March 15, 2017

All Arms Warfare in the 21st

Century
Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session

HEARING CONTENTS:
Witnesses

David A. Deptula
Dean
Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Power Studies
View Testimony

Douglas A. Macgregor
Executive Vice President
Burke-Macgregor Group
View Testimony

Paul Scharre
Senior Fellow And Director For The 20YY Warfare Initiative
Center For A New American Security
View Testimony

Available Webcast(s)*:
Full Hearing

Compiled From*:

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in-the-21st-century

* Please Note: External links included in this compilation were functional at the time of its
creation but are not maintained thereafter.

This hearing compilation was prepared by the Homeland Security Digital Library,
Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security.
 STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

The Future of All Arms Warfare in the

21st Century

David A. Deptula, Lt Gen, USAF (Ret)

Dean, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies

March 15, 2017

 STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND:
THE FUTURE OF ALL ARMS WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
March 15, 2017
Statement by David A. Deptula, Lt Gen, USAF (Ret)
Dean, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Introduction
Chairman Cotton, Senator King, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to present my thoughts on the critical issue of the future of all arms warfare in the
21st century. Our air and land forces have an extensive history of operating in conjunction with
one another to accomplish military objectives. WWII and the Cold War posed some very
significant challenges for the members of the greatest generation. As a result of their efforts, the
United States prevailed against incredible challenges. It is now up to us to confront our own
unique set of circumstances.
Our military situation today is stark. The United States faces a burgeoning number, and a
greater spectrum of threats around the globe. At the same time we have declining resources
allocated to meeting these threats. To successfully confront this dynamic array of dangers, we
must optimize our military organizations and concepts of operation. We must evolve service
relationships from ones of interoperability—a goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to ones of full
integration and interdependency. This is the next step in the evolution of our military.
A dollar spent on duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or
capability elsewhere. Confused organizational structures lead to sub-optimal employment of
forces already stretched too thin. Outdated service roles, missions, and concepts of operation
yield costly, inefficient acquisition programs. Clearly, things have to change—security
circumstances and fiscal pressures will no longer tolerate such conditions. We are not going to
be able to blast or buy our way out of these challenges—we are going to have to think our way
out of them.
I believe that if the United States is to succeed in protecting its core interests around the
globe and deter aggression, we must have the strongest Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force in the world. However, fiscal realities dictate that the military must make difficult choices
in balancing near-term operational readiness with longer-term needs. This demands much more
clarity regarding goals and desired outcomes, with special emphasis on how we can best project
effective, prudent power to negate threats that would oppose us in the 21st century.
Our Department of Defense and military services are conservative institutions. While
highly capable they are slow to change, but to operate effectively in the information age, we
must develop and capitalize on the new concepts of operation and organizations that new
technologies enable. Dr. Thomas Kuhn, renowned American physicist, historian and
philosopher, noted institutions only accept new paradigms when: 1) there is a paradigm crisis; 2)
the old people of a given paradigm die off; or 3) change is forced from the outside.1 We want to
change before a crisis occurs, and cannot afford to wait for the “old-guard” to depart.

1
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

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 In 1986 Congress was the outside institution that forced much needed change in the
Department of Defense with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It may be time to consider such action
again. I commend Chairman Cotton, Senator King, and the rest of the Airland Subcommittee for
beginning this conversation and initiating this series of hearings regarding the future of all arms
warfare in the 21st century. It is a much-needed start.
I believe the biggest challenge our defense establishment faces is one of institutional
inertia. We are well into the information age, yet our systems, organizations, and concepts of
operations remain rooted in the industrial age of warfare. Our diplomatic, economic, and
informational elements of our national security enterprise are also largely unchanged since the
mid 20th century, and require more integration than ever before. We can no longer afford this
misalignment—not only is it costly, but it also poses undue risk.
Change with respect to the military involves four principal factors—advanced
technologies, new concepts of operation, organizational change, and the human dimension.
Advanced technologies and the new capabilities they yield, enable new concepts of operation that
produce order-of-magnitude increases in our ability to achieve desired military effects.
Organizational change codifies changes and enhances our ability to execute our national security
strategy. The final and essential element to progress is the human dimension. People are
fundamental to everything we do, especially when it comes to leadership.
The 21st Century Security Environment
First, our defense strategy must contend with non-state and transnational actors; a rising
economic and military powerhouse in China; a resurgent Russia; declining states—some with
nuclear weapons; the increasing likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation; evil actors of the
most despicable nature; and a dynamic web of terrorism.
Second, the pace and tenor of our lives has been irrevocably altered by the acceleration of
change. Global trade, travel, and telecommunications have produced major shifts in the way we
live. Such developments are not isolated. Speed and complexity have merged, and now
permeate the conduct of warfare. Consequently, one implication for future air and land warfare
operations is that they must be able to respond rapidly and decisively anywhere on the globe at
any time. As recent events have demonstrated, key security events now unfold in a matter of
hours and days, not months or years. The window to influence such circumstances is
increasingly fleeting.
Third, we have to contend with increasing personnel and procurement costs at a time
when defense budgets are decreasing. Therefore, the provision of flexibility of response across a
wide spectrum of circumstances should be foremost among the decision criteria we apply to our
future military.

Fourth, we should acknowledge that deploying large numbers of American military

forces onto foreign soil to nation-build vice accomplishing a defined mission and then leaving is
counter-productive to securing our goals. Strategies centered upon occupation expose American
vulnerabilities, often result in anti-American backlash and domestic disapproval, and create
destabilizing effects within the very state or region they are intended to secure.
Fifth, we must actively pursue and invest in options we can use to counter the
increasingly advanced anti-access strategies and technologies our adversaries are developing.

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Precision weapons and stealth projected incredible lethality at the end of the Cold War. Those
capabilities proliferated, and our adversaries are now equipping themselves with these systems,
and seeking greater advancements. One quarter of a century later, it is foolhardy to assume U.S.
forces will be afforded freedom of action in future engagements. Our strategies, planning
assumptions, acquisition programs, and training need to account for more capable enemies.
Sixth, we need to challenge our adversaries’ domination of public perception. We have
to learn how to use the application of accurate, compelling information as a core element of our
security apparatus. We are woefully inept at strategic communications and too often put
ourselves in a reactionary versus proactive position in struggling to gain domestic and
international public support.
Finally, information’s value also extends past the media. Just as wireless connectivity,
personal computing devices, and cloud-based applications are revolutionizing life in the civilian
sector; these trends are also altering how our military forces project power. Faster and more
capable networks and computing capabilities are turning information into the dominant factor in
modern warfare. We need to understand that aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are information
systems far above and beyond being fighters that shoot missiles and drop bombs—they are
sensor-shooters. F-22 operations over Syria validate this statement. Given this reality, we must
now acknowledge that information and its management are just as important today as the
traditional tools of hard military power—airplanes, satellites, infantry, warships. Information is
the force evolving all weapon systems from isolated instruments of power into a highly
integrated enterprise where the exchange of information and data will determine success or
failure in the 21st century.
These facts have major implications throughout the military enterprise, particularly air
and land operations—shaping key areas like doctrine, organization, training, materiel acquisition
and sustainment, along with command and control. Top leaders in the policy community must
adjust to the new realities of information age combat operations. Cold War and
counterinsurgency paradigms will fall short when building, sustaining and employing military
power in the modern era.
These trends provide a starting point for anticipating the future with which we will have
to contend. Bluntly stated, all the services, Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, and the
other elements of our national security architecture have been slow to recognize the emerging
new security environment. Our focus has remained on traditional weapons platforms. We still
have institutions and processes that were designed in the middle of the last century to
accommodate what we now view—in retrospect—as a rather simple world of kinetics and
traditional domains that characterized the Cold War. While nuclear threats have not gone away,
we need to supplement our traditional focus on combined arms warfare with a broader “lens”
that exploits non-kinetic tools and the cyber domain. Excessive emphasis on traditional weapon
platforms associated with combined arms warfare runs the danger of under-investing in emerging
non-kinetic instruments. We cannot relive the era of battleship admirals and cavalry generals
that dismissed aviation as a passing fad.
Summarizing, the proliferation of technology, information flow, and the associated
empowerment of nation-states, organizations, as well as individuals, presents one of the most
daunting challenges our military has ever faced.

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The Cornerstones of the U.S. Military: Services and Combatant Commands
Interservice rivalry is a vivid part of American military history stretching forward from
the earliest days of our Republic. The most intense period of competition occurred at the close of
World War II. Drawing on the lessons of that war and seeking to address years of agonizing
political turmoil fueled by service rivalries, President Truman prodded Congress to pass the
National Security Act of 1947 and its first amendment in 1949. This legislation established the
fundamental postwar defense organization for the United States. They created, among other
entities, a new Department of Defense (DOD), intended to unify the earlier separate Departments
of War and Navy, and an independent air force as a third military department within DOD.
In 1958, additional legislation created the unified combatant commands that were
designated as the headquarters for the conduct of actual warfare. However, this objective
remained theoretical for many years, with the services remaining dominant in all aspects of
organization, training, equipping, and planning. Land, sea, and air forces tended to operate
autonomously. A service would develop weapons and equipment without regard to their
compatibility with that of the other services. Army and Navy communications systems could not
talk to one another; equipment was acquired by the Army and Navy that could not be loaded into
Air Force cargo planes; and each service had its own doctrine for employing aircraft. This did
not change until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Its passage was prompted when years of
interservice dysfunctionality manifested tragic results during the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue
mission and the less than optimal invasion of Grenada three years later.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was not intended to erase the differences in service
philosophies and cultures. However, it was hoped that the unique characteristics and strengths of
each service could be molded to complement one another so the whole would be greater than the
sum of its parts. Jointness became the mantra of the Armed Forces after passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. So just what did the Goldwater-Nichols act do? And what is the
proper meaning of jointness?
Here are the basics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. First, no longer do the individual
services fight our nation’s wars as separate entities—the unified combatant commands do the
fighting. The services organize, train, and equip what are called service component forces.
These are then assigned to the unified combatant commands to actually conduct operations under
a joint task force commander. The way America fights essentially boils down to this: individual
services organize, train, and equip to master their principal domains of operation. The combatant
commands assemble service and functional components to fight under the unifying vision of a
joint force commander. It does not mean four separate services deploy to a fight and simply
align under a single commander. It does not mean, “going along to get along.” Nor does
jointness mean everybody necessarily gets an equal share of the action. Jointness does not mean
homogeneity. Jointness means using the right force, at the right place, at the right time—not an
equal apportionment of all services.
Joint operations are often misunderstood. The strength in joint operations resides in the
separateness of the services. Joint force operations create synergies because they capitalize on
each services’ core functions—skill sets that require much time, effort, and focus to cultivate. It
takes 20-25 years to develop a competent division commander, a surface action group

4
commander, a Marine Expeditionary Force commander, or an air and space expeditionary force
commander.
The beauty of the joint approach to warfare is that because every contingency will be
different, a joint approach allows a joint task force commander to tailor-make a force optimal
and unique to the particular contingency at hand. The service component force make-up for
Operation Desert Storm (or the first Gulf War) was very much different than that required for
Operation Allied Force (the air war over Kosovo and Serbia); which was very much different
than that required for Operation Unified Assistance (the South Asia Tsunami relief); which is
very much different than that required for Operation Inherent Resolve (the current counter
Islamic State operation); and so it will be in the future.
Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a joint approach was first intended to
move contingency organizations and operations from independent, de-conflicted, service
approaches, to sustained interoperability. Today, we need to move beyond interoperability to
interdependency, which means the service components rely on capabilities brought to the joint
fight by other service components. The services must shed their historical predilection for self-
sufficiency, or “owning” everything required to fight and win independently. The reason joint
task force operations create synergies is because an interdependent approach allows each service
to focus on, hone, and offer its core competencies. Services trying to control everything is
unsustainable from a resource perspective and yields sub-optimized, compromised capabilities.
Control of all the capabilities in a fight is the role of the combatant commanders when employing
forces. It is far better for the services to invest and excel in their respective domains.
This idea is similar to doctors concentrating on healing the sick, and firemen focusing on
rescuing people from burning buildings. Drawing out this analogy, such an approach means
joint task force operations have at their disposal the abilities to both put out fires, and to cure sick
people, no matter which is needed where—and both of these important tasks are being performed
by specialists in their fields. The unfavorable alternative to interdependence is to have firemen
also attempting surgical procedures, and physicians darting in and out of blazing structures
between seeing patients.
Effective jointness relies upon having separate services; it is an imperative that service
members understand how to best exploit the advantages of operating in their domains.
Articulating the virtues and values of a member’s service is being “joint.” However, when a
single service attempts to achieve warfighting independence instead of embracing
interdependence, “jointness” unravels, trust is lessened, warfighting effectiveness is reduced, and
costly redundancies and gaps will likely increase. We do not want to reduce the effectiveness of
Goldwater-Nichols by allowing services to develop redundant “organic” capabilities, thereby
rejecting the premise of joint warfighting.
With a common context of the challenges of the future security environment; the rapid
advance of technology and information flow; and a proper understanding of joint operations, I
now address the four specific requests for comment by the Subcommittee on the future of all
arms warfare in the 21st century, and specifically air-ground operations.
1. An Assessment of the Future of Joint Force Air-Ground Combat Operations Against Peer
And Near-Peer Competitors.
Beginning with Operation Desert Storm in 1991, in operations over the next decade, and
into the beginning of the 21st Century, nascent joint force operations, combined with advanced

5
technologies and innovative concepts of operations aimed at achieving desired effects, have
dominated conventional warfare. As a result, our adversaries and potential peer and near-peer
competitors have watched and learned the lessons of what happens if the U.S. is allowed to
project power into a region of interest. They have used this time to develop systems, concepts,
and organizations to attempt to deny us in the future the advantages that our military has relied
upon for success in the past.
One of the most significant changes in the evolution of modern warfare is the result of the
impact of the combination of three technological changes: 1) modern intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) yielding persistent multi-spectral ISR; 2) the
normalization of the use of precision weapons; and 3) the dramatic improvement of system
survivability (stealth). This combination has resulted in the reversal of the traditional paradigm
of the use of air and ground forces to defeat adversary forces. The traditional warfighting
paradigm of ground forces leading the fight supported by air forces has been supplanted by a
construct where air forces supported by ground forces is often a much more responsive,
effective, efficient, and less costly—in terms of both lives and dollars—manner in which to
conduct warfare.2 Validating this observation, a platoon leader during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Iraq 2003) at the leading edge of the push to Baghdad by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force,
wrote: “For the next hundred miles, all the way to the gates of Baghdad, every palm grove hid
Iraqi armor, every field an artillery battery, and every alley an antiaircraft gun or surface-to-air
missile launcher. But we never fired a shot. We saw the full effect of American air power.
Every one of those fearsome weapons was a blackened hulk.”3
In the context of this hearing, the point of raising this realization is not to start a doctrinal
roles and functions fight between the Army and the Air Force, but rather to highlight the fact that
capabilities change over time and the fundamental causes should be exploited to our Nation’s
warfighting advantage. This is particularly true in an era where near-peer adversaries are
working hard to negate the warfighting advantages we have exhibited over the past quarter of a
century.
To best meet the challenges of future peer and near-peer adversaries we must continue to
exploit modern ISR, routine precision strike, improvements in survivability, and maneuver by
focusing on two key essential actions. First, unshackle the service-based organizational
paradigms of the past and embrace more functional joint organizational constructs that can be
achieved by greater integration of these elements. Second, rapidly capitalize on the capabilities
of the information age to actualize the ubiquitous and seamless sharing of information across
systems in every domain as a vision of the Department of Defense.
We are at a critical juncture in history. We are at the center of an, “Information in War
Revolution” where the speed of information, advance of technology, and designs of
organizations are merging to change the way we operate. This change has dramatically
shortened decision and reaction times, and reduced the number of weapon systems needed to
achieve desired effects. In World War II it took months of time, thousands of Airmen, and
hundreds of aircraft to neutralize a single target. Today we can find, fix, and successfully engage
multiple targets with a single aircraft within minutes.

2
For a comprehensive treatment on this phenomena see, The Urgent Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles, by
Price T. Bingham, Joint Forces Quarterly 84, 1st Quarter 2017.
3
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), p. 289.

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 Since the introduction of mechanized technology in the early twentieth century, the scale
and scope of combat has been governed by industrial means of power projection. Advances in
aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles increased speed, reach, and precision, but “mass” remained
an essential aspect of force application. In the last century, military missions, historically
restricted to land and sea, expanded into the air, space, and underwater domains. However, the
ability to project power globally was wholly dependent upon mechanized technology.
In the 21st century, we face another technology-driven inflection point that will
fundamentally reshape what it means to project power. Advancements in computing and
network capabilities are empowering information’s ascent as a dominant factor in warfare. No
longer will it be sufficient to focus on simply managing the physical elements of a conflict—
planes, satellites in space, tanks, amphibious elements or ships at sea. These individual
platforms have evolved from a stove-piped, parochial service alignment to a loosely federated
“joint and combined” construct today. To be effective in the future, these same forces must
become a highly integrated enterprise collaboratively leveraged through the broad exchange of
information.
Said another way, desired effects of military operations will increasingly be attained
through the interaction of multiple systems, each one sharing information and empowering one-
another for a common purpose. This phenomenon is not restricted to an individual technology or
system, nor is it isolated to a specific service, domain or task. It is a concept that can be
envisioned as a “Combat Cloud”—an operating paradigm where information, data management,
connectivity, and command and control are core mission priorities.
While mechanical technology will continue to serve as a key factor in future military
operations, the information empowering these systems will stand as the backbone maximizing
their potential. As the Combat Cloud is developed, it promises to afford an expansive, highly
redundant defense complex with radically enhanced data gathering, processing, and
dissemination capabilities. These attributes will offer actors at every level of war, and in every
service component, dramatically enhanced situational awareness by transforming masses of
disparate data into decision-quality knowledge. This represents an evolution whereby
individually networked platforms transform into a broader system of systems enterprise
integrated through domain and mission agnostic information linkages.
This approach will not only change the way we define new requirements, but also more
importantly, the way we think about; operations; intelligence; command and control; and
support. A distributed, self-forming, all-domain Combat Cloud that is difficult to attack and self-
healing when attacked, significantly complicates an enemy’s planning and will compel enemies
to dedicate more resources toward its defense and offense. In its ultimate instantiation, Combat
Cloud will be: 1) strategically dislocating to any challenger; 2) provide conventional deterrence
to a degree heretofore only achieved by nuclear weapons; and 3) will enable operational
dominance in multiple domains.
Turning this vision into reality will require a significant effort. While many militaries are
evolving toward informationized forces, the integration and assimilation of related capabilities is
incomplete. Forces are still predominantly organized, trained and equipped to fight a
mechanized war—one in which information integration is a secondary support function. Most
bureaucratic organizations and current programs of record reflect the linear extrapolation of
combined arms warfare construct developed in the industrial age of warfare. Program oversight

7
efforts within the DOD are also lagging—with antiquated industrial age governance impeding
information-age endeavors.
Any assessment of the likely landscape of future conflict with peer and near peer
adversaries must recognize that no matter what type of engagement occurs, the outcome will
increasingly be determined by which side is better equipped and organized to collect, process,
disseminate, understand, and control information. Furthermore, with budget austerity as the new
normal our military needs to devise more effective and efficient means to secure desired effects
with existing capabilities. The Combat Cloud concept is a paradigm that allows us to do this.
If we, along with our allies, are going to win the next war, we need to gain persistent
access to data networks while denying this same capability to any adversary. To be serious
about this effort, military services need to embrace doctrinal and concept changes to how their
forces are organized, trained, and equipped. The concept of the Combat Cloud stands as a
framework to empower this vision.
In the current program-centric budgetary world of DOD, narrow focus on individual
platforms, sensors, and weapons is the norm. Absent a clear definitive vision, and without a
strategy to realize that vision, the big picture is lost among a collection of disparate, disconnected
systems that are often kluged-together to pass as “joint.” This is why DOD needs to embrace the
vision of attaining a joint and combined Combat Cloud. Future combined and joint operations
will require new concepts and practices for how to join together and command and control
desired effects; and distributed battle, intelligence, and surveillance networks.
Commanders must change the way they view networks and information systems. Rather
than value only the weapons and platforms that launch them, commanders need to recognize the
value of the effects they can create based on the seamless sharing of information. This shift in
perspective will involve much more than simply material changes involving technology. Indeed
this is a completely different way of thinking about how we will use weapon systems in the
future. Transitioning from industrial age, platform-centric methods of force employment to an
interconnected, information-driven model involves numerous challenges. It will require a review
of, and appropriate changes to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel
and education, facilities, and policy to define a “template” to guide modernizing policy,
acquisition, and concepts of operation; seeking collaborative solutions among the services;
moving from measures of merit that replace cost per-unit to cost per-desired effect; eliminating
stove-piping of kinetic and non-kinetic options; developing reliable, robust, and anti-jam data
links; creating sufficient diversity of employment approach to avoid single points of failure; and
realizing automated multi-level security to ensure coalition participation.
2. The Conduct of Offensive Operations Against Adversaries in Anti-Access, Area Denial
Environments.
Over the last quarter-century that the U.S. has dominated military operations, our air
forces have been fighting in relatively permissive airspace. Similarly, our ground forces have
been engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fights with little exposure to modern
high-tech threats. Combat operations against peer and near-peer competitors in anti-access, area
denial environments will demand a new, more agile, and integrated operational framework for
the employment of U.S. military power to succeed. While terrorism and insurgencies have
proliferated more than traditional conventional combat since 9/11, a failure to be ready for state

8
on state warfare would be catastrophic. We must be ready to engage and succeed across the
entire spectrum of conflict.
Warfare against an adversary in an anti-access, area denial environment of the future will
be very different than the experience of the members of the U.S. military today.4 Heavy armor;
barrages of theater ballistic missiles; rear areas under attack; surface to air missiles ranging
hundreds of miles; smart mines; quiet submarines interdicting friendly shipping; anti-satellite
capabilities shutting down GPS; non-stealthy friendly drones falling from the sky like rain—are
all more likely to characterize warfare in the future than will the treatises of the recent past on
sharing “three cups of tea,” and “eating soup with a knife.”5
Furthermore, if we are to succeed in fighting in anti-access and area denial environments,
critical areas that require serious attention are not getting it. Potential opponents capable of
creating an anti-access, area denial environment are capitalizing on electronic warfare (EW)
tools and techniques to do so. The proliferation of high-end electronics has made offensive
cyber operations and EW the modern military equalizers. Russia is now routinely attacking
Ukraine and the Baltic states via the net. As a nation we are losing hundreds of billion dollars a
year of commercial/military value due to Internet thefts. Many of China's newest weapons
systems look eerily familiar to U.S. systems—they should, they stole our designs. However, in
the DOD, getting traction for electronic warfare requirements and investment is painfully slow,
and inadequate to properly prepare us for the future. Here is what the DOD electronic warfare
strategy states in its introduction, “...our EW work force is currently fragmented and ill-equipped
to dominate a pacing competitor.”6 In 2014 the Defense Science Board highlighted the
insufficient attention paid to electronic warfare by all Services, and recommended a 75 percent
markup in electronic warfare investments over the next 5 years—from $3 billion a year to over
$5 billion a year. Electronic warfare is no longer just an enabling capability—it is a survival
capability.
We need sufficient numbers of advanced munitions to prevail in the high-end anti-access,
area denial fights of the future. Today we are we are running low on these kind of munitions due
to their regular use in conflicts in southwest Asia. We also need to pay attention to the numbers
and capabilities of the people required to accurately target these advanced weapons. In Desert
Storm only about 5 percent of all the weapons employed were precision-guided, but we had over
three times the number of targeteers in our intelligence force than we have today where precision
weapons now make-up over 95 percent of weapons employed from our combat aircraft.
However, these needed resources are going unfunded because there is little public
awareness of the problems we face relative to the reduction in resources allocated to Defense.
As a result, the hollow force that the 2011 budget control act and sequestration it imposed will
not be readily apparent until those forces are required. What is so devastating about the 2011
budget control act—and not obvious in a 20 second sound byte—is that it is now affecting U.S.
capability to provide rapid response sufficient to meet the demands of our national security
strategy. Said another way, we have a growing strategy-resource mismatch. The dichotomy

4
Over 80 percent of the active duty U.S. military has joined since 9/11/2001, so their experience is primarily in the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.
5
Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace - One School at a Time, and Learning to Eat Soup with a
Knife: Counterinsurgency Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam were popular books reinforcing the primacy of
counterinsurgency warfare that affected the first decade of the 21 st century.
6
The Department of Defense Electronic Warfare Strategy, 2017, p1.

9
between what we say we want to accomplish, and what we can actually accomplish is growing.
Without action to eliminate sequestration, that mismatch will get worse. I believe it is vitally
important to remember that the first responsibility of the United States government is the security
of the American people. As the preamble of our Constitution states, the federal government was
established to first, “provide for the common defense” and subsequently to, “promote the general
welfare.” Recent decisions have confused this prioritization, with sequestration taxing defense
spending at a rate greater than twice its percentage of the total federal budget. It is time to return
to the first principles of our Constitution and get our priorities straight.
The most important element in the U.S. military’s ability to fight and win in any conflict
in the future—much less against one in an anti-access, area denial environment—is restoring the
readiness that has been robbed from it by the irresponsible budget control act of 2011. No
amount of innovation, reorganization, or restructuring will allow the U.S. military to succeed in
meeting its national security objectives without proper equipment, tools, people, and training
essential to execute its assigned missions. Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen David Goldfein
succinctly described the criticality of the role of the Congress in this regard when he stated,
“There is no enemy on the planet than can do more damage to the United States Air Force than
us not getting a budget.”7
Warfare is evolving as we transition out of the industrial age and further into the
information age. Advancements in computing and network capabilities are empowering the
ascent of information as a dominant factor in warfare. Accordingly, we must be bound by a
common appreciation for the value of sharing information as a critical element of national
security operations. This is about a vision—aptly described as Fusion Warfare based on building
a Combat Cloud—moving beyond combined arms and into an approach of combined effects
power.8 The kind of combined effects resident in a unified ISR, strike, maneuver, and
sustainment complex integrated across the electromagnetic spectrum.
The Combat Cloud inverts the paradigm of combined arms warfare—making information
the focal point, not the domains in which the military operates. This concept represents an
evolution where individually networked platforms—in any domain—transform into a “system of
systems” enterprise, integrated by domain and mission-agnostic linkages.
Capabilities from any domain can contribute to precision effects in and across all five
domains. In order to maximize operational agility against advanced adversaries, actions must be
designed to include integrated operations and effects in more than one domain. Desired effects
must be well timed, synchronized, immediately assessable, and scalable. Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines must collaborate with joint and coalition counterparts and with networked
experts worldwide to synthesize combinations of kinetic/non-kinetic, lethal/non-lethal,
direct/indirect, and permanent/reversible effects, striking targets in hours, minutes—or seconds.
To succeed against an adversary in an anti-access, area denial environment you must
encourage the Department of Defense to develop and embrace concepts that have as their basis,
the linking of information-age aerospace systems with cyber, sea, and land-based capabilities in

7
Gen David Goldfein, remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Feb 23,
2017 as reported in the Air Force Association Daily Report, Feb 24, 2017.
8
For greater insight into this concept for thinking about warfare in the 21st century see; Rokke, Drohan, Pierce,
Combined Effects Power, Joint Forces Quarterly 73, 2nd Quarter 2014.

10
ways that will enhance their combined effectiveness, while compensating for their individual
vulnerabilities.

3. The Key Attributes of a Modern, Fully Integrated Joint Air-Ground Theater Joint Task Force
Capable of Decisive Offensive Campaigns
By definition, anti-access, area denial environments will complicate, if not hinder, our
ability to conduct offensive operations. As potential adversaries expand their anti-access, area
denial capabilities, our ability to conduct offensive operations is reduced, especially if we fail to
keep pace by inadequately investing both qualitatively and quantitatively in advanced
technology. I have the fullest confidence that our armed forces can currently achieve any
military objective they are given. However, the sacrifices in casualties our service members will
have to make to achieve those objectives are increasing. As our forces get older, our capabilities
relative to modern threats are declining, while investment to reverse these negative trends is still
not adequate.
Standoff ranges imposed by area denial capabilities degrade the effectiveness of long-
range sensors in a highly contested environment. To overcome these limitations, the Air Force
must build an integrated network of air, space, and cyberspace-based capabilities and leverage
other service contributions from all domains to achieve a robust, reliable, redundant, sustainable
means of sensing, commanding and controlling, and employing effects to meet mission
objectives. Underlying this set of capabilities is the Combat Cloud operating paradigm where
every platform is capitalized upon as both a sensor as well as an “effector.” This vision will
enable more rapid and effective decisions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war
and will provide us an operating advantage that will be difficult for any adversary to overcome.
Key capability development areas in the Air Force to achieve this kind of operating paradigm
include:
a. Data-to-Decision: The objective is to fuse data from cloud-based sensor-effector
networks into decision quality information for use at the tactical as well as operational levels of
war. Machine-to-machine automation will be integral to allow for the rapid turning of data into
information and knowledge to inform decision-making. Big data analytics; incorporation of all-
source information; and sensor-to-sensor cueing must become the norm, not the exception in
creating a combat cloud.
b. ISR Collect and Persistent ISR: These are capabilities that focus on multi-domain
alternatives for placing the right sensor in the right place at the right time.
c. Penetrating Counter-air (PCA): PCA maximizes tradeoffs between range, payload,
survivability, lethality, affordability, and supportability to achieve penetrating counter-air effects
in anti-access, area denial environments. Establish PCA as a network nodal element to relay data
from penetrating sensors enabling the employment of standoff or stand-in weapons.
d. Agile Communications: This is increase in the resiliency and adaptability of integrated
networks. Focus on responsive, adaptable network architectures with functionality across all
platforms, weapons, apertures, and waveforms operating in a highly contested environment.
Each of the services are working to create architectures to rapidly sense, collect, process,
and analyze data; turn it into knowledge; and then disseminate it among their component forces
to create desired effects. The DOD vision must be to integrate each of the service architectures

11
to create a joint Combat Cloud where information and knowledge is shared in a ubiquitous and
seamless fashion.
A fully integrated joint air-ground theater joint task force capable of decisive offensive
campaigns must be capable of disrupting key adversary systems, especially air defenses. A
prerequisite to effective joint operations—a sine qua non—is the need to gain and maintain air
superiority. In all recent operations, we have gained air superiority rapidly and have not faced
threats denying us freedom of action. In a contested environment, air superiority will be
continuously important and will pace all other operations.
The recently released Air Force Air Superiority Flight Plan states, "The Air Force’s
projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against the array of
potential adversary capabilities.” This is an official statement from the United States Air Force,
and that statement should concern you, because without air superiority there can be no successful
land (or sea surface) operations.
Developing and delivering air superiority for the highly contested environment in 2030
requires a multi-domain focus on capabilities and capacity. Importantly, the rapidly changing
operational environment means the military can no longer afford to develop weapon systems on
the linear acquisition and development timelines using traditional approaches.
Air superiority—as well as other military capability development—requires adaptable,
affordable and agile processes with increasing collaboration between science and technology,
acquisition, requirements and industry professionals. Failure to adopt agile acquisition
approaches is not an option. The traditional approach guarantees adversary cycles will outpace
U.S. development, resulting in “late-to-need” delivery of critical warfighting capabilities and
technologically superior adversary forces.
In the future we must possess an agile operational framework that enables the integrated
employment of joint and allied military power. It means taking the next step in shifting away
from a structure of segregated land, air, and sea warfare approaches to truly integrated
operations.
The central idea is cross-domain synergy. The complementary employment of
capabilities in different domains, instead of merely additive employment, is the goal—such that
each capability enhances the effectiveness of the whole, and compensates for the vulnerabilities
of other assets. This combined effects approach will lead to integrating existing and future
operations across all the domains with an agile operational framework guided by human
understanding.
The reconnaissance-strike group (RSG) organizational construct posited by Doug
Macgregor is a step in the right direction in this regard. This concept would provide the Army
an organizational entity that at its core is interdependent with the other service components—
particularly the Air Force—for its success. Conversely, it provides the impetus to the other
services to develop and provide capabilities to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of the RSG
as a means to better secure joint task force objectives.
Beyond the RSG, all the services, and combatant commands need to be focusing on
moving to a future operating paradigm of the Combat Cloud. The Combat Cloud is not simply a
network, but an operating concept that integrates every warfighting platform as a node in the
ISR, strike, maneuver, and sustainment complex. Because of its nature as a distributed sensor-

12
shooter-effector composite, it will require command and control standards and sets of operating
procedures different from that which the services employ today. It must possess a command and
control structure capable of operating within multiple domains and across multiple echelons
while allowing operational units to operate interdependently with shared knowledge in a
contested area. U.S. forces can continue to operate, to move the fight, by understanding
commander’s intent and guidance through mission directives or orders. The command and
control structure must be adaptive and responsive enough to support decentralized execution
with authorities delegated to the lowest echelon practical.
In the future, increases in threat warfighting capability that can hinder or deny traditional
U.S. warfighting advantages will grow. In an era of constrained resources, the best bet for
defeating modern threats is implementing the Combat Cloud concept. This approach will not
only change the way we define new requirements, but more importantly, the way we think,
command, control, and operate those systems. This is the essence of the Combat Cloud—it is
not just the network—it is the entire enterprise of sensors; shooters; effectors; and connectors, all
part of a cohesive, coherent whole and it must extend across all operating domains.
4. The Challenges Of Deploying And Sustaining Expeditionary Forces Across The Globe
The major challenges of deploying and sustaining expeditionary forces across the globe
are two-fold. First there is the difference in the nature of air and land forces. Air forces can be
rapidly deployed and employed anywhere in the world in a matter of hours even from thousands
of miles away. Land forces, unless predeployed to the specific area of concern, take weeks or
months to deploy depending on the size of the force elements required.
Second, the explosive growth in the ease and speed at which ideas and technologies are
created and spread around the world has yielded a new, more unpredictable threat environments.
Rapid advancements in the capabilities of our potential adversaries, notably in electronic
warfare, cyber, drones, and long-range precision attack, all present unique challenges and expose
vulnerabilities. Our ability to deploy and sustain forces to areas needed for deterring or
countering malicious actors or adversaries is becoming ever-more contested and subject to reach
by surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons.
The spread of advanced technologies, enhanced by rapid advances in computing power,
places increasingly sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air defense systems,
submarines, anti-ship missiles, guided rockets, fourth and fifth-generation aircraft, as well as
advanced space and cyber capabilities in the hands of potential adversaries. The range and scale
of possible effects with these new capabilities present a new military problem set that threatens
the U.S. and allied expeditionary warfare model of power projection, freedom of action, and
maneuver.
The necessity of deploying and sustaining expeditionary forces across the globe is
absolutely fundamental to the U.S. national security strategy. There are two enduring tenets of
our national security strategies over the years regardless of Administration party affiliation. One,
that we will maintain sufficient forces and capabilities to engage around the world to encourage
peace and stability to prevent conflict. Two, that in the event that conflict is unavoidable, we
will maintain the ability to fight and win in more than one conflict at a time and do so away from
U.S. territory.
In order to be able to accomplish both of these fundamental tenets, each of the services
requires a set of robust, capable, and ready forces to establish a rotational base sufficient to

13
sustain operations. To do that the Air Force uses its “Air and Space Expeditionary Force” (AEF)
structure to maintain sufficient numbers of rotational base forces to engage in regions around the
world to shape and maintain peace and stability. AEFs provide joint force commanders with
ready and complete air and space forces to execute their plans.
In the most demanding anti-access/area denial scenarios, the U.S. will be challenged to
do what it has become accustomed to doing: building up combat power in an area, sustaining that
force, performing detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conducting operations
when and where desired. AEFs provide a construct for the potential of better teaming with the
Army on a regular and recurring basis to organize, prepare, and train together so when it does
come time to fight, our air and land forces present seamless capability.
During the 2000/2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) where I was the lead of the
Air Force QDR team, I suggested to my Army counterpart that we consider assigning and
teaming Army warfighting units with Air Force AEFs specifically for this purpose. I was told by
him that the Army was a garrison-based force and didn’t need to train for or practice for
expeditionary deployments. That was before 9/11 and much has transpired since then.
With the potential of the interdependent RSG, and its ISR and strike components that
parallel Air Force capabilities, it may be time to move toward greater air land interdependency
by aligning RSGs with AEFs at some point in the future. The characteristics of the RSG as
lighter; more agile; more mobile; and more interoperable than current Army warfighting
organizational structures, opens the possibility of much greater synergy with the air, space, and
cyber capabilities of the Air Force. RSGs matched with AEFs provide the basis for a step
increase in the partnership between air and land force organizations in the future.
Ten AEFs provide the framework to achieve sufficient expeditionary aerospace forces to
sustain rotational base requirements and personnel tempos to meet the dual requirements of our
security strategy. The key to Air Force expeditionary force structure is to ensure that those ten
AEFs are structured, equipped, and equivalent in capability and capacity for each of the Air
Force’s mission areas: gaining control of air, space, and cyberspace; holding targets at risk
around the world; providing responsive global integrated ISR; rapidly transporting people and
equipment across the globe; and underpinning each of these unique contributions with robust,
reliable, and redundant global command and control. Aerospace capability does not stop with
expeditionary assets. Space, ISR, cyber, national missile defense architecture, inter-theater
airlift, and others, provide the foundation upon which the AEF structure stands. To meet the
Nation’s security challenges of the future, the Air Force will require sufficient force structure to
maintain both an adequate rotational base of expeditionary capabilities, as well as its
foundation—that level of force structure does not exist today. Currently, the Air Force does not
have ten equally capable AEF’s—it “borrows” those forces in training to make those preparing
to deploy whole.
In the face of the expanding set of threats around the globe, the United States government
has elected to fund fewer resources to meet them.9 At the same time, our aerospace capabilities
have reached an inflection point. Last year we celebrated the 25th anniversary of Operation
Desert Storm—the first Gulf War. Your Air Force has been at war not just since 9/11/2001, but
since 1/16/1991. After over 25 years of continuous combat operations coupled with budget

9
In 2009 the U.S. spent 4.6 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. In 2017 the U.S. spent 3.2
percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.

14
instability and lower-than-planned budget top lines have made the Air Force the smallest, the
oldest, and the least ready force in its entire history.
Yet, our nation faces an ever growing and evolving list of challenges. While each of
them drive an increase in the demand for aerospace power, the Air Force has to deal with
unpredictable and eroding budgets that have shrunk force structure, as well as the defense
industrial base upon which it heavily relies.
Today we have 59 percent fewer fighter squadrons than during Operation Desert Storm in
1991 (134 in 1991, 55 today). We have 30 percent fewer people, and 37 percent fewer total
aircraft. At the height of the hollow military of the 1970's, and when President Reagan took
office pledging to rebuild it, our Air Force aircraft averaged 12 years of age. Today the average
age of Air Force aircraft is over 200 percent older...28 years.
The Air Force is operating a geriatric force that is becoming more so every day.
Bombers and tankers over 50 years of age, trainers over 40, fighters and helicopters over 30—for
comparison purposes the average age of the U.S. airline fleet is about 10 years…and they don’t
pull 6 to 9 “Gs” on a daily basis as do our fighters. Pilots are qualifying on the same bombers
and tankers that their grandfathers qualified on.
In the 70’s, nearly half our military planes could not fly because there were no spare parts
and proper maintenance. It is just as bad today. Between 2009 and 2018, the US military will
sustain budget cuts totaling over $1.5 trillion dollars. Many of these cuts have been arbitrary and
not reflected in strategy or analysis. Yet, the demand for airpower keeps growing while the Air
Force is seriously underfunded. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to deploying and
sustaining expeditionary forces across the globe.
Conclusion
The challenge before us is to transform today to dominate an operational environment that is
rapidly evolving, and to counter adversaries who are rapidly advancing in capability. The 9/11
commission report’s now famous summary that the cause of that disaster was a “failure of
imagination” cannot be allowed to be repeated across our security establishment.
I finish with a plea for new thinking. In the face of disruptive innovation and cultural change,
the military can maintain the status quo, or it can embrace and exploit change. I suggest that the latter
is preferred. Our services need to learn better how to rapidly adapt new technology to the innovative
concepts of operation that technology enables. Our intelligence community, military, and other
security institutions will suffer if their internal organizations fail to adapt to new, disruptive
innovations and concepts of operation.
Just as combat tomorrow will look different than it did yesterday, so too should the military
with which we prosecute it. We should take maximum advantage of the asymmetric capabilities
America possesses with her air, space, and cyber forces operating in conjunction with her land and
maritime forces in innovative ways. A concerted focus on further developing and expanding these
forces would serve the United States well, as they are uniquely positioned to underpin the kind of
defense strategy and force structure appropriate to America’s future.
One of our most significant challenges is the structural and cultural barriers that stifle new
ideas that challenge the status quo. That is the challenge for not just our military, but for all the other
pillars of our national security architecture. We must challenge our institutions to have an appetite for

15
innovation—and a culture that rewards innovative solutions. I encourage you to embolden our
military to seek out, experiment, and test new concepts of organization and operation.

16
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 1
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

Mr. Chairman (Senator Cotton), Senator King (ranking member), and members of the Air-Land
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear
today to present my thoughts on “all arms” warfare in the 21st century, and their implications
for Army force design in the context of a fully integrated joint air-ground theater joint task force
(JTF).

The American Republic, the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Army stand at the cross
roads of history. We cannot predict with certainty what great power or constellation of great
powers may directly challenge the United States in 5, 10 or 20 years. But we can say with
confidence that the outcome of a future major regional war involving the existential interests of
the American Republic will be determined by the preparations we make during the next 5-10
years.

We know from blood-spattered experience that armed forces and armies in particular
are more often defeated in war by clinging to doctrine, tactics and organizations that evolved
from earlier successful operations than by the superior skills and capabilities of their
opponents.1 In this connection, the contemporary U.S. Army is in a strategic position
reminiscent of the two decades that preceded the First World War (WW I).

From 4 February 1899 – 2 July 1902 roughly 126,000 U.S. Troops consisting primarily of
infantry, cavalry, and horse-drawn artillery fought 80,000 to 100,000 Filipino insurgents
supported by perhaps another hundred thousand Filipino auxiliaries. In a hard fought campaign
that lasted more than three years approximately 6,000 U.S. soldiers were killed and 2,818 were
wounded. Filipino combat losses exceeded 16,000, while Filipino civilian casualties numbered
up to 200,000.2

The Army’s experience of combat in the Philippines confirmed the Army generals’
opinion that the rifleman rather than massed artillery fire was the decisive factor in warfare.3
This was certainly true for the Philippine insurrection, but WW I demonstrated the reverse:
Accurate, quick-firing heavy artillery in combination with mines, machine guns and, eventually,
tanks and aircraft, constituted a new dominant paradigm of warfare.

Nevertheless, like the generals commanding the British and French Armies, the U.S.
Army’s senior leadership failed to grasp this reality even though the 1905 Russo-Japanese War
actually threw it into sharp relief.4 The results were tragic. In 110 days of fighting during 1918,
the U.S. Army sustained 318,000 casualties including 115,000 dead. In other words, on average,
1,000 American infantrymen died in every battle fought against the German Army.5
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 2
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

In a parallel analysis, suppressing the rebellion in the Philippines no more prepared the
U.S. Army for World War I than the last 15 years of suppressing insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan will prepare the U.S. Army for a future war involving peer or near-peer opponents.
Yet, whereas the Philippine Insurrection made little difference to the grand sweep of human
history, the U.S. Army’s arrival on the battlefields of France in 1918 rescued French and British
Forces from defeat and changed the course of world history.

The WW I experience helps to explain why the U.S. Army’s future, exploitation of
powerful new warfighting technologies and the emergence of a new, integrated, “All Arms-All
Effects” warfighting structure—the ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance)-STRIKE
(standoff, beyond-line-of-sight attack, theater air and missile defense)-Maneuver (positional
advantage on land)-Sustainment (logistics) Complex—must not be constrained by the insertion
of new technologies into organizational constructs in use since 1942 or tactics tied to the recent
past.6 Streamlined, integrated Command and Control (C2) on the operational level of war will
not only deliver the timely and effective integration of warfighting capabilities across Service
lines, joint integrated C2 promises a profound strategic advantage in war that will save
American lives. With these points in mind, my presentation is organized into three sections:

1. Section I briefly sketches the environmental character of future operations against

adversaries deployed into anti-access, area denial positions from an Army perspective;
2. Section II addresses the new Joint Operational Concept of “All Arms-All Effects,” Cross
Domain warfare and the concept’s implementation through the ISR–STRIKE-Maneuver-
Sustainment Complex and the Sustainment required to support a fully integrated joint
air-ground theater JTF;
3. Section III examines the need for integrated command and control in the form of
Standing Joint Force Commands to conduct integrated, “All Arms-All Effects warfare”
and the strategic implications for sustainment operations.
4. Summary and (2) Recommendations.

Before turning to the first section, it is important to understand that the rapid assembly
of Army ground forces anywhere on the greater Eurasian landmass depends on several
preconditions: First, the creation of hardened national space-based C4ISR infrastructure
combined with resilient, integrated cyber capabilities for electromagnetic spectrum domain
dominance; Second, the availability of large numbers of advanced, survivable long-range
reconnaissance and strike, manned and unmanned, aircraft with stand-off precision weapons;
and, Third, U.S. Army ground forces developed, organized, trained and equipped from the
bottom up for joint, integrated operations.
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 3
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

Otherwise U.S. Forces are unlikely to prevail against an established major power or
alliance of regional powers fighting to sustain or expand their regional dominance. A long,
arduous and exhausting conflict, rather than a decisive victory, would then ensue; the worst
possible outcome for an American society intolerant of heavy casualties and the reduced living
standards that such a war would entail.

SECTION 1 (Character of Future Operations)

Predicting the character of future conflict is always hazardous. Every war is unique,
requiring an understanding of the warring parties’ intentions, as well as, their capabilities. Yet,
there is one inescapable conclusion about the future character of warfare: The proliferation of
precision strike and persistent surveillance technologies presents extraordinary challenges to
the projection of U.S. Military power.

Many countries, not just China and Russia, are developing and will implement A2AD
strategies.7 They will exploit sea mines, space and terrestrially based surveillance, precision
strike, cyber-attacks, and electronic warfare to create “no-go” zones into which it will be
difficult and costly for the United States to project military power.8 In a future conflict with
near-peer or peer nation-state opponents on the Eurasian landmass, U.S. Forces must
anticipate all or most of the following conditions:

On a strategic level, U.S. command, control and communications, particularly space-

based capabilities, will be disrupted, if not for long periods, then, certainly long enough to
create operational havoc. In addition, even mid-sized powers are building a large, diverse, and
reliable range of conventional ballistic missiles for deep precision strikes designed to operate
within terrestrial and space-based sensor networks. As a result, U.S. Forces must expect that
future opponents to launch theater ballistic missiles and self-navigating long range cruise
missiles to strike ports, airfields, refineries, desalinization plants and food storage facilities vital
to U.S. Forces. For example, unless U.S. and allied air defenses can shoot down Russian Kaliber
Cruise Missiles, these missiles can strike all European ports and airfields with the exception of
those in the far southwestern corner of the Iberian Peninsula.

On the operational and tactical levels: the skies over U.S. Army Forces will be crowded
with loitering munitions, or unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones). These agile
UCAVs are really cruise missiles designed to engage beyond line-of-sight ground targets. With
proximity-fused, high-explosive warheads, these systems will remain airborne for hours, day or
night. Equipped with high resolution electro-optical and infrared cameras, enemy operators will
locate, surveil, and guide these drones to targets on the ground—primarily, U.S. ground forces.9
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 4
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

When these loitering missiles are integrated into the enemy’s Strike Formations armed
with precision guided rocket artillery that fires high explosive, incendiary, thermobaric,
warheads including sub-munitions with self-targeting anti-tank and anti-personnel munitions
warfare as we know it changes.10 Rockets fired from just 5 of these modern rocket launchers
can devastate an area the size of New York City’s Central Park (843 acres or 3.2 square miles) in
minutes.11

Meanwhile, at every level—tactical, operational and strategic—integrated air defenses

protect the enemy’s Strike Formations from U.S. air and missile attack. It would be a serious
mistake to underestimate the impact of integrated air defenses with phased array radars. Some
of the newest air defense systems—like the Russian S-500—are so capable that many U.S.
Defense Officials privately worry that even warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2 risk
destruction if they attempt to penetrate them.12 There is, however, no debate about the impact
of new increasingly lethal and accurate air defense technology on the tactical level: Any
manned or unmanned, low-flying, subsonic platform, whether it is a conventional rotorcraft, a
tilt-rotor, or a fixed wing prop/turboprop aircraft, will be highly susceptible to detection,
engagement and destruction.13

While U.S. Forces struggle with the combined power of enemy IADS and Strike systems
the enemy’s armored forces maneuver to exploit the ensuing chaos on the ground to close in
with accurate, devastating direct fire from automatic cannon, anti-tank guided missiles and high
velocity guns.14 The close battle also takes place on the opponent’s geographical doorstep
conferring a serious home court advantage on the opponent’s attacking ground forces.

The implications of this snapshot of future warfare are clear: “Holding ground” in the
face of ubiquitous overhead military surveillance and reconnaissance linked to an array of
precision guided weapons is extremely dangerous. Survivability depends on mobility and
protection from top, as well as, direct attack. Mobility depends on off-road maneuver. Off-road
maneuver requires tracked (not wheeled) mobility. Protection necessitates armor (active and
passive) in combination with accurate, devastating firepower and integration within the
aerospace-maritime dominated ISR-Strike complex. For reasons of physics, tracked armored
platforms provide superior all-around survivability and stability for modern weapon systems
during on-the-move engagements.15

The requirement that results from the proliferating ISR-Strike revolution is a warfighting
environment that rewards dispersed, mobile warfare, a brand of warfare that elevates tactical
dispersion to the operational level of war. To cope with the conditions that dispersed mobile
warfare creates, maneuver forces must infiltrate a theater of war at points where the enemy’s
air defenses are weak or nonexistent. These are the points where manned and unmanned
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 5
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

aircraft or missiles cannot easily attack them. This means that unless the U.S. Army moves
rapidly away from the last two decades’ focus on “permissive non-contested operations” in
counterinsurgency to higher-end operations in more contested, non-permissive environments
future U.S. Army and Air forces will face certain defeat.16

SECTION 2 (“All Arms-All Effects,” Sustainment and Army Force Design)

The technological trends in lethality, accuracy and range outlined in the previous section
point to a very different Army from the U.S. Army we have today; an overly light-infantry-
centric force equipped for low intensity conflict much like the Marine Corps. In the 21st Century,
the nation needs an Army that consists of mainly mobile, armored forces with accurate,
devastating firepower designed to operate on land the way ships operate at sea; within the
limits of their organic ISR, Strike and Sustainment capabilities. Like individual naval combatants,
Army ground maneuver formations must be able to operate independently or rapidly assemble
into larger forces.

These desired attributes point to Army forces that are organized, trained and equipped
for mobile, dispersed war within an integrated, joint operational framework; an army that
consists of self-contained fighting, mission-focused force packages organized around the
warfighting functions of modern warfare: maneuver, strike, ISR, and sustainment capabilities.
They must be equipped with the Joint C4ISR and organic sustainment to operate inside a joint
military command structure that tightly integrates ground maneuver forces with the ISR and
Strike capabilities that reside in the aerospace and maritime forces. The resulting formations of
5-6,000 soldiers under the command of brigadier generals with robust staffs are designed to
deploy and fight as unreinforced, stand-alone formations and plug directly into a Joint Task
Force without intervening division headquarters. With this new, integrative organizational
paradigm in place, the 21st Century U.S. Army becomes an operationally flexible grouping of
capability-based formations, faster to deploy, easier to transport and maneuver.

Recognizing the potential this organizational construct represents, Senator John McCain,
SASC Chairman, and Members included a provision in the FY 17 National Defense Authorization
Bill directing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to model, assess and report on a new prototype
ground combat maneuver formation, the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG). The RSG is a
6,000 soldier Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG); a special purpose organization designed to
lead change by exploiting new, but proven technologies in a joint, integrated, operational
context. In other words, the RSG is a force design that links strategy with concept and
capabilities to ensure capability integration and shared technological development across
Service lines (RD&A).
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 6
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

The RSG is organized to capitalize on the application of precision “Strike” informed by

networked ISR. With the proposed use of the PUMA infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) as a universal
platform for all of its weapon systems, radars and logistical support, the RSG is not a fragile
force. It employs manned and unmanned aircraft, sensors, radars and air defense systems
(NASAMS National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)), forward with ground
maneuver elements to provide the coverage needed to exploit the formation’s accurate,
devastating, direct firepower including 30mm autocannon, spike anti-tank missiles and either
120mm or 130mm smooth bore tank cannon.17 Along with strategic and tactical mobility, the
RSG has the precise striking power of loitering munitions, rocket artillery, and advanced 120mm
mortar systems to conduct its own fire and close air support, as well as, strike operations
against enemy concentrations.18

The RSG is organized and equipped to fight for information and to rapidly exploit the
information its subunits collect. It’s designed for integration with, but not dependence on, air
strikes for survival and effectiveness. The RSG is a mobile armored force that reflects the
understanding that regardless of how well new technologies are networked, they will never
provide perfect situational awareness or perfect information; that information is often of
fleeting value. The RSG’s robust, organic C4ISR integrates the RSG’s ground combat capabilities
(including the capability to dismount 840 soldiers) within the framework of “All Arms/All
Effects” Cross Domain warfare.

These points notwithstanding, the RSG is simply the vanguard for the Army ground force
that must emerge to defeat 21st Century threats. Thanks to the marriage of space-based and
terrestrial ISR capabilities with the timely dissemination of analyzed intelligence through
networks, the near-simultaneous application of Strike and Maneuver forces can be decisive in
21st Century warfare. This recognition suggests that massed, accurate firepower or, STRIKE
seeks to facilitate operational maneuver over distance, dislocate enemy C2, crush large
concentrations of enemy forces, isolate the battlespace through interdiction and destroy
enemy facilities with operational significance.

Army Strike Groups are the inevitable result of the ISR-Strike revolution. Consisting of
precision rocket artillery, cruise missiles and, potentially, intermediate range ballistic missiles,
Army Strike Groups are ideal for Joint, integrated Strike Operations with aerospace and naval
forces. These formations together with RSG-like Battlegroups can and must also play a key role
in the methodical destruction of the enemy’s integrated air defenses from the tactical to the
strategic levels, thus, liberating American aerospace power to conduct unconstrained strike
operations throughout the strategic depth of the opponent’s area of operations.
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 7
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

The realities of future force projection dictate that logistical support must be embedded
at the tactical level as shown in the RSG, as well as, present on the operational level to respond
to the needs of the JTF. Today’s Army centralizes too much logistical support at the division and
corps levels robbing subordinate BCTS of the capacity for independent operations. Today, the
active force also depends too heavily on contracted logistical support. Army C4ISR and Combat
Support Groups must be designed within a broader, Joint framework to ensure mutual
reinforcing dependence, not unneeded redundancy. (See illustration) As my distinguished
colleague, Lieutenant General Dave Deptula has stated in previous testimony, “A dollar spent
on duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or capability elsewhere.”19

For decades, America has underinvested in strategic lift—a calculated choice to accept
risk that shortages in lift could be offset by either taking more time to get forces to the theater
or by prepositioning equipment in regions of foreseeable conflict. Smart planning and better
acquisition strategies that result in formations like the PUMA-based RSG that are designed with
intercontinental transportation in mind can help enormously. Vehicles sized to facilitate rapid
transportation to forward locations can avoid the need to devise newer airframes or new ships
capable of lifting and accommodating heavier vehicles.

Still, it is not enough to simply expect the private sector to step in and transport the bulk
of the military to war on a moment’s notice. Dedicated airlift and short-notice private sector
support must be readily available, because long lead times to ramp up for war are becoming a
luxury in the age of missiles with transcontinental ranges. The capability to lift hazardous cargos
such as ammunition and explosives, as well as heavy outsized cargo that cannot easily be lifted
using commercial equipment along with investment in transportation support systems to off-
load military cargo in unimproved locations is vital.

In sum, to terminate future conflicts on terms that favor the United States and avoid
long, destructive wars of attrition, the U.S. armed forces must combine the concentration of
massive firepower across service lines with the near-simultaneous attack of ground maneuver
forces in time and space to achieve decisive effects against opposing forces. Integrating ground
maneuver forces into the larger ISR-Strike complex that already exists in U.S. aerospace and
naval forces is critical to this outcome. Organizing Army forces into Lego-like mission-capable
force packages on the RSG model and investing in the right mix of air and sea lift are
indispensable to future force projection.
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 8
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 9
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 10
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

SECTION 3 (Integrated, Joint Command and Control in Expeditionary Warfare)

As noted in the Section 2, the Army’s organizational constructs of the past—corps,

divisions and brigades—with their roots in WW II are the wrong constructs for 21st Century
Warfare. This observation applies with equal force to command overhead.

In the 1944-45 advance from Normandy to the Rhine, General Montgomery’s

headquarters controlled only two armies, which in turn had only two and three
corps respectively, and the corps operated only two to three divisions—
sometimes, even, only one. The ratio of headquarters was no more economic in
the U.S. Army until a late stage. On top of both was Eisenhower’s H.Q.—
reputedly comprising some 30,000 officers and men. The abundance of
headquarters was one reason why the advance to victory was so protracted,
despite mobile instruments and exhausted opponents.20

A discussion of the massive C2 overhead inside the Services and the Combatant
Commands is beyond the scope of this testimony, but a flattening of the echelons of C2 is long
overdue. In future conflicts and crises, there will be no time for a “pickup game.” By the time
the U.S. gets its operational construct and “C2” act in order, China, Russia, Iran (or any other
future great power or coalition of powers) will defeat U.S. forces.

Adding maneuver and sustainment to the ISR-Strike framework is vital step joint
interoperability cannot be created on the fly. Without unity of command, there is no unity of
effort. Effective integration is the key to unity of command. Unity of effort, speed of decision,
and action demand integrated command structures midway between the strategic and tactical
levels that create and maintain a coherent picture of operations. The challenge is to integrate
the diverse military capabilities from the aerospace and maritime forces with the Army’s
ground maneuver forces as seamlessly as possible when Army forces are committed as part of a
Joint Task Force.

Because command and control of geographically dispersed armed forces requires “brain
to brain” as well as “box to box” connectivity, C2 structures on the operational level must
involve trained professionals from all of the services. Shared battle space awareness is both
technical and intellectual. Within the operational framework of ISR-Strike-Maneuver-
Sustainment, the planning and execution of operations become routinely integrated through
multi-service command and control—common mission purposes. The outcome is a regionally
focused standing Joint Force Headquarters capable of commanding whatever mission-capable
force packages are assigned to it.
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 11
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 12
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

To briefly sum up, the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework is not just about

“things.” It’s about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational
framework guided by human understanding. The goal is to create a coherent view of warfare,
(not just operations) across service lines. The JFC concept moves the armed forces beyond the
last minute lash up of single-service headquarters, or the ad hoc coordination of individual
federal agencies and service-based elements of integration.

Summary and Recommendations

Today and in the future, the United States’ military response to future regional wars
depends on our general purpose, non-nuclear capabilities. The United States needs powerful
forces-in-being (professional ready, deployable, air, land and sea) that are prepared to win the
first fight, because we may not get the chance to win a second. The last fourteen years severely
eroded the United States’ military-technological edge and operational flexibility—particularly
those of the U.S. Army. The focus on irregular warfare—suppressing weak, insurgent opponents
without armies, air forces or air defenses let alone naval power—must end. At a strength of
500,000 or less, the active U.S. Army cannot preserve its vital warfighting forces and still
maintain large light infantry-centric and paramilitary forces for counterinsurgency and nation
building in the Eastern hemisphere.

Members of the Air-Land Committee must apply Peter Drucker’s private sector advice to
National Defense: “If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old.”21 To
survive and prevail in twenty-first-century close combat the vast majority of soldiers should be
mounted in tracked armored platforms equipped with accurate, devastating firepower and
tightly integrated with ISR and Strike capabilities in all of the services.22

Finally, a flattening of the American military command structure is equally critical. The
multiplicity of higher headquarters in the chain of command not only slows decision making
and increases friction, it drains the fighting formations of too many capable soldiers. These
points suggest two critical recommendations:

1. Urge the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the incoming Secretary of the Army to
accelerate the RSG’s evaluation and provide funding for rapid prototyping of PUMA
platforms to produce an experimental RSG maneuver battalion set as soon as possible;
2. Direct the CJCS to stand up an experimental 3 star Joint Force Headquarters on the
model presented in this testimony with the goal of developing a template for Joint Force
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 13
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

Commands inside the regional unified commands. The Joint Base Lewis-McChord should
be considered for the testing and evaluation of the proposed JFC C2 structure.

ENDNOTES

1
J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, (London, UK: Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd, 1936), page 26.
2
Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Counterinsurgency: The Philippines 1899-1902,” Parameters, spring 2005,
page 64.
3
Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex, (New York, NY: The Modern Library, 2001), page 127.
4
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–1918, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994), pages 48–49.
5
Leonard P. Ayres, Colonel, US Army, The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary, (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, August 1919), pages 121-123.
6
“Strike” as defined here can be kinetic or non-kinetic depending on the mission.
7
Ankit Panda, “After China, India Will Become Second Buyer of Advanced Russian S-400 Missile Defense Systems,”
The Diplomat, 5 November 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/after-china-india-will-become-second-buyer-
of-advanced-russian-s-400-missile-defense-systems/
8
Barry Watts, “Precision Strike: An Evolution,” NationalInterest.org, 2 November 2013.
9
At least 9 nation-states including Russia, China, Israel, Turkey, Iran and India possess these precision weapon
systems. The U.S. Army fields the Switchblade, a miniature, remotely-piloted 5.5 pound vehicle with ten kilometer
range and ten minutes endurance in the air. This is purely tactical weapon with limited utility compared with the
systems discussed here.
10
Sydney Freedberg, “Russian Drone Threat: Army Seeks Ukraine Lessons,” Breaking Defense, 14 October 2015.
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/russian-drone-threat-army-seeks-ukraine-lessons/
11
The Russian Smerch-M, a system that is proliferating, can fire many types of rockets such as the 9M55K which
carries 72 unguided fin-stabilized high-explosive fragmentation sub-munitions, the 9M55K1 which carries five
parachute-retarded MOTIV-3F top-attack anti-armor sub-munitions, the 9M55K4 which carries 25 anti-tank mines,
the 9M55F an unitary warhead with a charge of 95,5 kg of high explosive, the 9M55S a fuel air explosive munition,
and the 9M55K5 with 646 shaped charge fragmentation sub-munitions that are dispensed over the target. The
BM-30 Smerch-M 9A52-2 can fire rockets with a maximum range of 90 km.
http://www.armyrecognition.com/russia_russian_army_vehicles_system_artillery_uk/9a52-2_smerch-m_bm-
30_multiple_rocket_launcher_system_technical_data_sheet_information_description_u.html
12
Dave Majumdar, “Russia's Deadly S-500 Air-Defense System: Ready for War at 660,000 Feet,” The National
Interest, 3 May 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/russias-deadly-s-500-air-defense-system-ready-war-660000-
16028. The dramatic improvements in the massive processing of signals to find patterns and filter out noise have
dramatically improved the precision and capability of radar. The algorithms that enabled NASA to exploit
microwaves for exploration of the moon also apply to IADS.
13
As demonstrated by the failed RAH-66 Comanche, it is impossible to develop a rotor-driven manned craft with
sufficiently reduced radar, IR, visible and acoustic signatures to avoid destruction in the mid-to-high intensity
warfighting environment. http://nation.time.com/2012/05/25/real-lessons-from-an-unreal-helicopter/
14
Tamir Eshel, “New Russian Army: First Analysis,” Defense Update, 9 May 2015. http://defense-
update.com/20150509_t14-t15_analysis.html
15
Paul Hornback, “The Wheel versus Track Dilemma,” Armor Magazine, March-April 1998, pages 33-34.
16
In his work as Deputy Sectary of Defense, Robert Work, concluded that the density and lethality of future anti-
access/anti-denial capabilities raised questions about the viability of Marine light forces in a contested
environment. His observations are important because they apply to light-infantry centric forces in general. He
observed: “The Navy-Marine team will never contemplate littoral maneuver until an enemy’s battle network,
capable of firing dense salvos of guided weapons, is suppressed. Consequently, the initial phase of any joint
theater-entry operation will require achieving air, sea, undersea, and overall battle-network superiority in the
 TESTIMONY 15 March 2017 14
Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) US Army, PhD
EVP Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

amphibious objective area. . . . Thus far we have only argued that some capability to conduct theater-entry
operations and littoral maneuver must be retained. But it is fair to ask how much amphibious capacity is needed.”
Robert Work and F. C. Hoffman, “Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136/11/1
(2010), page 293.
17
National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/nasams/
18
AMOS®. "Advanced Mortar System," (BAE Systems Hagglunds AB). A double barreled breech-auto-loading 120
mm mortar turret mounted. System operates autonomously with direct and indirect fire capability together with
Multiple Rounds out to 10 km. One RSG contains 60 ‘120mm Mortar’ variants (System Fielded). MLRS (Lockheed
Martin Missiles and Fire Control). The weapon can fire guided and unguided projectiles from 42 to 300 km. (System
fielded). One RSG contains 12 MLRS launchers/systems variants. TARES (Tactical Advanced Recce Strike) is a UCAV
with a 200 km range and endurance time of four hours. It autonomously searches for, identifies and engages
targets. Up to 24 TARES can be flown simultaneously. System is tested ready for fielding. One RSG contains 24
TARES launcher variants. http://www.army-technology.com/projects/taifun/
19
Quoted by Walter Pincus, “Senate Armed Services Committee tackles Inter-service rivalries—finally,”
Washington Post, 9 November 2015.
20
B. H. Liddell Hart, Defence of the West, (New York, NY: William Morrow & CO., 1950), page 244. Forrest Pogue
puts the number of officers and soldiers assigned to Eisenhower’s HQ at 16,000. The difference lies in which
supporting elements are included in the count. Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command, (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, 1954), pages. 533-535.
21
Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century, (New York, NY: Harper Business, 1998), page 32.
22
For a good assessment of the lethality that confronts U.S. and allied ground forces, see Ron Tira, “Breaking the
Amoeba's Bones,” Strategic Assessment, Jaffee Center for Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, autumn
2006. http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p3Tira.html
March 15, 2017

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Airland of the Senate Armed

Services Committee
Future of All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century

Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director, Future of Warfare Initiative

Center for a New American Security

Adapting the Force to Emerging Challenges

Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Senators, thank you for inviting me to
testify today.

We are at a time of both risk and opportunity for the U.S. armed forces. Budget cuts instituted
under the 2011 Budget Control Act have harmed military readiness and delayed urgently-needed
modernization. The United States has fallen behind in adapting to challenges from other nations.
Russia and China have developed a suite of capabilities, broadly labeled “anti-access / area denial”
(A2/AD), that threaten traditional forms of U.S. power projection. In order to remain relevant as a
global power, the United States must adapt to these challenges. At the same time, the United States
must also find more cost-effective means of conducting day-to-day operations, such as countering
terrorism and providing a stabilizing presence in key regions around the globe.

To accomplish these and other high-priority missions, such as defending the homeland from ballistic
missile attacks from rogue nations, the U.S. military must continue to evolve and adapt. Congress,
working with the Trump Administration, has an opportunity to reverse the harmful budgetary cuts
under the Budget Control Act (BCA). In addition to a sustained increase in defense spending above
BCA levels, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs a predictable and stable budget in order to
plan future activities.

With additional resources, DoD should prioritize (1) restoring readiness by funding maintenance
and training and (2) modernizing the force to adapt to emerging challenges. U.S. forces cannot be
considered “ready” if they are prepared for the wrong threats. U.S. forces must be trained, equipped,
and postured to meet the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent
extremism. Greater capacity alone cannot meet these challenges. The force must evolve its
capabilities and operational concepts.

DoD should pursue a disciplined modernization strategy that focuses investments on high-payoff
capabilities that can deliver the most value in countering A2/AD challenges. This approach should
leverage existing programs wherever possible in order to maximize the efficient use of scarce
resources. DoD should also capitalize on emerging technologies such as robotics and automation to
increase operational effectiveness and decrease costs.1 Finally, DoD should improve its ability to
conduct day-to-day activities, such as countering terrorism, in a cost-effective manner by investing in
a “high-low mix” of forces: a small number of highly capable assets for countering sophisticated
adversaries and larger numbers of lower cost assets for routine operations.

The remainder of this testimony will outline key initiatives DoD should pursue to adapt the Air
Force and Army to these challenges.

Air Force – Strategic Environment and Key Investment Priorities

Adversary investments in advanced integrated air defense systems, ballistic and cruise missiles to
target U.S. bases, and mobile and relocatable assets require the U.S. Air Force to adapt. U.S. aircraft
must be able to project power over long distances, penetrate and survive in contested areas, deliver
high volume fires, and persist in order to track mobile and relocatable targets. These forces need
robust, secure communications links to operate as a distributed network.2

DoD has taken steps towards developing a global surveillance and strike capability that meets these
ends, but more could be done to ensure DoD attention and investments are focused on the most
high-priority areas. Key focus areas for the Air Force include:

• Long-range penetrating strike: The B-21 bomber, currently in development, will provide
DoD with the ability to deliver high-volume fires in contested environments over long distances.
Even medium-scale conflicts, like the opening phases of the 2003 Iraq War, require tens of
thousands of weapons on targets.3 Congress should work with the Administration to ensure that
once the bomber enters production, procurement proceeds at the maximum rate in order to
field this capability in sufficiently quantities for future conflicts. In the interim, the Air Force
should leverage work underway on the B-21 to upgrade existing B-2 bombers, with a focus on
increasing operational availability, survivability, lethality, and connectivity.

• Persistent surveillance and strike: In addition to delivering high volume fires, U.S. aircraft
must have the ability to persist within contested areas in order to find, fix, and finish enemy
mobile and relocatable targets. Stealthy uninhabited (unmanned) combat aircraft are the only
way to do this from long range. Refuelable uninhabited aircraft could achieve ultra-long
endurance, far exceeding the limits of human pilots.4 While the Air Force has invested in a large
fleet of non-stealthy uninhabited aircraft for counter-terrorism missions and a smaller number of
stealthy uninhabited aircraft for reconnaissance,5 it has yet to acquire a stealthy uninhabited
combat air system (UCAS) for operations in contested environments. This is the most
significant capability gap the Air Force faces today. Fortunately, the Air Force has a ready-made
option to affordably develop this capability. The Air Force has stated that it is preserving the
option of developing an “optionally manned” version of the B-21 in the future.6 Congress
should ensure the Air Force exercises that option and develops an optionally manned version
that could be used for uninhabited, long endurance persistent surveillance and strike missions.

2
• Robust, secure networks: U.S. forces will be most effective when they are connected via
secure, robust networks for communications and position, navigation, and timing (PNT). DoD
should capitalize on the rapidly maturing commercial space market to lower satellite launch
costs. DoD should also invest in an aerial layer network to increase redundancy, provide a
resilient backup against satellite disruption, and diminish the advantages to adversaries of
attacking U.S. satellites. This aerial layer could affordably be developed by placing
communications and PNT relay nodes on stealthy UCAS so that they provide their own self-
healing network in contested areas and on existing non-stealthy uninhabited aircraft for
communications relay outside of contested areas.

• Next-generation fires and effects: The Air Force must continue to upgrade and increase its
quantities of munitions to ensure they are sufficiently lethal, survivable, and acquired in
sufficiently high capacity to operate against future threats. This includes procuring larger
quantities of munitions such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile–Extended Range
(JASSM-ER) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and developing a new longer range
air-to-air missile. The Air Force has led the way on developing small air-launched swarming air
vehicles, which could be used for jamming, decoys, reconnaissance, battle damage assessment,
and strike, and the Air Force should move swiftly to operationalize this technology.7

• Directed energy weapons: High-energy lasers have the potential to provide a breakthrough
capability that radically “changes the game” in aerial warfare because of their deep magazines.
Provided they have sufficient power and cooling, high-energy lasers could continue engaging
targets indefinitely, intercepting incoming missiles and providing offensive effects.8 Coupled
with long-endurance uninhabited aircraft, high-energy lasers could potentially provide persistent,
cost-effective defenses against cruise and ballistic missile attacks. The Air Force should continue
to mature this important technology.

• Lower-cost delivery systems: The Air Force will need a way to affordably deliver large
quantities of munitions. In addition to procuring long-range stealthy penetrating platforms, the
Air Force should maximize the use of existing aircraft (e.g., B-1, B-52, F-15, F-16, and MQ-9) as
delivery vehicles for standoff weapons, decoys, and swarming air vehicles. Operating in concert
with stealthy aircraft, this high-low mix of platforms could help augment the magazine depth of
U.S. forces. The Air Force should upgrade these platforms with the necessary communications,
survivability improvements, and other capabilities to optimize their value against sophisticated
adversaries.

Even as the Air Force pursues these capabilities to respond to adversary A2/AD challenges, it must
also look for more cost-effective ways to counter less capable adversaries, such as the Islamic State.
The Air Force should invest in a fleet of low-cost, light attack aircraft to conduct counter-terrorism,
close air support, and other missions in permissive air environments. The Air Force should also
optimize its MQ-9 Reaper fleet by investing in extended range, multi-aircraft control, and automated
information processing, exploitation, and dissemination in order to improve operational cost-
effectiveness.

3
Army – Strategic Environment and Key Investment Priorities
The Army must similarly adapt, investing in new capabilities and concepts of operation to respond
to emerging challenges. The Army must be prepared to face a diverse array of potential threats, from
sophisticated states such as Russia to non-state actors such as the Islamic State and potentially
“hybrid” actors in between. Russia should be the “pacing threat” for Army modernization – the
threat archetype that represents the most sophisticated potential adversary in terms of capabilities,
technology, and organization. This does not mean that all other threats are “lesser included” cases.
Indeed, the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that ground forces optimized to
fight a conventional war against a state actor may be woefully unprepared for counterinsurgency or
irregular warfare. The Army must be prepared to fight across the full spectrum of potential
adversaries, which may require special-purpose capabilities, doctrine, training, and organizations to
counter certain threats. Both states and non-state actors alike are innovating in ways that challenge
the U.S. Army and could potentially dramatically change ground warfare in the coming years.

The Army must shift from a force primarily trained for counterinsurgency warfare towards one
prepared to deter and defeat aggression against a major state competitor. Key initiatives include:

• Increasing the number of active duty armored brigade combat teams (BCTs);
• Upgrading ground vehicles with active protection systems (APS) to intercept precision-guided
anti-armor weapons;
• Investing in long-range precision fires, electronic warfare, and protected communications;
• Upgrading Paladin 155mm howitzers with hyper velocity projectiles (HVPs) and targeting
capabilities for ballistic and cruise missile defense;9 and
• Experimenting with new operational concepts leveraging air and ground robotic teammates.

At the same time that the Army is upgrading its forces to keep pace with adversaries, it must prepare
for potentially dramatic changes in the character of ground combat.

• Threat from enemy air attack: For decades, the Army has been able to rely upon U.S. air
superiority to eliminate the threat from enemy aircraft such that U.S. ground forces have not
faced threats from the air. That era is ending. In a Russia conflict, U.S. ground forces would
have to fight within range of Russian air defenses and aircraft before those threats are
eliminated. That means that U.S. ground forces would be operating within the A2/AD
“bubble.” The Army must adapt its capabilities and concepts of operation to cope with a
contested airspace. The Army must increase its investment in air defenses and reduce the
signature of U.S. ground forces through camouflage, concealment, and deception. U.S. ground
forces also face the threats of air attack from non-state actors equipped with low-cost
commercially available drones. While these low-cost drones are not a threat to U.S. fighter
aircraft, they are a threat to ground forces and U.S. fighters are improperly matched to counter
this threat. The Army will need to invest in countermeasures to detect, target, and destroy
swarms of small commercial drones.

4
• Air-ground robotic systems: Other nations are investing in military-specific ground and air
robotic vehicles and using them in novel ways. Russia has been developing a fleet of ground
robotic vehicles, including some that are armed, and has employed uninhabited aircraft as
forward observers for artillery in the Ukraine. Robotic systems can be used to increase standoff
from threats, field larger numbers of forces on the battlefield, persist beyond the limits of
human endurance, and enable new concepts of operation such as attritable swarming
formations. The result could be new doctrine and ways of fighting on par with the invention of
the blitzkrieg. While the Army has been at the forefront of integrating uninhabited aircraft into its
force, partnering uninhabited Gray Eagle aircraft with inhabited Apache helicopters, the Army
significantly lags other nations in ground robotics. The Army will be woefully unprepared for
future conflicts if it misses out on the opportunity provided by robotic systems. The Army
should increase its investment in ground robotics, including armed systems, and experiment with
robotic teammates in mixed manned-unmanned formations.

• Precision-guided infantry weapons: One of the most innovative transformations in warfare

over the past several decades was the invention of precision-guided weapons. Warfare at the
level of infantry combat has remained, however, largely a realm of unguided weapons. With the
exception of night vision, infantry tactics have changed little since World War II. The continued
miniaturization of electronics means that precision-guided weapons are filtering down to the
level of the individual soldier, however. A range of new weapons, from smart munitions to
intelligent rifles to small drones, are placing precision-guided weapons into the hands of the
individual soldier.10 A future in which individual soldiers can target each other with precision at
long ranges would change infantry combat in ways not seen since the invention of the machine
gun. While some of these systems have been developed by the Army, others come from the
commercial sector and will be widely available. The Army should experiment with new ways of
fighting with and defending against these technologies in order to prepare for changes to come.

Even as the Army prepares for these potential changes in warfare, the Army must also conduct a
wide range of day-to-day peacetime activities, including advising and assisting partner forces. The
Army’s current model for resourcing these missions is to pull individual soldiers from Brigade
Combat Team (BCTs), an approach that is inefficient and undermines readiness. In order to help
restore readiness, the Army should invest in Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) that would provide
a pool of qualified advisors to resource these missions without disrupting BCT readiness.

Finally, the Army should take advantage of emerging technologies that have the potential to directly
improve the capabilities of individual soldiers. These include:

• Increasing soldier protection against blast-induced brain injury through improved helmet design;
• Investing in human enhancement technologies, such as transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS)11 and pharmaceutical enhancements to improve alertness and cognitive performance,
such as modafinil;12 and
• Maturing exoskeleton and exosuit technologies to improve soldier mobility and protection.

5
Increasing Strategic Agility
These investments can help evolve and adapt the force to confront a range of emerging challenges.
Ultimately, however, DoD must become more agile so that it is better suited as an institution to
rapidly adapt to adversary innovation. So long as DoD procures major weapon systems in timelines
measured in decades, it will continually be shooting behind a moving target. Institutional
innovations like the Army’s Rapid Capabilities Office will be essential to improving DoD’s strategic
agility. Congressional support for this and other efforts is critical to sustaining America’s military
edge in the years to come.

Notes
1
For more on the cost-saving advantages of robotic systems, see Paul Scharre and Daniel Burg, “The $100 Billion
Question: The Cost Case for Naval Uninhabited Combat Aircraft,” Center for a New American Security,
Washington, DC, August 2015, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-100-billion-question.
2
See also David Ochmanek, “Restoring the Power Projection Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces,” Testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2017, http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ochmanek_02-16-17.pdf.
3
Micah Zenko, “Comparing the Islamic State Air War With History,” July 6, 2015.
4
Paul Scharre, “The Value of Endurance,” Center for a New American Security, November 12, 2015,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/infographic-the-value-of-endurance.
5
U.S. Air Force, “RQ-170 Sentinel,” December 10, 2009,
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104547/rq-170-sentinel.aspx.
6
Dave Majumdar, “USAF leader confirms manned decision for new bomber,” FlightGlobal.com, April 23, 2013,
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-leader-confirms-manned-decision-for-new-bomber-385037/.
7
For more on swarming concepts, see Paul Scharre, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,”
Center for a New American Security, October, 2014, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/robotics-on-the-
battlefield-part-ii-the-coming-swarm.
8
Jason Ellis, “Directed Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects,” Center for a New American Security, April 2015,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/directed-energy-weapons-promise-and-prospects.
9
Sam LaGrone, “Pentagon: New Rounds for Old Guns Could Change Missile Defense for Navy, Army,” USNI
News, July 18, 2016.
10
For more on these changes to ground warfare, see Paul Scharre, “Uncertain Ground: Emerging Challenges in
Land Warfare,” Center for a New American Security, December 2015,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/uncertain-ground-emerging-challenges-in-land-warfare.
11
Jeremy Nelson, R. Andy McKinley, Edward Golob, Joel Warm, and Raja Parasuraman, “Enhancing vigilance in
operators with prefrontal cortex transcranial direct stimulation (tDCS)” NeuroImage 85 no. 3 (January 2014), 909-
917. Justin Nelson, Richard McKinley, Chandler Phillips, Lindsey McIntire, Chuck Goodyear, Aerial Kreiner, and
Lanie Monforton, “The Effects of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) on Multitasking Throughput
Capacity, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, (2016).
12
Arthur Estrada et al., “A comparison of the efficacy of modafinil and dextroamphetamine as alertness promoting
agents in aviators performing extended operations,” United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Report
No. 2011-05, December 2010, 4. Amanda Kelley et al., “Cognition-enhancing drugs and their appropriateness for
aviation and ground troops: a meta-analysis,” United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Report No.
2011-06, December 2010, 4. Amanda Kelley, Catherine Webb, Jeremy Athy, Sanita Ley, and Steven Gaydos,
“Cognition enhancement by modafinil: a meta-analysis.” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 83 no. 7
(July 2012), 685-690.