that game theory can provide a unifying framework to analyse the
decision-making behaviours of agents in defence contexts. In this section, we briefly discuss a range
of potential defence scenarios where game theory has hitherto not been applied but would make a
useful contribution if applied in future.

A recent investigation by Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) into ‘Mosaic
warfare’ [118] is an example of such a potential future application of game theory. The idea is
mentioned in Zhang [105] in the context of operating multiple unmanned vehicles, and proposes
having a lot of smaller cost-efficient resources interconnected in a ’mosaic’ network, such that if
several units are destroyed, the overall integrity of the network still remains, much like how a
mosaic retains its image even if a few tiles are removed. The goal is that such a vast array of
resources with different capabilities will be able to overwhelm the enemy with its completeness and
complexity. It utilises principles of concurrency to address the intricacy of the connections in systems
of millions of sensors and actuators. These systems in turn must handle inter-system
communication. If successfully implemented, such a system of systems can provide military
strategists with an overwhelmingly powerful network of weaponry and resources, which can defeat
opponents with the sheer scale and complexity of their dynamics. This method of combining
different parts of the arsenal maximises the benefits of each, and reintroduces a focus on
expendability of resources, rather than focussing on a few pieces of high value weaponry. This in
turn builds resilience and adaptability into the strategy, a shift away from heavyweight, single focus
attack methods. Since there are a high number of lower cost resources which need to cooperate for
the best outcome, this scenario could be modelled as a multi-player co-operative game at one level,
while the strife with the opponent(s) can be modelled as a multi-player non-cooperative game. It can
be noted that the concept of ‘Mosaic warfare’ is essentially similar to the more general concept of
agent-based modelling, which has already been used in several diverse contexts, ranging from
Ageless Aerospace Vehicle design [119] to modelling of infectious disease dynamics [120], and game
theory has already been used successfully in some of these contexts [120,121].

Another area, within the context of naval warfare, where game theory could be fruitfully applied is
in naval susceptibility. In analysing naval susceptibility, naval vessels factor in their environment,
movement patterns and potential adversary sensors to calculate their risk of detection when moving
as a covertly [122]. Such an application has overlaps between commonly studied tracking problems
in defence science, as explained in Gu [87], which describes tracking using sensor networks. Such a
scenario, as elaborated before, could be modelled as a two-player non-cooperative differential
game, with detection being the main payoff parameter for each player.

Indeed, ground-based tracking problems could benefit from the application of game theory as well,
and papers in this area so far have been few. Ground-based tracking problems may appear in both
ground-based military applications (classified here as land warfare), as well as domestic security and
anti-terrorism applications (classified here as national security applications), where the ability of
security agencies to track individuals’ movements throughout a society—including their locations,
their social network and their motivations—is a crucial capability [123]. The latter scenario could be
modelled as a two-player game of pursuit and evasion, or perhaps just pursuit and reconnaissance
with the aim of not revealing the pursuit to the target, while the target would try to identify pursuit.
The amount of predictive information gained from covert tracking would be the payoff in this
situation.

Modelling cyber warfare is another area where game theory could be applicable, and again, as noted
in the relevant section earlier, there have been few papers addressing this niche, other than papers
coming primarily from the computer science domain where the focus has been primarily on cyber
security. Kim et al. [124] describe cyberwarfare scenarios that are integral to all military operations
and highlight the critical role played by new technological paradigms such as the Internet of Things
(IoT) and Brain Computer Interfaces. Defence experts increasingly need to predict and preempt
cyberwarfare strategies of hostile players. Modelling decision-making scenarios involving
Cyberwarfare scenarios with novel technological interfaces is an area where game theory can play a
vital role.

As mentioned above, it may also be considered a ‘gap’ in the presented literature that there seems
to be little cross-pollination, exchange of ideas, or even awareness of other works which are similar,
in this niche, according to Table 4. Therefore, increased collaboration among researchers who use
game theory in defence applications is desirable and will result in the reuse of game-theoretic
methods across multiple domains of warfare.

Go to:

6. Discussion

It is pertinent here to discuss how a review such as this adds value to the field, beyond summarising
the state-of-art and identifying gaps in the literature. It was observed that citations from one paper
to another within the selected set of papers are rare. While it is hard to pinpoint the reasons for this,
it could be observed that most studies focus on specific domains of warfare, such as land, naval, or
aerial warfare, and try to address specific problems in a particular domain of warfare. Therefore, a
paper that focusses on a different domain of warfare was perceived not necessarily as another paper
that applies game theory in a defence context, but as a paper that belongs to a different domain of
warfare, and therefore was not looked into. Yet it is clear that such an approach can result in missed
opportunities as there is often no consideration about where else the same set of game-theoretic
tools could be applied similarly. A review paper such as this will go some way to rectify this problem.
Moreover, it can be observed that payoff functions are often rigidly and narrowly defined, based on
what has been traditionally thought of as important parameters in a particular type of warfare. For
example, land warfare focuses on minimising casualties, while national security applications focus on
boosting public confidence. Yet, in most types of warfare, there are a range of factors that
contribute to the ultimate payoff, ranging from casualties and loss of military assets to public
confidence, indirect economic costs, opportunity costs, costs to the allies, and political and strategic
considerations. This review paper is likely to stimulate the modelling of more holistic payoff
functions in each domain of warfare where game theory is used, by presenting a broad overview of
payoff structures across several warfare domains. Furthermore, in a generic sense, this review will
help to highlight defence-related decision making as a methodical and rational process that is
amenable to structured analysis, as opposed to being an intuitive process as it used to be perceived
in some sections of the defence community [125]. At the same time, the presented analysis will help
avoid micromanagement on one hand and impulsive decision making on the other hand [126],
instead of encouraging quantitative decision making processes in defence applications.

In particular, beyond the operational and tactical decision-making processes, the presented review
has managerial and social implications.

6.1. Managerial Implications

The application of game theory can be very useful to the defence forces of a country, not only in
tactical and operational matters but in strategic management of the defence assets in peacetime as
well. For example, the strategic placement of military resources, such as battleships, submarines,
and fighter jets, for purposes of deterrence as well as operational readiness, can be treated as a
cooperative game or equivalently an optimisation problem which can be solved by linear
programming or nonlinear programming. Similarly, decisions regarding the placement and building
of strategic military facilities, such as bases, airstrips, harbours, or even roads and railways [127,128]
can be aided by modelling the related scenarios using cooperative game theory. Another managerial
decision-making process where game theory can be applied is the management of reserve military
personnel, including when to call up reserves. Therefore, game theory is useful not only to military
personnel who make operational decisions but also to civilian managers and politicians who have to
make defence-related decisions, including in peacetime, which may have long term consequences.

6.2. Social Implications

The social benefits from applying game theory in defence scenarios arise primarily from the
viewpoint of national security. Public perception of homeland security is an important part of
defence considerations and has considerable influence on defence spending [129]. Decision-makers
from defence and law enforcement need to consider not only the actual risks and threats, but also
perceived risks, and factors that are influenced by it, such as insurance costs, the effect on tourism,
the ratings of credit rating agencies, the willingness of investors to invest in a country, the actual and
perceived cost of security measures etc, in making decisions about defence spending. Game theory
can be a very useful tool in modelling such a complex set of factors and parameters, and the
resulting overall payoffs in different scenarios. Conversely, such decisions, once made, obviously
affect national security and in turn influence public confidence and perception of national security.
Therefore, perception of risks and spending on national security influence each other [130,131] and
the toolset that game theory offers is very useful to model such a complex feedback loop. Obviously,
the public mood and perception of events is important in wartime scenarios as well, where decisions
made in all domains of warfare will influence public perception, which may, in turn, affect the
trajectory of the conflict. Therefore, the application of game theory in defence scenarios has clear
social implications.

It is also important to note that this review adds fresh insights which can be useful in understanding
command and control warfare. One such insight is that cooperation and hostile competition
between intelligent agents are not so fundamentally different as they appear to be at first sight:
indeed, in a sense, they can both be represented by the same framework (game theory), and both
involve a number of intelligent players, strategies, and payoffs. The difference is that hostile
competition is represented by Non-cooperative game theory, where one player’s payoff increase
often results in another player losing out (a zero-sum game is a special case of this). Cooperation on
the other hand is represented by cooperative game theory, where we model coalitions and
sometimes discuss the concept of ‘public good’. Such an insight is especially useful when a hostile
player can potentially turn into an ally or vice versa. Another insight is that the primary difficulty in
modelling defence scenarios as games arises not from identifying the possible strategies or the
players, but from quantifying the payoffs. Quite often, the papers that we have reviewed make
several assumptions, simplifications, and estimations in quantifying the payoffs, and it is possible to
envisage that the accumulated errors introduced by these processes may have critically altered the
outcome of the game, and thus rendered the modelling ineffective. Therefore, the primary challenge
many papers have faced in applying game theory is to model the payoffs accurately or sensibly. Such
insights cannot be gained unless a broad review of several defence applications of game theory is
compiled, as we have done here, and these insights are important in shaping the directions of future
research in the field.

Go to:

7. Conclusions

Game theory has proven itself as a versatile and powerful tool for obtaining vital insights into the
decision making processes of agents and players in a number of fields. In this review paper, we
elaborated several scenarios in which game theory could be applied in defence science and
technology, and presented a succinct review of existing research in this direction. We introduced an
extensive classification for the twenty-nine reviewed papers, based on the kind of warfare studied,
type of games used, and the nature of players. Based on the observations made, we identified gaps
in the literature where game theory has not been applied extensively so far but has great potential
to be applied fruitfully in future; and we discussed the potential directions in which defence
applications of game theory could expand in the future.

The domain-based classification was the primary mode of classification that was employed, and in
this context, we grouped the reviewed papers into the land, air, sea, cyber and space domains. We
also considered papers primarily concerned with tracking and national security. For each paper
considered, the number and roles of players and game types were defined, and where possible,
strategies and payoff functions were discussed. The goal of this exercise was to identify the most
commonly analysed domains as well as frequently used game types, and use this knowledge to
identify gaps in the literature and cross-pollinate ideas across various domains and types of warfare
within the defence context.

It is hoped that this review will result in several positive outcomes. We have identified gaps in the
literature and pointed out that the toolsets offered by game theory are not fully harnessed in
analysing certain modes of warfare. For example, we pointed out, there are relatively few papers
about naval warfare which use game-theoretic analysis. We also noted that emerging modes of
warfare, such as mosaic warfare, could be analysed by the application of game theory. Therefore,
this review can potentially result in more game-theoretic approaches in modelling such modes of
warfare. Furthermore, we have highlighted that the citation network within this field is very sparse:
that is, cross-pollination of ideas among various researchers who use game theory in defence
applications is rare. This review might serve as a catalyst for collaboration and cross-pollination
among researchers in this field. Most importantly, however, this review serves to highlight the utility
of game theory in defence applications to defence scientists who have hitherto not used game
theory, and will therefore result in introducing a fresh set of tools to defence scientists that they can
apply in their research.

As the world deals with emerging challenges to peace and stability, the future of humanity depends
on our ability to solve problems peacefully. While this is a lofty goal to achieve, the projection of
power is decidedly better than an actual armed conflict which will be very costly at many levels, and
game theory could indeed play a part in deciding some of the ‘soft conflicts’ which could play out in
the coming years and decades. As the focus on defence strategies and capabilities are likely to
increase in the coming years, game theory can serve as an additional tool that defence scientists can
use at many levels of abstraction to solve deployment, sensing, tracking, and resource allocation
problems.

Go to:

Funding

This research was funded by Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia under a STaRShot
grant to MP. The The APC was funded by the Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia.

Go to:

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Go to:

Footnotes
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.

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