M03ACS2 Field Fortification

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMBAT ENGINEER INSTRUCTION COMPANY
MARINE CORPS ENGINEER SCHOOL
PSC BOX 20069
CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA 28542-0069

FIELD FORTIFICATONS
C-41D02

Student Outline
11/02/22

Combat Engineer Course NCO Course

M03ACS2

APPROVED BY ________________________________ DATE ____________

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Topic Page
Analyze the Mission 4

Develop Products to support 11

Submit Required Forms/Reports 40

Analyze Survivability Requirements 43

Determine Resources to construct Survivability Positions 50

Plan Blast Mitigation Measures 50

Obstacle Siting and Survivability Positions 89

Plan Entry Control Point (ECP) 82

Plan Signature Management 85

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Terminal Learning Objective

Given a mission, commander’s intent, and identified threat, design a Survivability position to enable
friendly forces t withstand hostile actions, non-hostile actions, or environmental conditions while retaining
the ability to fulfill the primary mission. (1371-SURV-2001)

Given a mission, commander’s intent, IPB products, map, and materials, prepare an obstacle plan to
prevent enemy from gaining a position of advantage and shape enemy movement/maneuver to support
the company concept of operations. (1371-CMOB-2001)

Enabling Learning Objectives

Given a scenario, map, and references, analyze the mission to identify obstacle(s) required to support the
commander’s plan while not hindering friendly mobility. (1371-CMOB-2001a)

Given a scenario, map, and references, develop products to support obstacle construction that supports
the commander’s plan within the time allotted. (1371-CMOB-2001b)

Given a scenario, map, and references, submit required forms/reports to maintain supported units
situational awareness and request required support for obstacle construction. (1371-CMOB-2001c)

Given a scenario, map, resources, and references, analyze survivability requirements to withstand hostile
actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill the primary mission. (1371-SURV-
2001a)

Given a scenario, map, resources, and references, determine resources to construct survivability
positions that withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions. (1371-SURV-2001b)

Given a requirement, and references, plan blast mitigation measures to support defensive positions in
withstanding enemy threat actions in accordance with the reference. (1371-SURV-2001c)

Given a requirement, and references, plan entry control points (ECP) to support defensive/survivability
measures against enemy threat and allow friendly access into controlled areas in accordance with the
references. (1371-SURV-2001d)

Given a requirement, and references, plan signature mitigation/deception measures to support

survivability operations in accordance with the references. (1371-SURV-2001e)

Given a scenario, map, resources, and references, submit required forms/reports to capture resources
required for construction and to illustrate the survivability positions. (1371-SURV-2001F)

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ANALYZE THE MISSION

Countermobility operations are planned by incorporating the obstacle employment principles within the
planning process. The engineer is the primary integrator for countermobility operations. Countermobility
requirements and the tasks necessary to fulfill them are synchronized primarily through integrating pro-
cesses and continuing activities.

Problem Framing
Upon receipt of the mission, the engineer gathers existing geospatial information and geospatial products
for the area of operations and the area of interest. Products may include standard products (maps and
studies, reports) and tailored products (mobility corridors, combined obstacle overlays). The engineer
also gathers available intelligence products on enemy mobility capabilities (ways and means), threat pat-
terns, and any available information on existing natural and man-made obstacles.

The engineer running estimate/staff estimate is the primary source of information about friendly counter-
mobility capabilities. Such capabilities are primarily a function of the availability and status of the Class
IV/V obstacle material, engineer units, obstacle emplacement equipment and systems, and time. Engi-
neers use this information and planning factors to develop a rough estimate of the linear obstacle effort
that is possible. This estimate provides the basis for generating feasible obstacle plans to support each
COA.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)

As part of IPB, which begins during mission analysis/problem framing and continues throughout the oper-
ations process, the staff focuses on understanding the terrain and the enemy and on determining where
to reinforce the terrain to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. Commanders and
staffs analyze the terrain by using the five military aspects of terrain expressed as OAKOC/KOCOA. The
staff evaluates the effects of terrain and weather on friendly countermobility and enemy mobility capabili-
ties. The engineer staff officer coordinates with the G-2/S-2 for geospatial engineering support in analyz-
ing the terrain and generating geospatial information and the corresponding terrain visualization products
to help form the mobility portion of the COP (real-time MCOO).

The engineer develops an understanding of enemy mobility capabilities (ways and means) to forecast
specific enemy mobility actions by analyzing;
 Vehicle and equipment performance characteristics.
 Enemy engineering units (manpower, equipment, and materials).
 Threat patterns.
 Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
 Support mechanisms in consideration of terrain effects and available resources to forecast spe-
cific enemy mobility actions.

During mission analysis and the initial IPB, the engineer attempts to;
 Determine where reinforcing obstacles can be maximized based on existing natural and man-
made obstacles.
 Identify and assess enemy mobility capabilities (strengths and vulnerabilities) based on vehicle
and equipment performance characteristics and the effects of terrain based on weather.
 Identify emerging threats and TTP.
 Predict enemy mobility intentions and actions.
 Determine and prioritize information requirements that are fulfilled through information collection,
including engineer reconnaissance, geospatial intelligence, requests for information, and reach-
back.
 Identify enemy mobility HVTs, and recommend high-payoff targets (HPTs).

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Evaluating Terrain
 Large Rivers. Large non-fordable rivers are formidable obstacles because they must be crossed
by tactical bridging, swimming, ferrying, or special deep water fording. The width, depth, velocity,
turbulence, bank and bottom conditions, rapid tactical bridging available and existing bridges de-
termine the ease of crossing
these rivers. If a river is slow-
moving, it is usually because it
is a major river in a valley.
Mountainous areas are often
subject to heavy precipitation,
in the form of rain or snow.
Abrupt temperature changes or
heavy precipitation, particularly
during short periods, can dra-
matically increase water cur-
rent in mountain streams and
rivers.

 Small Rivers, Streams, and Canals. Minor fordable rivers, streams, and canals are much more
numerous than major rivers, and their tactical value as obstacles should not be overlooked.
These features are variable in ef-
fectiveness as obstacles. Careful
planning is required to integrate
them into the obstacle system.
Watercourses frequently constitute
elongated obstacles in terrain that
may otherwise be excellent for
movement. Drainage also influ-
ences the orientation of the road
net and the direction of movement
in an area. The destruction of a
few selected bridges can force
cross-country movement or long
detours. During floods, minor
rivers and streams can become
major obstacles. They can cause conditions, which extend the obstacle effect for a considerable
period by damaging temporary and expedient bridges, and by deepening the original channel of
the river or stream, making ingress or egress difficult or impossible. Streams or drainage ditches
that appear insignificant on a 1:50,000-scale tactical map may be of significant value in canalizing
or slowing enemy movement. They are easily reinforced and can be integrated into the overall
obstacle plan with only small amounts of effort expended. A stream is a minor hindrance when a
ford is available and usable with little or no improvement. A stream is a major hindrance if a suit-
able ford is lacking, or if fording requires considerable preparation of approaches, reinforcement
of bottoms, or the use of special equipment on vehicles. The significant characteristics of
streams are:

o Width of Channel. Channels that are three meters and wider are effective such as gul-
lies, ditches, and ravines.

o Depth of Water. For fording, the permissible maximum depth of water for most tanks is
between 0.9 to 1.5 meters (3 to 5 feet). However some vehicles can be equipped with
deep water fording devices that will enable them to cross water bodies as deep as 4.3
meters (14 feet).

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

o Velocity of Water. Stream velocities of 1.5 meters (5 feet) per second or less are reason-
ably safe for fording.

o Nature of bottom. Often, a ford may be negotiated with minor difficulty by the first few ve-
hicles, but the ones remaining will be unable to cross because bottom conditions or ap-
proaches have deteriorated with use. The bottom of stream channels must be firm
enough to support vehicles. Bottoms made up of fine-grained material can prevent ford-
ing even though the water may be only a few inches deep. Suitable bottoms are re-
stricted to those that are sandy, gravelly, or rocky; but sandy bottoms may give way un-
der the weight of vehicles or boulders may prevent vehicular movement.

o Banks. Hard, vertical banks will be obstacles to tanks, if bank height exceeds 1.5 meters
(5 feet). Greater heights can be tolerated if the vehicles can get adequate traction or if
assistance (such as winching) is used. The type of material composing the banks may
be significant. Banks made up of fine-grained soils may fail under repeated traffic.
Sandy and gravelly materials usually provide adequate strength and durability.

o Ford-ability. Fording of a stream expresses how easily it may be crossed without the
means of bridging or ferrying. In arid regions, dry stream channels may be preferred av-
enues for movement during periods of little or no flow. However, there may be quicksand
or other soft places where vehicles bog down; there is also the danger of flash floods.
Crossing Wadi’s during certain times of the year is dangerous.

 Lakes. Large lakes make excellent obstacles. They are usually unable to ford, unable to be
bridged, and must be bypassed. Amphibious vehicles or boats can cross; beach and underwater
obstacles should be used to discourage enemy crossing efforts.

 Swamps, Marshes, and Bogs. Wetlands severely restrict mobility and, force the canalization of
vehicular movement onto causeways. They also greatly increase vulnerability to air attack, ar-
tillery, or direct fire weapons. Historically swamps have been avoided by attacking armies.

 Slopes. Slope is the inclined surface of a hill, mountain, ridge, or any other part of the earth's
land surface. In mountainous areas, the steep slopes commonly make cross-country vehicular
movement either difficult or impossible. Movement will be channelized by existing terrain. The
amount of slope is usually expressed as a percentage, which is the number of meters of elevation
difference per 100 meters of horizontal distance. Most military vehicles are able to climb slopes
of 60% (about 30° to 35°) under optimum conditions. This limit, however, is too great to negotiate
in military operations. When evaluating terrain for cross-country movement, 45% (about 27°) is
commonly used as the reasonable upper limit for tanks. Wet weather, trees, unfavorable soil
conditions, snow, boulders, and the employment of reinforcing obstacles may make gentle slopes

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

impassable. Topographic maps are useful, but some features may not be shown (such as small
gullies). The most reliable information on slopes, particularly short, steep ones, is obtained by
on-site reconnaissance. Engineer Reconnaissance is the best overall source of up-to-date infor-
mation to determine slope and other terrain information if an on-site reconnaissance is not possi-
ble.

 Vegetation. Vegetation includes not only natural, wild vegetation, but also cultivated forests and
crops. Forest vegetation is the primary concern in cross-country movement. Trees are the princi-
pal obstacles of movement. Although high grass and brush can obstruct vision, they are of rela-
tively little significance in most cases. Nearly all forests have a slowing effect on movement.

o The problem is to determine

whether a particular forest will
slow movement slightly, drasti-
cally, or stop it altogether. Tem-
perate-zone forests tend to canal-
ize movement since the roads,
trails, and firebreaks through them
provide the only means for rapid
movement. Reinforcing obstacles
readily strengthen the defensive
value of woods, and are placed
both outside and inside the
wooded area to delay the advance
of the enemy and better use sup-
porting fires.

o Tree size and density, soil condition, slope, and the depth of forests contribute to their ob-
stacle value. Forests with trees 20 to 25 centimeters (7 to 10 inches) in diameter are
tank obstacles and 5-centimeter (2 inch) stands will stop most wheeled vehicles. Fully
dependable criteria pertaining to the size of trees, and the significance of species and
root systems, have not been determined. Medium tanks, for example, have pushed over
single trees as much as 30 centimeters (12 inches) in diameter. Overturning trees within
stands can also create complications; for example, if several trees are pushed over,
some will interlock with other trees to form a more difficult obstacle to movement. The
protruding root system and trunks of overturned trees are obstacles to vehicles. The criti-
cal average distance between trees in forests, where the trees are too big to be pushed
over is about 3 to 5 meters (10 to 15 feet), depending on whether the trees are regularly
or irregularly planted. Although this distance may be wide enough for the vehicle to pass
through, in most cases there is no room for turning. Trees blow down during nuclear at-
tack will present significant mobility problems. Forested areas, which have been affected
by blast, will be impassable to tracked and wheeled vehicles.

 Climate. Climate and weather both significantly affect cross-country movement, although
their effects are usually indirect, and their influence is variable in duration and difficult to
predict. Climatic influences are usually reflected in the nature of the terrain and obsta-
cles. To a large extent, climate controls soil moisture and soil strengths. It also deter-
mines basic river and stream characteristics. Some easily overlooked direct effects of cli-
mate are important. Fog and haze, common in some areas, significantly affect weapons
employment and can retard or even prevent movement. Dust storms and snowstorms
have a similar effect.

o Snow. Snow is a hindrance and hazard to wheeled vehicles, as most will become immo-
bilized when the depth of the snow reaches one third of the tires diameter. Snow re-
duces slope climbing ability, maximum payload capacity, maneuverability and speed at
all vehicle operations. Melting snow may cause high water downstream even in regions

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

where rainfall is low. During the Soviet-Afghan war, snow would impede the pace of the
Soviet buildup and subsequent deployments, but it would also hamper the mobility of
rebel forces.

o Ice. Continuous below-freezing weather can reduce stream flow even though precipita-
tion may be high. In winter, ice may be strong enough to support vehicles; then, instead
of being obstacles, water bodies may become the preferred avenues for movement.
Movement on ice is risky because of weaknesses caused by water flowing from springs
and other areas of swiftly moving water.

 Cultural. Cultural features are constructed works such as stonewalls, hedgerows, dikes, canals,
drainage ditches, embankments, cuts, fills, and built-up areas, as well as damaged or abandoned
vehicles and mobile equipment. Some of these features are considered under the slope factor,
some under streams, and some (such as built-up areas) are frequently not evaluated in cross-
country movement studies. Cultural features are treated as a separate factor to ensure that they
are not overlooked in evaluating terrain for cross-country movement. The obstacle value of a cul-
tural feature depends on its size or extent, location, and construction. Although most of the minor
cultural features can be interpreted from aerial photographs, and many may be shown on topo-
graphic maps, the dimensions of the features, which directly affect cross-country trafficability, are
difficult or impossible to determine from photographs and maps. Thus, cultural-feature informa-
tion that may be most relevant to cross-country movement is frequently available only through
over-the-ground reconnaissance or from terrain teams.

o Man-Made Lakes, Ponds, Canals, and Paddy Fields.

 Man-made lakes and ponds are made by water accumulating in reservoirs.

These were originally built for farming, but now have different uses such as stor-
ing water for towns/cities and fire protection. There are two general types: exca-
vated and embanked.

 Excavated ponds or lakes are mostly used where the existing ground is flat.
They are constructed by digging a pit below the surrounding ground level and
runoff or groundwater maintains the water supply.

 Embankment ponds are more common and used where the topography is mod-
erately steep and the bottom is relatively flat. They are constructed by emplacing
a dam so the water is impounded behind it.

 Canals are artificial channels for water. There are two types: aqueduct and wa-
terway. Aqueduct canals are used for the conveyance and delivery of water,
while waterways are navigable transportation canals used for passage of goods
and people, often connected to existing lakes, rivers, or oceans.

 Paddy fields are a flooded parcel of land used for growing rice and other semi-
aquatic crops. Paddy fields can be found in East Asia, South Asia, Cambodia,
Bangladesh, China, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet-
nam. Other regions include Italy, France, and Haiti.

o Quarries. A quarry is a type of open pit mine from which rock or mineral was/is extracted.
They are generally used for extracting building materials (aggregate, riprap, sand, and
gravel).

o Cuts and Fills on Roads, Railroads, and Dams.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

o Seeded Forests and Hedgerows. Hedgerows are a line of closely spaced shrubs and
tree species, planted and trained in such a way as to form a barrier or to mark the bound-
ary of an area. They can be used to separate a road, fields, or other property.

o Buildings, Religious Sites, Fences, Towns, and Urban Areas. Certain buildings may be
significant to a population. These could be the communities gathering place for worship,
a town center, or historical area. All should be taken into account. Large cities and
towns that have many masonry buildings located astride principal communication routes
can become obstacles of considerable importance because they can be reduced to rub-
ble and restrict enemy movement. Even if gaps are cleared through the rubble and de-
bris, movement is still canalized. The natural obstacle value of built-up areas can be
readily reinforced, and those properly located to control approaches or key terrain can be
developed into formidable strong points.

Information Requirements
Information requirements that are important to the commander are nominated as commander’s critical in-
formation requirements (CCIRs). Some examples of countermobility-related information requirements in-
clude;
 Enemy obstacle reduction capabilities and TTP.
 Composition, capabilities, and strength of enemy engineer units.
 Operational status and location of selected friendly countermobility assets (friendly-force informa-
tion requirements).
 Details about existing natural and man-made obstacles, to include identifying potential enemy
points of breach and bypass.

Obtaining information on existing obstacles may require a combination of information collection assets.
Committing engineers or specific engineer reconnaissance teams as part of the reconnaissance effort can
improve the technical information collection on obstacles. Engineers can provide technical insight on the
restrictive nature of an obstacle and the ease of breaching or bypassing potential reinforcing obstacles at
a particular location. Any unknowns about the enemy mobility effort become information requirements
(possibly priority intelligence requirements) and are synchronized and integrated into the information col-
lection plan.

Situation Template
During the initial IPB that occurs during mission analysis/problem framing, a situation template is devel-
oped for each enemy COA to graphically depict the expected disposition of enemy forces based on threat
templates and the effects of the operational environment. The engineer is the staff expert on enemy mo-
bility capabilities and terrain visualization and works together with the G-2/S-2 and other staff members in
templating enemy AAs based on enemy mobility capabilities and terrain and weather effects.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Sample Adversary Situational Template

Commander’s Intent and Countermobility Tasks

As part of mission analysis/problem framing, the staff analyzes the unit mission, commander’s intent,
scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver, and scheme of protection/scheme of force
protection two levels up to identify specified and implied countermobility tasks. Each staff section may
generate countermobility requirements as a result of analyzing the situation from its own perspective.
The staff engineer focuses on the higher headquarters scheme of engineer support and obstacle plan, in-
cluding overlays and execution matrixes, to identify countermobility requirements or tasks. From these
tasks, combined with the maneuver commander’s guidance, the staff collectively develops recommended
essential tasks for countermobility.

 Specified Tasks
Specified tasks are specifically stated in the higher headquarters’ order or plan. They will be found in
the mission statement, unit task statements, or coordinating instructions.

 Implied Tasks
Implied tasks are those tasks NOT specifically stated in the order or plan, but are required in the
course of the operation. They are deduced from the Commander’s intent, coordinating instructions,
and the estimate of the situation.

 Essential Tasks
Essential countermobility tasks are those tasks that the unit must conduct to meet the commander’s
intent and accomplish the mission. The staff determines obvious shortfalls in countermobility assets
(including units, Class IV/V obstacle material, and special equipment) based on the current task orga-

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

nization and initiates requests for augmentation as early in the planning phase as possible to facilitate
early movement and the timely arrival and linkup of augmenting units. The staff makes assumptions
on expected augmentation to facilitate the continuation of planning. A fully developed, essential
countermobility task has a task and purpose. Table 3-2 shows sample essential countermobility
tasks.

MCTP 3-34B, Table 3-2 Sample essential countermobility tasks

Engagement Areas (EA), Unit Positions, and Obstacle Siting

The Engagement Area (EA) development process provides added focus on planning and preparing for a
specific engagement. Obstacle siting confirms or modifies the exact location and design for each planned
obstacle based on the actual terrain and the refinement of the observation and fire plan that occurs at the
lowest level. Because of their interdependence, obstacle emplacement and fighting position construction
are completed concurrently. Once the maneuver commander decides how the enemy will attack and
where to mass fires to accomplish the tactical task, tentative locations for obstacles and weapon systems
can be determined. The positioning of obstacles and weapon systems are interdependent and must be
planned and refined in unison. Effective obstacle siting relies on collaboration between the emplacing
unit leader (typically an engineer), the fire support team, and the responsible maneuver company com-
mander to ensure that the combination of fires and obstacles will achieve the intended effect. Obstacle
siting ensures that each individual obstacle or obstacle group is;

 Properly oriented in relation to an actual mobility corridor.

 Tied into the natural restrictiveness of the terrain.
 Able to be covered by fire to achieve the desired effect.
 Positioned on suitable terrain that allows for obstacle emplacement and proper obstacle perfor-
mance.

DEVELOP PRODUCTS
Commanders reinforce the terrain to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. To be able
to maintain control and provide a common operational picture, commanders require specific products to
be produced by engineers to show obstacle intents, obstacle types, locations, materials, time and man-
power or equipment commitments required to achieve the desired results. To be able to provide the
needed information, an engineer must possess the requisite knowledge on the Obstacle Employment
Principles, Obstacle Intents, Obstacle Classification, and obstacle construction/estimations.

Obstacle Employment Principles

The basic employment principles for reinforcing obstacles are; Support the maneuver commander’s plan,
Integrate with observation and fires, Integrate with other obstacles, Employ in depth, and Employ for sur-
prise. These principles are considered regardless of the type of operation being conducted.
Support the Maneuver Commander’s Plan
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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Reinforcing obstacles must be planned and emplaced to support the maneuver commander’s plan, while
not hindering friendly-force mobility. Obstacle plans are developed based on a thorough understanding of
the commander’s intent and concept of operations, enemy mobility capabilities, and the effects of the nat-
ural terrain and existing obstacles. Only then can the true value of integrating obstacles, observation,
fires, and maneuver be realized. Obstacle control is essential in supporting the maneuver commander’s
plan. Commanders should be aware of other forces operating in and around their operational area and
ensure that their plans are integrated with all units and forces in the area. Conventional land forces and
special operations forces may be operating in proximity to each other to accomplish the joint force com-
mander’s mission. These two forces can assist and complement each other with mutual support so they
can achieve an objective, which might not otherwise be attainable. These operations require integration
and synchronization to avoid interference in each other’s missions. In this respect, control measures take
on an added significance. Exchanging liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional
and special operations forces further enhances integration.

Integrate With Observation and Fires

The primary purpose for integrating obstacles with fires is to enhance the effectiveness of those fires.
Obstacles and fires are interdependent in achieving the desired effects. With rare exceptions, obstacles
that are not covered by fire are little more than a nuisance to the leading elements of an attacking force.
While obstacles and fires may be observed or unobserved, the optimization of the obstacle and associ-
ated fires typically occurs when an obstacle is observed or monitored. Unmanned aircraft systems and
unattended ground sensors allow for observation of reinforcing obstacles employed remotely or beyond
the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Plans for obstacles, observation, and fires must be developed in
unison to ensure they are mutually supportive. Reinforcing obstacle employment is most effective in sup-
porting EAs, in terms of the effects achieved in relation to effort expended, where threat maneuver is al-
ready restricted and slowed by the natural terrain, thereby increasing the engagement opportunities for di-
rect and indirect fires. The maneuver commander or leader who is responsible for EA identification and
development and the supporting engineer and fire support planners work together to ensure that obsta-
cles and fires are employed to create the desired effects. The leaders on the ground and supporting
staffs must communicate throughout the siting, emplacement, and rehearsal process to ensure proper ob-
stacle integration. Leaders focus on positioning obstacles, which will complement the fires from tanks
and anti-armor missile systems at the farthest effective range based on visibility conditions. Observed in-
direct fires are also used in conjunction with obstacles against threat vehicles and personnel in the open.
Observation and the adjustment of fires are essential in maximizing the effectiveness of indirect fires. At
the same time, fires serve to protect the obstacle by making it costly to breach or bypass. Ideally, obsta-
cles are also positioned where an enemy breaching force is not offered good cover and concealment.

Integrate With Other Obstacles

Individual reinforcing obstacles are optimized when sited and designed to tie in with existing obstacles
and with each other. Taking advantage of existing obstacles reduces the assets and time needed to
rapidly establish an effective obstacle system. The effective reinforcement of existing obstacles in a por-
tion of an EA or across a defensive sector allows limited countermobility resources to be concentrated
where their capabilities can be optimized. Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with each other to ensure
that the combined effects of each individual obstacle are mutually supportive and to create the overall in-
tended effect of the obstacle system; for example, an uncoordinated concentration of individual obstacles
along the approach to an EA that is intended to disrupt the enemy may actually result in achieving an un-
intended block or turn effect, essentially defeating the purpose of the EA.

Employ in Depth
Obstacles employed in depth cause the enemy to repeatedly respond to obstacles and disrupt the timing
and tempo of an attack, tax enemy command and control, deplete obstacle reduction assets, and in-
crease exposure to fires and losses from multiple engagements that ultimately degrade the will to fight.
Obstacles must not be located so close together that only a single enemy response is required. Com-
manders’ use operational or battlespace frameworks to conceptually organize operations. Staffs use
these frameworks to help identify and analyze obstacle requirements in depth during mission analysis/
problem framing.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Employ for Surprise

Using obstacles to obtain surprise is one means that is available to the commander to retain a degree of
initiative even when defending. The SCATMINEs permit rapid obstacle emplacement throughout a unit
area of operations, confronting the attacker with a completely new situation almost instantly. The self-de-
struct feature of SCATMINE also provides surprise; for example, a friendly counterattack may be
launched through an area that was mined and then self-destructed. Other ways to achieve surprise in-
clude;

 Camouflaging obstacles or using phony obstacles to mask recognizable patterns or the extent of
the obstacle system.
 Suddenly detonating concealed obstacles in front of or within an attacking enemy formation.
 Repairing reduced obstacles between enemy echelons.

An obvious pattern of obstacles can divulge locations of units and weapons. Avoiding readily discernible,
repetitive obstacle patterns by varying the type, design, and location degrades enemy ability to predict
how friendly obstacles are employed. This complicates enemy ability to plan for and ultimately reduce ob-
stacles. The employment for surprise may also include allowing an enemy to discern actual obstacles
linked to phony obstacles as part of a deception. A good deception must also have enough reality in it to
cause the enemy to accept it as truth.

Obstacle Intent
Obstacle Intent is how the commander wants to use tactical obstacles to support his concept of opera-
tions. It consists of the following components: Target, Obstacle effect, and Relative location.

Target
Target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with tactical obstacles. The commander
usually identifies the target in terms of size and type of enemy force, the echelon, the avenue of approach
(AA), or a combination of these things. Once the target has been identified, the commander will then de-
termine the effect that he wants to achieve on that target.

Obstacle Effect
Effect is the intended effect that the commander wants the obstacles and fires to have on the enemy.
The effect drives integration, focuses subordinates’ fires, focuses obstacle effort, and multiplies the ef-
fects of firepower. It is important to remember that effects occur because of fires and obstacles, not just
obstacles alone. All tactical obstacles produce one of the following obstacle effects: Disrupt, Turn, Fix,
and Block.

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 Disrupt Effect. Disrupt focus fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its
formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit breaching assets pre-maturely, and piece-
meal the attack. It also helps to deceive the enemy concerning the location of friendly defensive
positions, to separate combat echelons, or to separate combat forces from their logistical support.
 Turn Effect. Turn integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation off one
avenue of approach to another avenue of approach or into an engagement area. Its development
requires well-defined mobility corridors and avenues of approach.

 Fix Effect. Fix focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker within a specific area,
normally an engagement area. Primary use of this effect is to give the friendly unit time to ac-
quire, target, and destroy the attacking enemy with direct and indirect fires throughout the depth
of the engagement area or avenue of approach.

 Block Effect. Block integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific
avenue of approach or prevent him from passing through an engagement area. Block effect ob-
stacles must defeat the enemy’s mounted and dismounted breaching effort. To accomplish the
block effect, the obstacles and fires must; prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching the ob-
stacles, maximize available standoff, and stop the enemy’s forward movement.

Relative Location
Relative location refers to the location of a tactical or protective obstacle in relation to maneuver or fire
control measures such as AAs, BPs, or EAs. Engineers and other countermobility planners describe

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

planned obstacle locations in relation to maneuver or fire control measures to help maneuver comman-
ders visualize linkages between obstacles, fires, and maneuver to ensure obstacle integration.

Obstacle Classification

Existing Obstacles
Existing obstacles are inherent aspects of the terrain that impede movement and maneuver. Existing ob-
stacles may be natural (rivers, mountains, wooded areas) or man-made (enemy explosive and nonexplo-
sive obstacles and structures, including bridges, canals, railroads, and embankments associated with
them). Although not specifically designed or intended as an obstacle, structures may pose as an obstacle
based on existing characteristics or altered characteristics that result from combat operations or a cata-
strophic event. Structures such as bridges and overpasses present an inherent impediment to mobility
based on weight and clearance restrictions. Existing obstacles are shown on the combined obstacle
overlay developed as part of the IPB.

Reinforcing Obstacles
Reinforcing obstacles are those man-made obstacles that strengthen existing terrain to achieve a desired
effect. For U.S. forces, reinforcing obstacles on land consist of land mines, networked munitions, demoli-
tion, and constructed obstacles;

Land mines
A land mine is a munition on or near the ground or other As of 1 January 2011,
surface area that is designed to be exploded by the pres- U.S. forces are no
ence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. Land longer authorized to
mines can be employed in quantities within a specific area employ persistent
to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to rein- (those that are not self-destructing or
force nonexplosive obstacles. Land mines fall into the two self-deactivating) or non-detectable
general categories: land mines. MCTP 3-34B

 Persistent. Persistent land mines are not capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating.

 Nonpersistent. Nonpersistent means that they are capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating

(SD). Land mines can be further defined as antivehicle or antipersonnel. They can be air-, ar-
tillery-, or ground-delivered.

o Scatterable Mines. SCATMINEs are laid without regard to classical pattern and are deliv-
ered by aircraft, helicopter, artillery, missile, or ground dispenser. SCATMINEs provide
the maneuver commander a flexible, responsive, and lethal mine-laying capability to af-
fect the enemy’s ability to maneuver. All US SCATMINEs have a limited active life and
self-destruct at a preset time. The duration of the active life depends on the type of mine
and delivery system. Scatterable mines significantly reduce manpower requirements as-
sociated with mine warfare. Scatterable mines are also smaller and lighter so they offer a
reduction in logistical requirements due to reduced bulk and weight.

 SCATMINEs are not an obstacle cure-all for inadequate tactical planning. Their
use requires extensive coordination, integration, and control. Indiscriminate use
of SCATMINEs causes a rapid depletion of valuable assets. More importantly,
the poorly planned use of SCATMINEs can impede friendly movement and cause
fratricide.

 SCATMINE systems enable a tactical commander to emplace minefields rapidly

in enemy-held territories, contaminated territories, and in most other areas where
it is impossible for engineers to emplace conventional minefields. Some systems
allow for rapid emplacement of minefields in friendly areas. Based on the tactical
plan, the maneuver commander's staff engineer determines the minefield loca-

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

tion, size, density, and emplacement and SD times. With this information and a
thorough understanding of the available systems, the engineer can then recom-
mend the type of minefield to be emplaced. When employed the SCAT-
MINEREC is used to report and record friendly scatterable minefields.

SCATMINE Report, JP 3-15

o Special-Purpose Munitions. Special-purpose munitions are hand-emplaced and used to

create an expedient obstacle, enhance existing ones, and attack specific target types.
The commander can employ these munitions to support his scheme of maneuver, to
mass firepower, and to disrupt or destroy enemy forces in depth. An example of a spe-
cial-purpose munition is the M18A1 claymore. A munition field will be recorded on a DD
Form 3007.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Networked munitions
Networked munitions is a remotely controlled, interconnected, weapons system designed to provide
rapidly emplaced ground-based countermobility and protection capability through scalable application of
lethal and nonlethal means (JP 3-15).

Demolition obstacles
Demolition obstacles are created using explosives. Examples include bridge or other structure demolition
(rubble) and road craters. (See MCTP 3-34B, appendix B for more information on demolition obstacles.)

 Craters. Craters are effective obstacles to enemy movement when constructed properly and
located at critical points along his movement route. Craters are normally placed on roads or
other high-speed movement routes the enemy is expected to use but can also be used on air-
fields, taxiways, parking areas, and railroads. They should be placed at locations that cannot
be easily bypassed such as cuts or fills. The basic purposes are to delay or stop the enemy,
cause his forces to bunch up and provide good targets, and force him to use up breaching as-

17
M03ACS2 Field Fortification

sets such as bridging and earth moving equipment. Use of antipersonnel and antitank mines
in conjunction with craters creates formidable obstacles. To be effective obstacles, craters
must be too wide to be spanned by tracked vehicles, and too deep and steep-sided for any
other vehicle to pass through them. There are three types of Road craters; Hasty, Deliberate,
and Relieved Face.

o Hasty Road Craters. A hasty road crater is emplaced when time and explosives are
limited. It is not as effective as a deliberate crater. The hasty cratering method pro-
duces a crater 6 to 7 feet deep, and 20 to 25 feet wide with side slopes of 25 to 35
degrees. This method takes the least amount of time for construction, and produces
the least effective barrier because of its depth and shape. Modern tanks require an
average of four passes to cross-hasty road craters.

o Deliberate Road Crater. This cratering method produces road craters which are
more effective than those resulting from the hasty method but require more time and
explosive. The deliberate method produces a deeper (7 to 8 feet), wider (25 feet),
and steeper-sided (30 to 37 degrees) crater than the hasty method. Modern tanks
must make an average of eight passes to cross them.

o Relieved Face Road Craters. This cratering method produces road craters that are
more effective obstacles to modern tanks than the hasty or deliberate method, but
they require still more time and explosive than the hasty or deliberate. This tech-
nique produces a trapezoidal-shaped crater about 7 feet deep and 25 to 30 feet wide
with unequal side slopes. The side nearest the enemy slopes at about 25 degrees
from the road surface to the bottom, while that on the opposite or friendly side is
about 30 to 40 degrees steep. The exact shape, however, depends on the type of
soil found in the area of operations.

 Abatis. An abatis is a vehicular obstacle constructed by falling trees on both sides of a road,
trail, gap, or defile so that they fall, interlocked, toward the expected direction of the enemy
approach. Abatis are only effective if available trees are large enough to stop the enemy
force. Abatis can be useful on roads and narrow movement routes within heavily wooded ar-
eas. Abatis can be created using demolitions or mechanical means such as large tracked ve-
hicles, winches, and chain saws.

 Bridge Destruction. The use of existing bridges is critical to the mobility of a military force, es-
pecially bridges spanning nonfordable rivers and streams. Demolishing bridges causes the
enemy to search for a suitable bypass, such as another bridge or ford site at a different loca-
tion, or expend bridging assets to maintain its momentum. For maximum effectiveness, the
gap produced should exceed the assault bridging capability of the enemy by 5 meters (16’)
(about 25 meters (82’) for planning purposes).

Constructed Obstacles
Constructed obstacles are created without the direct use of explosives. Examples include wire obstacles,
antivehicle ditches, or similar construction that typically involves the use of heavy equipment. (See MCTP
3-34B, appendix C for more information on construction obstacles.)

 Wire Entanglement. Entanglements are classified according to their use (tactical, protective, or
supplementary), their depth (belt, band, or zone), and whether fixed or portable. Wire obstacles
typically target the dismounted threat. Triple standard concertina is a common wire obstacle;
however, there are other types (such as double-apron fence, tanglefoot, and 11-row antivehicle
obstacle). A double-apron obstacle is manpower- and material-intensive, and units typically use it
only for protective obstacles for static locations. Tanglefoot obstacles work well in tall grass or
along a low-water line. An 11-row antivehicle obstacle is an extremely effective wire obstacle
against vehicles.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Use.

 Tactical. Tactical wire entanglements are sited parallel to and along the friendly
side of the final protective line. They are used to break up enemy attack forma-
tions and to hold the enemy in areas covered by the most intense defensive fire.
Tactical entanglements extend across the entire front of a position but are not
necessarily continuous. Tactical wire entanglements should be equivalent in ef-
fectiveness to three belts of 4 and 2 pace double apron fence whenever possible.

 Protective. Protective wire entanglements are located to prevent surprise as-

saults from points close to the defense area. As in the case of all antipersonnel
obstacles, they are close enough to the defense area for day and night observa-
tion and far enough away to prevent the enemy from using effectively from points
just beyond the obstacle, normally 40 to 100 meters (131 to 328 ft). Protective
wire surrounds the individual units of a command, usually the platoons, to en-
close entire defensive positions. Protective entanglements are erected around
rear-area installations in the same manner and to serve the same purpose as
protective wire around defensive positions in forward areas. Protective wire also
includes the entanglements that should be installed over the tops of installations
provided with overhead cover. Protective wire may employ any type of entangle-
ment provided its effectiveness is at least the equivalent of that of the 4 and 2
pace double apron fence.

 Supplementary. Supplementary wire entanglements in front of the forward edge

of the battle area are used to conceal the exact line of the tactical wire. To the
rear of the FEBA, supplementary wire is used to enclose the entire defensive po-
sition by connecting the protective wire entanglements. Supplementary wire en-
tanglements used to break up the line of tactical wire should be identical to the
tactical wire entanglements and constructed simultaneously with them whenever
possible. Supplementary wire should have effectiveness equivalent to that of the
type of wire it supplements. It should be equivalent to tactical wire or equivalent
to the type of protective wire being used if it connects the outer perimeters of pro-
tective wire at the flanks and rear.

 Depth. Wire entanglements are classified by depth as belts, bands, or zones.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Belt. A belt is an entanglement one fence in depth.

 Band. A band consists of two

or more belts in depth, with no
interval between them. The
belts may be fences of the
same type, or the band may be
composed to two or more
fences of different types.

 Zone. A zone consists of two

or more bands or belts in depth, with intervals between them.

 Common Fences.

 Four Strand Cattle Fence. The four-strand center section of a double apron
fence can be installed rapidly to obtain some obstacle effect, and aprons can be
added later to develop it into a double apron fence. In country where wire fences
are used by farmers, obstacles in the form of four-strand cattle fences (MCRP 3-
17A) will blend with the landscape. Their design should follow as closely as pos-
sible the local custom, usually wooden pickets at about 2 to 4 pace intervals with
four horizontal strands of barbed wire fixed to them. They should be sited along
footpaths and edges of fields or crops, where they will not look out of place. If
conditions permit, this fence may be improved by installing guy wires in the same
manner as the diagonal wires of the double apron fence. All longitudinal wires of
this fence must start and end at an anchor picket. Eight men may be employed
on short sections of this fence and up to 16 men on 300-meter (984 ft) sections.

 Double-Apron Fence. There are two types of double apron fences, the 4 and 2-
pace fence and the 6 and 3-pace fence (MCRP 3-17A). Except for picket spac-
ing, the 4 and 2 pace and the 6 and 3 pace fences are identical. A 300-meter
(984 ft) section of either type of double apron fence is a platoon task normally re-
quiring 1 hour, assuming 36 productive men per platoon.

 Triple Standard Concertina Fence. As an obstacle, in most situations, the triple

standard concertina fence is better than the double-apron fence. This consists of
two lines of concertinas serving as a base, with a third line resting on top, as
shown in MCRP 3-17A. All lines are installed with staggered joints. Each line is
completed before the next is started so that a partially completed concertina en-
tanglement presents some obstruction. It is erected quickly and is difficult to
cross, cut, or crawl through.

 11-Row Concertina Wire Roadblock. The concertina wire roadblock is a series of

barbed wire concertinas that will stop wheeled vehicles. Use a series of these
blocks placed about 10 meters (33’) apart. Wire together the ends of adjacent
coils and lightly anchor the obstacle at the sides of the road. Site the block to
achieve surprise.

 Knife Rest. The knife rest (fig. 8-33) is a portable, wooden or metal frame strung
with barbed wire. Use it wherever a readily removable barrier is needed; for ex-
ample, at lanes in wire obstacles or at roadblocks. With a metal frame, you can
use it as an effective underwater obstacle in beach defense.

 Tangle Foot. Tangle foot is used where concealment is essential and to prevent
the enemy from crawling between fences and in front of emplacements. Con-
structed with barbed wire, tangle foot is constructed at varying heights.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Construction.
MCRP 3-17A chapter 6, gives the materials and man-hours required for entanglements of
the various types. The normal sizes of work crews are given in the descriptions of the
entanglements. For each construction project, the senior noncommissioned officer di-
vides his crew into groups of approximately equal size, based on his knowledge of the
skill and speed of each man. He organizes them in such a way the construction pro-
ceeds in proper order and at a uniform rate. Each individual must know exactly what his
group is to do and his job in the group. Each man should have barbed wire gauntlets.
The sequence of operations for each fence is given in the paragraph describing the erec-
tion of the fence. The sequence that is outlined should be followed, and as experience is
gained, the size and composition of the groups may vary. For each section of entangle-
ment, all fence-building operations normally proceed from right to left, as one faces the
enemy. It may, however, be necessary to work from left to right, and men should, if time
permits, be taught to work in either direction. In case of heavy casualties, the senior offi-
cer or NCO will decide what wires, if any, are to be omitted.

 At Night. For night construction the following additional preparations are made.
Tracing tape should be laid from the materials dump to the site of work and then
along the line of fence where possible. Materials should be tied together in man
loads and pickets bundled tightly to prevent rattling. Wire fastenings or wire coils
and pickets should be removed and replaced with string which can be broken
easily. A piece of tape should be tied to the ends of the wire on each reel or bob-
bin.

 In Combat Areas. When working in close proximity to the enemy, the necessary
precautions include:

1. Provision of security around the work party.

2. Silence.
3. No working on enemy side of fence unless absolutely necessary.
4. Use of screw pickets, if available.
5. Men not working should lie down near start of work until they can con-
tinue their work.
6. Individual weapons must be kept nearby at all times.

 Supervision. Proper supervision of entanglement construction includes the following:

 Proper organization of the work into tasks.

 Ensure the tasks are carried out in the proper sequence.
 Prevention of bunching and overcrowding of personnel.
 Ensure the wires are tightened properly and spaced correctly.
 Checking ties to see that they are being made correctly and at the right points.

 Wire estimation. Barbed wire obstacles are constructed primarily from issued materials,
thus, both logistical and construction estimates are involved. Table 6-1 (MCRP 3-17A)
gives weights, lengths, and other data required for estimating truck transportation and
carrying requirements. Table 6-2 (MCRP 3-17A/ MCRP 3-17A) gives the material and la-
bor requirements for construction of various wire entanglements.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Table 6-2 (MCRP 3-17A) gives estimates for a 300-meter section of entanglements and weights of mate-
rial per linear meter of entanglement.

 Type of Entanglement. There are several types of wire entanglements in this

section.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Pickets. Pickets are broken down into Long, Medium, and Short. See Notes
Section.

 Reels of Barbed Wire. This takes into account the U-Shaped Pickets and
Wooden Pickets that were described above. See Notes Section.

 Number of General Purpose Barbed Tape Obstacle. See Notes Section.

 Number of Concertinas. This refers to how much Concertina Wire is to be used

for the individual Obstacle.

 Staples. Improvised staples about 45 centimeters long (17-18 inches) and made
of 1.25 centimeter (.5 inches) drift pins or similar material are used to fasten the
bottoms of the concertina fences securely to the ground.

 Man Hours to Erect. See Notes Section.

 KG of Materials per Linear Meter of Entanglement. See Notes Section.

NOTE: To convert kilograms to pounds divide kilograms by 0.4536 or multiply kilograms by

2.2046.

Example #1.

You are given an area that needs wire obstacles emplaced. You’re tasked with constructing a 200 meter
belt of Triple-Standard Concertina wire. U-Shaped pickets are available. The construction will be com-
pleted in daylight hours with an experienced crew, 13 man squad (12 effective Marines). You will have 7-
Ton MTVR’s in support of you to transport material. (Use Table 6-2 on page 6-2 of the MCRP 3-17A)

Sections

Determine the number of 300 meter sections by dividing length required in meters by 300m.

200 meters ÷ 300 meters = .66

Pickets

For a 300 meter section, you will need 160 long pickets and 4 short pickets. This has to be converted to
200 meters.

160 x .66 = 105.6 round up to 106 Long Pickets

Note #8 = 4 Short Pickets

Reels of Barbed Wire

For a 300 meter section, you will need 3 reels of barbed wire. This has to be converted to 200 meters.

3 x .66 = 1.98 round up to 2 Reels of Barbed Wire

Number of General Purpose Barbed Tape Obstacle (GPBTO)

None

Number of Concertina

For a 300 meter section, you will need 59 rolls of Concertina. This has to be converted to 200 meters.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

59 x .66 = 38.94 round up to 39 Rolls of Concertina

Staples

For a 300 meter section, you will need 317 Staples. This has to be converted to 200 meters.

317 x .66 = 209.22 round up to 210 Staples

Man Hours to Erect

For a 300 meter section, it will take 30 man hours. This has to be converted to 200 meters.

30 x .66 = 19.8 Man Hours

19.8 x .67 (Note 2 for experienced crew) = 13.26 round up to 14 Man Hours

For a 13 Man Squad (–Squad Leader) = 12 effective Marines

13.26 ÷ 12 = 1.1 Hours for Engr Squad

KG of Materials per Linear Meter of Engagement

200 meters x 8.2 = 1640 kg

1640 ÷ 0.4536 = 3615.52 lb

3615.52 ÷ 14,000 lb (weight of 7 ton load) = .25 = 1 MTVR

Task Completed: You will need 1 MTVR for moving your material to the selected site. For your material,
you require 106 Long Pickets, 4 Short Pickets, 2 Reels of Barbed Wire, 39 Rolls of Concertina, and 210
Staples. It will take you 14 hours to complete the task by yourself or 1.1 hours with your Squad.

STUDENT NOTE

Complete example 2.

Example #2.

You are given an area that needs wire obstacles emplaced. You’re tasked with constructing a 500 meter
belt of Low Wire, 4 & 2 pace obstacle. U-Shaped pickets are available. The construction will be com-
pleted at night time with an inexperienced crew, 13 man squad (12 effective Marines). You will have 7-
Ton MTVR’s in support of you to transport material. (Use Table 6-2 on page 6-2 of the MCRP 3-17A)

Sections

Determine the number of 300 meter sections by dividing length required in meters by 300m.

______ meters ÷ ________ meters = __________

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Pickets

For a 300 meter section, you will need 100 medium pickets and 200 short pickets. This has to be con-
verted to 500 meters.

_____ x _____ = _______ Medium Pickets

_____ x _____ = _______ Short Pickets

Reels of Barbed Wire

For a 300 meter section, you will need 11 reels of barbed wire. This has to be converted to 500 meters.

________ x _______ = _________ round up to _______ Reels of Barbed Wire

Number of General Purpose Barbed Tape Obstacle

None

Number of Concertina

None
Staples

None

Man Hours to Erect

For a 300 meter section, it will take 59 man hours. This has to be converted to 500 meters.

_________ x _________ = _________ Man Hours

_________ x _________ (Note 2 for night time work) = ___________ = __________ Man Hours

For a 13 Man Squad (–Squad Leader) = 12 effective Marines

___________ ÷ 12 = ___________ Hours for Engr Squad

KG of Materials per Linear Meter of Engagement

___________ meters x _________ = ___________ kg

__________ ÷ __________ = ____________ lb

__________ ÷ ___________ lb (weight of 7 ton load) = _______ = ______ MTVR

Task Completed: You will need ________ MTVR for moving your material to the selected site.
For your material, you require _________Medium Pickets
_____________ Short Pickets
_____________ Reels of Barbed Wire
It will take you _____________ hours to complete the task by yourself or ________
hours with your Squad.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Anti-vehicle (Tank) Ditches. Anti-vehicle (tank) ditches are one way to degrade an attacking
force's speed and mobility. They impede the advance by slowing vehicles and confusing the
crews.

 Employment. Construction of anti-vehicle (tank) ditches is time and equipment intensive

so, the shortest anti-vehicle (tank) ditch or ditch system possible should be used. An
Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch alone is not an adequate obstacle and will not stop a determined
attacker. Maximum use should be made of the terrain. Anti-vehicle (tank) ditches should
complement existing obstacles to include:

 Slopes greater than 35 degrees.

 Steps over 1.5 meter high.
 Ravines, gullies, and ditches wider than 3 meters.
 Swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep.
 Forests having trees over 8 inches in diameter.
 Forests having 15 degrees slopes and trees over 4 inches in diameter.
 Built-up areas.

 Additional procedures to increase ditch effectiveness are to:

 Locate the Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch within the optimum effective range of antitank
weapons from covered and concealed firing positions.

 Pre-plan artillery and air strikes in anti-vehicle (tank) ditch area. Artillery and air
strikes force the enemy to button up while attempting to breach the ditch, making
him more vulnerable to direct fire weapons.

 Emplace antitank SCATMINEs on both friendly and enemy sides of the ditch, es-
pecially in the loose soil material and the ditch bottom, to multiply effectiveness.
Even the smallest ditch will strip mine plows and rollers from the front of the at-
tacking force, thus making the enemy more vulnerable to mines on the friendly
side of the Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch.

 Place concertina wire, water, or antipersonnel mines in the ditch to keep dis-
mounted troops from working in the ditch and creating gaps by hand. The wire
and water also improve the ditch's effectiveness against attacking tanks.

 Place concertina wire or water in the ditch to hamper dismounted enemy forces
maneuvering in the ditch or attempting to reduce the ditch by hand. Wire and wa-
ter also degrade the ability of wheeled and some tracked vehicles to transit
through a ditch that has been reduced.

 Anchor the ends of antivehicle ditches into restricted terrain or existing obstacles
(such as steep slopes, wooded areas, and man-made structures), to prevent
them from being easily bypassed. After completing the ditch, the access ramps
used during construction should be removed or blocked to prevent enemy ac-
cess.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 When planning emplacement of Anti-vehicle (tank) ditches, keep this in mind:

Threat commanders rely on carefully rehearsed tactical formations for control in
the attack. You can disrupt the momentum of the attack and force directional
changes in attacking vehicles, thus exposing their vulnerable flanks. This is done
by imaginative placement of ditches with other obstacles. Anti-vehicle (tank)
ditches should be placed in a series or, if time is available, in a random pattern.
Placing the ditch or ditches at 90 degree angles to enemy's avenue of approach
may not always be the best tactical use. Consider the terrain and assets avail-
able, and construct ditches in a pattern that will confuse, present good targets,
and force the enemy to use resources to breach.

 Design. The configuration of the most effective Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch has been a sub-
ject of much discussion and field-testing with such constraints as time and equipment
available, and soil conditions. The most efficient ditch is either a rectangular or triangular
ditch.

Rectangular ditches. The following parameters apply to rectangular ditch construc-

tion:
 The width should be at least 3.3 meters to exceed the self-bridging capability of
tanks.
 The depth should be at least 1.5 meters in firm soil and greater than 1.6 meters
in sand to achieve
 more than a disrupt effect against vehicles that lack the aid of bridging or earth-
moving equipment.
A rectangular ditch should have a 1–2-meter berm on its friendly side. This
serves to increase
 obstacle height, decrease traction to crossing tanks, impede crossing with scis-
sor type bridges, and
 keep the enemy from pushing the soil back into the ditch without exposing its
dozers or tanks with
 plows.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Triangular ditches. The following parameters apply to triangular ditch construction:

 The entrance slope is not critical in determining the effectiveness of triangular
ditches.
 The wall is constructed as steep as possible.
 A tank cannot breach a 1.5-meter-deep ditch in hard clay rich soils under most
conditions.
 A triangular ditch 1.2 meters deep in hard soil will only disrupt the enemy.
 A triangular ditch in sand must be greater than 1.8 meters deep to achieve more
than a disrupt effect.
 The soil must be spread loosely on the enemy side, rather than as a berm, to
prevent the use of a triangular antivehicle ditch as a fighting position for the at-
tacking armor. This will also reduce tank traction when approaching the ditch.

 Effectiveness. The effectiveness of tank ditches is measured by the delay time imposed
and targets presented. It is a function of soil type and condition, and ditch width and
depth. The rectangular ditch has proven to be the most effective in imposing delays in
both directions. The ditch must be wide enough to prevent the tank from simply running
over it, and narrow enough to force the tank to expose itself to our defensive firepower.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

Figure C-1. (U) Rectangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time

Figure C-2. (U) Triangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Construction of Anti-vehicle (tank) Ditches. Earth moving equipment such as the M9 Ar-
mored Combat Earth mover (ACE), dozers, scrapers, and bucket loaders can all be used
for tank ditching. Generally, the equipment is much more effective if used in teams rather
than alone. The M9s, dozers, and scrapers are most effective, while bucket loaders are
used as a last resort. Operator training is an absolute must to attain maximum produc-
tion. Experimenting with various equipment combinations and soil conditions is valuable
to determine the best production for a specific area of operations and given equipment
availability. Following are four proven methods for Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch construction
using organic engineer equipment.

 Two dozers or two M9s (ACEs) as a team. In step 1, vehicle #1 will start the
ditch and push a load up to 9 to 10 meters (29 to 33 feet) from the start point,
and then back up to start the cut again. In step 2, vehicle #2 will push the load
away from the ditch to form a berm as vehicle #1 is backing up. The team con-
tinues performing in this manner to construct the ditch. This "T-push" method is
suitable for construction of Anti-vehicle (tank) ditches in all soil types.

 One dozer and one scoop loader and grader as a team. This method is per-
formed the same as the previous method except that the loader is used in place
of vehicle #2. The grader is available to keep the berm straight and built up. Af-
ter the ditch is constructed, and if time permits, the berm can then be further
shaped. Normally, this method would be less productive than the first method.
Again, more than one team may be used to construct the ditch.

 Scrapers in tandem as a team. Using scrapers in tandem as a team is an excel-

lent method of Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch construction. Each loaded scraper travels
the full length of the Anti-vehicle (tank) ditch and exits toward the friendly side of
the ditch to spread the load and form the berm. A grader can also be used to
shape and smooth the berm that will reduce scraper-operator fatigue. This
method uses horizontal construction assets and may free other blades assets
(such as M9s, dozers, and bucket loaders) to perform other missions.

 Scraper and M9s or dozers in tandem as a team. This method uses scrapers as
earthmovers and generally requires a pusher (such as an M9, dozer or scraper)
to assist loading of the scrapers. As the pusher and scraper exit the ditch, the
scraper will turn toward the friendly side to dump the load along the berm. The
pusher will turn to the enemy side and proceed back to the beginning of the ditch
to push another scraper. This method produces excellent results, but requires
training to reduce idle equipment time spent waiting for a pusher or scraper.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Production Time. Basic production data of estimated construction times is shown for a
1.5 meter by 3.3-meter ditch using the teams indicated. The production rates are based
upon field tests. No significant differences exist between construction of a triangular or a
rectangular ditch. Valid test data does not exist for equipment combinations other than
those listed.


 Opertaor Training: Operator training is necessary to obtain maximum production. Units
must determine production factors based on actual training data. Staff engineers adjust
these rates for a given mission based on the quantity and type of equipment available,
the maintenance status, soil and light conditions, and the condition of the operators. One
blade team should be able to dig about 100 meters of ditch in 3 hours. It is possible to
use blade assets in support of the countermobility effort early in an operation when the
supported unit is not prepared to initiate the survivability effort. It is a waste of effort to
emplace a ditch that was not sited in the EA development process.

 Construction at Night. Anti-vehicle (tank) ditching can be accomplished under blackout

conditions. However, production will not be as great, and certain precautions need to be
taken. Equipment operators need an object such as a flashlight with red lens to orient on
and facilitate the digging of a straight ditch. Night vision devices, if available, are excel-
lent for operators to use. Scraper operators particularly need to have a guide or light to
lead them out of the ditch and prevent turning out early and overturning. Night operations
will be a must in order to emplace the number of Anti-vehicle (tank) ditches that will prob-
ably be necessary. Commanders should recognize this fact and train under conditions of
darkness.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Construction Using Equipment and Explosives. When encountering hard soils or rocky
ground to be excavated, rippers used to loosen and break the soil aid in excavation and
are the most economical. Should the rippers be unable to loosen the material for excava-
tion, "pre blasting,” or the use of demolitions could be employed using shaped, cratering,
line, or buried tamped explosive charges to break up the ground. This technique will
shatter the material sufficiently to make excavation easier and thereby raising production
rates. An advantage to be considered is that pre blasting allows less powerful pieces of
equipment, like the scraper, to dig ditches out of previously hard material. Should the
tactical situation dictate that dozers be used for other tasks, pre blasting may make it
possible to excavate with scoop-loaders. With dozers, pre blasting may substantially in-
crease production rates and decrease "downtime.” Pre blasting will surely decrease wear
and tear on machines and operators. For the Combat Engineer who has limited types
and number of equipment, limited capability, and large number of tasks, equipment uti-
lization in conjunction with pre blasting may turn an impossible tank ditch mission into
merely a difficult one.

 Log Obstacles.

o Rectangular or Triangular Log Cribs. Log cribs, as shown in MCRP 3-17A, Engineer
Field Data, are point obstacles constructed of logs and filled with earth. This obstacle is
used effectively where standing timber is available and where the obstacle cannot be
readily bypassed. Unless substantially built, obstacles of this type are not effective
against heavy tracked vehicles. Units strengthen cribs by filling them with earth exca-
vated from the enemy side of the crib. Log hurdles in front of a log crib will force vehicles
to reduce speed and add to the effectiveness of the roadblock.

o Log Posts. Log posts, as shown in MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, create a point ob-
stacle constructed by burying log posts in the ground, either vertically or at a slight angle
toward the enemy. Posts are among the best antivehicle obstacles because each post
presents reduction problems to the attacker. There are no fast methods of reducing a belt
of posts. Normally, the attacker will try to bypass such an obstacle. Therefore, post ob-
stacles should be placed where bypass requires much time and effort. The effect of post-
type obstacles can be improved and the obstacles made more difficult to reduce by
weaving spirals of barbed wire among the posts. SCATMINEs can also be used to make
the obstacle more difficult to reduce. The minimum acceptable density for posts is 200
per 100 meters of front. The spacing should be irregular, with at least 1 meter, and not
more than 2 meters, between posts.

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o Log Hurdles. Log hurdles can be constructed using logs greater than 10 inches in diame-
ter. The size of the logs will dictate if the hurdles should be constructed of single logs or
multiple logs tied together. On level ground, log hurdles will not stop tanks, but will cause
them to slow down. Hurdles will improve the effectiveness of other obstacles by slowing
enemy vehicles and making them more vulnerable to friendly weapon fire. Log hurdles
can stop tanks on uphill grades. The significant factor is determining how high to con-
struct the hurdle. A field expedient method to determine the height of the hurdle is to use
a stick about 12 feet long, stick the uphill end in the ground, and depress the stick until it
is level. The distance between the downhill end of the stick and the ground is how high
to construct the hurdle. The hurdle should be sited on the steepest part of the slope and
as near the top as possible.

 Steel “I” Beam Posts. The beam post obstacle is designed for blocking roads at defiles
without destroying the pavement. The obstacle consists of steel I-beam posts inserted
into pre-constructed shafts in the road width which prevents movement of all vehicles,
wheeled or armored. A minimum of two double rows of shafts must be pre-constructed
into a concrete foundation. Within each double row, the individual shafts must also be
staggered. Each beam post shaft is 80 centimeters (31 inches) deep and has a steel
cover. The I-beam post is constructed of sectional steel, 2.2 meters (7.2 feet) long and
weighing 216 kilograms (476 lb). When
inserted into the shaft it will extend 1.4
meters above the road surface. Each
steel I-beam post is equipped with lock-
ing devices which prohibit the enemy
from pulling them out of the shafts. The
beam post obstacle is emplaced by re-
moving the shaft covers after unscrewing
the hexagonal nuts with T-handle
wrenches. Lifting hooks, organic to an
engineer squad, are used to place the
shaft covers to the side. As with the pre-
chamber shaft system, removal of the crossbar allows access to the shaft. Carrying bars
are employed to bring the I-beam posts to each shaft. Each beam is a designated four-
soldier carry for lowering the posts into the shafts. Once emplaced, the enemy side dou-
ble row may be improved through the addition of concertina wire and camouflage netting.
The standard planning factor for complete installation of a beam post obstacle 12 meters

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(39 feet) in width, three double rows deep (requiring a total of 54 I-beam posts), dictates
that two squads, each with nine members, require 2 hours to complete the task.

 Falling or Tumble Blocks. A structure that is maintained in an elevated position and can
be dropped to form an obstacle.

 Dragon’s Teeth, Hedgehogs, and Tetrahedrons.

o Dragons Teeth. Regular spaced concrete or metal barriers laid in single or multiple rows
to prevent vehicle movement.

o Hedgehogs. Steel hedgehogs are relatively lightweight for the obstacle effect they pro-
vide, and they are quickly installed or removed. They are designed to revolve under
wheeled vehicles and puncture them or to belly up tracked vehicles. Unless kept under
observation and covered with fire, the enemy can readily move them. They are well
adapted for use in vegetation enough to afford complete or partial concealment. Ex-
posed parts should be painted to blend with the background.

o Tetrahedrons.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Steel Tetrahedrons. Steel tetrahedrons are

employed in a manner similar to that of
hedgehogs. They are usually made of 4” or
6” angle steel, the base and sides in the
shape of equilateral triangles, 5 feet on a
side. Their finished height is approximately
4 feet.

 Concrete Tetrahedrons. Concrete tetrahe-

drons are pyramids with base and sides of
equilateral triangles 5 feet on a side. They
are set in irregular rows. A tetrahedron of
this size has a vertical height of about 4 feet, requires 1.05 cubic yards of con-
crete, and weighs about 1.1 tons. They may be pre-cast in trough shaped forms
between triangular divisions, with a lifting ring embedded in the center of the top
surface of each tetrahedron.

 Non-Explosive Abatis. An abatis is an effective obstacle against tanks and other vehicles
in a heavily wooded area with few roads or trails. The trees should be felled at a 45-de-
gree angle to the road or trail. The tree should remain attached to the stump to make the
obstacle more effective and difficult to clear. Trees can be felled with saws, axes, or
heavy equipment.

 Force Protection Obstacles. Other types of Obstacles are used by engineers and Coalition
Forces for protection. Force Protection Obstacles are used mostly in the urban environment.
These obstacles are used for vehicle control points (VCP’s), entrance control points (ECP’s), or
as barriers and blockades. There are two general types: Anti-Personnel Barriers and Anti-Vehic-
ular Barriers.

o Anti-Personnel Barriers are designed to deter personnel on foot from entering an operat-
ing base or post. These barriers protect against infiltrators who may try to place small ex-
plosive charges, tamper with supplies and equipment, or attack friendly personnel or criti-
cal assets once they are inside. Typical antipersonnel barriers include chain link fences
with barbed wire outriggers, triple-strand concertina fences, wire obstacles, concrete
walls, and barbed wire fences. In most instances, antipersonnel barriers can be pene-
trated by the enemies’ climbing over them or using wire cutters. Consequently, antiper-
sonnel barriers must remain under constant observation.

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o Anti-Vehicular Barriers are designed to stop vehicles at the perimeter of an operating

base or post. They also assist in establishing standoff distance from protected assets.
When placing anti-vehicular barriers, attention should be focused along high speed av-
enues of approach outside the perimeter. When selecting the type of barriers, considera-
tion must be given to secondary debris and fragmentation created by explosives in close
proximity to concrete barriers or concrete walls. Typical anti-vehicular barriers include:

 Concrete barriers (Jersey, Texas, Colorado, Alaska, California, T-Wall) are used
as blockades. These obstacles are used in VCP’s/ECP’s, protect billeting areas,
and in a serpentine formation to slow vehicle coming in or going out. The barri-
ers come in different sizes and shapes. Concrete Barriers must be anchored to
achieve their effectiveness.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 T-Wall. T-Walls are effective when acting as blast shielding walls and will pro-
vide reductions in blast pressure and impulse behind the blast shielding wall out
to a distance of about 10 times the cube root of the explosive in pounds. Any fur-
ther than that and you should not rely on the perimeter wall to do very much as
the blast load pretty much reforms after that distance - so for example against a
1000-lb TNT equivalent VBIED, the cube root of 1000 is 10 and the effective dis-
tance becomes 10 x 10 or about 100 feet. To get the blast load reductions, the
blast shielding wall should be a height of 1 times the cube root of the explosive
weight or in terms of the 1000lb VBIED, about 10-feet. Also, the bomb should be
no further than 3-times the cube root of the explosive weight or 30-feet from the
blast shielding wall. Now there are a lot of geometric variations that come into
play and the load could be reduced more or less depending on your specific site
layout. As a last thought, when thinking about using a perimeter wall as a blast
shielding wall, it needs to stay around during the blast or it will become debris
that could impact the facility or people outside. There are now designed double
T-walls with soil in between that will help eliminate the debris problem.

 Concrete Blocks. These blocks can be cast in place and should be anchored to-
gether with at least a 3/4-in. aircraft cable so that movement or removal is diffi-
cult. Concrete blocks are most effective when placed in a serpentine (‘S’) pat-
tern.

 Portable Barriers, Spike Strips, Chicanes. Portable barriers have a stopping ca-
pability of a 15,000lb vehicle traveling at 40 mph. This barrier is made of steel
and can be constructed by a welder. Spike strips are laid across the road in or-
der to blow the tires of a vehicle passing over it. This obstacle will not stop a ve-
hicle, but it will slow the vehicle down. It is made of a series of spike or nails
which is anchored to a flat piece of rubber, wood, or steel. Chicanes are a 2 or 3

37
M03ACS2 Field Fortification

section curb protruding from the roadway that forces vehicles to maneuver
through a narrow, single, or two lane angled road section.

 Reinforced Concrete Walls. Concrete walls can be a costly, yet effective, low-
profile anti-vehicle barrier. In order to be effective, a wall should consist of at
least 1.6 ft. of reinforced concrete and have a 2.6 ft. deep footer (depending on
local soil conditions). Tests have shown that an anti-ramming foundation wall will
stop a 15,000 lb. (6,818 kg) vehicle traveling 50 mph (80 kph) at 3.27 ft.

 Bollards and Heavy Equipment Tires. With a series of at least three Heavy
Equipment tires buried half way has the stopping capability of a 3,350lb vehicle
traveling at 50 mph.

 Sliding and Swinging Gates. Sliding gate is tested to stop a 15,000lb vehicle
traveling at 50 mph.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

 Earth-filled barriers (Concertainer, Metalith). Concertainer comes in many differ-

ent sizes. It also can be used in many different ways, (made as a barrier, block-
ades, protective walls, check point post). The Marine Corps has a major need for
physical security barrier, barrier walls, and systems that can protect ground
forces, military fighting assets such as planes and tanks, and critical infrastruc-
ture assets from hostile actions. The Metalith barriers were originally designed
with military uses as the focus to provide: blast mitigation/containment barriers,
force protection barriers, critical infrastructure protection barriers, anti-ram vehi-
cle barriers, protective delay barriers, and perimeter security barriers.

 Expedient Obstacles. The potential of expedient obstacles is almost unlimited. Imagination and
ingenuity are the key factors in successfully constructing and employing expedient obstacles.
These may include:

o Non-Standard Log obstacles.

o Rubble from buildings or structures.
o Junked automobiles and battle-damaged equipment.
o Flooding an area by demolishing dams, canal walls, or levees.
o Fires on a timber bridge or burning brush and fields.
o Distribute boulders and large pieces of earth to block vehicle access to an area.
o Steepen slopes, stream banks, and other terrain.

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 Portable Entanglements. Fixed entanglements are those types which must be erected in place
and which cannot be moved unless completely disassembled. Portable entanglements are those
types which can be moved without complete
disassembly. Portable entanglements have
been developed for one of the following rea-
sons: To permit assembly in rear areas, with
ease of transportation and rapid installation
in forward positions, and for the temporary
closing of gaps or lanes which can be re-
opened quickly for patrols or counterattack-
ing forces.

SUBMIT REQUIRED FORMS/REPORTS

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

The emplacing-unit commander submits obstacle reports through operations channels to the G-3/S-3 of
the owning headquarters. Information from obstacle reports is rapidly distributed as necessary to ensure
that friendly forces are not negatively impacted by emplaced or discovered obstacles. Information from
obstacle reports is integrated with other obstacle information and intelligence to help form the mobility
portion of the COP (real-time MCOO). The format and frequency of obstacle reports are stated in unit
SOPs. Nonstandard reports are listed in Annex R of the OPLAN or OPORD. Units submit the following
reports for friendly reinforcing obstacles:

 Report of intention.
 Report of initiation.
 Report of completion.

Report of Intention
The requirement for a report of intention depends on the use of obstacle control measures. A report of in-
tention is unnecessary if the higher headquarters has designated obstacle control measures, since the
authorization to install obstacles within that area is already given. If an obstacle control measure is not
provided, then units must submit a report of intention before planning to emplace an obstacle.

 For SCATMINEs, a scatterable minefield request (SCATMINEREQ) is used to request authority

to plan emplacement of a scatterable minefield. The SCATMINEREQ is submitted in enough
time to allow it to be staffed and approved or disapproved at the appropriate level. Once ap-
proved, the emplacing unit must still receive release authority before emplacing the minefield.
This is normally done by submitting a scatterable minefield warning (SCATMINEWARN) before
execution, typically about 30 minutes in advance, to allow the higher commander to acknowl-
edge and approve the release. Once the minefield is emplaced, a SCATMINEREC is prepared
and submitted to register the minefield.

The report of intention doubles as a request when units initiate it at levels below emplacement authority.
The report includes the following:

 Type of obstacle.
 Obstacle target and effect.
 Composition of the scatterable minefield or munition field to be emplaced, if applicable.
 Location of obstacle.
 Description of how the obstacle will be marked, if applicable.
 Proposed start and completion times.
 Location and the width of lanes and gaps and how they will be marked.

Report of Initiation
A report of initiation is used by the emplacing unit to inform the owning unit that emplacement has begun
and that the area is no longer safe for friendly movement and maneuver. The report specifies the time
that emplacement began and identifies the location and target numbers of obstacles.

 For scatterable minefields, a SCATMINEWARN is used to notify affected units that SCATMINEs
will be emplaced. The SCATMINEWARN report provides affected units with the necessary warn-
ing to plan and execute their operations. Emplacing units send the report to the owning unit be-
fore they have emplaced mines. The G-3/S-3 is responsible for ensuring dissemination of the re-
port to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units through operational channels. (A sample SCAT-
MINEWARN format is shown in JP 3-15.)

Report of Completion

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A report of completion is used by the emplacing unit to inform the owning unit that the obstacle is com-
plete and functional. If required, other reports may follow a unit’s report of completion such as a com-
pleted DD Form 3007 or a scatterable minefield report and SCATMINEREC.

Additional Reports

 Report of progress. While obstacles are being emplaced, the commander may require periodic
reports to monitor the status of work being completed.

 Report of transfer. A commander transfers obstacle responsibility to another commander with a

report of transfer. Both commanders sign this report.

Recording
Obstacle recording is an electronic or written communication that documents the emplacement and de-
scription of an obstacle. The commander specifies obstacle-recording responsibilities and procedures in
plans, orders, and SOPs, and ensures that they conform to higher authority. Although SCATMINEs have
a self-destruct capability, scatterable minefields are still recorded to facilitate the clearing of possible un-
exploded explosive ordnance or duds. Since the exact location of each individual SCATMINE within a
scatterable minefield is unknown, safety zones are determined and recorded based on corner points or
aim points, depending on the emplacing system. Units use the SCATMINEREC to report and record
friendly scatterable minefields. Units use the DD Form 3007 to record munition fields.

 Obstacle records contain pertinent information about individual obstacles to include such things
as;

o Location of obstacle.
o Type of obstacle.
o Composition of the obstacle, to include the number and type of SCATMINEs or net-
worked munitions emplaced, if applicable.
o Location and width of lanes and gaps, if applicable.
o Description of any marking, if applicable.

Concertainer Product Range

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Unit Height Width Length Stock Number

Mil 1B 4’ 6” 3’ 6” 32’ 5680-99-835-7866
Mil 1G (1.37m) (1.06m) (10m) 5680-99-001-9396
Mil 2B 2’ 2’ 4’ 5680-99-968-1764
Mil 2G (0.61m) (0.61m) (1.21m) 5680-99-001-9397
Mil 3B 3’ 3” 3’ 3” 32’ 5680-99-001-9392
Mil 3G (1.0m) (1.0m) (10m) 5680-99-001-9398
Mil 4B 3’ 3” 5’ 32’ 5680-99-001-9393
Mil 4G (1.0m) (1.5m) (10m) 5680-99-001-9399
Mil 5B 2’ 2’ 10’ 5680-99-001-9394
Mil 5G (0.61m) (0.61m) (3.05m) 5680-99-001-9400
Mil 7B 7’ 3” 7’ 90’ 5680-99-169-0183
Mil 7G (2.21m) (2.13m) (27.74m) 5680-99-126-3716
Mil 8B 4’ 6” 4’ 32’ 5680-99-335-4902
Mil 8G (1.37m) (1.22m) (10m) 5680-99-517-3281
Mil 9B 3’ 3” 2’ 6” 30’ 5680-99-563-5949
Mil 9G (1.0m) (0.76m) (9.14m) 5680-99-052-0506
Mil 10B 7’ 5’ 95’ 5680-99-391-0852
Mil 10G (2.12m) (1.52m) (30.5m) 5680-99-770-0326

Note: ‘B’ in the model number denotes Beige color geotextile. ‘G’ denotes Green.

Flat-Packed Individual Unit Dimensions & Weights

Unit Height Width Length Weight

Mil 1 10” 42” 54” 327lb
(0.25m) (1.07m) (1.37m) (148.5kg)
Mil 2 2” 24” 24” 22lb
(0.05m) (0.61m) (0.61m) (10kg)
Mil 3 8” 39” 39” 231lb
(0.2m) (1.0m) (1.0m) (105kg)
Mil 4 8” 98” 39” 352lb
(0.2m) (2.49m) (1.0m) (160kg)
Mil 5 8.5” 24” 24” 50lb
(0.22m) (0.61m) (0.61m) (23kg)
Mil 7 28” 91” 91” 2068lb
(0.72m) (2.23m) (2.23m) (940kg)
Mil 8 10” 48” 54” 341lb
(0.25m) (1.22m) (1.37m) (155kg)
Mil 9 12” 30” 39” 222lb
(0.3m) (0.76m) (1.0m) (101kg)
Mil 10 31” 65” 88” 2286lb
(0.79m) (1.66m) (2.25m) (1039kg)

Note: For Mil 7 & Mil 10, dimensions are based on full units on a timber pallet or skid.

Units Per Pallet Pallet Pallet Pallet Pallets Pallets Per

Unit Pallet Height Width Length Weight Per 40'

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

13.5m Container
Trailer
Mil 1 7 80” 45” 55” 2332lb 18 16
(2.03m) (1.14m) (1.40m) (1060kg)
Mil 2 120 30” 75” 79” 2684lb 18 12
(0.76m) (1.90m) (2.0m) (1220kg)
Mil 3 8 70” 46” 46” 1892lb 20 20
(1.78m) (1.17m) (1.17m) (860kg)
Mil 4 8 67” 41” 106” 2889lb 10 8
(1.70m) (1.04m) (2.70m) (1313kg)
Mil 5 50 30” 75” 79” 2552lb 18 12
(0.76m) (1.9m) (2.00m) (1160kg)
Mil 7 1 30” 86” 90” 2156lb 20 10
(0.76m) (2.20m) (2.30m) 980kg)
Mil 8 4 60” 42” 50” 1408lb 18 18
(1.5m) (1.06m) (1.27m) (640kg)
Mil 9 6 75” 39” 43” 1388lb 18 18
(1.91m) (1.00m) (1.12m) (631kg)
Mil 10 1 31” 64” 93” 2374lb 21 14
(0.79m) (1.62m) (2.35m) (1079kg)

ANALYZE SURVIVABILITY REQUIREMENTS

Survivability on the Battlefield

Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand
hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mis-
sion. This quality or capability of military forces is closely related to protection (the preservation of a mili-
tary force’s effectiveness) and to the protection/force protection warfighting function (the tasks or systems
that preserve the force).

 Survivability Aspects.

o Avoiding. The aspect of avoid seeks to prevent an attack, surveillance, or accurate targeting.
Susceptibility is the inability to avoid attack and is a function of tactics, countermeasures, proba-
bility of enemy attack.

o Withstanding. The aspect of withstand seeks to prevent degradation as a result of having been
subjected to an attack. Normally in a military operation, a force with greater vulnerability has less
capability to withstand degradation as a result of an attack.

 Threats to Survivability. There are three general categories of threats; hostile actions, non-hostile
activities, and environmental conditions. All three categories of threats can cause damage, destruc-
tion, death, or injury to personnel and physical assets, survivability is concerned with avoiding or with-
standing threats posed by two of those categories—hostile actions and environmental conditions.

o Hostile Actions. Threats from hostile actions include any capability that armed forces or criminal
elements possess that can inflict damage on personnel, physical assets, or information. Army and
Marine Corps forces today face hybrid threats, which are the diverse and dynamic combination of
regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these
forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. These forces and ele-
ments often employ hostile actions to inflict damage upon personnel, physical assets, or informa-
tion.

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M03ACS2 Field Fortification

o Environmental Conditions. Hazards associated with the surrounding environment also pose
threats to survivability. Weather, natural disasters, and disease are common examples, as are
terrain-related hazards. In addition, threat forces and elements may, as a hostile action, create
hazardous environmental conditions; for example, they may set forest fires or create flooding by
destroying a dam.

 Factors Affecting Survivability. Dispersion, redundancy, morale, leadership, and discipline (includ-
ing noise and light) are examples of such factors. Factors of mobility, situational understanding, and
terrain and weather conditions, which are among the factors that can enhance the capability to avoid
or withstand threats.

o Mobility. Survivability of friendly forces is typically more likely when they are moving or when they
possess the ability to reposition quickly. Maintaining freedom of movement and repositioning of-
ten increase survivability. Static units must maintain the capability to move on short notice. Be-
cause of this, assured mobility is an important factor that can enhance survivability. Assured mo-
bility is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to
deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, to achieve the commander’s intent

o Situational Understanding. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judg-
ment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission
variables to facilitate decision making. It requires the ability to identify, process, and comprehend
the critical elements of information about what occurs inside a commander’s area of operations
(AO). Having an accurate situational understanding provides the baseline for hazard assess-
ments. For example, situational understanding of terrain (by applying geospatial information and
proper terrain analysis) is important to survivability and the development of survivability positions,
minimizing the requirements to adjust terrain and leading to the efficient use of survivability as-
sets.

o Terrain and Weather. Existing terrain features (natural or manmade) can provide cover (protec-
tion from the effects of fires) and concealment (protection from observation and surveillance) or
be reinforced to enhance cover, concealment, or camouflage. Terrain can also enhance surviv-
ability by providing shelter from the elements. Weather conditions can also enhance survivability.
For example, the reduced visibility caused by fog or snow can provide concealment for personnel
and physical assets, reducing the effectiveness of threat sensor systems.

 Jungle Terrain. Jungles are humid, tropic areas with dense growth of trees and vegetation
which typically limits visibility to less than 100 feet. Because mounted infantry and armor op-
erations are limited more emphasis is placed on individual and crew-served weapons posi-
tions. While the vegetation provides good concealment it does not provide adequate cover
from direct or indirect fire and fields of fire are difficult to establish. Use of natural ravines and
gullies can provide adequate cover. If positions are constructed particular attention should be
paid to drainage and the use of rot resistant materials. Due to high water tables, dense un-
dergrowth and tree roots survivability operations in the jungle environment often require
above ground construction. FM 90-5 provides detailed information on jungle operations.

 Mountainous Terrain. Characteristics of mountain ranges include rugged, poorly trafficable

terrain; steep slopes; and altitudes greater than 488 meters (1,600 feet). Irregular mountain-
ous terrain provides numerous places for cover and concealment. Because of rocky ground, it
is difficult and often impossible to dig below ground positions; therefore, boulders and loose
rocks are used in aboveground construction. Irregular fields of fire and dead spaces are con-
sidered when designing and locating fighting positions in mountainous areas. ATP 3-90.97,
MCTP 12-10A, and TC 3-97.61 provide additional information on fighting positions and cam-
ouflage and concealment in mountainous areas. Reverse-slope defensive positions are well-
suited to mountainous terrain. Units may easily locate mutually supporting positions and
mass fires onto the crest, while the terrain provides numerous natural obstacles. Direct-fire
weapon positions in mountainous areas may be at a disadvantage because restricted frontal

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views inhibit engaging the enemy at maximum weapon range. Enemy forces topping the crest
may also be able to shoot down on top of fighting positions. Indirect-fire weapon positions are
better protected from direct and indirect fire when they are located behind steep slopes and
ridges.

 Desert Terrain. Deserts are extensive, arid, and treeless; suffer from a severe lack of precipi-
tation; and possess extreme daily temperature fluctuations. The terrain is sandy with boulder-
strewn areas, mountains, dunes, deeply-eroded valleys, areas of rock and shale, and salt
marshes. Designers of fighting and protective positions in desert areas must consider the lack
of available natural cover and concealment. The only minimal cover available is through the
use of terrain masking; therefore, positions are often completed above ground. Mountain and
plateau deserts have rocky soil, or surface chalk soil, which makes digging difficult. In these
areas, rocks and boulders are used for cover. Most often, berms used in desert fighting or
protective positions are undesirable because of probable enemy detection in the flat desert
terrain. Deep-cut positions are also difficult to construct in soft, sandy areas because of wall
instability during excavations. Revetments are almost always required unless excavations are
very wide and have gently sloping sides of 45 degrees or less. Designing OHC is also impor-
tant because nuclear explosions have increased fallout due to easily displaced sandy soil.
Metal culvert revetments are quickly emplaced in easily excavated sand. Sandbags, sand-
filled ammunition boxes, and soil-filled containers are also used for containing backsliding
soil. Therefore, camouflage and concealment, as well as light and noise discipline, are impor-
tant considerations during position construction.

 Cold Terrain. Cold regions are characterized by deep snow, permafrost, seasonally frozen
ground, frozen lakes and rivers, glaciers and long periods of extremely cold temperatures.
When possible positions are designed to take advantage of below ground cover and are then
build up. Fighting and protective positions in frozen ground take up to twice as long to con-
struct as in unfrozen ground. It is virtually impossible to dig by an entrenching tool in frozen
ground. There are three basic building materials use in cold regions for position construction;
snow, ice, and frozen soil. Positions are more effective if these materials are used in con-
junction with timber, stone and other local materials. Wind protection reduces the effects of
the cold on personnel and equipment. It is approximately 10 times faster to build above
ground snow positions than to dig into frozen ground to obtain the same protection. Excava-
tion by heavy equipment is limited by traction and maneuverability. The use of explosives is
an expedient method but require larger amounts of explosives to remove the frozen soil See
TM 3-34.82/MCRP 3-17.7L for information on using explosives to excavate fighting positions
and considerations for use in ice and permafrost.

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 Construction Materials. Materials such as soil, steel, concrete, rock, wood, bricks, and masonry
provide shielding and protection against penetration of both projectiles, fragments, and the effects of
blast. Various materials and amounts of materials provide varying degrees of shielding. Some of the
more commonly used materials and the effects of both projectile and fragment penetrations in these
materials are discussed below. The tables contain shielding requirements of various materials to pro-
tect against direct hits by direct fire projectiles, direct fire high explosive (HE) shaped charges, and in-
direct fire fragmentation and blast.

o Soil. Soil is often used for protection against the penetrating effects of projectiles. There are a
few general rules about the ability of soil to protect against such penetration: coarse-grained and
well-graded soils protect better than fine-grained soils; protection increases with the level of soil
compaction; and protection decreases with increased soil moisture content. Always place a wa-
terproof layer over soil cover to prevent this loss of effectiveness.

o Steel. Steel is the most commonly used material for protection against direct and indirect fire
fragmentation. Steel is also more likely to deform a projectile as it penetrates, and is much less
likely to spall than concrete. Steel plates, only 1/6 the thickness of concrete, afford equal protec-
tion against non-deforming projectiles of small and intermediate calibers. It is also effective
against thermal radiation, although it transmits heat rapidly. Many field expedient types of steel
are usable for shielding. Steel landing mats, culvert sections, and steel drums, for example, are
effectively used in a structure as one of several composite materials. Expedient steel pieces are
also used for individual protection against projectile and fragment penetration.

o Concrete. When reinforcing steel is used in concrete, direct and indirect fire fragmentation pro-
tection is excellent. A potential consequence of concrete penetration is spalling. If a projectile
partially penetrates concrete shielding, particles and chunks of concrete often break or scab off
the back of the shield at the time of impact. These particles can kill when broken loose. The rein-
forcing helps the concrete to remain intact even after excessive cracking caused by penetration.
When a near-miss shell explodes, its fragments travel faster than its blast wave. If these frag-
ments strike the exposed concrete surfaces of a protective position, they can weaken the con-
crete to such an extent that the blast wave destroys it. When possible, at least one layer of sand-
bags, placed on their short ends, or 15 inches of soil should cover all exposed concrete surfaces.

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o Rock. Rock, especially in layers, can protect against penetration by projectiles and projectile
fragments. Rocks with denser properties have better protective qualities. Sandstone is less ef-
fective than basalt, shale, or gneiss. Rock is often used as a bursting layer in overhead cover.

o Wood. Direct and indirect fire fragmentation protection using wood is limited because of its low
density and relatively low compressive strengths. Greater thicknesses of wood than of soil are
needed for protection from penetration. Wood is generally only used as structural support for a
survivability position. Also, with its low ignition point, wood is easily destroyed by fire.

o Brick and Masonry. Brick and masonry can be effective for shielding. They provide protection
similar to that of concrete, but are less effective due to their lower compressive strengths. Gener-
ally, solid masonry or masonry with its voids filled with grout should be used for shielding against
projectiles. Masonry can exhibit spalling behavior similar to concrete as well; therefore, it should
be treated similarly to concrete.

o Other Materials. Sandbags can be used in a number of ways. They can be filled with soil, but
should have minimal rock to minimize spalling when a sandbag is hit. Soil-filled containers are a
common option for survivability construction. Soil-filled containers are easy to emplace, come in
various sizes, are stackable to different heights, and may be used to protect existing structures or
may be configured as a structure themselves. Other expedient materials include steel pickets,
landing mats, steel culverts, steel drums, concrete barriers and steel shipping consolidated ex-
press (CONEX) containers.

WARNING
When using a CONEX as a bunker, the roof and walls offer minimal structural support or protec-
tion and require reinforcement due to the primary load-bearing ability residing at the corner posts.
Failure to properly reinforce the walls and roof could result in structure failure and serious injury
or death. Refer to GTA 90-01-011 or contact the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development
Center (ERDC) regarding appropriate container reinforcement.

NOTE: Information on the concertainer sizes and shipping, as well as various concrete barriers is
located at the end of your student outline.

 Survivability Operations. Survivability operations are those protection activities that alter the physi-
cal environment by providing or improving cover, concealment, and camouflage. By providing or im-
proving cover, concealment, and camouflage, survivability operations help military forces avoid or
withstand hostile actions. Although such activities often have the added benefit of providing shelter
from the elements, survivability operations focus on providing cover, concealment, and protection to
avoid or withstand hostile actions.. Survivability operations focus more on stationary capabilities—
constructing fighting and protective positions and hardening facilities. In the case of camouflage and
concealment, however, survivability operations include both stationary and on-the-move capabilities.

o Fighting Positions. The purpose of a fighting position is to allow Soldiers/Marines and their
weapon systems to engage and destroy enemy forces while avoiding or withstanding hostile ac-
tions. Such positions include individual, crew-served, and combat vehicle positions, as well as
bunkers and towers. Fighting positions provide cover and (often) camouflage and concealment
and, to be effective, they must also support the unit’s defensive plan. This requires close integra-
tion with the concept of operations and its supporting schemes, particularly the scheme of move-
ment and maneuver/scheme of maneuver and the scheme of fires.
o Protective Positions. The purpose of a protective position is to protect the personnel, vehicles,
and equipment occupying the position by allowing them to avoid or withstand hostile actions. As
with fighting positions, protective positions provide cover, camouflage, or concealment (or a com-
bination of the three). Unlike fighting positions, protective positions are not focused on providing
a position from which to engage the enemy.

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o Hardened Facilities. When enhanced protection is required for a facility, it can be hardened to
provide or improve cover to the structure and its occupants. Hardening helps to avoid or with-
stand hostile actions and is accomplished by using barriers, walls, shields, berms, or other types
of physical protection. Hardening of facilities also includes the use of bridge protective devices
such as antimine booms, impact booms, and antiswimmer nets. These devices typically protect
bridges or crossing sites from waterborne demolition teams, floating mines, or floating debris (see
MCWP 3-17.8).

o Camouflage and Concealment. Camouflage and concealment are materials and techniques used
to hide, blend, disguise, or disrupt the appearance of military targets and their backgrounds to
prevent visual and electronic detection of friendly forces. Camouflage and concealment helps to
avoid or withstand hostile actions by preventing an enemy from detecting or identifying friendly
troops, equipment, activities, or installations.

 Survivability Operations in the Offense. In the offense, fighting and protective position develop-
ment is minimal for tactical vehicles and weapons systems. Camouflage and concealment will typi-
cally play a greater role in survivability during offensive tasks than the other areas of survivability op-
erations will. Protective positions for artillery, air and missile defense (AMD), and logistics positions,
however, may still be required in the offense. Stationary command posts (CPs), and other facilities
for command and control, may also require protection to lessen their vulnerability. During halts in the
advance, while the use of terrain will provide a measure of protection, units should still develop as
many protective positions as necessary for key weapons systems, CPs, and critical supplies based
on the threat level and unit vulnerabilities. During the early planning stages, engineer teams can pro-
vide information on soil conditions, vegetative concealment, and terrain masking along march routes
to facilitate survivability for the force.

 Survivability Operation in the Defense. Defensive missions typically demand the most effort and
resources for survivability operations. Activities in the defense include constructing survivability posi-
tions for CPs, artillery, AMD, and critical equipment and supplies. They also include preparing indi-
vidual and crew-served fighting positions and defilade fighting positions for combat vehicles. Surviv-
ability efforts must consider threats from conventional (direct and indirect fires) and also unconven-
tional threats (such as suicide bombing and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices [VBIEDs]).

 Survivability Operations Supporting Stability or Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks .

When conducting stability or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks, survivability remains a key
commander concern and may require significant effort applied to survivability operations. Although
the likelihood of combat operations is reduced, key resources and personnel remain vulnerable to
conventional and unconventional threats. Vital resources requiring protection may also include facili-
ties critical to the civilian infrastructure such as key industrial sites, pipelines, water treatment plants,
and government buildings.

Types of Weapons Effects

In order to develop plans for survivability positions, the weapon types and the effects to be mitigated need
to be addressed by your survivability considerations.

 Direct Fire. Direct-fire projectiles are primarily designed to strike a target with a velocity high enough
to achieve penetration. In this section, two types of direct-fire weapons effects are discussed: chemi-
cal and kinetic.
o The chemical energy projectile uses some form of chemical heat and blast to achieve penetra-
tion. It detonates either at impact or when maximum penetration is achieved. Chemical energy
projectiles carrying impact-detonated or delayed detonation high-explosive (HE) charges are
used mainly for direct fire from systems with high accuracy and consistently good target acquisi-
tion ability. Tanks, antitank (AT) weapons, and automatic cannons usually use these types of
projectiles.

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 High explosive (HE) rounds include high explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds, recoilless rifle
rounds, and antitank (AT) rockets. They are designed to detonate a shaped charge on im-
pact. At detonation, an extremely high velocity molten jet is formed. This jet perforates large
thicknesses of high-density material, continues along its path, and sets fuel and ammunition
on fire. The HEAT rounds generally range in size from 60 to 125 mm.

o The kinetic energy projectile uses high velocity and mass (momentum) to penetrate its target.
Currently, the hypervelocity projectile causes the most concern in survivability position design.
The materials used must dissipate the projectile’s energy and thus prevent total penetration.
Shielding against direct fire projectiles should initially stop or deform the projectiles in order to
prevent or limit penetration. Kinetic energy direct-fire projectiles include ball and tracer, armor
piercing, and armor piercing incendiary rounds.

 Ball and tracer rounds are normally of a relatively small caliber (5.56 to 14.5 millimeters
(mm)) and are fired from pistols, rifles, and machine guns. The round’s projectile penetrates
soft targets on impact at a high velocity. The penetration depends directly on the projectile’s
velocity, weight, and angle at which it hits.

 Armor piercing and armor piercing incendiary rounds are designed to penetrate armor plate
and other types of homogeneous steel. Armor piercing projectiles have a special jacket en-
casing a hard core or penetrating rod which is designed to penetrate when fired with high ac-
curacy at an angle very close to the perpendicular of the target. Incendiary projectiles are
used principally to penetrate a target and ignite its contents. They are used effectively
against fuel supplies and storage areas.

 Indirect Fire. Indirect-fire projectiles used against protective positions include rifle grenades, mor-
tars, artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft-delivered ordnance which cause blast, incendiary, and
fragmentation damage to affected structures.

o Blast caused by the detonation of an explosive charge creates a shock wave which knocks apart
walls or roof structures. Contact bursts cause excavation cave-in from ground shock or structure
collapse. Overhead bursts can buckle or destroy the roof. Blasts from HE shells or rockets can
occur in the following three ways: Overhead or proximity burst, Contact burst, Delay-fuze burst.

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 Delay-fuze bursts are the greatest threat to covered structures. Repeated surface or delay-
fuze bursts further degrade fighting and protective positions by the cratering effect and soil
discharge. It may also cause a spalling effect against certain materials.

o Fragmentation occurs when the projectile disintegrates, producing a mass of high-speed steel
fragments which can perforate and become imbedded in fighting and protective positions. The
pattern or distribution of fragments greatly affects the design of fighting and protective positions.
Airburst of artillery shells provides the greatest unrestricted distribution of fragments. Fragments
created by surface and delay bursts are restricted by obstructions on the ground.

 Explosive Hazards (EH). EHs include mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and ammunition, IEDs,
and booby traps that were dropped, projected, thrown, or emplaced in past conflicts or in support of
current operations. These hazards are often difficult to detect and present serious concerns across
the range of military operations. IEDs can be detonated directly or remotely and include VBIEDs and
suicide bombers. VBIEDs have a capability to inflict large-scale damage to facilities and cause multi-
ple casualties. While booby traps are designed primarily to attack personnel, they may also damage
or destroy equipment. UXO and mines may often be encountered during the conduct of stability
tasks when those tasks take place in areas that have experienced armed conflict. UXO are also en-
countered on the training areas of military installations, and also occur when ammunition storage fa-
cilities have been attacked during a conflict.

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN). The large variety of CBRN threats and
hazards includes weapons of mass destruction, CBRN agents, and toxic industrial material. The
mechanisms for dissemination of contamination differ in that biological and chemical weapons either
undergo low-order detonations or employ some less violent form of release to disperse the agent
without destroying it; whereas, nuclear weapons can produce radioactive contamination and EM
pulse from an explosion or a simple rupture, and the extent of contamination increases with the vio-
lence of the event.

NOTE: For additional information on cover and other protection from CBRN agents and weapons,
see ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37. NOTE: FAS.org and the OPFOR World Equipment
Guide are both sources of more information on military weapon systems.

DETERMINE RESOURCES

Mitigating Weapons Effects

When planning the construction of fighting and protective positions or the hardening of existing facilities,
many items must be taken into consideration. The terrain, weather, material availability, and the type or

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level of threat will dictate many of the designs that are used. The use of existing buildings in built-up ar-
eas, for instance, may furnish an increased level of survivability based on location and construction mate-
rials. In other circumstances, new construction will be undertaken that will require the integration of sur-
vivability measures.

 Direct Fire Mitigation. The goal of direct-fire survivability construction is to provide a target surface
that is thick enough (and therefore strong enough) for the given material, or that provides for an
oblique impact of projectiles at other than a perpendicular angle to the structure. An oblique impact,
or impact of projectiles at other than a perpendicular angle to the structure, will increases the appar-
ent thickness of the structure and decreases the possibility of penetration. The potential for ricochet
off a structure increases as the angle of impact from the perpendicular increases. Designers of pro-
tective structures should select the proper material and design exposed surfaces with the maximum
angle from the perpendicular to the direction of fire. A low structure silhouette design makes a struc-
ture harder to engage with direct fire. Another technique used to mitigate direct-fire weapons effects
is the use of predetonation screens, which can provide effective protection from rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs).

 Indirect Fire Mitigation. Protection against fragments from airburst artillery is provided by a thick-
ness of shielding required to defeat a certain size shell fragment, supported by a roof structure ade-
quate for the dead load of the shielding. Survivability construction may also be conducted to mitigate
the effects of direct hits from various sizes of artillery mortar rounds and rockets. These measures
generally include some form of soil cover on the structure, and may be supplemented by a bursting
layer of harder material such as stone or masonry rubble. Because roofs constructed to resist direct
blast effects and fragmentation from indirect-fire rounds tend to be quite thick and heavy, an alternate
approach is to provide a lightweight sacrificial roof at a short distance above a hardened roof to deto-
nate the round at a standoff, thus minimizing the thickness of the hardened roof. In addition, walls
and windows need protection against the fragmentation and blast effects of incoming rounds.

 Explosive Hazard Mitigation. Proper training in the recognition of, and reaction to, EHs is the first
line of defense against them. The use of personal protective equipment, including the wearing of
body armor and eye protection, and the use of armored vehicles will reduce the impact against per-
sonnel and equipment. Employing entry control points (ECPs), and using explosive detection devices
and military working dogs will reduce the chances that an IED or VBIED attack can occur on a base
camp. In the event that an IED is employed, proper protective construction and standoff distances
from facilities will mitigate the effects.

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Mitigation. Survivability positions can
enhance protection against CBRN threats and hazards generally in the form of overpressure systems
that keep out contaminated air. In other cases, structures can be sealed against the in-flow of con-
taminants. Engineer assistance is also required in the construction of operational and deliberate de-
contamination sites. Nuclear weapons survivability includes dispersion of protective positions within a
suspected target area. Deep-covered positions will minimize the danger from blast and thermal radi-
ation. Facilities can be hardened against blast effects, and fire prevention techniques can be inte-
grated. An open fighting position blocks most of the line-of-sight radiation and allows only a fraction
of scattered radiation to enter. Increasing the amount of earth cover significantly improves protection
from radiation. Sand or compacted clay gives better radiation shielding than earth because it is
denser. Each layer of sand- or clay-filled sandbags can give up to 66 percent more radiation protec-
tion than the same thickness of soil or soil-filled sandbags.

Construction Techniques
 Standoff. Standoff provides distance between the existing facility and the location from which the fa-
cility could be attacked. If the threat is commonly using explosive devices to attack friendly facilities,
the effects of the explosion on a facility will decrease exponentially with distance.

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 Compartmentalization. Compartmentalization refers to dividing a large, heavily populated facility into

smaller components through the use of ballistic resistant walls. These walls can be placed both in-
side and outside a facility, and in the event a fragmenting weapon detonates near or inside the facility
the fragmentation effects can be contained. Special attention must be paid to ensure that the protec-
tive walls themselves do not become a hazard.

 Holes and Simple Excavations. Provide good protection from direct fire and permits 360 degrees ob-
servation and fire. However, they provide limited protection from direct fire when the occupant is fir-
ing and relatively no protection from fragments from overhead burst of artillery. These include fighting
positions, trenches, and tunnels.

o Trenches are excavated to connect individual fighting positions and weapons positions. They
provide protection and concealment for personnel moving between fighting positions or in and out
of the area.

o Given available time, fighting positions may be enhanced by the construction of tunnels connect-
ing other fighting positions nearby. When available, natural shelters such as caves, mines, or
tunnels are used instead of constructing shelters. Caves, mines, tunnels, or storage bunkers
used for extended periods should be checked for environmental health hazards that may impact
health, to include ammunition residue, hazardous materials, and potential disease-spreading vec-
tors. Engineers are consulted to determine the suitability of caves and tunnels.

 Protective Walls. While some walls only provide support for the structure or fulfill some other pur-
pose, protective walls provide protection against the effects of fires. The walls range from; simple
ones constructed with hand tools (fighting position parapets or revetments), to more complicated
walls requiring specialized engineering and equipment capabilities (earth berms or concertainer revet-
ments).

 Predetonation Roofs and Overhead Cover. Predetonation roofs are sacrificial layers built over exist-
ing roofs to cause detonation of indirect-fire munitions before reaching the permanent structure. A
variety of materials can be used to construct these systems but must be properly chosen based on
the fuzing characteristics of the threat weapon. Predetonation roofs are intended to detonate the mu-
nitions and provide increased standoff to minimize the blast effect. These roofs must be supported by
structure capable of supporting the weight of the structure itself (static load) and the force of the deto-
nation and other moving or changing forces (dynamic loads); proper standoff is determined by threat
analysis. Additional measures must be taken to stop the fragmentation hazards generated during the
detonation. A more substantial shielding layer is typically used.

 Predetonation (Triggering) Screen. Built separately or added to existing structures to activate the
fuze of incoming shell or projectile at a standoff distance. A variety of materials are used to detonate
both super-quick and delay fuze projectiles to minimize blast effects. However, if the fuze is capable
of delay settings, the additional flight after initiating on the triggering screen must be accounted for
when specifying the standoff at which the screen will be placed. Delay shells require more material to
both limit penetration and activate the fuze.

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Designing Fighting Positions

 Position Design Requirements.

o Weapon Employment.

 It is desirable for fighting positions to give maximum protection to personnel and equipment,
primary consideration is always given to effective weapon use. Positions must have good ob-
servation and fields of fire into the assigned sector of fire or engagement areas (EA) and be
mutually supporting between squad positions and other elements.

 In offensive combat operations, weapons are sighted wherever natural and existing positions
are available, or where minimal digging is required.
o Cover. Cover is protection from enemy fire. The overall purpose of cover is to defeat any possi-
ble threat. Cover designed for one type of enemy fire is not necessarily effective against another.

 Frontal: The primary purpose of frontal cover is to provide protection from direct-fireweapons,
but it also provides some protection from the effects of indirect-fire weapons. The use of ef-
fective natural frontal cover (such as rocks, thick trees, thick logs, and rubble) is preferred be-
cause it is more difficult for the enemy to detect.

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 Overhead: Cover provides protection from indirect fire fragmentation but it also provides
some protection from direct fire delivered from a higher position (for example, from a hill) or
from enemy aircraft.. When possible, overhead cover is always constructed to enhance pro-
tection against air burst indirect-fire rounds.

 Flank and Rear: Cover ensures complete protection for fighting positions. It protects person-
nel against the effects of indirect fire bursts to the flanks or rear of the position and from the
effects of friendly fire hazards, such as the petals from discarding sabot ammunition. .
o Simplicity and Economy. Characteristics of fighting positions are simplicity and strength, provid-
ing the maximum amount of protection possible to the Soldier/Marine and equipment. Providing
this protection through the use of readily available materials or existing structures is typically the
most desirable as this requires the least amount of engineer equipment to construct the position.
Occupying (and modifying, if necessary) existing positions can also save significant time and re-
sources over constructing new positions.

o Ingenuity. A high degree of imagination is essential to ensure the best use of available materials.
Many different materials that exist on the battlefield, and prefabricated materials found in indus-
trial and urban areas can be used for position construction.

o Progressive Development.

 Positions should allow for progressive development to insure flexibility, security, and protec-
tion in depth. Development in progressive phases, with highest prioritized tasks accom-
plished first.

 Hasty positions are continuously improved into deliberate positions to provide maximum pro-
tection from enemy fire.

 Structural Components. The structure of a fighting and protective position depends on the weapon
or weapon effect it is designed to defeat. All fighting and protective positions have some configura-
tion of floor, walls, and roof designed to protect material and/or occupants. The floor, walls, and roof
support the shielding discussed earlier, or may in themselves make up that shielding. These compo-
nents must also resist blast and ground shock effects from detonation of high explosive rounds which
place greater stress on the structure than the weight of the components and the shielding. Designers
must make structural components of the positions stronger, larger, and/or more numerous to defeat
blast and ground shock.

o Basic (Fighting and Protective) Positions.

 Floors. Fighting and protective position floors are made from almost any material, but require
resistance to weathering and wear. Soil is most often used, yet is least resistant to water
damage and rutting from foot and vehicle traffic. Wood pallets, or other field-available materi-
als are often cut to fit floor areas. Drainage sumps or drains are also installed when possible.

 Walls. Walls of fighting and protective positions are of two basic types— belowground (earth
or revetted earth) and aboveground. Belowground walls are made of the in-place soil remain-
ing after excavation of the position. This soil may need revetment for support, depending on
the soil properties and depth of cut. When used to support roof structures, earth walls must
support the roof at points no less than one fourth the depth of cutout from the edges of exca-
vation, as shown in Figure 4. Aboveground walls are normally constructed for shielding from
direct fire and fragments. They are usually built of revetted earth, sandbags, concrete, or
other materials. When constructed to a thickness adequate for shielding from direct fire and
fragments, they are thick and stable enough for roof support.

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• Revetment. A revetment is a facing to sustain an embankment or a barricade to provide

protection against bombs, splinters, strafing and fragmentation. It serves mainly to sup-
port excavated surfaces from the effects of weather and occupation. Some basic ways to
construct a revetment for a position are; Brushwood hurdle, Continuous Brush, Pole/
board, corrugated metal/plywood, Sandbag, and concertainer revetments.

 Roofs. Roofs of fighting and protective positions are easily designed to support earth cover
for shielding from fragments and small caliber direct fire. However, contact burst protection
requires much stronger roof structures and, therefore, careful design. Roofs for support of
earth cover shielding are constructed of almost any material that can be used as beams or
stringers. When roof structures are designed to defeat contact bursts of high explosive pro-
jectiles, substantial additional roof protection is required. Appendix D of MCTP 3-34C also
describes a procedure for overhead cover design to defeat contact burst of high explosive
projectiles. To defeat delay-fuzed projectiles, a bursting layer of rock or concrete is added to
the top of the position, and this additional weight must be allowed for in the structure design.

• Stringers and Sheathing. Stringers are a heavy horizontal timber or other suitable mate-
rial used for structural purposes to support the sheathing and the weight of the roof com-
ponents. Depending upon the overhead protection required stingers can run in size from
2” x 4”’s to 8” x 8”’s or larger.

• Dustproof Layer. The dustproof layer is a layer of material, i.e. tarpaper, plastic etc., that
prevents dust and soil from coming through any joints/seams in the roof sheathing.

• Cushion Layer. The cushion layer is a layer of loose soil or sand that is placed on the
roof to help absorb the impact pressure of a detonation. There can be multiple cushion
layers over a position. A cushion layer below the distribution layer does not extend be-
yond the edge of the position.

• Waterproof Layer. The waterproof layer is a layer of non-permeable material to prevent

water/moisture from penetrating the cushion layer and causing it to tamp and weather.

• Distribution Layer. The distribution layer is made of logs, timbers, or other resilient mate-
rial to help distribute the impact/pressure of a detonation.

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• Burster Layer. The burster layer is made of rock or concrete and is placed to activate the
fuse of a delay fuse round so it does not penetrate the position. Figure 6 provides the
thickness of the bursting layer required to defeat specific threats.

• Camouflage Layer. The camouflage layer should bend in with the surrounding terrain to
conceal the position from observation.

NOTE: Cushion*, Distribution, and Burster layers extend beyond the edges of the shelter a mini-
mum of 1.5 meters.

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MCRP 3-34.1 Table 8-12, MCTP 3-34C Table D-8

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NOTE: Steel pickets and landing mats for roof supports for fragment shielding only.

NOTE: Information on the Figure 6 below is from the FM 5-103 Survivability publication and shows
the minimum requirements for a burster layer over a position to mitigate the effects of various
shells with delay fuzes.

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Figure 6, FM 5-103 Survivability

 Individual Fighting Positions. Individual fighting positions protect one or more dismounted Marines
armed with individual weapons—intended to be operated by an individual rather than by a crew—
while supporting their ability to engage the enemy from the position. The positions should be planned
and designed so that they are concealed, mutually supporting, and have interlocking fields of fire in all
directions. Each weapon system must be assigned a primary sector of fire to support the defensive
plan. Alternate positions that over watch the primary sector should also be selected. Finally, each
weapon should be assigned a supplementary position to engage attacks from other directions.

o Additional Design Considerations.

 Availability of materials.

 Soil.

 Drainage.

 Safety.

o Hasty Position. When time and materials are limited, troops in contact with the enemy use a
hasty fighting position located behind whatever cover is available, maximizing the advantages
provided by the existing terrain and natural or manmade cover. Hasty positions may only provide
limited protection; however, positions should be selected to provide, as a minimum, frontal protec-
tion from direct fire while allowing Marines to fire to the front and oblique.

o Deliberate Position. Deliberate fighting positions are often modified hasty positions prepared as
the situation and time permit. The unit leader should verify the sectors of observation/fire, inter-
locking fields of fire, adequate size for occupants, and safe back blast areas before improving
each position. Improvements include adding overhead cover, digging trenches or opening routes
to adjacent positions, and maintaining camouflage.

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 Crew-Served Weapons Fighting Positions. Crew-served weapons positions are also classified as
hasty and deliberate. The same principles apply to the crew-served weapon, although minor changes
include dimensions of the position and characteristics to facilitate effective use of the weapon system.
Frontal, overhead, flank, and rear protection provide increased survivability and protection as well.
For crew-served weapons that create a back blast, overhead and rear protection must be considered
for effective employment of the weapon while minimizing the risk of injury to the operator. These po-
sitions must be tailored to the operating characteristics and requirements of the weapon that will oc-
cupy the position.

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 Bunkers and Towers. Base camps will generally require fighting positions in the form of bunkers
and towers. They are built either above- or belowground and are usually made of reinforced con-
crete, but can be designed and constructed with a variety of materials (Timber, sandbags, soil-filled
containers, prefabricated concrete, or other specific items that are available through the supply sys-
tem). These positions are employed to support perimeter security, security of key sites such as en-
emy prisoner of war compounds, and ECPs. A deliberate defense may also involve the construction
of more elaborate bunkers that may hold up to a squad of Marines. Because of the extensive engi-
neer effort required to build bunkers, they are usually constructed when preparing strong points or
protecting vital facilities such as base camps. If time permits, bunkers are connected to other fighting
or supply positions by tunnels. Prefabrication of bunker assemblies affords rapid construction and
placement flexibility. Bunkers offer excellent protection against direct fire and indirect-fire effects and,
if properly constructed with appropriate collective protection equipment, can provide protection
against chemical and biological agents. Some common types of positions are;

o Soil-Filled Container Fighting Position. Soil-filled container positions can be quickly constructed
and provide a high degree of survivability. They are most commonly used above ground, but the
soil-filled container will provide increased ability when partially buried. Soil-filled containers are
available through normal supply channels and, when employed correctly, provide a high degree
of protection against blast and fragmentation. When using soil-filled containers, Marines must en-
sure that proper overhead cover frames are used in the construction to prevent cave-ins from oc-
curring.

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o Wood or Steel-Frame Fighting Position. The wood-frame or steel-frame fighting position consists
of prefabricated timber or steel-frame support elements that support a timber or concrete roof.
The position is useful as a two-person fighting or observation position in areas where it can be
dug into the ground.

o Corrugated Metal Wall Bunker. This bunker made from corrugated metal walls is very useful in
areas where digging is not possible or practical. With 4-foot earth-filled walls and 2-foot OHC, this
position defeats direct fire and blasts or fragments from near-miss mortar and artillery ammuni-
tion. For more protection, stack sandbags or push loose earth up against the walls. The upper
portion of the structure is left open for maximum visibility in all directions. Firing ports are located
in the walls near the floor.

o Plywood Perimeter Bunker. A plywood perimeter bunker is used as an aboveground protected

observation post. The bunker has a post foundation, or it can be constructed on the ground. An-
other option is to build the wood bunker on top of one or two stacked CONEX boxes. Walls of this
bunker need to be earth-filled or otherwise hardened to resist the applicable threat.

 Vehicle Fighting Positions. Vehicle fighting positions include fighting and protective positions for
major weapons systems vehicles and their support equipment. Initially, vehicles use the natural
cover and concealment in hide positions to increase survivability. Priority is given to those vehicles
containing essential critical equipment or supplies.

o Hasty Fighting Positions. Hasty fighting positions for combat vehicles take advantage of natural
terrain features or are prepared with a minimum of construction effort. A frontal berm, as high as
practical without interfering with the vehicle’s weapon systems, shields from frontal attack and
provides limited concealment if properly camouflaged. Protection is improved if the position is
made deeper and the berm extended around the vehicle's sides.

o Deliberate Fighting Positions. Deliberate fighting positions are required to protect a vehicle from
kinetic energy and hypervelocity projectiles. Deliberate vehicle fighting positions are holes in the
ground which provide cover and concealment, reducing the target signature. The position is con-
structed in four parts: hull defilade, turret defilade, concealed access ramp or route, and hide lo-
cation. When developing deliberate positions, construction of hide locations and a concealed
route between positions is only done when time and engineer assets are available. When limited
time is available, engineer assets should be prioritized to concentrate on hull and turret defilade
positions.

 Hull Defilade. Leaves the vehicle’s turret above ground, allowing it to observe and engage
targets.

 Turret Defilade. The entire vehicle is belowground level.

 Hide Location. Allows the vehicle to be concealed away from the fighting position, and in-
cludes overhead concealment when possible.
 Concealed Access Ramp or Route. Either natural or constructed, allows the vehicle to move
from its hide position to its fighting positions.

o Construction Considerations.

 Siting. Although engineers are responsible for prioritizing the engineer effort within the com-
mander’s guidance and constructing fighting positions to standard, the maneuver unit is re-
sponsible for siting each position and developing the battle position.

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 Marking. It is extremely important to mark the positions (for recognition during day and night)
and understand when and how the positions will be occupied. This maximizes the time avail-
able for construction and ensures that the fighting positions meet the intent of the maneuver
commander. Maneuver commanders and vehicle commanders will mark the position and
then be available when engineer assets begin digging. It is the vehicle commander’s respon-
sibility to check the position for proper depth and line of sight (LOS) before releasing engineer
assets to move to the next position.

 Excavation. The basic excavation capabilities of the most likely survivability equipment sup-
porting a RCT are shown in table 4-5. These planning factors may be further influenced by
the condition of the soil, terrain, weather and weather-related effects; maintenance of the ve-
hicles; personnel availability; and other potential significant influences on their performance.
These capability estimates can be used to estimate the time required to excavate for various
fighting and protective positions, in the event that other tables do not include the information
necessary for a specific vehicle or situation. In that event, it is necessary to estimate the size
of the position required, the amount of material to be moved, and the type of equipment used.
MCRP 3-40D.6 (3-17.7F) and MCRP 3-40D.9 (3-17.7I) provides additional information on es-
timated earthwork.

 Berms and revetments will provide improved protection from direct fire and from blast and
fragments of indirect-fire artillery, mortar,
and rocket shells. At its base, a berm has
a thickness of at least 8 feet. Further, the
berm or revetment functions as a standoff
barrier for impact-detonating, direct-fire
HEAT and antitank guided missile (ATGM)
projectiles.

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 If the expected enemy uses kinetic energy direct-fire armor piercing or hypervelocity projec-
tiles, it is impossible to construct berms thick enough for protection. To protect against these
projectiles, prepare deep-cut, hull defilade, or turret defilade positions.

 Success on the battlefield may require maneuver between hide and fighting positions be-
tween main gun firings. Maximum use of wadis or draws, reversed slope hills, and natural
concealment is required to conceal fighting vehicles maneuvering among fighting positions.
When feasible multiple positions should be constructed to improve survivability.

 The terrain, the type of soil, and the water table will all influence the construction of vehicle
fighting positions. In many cases, the depth of soil to bedrock or to the water table will pre-
vent or hinder the construction of positions. This concern may impact a specific vehicle posi-
tion or an entire unit battle position.

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 Artillery Positions. Artillery firing platforms for towed or self-propelled artillery weapons are neces-
sary on soft ground to preclude weapon relaying after each round is fired. The pad distributes the
loads over a larger area with no significant settlement and is flexible, level, and strong enough to with-
stand the weapons turning and movement.

o A berm or revetment position for field artillery provides improved protection from near-miss, indi-
rect-fire weapons effects and small caliber direct fire. The berm is constructed with material re-
moved from the excavation and is built low enough to allow direct howitzer fire. It is usually nec-
essary to stabilize the berm to prevent deterioration caused by muzzle blast.

o Shelter construction is necessary to provide adequate protection for the firing crew, fire direction
center, and CP. Separate shelters are necessary to contain an artillery section’s basic load of
projectiles, fuzes, and propelling charges. If time allows, firing positions, CPs, and fire direction
centers are connected by trenches.

o Trail logs may be necessary to overcome the weapons recoil, while still providing the ability to tra-
verse the artillery piece. Trail logs are commonly constructed in a complete circle to allow the
howitzer to pivot 360 degrees.

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Portion of Table 4-6, MCTP 3-34C

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Designing Protective Positions

A protective position is one that has been specifically modified and enhanced to repel or minimize enemy
weapons effects against personnel, equipment, and facilities. Engineer planners will coordinate with the
commander and other staff elements to develop the mission’s specific protection criteria during the orders
planning sequence and by maintaining the engineer’s running estimate.

 Protective Shelters and Observation Posts. Shelters are primarily constructed to protect person-
nel, equipment, and supplies from enemy action and the weather. Shelters differ from fighting posi-
tions because there are usually no provisions for firing weapons from them. However, they are often
constructed to supplement fighting positions. Observation posts must also allow personnel to have
clear observation of their assigned sector. Shelters are constructed with as much overhead cover as
possible. They are dispersed and limited to a maximum capacity of about 25 personnel. Supply shel-
ters are of any size, depending on location, time, and materials available.

o Metal Culvert Shelter. A metal culvert shelter, quickly constructed above ground, is intended for
use in areas where personnel are billeted or work in conventional unprotected buildings, but need
shelter in case of attack. For example, shelters are placed outside conventional billets, dining fa-
cilities, and large areas of living quarters. The shelter is six feet high and consists of two rows of
55 gallon drums with about a four foot span between rows. 2" X 4" studs, measuring four inches
higher than the drums, are centered inside each drum. The drums are then filled with soil. A 2" X
8" top plate is connected to the 2" X 4" studs lengthwise through the bunker. The six foot corru-
gated metal pipe halves are bolted to the plate and covered with soil and sandbags, creating a 2-
foot layer. To protect the ends of the bunker, barrier walls are erected two feet beyond the en-
trances. Additional protection is provided on the side and end facing the probable direction of at-
tack by increasing sandbag thickness. This shelter provides protection against mortars and small
caliber direct fire weapons.

o Metal Shipping Container Shelter. Large metal shipping containers, such as consolidated ex-
press (CONEX/MILVAN) containers, are used to make effective shelters. These box shaped con-
tainers, with internal dimensions of twenty feet long, eight feet wide, and eight and a half feet
high, are easily converted into protective command posts, communication shelters, troop shelters,
aid stations, and shelters for critical supplies. The shelter can be constructed aboveground, but it
is most effective when constructed belowground, properly reinforced, and covered with soil and
sandbags. When constructing this type of buried shelter, it is critical that the CONEX roof and
walls be reinforced to support the weight of the additional load from soil or sandbags (see figure
5-3). The container corners are the primary load-bearing points and are stronger than the roof;
therefore, just inverting it may not allow enough support for OHC.

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o Timber Frame Shelters. Timber frame shelters are constructed from raw materials or prefabri-
cated sets. They are designed to provide protection from direct-fire weapons and indirect-fire
fragmentation. These structures are most effective when constructed belowground, but do not
provide adequate protection against direct hits from indirect-fire weapons. Properly constructed
overhead cover will shield against contact burst weapons up to 82-millimeter mortars.

o Soil-filled Container Shelter & Observation Post. Soil-filled containers can be used to build effec-
tive shelters and observation posts. GTA 90-01-011 (JFOB) provides design and construction in-
formation for several such structures, including an aboveground 20-foot military van (MILVAN)
personnel bunker, a small observation post, and a large observation post. Soil-filled container
observation posts are built directly on the ground or on raised structures to provide protected ob-
servation in all directions. They have increased level of survivability over plywood perimeter
bunkers but require additional engineer effort.

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 Vehicle and Equipment Protective Positions. Vehicle protective positions are constructed for vehi-
cles and weapons systems that are not directly engaged in providing fires against the enemy. These
positions generally require extensive engineer assets and construction materials to build. Unless
separate overhead cover is constructed, these positions do not provide blast protection from indirect-
fire super quick, contact, or delay-fuze shells. These positions, however, provide medium artillery
shell fragmentation protection from near-miss bursts greater than five feet from the position and from
direct-fire HEAT projectiles 120 millimeters or less.

o Use draws, reverse slopes, and urban terrain.

o Should be large enough to accommodate the vehicle with space to work.

o Positions may include berms and/or revetments.

o Account for drainage in deep cut positions.

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Rehabilitation & Upgrade of Existing Structures

When occupying existing structures and buildings in the AO, several measures may be taken to increase
survivability of personnel and equipment. Below are proven techniques that will harden permanent build-
ings. Many techniques discussed previously remain applicable although the sequence of implementation
may change depending on the situation and the availability of resources.

 Establish standoff from the structure.

 Ditching and berming to mitigate blast effects.

 Establish fighting positions and shelters.

 Establish ECPs.

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 Covering doors and windows to prevent observation inside the structure and limit entrance of muni-
tions (screens, plywood, and such). In cases where glass windows or doors must remain uncovered,
they should be protected with an approved reflective fragment retention film to minimize casualties
from flying glass.

 Applying blast protection fabrics and materials to interior walls to mitigate masonry wall fragmentation
(such as corrugated metal or geotextile fabric retrofits).

 Construct pre-detonation roofs and screens.

Urban Terrain
Survivability of combat forces operating in urban areas depends on the leader’s ability to locate adequate
fighting and protective positions from the many apparent covered and concealed areas available. Fight-
ing and protective positions range from hasty positions formed from piles of rubble, to deliberate positions
located inside urban structures. Urban structures are the most advantageous locations for individual
fighting positions. ATTP 3-06.11, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, and MCRP 12-10B.1 contain detailed infor-
mation of fighting positions, camouflage and concealment in urban terrain. ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-
06/MCTP 12-10B describes urban environments as including urban airspace, super-surface (tops of
buildings), surface (ground, street, and water level), and subsurface (underwater and subterranean) ar-
eas, and it emphasizes the importance of considering both exterior and interior space.

 Some multistory buildings are vulnerable to what is known as progressive collapse. Progressive col-
lapse is where a building component that supports other components fails, leading to the supported
components failing as well, potentially resulting in collapse of large portions of buildings as in a house
of cards. Because of the load-bearing nature of exterior walls in buildings with stacked walls, such
collapses are more common in these buildings. Consequently, where there are framed buildings
available to be used for shelter or protection, consider using them rather than buildings with stacked
walls.

 Leaders use the characteristics of buildings to evaluate them for protective soundness. The evalua-
tion is based on troop protection available and weapon position employment requirements for cover,
concealment, and routes of escape.

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 Building characteristics fulfilling survivability requirements for fighting positions for individuals, ma-
chine guns, and AT and antiaircraft weapons.

 Building Preparations.

o Doors. Unused doors should be locked, nailed shut, blocked, and reinforced with furniture, sand-
bags, or other field expedients. Outside doors can be booby trapped by engineers.

o Hallways. If not required for the defender’s movement, hallways should be blocked with furniture
and tactical wire. If authorized, booby traps should be employed to impede enemy movement.

o Stairs. Defenders should block stairs not used by the defense with furniture and tactical wire or
remove them. If possible, all stairs should be blocked, and ladders should be used to move from
floor to floor and then removed when not being used. Booby traps should also be employed on
stairs.

o Windows. All glass should be removed. Windows not being used should be blocked with boards
or sandbags.

o Floors. Fighting positions should be constructed on the ground or basement floors. If there is no
basement, fighting positions on the first floor must be constructed to provide additional protection
from heavy direct-fire weapons.

o Ceilings & Roofs. Propping supports that can withstand the weight of rubble from upper floors
should be placed under ceilings to provide protection from progressive collapse of a building.

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• Props. Square cut timber props such as railroad ties, etc. & round timber uncut props such
as wood that you would get from a wooded area.

• Spreaders. Used to spread the load across a larger area and prevent point loading of floors
and ceilings.

• Wedges. Used to ensure a tight fit for the timber props.

o Individual Positions. An upper floor area of a multistoried building generally provides sufficient
fields of fire, although corner windows can usually encompass more area. Protection from the
possibility of return fire from the streets requires that Soldiers/Marines know the composition and
thickness of the building’s outer wall. Load-bearing walls generally offer more protection than the
typically light-clad walls of framed buildings.

o Machine Gun Positions. Machine guns are usually located on the ground floor to achieve grazing
fire. In brick buildings, the lower floors have the thickest walls and thus the greatest degree of
cover. In frame buildings, walls are the same thickness on every floor and thus the ground floor
provides no advantage.

o Antitank Weapon Positions. The positioning of AT weapons within buildings demands considera-
tion of the critical need for cover. Buildings with fairly thick walls have rooms that are too small to
permit firing of heavy AT weapons, such as the TOW. Therefore, only light AT weapons such as
the AT4 are fired from inside buildings. When AT weapons are fired, back blast is present and
minimum room size must be adhered to as shown in table 8-4.

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• Ceiling 7 feet high.

• 20 sf of ventilation to rear of weapon (i.e. doorway).

• Remove small loose object and window/door glass by firing area.

• Remove combustible material.

• Meet vertical clearance from bottom of launch tube and opening (12” for Javelin).

o Antiaircraft Positions. The deployment of antiaircraft weapons can also be related to a considera-
tion of building characteristics. An ideal type of building for such deployment is a modern parking
garage (one with rooftop parking).

 Establishing Fighting Positions.

o Avoid lighted areas around windows.

o Stand in shadows when observing and firing weapon.

o Select positions with covered & concealed access and egress.

o Develop decoy positions to enhance camouflage & concealment.

o Hide vehicles in large structures, if possible, or use camouflage and use shadows for conceal-
ment.

Trenches
Trenches provide the same protection as holes and simple excavations. Excavating trenches involves
considerable time, effort and materials, and is only justified when an area is occupied for a long time.
Trenches, as other positions, are progressively developed.

o Crawl Trench. A crawl trench is usually dug 2 to 2 1/2 feet deep and as narrow as possible and
should have a zigzag or winding pattern. The spoil is placed on both sides of the trench to form a
parapet. If the trench runs across a forward slope, all the spoil is placed on the enemy side. In
either case all the spoil needs to be concealed from enemy direct observation.

o Standard Fighting Trench. This trench is developed from the crawl trench to a depth of at least 5
1/2 feet. Fighting bays or fighting steps are sometimes constructed and must be built into both
sides of the trench to provide alternate positions to fight to the rear, step off areas for foot traffic,
and provides protection against lengthwise firing into the trench. While it is primarily used as a
fighting position, this trench is also used for communication, supply, evacuation, and troop move-
ments.
o Trench Patterns. Trenches are constructed to the length required and follow either an octagonal
or zigzag pattern. Special combinations and modifications are made to meet battlefield demands.

 Octagonal Pattern. Affords for easy communication and provides excellent protection. It is
economical to construct, both in labor and material and can be built with a continuous firing
step.

 Zigzag Pattern. Provides protection from lengthwise fire, is simple and easy to construct, and
permits both frontal and flanking fire.

Entry Control Point (ECP)

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An ECP serves as the entry point for all personnel, visitors, and vehicles to an operating base. The ob-
jective of an ECP is to prevent unauthorized personnel/vehicle access, maximize vehicular traffic flow, ac-
commodate various sizes of vehicles, and maintain continuous surveillance of pedestrians transiting the
ECP.

ECP Classifications
The use classification is a function of the anticipated type of traffic, hours of operation, and protection con-
siderations.

ECP Use Classifications, GTA 90-01-11 v.7 JFOB

ECP Functional Zones

ECPs should be subdivided into four functional zones, each encompassing specific functions and opera-
tions. These zones are as follows:

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ECP Functional Zones, GTA 90-01-11 v.7 JFOB

Approach Zone
The approach zone is the first interface with the off-site road network and the operating base. The length
of the approach zone is based upon the land available and the distance required for queuing of approach-
ing traffic. The approach zone should include design elements that accomplish:

 Sorting traffic by vehicle type.

 Reducing the speed of incoming vehicles.
 Protect vehicles and personnel inside the zone.
 Space to reject and redirect unauthorized vehicles.
 Deny unauthorized entry through outbound traffic lanes.
 Provide an off-site parking area for unauthorized vehicles.
 Protect ECP security personnel.
 Provide audio and visual warnings to alert approaching individuals.

NOTE: Use the ECP layout and traffic control devices in local language(s) such as signs, message
systems, signals and lane control systems to perform these functions. Drivers should be notified
before entering the ECP of the proper speed and lane to use.

Access Control Zone

The access control zone is the ECP main body. This zone includes vehicle and personnel search/inspec-
tion areas, speed and traffic management devices, over-watch, and hardened positions for ECP security
forces. The access control zone should be flexible enough to support future inspection demands, access
control equipment, and technologies. The access control zone should accomplish the following:

 Layered concept.
 Maximum standoff.
 Nonlinear layout, speed reduction, and traffic management techniques.
 Containment, segregation, and channelizing of vehicle and pedestrian traffic.
 Verification of personnel/vehicle identification.
 Vehicle turn around and rejection areas.
 Capability to conduct 100 percent inspection of incoming personnel and vehicles.
 Parking/transfer yard for authorized logistics and delivery vehicles.
 Over-watch.
 Maximum protection for ECP security personnel.
 Outbound lane(s) and exits that prevent unauthorized entry.

Primary Response Zone

The response zone extends from the start of the approach zone to the final denial barrier or gate into the
site. The response zone encompasses the entire ECP and should:

 Allow time to react to a threat, activate the final denial barrier/gate closure.
 Provide a hardened perimeter gate to act as a final denial barrier.
 Provide over-watch for the entire ECP (consider employed weapons capabilities, ranges, and effects
to prevent collateral damage).

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 Define the perimeter.

 Integrate with perimeter security systems and maintain a layered concept.

Safety Zone
The safety zone extends from the final denial barrier in all directions to protect personnel from an attack in
the ECP. Determine an acceptable standoff distance from estimated VBIED and PBIED explosive charge
weights based on a threat assessment.

Design Considerations
There are no one-size-fits-all standard design solution for ECPs. Resist the temptation to copy an exist-
ing ECP design. A duplicated design also means duplicated vulnerabilities, some that may have been
successfully exploited elsewhere. Each site is unique and subject to local constraints. Consider the fol-
lowing:

 ECP Mission and Access Control. ECP design will be significantly different if the mission requires lo-
cal national and civilian vehicle access.

 Limited Number of ECPs. Limit the number of ECPs to reduce needed protective measures and
manpower requirements. Designs typically include primary and limited use ECPs.

 Specific Threat. Design ECPs based on current and expected threats.

 Site Selection and Terrain Constraints. Terrain characteristics can either enhance or limit ECP de-
signs. Flat terrain with a slight rise in elevation is generally preferred. A higher elevation allows clear
observation of approaching vehicles and assists security personnel in assessing potential threats.

 Resources. Logistics support affects ECP design and influences the choice of construction materials.

 Higher Guidance. Higher Headquarters regulations or Host Nation (HN)/Political constraints.

 Available Space. Foremost is the need to establish a clear zone between the ECP perimeter and sur-
rounding areas.

 Security Personnel Available. The number of security personnel available to operate the ECP will af-
fect the mission.

 Integrated into Perimeter. ECP protection measures should mirror that of the perimeter.

Search Areas
One of the most important and dangerous functions of an ECP is vehicle and pedestrian search and in-
spection.

 Separate search areas from traffic lanes.

 Segregate vehicle types.

 Apply blast mitigation measures, i.e., walls and barriers.

 Adequate size for search areas.

o Passenger vehicle, 18’ wide x 40’ long
o Oversized vehicle, 18’ wide x 80’ long

 Driver/Passenger holding area.

PLAN SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT/DECEPTION MEASURES

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Camouflage standards should be practiced during all training and all exercises in all environ-
ments, regardless of the primary purpose of training. Unit leaders can use time during larger ex-
ercises to practice drills and evaluate their own unit’s camouflage efforts. Non-Commissioned
Officers train Marines on camouflage discipline. Camouflage discipline includes light discipline,
heat discipline, noise discipline, trash discipline, and movement discipline.

Company training should include: HAWKEYE Drill, REDEYE Drill, LONGBOW C-CAS, Air
Guard

HAWKEYE Drill:
The purpose of the HAWKEYE Drill is to reduce the signature (visual, IR thermal, radar) of the
convoy IOT avoid being observed and targeted by the adversary. For example: A unit is moving
by convoy and not in contact with the enemy. The unit cannot be seen or heard by a ground or
air adversary 1000m away. Each Marine and each vehicle has the camouflage equipment they
need. The unit leader calls the codeword and the time. (HAWKEYE the convoy 1520!) Only the
unit leader can stop the convoy. Moving is the best method to avoid being targeted, but stopping
is best to avoid detection. When the unit leader makes the deliberate decision to trigger the drill,
all movement stop for 40 minutes and HAWKEYE becomes the mission.

Steps for HAWKEYE:

1) STOP and Disperse. All vehicles pick a good site and kill their engines. Slowly. Do not in-
crease the physical signature of the unit. Do not raise dust. Disperse at least three vehicle
lengths from the next vehicle.

2) Camouflage your vehicle for 20 minutes.

3) Stand-to for 20 minutes. Do not move or use the radio. For 20 minutes the unit is at a stand-
still and dead quiet. Only the unit leader can end the HAWKEYE drill with the command,
“STAND DOWN HAWKEYE.”

REDEYE Drill:
REDEYE is an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) immediate action (IA) drill, executed automati-
cally. REDEYE for small UAS is no different than for large UAS. Identification of the specific
UAS is not required. Often, an adversary UAS will be heard before it is seen. The purpose of the
REDEYE Drill is to alert the unit when an adversary UAS is sighted. The unit can be stationary
or moving. When an adversary UAS is sighted, any Marine can call the codeword and the loca-
tion: (REDEYE UAS at one o’clock! or REDEYE UAS to the West over the river.)

Steps for REDEYE:

1) All units, Marines, and vehicles freeze. If you are on foot in the open, go to the prone position.
Minimize your shadow.
- Cover yourself with a camouflage ghillie blanket, poncho or tarp.
- Stay behind and under the trees if you are in the woods. Put something between you and
the
UAS. Stay inside if you are in the city. Stay away from the windows.
- Avoid looking up immediately. An obvious feature of aerial photos in upturned faces. Faces
shine, eye protection reflects light, and optics reflect light. Cover all optics. Cover the lens of
the RCO with a honeycomb.
- Do not run as this will increase the signature of the unit.

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2) Respond to the unit leader’s orders:

- FREEZE! Do not move.
- Continue the mission
- Attack the UAS.
- Camouflage the unit.

3) Report UAS to S-2 and HHQ. (Use UAS Report Format below)

Table 3-1. Recommended Threat UAS Reporting Format

Line Information Example Example
1 Unit Call Sign and Frequency Red 1, FHXXX
2 Unit Location 6 to 8 digit grid
3 Location of threat unmanned aircraft system Grid or distance and direction
from reporting unit location
4 Time threat unmanned aircraft system asset Date/time group (DTG)
spotted/detected
5 Estimated time of on site Was threat unmanned aircraft
system asset approach ob-
served or was it spotted over-
head? How long might it have
been there?
6 Flight characteristics Is threat unmanned aircraft
system loitering in one spot
(possibly already spotted re-
porting unit), is it flying
straight (en route to loitering
location), what is the direction
of flight, or is it flying ran-
domly (searching)?
7 Estimated size, elevation, and physical descrip- Wingspan, height, color, tail
tion configuration, other distin-
guish markings.
ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense

Responsibilities:
Although an air guard is always posted, any Marine can call REDEYE. NCOs enforce camou-
flage discipline. SNCOs inspect and correct.

The unit leader decides on the response to adversary UAS. REDEYE requires a critical combat
decision when the unit is operating under the arc of the adversary’s long-range precision fires.

Does he see me is not the question. The unit leader needs to assess “What will he do with the
information?” Has the unit been sighted by an enemy squad, company, battalion or a fire net-
work?
Does the adversary use UAS to recon for a ground attack, call for fire, or solely BDA?

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If REDEYE is executed at night, we can assume that the UAS has IR thermal sights.

REDEYE is NOT the same as an air attack. Air defense warning conditions (RED, YELLOW,
WHITE) and weapons control status (TIGHT, HOLD, FREE) do not apply to UAS. The air attack
drill—three horns terminated by an “All Clear” signal—assumes that the enemy aircraft will be
overhead for only minutes. With multiple, persistent UAS overhead, we cannot make that as-
sumption

LONGBOW Counter-UAS (C-UAS) DRILL:

The Longbow C-UAS is an active C-UAS measure. It is not a UAS immediate action drill such
as REDEYE. The purpose of the LONGBOW drill is to attack an adversary UAS. Low, small,
and slow UAS are flown by the adversary from nearby clearings and hilltops. Aggressive pa-
trolling of key terrain can push adversary UAS operators away from your unit. The unit must
rely on direct-fire weapons and passive responses to adversary UAS. The LONGBOW C-UAS
team is comprise of Marines within a unit. Those Marines not involved in C-UAS actions should
maintain camouflage discipline.

Steps for LONGBOW Drill:

1) ALERT. The unit leader calls the designated C-UAS team. Only the unit leader can make the
deliberate decision to attack the UAS. Shoot only if you think you’ve been seen, because en-
gaging a UAS unmasks you position.

2) ATTACK: Shoot at the UAS.

3) REPORT: Report the results of the UAS encounter to S-2 and HHQ utilizing the UAS Report
Format.

Air Guard:
Each unit should post an Air Guard when conducting training. The purpose of the Air Guard is to
sound the alert when the unit is being observed by an adversary UAS. Air Guards are posted at
all times, day and night. If two or more Air Guards are posted, then sectors are assigned.

The Air Guard watches and listens for an adversary UAS. The Air Guard should know and be
familiar with the alert process (REDEYE). The Air Guard may or may not be trained in UAS
recognition.

The Air Guard will not attack the UAS. Those actions are separate actions and should be con -
ducted the LONBOW C-UAS team.

The duties of the Air Guard can rotate like any other duty. It is not a sleeping post. It can be an
additional duty for the existing security watch. If LP/OPs are used then they can be assigned the
Air Guard mission to listen or observe for UAS.

COLLECT OWN-FORCE SIGNATURE

Physical signatures are collected by adversary geospatial-intelligence assets (space, aerial,
ground, or human) or through direct observation. Technical signatures are collected by adver-
sary Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) assets and countered by Electro-magnetic Control (EMCON)
procedures. The purpose of collecting your own signature is to see what the adversary sees.
This will help you improve your camouflage effectiveness.

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Unit leaders should appoint a SNCO to collect its own-force signature. The observer should un-
derstand adversary ISR capabilities-satellites, aviation, UAS, and ground sensors. The ob-
servers should envision the unit signature from the air, lines, lights, vehicles, tracks, fighting po-
sitions, spoil, debris, pallets and supplies.

Steps for collecting own signature:

1) Examine: Examine your unit from the adversary’s point of view. Use binoculars, NVGs, ther-
mal scopes and UAS to spot check your signature.

2) Photograph the unit and record any discrepancies.

3) Report to the unit commander.

You can utilize a Camouflage Inspection checklist to aid in the collection of your unit’s signature.

Camouflage Inspection Checklist Date:

Purpose: To inspect a stationary unit that has been in an AA or BP for more than two Unit:
hours.
Scope: Not a base camp. Not a movement. Not a convoy. Marks. All “Yes” is best
1 Leadership. Do unit leaders inspect camouflage every day IAW SOP? Y N TBD
Is an Air Guard, who know the warning procedure, on watch for aircraft and
UAS?

2 Marines. Is every Marine’s helmet camouflaged? Attachments too?

Is every Marine’s bivouac or fighting position camouflaged? Are packs camou-
flaged?

3 Vehicles. Is every vehicle off, covered with a camouflage net, flush to the
ground?
Is every vehicle dispersed, irregularly, at least three vehicle lengths from the
next?

4. Command Post: Is the Command Post camouflage so it will not be targeted?

Are the elements (and antennas) of the CP dispersed?
Tents. Is every CP tent covered with a camouflage net, flush to the ground?
Buildings. Do CP buildings look ordinary so they will NOT be targeted?

5 Supply Points: Are the Supply Points camouflaged so they will not be tar-
geted?
Are the separate supply points dispersed?
Tents. Are all supplies or pallets covered with a camouflage net, flush to the
ground?
Buildings. Do supply buildings look ordinary so they will not be targeted?

6 Unit. Is the unit’s overall position camouflaged well enough not to be targeted?
Have piles of earth (spoil) been masked so that they are not visible from the air?
Have vehicle tracks been masked so they are not visible from the air?
Was light discipline good last night? Were lights from vehicles and the CP
masked?

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Trash: Is trash discipline good? Have trash bags, dunnage, and debris been
hidden?
Summary:
SIGMAN Camouflage SOP 200630

SUBMIT REQUIRED REPORTS/FORMS

Several tools may assist engineers, other staff, and commanders in tracking survivability operations. Sur-
vivability timelines and matrices are used to indicate priorities of effort, track progress, and update the
commander on the status of survivability operations.

Bill of Materials (BOM). The BOM is the means of identifying the Class IV materials required to
complete a project. It identifies the nomenclature, unit of issue, and amount of material. This information
is required by the engineer platoon or supported commander to requisition the Class IV material via sup-
ply channels.

Support Requests. A support request is often created locally in GCSS or other means IAW a units
SOP. The request should include the information required to clearly identify the support requested, at a
minimum; what is require, where, when, why (the task), how long (duration), who they are reporting/link-
up information. These requests may be classified as routine, urgent, or priority depending upon the oper-
ational tempo or commander’s focus of effort.

Report of Initiation. Report of initiation is used by the engineer unit to inform the supported unit that
construction has begun. The report specifies the time that construction began and identifies the location.
The S-3 is responsible for ensuring dissemination of the report to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units
through operational channels.

Report of Completion. A report of completion is used by the engineer unit to inform the supported
unit that construction is complete and functional.

Report of Progress. While survivability positions are being built, the commander may require peri-
odic reports to monitor the status of work being completed.

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REFERENCES:
MCWP 3-17.6 Survivability Operations
MCRP 3-34.1 Engineer Field Data
GTA 05-08-001 Survivability Positions
GTA 07-06-001 Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card
GTA 90-01-011 Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Protection Handbook
GTA 90-01-018 Joint Entry Control Point & Escalation of Force Procedures
MCTP 3-34B Combined Arms Countermobility Operations
MCTP 3-34C Survivability Operations
MCRP 3-34.4 Engineer Forms and Reports
MCWP 3-34 Engineering Operations
MCRP 5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics
TC 3-23.30 Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals
DoDI 6055.1 DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program
ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense
Signature Management (SIGMAN) Camouflage SOP.

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