Centre on Migration, Policy and Society

Working Paper No. 13,

University of Oxford, 2005

The Political Importance

of Diasporas
Steven Vertovec

WP-05-13

COMPAS does not have a centre view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this
document are only those of its independent author
The Political Importance of Diasporas

Abstract:
Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment
to, a place of origin and its culture. The paper examines the role diasporas
play in migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries.

Keywords:
diaspora, transnationalism, tsunami, dual citizenship, dual nationality

Author:
Steven Vertovec is Professor of Transnational Anthropology and Director of
the ESRC centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Email:
[email protected]

This paper was written for the Migration Policy Insitute (MPI) Migration
Information Source, 'Migration Fundamentals Series’. See:
http://www.migrationinformation.org/
 The Political Importance of Diasporas

Over the past 25 years, diasporas have increasingly become significant

players in the international political arena. Examples of such politically active
diaspora communities are the Jewish-, Greek-, Cuban- and Armenian-
American associations that represent some of the strongest lobbies in
Washington, DC. Diasporic Iraqi groups and individuals played crucial roles in
encouraging American military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Many countries,
such as Israel and Armenia, regard their diasporas as strategically vital
political assets, while others, such as India, the Philippines, and other
migrant-sending countries, have been recognizing the massive contributions
their diasporas make through remittances.

There are many supporting reasons or conditions why, over the past few
decades, such diasporas have become more prominent on the world stage.
The development of new communication technologies have improved abilities
to mobilize, and multiculturalism policies in receiving countries have
revitalized ethnic pride and assertiveness. Also important are the growth of
economic resources due to swelling migrant numbers, and the profound
changes in the world political system itself as more democratic nation-states
have emerged following the fall of communist regimes. In a range of policy
areas today — including foreign affairs, economic development, and
international migration — the place of diasporas increasingly needs to be
taken into account.

Contested Definitions

“Diaspora” is a word of Greek origin meaning “to sow over or scatter.” Until
fairly recently, the historical Jewish experience provided the archetype:
forced expulsion and dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of
return. Over the past decade or so, however, “diaspora” has become a term

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of self-identification among many varied groups who themselves or whose
forbearers migrated from one place to another or to several other places.
Observable in a multitude of websites (a Google search gives close to four
million hits for “diaspora”), most self-described diasporas do not emphasize
the melancholy aspects long associated with the classic Jewish, African, or
Armenian diasporas. Rather, they celebrate a culturally creative, socially
dynamic, and often romantic meaning. For example, one Indian diaspora
website states that:

The Diaspora is very special to India. Residing in distant lands, its

members have succeeded spectacularly in their chosen professions by
dint of their single-minded dedication and hard work. What is more,
they have retained their emotional, cultural and spiritual links with the
country of their origin. This strikes a reciprocal chord in the hearts of
people of India.

Also, any longed-for return to the homeland now tends to be downplayed in

favour of ideological identification or transnational practice that can link the
scattered community with the homeland. Today, self-defined diasporas tend
to find esteem — and a kind of strength-in-numbers — through using the
term.

This shift in the adoption and meaning of “diaspora” has undoubtedly caused
some confusion and stimulated debate. In a burgeoning body of literature,
academics across the humanities and social sciences often disagree on
contemporary definitions of “diaspora,” its typical reference points,
characteristic features, limits, and social dynamics. Critics of the term
“diaspora” object to the ways it may suggest homogeneity and a historically
fixed identity, as well as values and practices within a dispersed population.
And who decides who belongs, and according to what criteria? Is it normally
based on original nation-state, religion, regional, ethno-linguistic or other
membership criteria? Is descent the only defining condition of membership —
and for how many generations after migration?

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In order to have real meaning, claims and criteria surrounding diasporic
boundaries and membership should be self-ascribed. It seems illegitimate for
others to decide if a person is part of a diaspora if they do not regard
themselves as part of such a group. Belonging to a diaspora entails a
consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly purported origins
and cultural attributes associated with them. Such origins and attributes may
emphasize ethno-lingustic, regional, religious, national or other features.
Concerns for homeland developments and the plight of co-diaspora members
in other parts of the world flow from this consciousness and emotional
attachment.

Such a definition cuts through questions around the number of generations

passed, degree of linguistic competence, extent of co-ethnic social relations,
number of festivals celebrated, ethnic meals cooked, or style of dress worn.
That is, just “how ethnic” one is does not affect whether and to what extent
someone might feel themselves part of a diaspora.

With such an understanding, we can appreciate how diasporic identification

may be lost entirely, may ebb and flow, be hot or cold, switched on or off,
remain active or dormant. The degree of attachment — and mobilization
around it — often depends upon what events are affecting the purported
homeland. Natural disasters, conflicts, and changes of government tend to
bring out such attachments. For example, the Asian tsunami in December
2004 mobilized Sri Lankan, Indian, Thai, and Indonesian groups abroad.

When actual exchanges of resources or information, or marriages or visits —

take place across borders — between members of a diaspora themselves or
with people in the homeland — we can say these are transnational activities;
to be transnational means to belong to two or more societies at the same
time. At that moment, the diaspora functions as a transnational community.
When such exchanges do not take place (sometimes over many
generations), but people maintain identification with the homeland and co-

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ethnic elsewhere, there is only a diaspora. In this way, not all diasporas are
transnational communities, but transnational communities arise within
diasporas.

Today, technology makes it far easier for groups to function as transnational

communities for identity maintenance and political mobilization. In particular,
cheap air travel and phone calls, the internet, and satellite television have
made staying in touch affordable. Indeed, the proliferation of websites
testifies to the strength of “digital diasporas” supporting common interests
and identity.

Diasporic identifications may be multiple, too, depending on the criteria used.

The same individual may consider herself to be part of a global Hindu
population or a dispersed community of Swaminarayanis (sect), Indians
(nation-state), Gujaratis (state or language), Patidars or Patels (caste and
sub-caste), Suratis (dialect and region) or villagers. These do not rule each
other out. Moreover, any one such dimension of identity may be dormant or
active transnationally.

Finally, in conceiving diasporas we should resist assumptions that views and

experiences are shared within a dispersed population despite their common
identification. This is especially the case among diasporas of people who
migrated at different historical junctures. Awkward encounters or serious
intra-diaspora conflicts tend to arise as new waves of migrants meet people
of previous waves who preserve bygone traditions or who left with greatly
differing political views and circumstances. Vehemently anti-Castro, pre-1962
Cuban émigrés may clash with Cuban migrants who are “children of the
Revolution”. Sometimes, there is a lack of communication and interaction
when an earlier wave of migrants comes from a different social or economic
class than a later wave. For example, a previous generation of migrants may
have had very limited communication with, or knowledge about recent
events in, the homeland although they still have ethnic pride. They may have

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little in common with a fresh wave of highly politicized refugees or exiles who
are wholly absorbed with cultural and political changes in the homeland.
Conversely, to the embarrassment or dismay of new migrants, the well-
established diaspora communities in the destination country might promote
“long-distance nationalism” and believe in some of the most right-wing and
reactionary forms of ethnic exclusivism and patriotism.

Diaspora Politics

Political interests and activities within diasporas are certainly nothing new.
Historical studies of migrant communities indicate the considerable degree of
political engagement-from-afar evident at least 100 years ago. At present,
we can broadly observe a variety of ways — many similar to these historical
forms – in which internationally dispersed social groups mobilize and
undertake a range of electoral and non-electoral political activities.

Different diaspora-based associations may lobby host countries (to shape

policies in favour of a homeland or to challenge a homeland government),
influence homelands (through their support or opposition of governments),
give financial and other support to political parties, social movements and
civil society organizations, or sponsor terrorism or the perpetuation of violent
conflict in the homeland. Global networks of diaspora associations sometimes
engage in mass protest and consciousness-raising about homeland-related
issues. Following the 1999 capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan,
organized mass demonstrations among Kurds took place in dozens of
localities around the world, bringing Kurdish issues to worldwide attention.
Homeland nation-states themselves may reach out to engage the political
interests of diaspora populations. Making provisions for dual citizenship
and/or nationality is one way for countries to reach migrants. There is now
an upward global trend in the prevalence of dual citizenship/nationality, both
in terms of people having it and states allowing it.

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It is estimated that more than a half-million children born in the United
States each year, who are American citizens automatically, have at least one
additional nationality. Of course, many policymakers in migrant-receiving
countries are unhappy about this, believing that people should only have
allegiance to one flag and loyalty to one state. In migrant-sending countries,
sometimes dual citizenship has been difficult to push through many
governments since domestic politicians tend to see the disadvantages. They
often feel that “absentee” voting might give too much influence to people
living outside the country. Indeed, expatriate votes are of concern to many
countries with sizable diasporas. This was recently felt around the Iraqi
election in January 2005, when over one million Iraqi expats were expected
to have a major impact on results. In fact, only a quarter actually registered
to vote. Other cases demonstrate how overseas nationals may return home
en masse to participate in elections, which has happened in Turkey and
Israel, sometimes with political parties paying for flights. Migrants also may
vote in large numbers at overseas embassies, as during recent Indonesian
and Algerian elections.

The weight of diaspora interests and support sometimes leads to special

forms of representation in governments or indeed special ministries for
diasporas. A prime illustration of diasporic political payoff occurred in 1990
when Croatians abroad donated $4 million towards the election campaign of
Fanjo Tudjman and were subsequently rewarded with representation in
parliament: 12 of 120 seats were allotted to diaspora Croats — more than
allotted to Croatia’s own ethnic minorities.

The money diaspora populations send home is highly sought by many

countries (developing or not). Hence, numerous governments now offer to
their nationals abroad special foreign currency accounts, incentives or bonds
for expat investment, customs or import incentives, special property rights,
or privileged access to special economic zones.

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In order both to keep the diaspora politically interested as well as to sustain
financial flows, politicians in countries of emigration often invoke solidarity
among their expatriate nationals. This was exemplified in 1990 when Irish
President Mary Robinson proclaimed herself leader of the extended Irish
family abroad. During Vincente Fox’s campaigning among Mexicans in
California in2000, he similarly played upon the broader boundaries of an
imagined nation by declaring he would be the first president “to govern for
118 million Mexicans” — including 100 million in Mexico and 18 million living
outside the country. And in his inaugural speech in 2002, Kenyan president
Mwai Kibaki appealed to all Kenyans abroad “to join us in nation-building.”

Nation-Building and Wrecking

History provides many examples of nation-creation projects fashioned in

exile; Garibaldi, Lenin, Gandhi, and Ho Chi Min all spent time abroad.
Leaders of several “stateless diasporas” — Kurds, Kashmiris, and Sri Lankan
Tamils among them — struggle towards such projects today. Diasporas play
an increasingly significant part in the development of nation-building in poor
countries and in ones which have undergone major transformation, such as
Eastern European and former Soviet states. This is due to a number of
factors, including access to economic resources, greater ease in
communication and travel, and the large number of expatriate professionals
and entrepreneurs who have skills and experience to offer.

The foremost means of diasporic nation-building comes through individual

remittances, followed by hometown associations and charitable initiatives
that directly affect economic development, poverty reduction, and capacity
building. Governments of migrant-sending and receiving countries,
international agencies, and academics are now paying considerable attention
to the relationship between diasporas and development.

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Another, related field gaining notice concerns the potential diasporas have for
reducing brain drain in developing countries. Innovative national and
international programmes for “tapping the diaspora” have been put in place
so that home countries can access expatriate expertise, knowledge, and
experience (as well as to external networks for trade, communications and
technological development). One of the best known is the UN Development
Program’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN),
which began in Turkey in the 1970s and is now established in some 50
countries. The program supports thousands of emigrant nationals with
professional expertise to return to their countries of origin and work for a few
weeks or months, though some choose to stay longer.

Another mode of nation-building, or at least maintenance, comes through

disaster relief. There are many examples of substantial aid flowing from
diasporas following catastrophes such as Hurricane Mitch in Central America
in 1998 and the earthquakes in Turkey in 1999 and in Gujarat in 2001.
Diaspora groups relevant to areas throughout the Indian Ocean responded
generously to the December 2004 tsunami, as mentioned earlier. Yet even
where such humanitarian responses arise, corrosive diaspora politics may be
present. According to reports, diaspora aid to Gujarat after the 2001
earthquake served to sustain anti-Muslim pogroms. There have been claims
that various Tamil organizations collected money for Sri Lankan tsunami
victims that was in fact used for weapons and materials for the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Diasporas can also actively be involved in nation-wrecking when there is

violence and war in the homeland. Diasporic groups have played major roles
in fomenting and supporting conflict in places as diverse as Ethiopia, Kosovo,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Kashmir, Israel, and Palestine. Financial support may
flow from various parts of a diaspora to insurrectionist groups or a particular
government’s efforts to eradicate them. When this is an inter-ethnic conflict,
two or more diasporas might be pitted against each other, as was evident in

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the break-up of Bosnia. Diasporas may take part in efforts to resolve conflict
and to sustain post-conflict reconstruction, such as in Eritrea and Sri Lanka.
But with the money they send home, they can increase the risk of renewed
conflict in the years immediately following an upheaval, according to a World
Bank Report.

Conclusion

Even though they reside outside of their or their parents’ home countries’
borders, many people regard themselves as legitimate members of its
collective identity and socio-political order. But diasporic identities and
activities tend to have differential implications for homelands and host
countries. For host countries, the dual political loyalties suggested by
diasporas may raise fears of mobilized fifth columns, “enemies within,” and
terrorist sleeper cells. Such suspicions can feed into racism and other forms
of discrimination.

A further question with social and policy importance arises in host countries:
does diasporic attachment — passive or active — hinder immigrant
integration? Some argue that immigrants will never truly integrate if they are
constantly looking “back home.” Others say that only by maintaining strong
ethnic and transnational bonds can migrants build the confidence they need
to successfully incorporate themselves.

With regard to their national diasporas, homelands certainly want money and
may appreciate lobbying, but they may resent too much political
involvement. That is why some offer limited forms of dual nationality without
extending too much by way of voting and parliamentary representation.

With regard to all these dimensions of diasporic political impact, diversity

within diasporas must be stressed. In any case of lobbying, charitable
donation, or conflict support, “the diaspora” rarely acts as one. Most

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diasporas, whether based on ethno-linguistic or national criteria, include
opposing factions and dissenting voices. These, however, are often muffled
by better organized, networked, and financed actors, who are often the ones
pushing nationalist or ethnic agendas.

Diasporas powerfully embody broader trends in the changing nature of

nation-states. Today, national/ethnic identification, political community, and
place of residence do not automatically fit together neatly. Instead, migrants
have multiple attachments that modern technology has facilitated. Their
political identities and practices are shaped between and within the contexts
of both migrant homelands and host societies. This is an irreversible trend
that policymakers should be conscious of when reconsidering any
adjustments to immigration and integration policies. We cannot expect
today’s migrants simply to cut their roots.

Sources

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