SPECIAL REMINDERS FOR 2024 BAR EXAMINATION

(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW)
By Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO-CARUSO

INTRODUCTION

The 1987 Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held (February 2, 1987) for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.

* Approved by the Constitutional Commission of the twelfth day of October 1986

* Proclamation No. 58, February 11, 1987-Proclaimed the ratification of the 1987
Constitution

* De Leon vs. Esguerra (153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987- The record of the proceedings
and debates of the constitutional commission fully supports the court's judgment. It shows
that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the constitutional commission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted
Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 constitution was that "the act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people.

So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely
the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the president is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the constitution when they cast their
votes on the date of the plebiscite."

*Supremacy of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The 1987 Philippine Constitution is

the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however
noble its intentions are, if it conflicts with the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The 1987
Philippine Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Right or wrong, the 1987 Philippine Constitution must be upheld as long as the sovereign
people have not changed it (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 Ed., p.11).

Amendments and Revisions

Revision Amendments
A change that alters a basic principle in A change that adds, reduces, deletes,
the Constitution, i.e., the separation of without altering the basic principle
powers or the system of checks and involved.
balances.

There is also revision if the change alters

the substantial entirety of the
Constitution.

Generally affects several provisions of the Generally affects only the specific
constitution. provisions being amended.
Case: Lambino v. COMELEC, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test:
a. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "ʺso extensive in its provisions as
to change directly the 'ʹsubstantial entirety'ʹ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions."ʺ The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.

b. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.ʺ Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "ʺa
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental planʺ includes "change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.ʺ A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that ʺjeopardize the traditional form of government
and the system of
check and balances".

STEPS IN THE AMENDATORY PROCESS

The constituent power is exercised by Congress (by special constitutional conferment), by a

constitutional convention or commission, by the people though initiative and referendum,
and ultimately by the sovereign electorate. Does not ordinarily need the approval of the
Chief Executive, except when done through initiative and referendum. (Adapted from
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).

I. PROPOSAL

Manner Requirements/Procedure

1. Congress (Constituent Assembly- by a vote of ¾ of all its members (Sec. 1

(1) , Art. XVII).

Notes:
a. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution
(now Art. XVII), has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to
call a convention for the purpose, by a three fourths vote of each House in joint session
assembled but voting separately (Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28).

b. Since the effectivity of a proposal made by a constitutent assembly depends upon the
approval by the sovereign people, a constituent assembly may propose any change in the
constitution. The only possible exception is that a constituent assembly may not propose
anything that is “inconsistent with what is known particularly in international law as Jus
Cogens (Planas v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 105, cited in Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 545).
c. The choice as to whether to propose amendments or to call a constitutional convention for
that purpose or to do both was a question of wisdom and not of authority and hence was a
political question not subject to review by the Courts (Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA
774).

2. Constitutional Convention- a. by a 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress,

b. by a majority vote of all the members of

Congress with a question of whether or not
 to call a Convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite (Sec. 3, Art. XVII).

Notes:

a. The manner of calling a ConCon is subject to judicial review, because the Constitution has
provided for voting requirements.

b. If Congress, acting as a ConAss, calls for a ConCon but does not provide the details for the
calling of such ConCon, Congress in accordance with the Constitution, for example:

 Whether a proposal was approved by the required number of votes in

Congress (acting as a constituent assembly).
 Whether the approved proposals were properly submitted to the people
for ratification.

exercising its ordinary legislative power may supply such details. But in so doing, Congress
(as legislature) should not transgress the resolution of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 544-545,
2011).

c. Congress, as a ConAss and the ConCon, has no power to appropriate money for their
expenses. Money may be spent from the treasury only pursuant to an appropriation made by
law. However, the constitutional convention is free to dispose the funds appropriated by
Congress for the Convention's operation (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A
Comprehensive Reviewer, 545, 2011).

3. People’s Initiative- A petition of at least 12% of the total number

of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein (Sec. 2, Art. XVII).
Notes:

a. People’s initiative applies only to an amendment, not a revision of the Constitution

(Lambino v. COMELEC, supra).
b. No amendment through a People's Initiative shall be authorized within 5 years following
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (Feb. 2, 1987) nor more often than once every 5
years. Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Art. XVII,
Sec.2)

c. Revision of the Constitution cannot be effected through initiative and referendum.

Formulation of provisions revising the Constitution requires both cooperation and debate
which can only be done through a collegial body. (BERNAS)

d. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing
legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution
is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation (Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270
SCRA 106).

e. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petitionʺ is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present:

1. The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf.

2. As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be

embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "ʺdirectly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"ʺ
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments
(Lambino v. COMELEC, supra).

f. Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state
the following:

1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,

amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
g. Verification of Signatures- Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this
wise:

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. - The Election Registrar shall verify the

signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and
voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the
signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election
registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay
officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the
election registrars has no legal effect.

h. The COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence
for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require
of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners
themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and substance.

II. PROPER SUBMISSION

Doctrine of Proper Submission.

a. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its
amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less
they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in
its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for
themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its
parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them
that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any
of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability (Tolentino v.
COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702).

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per
se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole (Ibid). The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections
(Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p.16, citing Gonzales v. COMELEC,
21 SCRA 774, Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1, Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69).

III. RATIFICATION: Requirements/Procedure

Notes:

a. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 (Proposal by its
drafters assembled by Congress or Constitutional Convention) hereof shall be valid when
ratified by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

b. Any amendment under Section 2 (People’s Initiative) hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition (Sec. 4, Art. XVII).

c. Ideally, amendments should be presented in a special election in order that it can command
the undivided attention of the electorate. However, this is not required by the Constitution
(Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 548,
citing Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra).

d. Requisites for Valid Ratification: (PCR)

1. Held in a Plebiscite conducted under the election law.
2. Supervised by the COMELEC.
3. Where only franchised (Registered) voters take part.

The Constitution does not require that amendments and revisions be submitted to the people
in a special election. Thus, they may be submitted for ratification simultaneously with a
general election.

e. The determination of the conditions under which proposed amendments/revisions are

submitted to the people falls within the legislative sphere. That Congress could have done
better does not make the steps taken invalid.

f. All the proposed amendments or revisions made by the constituent assemblies must be
submitted for ratification in one single plebiscite. There cannot be a piece-meal ratification of
amendments/revisions.

All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people
in a single "election" or plebiscite (Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, Oct. 16,
1971).

g. Presidential proclamation is NOT required for effectivity of amendments/revisions.

Exception: When the proposed amendments or revisions so provide (Bernas, The 1987
Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 550, 2011).

Date of Effectivity of an Amendment or Revision

Since Section 4 of Article XVII, says that any amendment or revision shall be valid when
ratified', the date of effectivity of any amendment or revision should be the same as that of
the date of ratification, that is, the day on which the votes are cast. However, the amendments
themselves might specify otherwise. (BERNAS)

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Notes:

1. Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to

judicial review, because invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the
constitutional provisions had been followed (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law,
2009 Ed., p.16, citing Sanidad v. COMELEC, 78 SCRA 333, Javellana v. Executive
Secretary, 50 SCRA 50).

2. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution,
is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with
that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits
(Sanidad v. COMELEC, 78 SCRA 333).

3. The substance of the proposals are not subject to judicial review since what to
propose, subject to the above limitation, is left to the wisdom of the constituent assembly.
However, the manner of making the proposal is subject to judicial review (Bernas, The 1987
Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 545).

CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION of the 1987CONSTITUTION

Q: How should the Philippine Constitution be interpreted?

A:

1. Verba legis
– whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.

2. Ratio legis et anima

– where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of the framers.

3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat

– the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole. (Francisco v. HR, G.R. No. 160261, Nov.
10, 2003)

Q: In case of doubt, how should the Constitution be construed?

A: The provisions should be considered self‐ executing; mandatory rather than directory; and
prospective rather than retroactive. (Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, 2005 ed., p. 3)

Q: What is the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy?

A: Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or
contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, Feb. 3, 1997)

Notes:

Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions:

1. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self- executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action (Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408).

2. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere

legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, “do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.” Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating
and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution (Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476).

3. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article
II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does
not give rise to any cause of action before the courts (Pamatong vs. Commission on
Elections, 427 SCRA 96).

4. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is
not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v.
Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 746, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that “Some of the
constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution — specifically, Sections 5 (on maintenance of peace and order) and 18(labor as
a primary social economic force) — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to
be non-self-executing” (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, 580
SCRA 295).

5. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also
for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life (Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792).

6. The effectivity of the policy of public disclosure (Sec. 28, Article II) need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide
for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self
executory nature (Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), 568 SCRA 402)

Rule of Prospectivity

• Article III, Sec. 22 – Provides the basis for this Rule. It provides: no expost facto law
or bill of atainder shall be enacted.

• ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE- laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

DEFINITION

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (Article I).

COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL TERRITORY

1. Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein;
2. Internal Waters: waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of breadth and dimension; and
3. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
It consists of:
1. Territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, and other submarine areas
2. Terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains
Notes:

a. Archipelagic Doctrine. An archipelago is a body of water studded with island (Bernas, The
1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011 Ed., p. 4) “The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines” (see Second Sentence of
Article I).The second sentence is an affirmation of the archipelago doctrine, under which we
connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the
waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one
integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so many thousand islands (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 2014 Ed., p.24).

b. Future Acquisitions included in National Territory

The clause includes any territory presently belonging or those that might in the future belong
to the Philippines through any of the accepted international modes of acquiring territory.

c. Territories belonging to Philippines by historic right or title

The clause also includes what was referred to under the 1973 Constitution as territories
"belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title," that is, territories which,
depending on available evidence, might belong to the Philippines (e.g., Sabah, the Marianas,
Freedomland) (Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, 8, 2010).

d. Under Article 3 of the UNCLOS, "every state has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines"

e. Archipelagic Doctrine. It is defined as all waters, around between and connecting different
islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, are
necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming an integral part of the national or inland
waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines. It is found in the 2nd sentence
of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

f. The Philippine archipelago and all other territories consist of the following domains:
(TAFA)
1. Terrestrial
2. Aerial
3. Fluvial
4. All other territories outside archipelago over which RP has sovereignty or jurisdiction

g. Normal Baseline Method The baseline is drawn following the low-water line along the
coasts as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. This line
follows the sinuosities of the coast and therefore would normally not consist of straight lines
(Section 5, 1982 LOS; Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Commentary, 23, 2009).

h. Straight Baselines Method. Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost points
of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to
land); provided that the drawing baselines shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from
the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be
considered internal waters; while the breadth of the territorial sea shall then be measured
from the baselines (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p. 32).
i. The Baseline Law (R.A. 9522, 2009) R.A. No. 9522-amended R.A. No. 3046, entitled "An
Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines;" specified that baselines
of Kalayaan Group of Islands and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) shall be determined
as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines, consistent with the UNCLOS.

R.A. No. 9522 is constitutional:

(a) It is a statutory tool to demarcate the maritime zone and continental shelf
of the Philippines under UNCLOS III, and does not alter the national territory.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III state
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. The law has nothing to do with acquisition, enlargement,
or diminution of territory, as States may only acquire (or lose) territory
through the following modes: (CAPO) Cession, Accretion, Prescription, and
Occupation (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, 2011).

(b) The law also does not abandon the country's claim to Sabah, as it does not
expressly repeal the entirety of R.A. No. 5446. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 187167, Jul. 16, 2011) The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea
of the Philippine Archipelago is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty
(R.A. No. 5446).

The law also does not convert internal waters into archipelagic waters (which allow the right
of innocent passage). The Philippines still exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
The political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their
constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, Jul. 16,
2011).

* The doctrine enunciated in the UNCLOS and affirmed in Article I of the 1987 Constitution,
pertains to the sovereign coastal state and does not place within the territory of LGUs the
waters between and surrounding its islands (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan,
GR Nos. 170867 & 185941, December 4, 2018)

Supreme Court held that there is no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-
Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State, noting that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on
ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the
1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local government units (LGUs) to
share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their
respective areas. The Supreme Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
Palawan.

Supreme Court ruled Palawan’s territorial boundaries do not include the continental shelf
where the Malampaya is located. The Court explained that territorial jurisdiction referred to
"the local government unit's territorial boundaries," or that jurisdiction "pertaining to a
physical location or area as identified by its boundaries." Thus, its 40% share only pertains to
the proceeds from the use and development of natural resources found only in its land area.
Further, the Court ruled that the UNCLOS cannot be considered to have vested the LGUs
with their own continental shelf based on the doctrine of transformation. Continental
shelf under the UNCLOS does not automatically apply to a province. The UNCLOS
operates in inter-state relations, not intra-state relations.
* MR Resolution: January 21, 2020- The Constitution does not define a local government
unit's territorial jurisdiction in relation to its entitlement to an equitable share in the utilization
and development of the natural wealth.

It is, thus, inaccurate to declare that a local government unit's territory, and by extension, its
territorial jurisdiction, can only be over land that is contiguous. When the territory consists of
one (1) or more islands, territorial jurisdiction can also be exercised over all waters found
inland, or in any area that is part of its seabed, subsoil, or continental margin, "in the manner
provided by law[.]"

The Supreme Court ruled that an LGU’s area of jurisdiction need only be properly identified
by metes and bounds if it is composed of islands. In order to properly identify the metes and
bounds of the province of Palawan, it is not only the contiguity of the land mass that must be
considered. After considering other laws, such as PD 1596, which established the KIG, the
Court ruled that the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan includes the entirety of
the Municipality of Kalayaan, including its seabed, subsoil, and the continental margin. This
more liberal interpretation is only consistent with the Philippines vs. China Arbitral Ruling.
Thus, the 2020 Resolution clarified that an LGU , when composed of one or more islands,
exercises territorial jurisdiction over all waters found inland, or in any area that is part of its
seabed, subsoil, or continental margin, in the manner provided by law. This notwithstanding,
the Court maintained its earlier ruling that the Province of Palawan is not entitled to any share
in the proceeds of the Malampaya.

CAPITOL WIRELESS v. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS G.R.

No. 180110 | 791 SCRA 272| May 30, 2016 | The Supreme Court ruled that submarine or
undersea communications can be likened to electric transmission lines, which may qualify as
“machinery,” that can be subjected to real property tax. On the argument of Capwire that the
cables lie on international waters, the Supreme Court discussed that Nasugbu is a coastal town,
with its surrounding sea considered territorial sea, over which the country has sovereignty
under UNCLOS. Further, under Article 79 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines has jurisdiction
over cables laid in our territory that are utilized in support of other installations and structures
also in the Philippines.

REGIME OF ISLANDS

Under Article 121 of the UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tides, qualifies under the
category of "regime of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones (e.g., Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal).

o Kalayaan Islands has its own Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone,

and Exclusive Economic Zone.
o BUT Scarborough Shoal ONLY has a Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone.
 o There can be a Continental Shelf without an EEZ, but not an
EEZ without a Continental Shelf.

RIGHT OF COASTAL STATE OVER MARITIME ZONES

TERRITORIAL ZONE 12 nautical miles from Absolute Sovereignty

baselines
CONTIGUOUS ZONE 24 nautical miles from Enforcement
baselines of
customs, fiscal,
immigration, sanitation laws
EXCLUSIVE 200 nautical miles from Sovereign rights of
ECONOMIC baselines exploitation of living and
non-living resources
CONTINENTAL SHELF Submerged prolongation of Sovereign rights of
the land territory. exploration and exploitation
of natural resources,
including mineral and non-
living resources

TERRITORIAL SEA

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with
the UNCLOS. (UNCLOS, art. 3).

Sovereignty over these waters (including the airspace above it and the seabed under
it) is the same extent as its sovereignty over land. There is a right of innocent passage
(UNCLOS, art. 7), and in case of certain straits, to transit passage.

Under the UNCLOS, features that are above water at high tide generate an
entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are
submerged at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones. (The South
China Sea Arbitration, 2013-19, Jul. 12, 2016)

CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Definition

The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (UNCLOS, art. 33)

Area of water not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline. It thus extends 12
nautical miles from the edge of the territorial sea (UNCLOS, art. 33).

Jurisdiction over Contiguous Zone

In the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
  Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
 Punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea. (UNCLOS, Art. 33)

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Definition

The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
(UNCLOS, art. 57)

The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which
the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS
(UNCLOS, art. 55).

Jurisdiction over EEZ: In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:

1. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;

2. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS with

regard to:

1. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations

and structures;

2. maritime scientific research;

3. the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

4. Other rights and duties provided for in the UNCLOS.

(UNCLOS, art. 56)

Under the UNCLOS, states have the sovereign right to exploit the resources of
this zone, but shall share that part of the catch that is beyond its capacity to
harvest. (UNCLOS, art. 62)

Obligations of Coastal State In exercising their rights and performing their

duties under the UNCLOS in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a
manner compatible with the provisions of the UNCLOS (UNCLOS, art. 56)
The entitlement of a feature to an exclusive economic zone depends on the objective capacity
of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or
economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in
nature. The current presence of official personnel on the features is not enough to establish
the right to an EEZ. (The South China Sea Arbitration, 2013-19, Jul. , 2016)

Within its EEZ, a coastal state may also:

1. Establish and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (UNCLOS,
art. 60)
2. Conduct scientific research; and
3. Preserve and protect its marine environment.

However, under Article 58, UNCLOS, all states enjoy the freedom of navigation, over flight,
and laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the EEZ of coastal states.

The coastal state has the right to enforce all laws and regulations enacted to conserve and
manage the living resources in its EEZ. It may board and inspect a ship, arrest a ship and its
crew and institute judicial proceedings against them. In detention of foreign vessels, the
coastal state has the duty to promptly notify the flag state of the action taken. (UNCLOS, art.
73)

Conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ must be resolved on
the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances, taking into account the
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international
community as a whole (UNCLOS, art. 59).

CONTINENTAL SHELF

Also known as the archipelagic or insular shelf which refers to:

1. The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal State but outside
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth
allows exploitation, and
2. The seabed and subsoil of areas adjacent to islands. (UNCLOS, art. 76).

Extended Continental Shelf

It is part of the Continental Shelf that lies beyond the 200 nautical miles from the coastal
baselines. It is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial
sea of the coastal state throughout the natural prolongation of its lands territory up to:
1. The outer edge of the continental margin; or
2. A distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (UNCLOS, art. 76)

Continental margin

The submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state, and consists of the seabed
and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. (UNCLOS, art. 76)

Limits of the Continental Shelf

The juridical or legal continental shelf covers the area until 200 nautical miles from baselines.
The extended continental shelf covers the area from the 200-mile mark to 350 nautical
miles from the baselines depending on geomorphologic or geological data and
information.

When the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the coastal state shall establish
its outer limits.

At any rate, the continental shelf shall not extend beyond 350 nautical miles from the baseline
of the territorial sea, or 100 nautical miles from the 2500- meter isobath (i.e., the point where
the waters are 2500 meters deep).

Rights of the Coastal State

The continental shelf does not form part of the territory of the coastal state.

It only has sovereign rights with respect to the exploration and exploitation of its natural
resources, including the mineral and other non- living resources of the seabed and subsoil
together with living organisms belonging to the sedentary species. (UNCLOS, art. 77)

The coastal state has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate oil-drilling on its
continental shelf. (UNCLOS, art. 81)

High Seas
All parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea
or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.
(UNCLOS, Art. 86)

Allowable Acts in the High Seas

1. Freedom of navigation
2. Freedom of overflight
3. Freedom of scientific research
4. Freedom to construct artificial islands and structures
5. Freedom of fishing
6. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines (UNCLOS, art. 87).

ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 | 735 SCRA 102 | September 16, 2014- While it is
true that the US has not ratified the UNCLOS, the Court adopted Justice Carpio’s discussion
during the deliberations that the US, as a matter of long-standing policy, considers itself
bound by the customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans,” now
codified in the UNCLOS. Non-membership to the UNCLOS does not mean that the US can
simply disregard the Philippines’ right as a coastal state over the internal waters and
territorial sea.

LEGAL/HISTORICAL BASIS OF PHILIPPINES CLAIM OVER:

1. SPRATLY ISLANDS/KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP (constituted under RA 1596)-

part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380
miles west of the southern end of Palawan. Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the
entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines
essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
The Philippines claims the Kalayaan Island Group on the assumption that after Japan
renounced its title to the islands in the San Francisco Treaty of Peace of 1951, they reverted
to being terra nullius because title was not explicitly passed to another state. Therefore, when
a Filipino explorer named Tomas Cloma declared ownership over 33 maritime features in the
Spratly Islands in 1956, no other country had a valid claim to them. In 1978, the
administration of President Ferdinand Marcos issued a decree that listed three bases for the
Philippines’ legitimate rights to the territory: (1) contiguity with the Philippine archipelago,
(2) historical title, and (3) the lapsing of others’ claims. Following the passage in March 2009
of a legislative act to bring the Philippines’ baselines in conformity with the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines’ claim to territorial waters around the
maritime features of the Kalayaan Island Group appears to have been restricted to using the
low-water baseline, therefore precluding the treatment of the islands as an archipelagic group.

The Philippines claims part of the area as its territory under UNCLOS, an agreement parts of
which have been ratified by the countries involved in the Spratly islands dispute. However,
China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Vietnam are the only ones to have made claims based on
historical sovereignty of the islands.

2. SCABOROUGH SHOAL (BAJO MASINLOC) also known as scarborough reef, Panatag

Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly
rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic
Bay. Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) is not an island. Bajo de Masinloc is also not
part of the Spratlys. About five of these rocks are above water during high tide. Of these five
rocks, some are about 3 meters high above water. The rest of the rocks and reefs are below
water during high tide.

Bajo de Masinloc’s (Scarborough Shoal) chain of reefs and rocks is about 124 NM from the
nearest coast of Luzon and approximately 472 NM from the nearest coast of China. Bajo de
Masinloc is located approximately along latitude 15°08′N and longitude 117°45′E. The rocks
of Bajo de Masinloc are situated north of the Spratlys. Obviously, therefore, the rocks of Bajo
de Masinloc is also within the 200-NM EEZ and 200-NM continental shelf (CS) of the
Philippines.

A distinction has to be made between the rock features of Bajo de Masinloc and the larger
body of water and continental shelf where the said geological features are situated.

*The Philippines exercises full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de
Masinloc, and sovereign rights over the waters and continental shelf where the said rock
features of Bajo de Masinloc are situated.

A. The rock features of Bajo de Masinloc: Basis of Philippine sovereignty under Public
International Law. The rock features of Bajo de Masinloc are Philippine territories.

As decided in a number of cases by international courts or tribunals, most notably the Palmas
Island Case, a modality for acquiring territorial ownership over a piece of real estate is
effective exercise of jurisdiction. Indeed, in that particular case, sovereignty over the Palmas
Island was adjudged in favor of the Netherlands on the basis of “effective exercise of
jurisdiction,” although the said island may have been historically discovered by Spain and
historically ceded to the U.S. in the Treaty of Paris. In the case of Bajo de Masinloc, the
Philippines has exercised both effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over Bajo de
Masinloc since its independence.

B. Waters outside and around Bajo de Masinloc: Basis of Philippine sovereign rights under
UNCLOS

As earlier indicated, there is a distinction between the rock features of Bajo de Masinloc and
the waters within its vicinity. The question of who owns the rocks is a matter governed by the
principles of public international law relating to modalities for acquiring territories. On the
other hand, the extent of its adjacent waters is governed by UNCLOS. Likewise, the waters
outside of the maritime area of Bajo de Masinloc are also governed by UNCLOS.

As noted, there are only about five rocks in Bajo de Masinloc that are above water during
high tide. The rest are below water during high tide. Accordingly, these rocks have only 12
NM maximum territorial waters under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Because the Philippines has
sovereignty over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, it follows that it has also sovereignty over
their 12-NM territorial waters.

The waters and continental shelves outside of the 12-NM territorial waters of the rocks of
Bajo de Masinloc appropriately belong to the 200-NM EEZ and CS of the Philippine
archipelago. As such, the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore and
exploit the resources within the said areas to the exclusion of other countries under
UNCLOS. Part V of UNCLOS specifically provides that the Philippines exercises exclusive
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage resources, whether living or
nonliving, in this area.

Therefore, the current action of the Chinese surveillance vessels in the said 200-NM EEZ of
the Philippines that are law enforcement in nature is obviously inconsistent with its right of
freedom of navigation and in violation of the sovereign rights of the Philippines under
UNLOS.

Key Points on Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Verdict on the PH-China Dispute over
Scarborough Shoal: In Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2013-19
(In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of the
Philippines and the People’s Republic of China), decided on 12 July 2016, the
arbitration court declared “as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash
line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they
exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under
the Convention; and further DECLARES that the Convention superseded any historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein” .

What is the "nine-dash line"? (11 dash line?)

What has become known as the "9-dash line" first appeared on an official Chinese map in
1948. In that year, the Ministry of the Interior of then Republic Government of China
published a "Map Showing the Location of the Various Islands in the South Sea". China
argues that it has historical rights to the waters encompassed by the "nine-dash line". On the
other hand, the Philippines argues both (a) that any rights that China may have had in the
maritime areas of the South China Sea beyond those provided for in the UNCLOS were
extinguished by China's accession to the Convention and (b) that China never had historic
rights in the waters of the South China Sea.

The arbitral tribunal agreed unanimously with the Philippines. In its award, it concluded that
there is no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or
resources, hence there was "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the nine-
dash line.

China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation of
rights and maritime zones in the Convention and concluded that to the extent China had
historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such China's accession to the
Convention and its entry into force, any historic rights that China may have had to the living
and non-living resources within the "9-dash line" were superseded, as a matter of law, and as
between the Philippines and China, by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the
Convention.

b.) The Status of Features in the South China Sea

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the status of features in the South
China Sea and the entitlements to maritime areas that China could potentially claim
pursuant to the Convention. The Tribunal first undertook a technical evaluation as to
whether certain coral reefs claimed by China are or are not above water at high tide. Under
Articles 13 and 121 of the Convention, features that are above water at high tide generate an
entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged
at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones. The Tribunal noted that many of the
reefs in the South China Sea have been heavily modified by recent land reclamation and
construction and recalled that the Convention classifies features on the basis of their natural
condition. The Tribunal appointed an expert hydrographer to assist it in evaluating the
Philippines’ technical evidence and relied heavily on archival materials and historical
hydrographic surveys in evaluating the features. The Tribunal agreed with the Philippines
that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are high-tide
features and that Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal were
submerged at high tide in their natural condition . However, the Tribunal disagreed with the
Philippines regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef and concluded
that both are high tide features. The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features
claimed by China could generate an entitlement to maritime zones beyond 12 nautical
miles. Under Article 121 of the Convention, islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but “rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.”

The Tribunal noted that this provision was closely linked to the expansion of coastal State
jurisdiction with the creation of the exclusive economic zone and was intended to prevent
insignificant features from generating large entitlements to maritime zones that would
infringe on the entitlements of inhabited territory or on the high seas and the area of the
seabed reserved for the common heritage of mankind. The Tribunal interpreted Article 121
and concluded that the entitlements of a feature depend on (a) the objective capacity of a
feature, (b) in its natural condition, to sustain either (c) a stable community of people or (d)
economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in
nature. The Tribunal noted that many of the features in the Spratly Islands are currently
controlled by one or another of the littoral States, which have constructed installations and
maintain personnel there. The Tribunal considered these modern presences to be dependent
on outside resources and support and noted that many of the features have been modified to
improve their habitability, including through land reclamation and the construction of
infrastructure such as desalination plants. The Tribunal concluded that the current presence
of official personnel on many of the features does not establish their capacity, in their
natural condition, to sustain a stable community of people and considered that historical
evidence of habitation or economic life was more relevant to the objective capacity of the
features. Examining the historical record, the Tribunal noted that the Spratly Islands were
historically used by small groups of fishermen from China, as well as other States, and that
several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted in the 1920s and
1930s. The Tribunal concluded that temporary use of the features by fishermen did not
amount to inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity
had been extractive in nature. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide
features in the Spratly Islands (including, for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island,
Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally “rocks” that do not generate an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The Tribunal also held that the Convention
does not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime
zones collectively as a unit.

c.) Chinese Activities in the South China Sea

In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness under the Convention
of various Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having found that Mischief Reef,
Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged at high tide, form part of the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines, and are not overlapped by any
possible entitlement of China, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention is clear in
allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea areas in its exclusive
economic zone. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China had (a) interfered with
Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to prohibit fishing by
Philippine vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, (c) protected and failed
to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone
at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed installations and artificial
islands at Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Philippines. The Tribunal therefore
concluded that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Tribunal next examined traditional
fishing at Scarborough Shoal and concluded that fishermen from the Philippines, as well as
fishermen from China and other countries, had long fished at the Shoal and had traditional
fishing rights in the area. Because Scarborough Shoal is above water at high tide, it
generates an entitlement to a territorial sea, its surrounding waters do not form part of the
exclusive economic zone, and traditional fishing rights were not extinguished by the
Convention. Although the Tribunal emphasized that it was not deciding sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal, it found that China had violated its duty to respect to the traditional
fishing rights of Philippine fishermen by halting access to the Shoal after May 2012. The
Tribunal noted, however, that it would reach the same conclusion with respect to the
traditional fishing rights of Chinese fishermen if the Philippines were to prevent fishing by
Chinese nationals at Scarborough Shoal. The Tribunal also considered the effect of China’s
actions on the marine environment. In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by three
independent experts on coral reef biology who were appointed to assist it in evaluating the
available scientific evidence and the Philippines’ expert reports. The Tribunal found that
China’s recent large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven
features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and that
China has violated its obligation under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to preserve
and protect the marine environment with respect to fragile ecosystems and the habitat of
depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese fishermen
have engaged in the harvesting of endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a
substantial scale in the South China Sea, using methods that inflict severe damage on the
coral reef environment. The Tribunal found that Chinese authorities were aware of these
activities and failed to fulfill their due diligence obligations under the Convention to stop
them. Finally, the Tribunal considered the lawfulness of the conduct of Chinese law
enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal on two occasions in April and May 2012 when
Chinese vessels had sought to physically obstruct Philippine vessels from approaching or
gaining entrance to the Shoal. In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by an independent expert
on navigational safety who was appointed to assist it in reviewing the written reports
provided by the officers of the Philippine vessels and the expert evidence on navigational
safety provided by the Philippines. The Tribunal found that Chinese law enforcement vessels
had repeatedly approached the Philippine vessels at high speed and sought to cross ahead of
them at close distances, creating serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and
personnel. The Tribunal concluded that China had breached its obligations under the
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and
Article 94 the Convention concerning maritime safety. UNCLOS.

3. SABBAH-

Republic Act No. 5446 of the Philippines, which was passed by the legislature on 26 August
1968 and signed by Marcos on 18 September, regards Sabah as a territory "over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty".

The Philippines maintains a territorial claim over eastern Sabah (formerly known as North
Borneo) based on an agreement signed in 1878 between the Sultan of Sulu and the North
Borneo Chartered Company.

After Japanese occupation during World War II, British crown colony status was granted
(1946), and Sabah joined Malaysia in 1963. It became a British protectorate in 1888 and at
the end of World War II, North Borneo was handed over to the British government. Through
a referendum held in 1963, it gained independence and its people voted in favour of joining
Malaysia. This resulted in North Borneo being renamed as Sabah.

4. AYUNGIN SHOAL (also known as the Second Thomas Shoal)

Ayungin Shoal is not an island; it is a low-tide elevation that cannot be appropriated or
subjected to sovereignty claims. Ayungin Shoal is located 106.3 nautical miles from the
Philippine island of Palawan. On the other hand, Ayungin Shoal is 423.30 NM from the
Paracels, and 617.39 NM from the Chinese mainland - clearly beyond the 200 NM maximum
maritime entitlement for an EEZ under UNCLOS. In accordance with UNCLOS and the final
and binding 2016 Award in the South China Sea Arbitration, Ayungin Shoal is "within the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines," over which the Philippines
has sovereign rights and jurisdiction. China cannot, therefore, lawfully exercise sovereignty
over it.
The resupply mission to and the upkeep of the BRP Sierra Madre are legitimate Philippine
Government activities in our EEZ, and in accordance with international law, particularly
UNCLOS.

The BRP Sierra Madre is a commissioned Philippine naval vessel permanently stationed in
Ayungin Shoal in 1999 to serve as a constant Philippine government presence in response to
China's illegal occupation in 1995 of Panganiban Reef, also known as Mischief Reef. This
was prior to the signing of the DOC in 2002.

The Philippines has not entered into any agreement abandoning its sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf, including in the vicinity of Ayungin Shoal.

The arbitral tribunal ruled that Mischief Reef is a low-tide feature forming part of the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. Despite this, China illegally reclaimed Mischief
Reef and converted it into the largest air and naval base of China in the Spratlys. Because of
Ayungin Shoal’s proximity to Mischief Reef, China wants to seize Ayungin Shoal from the
Philippines.

5. BENHAM RISE/Philippine Rise- The Philippine Rise, formerly called the Benham Rise, is
a seismically active undersea region and extinct volcanic ridge located in the Philippine Sea
approximately 250 km (160 mi) east of the northern coastline of Dinapigue, Isabela. The Rise
has been known to the people of Catanduanes as Kalipung-awan since pre-colonial times,
which literally means 'loneliness from an isolated place'.

Under the Philippine Sea lie a number of basins including the West Philippine Sea Basin,
inside of which is located the Central Basin Fault (CBF).The Benham Plateau is located in
the CBF and its basement probably is a micro-continent. Several scientific surveys have been
made on the feature to study its nature and its impact on tectonic subduction, including one
about its effects on the 1990 Luzon earthquake. The Philippines claimed this feature as part
of its continental shelf in a claim filed with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf on April 8, 2009, and which was approved under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2012.

It is designated as a "protected food supply exclusive zone" by the Philippine government in

May 2017. Mining and oil exploration is banned in the Benham Plateau as a protected area.
On May 16, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 25 renaming the
feature to “Philippine Rise”, and later allowed international vessels to conduct research on the
Rise.

Despite its proximity to the archipelago, the plateau was previously not included in the
territory of the Philippines. On April 8, 2009, the Republic of the Philippines lodged a partial
territorial waters claim with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf in relation to the continental shelf in the region of Benham Rise. It was submitted as
part of petition expanding the archipelago's baselines and exclusive economic zone through a
law that also included other claims involving disputed territories of the Kalayaan Islands
(Spratly Islands) and Scarborough Shoal. Although the landform, in itself, is not disputed, the
petition still received some criticism from China. According to the government's claim, based
on a set of guidelines by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the area
satisfies the 350-mile constraint line since the outer limits of the continental shelf are located
landward of the constraint line, which is located 350 miles from the baselines where the
measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea begins.

The Philippines filed its claim for Benham Rise in 2008 in compliance with the requirements
of the [[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas. The UN officially approved the
claim in April 2012, the first claim of the Philippines approved by an international body since
the colonial era. China released a statement saying that they do not recognize the ruling and
that China seeks to claim the Benham Rise in the near future as it is part of a so-called
'Chinese second-chain islands'. However, there are no existing islands within the Benham
Rise.

ATTY. ROMEO M. ESMERO vs. PRESIDENT, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, G.R. No.
256288, June 29, 2021-Indeed, the President is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago,
including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it
has sovereignty or jurisdiction. By constitutional fiat and the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.

The President, as the chief architect of Philippine foreign policy, is given utmost discretion,
accountable only to the country in his political character and to his conscience.

Ultimately, the decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily,
diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government. xxx The Constitution
vests executive power, which includes the duty to execute the law, protect the Philippines,
and conduct foreign affairs, in the President- not this Court.

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

* All provisions of the Constitution are self-executing unless otherwise intended.

The exception to this rule are provisions which merely lay down a general principle,
such as those laid down in the declaration of principles and state policies (Espina v.
Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010). Since they are not self-executing,
they require implementing legislations.

But there are state policies that are inherently self-executory, such as the following:

1) Right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July
30, 1993);
2) Promotion and protection of health in Article II, Section 15 (Imbong v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014);
3) Right to information under Article III, Section 7 (Legaspi v. CSC, G.R. No.
L-72119, May 29, 1987);
4) Filipino First Policy (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3,
1997.]
 STATE PRINCIPLES

Republicanism (Manifestations)

SOVEREIGNTY: Supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a state by which the state
is governed.

Theory of Auto-Limitation- it is the property of the State –force due to which a State has
exclusive legal competence of self-limitation and self-restriction. Tanada v. Angara-
Sovereignty is subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.

“Dominium” v Imperium”

“Dominium”- capacity of the State to own property.

- covers such rights as title to land, exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the
same. The Regalian doctrine- all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and anyone
claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept. In this capacity,
the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes liable as such.

“Imperium”- State’s authority to govern.

- covers such activities as passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order
over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. When the State acts in this capacity, it
generally enjoys sovereign immunity.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. The jurisdiction of the state is understood as

both its authority and the sphere of the exercise of that authority. (Sinco)

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE & DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

- The State may not be sued without its consent. (Sec 3, Art XVI)

- There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws on
which the right depends. [Kawananakoa v.Polyblank 205 US 349]

- also called the doctrine of Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty

If the State is amenable to suits, all its time would be spent defending itself from suits and
this would prevent it from performing it other functions. [Republic v. Villasor]

A. A suit is against the State regardless of who is named the defendant if:

1) it produces adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of

public funds and loss of government property.

2) cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent.

B. In the following cases, it was held that the suit is not against the State:
1) when the purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of making
payments pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make
 such payment, since the suit is intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty.
(Begoso v. PVA)

2) when from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a public
officer sued in a private capacity;

3) when the action is not in personam with the government as the named defendant, but
an action in rem that does not name the government in particular.

DOH, et al. VS. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., G.R. NO. 169304, March 13, 2007 The
defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the
government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and
mandamus. The defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which
do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. [Philippine Agila
Satellite, Inc. v. Trinidad-Lichauco, G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 22]

C. How the State’s consent to be sued is given

1. Express consent

• It is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted
statute.

• It may be embodied either in a:

a. general law- authorizes any person who meets the conditions stated in the law
to sue the government in accordance with the procedure in the law.

Money claims arising from contracts

1. Act. No. 3083 :when a money judgment is given against the government, the
ordinary rule for execution of judgment would not apply, for consent of the
government to be sued is only up to the point of judgment.

The procedure is for the Commission on Audit to furnish the Office of the President
with the decisions so it could include the amount in the budget for the next year as
basis for appropriation (since there can be no disbursement of public funds except in
pursuance of law). If the Judge nonetheless issues a writ of execution against the
government funds or property, no ordinary civil action can be filed against him,
unless there is a clear showing of malice. But a reinstatement of the funds to the
government accounts and a refund by the private party can be ordered.
(Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616)

2. CA 327 as amended by PD 1445: an act fixing the time within which the Auditor
General should render his decision and prescribing the manner of appeal

a. decision rendered within 60 days after receipt of necessary

information for cases involving settlement of accounts or claims

b. decision rendered within 100 days from submission for

accounts for accountable officers

c. decision may be appealed in writing to the President or the

 Supreme Court within 30 days if aggrieved party is a private
person

d. appeal may be taken by the proper head of department or head

of office or branch immediately concerned.
Sayson v. Singson, 54 SCRA 282

3. PD 3038; DA v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693

b. special law- may come in the form of a private bill authorizing a named
individual to bring suit on a special claim

* Merritt v. Govt. of the P.I., 34 Phil 311

4. Act 2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective conditions of
roads, streets, public buildings and other public works under the control and
supervision.

5. PD 1620 (IRRI)

6. Section 22 (2) of RA 7160, LGC- Local Government Units have been given the
power to sue and be sued.

7. PD 1807- It provides procedure whereby the Republic of the Philippines may waive its
sovereign immunity from suit. It provides other legal proceedings with respect to itself on
its property in connection with foreign obligations contracted by it pursuant to law.

2. Implied consent

1. when the State enters into a business/commercial contract or itself commences litigation.

i. State may only be liable for proprietary acts (jure gestioni) and not for
sovereign acts (jure imperii)-
US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487
JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224
US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
Malong v. PNR, 138 SCRA 63
Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil 281
Syquia v. Almeda-Lopez, 84 Phil 312

ii. Restrictive Doctrine of Immunity from Suit- The restrictive application of

State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.” (Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])

Two concepts of SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

 1. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (Holy
See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524; China National Machinery
Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA 189).

2. As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity

from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis) (JUSMAG v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224; China National
Machinery vs. Sta. Maria) Mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such
an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

b. when state files complaint, suability will result only where the government is
claiming affirmative relief from the defendant Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, 95 Phil
905 Lim v. Brwonell, 107 Phil 345 Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, Dec. 17, 1990

c. when it would be inequitable for the State to invoke its immunity in instances
when the State takes private property for public use or purpose. EPG
Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, March 16, 2001 [The doctrine
should not used to perpetrate an Injustice on a citizen.]

The ATO is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or

sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of
the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State's immunity from
suit. Air Transportation Office vs. Sps. David and Elisea Ramos [G.R. No. 159402,
February 23, 2011]

b. non payment of just compensation in expropriation cases (Section 9 of Article III.

Ministerio vs. CFI)

3. When does liability attach?

The Government is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees,
when they act as special agents within the meaning of (ART. 2180 (6) CC).

Special agent one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to
the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations
(Merritt v. Govt of the Philippine Islands)

Shauf v CA

Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State.

The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen, for acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.

When the Government creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation a

separate entity and with the capacity to sue and be sued.

Consent to be sued includes actions based on quasi-delict even though committed by

regular, and not special agents.

Rule: a government entity can be sued for tort, but if it is it can invoke the defense
that it acted through its regular employee, and not through a special agent.

The principle of State immunity from suit does not apply when the relief demanded
requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State no the affirmative
discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even
though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
virtue of a title of the State and as its agents and servants. (Republic v Sandoval)

Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)-A petition filed for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan directed against the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet for the destruction
of our corrals in Tubbataha reef (a protected area system under the NIPAS [National
Integrated Protected Areas System] and a UN declared World Heritage Site because
of its rich marine bio-diversity) in the Sulu Sea caused by the USS Guardian, an
American naval vessel when it ran aground there in the course of its voyage to
Indonesia from its base in Okinawa, Japan, will not prosper for lack of jurisdiction
following the doctrine of sovereign equality of all States. In effect, the suit is a suit
against the US government and, therefore, should be dismissed.

The waiver of immunity from suit of the US under the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) applies only to waiver from criminal jurisdiction, so that if an
American soldier commits an offense in the Philippines, he shall be tried by
Philippine courts under Philippine laws. The waiver did not include the special civil
action for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan.

Also, the demand for compensation for the destruction of our corrals in Tubbataha
reef has been rendered moot and academic. After all, the US already signified its
intention to pay damages, as expressed by the US embassy officials in the
Philippines, the only request is that a panel of experts composed of scientists be
constituted to assess the total damage caused to our corrals there, which request is not
unreasonable.

Scope of consent

Government Funds may not be subject to Garnishment- The funds of the UP are
government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing
from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could
not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the
State did not necessarily mean its liability. (UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679
SCRA 54, 23 August 2012, 1st Div. [Bersamin])

Incorporated agencies: Separate Juridical Personality- The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that if a government agency has a separate juridical personality, its
funds may be garnished. Should not a further inquiry be made as to what is the
source of such funds and for what purpose such funds were appropriated? If the funds
sought to be garnished came from a legislative appropriation and they were
appropriated for a certain special purpose, they should be exempt from garnishment.
Otherwise, the funds will be diverted from the purpose for which they were
appropriated.

Government not liable for interest and costs- Marine Trading Co., Inc. v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 39 Phil. 29, 33 (1918). Except: Sec. 12 of
Rule 67 of the Rules (Expropriation) Interest is also not chargeable against it except
when it has expressly stipulated to pay it or when interest is allowed by an act of the
legislature or in eminent domain cases where damage sustained by the owner takes the
form of interest at the legal rate (Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252).

Contract of Loans of Government

The Supreme Court, in its decision in February 2012 saying Northrail project
contractor China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. was not entitled to
immunity from suit, pointed out that “(t)he mantle of State immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts… a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued when it enters into business contracts.”
Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. (China National Machinery and
Equipment Corp. vs. Santamaria, G.R. No. 185572, Feb 7, 2012)

Loan contracts fall squarely as business contracts.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency, a major source of financial aid for the
Philippines, has a specific provision on the waiving of sovereign immunity in its loan
documents. It requires the borrower to “irrevocably waive (i) any and all of its
privileges and sovereign immunities from and against any lawsuit and enforcement
of arbitral award and (ii) any and all privileges and sovereign immunities on any of
its properties from and against any attachment, enforcement and any other legal
proceedings, both of which it may be entitled to as a legal defense under any
applicable international or domestic law.”

By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1807, the Philippines waived its immunity
from suit with respect to its foreign debts.

In instances where the law expressly authorizes the Republic of the Philippines to
contract or incur a foreign obligation, it may consent to be sued in connection
therewith. The President of the Philippines or his duly designated representative
may, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, contractually agree To waive any
claim to sovereign immunity from suit or legal proceedings and from set-off,
attachment or execution with respect to its property, and to be sued in any
appropriate jurisdiction in regard to such foreign obligation.
PD 1807- Waiver from Execution of Patrimonial Properties of the Republic of
the Philippines- not included those properties for public use and public service.

Exemption from legal requirements. When the state litigates, either directly or
through its authorized officers, it is not required to put up a bond for damages, or an
appeal bond since it can be always assumed that it is always solvent (Araneta v.
Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 323, cited in Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014 Ed., p,
75)

This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to GOCCs for the reason
that the latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC’s
majority stockholder, the State, will always be presumed solvent, the presumption
does not necessarily extend to the GOCC itself (Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation v. Pacana, 649 SCRA 196).

However, when a GOCC becomes a “government machinery to carry out a declared

government policy,” it becomes similarly situated as its majority stockholder as there
is the assurance that the government will necessarily fund its primary functions.
Thus, a GOCC that is sued in relation to its governmental functions may be, under
appropriate circumstances, exempted from the payment of appeal fees (Ibid).

RELATED MATTERS:

1. The State’s immunity extends to Head of State who is the personification of the
state (see Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 1 QB 149, cited in Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p. 660). The State’s diplomatic agents, including consuls
to a certain extent, are also exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts and
administrative tribunals (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p.
36) of his authority or jurisdiction (Liang v. People, supra).

2. The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies, are likewise
beyond the jurisdiction of the local courts (Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations; World Health Organization v.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242).

3. An intergovernmental organization, including its departments, enjoys functional

independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located. Invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing
because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over
a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement
of the parties can provide one (SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580).

4. International organizations enjoy almost absolute, if not absolute, immunity. This

grant of immunity protects their affairs from political pressure or control by the host
country and prevents local courts from exercising jurisdiction over them. On the
other hand, personnel of international organizations are entitled to immunity only for
acts performed in their official capacity. They enjoy functional immunity or only that
necessary to exercise the organization’s functions and fulfill its purposes. Immunity
does not apply to their private acts, crimes, and those acts contrary to law. Immunity
of ADB Officials Limited to Official Acts. (Westfall vs. Locsin, et al., G.R. No.
250673, April 16, 2024)
INCORPORATION CLAUSE -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. [Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

Any treaty, customary international law or generally accepted international law

principle has the status of a municipal statutory law.

Incorporated/Transformed to be part of the laws of the land:

1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs.Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6,

2005) and executive agreements

2. norms of general or customary laws (jus cogens)

3. treaties which have become part of customary law (Mejoff vs. Director
o G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015ionaf Prisons; Kuroda vs.
Jalandoni

Under the incorporation clause, these principles form part of the law of the land.
And, "by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law."

The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by

transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of

the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation

pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution ... Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. David v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529 (2016)

It signifies that treaties and international agreements are not automatically

incorporated to the Philippine legal system, but are transformed into domestic law by
Senate concurrence.

Norms of general or customary laws:

Alanis vs. CA, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be ensured by the
State. This is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, a statute, and an
international convention to which the Philippines is a party. With the Philippines as a
state party to the Convention (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women), the emerging customary norm, and not least of all in
accordance with its constitutional duty, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7192, or
the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Reiterating Article II, Section
14, the law lays down the steps the government would take to attain this policy.

Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the text
of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is
the correct interpretation.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children
cannot use their mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court
treated the surnames of petitioner's mother and father unequally.

Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule derived
from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign
judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 - Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding
as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based
on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles
of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."
These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself,
as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights

The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the

Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402- International law
has long recognized the right to self- determination of "peoples," understood not
 merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. Among the
conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which state,
in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-
determination, "ʺfreely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development"

Right to self-determination of a people is The establishment of a sovereign and

normally fulfilled through internal self independent State or the emergence into any
determination – a people’s pursuit of its other political status freely determined by a
political, economic, social and cultural people constitute modes of implementing the
development within the framework of an right of self- determination by that people.
existing state. (The Province of North (The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic Government of the Republic of the
of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
Domain, 568 SCRA 402). 568 SCRA 402).

Internal External

Power of the state to control its domestic The power of the State to direct its relations
affairs. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014 with other States, also known as
Ed., p. 43) independence. (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 2014 Ed., p. 43

The people's right to self- determination should not, however, be understood as

extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between
the right of internal and external self-determination.

The right to innocent passage is a customary international law- In the absence of

municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate
to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject
to the treaty's limitations or conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus, automatically incorporated in
the corpus of the Philippine law (Magallona v. Ermita, GR # 187167, August 16,
2011)

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8, 2010- At this

time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyarta Principles (the Application
of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity), contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlines in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state
of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Xxx Using even the most liberal lenses, these Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are – at best - de
lege refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.

Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law

nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
 cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amounts to no
more than well-meaning desires, without support of either State practice or opinio
juris.

Pangilinan vs. Alan Peter S. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875/G.R.

No. 239483/G.R. No. 240954, March 16, 2021- It has been
opined that the principle of law in the Rome Statute are generally
accepted principles of international law. Assuming that this is true
and considering the incorporation clause, the Philippines’
withdrawal from the Rome Statute would be a superfluity thus,
ultimately ineffectual. The Philippines ultimately remain bound by
obligations expressed in the Rome Statute.

In case of CONFLICT between a Treaty and Statute? = MUNICIPAL

LAW/STATUE

Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted principles of International
Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local

courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA
230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances
(Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion,
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000].

Pangilinan vs. Alan Peter S. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875/G.R. No. 239483/G.R.
No. 240954, March 16, 2021- A valid treaty or international agreement may be
effective just as a statute is effective. It has the force and effect of law. Still, statutes
enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case of conflict between a law
and a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail. (obiter dictum)

STATE POLICIES

SEPARATION OF THE CHURCH AND STATE –

BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY ACCOMODATION

Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
“compelling state interest”.
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary,
July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework
like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and
instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS

RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 313.- To disallow the holding of
religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and
commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a
courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims
from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered
nugatory because of strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo
from joining a union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go
down the drain simply because we insist on strict separation.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend
non- Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an
unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their
faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be without
discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be
mere lip service.

RENATO V. PERALTA vs. PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION

(PHILPOST), G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018-Benevolent neutrality
recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence
of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must
pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might
adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden
religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these
breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is
the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first
type of accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general
applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent

neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that
the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and
practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible
constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim
 under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the
orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of
the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law
of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion
clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can
eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on
religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means
adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal
towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down
the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality
approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more
importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably
show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court
should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which
this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a
minority, however small-not only for a majority, however large-but for each of
us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.xxx

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit
the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such
use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to
the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession
even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not
barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.

FIRST FILIPINO POLICY

COLMENARES v. DUTERTE G.R. No. 245981 | August 09, 2022 | Justice J.Y.
Lopez

The Filipino First Policy-In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos (Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII of the Constitution)

Article XII, §10 of the Constitution which embodies the Filipino First Policy. This
policy has been explained previously in Tanada v. Angara, where the Supreme Court
held that while the Constitution leans in favor of Filipino goods, services, and
enterprises, there is a need to balance such with international economic
relations.

•At the core of the Constitution is the common good, public interest, and public
welfare of the Filipino people. In this case, the petitioners failed to show how the
award of project to the Chinese firms undermined public good, when such an
engagement will only open doors for investments and would fast-track development.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997) (Bellosillo)- In this case, the
SC ruled that this provision is self-executing. It was also in this case where the Court
clarified that the rule now is that all provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be
self-executing, rather than non-self-executing. Elaborating, the Court explained that
if a contrary presumption is adopted, the whole Constitution shall remain dormant
and be captives of Congress, which could have disastrous consequences. Also, in this
case the SC held that “patrimony” simply means “heritage.” Thus, when we speak of
“national patrimony,” we refer not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but
as well as the cultural heritage of the Filipino people.
Filipinization of Public Utilities- Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary
Margarito B. Teves, et al., G./R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, En Banc (Carpio)
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Filipinization of public utilities.

The 1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring
that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted
only to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital
position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national security.
The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from
assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest.
This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public
utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to
conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet
the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public
utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.

The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term capital. Does the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to the
total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred
shares)?

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock, including
both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and
letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily
equates to control of the public utility.

Indisputably, construing the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject
surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear
abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to
Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional
provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the
exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign
control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a
betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its
solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure x
x x a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution
expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development
of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business, is self- executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. X x x
[We] rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in
the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
(common and non-voting preferred shares.)

Although the Constitution explicitly recognizes the primacy of labor as a social

economic force, it does not imply degrading the role of capital in economic
production. The underlying policy, in fact, has always been towards balancing
the rights of labor with the interests of workers in economic activities (Panao and
De Leon 2018). Section 20 of Article II provides: “The State recognizes the
indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.” This protection can even be
characterized as exclusive and Filipino-oriented, as Section 19 provides: “The
State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.” This ‘Filipino first’ policy was reiterated
in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) (G.R.
No. 122156, February 3, 1997) where the high court upheld the right of Manila
Prince Hotel to match the winning bid for GSIS shares on the Manila Hotel
Corporation after losing earlier to Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. As
Manila Hotel lost, GSIS declined to PANAO surrender the shares so Manila
Prince brought the suit to the high court arguing Manila Hotel is part of
national patrimony and invoking the right to preferential concession under
the ‘Filipino First’ policy.

The high court also ruled that provisions covering Article XIII (National
Economy and Patrimony) are self-executing and require no enabling law . However,
in recent years and after a number of landmark enactments, the ‘Filipino
First’ policy has been relaxed to afford aliens greater economic participation.

Republic Act No. 8179 is a landmark as it liberalizes the extent foreign

business entities can invest in the Philippines. Before its passage, the
general rule restricts foreign investments to 40 percent. Under the new
law, however, foreign investors are allowed up to 100% equity in
companies engaged in almost all types of business activities, provided (a) the
enterprises are not on the Negative List, (b) the country or state of the foreign
investor also allows Filipinos and their corporations to do business in those
countries (reciprocity), and (c) if the foreign investor is investing in a
domestic enterprise, the domestic enterprise must have a paid-in capital
equivalent to USD 200,000.

Republic Act No. 10881, on the other hand, specifies the enterprises that
fall under the Negative List. Be that as it may, foreign equity is still not allowed
in mass media except recording; practice of professions; retail trade
enterprises with paid- up capital of not less than US$2,500,000.00;
cooperatives; private security agencies; utilization of marine resources in
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone; ownership,
operation and management of cockpits; manufacture, repair, stockpiling and/or
distribution of nuclear weapons; manufacture, repair, stockpiling and/or
distribution of biological, chemical and radiological weapons and anti-personal
mines; and manufacture of firecrackers and other pyrotechnic devices.

Foreign corporations can own immovable property, including condominium

units, as long as foreign equity in the corporation does not exceed 40
 percent.

Foreign corporations can also participate in the bidding of projects of the Philippine
government.

Also, the practice of professions by aliens are allowed in many instances provided
the latter’s country extends such privilege (reciprocity) to qualified Filipino
practitioners (see Board of Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14, 2008).

NATURAL DUTY OF PARENTS

Are the Curfew Ordinances unconstitutional because they deprive parents of

their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without due
process? (SPARK vs. Quezon City, et al)

Answer:

No. Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children. The rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their
moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that
"when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-
being of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate interests."

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the
exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo, this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are
to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting
role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations.

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents
in their role of promoting their children's well-being. At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their
parents. In all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.

The Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement

upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child. Finally, it may be well to point out
that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at
home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take
a more active role in their children's upbringing.

PROTECTION OF THE LIFE OF THE UNBORN

It is not an assertion that the unborn is a legal person. It is not an assertion that the
life of the unborn is placed exactly on the same level of the life of the mother. Hence,
 when it is necessary to save the life of the mother, the life of the unborn may be
sacrificed.

The Roe v. Wade doctrine allowing abortion up to the 6th month of pregnancy
cannot be adopted in the Philippines human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be (Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014).

BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR.
(Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

The precautionary principle applies when the following conditions are met:

a) There exist considerable scientific uncertainties;

b) There exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are scientifically
reasonable (that is based on some scientifically plausible reasoning);
c) Uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the same time
increasing ignorance of other relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction
and idealization;
d) The potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or
future generations or otherwise morally unacceptable;
e) There is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will be made
significantly more difficult or costly at any later time.

The Rules (of Procedure for Environmental Cases) likewise incorporated the
principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

AGHAM v. Japan Tobacco International (Philippines), Inc.,

G.R. No. 235771, June 15, 2021- Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provide that the writ is
a remedy available “on behalf of persons whose constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.” xxx
AGHAM failed to discharge the burden to prove the requirements
for the issuances of a writ of kalikasan. In sum, there is no clear
showing that respondents committed an act or omission violative of
any environmental law which resulted or will result in an
environmental damage of such magnitude that would infringe the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology healthful
ecology,”

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Sec. 1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing

a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC. 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary principle, the

following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the
environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.

Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation
of evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in
cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By applying
the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either
judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. This may be further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is
created in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology. In effect, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm
away from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status
quo. An application of the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will
enable courts to tackle future environmental problems before ironclad scientific
consensus emerges. (Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. Inc. v.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., December 8, 2015- Precautionary
Principle- expressing the normative idea that governments are obligated to “foresee
and forestall” harm to the environment. Under this rule, the precautionary principle
finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. Bias
is created in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology. It shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer
harm and onto those desiring to change the status quo. For purposes of evidence, the
precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last resort of the regular
Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff
when: 1. Settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; 2. Settings in which harm
might be irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and 3. Settings in which the
harm that might result would be serious. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in
favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et

al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016- The Supreme Court did not find the presence
of the elements for the precautionary principle to apply.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon straits, et al. v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR No.180771, April 21, 2016- Marine mammals
were joined by human beings as “stewards of nature”. The stewards having shown in
their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the resident marine mammals, are declared to have the legal standing to file the
petition. The Supreme Court ruled instead that the issue of whether these marine
mammals have locus standi to file the petition had been eliminated because of
Section 5, Rules for the Enforcement of Environmental Laws, which allows any
citizen to file a petition for the enforcement of environmental laws (Citizen’s Suit)
and, in their petition, these marine mammals were joined by human beings as
“stewards of nature."
LOCAL AUTONOMY

the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy
under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state of an “imperium in imperio” (unlike in a
Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling
is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments. ( Basco vs. Pagcor)

Mandanas, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,

Jr., et al./Honorable Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. Vs. Honorable
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 199802/G.R. No.
208488. April 10, 2019- Although it has the primary discretion to
determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes
(e.g., Section 284 of the LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express
mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution for the just
share of the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes. The phrase
as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the phrase
just share, and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding
phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of
Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the
LGUs taxes should include all national taxes. To read Section 6
differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in the national
taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized
revision of the 1987 Constitution.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR

MIGUEL LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, PETITIONER, V. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, March 10, 2020, G.R. No. 227926- The grant of local autonomy is
Constitutionally mandated and allows local government units to make
independent administrative determinations subject only to the Executive
branch's general supervision. Thus, any regulations imposed on the exercise of
local autonomy should not, in any way, amount to control.(separate opinion of J.
Leonen)

Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14,
2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
 Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014- At any rate, LGUs
must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not completely
severe them from the national government or turn them into impenetrable states.
Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still
under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance
or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And
the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of
local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While the aforementioned
provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of
providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this
express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves
the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. xxx The national
government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014- The essence of this express
reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as
the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. xxx The national government
still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use
of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be
said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

HEALTH AWARENESS

The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them. Duterte has just signed a Universal Health Care (UHC)
Bill into law (Republic Act No. 11223) that automatically enrolls all Filipino
citizens in the National Health Insurance Program and prescribes complementary
reforms in the health system.

ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
It must be noted that the restriction provided in the Bill of Rights is directed against the
government, so that it does not govern private relations. As far as the Constitution is
concerned, Article III can be invoked only against the government. Nonetheless, with the
inclusion of almost all the constitutional rights in Article 32 of the Civil Code, the same may
now be invoked in civil cases involving relations between private persons. Thus, the
definition above indicates that the bill of rights is a safeguard not just against the abuses of
the government but also of individuals or group of individuals.

POWERS OF THE STATE

Police Power Power of Power of

Eminent Taxation
Domain
Concept and Application
1. The power of 1. The right of 1. The power by
promoting the the state to which the
public welfare by acquire private sovereign raises
restraining and property for revenue to defray
regulating the use public use upon the expenses of
of liberty and payment of just government
property (Ericta compensation (Paseo Realty
vs. City (Metropolitan and Development
Government of Cebu Water Corporation v.
Quezon City, 122 District v. King Court of
SCRA 759). and Sons Appeals, G.R.
Company, G.R. 119286, October
2. It has been No. 175983, 13, 2004).
said that the April 16, 2009;
police power is Sec. 9, Art. III). 2. The power of
the most essential taxation is
of government 2. The inherent inherent in the
powers, at times power of the State, being an
the most State to condemn attribute of
insistent, and private property sovereignty. As
always one of the to public use an incident of
least limitable of upon payment of sovereignty, the
the powers of just power to tax has
Government compensation been described as
(Ruby vs. (Didipio Earth- unlimited in
Provincial Board, Savers range,
39 Phil. 660; Multipurpose acknowledging in
Ichong v. Association v. its very nature no
Hernandez, L- Gozun, G.R. No. limits, so that
7995, May 31, 157882, March security against
1957). 30, 2006). its abuse is to be
found only in the
3. Cannot be 3. Eminent responsibility of
bargained away domain may be the legislature
through the used as an which imposes
medium of a implement the tax on the
treaty or a to attain police constituency who
contract (Ichong objective are to pay it
v. Hernandez, (Association of (Mactan Cebu
supra.). Small International
Landowners Airport Authority
Basic purposes of v. v. Marcos, 261
police power: Secretary of SCRA 667).
1. To serve the Agrarian Reform,
general welfare, 175 SCRA 343). 3. The taxing
comfort, and power may be
convenience of used as an
the people; implement of
2. To promote police power
and preserve (Lutz v. Araneta,
public health; 98 Phil. 148)
3. To promote
and protect Importance of
public safety; taxation:
4. To maintain 1. No
and safeguard constitutional
public order; government can
5. To protect exist without it;
public morals; 2. It is one great
and, power upon
6. To promote which the whole
the economic national fabric is
security of the based;
people. 3. It is necessary
for the existence
and prosperity of
the nation; and

4. It is the
lifeblood of the
nation.
Limitations: Generally, the Bill of Rights, although in some cases the exercise
of police power prevails over specific constitutional guarantees (Phil. Press
Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272

Requisites for valid exercise

Summary: Summary: Summary:
1. Lawful 1. Necessity 1. Public
Subject 2. Private purpose;
2. Lawful Means property 2. Uniformity of
3. Additional 3. Taking in the taxation is
requisites (if constitutional observed;
delegated) sense 3. Either the
4. Public use person or
5. Just property taxed is
Compensation within the
jurisdiction of the
government
levying the tax;
4. Notice and
opportunity for
hearing are
provided
1. 1. Necessity: 1. Public purpose
Lawful subject: (see Pascual
The a. When v. Secretary
interest of the exercised by the of Public
public generally, Legislature, the Works and
as distinguished question of Communication,
from those of a necessity is G.R. No. L-
particular class, generally a 10405, December
require political question 29, 1960).
the exercise of (Municipality of
the police Meycauayan, 2. Equal
power Bulacan v. protection. The
(Taxicab Intermediate rule on
Operators v. Appellate Court, uniformity of
Board of 157 SCRA 640) taxation is
Transportation, observed. Taxes
119 SCRA 597); b. When should be
exercised by uniform and
2. Lawful means: a delegate, equitable (Sec.
The means the determination 28 [1], Art. VI)
employed are of whether there
reasonably is genuine 3. Either the
necessary for the necessity for the person or
accomplishment exercise is a property taxed is
of the purpose justiciable within the
and not unduly question jurisdiction of the
oppressive upon (Republic v. La government
individuals (Ynot Order de Po. levying the
v. Intermediate Benedictinos, 1 tax (Pepsi-Cola
Appellate Court, SCRA 649). Bottling Co.
148 SCRA 659); v. Municipality
and 2. Private of
3. Additional Property: Tanauan, G.R.
limitations when No. L-31156,
exercised by a. Private February 27,
delegate: property already 1976);
devoted to public
a. express grant use cannot be 4. Due Process.
by law (Sec. 16, expropriated by a In the assessment
391, 447, 458, delegate of and collection of
468, LGC);

legislature acting certain kinds of

b. within under a general taxes notice and
territorial limits – grant of authority opportunity for
for local (City of Manila hearing are
government units v. Chinese provided (Ibid).
except to protect Community, 40 With the
water supply Phil. 349); legislature
(Nachura, primary lies the
Outline Reviewer b. All private discretion to
in Political property capable determine the
Law,); and of ownership nature, object,
may be extent, coverage
c. must not be expropriated and situs of
contrary to law – except money taxation. But
for municipal and choses in where a tax
ordinances to be action. Even measure becomes
valid (Nachura, services may be so
Outline Reviewer subject unconscionable
in Political Law): to eminent and unjust as to
domain confiscation of
i. must not (Republic property, courts
contravene the v. PLDT, 26 will not hesitate
Constitution or SCRA to strike it down,
any statute 620); for despite all its
plenitude,
ii. must not be 3. Taking in the the power to
unfair or Constitutional tax
oppressive Sense: cannot override
constitutional
iii. must not be a. The prescriptions
partial or expropriator (Tan v. Del
discriminatory must enter a Rosario, 237
private property; SCRA 324).
iv. must not
prohibit, but may b. Entry must be
regulate trade for more than a
momentary
v. must not be period;
unreasonable;
and, c. Entry must be
under warrant or
vi. must be color of
general in authority;
application and
consistent with d. Property must
public policy be devoted
(Magtajas v. to public use or
Pryce Properties, otherwise
G.R. 111097, informally
July 20, 1994). appropriated
or
injuriously
affected;
e. Utilization of
the property must
be in such a way
as to oust the
owner and
deprive him of
beneficial
enjoyment
of the property
(Republic v.
Castelvi, 58
SCRA 336).

NOTE: Exercise
of the power of
eminent domain
does not always
result in the
taking or
appropriation of
title to the
expropriated
property; it may
only result in the
imposition of a
burden upon the
owner of the
condemned
property, without
loss of title or
possession
(National Power
Corporation
v.
Gutierrez, 193
SCRA 1).

The flight
of airplanes,
which
skim the surface
but do not touch
it, is as much an
appropriation of
the use of the
land as a more
conventional
entry upon
it. The
super
adjacent airspace
at this low
altitude is so
close to the land
that continuous
invasions of it
affect the use of
the surface of the
land itself (U.S.
v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256).

4. Public Use
(see discussion
on Eminent
Domain, infra):

5. Just
compensation:
The full and fair
equivalent of the
property taken; it
is the fair market
value of
the property. It
is settled
that the
market value of
the property
is “that sum of
money which a
person, desirous
but not
compelled to
buy, and an
owner, willing
but not
compelled to sell,
would agree on
as a price to be
given and
received therefor
(National Power
Corporation v.
Spouses Chiong,
G.R. 152436,
June 20, 2003). If
only a part of a
certain property
is expropriated,
the owner is not
restricted to
payment of the

market value of
the portion
actually taken, in
 addition, he is
also entitled
to payment
of
consequential
damages, if any,
to the remaining
part of the
property. At the
same time, from
the total
compensation
must be deducted
the value
of consequential
benefits, if any,
provided
Property consequential
Who exercises the power?
ONLY by the 1. Government; ONLY by the
government government
2. Private entities
undertaking
public functions/
services
Nature of property
Property taken is Property is Property is
usually noxious wholesome and wholesome and
or intended for a devoted to public devoted to public
noxious purpose use or purpose; use or purpose;
and may thus be
destroyed;
Compensation
Compensation in It is the full and It is the
police power is fair equivalent of protection given
the intangible, the property and/or public
altruistic feeling taken. improvements
that the instituted by
individual has government
contributed to the for the taxes paid
public good.
Delegation
 The National Congress may Congress may
Legislature may delegate this delegate this
delegate this power to: power to:
power to: 1. The President 1. Local
1. The President of the legislative bodies
of the Philippines; (Sec. 5, Art. X);
Philippines; 2. Administrative 2. The president
2. Administrative Bodies; and when granted
Boards; and 3. Local delegated tariff
3. Lawmaking government power (Sec.
bodies of units; 28[2], Art. VI).
Municipal 4. Private
Corporations; enterprises
performing
NOTE: Once public services.
delegated, the
agents can
exercise only
such power as
conferred on
them by the
national
lawmaking body
(MMDA vs. Bel-
Air Village

Association, Inc.
328 SCRA 836).

RIGHTS & DUE PROCESS

PERSON

The due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial. Natural person
include both the citizen and the alien. Artificial persons like corporations and partnerships are
also covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned. The reason for
the narrower scope is that the life and the liberty of the artificial person, as a creature of law,
are derived from and therefore subject to the control of the legislature.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due
process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process
“refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process
“requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced,
is fair, reasonable, and just.” (De Leon, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, 1991, p.
81) (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31, Dec. 12,
1997 [Romero])

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in
exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their
respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are
informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient
character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been
designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and
expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both, the United States
and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead
prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause “generally ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise (Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to “the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
play” (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner’s Association v. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components – substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade
not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties
(Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322
SCRA 160, 186-188, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property. The inquiry in this regard is not whether or not
the law is being enforced in accordance with the prescribed manner but whether or not, to
begin with, it is a proper exercise of legislative power. The law must have a valid
governmental objective in example the interest of the public generally as distinguished from
those of a particular class require the intervention of the state.

Furthermore, this objective must be pursued in a lawful manner, or in other words, the means
employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose and not duly
oppressive. Justice Labrador declared: “the disputed law is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective- to free the national economy from alien control
and dominance. If political independence is a legitimate aspiration, then economic
independence is nonetheless legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the
people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their
own race and country.”

“The law is reasonable,” he added. “It is made prospective and recognizes the rights and
privileges of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of
their lives; and similar recognition is accorded associations of aliens,” which were allowed a
ten year period of grace within which to wind up their affairs in the retail trade and transfer to
other business.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The essence of procedural due process is expressed in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Eurybiades: Strike, but hear me first!” In more familiar words, the justice that procedural due
process guarantees, to repeat with Daniel Webster, is the one “which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Our supreme
court has held that “the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process and neither of these elements can be eliminated
without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.

HEARING

Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute
the evidence submitted by the other party. Every litigant is entitled to his day in court. He has
a right to be notified of every incident of the proceeding and to be present at every stage
thereof so that he may be heard himself and counsel for the protection of hi interests. As held
in David v. Aquilizan, a decision rendered without a hearing is null and void ab initio and
may be attacked directly or collaterally. “If it otherwise,” the Supreme Court declared, “then
the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without
being given a hearing would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
court when such a question arises.or that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the improcess of nullity.”

Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever
reason, not to be heard. If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be
heard to complain that he was unduly silenced. The Supreme Court has held, however, that:
Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, requires trial-
type proceedings. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
tobe heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense

“To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

EXCEPTIONS

There are cases in which the essential requisites of notice and hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process.

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;

2. Abatement of nuisance per se Art. (704, NCC);
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges; (Co. vs. Barbers.
Sec. 63 of LGC; BP 337);
5. Removal or replacement of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy of properties by the BIR Commissioner for
tax delinquency;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Padlocking of restaurants found to be insanitary or theatres showing obscene movies;
9. Issuance of sequestration orders;
10. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
11. Suspension of bank’s operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of
liquidity problems in such bank.
12. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs.
Munoz, 2000);
13. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
14. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013);

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

In administrative proceedings, the requisites of procedural due process are the

following:1.The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence in support thereof.2.The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.3.The
decision must have something to support itself.4.The evidence must be substantial 5.The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.6.The tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.7.The board or body
should, in all controversial questions ,renders its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered

CASES:

Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008-
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they
stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property.
The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local
government unit] LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail,”.

Procedural Due Process- Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323
SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a limitation on government powers. It
does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under
the Labor Code.

Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, et al., GR No.
196425, July 24, 2012- Pichay’s right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.

Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor a
property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of
one’s residence maybe revoked at anytime.

MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor vehicle is
not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked
by the State in the exercise of police power.

Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the official
act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.

SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23, 2014- Prior notice and
hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial
proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi
legislative or administrative functions.

Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they were denied due process
during the NBI Investigation. The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of
granting any relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.

Rodriguez v. NBI and DOJ, G.R. No. 219781, July 28, 2021- The Supreme Court held that
the NBI’s investigation of the Napoles PDAF scam were done in the performance of the
NBI’s functions which are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The NBI did not
perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function when it recommended to the Ombudsman further
fact-finding investigation or the corresponding preliminary investigation for the eventual
filing of the appropriate charges before the Sandiganbayan. Instead, the NBI’s findings were
merely recommendatory and still subject to the Ombudsman’s actions.

Citing to its similar ruling in Shu v. Dee, et al. in 2014, the Supreme Court said “no denial of
petitioner’s due process right could have taken place. There is also no violation of petitioner’s
right to equal protection of the laws to speak of…there is not even a vested right granted by
law to any person under investigation to participate in the proceedings before the NBI.”

The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine

1. The law should be declared void as it is vague, i.e., it lacks comprehensible standards so
that men of ordinary intelligence will probably have to guess as to its meaning and differ in
its application.

2. Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: one, it violates due
process as it fails to afford persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and; second, it gives
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out provisions and, therefore, in effect, it
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
government’s muscle.

3. However, for this to be validly invoked, the act or law must be utterly vague on its face
that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by statutory construction.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW

ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. VS. SPECIAL TWENTIETH

DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY AND UNION BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 194461, January 07, 2020

Equal protection, however, was not intended to prohibit the legislature from enacting statutes
that either tend to create specific classes of persons or objects, or tend to affect only these
specific classes of persons or objects. Equal protection "does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."61 As
aptly discussed in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion.
It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of
things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on
narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

Thus, a statute that treats one class differently from another class will not violate the equal
protection clause as long as the classification is valid. In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan
v. Quezon City, this Court summarized the three (3) tests to determine the
reasonableness of a classification:

The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.

A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. "

"The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and
that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it."
A longer period of redemption is given to natural persons whose mortgaged properties are
more often used for residential purposes. A shorter period of redemption is given to juridical
persons whose properties are more often used for commercial purposes. Goldenway
Merchandising explains that the shorter period is aimed to ensure the solvency and liquidity
of banks. This helps minimize the period of uncertainty in the ownership of commercial
properties and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose of these acquired assets quickly.

There is, thus, a legitimate government interest in the protection of the banking
industry and a legitimate government interest in the protection of foreclosed residential
properties owned by natural persons. The shortened period of redemption for juridical
entities may be considered to be the reasonable means for the protection of both these
interests.

The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a
valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other
words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the class. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety of the Classification under
the Equal Protection Clause

To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny,
viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.

The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test)
demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis
test often applies in cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not
involving a suspect class.

When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under
intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives
intermediate scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the
justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.

CASES:

The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a
suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R.
No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]), the Court, applying the rational basis
test, ruled that the ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural
entities therein as the practice produces pesticide drift causing inconvenience and harm to the
residents and degrades the environment, violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be
declared unconstitutional.

Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal
venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It
effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective
operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition
against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of the banana plantations that
depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other
menaces that threaten their production and harvest. X x x the effect of the ban will not be
limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading to the
country’s economy.

The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light
of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not
overburden the respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those who
stand to be affected by the ordinance. X x x

Jaime O. Ibaňez Vs. Cabinet Secretaries Karlo Alexei B. Nograles, Sec. Francisco T.
Duque III, and the Inter-Agency Task Force [IATF]-G.R. No . 252167. September 1,
2020-The Supreme Court en banc dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by lawyer Jaime Ibañez who assailed the constitutionality of the Bayanihan law “in so far as
the imposition in the country of the Enhanced Community Quarantine.” Note: Resolution is
not available yet).

Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict scrutiny standard, an
American constituted construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend
to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny
standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender
or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier application to equal
protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially condemnable act- accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is universally condemned act.

Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010- the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is not
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003, Substantive
distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizure

SECTION 2- RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH & SEIZURE

The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No.
180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec.
2.

CHRISTIAN C. CADAJAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 247348.

November 16, 2021]

- Violation of the right to privacy between individuals is properly governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code, the Data Privacy Act (DPA), and other pertinent laws, while its
admissibility shall be governed by the rules on relevance, materiality, authentication of
documents, and the exclusionary rules under the Rules on Evidence.

In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were
obtained and used as evidence against petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the poisonous
tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State.
Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the
admissibility of an evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only those
pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who can
flex government muscles and use government resources for a possible abuse. However,
where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is governed by the
New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence cannot be determined by the provisions
of the Bill of Rights.

The test in ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy has been explained
in the case of Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr. as follows:

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts

use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that
"the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices
may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of
 privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.

Vivares, et al. vs. STC, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014- the concept of privacy has,
through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information
about themselves.

It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many Online Social Network (OSN)
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to
their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. Utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce
all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access
to the Web page or the photograph itself.

Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the
less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy."

Is there a constitutional right to privacy?

The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 14 L. ed. 2D 510 [1965]), the United States Supreme Court gave
more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments x x x. In the 1968 case of Morfe v.
Mutuc (22 SCRA 424, 444-445), we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy x x x.

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. (Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 444
[1968]; Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, p. 18 [1970]). It is expressly
recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights x x x. Other facets of the right to privacy are
protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights (viz: Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17. (Ople v.
Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July
23, 1998 [Puno])

What are the zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws?

The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons” and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of
the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by
an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200), the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293). The Rules of
Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information
(Section 24, Rule 130[c], Revised Rules on Evidence). (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685,
July 23, 1998 [Puno])

Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No,. 203335, Feb.
11, 2014, En Banc (Abad) The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as
early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the “Zones of
Privacy.” The Court explained in “In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon” the relevance of these zones to the right to
privacy:

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized
men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and
“everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and
(b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.

In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
National Centralized Identification System

Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998- The right to privacy is one of the most
threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources
— governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it
will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer,
only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the
power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note
of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is
that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy
was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

KMU v. NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006- On its face, EO 420 shows no
constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in
contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. The right
to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. With
the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420.
These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. The disclosure
requirements under EO 420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the
right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID
purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID
cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior
to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed
before.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems
of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient,
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.

PP vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government and agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.

Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The confiscated items having
been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to warrantless search
conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent
of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code.

ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS

G.R. No. 242957, Board of Commissioners v. Wenle, February 28, 2023

The Supreme Court laid down guidelines for establishing the validity of administrative
warrants:
1. The danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent
and must be greater than the damage or injury which will be sustained by the one
who shall be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property;
2. The warrant’s resultant deprivation of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement
must be temporary or provisional, aimed only at suppressing imminent danger,
harm or evil, with such deprivation’s permanency strictly subjected to procedural
due process requirements;
3. The issuing administrative authority must be empowered by law to perform
specific implementing acts pursuant to regulatory purposes;
4. The issuing administrative authority must be necessarily authorized by law to pass
upon and make final pronouncements on conflicting rights and obligations of
contending parties, as well as to issue warrants or orders that are incidental to the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it;
5. The issuance of an administrative warrant must be based on tangible proof or
probable cause and must state a specific purpose or infraction allegedly committed,
with particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized;
6. The warrant issued must not pertain to a criminal offense or pursued as a precursor
for the filing of criminal charges and any object seized pursuant to such writ shall
not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding;
7. The person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative
warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time, if no such period is
provided, and shall not be denied access to a competent counsel of his or her
choice. In cases where a person is deprived of liberty by virtue of an administrative
warrant, the administrative body which issued said warrant shall immediately
submit a verified notice to the RTC nearest to the detained for purposes of issuing
a judicial commitment order; and
8. A violation of any item of these guidelines is a prima facie proof of usurpation of
judicial functions, malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or graft and corrupt
practices on the part of responsible officers.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES:

1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella,
395 SCRA 553);
 2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and
stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been turned over to the
Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered
as evidence in plain view);
4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge of
such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the
right.) Silahis Int’l Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)-
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search – (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968;
Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based
upon “reasonable suspicion” that a person may have been engaged in criminal activity,
whereas an arrest requires “probable cause” that a suspect committed a criminal offense;
7. Armed conflict (war time);
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR No. 129756-58, January 28,
2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a
warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder
because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the exercise of military
powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson,
GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

Acosta vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019

There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a

firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline
the government’s terms for its use. The grant of a license, however, is without prejudice to
the inviolability of the home. The right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures remains paramount, and the government in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct
inspections of applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant.

The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all individual rights declared
and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. “A man’s house is his castle,” has
become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth.

In addition, Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides the prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, this right may be waived if it can be shown
that the consent was “unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.”

For that reason, the Court holds the inspection requirement under R.A. 10591, as interpreted
by the PNP in the IRR, to be an unreasonable search, as it is prohibited in Art. III, Sec. 2 of
the Constitution and a violation of the right to privacy. The legitimate, almost absolute,
expectation of privacy in one’s residence renders the State’s intrusion a “search” within the
meaning of Art. III, Sec. 2., and which intrusion requires a search warrant.
Further, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection would be an invalid
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches under Art. III, Sec. 2. as it is not given
“freely, voluntarily, and knowingly” by the applicant who would just sign it, to prevent the
application not to be approved. The applicant cannot intelligently consent to the warrantless
inspection allowed in R.A. 10591 because of the utter lack of parameters under Sec. 9 on how
the inspection shall be conducted.

Valmonte v. De Villa: For searches at checkpoints to be valid, the following must be

observed:

1) The checkpoint must be pre-announced;

2) It must be stationary; and
3) The search at checkpoint must be limited to visual search only. An intrusive search is
not allowed.

People v. Doria

The requisites for the “plain view” doctrine to be validly invoked are:

1) The law enforcement officer must have a valid justification for an intrusion, or is in a
position where he can view a particular area;
2) The discovery of the evidence in plain view must be inadvertent; and
3) It is immediately apparent to him that the thing he sees is object of a crime,
contraband, or subject to seizure.

It is clear that if the object is inside a closed container, “plain view” may not be invoked.
However, even if it inside a closed container but if due to the configuration of the container,
or due to its transparency, it can still be seen from the outside what
is inside, “plain view” may still be invoked.

Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified only
when:

1) there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there
where they are;
3) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4) plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted- Manalili vs. CA,
280 SCRA 400

PRIVACY IN WORKPLACE

Polo vs. Constantino-David, October 8, 2011

The existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first,
that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not
disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its
capacity as employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great
variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or by human means. An Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use
Policy (CUP)" explicitly provided for such. This implied therefore, that on-the-spot
inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.

SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008-
Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug testing for
secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and employees of public and
private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.

Registration of Prepaid Phones

Registration of prepaid mobile phone subscriber identity module (SIM) has been objected to
as an unconstitutional intrusion into one’s privacy. With the enactment of the Data Privacy
Act of 2012, and all the safeguards it offers, it is now submitted that registration of prepaid
SIMs constitutes a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.

Comerciante vs. People, July 22, 2015

Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence
of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case, the Court
reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason"
for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and
frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

Dimal, et al. vs. People, April 18, 2018

For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
Carrol Doctrine (Automobile Exception)- a vehicle could be searched without a search
warrant if there was probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the vehicle, coupled
with exigent circumstances to believe that the vehicle could be removed from the area before
a warrant could be obtained.

Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018

In the conduct of bus searches, the Supreme Court lays down the following guidelines. Prior
to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin
to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of
electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for
inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger
object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of
the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a
passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be
stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no
different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the
contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on board. Second, whenever a bus picks
passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be
subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel
as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus
is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to
evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated
military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine
inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus
terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions
to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the
least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or
ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental
rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups
should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be continued to ensuring
public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be
convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that
category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at
the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes
unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they
applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis,
which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be
flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

PP vs. Jerry Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020

In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non--violative of an individual's right

against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light
therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct
intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection,
"such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to
be searched."23

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of
the vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

Government of the USA v. Judge Purganan

Prior notice or hearing is not required before a judge issues a warrant of arrest of an
extraditee once the petition for extradition is filed in court on two (2) basis, i.e., statutory
(Sec. 6, P.D. No. 1069); and constitutional (Sec. 2, Art. III of the Bill of Rights).

On statutory basis

Section 6, P.D. No. 1069 (Extradition Law) provides that the moment the petition for
extradition is filed in the RTC, the judge shall cause the immediate issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Hearing entails sending of notices to opposing parties, and receiving facts and
arguments from them. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.” The law could not have intended the use of the word “immediate” a
superfluity.

On constitutional basis

Even Section 2, Article III of the Bill of Rights does not require notice or hearing before a
judge issues a warrant of arrest. On the contrary, what the Constitution provides is “after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant (not of the accused) and the
witnesses he may produce.”

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST (Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of

Court)

This is the most common among the instances of valid warrantless searches. The object of
this kind of warrantless search is to obtain object or effect of a crime, like the stolen wallet or
the knife used in hold-up.

The three (3) important features of this kind of warrantless search are:

1. In this kind if warrantless search, the arrest always precedes the search; the
process cannot be reversed;
2. The precedent arrest must always be lawful because, if the precedent arrest is
unlawful, the subsequent search, although it may have yielded positive
results, may never validate the unlawful arrest that preceded it; and
3. The search must be limited or confined only to the immediate vicinity of the
place of the arrest. It may not be extended beyond that.

In the later case of People v. Susan Canton, the SC held that this is now another instance of
valid warrantless search – warrantless searches at airports.

STOP & FRISK

MANIBOG vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally
observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate further.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules, a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. As a corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. xxx In this
case, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.

People vs Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019- There was similarly no lawful
arrest in this case as Cristobal's violations were only punishable by fine. There was thus
no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

In the later case of People v. Susan Canton, the SC held that this is now another instance of
valid warrantless search – warrantless searches at airports.

STOP & FRISK

DUROPAN V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020- For a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the presence
of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The
requirement of the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from the
scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the crime.

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

1) The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time
of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
2) There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.

PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time of the offense was committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an
appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.

Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID;
BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can issue a
warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.

SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one offense.

Miguel vs. People, July 31, 2017

The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective
areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the
1987 Constitution to them.

PP vs. Manago, August 1, 2016

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest
may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will
be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.
SECTION 3- PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION & CORRESPONDENCE

In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R.
No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing.
In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.
If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers,
the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in
the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude
on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not
to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject
to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners
have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on account of his
letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of
these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The
making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free
expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let alone is not
an absolute right where the person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.

Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is
if there is a “lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law”.

A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the
unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with
the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person;
and (c) to communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the
provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges from six months to six
years.

Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10173- Data Privacy Act of 2012 - to ensure that personal
information in information and communications systems in the government and in the private
sector are secured and protected.
This Act applies to the processing of all types of personal information and to any natural and
juridical person involved in personal information processing including those personal
information controllers and processors who, although not found or established in the
Philippines, use equipment that are located in the Philippines, or those who maintain an
office, branch or agency in the Philippines.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to have amended or repealed the provisions of
Republic Act No. 53, which affords the publishers, editors or duly accredited reporters of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation protection from being compelled to
reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication which was
related in any confidence to such publisher, editor, or reporter.

SECTION 4- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

What are considered protected speech:

Protected speech includes every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc
recorded. It includes motion pictures as well as what is known as symbolic speech such as
the wearing of an armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful picketing has also been included
within the meaning of speech.

Prohibitions under Section 4

1) Prohibition against PRIOR RESTRAINT

2) Prohibition against SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

Standards for allowable subsequent punishment

TEST CRITERION

1. Dangerous Tendency Test There should be a RATIONAL

CONNECTION between the
speech and the evil apprehended.

2. Clear and Present Danger Test There should be a clear and present
danger that the words when used
under such circumstances are of such
a nature as to create a CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER that they will
bring about the substantive evils that
the State has a right to prevent.

3. Balancing of Interests Test The courts should BALANCE the

PUBLIC INTEREST served by
legislation on one hand and the
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (or any
other constitutional right) on the
other. The courts will then decide
where the greater weight should be
placed.
Freedom of Speech

The doctrine on freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of
“core” speech, i.e. speech which communicates political, social or religious ideas. These
enjoy the same degree of protection. Commercial speech, however, does not.

Commercial Speech
A communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction.

To enjoy protection:
1) It must not be false or misleading; and
2) It should not propose an illegal transaction.

Even truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if:

1) Government has a substantial interest to protect;
2) The regulation directly advances that interest; and
3) It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest. (Central Hudson Gas
and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of NY, 447 US 557)

Content-based restrictions on free speech, and content-neutral regulations

Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are,
therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger test. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. Comelec, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers
from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason
to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial
and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will
be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.

Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which
prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates during the
campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need
only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review
will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test
for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which
are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the
clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a
sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.

The test for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that
content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually
imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons
underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner of holding
public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. (Osmena v.
COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza])
What is the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral
regulations?

The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. O’ Brien:

[A] a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within the constitutional

power of the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and
press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed.
2df 692, 680 [1968] [bracketed numbers added])

This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral
regulations and is said to have “become canonical in the review of such laws.” (G. Gunther &
K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1217 [13th ed. 1997]). It is noteworthy that the O’ Brien test
has been applied by this Court in at least two cases (Adiong v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 712
[1992]; Osmena v. Comelec, supra.).

Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it
should be invalidated if such governmental interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of
free expression.” Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. (Social
Weather Stations, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc [Mendoza])
Chavez v. Secretary Gonzales

Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may either be content-
based (the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it
regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the time, place and manner). To
pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show that the government has a
compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction, on
the other hand, need only show an important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

CASES:

Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008- The acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television stations against playing the “Garci
tapes” under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and should
be subjected to the “clear and present and danger test”.

Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No. 170270/GR No.
179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny”
test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to prove that their
actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be
done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et
al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc (Leonen) This case defines
the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first
impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens – who are not candidates – during
elections.

All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition
against the abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation.
The primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state
interest clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech
implicit in the kind of society framed by our Constitution.

Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in
addition to the freedom of speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word
“expression” was added in the 1987 Constitution x x x for having a wider scope x x x.

Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as “[t]he right to think is the
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought.” (Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 272, 277
[2002], quoting Justice Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403
[2002])

Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech. Communication exists when

“(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he or she
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended;
and (2) the audience so takes the actions.” (Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 Yale
L. J. 945, 954 [1990]) “[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by
x x x either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification.” (Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Haberma’s Theory of Law, 23
Cardozo L. Rev. 473, 499 [2002])

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech

sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’ (Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and
Social Meaning, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1844, 1847 [1997]) such that “’when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative
element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’” (Id., citing US v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 [1968])

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from
utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.

Even before freedom “of expression” was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present
Constitution, this court has applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal
utterances.

Speech Regulation in Relation to Election

G.R. No. 258805, St. Anthony College of Roxas City, Inc. v. COMELEC,
October 24, 2023
In St. Anthony College of Roxas City, Inc. v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot remove or destroy
privately-owned campaign materials displayed on private property.

The Court held that RA 9006, or the Fair Election Act, only permits the
COMELEC to regulate election propaganda owned by candidates and political
parties. It does not allow the COMELEC to regulate the political speech of
private persons on private property. While COMELEC may validly
implement “Oplan Baklas” against candidates and political parties, it cannot
implement “Oplan Baklas” against private individuals expressing their
political preferences or support for a candidate or political party.

The Court emphasized that it “has always protected political speech as one of
the most important expressions guaranteed by the Constitution, and freedom
of speech and expression is at the core of civil liberties and must be protected
at all costs for the sake of democracy.” While acknowledging “the zeal and
dedication with which the COMELEC performs its duties and fulfills its
mandate to ensure free and fair elections,” the Court stressed that “the best
intentions cannot justify impermissible infringements on constitutional rights.”

R.A. NO. 9006: FAIR ELECTION ACT

Purpose

Republic Act No. 9006 was adopted with the end in mind of guaranteeing or
ensuring equal opportunity for public service and to this end, stipulates
mechanisms for the supervision or regulation of the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or
information. The Fair Election Act provides means to realize the policy
articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution to guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service. (SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
208062, April 07, 2015)

Sec. 5.4 of R.A. 9006 - Unconstitutional

§5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates
within the prescribed periods of fifteen
(15) days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a
local election.

Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O'Brien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such
interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio
and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect,
§5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by
preferring personal opinion to statistical results.

Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only
incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test,
namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-
minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of
weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
"dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when
such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather
than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.

To summarize then, §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on

the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and
(3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than the suppression of freedom of expression. (SWS v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001)

COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 - Constitutional

Section 5. Election Surveys. – 5.2. During the election period, any person,
natural as well as juridical, candidate or organization who publishes a survey
must likewise publish the following information:

a. The name of the person, candidate, party or organization who

commissioned or paid for the survey.

SWS, Pulse Asia and other survey firms of similar circumstance are required
to submit the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys. The
submission shall include the names of all "subscribers" of those published
surveys. Such information/data shall be for the exclusive and confidential use
of the Commission. All surveys published subsequent to the promulgation of
this Resolution must be accompanied by all the information required in
Republic Act no. 9006, including the names of commissioners, payors and
subscribers. A violation of these rules shall constitute an election offense as
provided in Republic Act no. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 is valid. The names of those who

commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms,
must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act. This
requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects
the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for
public service. Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing subscribers does not
curtail petitioners' free speech rights.
 1) Applying the O'Brien Test, first, the text of Section 5.2(a)
of the Fair Elections Act supports the inclusion of
subscribers among those persons who paid for the survey.
Thus, Resolution No. 9674 is a regulation finding basis in
statute.
2) Second, not only an important or substantial state interest
but even a compelling one reasonably grounds Resolution
No. 9674's inclusion of subscribers to election surveys.
Thus, regardless of whether an intermediate or strict
standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes scrutiny.
3) Third, while it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners'
publication of election surveys), it does not go so far as to
suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition
nor censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The
freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution
No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the
manner of publication, that is, that the disclosure of those
who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys must be made.
4) Lastly, Resolution No. 9674 is narrowly tailored to meet the
objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to
be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of
free expression and is demonstrably the least restrictive
means to achieve that object. (SWS v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 208062, April 07, 2015)

COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 - Not a Prior Restraint

Resolution No. 9674 poses no prohibition or censorship specifically aimed at

election surveys. Apart from regulating the manner of publication, survey
companies remain free to publish election surveys. The disclosure requirement
kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication. (SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
208062, April 07, 2015)

Public Election Surveys May Be Subject to Regulation

Election surveys, on their face, do not state or allude to preferred candidates.

As a means, election surveys are ambivalent. Election surveys thus become
unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the end for which they are
employed. To those whose end is to get a candidate elected, election surveys,
when limited to their own private consumption, are a means to formulate
strategy.

When published, however, the tendency to shape voter preferences comes into
play. In this respect, published election surveys partake of the nature of
election propaganda. It is then declarative speech in the context of an electoral
campaign properly subject to regulation. (SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
208062, April 07, 2015)
 Effects of Election Surveys on Voter Behavior

1) Bandwagon effect - where electors rally to support the candidate

leading in the polls.
2) Underdog effect - where electors rally to support the candidate trailing
in the polls.
3) Motivating effect - where individuals who had not intended to vote are
persuaded to do so.
4) Demotivating effect - where voters abstain from voting out of certainty
that their candidate or party will win.
5) Strategic voting - where voting is influenced by the chances of
winning.
6) Free-will effect - where voters cast their ballots to prove the polls
wrong. (SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015)

REGULATION OF SPEECH IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

Regulation of Speech Made by Candidates or the Members of Their Political

Parties

Valid if Content-Neutral

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates

or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be
regulated as to time, place, and manner (content- neutral regulation). (Diocese
of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015)

Regulation of Speech of Persons Who Are Not Candidates or Who Do Not

Speak as Members of a Political Party - Unconstitutional Regulation of speech
in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates
or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider
during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the
guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the
electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust
debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the right
to freedom of expression exercised by citizens who are neither electoral
candidates nor sponsored by any electoral candidate. A tarpaulin that
expresses a political opinion constitutes political speech. Speech that promotes
dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent,
should be protected and encouraged.

However, this does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a
private citizen which will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly
regulated by law. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728,
Jan. 21, 2015)

Test for a Valid Regulation of Election Paraphernalia Directed to Private

Persons

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it

reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation should be: (LR-
NT-LR)

1) Provided by Law;
2) Reasonable;
3) Narrowly Tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity
of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression; and
4) Demonstrably the Least Restrictive means to achieve that object.

The regulation must only be content-neutral, i.e. with respect to the time,
place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose,
it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015)

Regulation on Size Limitations of Tarpaulins -

A Content-Based Regulation

Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of
the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. A content-
based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.

With the clear and present danger test, respondent COMELEC failed to justify
the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else's constitutional rights.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015)

Prohibition on Posting of Election Campaign Materials During an Election

Period in PUVs and Transport Terminals - A Prior Restraint; Unconstitutional

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615: Posting an election campaign material

during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the
penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition,
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control
the place where election campaign materials may be posted.

Regulation on Size Limitations of Tarpaulins -

A Content-Based Regulation

Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of
the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. A content-
based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.

With the clear and present danger test, respondent COMELEC failed to justify
the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else's constitutional rights.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015)

Prohibition on Posting of Election Campaign Materials During an Election

Period in PUVs and Transport Terminals - A Prior Restraint; Unconstitutional

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615: Posting an election campaign material

during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the
penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition,
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control
the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of
the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation (O'Brien Test).
Applying the O'Brien Test, it is conceded that Resolution No. 9615 furthers an
important and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal
opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further conceded that the
governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. However, Resolution No. 9615 is not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC, thus fails the first
criterion of the O'Brien Test. (1- UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020,
April 14, 2015)

COMELEC May Only Regulate the Franchise or Permit to Operate and Not
the Ownership per se of PUVs and Transport Terminals

Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC

supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation, inter alia, of transportation and other
public utilities. The COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate
transportation for the use of the public and the ownership per se of the vehicles
used for public transport. In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have
the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by
private persons. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

Resolution No. 9615 Not Justified Under the Captive Audience Doctrine

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical

matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The
captive-audience doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided. A regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when
the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity
makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to
avoid exposure.

A government regulation based on the captive- audience doctrine may not be

justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Resolution No. 9615 is not
justified under the captive- audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the
messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may
simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. (1-UTAK v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
 Prohibition on Posting of Decals and Stickers in Mobile Places -
Unconstitutional

COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no
clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment
of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.

The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference

and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker
may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it
placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the
owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. (Adiong v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992)

Commercial Speech

1. It is communication which “no more than proposes a commercial

transaction”. Advertisement of goods and or of service is an
example (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer).

2. To enjoy protection, commercial speech:

a. Must not be false or misleading [Friedman v.

Rogers, 440 US 1 (1979)] and

b. Should not propose an illegal transaction

(Pittsburgh Press Co. v Human Relations
Commissions, 413 US 376).

3. However, even truthful and lawful commercial speech maybe

regulated if:
a. government has a substantial interest to protect;

b. the regulation directly advances that interest; and

c. it is not more than extensive than is necessary to

protect that interest [Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp v. Public Service Commission of NY, 447 US
557 (1980)]

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited

commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right without violating his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. -
 Commercial Speech vis-a-vis Section 4©(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the
transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level
of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to protection. The State cannot rob
him of his right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate forms of expression.

Political vs. Commercial Speech.

Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a contribution

to public deliberation about some issue, "fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation." On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction. "The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.

In Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed that "the content of the

tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject of the
regulations in RA 9006 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615."

He adds that "while indeed the RH issue, by itself, is not an electoral matter,
the slant that the petitioners gave the issue converted the non-election issue
into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea to
support one and oppose the other." While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group. (The Diocese of Bacolod, represented by The Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra and The Bishop Himself In His Personal Capacity, vs.
Commission on Elections and The Election Officer Of Bacolod City, Atty.
Mavil V. Majarucon, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Private v. Government Speech

Private Government
The right of A speech where
a the
person to government
freely
may
speak one’s advance or

mind restrict
is a highly valued its own speech in a
freedom in manner that
a
would
republican clearly be
forbidden
and
democratic were it
society. regulating
(Ashcroft v. the speech of
Free a
Speech private

Coalition, citizen
535 U.S. 234 (Wooley v.
Maynard,
[2002]) 1971).
Tests for Valid Governmental Interference:

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by

either or a combination of three tests. As articulated in our jurisprudence, the
Court has applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present
danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, the Court has
concluded that it has generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.
(Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)

a. Clear and Present Danger

Test Concept

This test is used for statements against lower courts. Whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

"Clear" connotes a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil
arising from the utterance questioned. "Present" refers to the time element that
is identified with imminent and immediate danger. (Gonzales v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969)

Applies to Content-Based Regulation; Presumed Unconstitutional

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based

on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive
impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the
government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will
be struck down. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)

As Applied to Broadcast Media

Radio station DYRE was summarily closed for national security reasons
because it allegedly aired subversive programs. The Court ruled that all forms
of media are entitled to the protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The clear and present danger test may be applied to test the limits of
free speech. That the words are used in such circumstances and are of such
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The SC recognized that
the government also has a right to be protected against broadcasts that incite
the listeners to violently overthrow it.

However, the clear and present danger test is not an all-embracing

interpretation that is applicable to all utterances in all forums. Freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting receives the most limited
protection from the free expression clause. Broadcast media have a uniquely
 pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens - it reaches even the privacy of
the home. Broadcast media is uniquely accessible to all, even children -
selectivity is more difficult in radio and TV. In other words, the audiences of
radio and TV have lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterances. (Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans Jr., G.R. No. L-59329, July 19,
1985)

Applied to Cases involving the Court's Power of Contempt

The power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of

expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on
public matters. The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without
careful consideration of the circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act,
and the purpose of punishing the act. Especially where freedom of speech and
press is involved, this Court has given a restrictive interpretation as to what
constitutes contempt. An article which does not impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice is not contumacious. The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree. (Roque v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, February
15, 2017)

b. Dangerous Tendency Rule

Concept

If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite
or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
(Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957)

This is used for statements against the Supreme Court and permits the
application of restrictions when:

a) There is a rational connection between the speech restrained and

the danger apprehended; and
b) The tendency of one to create the other is shown. (Gonzales v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L- 27833, April 18, 1969)

Applied to the Cases Involving Independence of the Court

The "dangerous tendency" rule has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and
the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
 remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the
freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress
of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are
subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the
courts against contempt. (Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974, Oct. 18,
1957)

Applied to Seditious Speech

Citizen Perez made this remark at a political discussion at a town municipio:

"and the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines." The court held that
criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. In this case, the Court found a seditious tendency which
could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-21049, Dec. 22, 1923;
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009)

c. Balancing of Interests Test

Concept

The balancing of interests test is used as a standard when courts need to

balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation of type of situation. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338,
Feb. 15, 2008)

Republic Act 4880 among other things prohibits the too early nomination of
political candidates and limits the period for partisan political activity. Its
purpose is to prevent the debasement of the political process. In determining
the validity of the law, free speech as a social value must be weighed against
the political process as a social value. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
27833, April 18, 1969)

The dangerous tendency rule and the clear and present danger rule were
evolved in the context of prosecution for seditious speech. They are thus
couched in terms of degree of evil and proximity of the evil. But not all evils
easily lend themselves, like sedition to measurement of proximity and degree.
For legislation therefore whose object is not the prevention of evil measurable
in terms of proximity and degree, another test had to be evolved. The
balancing of interests serves this purpose. It is used, for instance, for
commercial speech. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-21049, Dec. 22, 1923;
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009)
 Factors to Consider

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by

Congressional power restricting the individual's freedom, and the social
importance and value of the freedom so restricted, are to be judged in the
concrete, not on the basis of abstractions, a wide range of factors are
necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among
these are:

a. The social values and importance of the specific aspect of the

particular freedom restricted by the legislation;
b. The specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction
is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are
few;
c. The value and importance of the public interest sought to be
secured by the legislation - the reference here is to the nature
and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent;
d. Whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such
public interest; and
e. Whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest
involved may be achieved by some other measure less
restrictive of the protected freedom. (J. Castro, Separate
Opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L- 27833, April
18, 1969)

Summary
TEST CRITERION
Whether the words used are
used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present
Clear and danger that they will bring
Present Danger about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are
punishable.
Dangerous There should be a rational
Tendency connection between the
speech restrained and the
danger apprehended and the
tendency of one to create the
other is shown.
 Courts need to balance
conflicting social values and
individual interests, and
Balancing requires a conscious and
of detailed consideration of the
Interests interplay of interests
observable in a given
situation of type of situation.

Heckler’s Veto

The opposition of a rowdy or obstreperous crowd might as well drown out the
voice of the one seeking to exercise the right to speak. In legal context, that
might come in the form of regulation that might be engendered among those
opposed to it. This might be in the guise of a permit requirement in the
holding of rallies, parades or demonstrations conditioned on the payment of a
fee computed on the basis of the cost needed to keep order in view of the
expected opposition by persons holding contrary views (Gorospe,
Constitutional Law Notes and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and
Suffrage, Vol. 1, 2006 Ed., p. 863; see Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 US 123).

The "heckler's veto" involves situations in which the government attempts to

ban protected speech because it might provoke a violent response. In such
situations, the mere possibility of a violent reaction to protected speech is
simply not a constitutional basis on which to restrict the right to speak. (Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 June 7,
1971)

In Feiner v. New York (340 U.S. 315, Jan. 14, 1951), petitioner was neither
arrested nor convicted for the making of the speech or the content of his
speech, but for the reaction which it actually engendered. The Court held that
the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular
views; but, when a speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and
undertakes incitement to riot, the police are not powerless to prevent a breach
of the peace.

Notes on OVERBREADTH & VAGUENESS DOCTRINES

The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines
of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished from

an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.

The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against
a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
“chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would
be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before
it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal
statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on
a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before
the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigant.

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,
observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the “transcendent value to
all society of constitutionally protected expression.”

American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with
regard to the statute's facial validity.”

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has
been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the
Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of
municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b)
of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and
Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.

NOTES ON ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IN THE CASE OF CALLEJA VS.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (related to Freedom of Speech and other
cognate rights)

What are the provisions of the ATA that were declared unconstitutional by
the Court?

The Court declared unconstitutional the following provisions:

1) The phrase in the proviso of Section 4 which states “which are not intended to
cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger’s a person’s life, or
to create a serious risk of public safety”

2) The second mode of designation found in paragraph 2 of Section 25; and

3) As a necessary consequence, the corresponding reference/provision relative to

the foregoing items in the IRR of the ATA

3. Was the petition for certiorari and/or prohibition the proper remedy to
assail the constitutionality of the ATA even if it is a legislative act?

Yes, the Court partly gave due course to the petition for certiorari and/or
prohibitions by invoking the expanded power of judicial review under Section 5
Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court explained that although what is
assailed by the petitions for certiorari and/or prohibitions are legislative act not
judicial or quasi-judicial act as required under Rule 65 of the ROC, the petitions
for certiorari and/or prohibition remain the proper remedy under the expanded
definition of judicial review particularly to determine whether there is grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Congress
for passing RA No. 11479.

4. Is the facial challenge applicable against the ATA?

Yes, the consolidated petitions sufficiently raised concerns regarding the possible
impairment of freedom of speech, of expression and other cognate rights.

5. Whether the petitions complied with the requisites for the exercise of
power of judicial review?

A. Was there an actual case or controversy?

Yes, there is actual case or controversy with respect to certain issues falling within
the delimited facial analysis framework. In other words, the consolidated petitions
presents a permissible facial challenge on the ATA in the context of possible
impairment of freedom of speech, of expression and other cognate rights.

B. Do the petitioners have locus standi?

Yes, the Court finds that petitioners have sufficiently alleged the presence of
credible threat of injury for being constant targets of “red-tagging” or “truth-
tagging.” Therefore, they satisfy the requisites of the traditional concept of legal
standing based on direct injury test.

The Court also mentioned that even if petitioners Cassambre, RPM, Anakbayan,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan and GABRIEL had not
come under the operation of the ATA, there would have still been no legal
standing impediment to grant due course to the petition because they also present
actual facts that also partake of a facial challenge in the context of free speech and
cognate rights.

As held in the case of Disini vs Secretary of Justice, the Court noted that a
petitioner may mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if
he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it
involves free speech on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

Besides, the Court also ruled that petitioners may also be treated as non-traditional
suitors who may bring suit in representation of parties not before the Court
(taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens or legislators).
Lastly, the Court recognized that the petitions which asked the Court to declare
that the ATA infringes on their right to due process, free speech, of expression,
association and academic freedom, involved matters of transcendental importance
that merit the relaxation of procedural rules on standing.

C. Was the question on constitutionality of the law raised at an earliest

opportunity?

Yes, since the present constitutional challenge against the statute was directly
filed with the Supreme Court, the third requisite of judicial review of “earliest
opportunity” is complied with because the issue of constitutionality is raised at the
first instance.

D. Is the lis mota requirement for the exercise of power of judicial review
complied with?

Yes, the Court finds that the lis mota requirement is complied with by the very
nature of the constitutional challenged raised by petitioners against the ATA
which deal squarely with freedom of speech, expressions and its cognate rights.

6. If a law violates the doctrine of Separation of Powers, can the Court

invalidate it on its face or through the use of facial challenge?

No. based on prevailing Philippine jurisprudence, facial challenge on legislative

acts are permissible only if they curtail the freedom of speech and its cognate
rights (ie. freedom of religion and freedom of association) based on overbreadth
and void-for-vagueness doctrine. In short, facial challenges have not been
recognized as applicable to other provisions of the Constitution or the separation
of powers.

7. Can future cases assailing the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act

be filed even after the Court resolved the issues in the present case?

Yes, the Court held that since only the issues involving violation of freedom of
speech, expression and other cognate rights are resolved under the present case,
future petitions can be filed assailing the constitutionality of the unresolved
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law.

8. Can penal statutes be invalidated using facial challenge?

Yes, provided it involves violation of freedom of speech. The Court held that
penal statutes may be facially challenged under the overbreadth doctrine to
counter the “chilling effects” on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech because a person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime.
9. Can facial challenge be used to invalidate the main part of Section 4 of the
ATA?

No. Since the main part of Section 4 chiefly pertains to “conducts” and not
speeches, the delimited facial challenge framework is not applicable to assail
these provisions. In other words, the Courts noted that the acts constitutive of the
crime of terrorism under paragraphs a to e of Section 4 are clearly forms of
conducts unrelated to speech, in contradistinction with the enumeration on the
proviso, which are forms of speech or expression, or are manifestations thereof.
Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of the main part of Section 4—being a
primarily non-speech provision—must stand.

10. Is the proviso or the Not Intended Clause found in Section 4 of the ATA
constitutional?

No, the provo “which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a
person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety” or
the Not Intended Clause in Section 4 of ATA is unconstitutional under the strict
scrutiny test as well as void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.

To the Court’s mind, it was enough for Congress to state the terrorism is as
defined in Section 4 shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and
political rights.

However, Congress unnecessarily included the “Not Intended Clause,” thereby

invading the area of protected freedom. The not intended clause also shifts the
burden upon the accused to prove that his actions constitute an exercise of civil
and political rights contrary to the principle that it is the government that has the
burden to prove the unconstitutionality of an utterance or speech.

More significantly, the “Not Intended Clause” causes serious ambiguity since
there are no sufficient parameters that render it capable of judicial construction.
To demonstrate this ambiguity, one may dangerously suppose that the “intent to
cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to
create a serious risk of public safety” may be inferred from strong public clamor
attendant to protest, mass actions, or other similar exercises of civil and political
rights. By their very definition, these types of speeches are intended to express
disapproval against someone else’s proposition or stance on a given issue and
corollary to that, to advance one’s own proposition, and thus, should not be
considered as terrorist conduct.

The “Not Intended Clause” is void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on the
average person. Before the protester can speak, he must first guess whether his
speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act under Section 4 and whether he
might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it. They will have to contend
whether the few hours they would spend on the streets to redress their grievances
 against the government is worth the prospect of being indefinitely incarcerated,
considering that terrorism under Section 4 would be an unbailable offense as per
Section 7 Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The Not Intended Clause also allows law enforcers to take an “arrest now, explain
later” approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters. The
vagueness of the provision is likely to result in an ordinary flexing of the
government muscle, which is equally aversive to due process. An ordinary citizen
might forego speaking out against the government if only to avoid being branded
as terrorist by its own government. Even when a dissenter has successfully
defended himself in court, he may never fully rid of stigma of having been once
labeled a “terrorist” by his own government. The Not Intended Clause is also
overbroad since it creates a chilling effect to speech. Speech that is intended to
cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety should remain protected as long as it does not
render the commission of the terrorism imminent as per the Branderburg Standard
or the Clear and Present Danger Test.

The proviso does not pass the Strict Scrutiny Test because although there appears
to be a compelling state interest, such as to forestall terrorist activities in light of
global efforts to combat terrorism, punishing speech intended to “cause death or
serious physical harm, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to
public safety” is not the least restrictive means to achieve the same.

Freedom of the Press

Four (4) Aspects of Press Freedom

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has
recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint;
(2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to
information; and (4) freedom of circulation. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, et. al.,
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc [Puno, CJ])

Freedom of Assembly

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25,
2006, En Banc [Azcuna])
The standards for allowable impairment of speech and press also apply to the right of
assembly and petition.

Rules on assembly in public places:

1) Applicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when the assembly will take place.
2) The application should be filed ahead of time to enable the public official concerned
to appraise whether there are valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant,
but in another public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the application of
the Clear and Present Danger Test.
3) If the public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
4) The decision of the public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so
desire, have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Rules on assembly in private properties:

Only the consent of the owner of the property or person entitled to possession thereof is
required.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 – The Public Assembly Act of 1985

Meaning of Public Assembly- “Public assembly” means any rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for
the purpose of presenting a lawful cause, or expressing an opinion to the general public on
any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in
strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(Section 3[a], B.P. Blg. 880)

Permit when required and when not required- A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in a private property, in which case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government–owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any
election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. (Section 4, B.P.
Blg. 880)
Freedom Parks- Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the
effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in
their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of
any prior permit. (Section 5, B.P. Blg. 880)

Action to be taken on the application (Section 6, B.P. Blg. 880)

1) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.

2) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have
been filed.

3) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform
the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

4) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applicant within
twenty-four hours.

5) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate
court of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza, G.R. No. 175241,
24 February 2010, 1st Div. (Carpio Morales) Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly Act (BP
880) provides that “If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately
inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.”

In modifying the permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which x x x is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as
the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the
assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. It smacks of whim and caprice for Atienza to impose a change of venue for
an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the
appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit “in terms satisfactory to the applicant.”

Meaning of Maximum Tolerance- “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of

restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (Section 3[c], B.P. Blg. 880)

B.P. No. 880 is merely a “content-neutral” regulation

- It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction
that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmena v. Comelec (G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447), where the Court
referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding
public assemblies (Ibid, p. 478).

- A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies (except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and other
labor laws, political meeting or rallies held during election campaign period, which are
governed by the Election Code and other election related laws, and public assemblies in the
campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution, which shall be subject
to the rules and regulations of said educational institution [Sec. 3(a) and Sec. 4 of B.P. No.
880]) that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and
“influencing” in the definition of public assembly content-based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefits of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions
in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights x x x. (BAYAN,
et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

A.M. 98-7-02-SC: GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF DEMONSTRATIONS,

PICKETS, RALLIES AND OTHER SIMILAR GATHERINGS IN THE VICINITY
OF THE SUPREME COURT AND ALL OTHER COURTS

Prohibited Activity Near the SC and Other Courts

Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined
from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to, in front of,
or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer boundary of the
Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that
 houses at least one (1) court sala. Such activities unquestionably interrupt and
hamper the working condition in the salas, offices and chambers of the courts.
(Sec. 2)

SECTION 5- NON ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION & FREEDOM OF

RELIGION CLAUSES

Distinction between the clauses (School District v. Schempp, 374 US 203)

The non-establishment clause does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion. It is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. The test of
compliance with the non-establishment clause can be stated as follows: What are the
purposes and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion, the law violates the non-establishment clause. Thus, in order for a law to comply
with the non-establishment clause, two requisites must be met. First, it has a secular
legislative purpose. Second, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.

The free exercise of religion clause withdraws from legislative power the exertion of any
restraint on the free exercise of religion. In order to show a violation of this clause, the
person affected must show the coercive effect of the legislation as it operates against him in
the practice of his religion. While the freedom to believe (non-establishment) is absolute, the
moment such belief flows over into action, it becomes subject to government regulation.

Requisites for government aid to be allowable:

1) It must have a secular legislative purpose;

2) It must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
3) It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.

Tilton vs. Richardson & Lemon vs. Kurtzman

Non establishment of religion and Free Exercise of Religion Clause

Permitting federal aid for construction of secular buildings at church-sponsored colleges and
universities, finding that the Act did not violate the religious clauses.

Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause

Benevolent neutrality doctrine

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The
purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s
or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion
into account…to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)."

NOTE: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public
life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict
neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of "In God
We Trust" on American currency; the recognition of America as "one nation under God" in
the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of
opening oral argument with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court"; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain, usually
of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer. These practices
clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential for
intervention by a god—over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism (Ibid)

RENATO V. PERALTA vs. PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST),

G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018-Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature
of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it
acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals,
however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which
inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation
of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches
in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of
the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where an
exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious
exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality,

benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a
free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with
hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will strive to
accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the
Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in
question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by
the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting
exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the
religion clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can
eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious
practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the
state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious
clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as
discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation
indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should
take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is
directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small-not only
for a majority, however large-but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Xxx

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general."
Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic
parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be
used for a political assemblage.

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS

AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC,
March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 313.- To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of
justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence a domino effect. Strict separation,
rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the
exception of Muslims from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would
all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni
Cristo from joining a union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go down
the drain simply because we insist on strict separation.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-
Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an
unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith
belong to the majority or to the minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be without discrimination or preference."
Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip service.

Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-165, August 4, 2003- The State could not penalize
respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion
is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson
put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32,
April 8, 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo) The decision of the COMELEC not to allow the Ang
Ladlad-LGBT Party to participate in party-list elections because its members are “immoral,”
citing verses from the Bible and the Koran, was ruled by the SC to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and, therefore, nullified, as it violated the non-establishment clause of
freedom of religion. In effect, the COMELEC used religious standard in its decision by using
verses from the Bible and the Koran. The COMELEC, as a government agency, is not
supposed to be guided by religious standards in its decisions and actions.

What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot meddle following the
Separation of Church and State Doctrine?

An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed not worthy of membership.” Based on this definition, an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate
to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be
concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle
are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of
sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. (Pastor Dionisio V.
Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals- Under the non-establishment clause of freedom of

religion, when it comes to religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options –
neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. It is not its task to defend one religion
against an attack by another religion. After all, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. Let them duel in the market place of ideas. The marketplace of ideas demands that
speech should be met by more speech, for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TEST

1. A conscientious objector (CO) is an "individual who has claimed the right to refuse to
perform military service” on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, and/or religion
("International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; See Article 18". Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved April 1, 2014).

2. The United State Supreme Court held that the test of religious belief within the meaning of
the exemption in the Universal Military Training and Service Act – Section 6(j) excepts from
combatant service in the armed forces those who are conscientiously opposed to participation
in war by reason of their "religious training and belief," i.e., belief in an individual's relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties beyond a human relationship but not essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code – is whether it
is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption.

a. The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code,
nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or
economic considerations, rather than religious belief. There is no issue here of atheistic
beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question. This test accords with
long established legislative policy of equal treatment for those whose objection to military
service is based on religious beliefs [United States v.Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)].
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8,
2014, En Banc (Mendoza) - Wherefore, THE PETITIONS ARE partially granted.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, except
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

xxx

- 2) Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

xxx

- 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

- 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders
the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 - members of
Jehovah’s witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national
anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.

Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
when it will bring about clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a
duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not constitute
clear and present danger.

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that the COMELEC order
to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious
doctrine of the catholic church.

Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

SECTION 6- LIBERTY OF ABODE & RIGHT TO TRAVEL

1) Freedom to choose and change one’s place of abode.

2) Freedom to travel within the country and outside.

Curtailment of rights:

RIGHT MANNER OF CURTAILMENT

1. Liberty of abode Lawful order of the court and within the

limits prescribed by law.

2. Right to travel May be curtailed even by administrative

officers (ex. passport officers) in the
interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Note: The right to travel and the liberty of abode are distinct from the right to return to one’s
country, as shown by the fact that the Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on
Human Rights have separate guarantees for these. Hence, the right to return to one’s country
is not covered by the specific right to travel and liberty of abode. (Marcos v. Manglapus)

WATCH-LIST AND HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDER

DOJ Circular No. 41: Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and
Implementation of Hold Department Orders (HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO) and
Allow Departure Orders (ADO) is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Hon. Leila De Lima, G.R. No. 199034, April 17, 2018)

1. There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to
curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the
petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Join DOJ-
COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage
against them.

2. To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which
underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for
approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions
of the enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order No. 292
–
Administrative Code of 1987. It is however important to stress that before there can be valid
administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power
is itself valid.
3. A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ
Secretary disclosed that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ
Circular No. 41
which effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs. Said
provisions are mere general provisions designed to lay down the purposes of the enactment
and the broad enumeration of the powers and functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be
interpreted as a grant of power to curtail a fundamental right as the language of the provision
itself does not lend to that stretched construction.

4. The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive
department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of the HDO and WLO is not
the DOJ’s functions.

5. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and

sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate
rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of
laws. The DOJ is confined to filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into
effect the law enacted. Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance
is ultra vires.

6. The DOJ cannot issue DOJ Circular No. 41 under the guise of police power. On its own,
the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority pertains to Congress.

7. Apart from lack of legal basis, the apparent vagueness of DOJ Circular No. 41 as to the
distinction between a HDO and WLO is violative of due process clause. The distinction is
significant as it will inform the respondents of the grounds, effects and the measures they
may take to contest the issuance against them. Verily, there must be a standard by which a
HDO or WLO may be issued, particularly against those whose cases are still under
preliminary investigation, since at that stage there is yet no criminal information against them
which could have warranted the restraint

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The person’s right to travel
is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian
reasons is a matter addressed to the court’s discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6,
2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country

Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate to suspension of
deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA;
Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK) vs. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if
made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself
reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by
law.

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety
and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and
their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the
minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the
second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete
with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,
as amended, RA 9775, RA 9262, RA 9851, RA 9344, RA 10364, RA 921, RA8980, RA9288,
and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, as amended.

Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO. MTJ-10-1770-July 18,

2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court [personnel, before they can go on leave to
travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
“regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule.

Zabal, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019- Any
bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the
closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary
incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No.
475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Tue questioned proclamation is clearly
focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right
cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its import.

Restriction on travel

Section 34 of the Anti-Terrorism Law (RA 11479)- which limits an accused’s movement
within the city or municipality where he resides. This section likewise allows house arrest,
upon order of the court.

SECTION 7- RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Rights guaranteed under Section 7

1) Right to information on matters of public concern

2) Right of access to official records and documents

Persons entitled to the above rights

Only Filipino citizens.

Discretion of government

The government has discretion with respect to the authority to determine what matters are of
public concern and the authority to determine the manner of access to them.

Recognized restrictions on the right of the people to information:

1) National security matters

2) Intelligence information
3) Trade secrets
4) Banking transactions
5) Diplomatic correspondence
6) Executive sessions
7) Closed door cabinet meetings
8) Supreme Court deliberations

There are certain classes of information which may be withheld from the public and even
from Congress. These are national security matters or confidential diplomatic matters, trade
secrets and banking transactions, the identity of informants in criminal investigations,
confidential or classified matters which come to the knowledge of public officials by reason
of their office. (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No 130716, Dec. 9, 1998)

Before a definite proposition is reached by an agency, there are no official acts, transactions,
or decisions yet which can be accessed by the public under the right to information. Only
when there is an official recommendation can a definite proposition arise and, accordingly,
the public's right to information attaches. (DFA v. BCA International, G.R. No. 210858, June
29, 2016)

Access to court records

1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information
acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from
authorized or unauthorized sources. Confidential information means information not yet
made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made
public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes,
drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision,
resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is
made public. (Sec. 1, Canon II Confidentiality Code of Conduct for Court Personnel [AM
No. 03-06-13-SC]).

2. Under the Constitution, access is subject to limitations as may be provided by law.

Therefore, a law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny such as
national security. The privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on the military, diplomatic and similar matter. Since intestate proceedings do not
contain any military or diplomatic secrets which will be disclosed by its production, it is an
error on the part of the judge to deny Ramon’s motion (Hidalgo v. Reyes, AM No. RTJ-05-
1910, Apr. 15, 2005).

NOTE: With regard to court hearings and court records and the right of accused over right to
public information – With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the
very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come
only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed
by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics
that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,
and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind unbridled by running emotions or passions
(Re:Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez
v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4- 03-SC, June 29, 2001]

Note: Freedom of Information (FoI) is a right enshrined in our fundamental law. It refers to
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is the right of every
citizen to access official records, documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development (Sec. 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). This includes the public’s right to know the
public officials’ and employees’ assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests.

So as not to render this right ineffectual brought about by the lack of a law therefor, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte passed Executive Order No. 2, Series of 2016, which implemented the
FoI Program in the executive branch. For its part, the Supreme Court passed the Rule on
Access to Information About the Supreme Court early this year. The Supreme Court likewise
ordered the creation of FoI Manuals in the entire judiciary, ie, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts.

Deliberative Process Privilege

U.S. courts have established two fundamental requirements, both of which

must be met, for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked:

1) Predecisional - The communication must be predecisional, i.e.,

antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy; and

2) Deliberative - The communication must be deliberative, i.e., a direct

part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or
expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.

The deliberative process privilege exempts materials that are 'predecisional'

and 'deliberative,' but requires disclosure of policy statements and final
opinions 'that have the force of law or explain actions that an agency has
already taken.

As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency

asserting the deliberative process privilege to prove that the information in
question satisfies both requirements - predecisional and deliberative. The
agency bears the burden of establishing the character of the decision, the
deliberative process involved, and the role played by the documents in the
course of that process. It may be overcome upon a showing that the
discoverant's interests in disclosure of the materials outweigh the government's
interests in their confidentiality. The determination of need must be made
flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis, and the factors relevant to this
balancing include: the relevance of the evidence, whether there is reason to
believe the documents may shed light on government misconduct, whether the
information sought is available from other sources and can be obtained
without compromising the government's deliberative processes, and the
importance of the material to the discoverant's case. (DFA v. BCA
International, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016)

Presidential Communications Privilege

Applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the constitutional

principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role;
applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre- deliberative ones; meant to encompass only those
functions that form the core of presidential authority.

Requisites:

1) The communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable

power" of the President;

2) The communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President;

and

3) There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify

the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. (Neri
v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)

Publication of Laws and Regulations

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There
shall be published in the Official Gazette..." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list
of what should be published in the Official Gazette. It is needless to add that
the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. (Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,
1985).
 Other Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Information

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and

implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (PHIL. CONST., art. II, § 28)

DSCLOSURE STATE OF HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENT

De Leon v. Duterte, [G.R. No. 252118, May 8, 2020]

The petition failed to set forth his material allegations to establish the prima facie case (based
on first impression) for mandamus. The tribunal also took note that Constitutional
Commission deliberations showed that the “state of health or analysis as to the actual
condition of the President should be left to the President and his doctor.”

MR Ruling

De Leon failed to make a prima facie case for his petition and failed to prove that a legal right
was violated by Duterte and his office. It added that the petition failed to show that
compelling the president to disclose his state of health or subject himself to confirmatory
medical and psychological tests “constitute ministerial duties” of the government.

DISCLOSURE OF SALN

Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo vs. Hon. Ombudsman Samuel R. Martires, G.R. No. 254516,
February 2, 2021- Here, while the right of access and information to a public official's
SALN is provided under the Constitution and RA 6713, the same is not an absolute vested
right. The Court has declared in the past that while no prohibition could stand against access
to official records such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the
inherent power of the custodian to control its very office to the end that damage to, or
loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that
the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured. Thus, a custodian
such as the Office of the Ombudsman is not bound under every circumstance to allow or to
grant the request of disclosure of a public official's SALN to the public. A custodian is not
prohibited by the Constitution to regulate such disclosure. Its duty therefore, under the
Constitution and applicable laws, is far from being merely ministerial. The Court, in fact, as
custodian of the SALNs of justices and judges, has itself laid down some guidelines to be
observed for requests made to gain access to these SALNs.30 It has likewise, on
occasions, denied requests due to a "'plainly discernible' improper motive"31 or one
that "smack[ed] of a fishing expedition."32 27 Id. at 451, as cited in Laygo, et al. v. The
Municipal Mayor of Solano, Nueva Viz

Supreme Court & SALN Disclosure

Non-disclosure of SALNs, PDSs and CVs is a privilege that belongs to the Supreme Court as
an institution, not to any justice or judge in his/her individual capacity. Hence, no sitting or
retired justice or judge, even the Chief Justice, may claim exemption without the consent of
the Court.

To borrow the words of the Supreme Court, “while the Constitution holds dear the right of
the people to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the
independence of the judiciary”. Thus, the passage of the Rule on Access to Information
About the Supreme Court, which allowed people to exercise their right to know by
allowing access to public and official records in the custody of the Supreme Court
subject only to reasonable requirements provided therein.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is
consummated. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.

Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section 17, Art. XI has
classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In
other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to know”. Both of constitutional
origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on the
part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or control of public records have
the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied
by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access,
inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust.

Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCRA 592- While access to official records may not be
prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

SECTION 8- RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

Calleja v. Executive Secretary- Does the territorial application (Section 49) of the ATA
which punishes people abroad for acts that may not be illegal in their respective
countries (ie. membership, association or affiliation with designated terrorist
organizations) have chilling effects on the right of association?

The Court holds that the constitutional challenge against Section 49 is not ripe for
adjudication. In any event, the supposed chilling effect is more apparent than real. A plain
reading of Section 49 shows that it merely provides rule on how jurisdiction over the offense
of terrorism is acquired. It is noteworthy that the ATA having extraterritorial application is
not peculiar. Section 49 is not the first time the country would extend the application of penal
law to Filipino citizens, for acts committed outside the country.

The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law and is thus an
aspect of the right of liberty. It is also an aspect of the freedom of contract. In addition,
insofar as the associations may have for their object the advancement of beliefs and ideas, the
freedom of association is an aspect of the freedom of speech and expression, subject to the
same limitation.

The right also covers the right not to join an association.

United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15- Congress, via Art. 125
of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to
strike does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Government employees have the right to form unions. They also have the right to
strike, unless there is a statutory ban on them. NOTE: Right to association and right to
unionize of government employees do not include the right to strike (SSS Employees
Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686)

SECTION 9- TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY BY EMINENT DOMAIN

Who can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1) The national government

a. Congress
b. Executive, pursuant to legislation enacted by Congress

2) Local government units, pursuant to an ordinance enacted by their respective legislative

bodies (under LGC)

3) Public utilities, as may be delegated by law.

When is the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessary?

It is only necessary when the owner does not want or opposes the sale of his property. Thus,
if a valid contract exists between the government and the owner, the government cannot
exercise the power of eminent domain as a substitute to the enforcement of the contract.

Elements of the power of eminent domain

i. There is a TAKING of private property

ii. Taking is for PUBLIC USE

iii. Payment of JUST COMPENSATION

“TAKING”

A. Elements:

1) The expropriator enters the property

2) The entrance must not be for a momentary period, i.e., it must be permanent
3) Entry is made under warrant or color of legal authority
4) Property is devoted to public use
 5) Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.

B. Compensable taking does not need to involve all the property interests which form part
of the right of ownership. When one or more of the property rights are appropriated and
applied to a public purpose, there is already a compensable taking, even if bare title still
remains with the owner.

“PUBLIC USE”

Public use, for purposes of expropriation, is synonymous with public welfare as the latter
term is used in the concept of police power.

Examples of public use include land reform and socialized housing.

“JUST COMPENSATION”

Compensation is just if the owner receives a sum equivalent to the market value of his
property. Market value is generally defined as the fair value of the property as between one
who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell.

The point of reference use in determining fair value is the value at the time the property was
taken. Thus, future potential use of the land is not considered in computing just
compensation.

Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain

1) To determine the adequacy of the compensation

2) To determine the necessity of the taking
3) To determine the “public use” character of the taking. However, if the expropriation
is pursuant to a specific law passed by Congress, the courts cannot question the public
use character of the taking.

G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013, Secretary of DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson

Just compensaton is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds
true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the
property owner who brings the action for compensaton.

The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al., and repeatedly
held by the Court in recent cases, Thus :x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of
the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where
property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may
be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to
general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or
injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the
time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with
constitutional requirements in taking private property.

In the case where DPWH had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation,
DPWH clearly acted in utter disregard of land owners’ proprietary rights which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, landowners are entitled to adequate
compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case should be
the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of taking
in 1940 until full payment. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law
and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of taking.

Thus, adding the interest computed to the market value of the property at the time of taking
signifies the real, substantial, full and ample value of the property. Verily, the same
constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and serves as
a basic measure of fairness. In addition to the foregoing interest, additional compensation
shall be awarded to respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
in view of the government's taking without the benefit of expropriation proceedings.

The State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the
concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.

Despite the foregoing developments, however, We emphasize that the government's failure,
to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the State's exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said
expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of
the State's inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. Thus,
the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

For entry of possession or issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the government (2

systems of deposit)

1. Sec. 1, Rule 67- initial deposit of assessed value of the property for tax purposes (tax
declaration) with an authorized bank depositary.
2. RA 10752 (The Right of Way Act which repealed RA 8974)– One hundred percent (100%)
of the value of the land based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) issued not more than three (3) years prior to the filing of the expropriation
complaint and the value of the improvements and/or structures (using the replacement cost
method)

No hearing is required for the issuance of the writ of possession, which demands only
two (2) requirements:

1. Sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint; and

2. The required provisional deposit.

• Upon compliance with these requirements, the plaintiff in an expropriation case is entitled
to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial.
[Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development Corporation, G.R. No. 205544, June 29,
2016]

INTEREST PAYMENT

RP v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 227215, January 10, 2018

The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to
compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld in a
plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. Indeed,
the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.

In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also
its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value
must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the
just compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid
balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This shall comprise the real,
substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes due
compliance with the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain.

Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the just compensation," warranting
the imposition of interest. It is settled that the delay in the payment of just compensation
amounts to an effective forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the
difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial
payment made by the government.

However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal
interest is only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent
(6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. Prevailing jurisprudence has
upheld the applicability of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 to forbearances of
money in expropriation cases, contrary to respondent's contention. The cases of Sy v. Local
Government of Quezon nd Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, cited by respondent are
both inapplicable because they were all decided prior to the effectivity of BSP-MB Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013 on July 1, 2013.

Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of
the complaint but from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008,
since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be established. As
such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from this date. Accordingly,
the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be computed at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due respondent
shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.

Republic v. Posadas, G.R. No. 214310, February 24, 2020

• The date of taking will have an effect on the amount due as a deposit for the property's
expropriation.

• The road-widening project subject of the case at bar is properly categorized as a national
government infrastructure project within the purview of R.A. No. 8974.

• The law directs the government agency implementing the project to immediately pay the
owner 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation, as
determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, plus the value of the improvements and
structures erected thereon.

• Since R.A. No. 8974 took effect on November 26, 2000 without a retroactivity clause, the
government's obligation to deposit such an amount will arise only with regard to property
taken on or after that date.

• Alternatively, if the property was taken before then, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court apply.

• Rule 67 provides that the expropriating agency must deposit with an authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the property's assessed value for taxation purposes.

• Simply put, if the property was taken on or after November 26, 2000, the Republic must
immediately pay the respondents the amount provided under R.A. No. 8974.

• On the other hand, if the property was taken before said date, the trial court must order the
Republic to comply with the provisions of Rule 67, particularly the requirement of depositing
the property's assessed value with the appropriate government depositary.

• Note that R.A. No. 8974 has been repealed by R.A. No. 10752. This, however, did not
affect the Republic's obligation to deposit the land's zonal value plus the value of the
improvements situated thereon.

• The determination of the time of taking is also necessary for interest, which is imposed as
damages for delaying the payment of just compensation, begins to run from the time the
property is taken from its owner.
• In the Posadas case, the taking was done by the government 40 years prior to the filing of
the complaint for expropriation.

What if the title over the land sought to be expropriated is derived from a free patent?

• If the title over the land was derived from a free patent, a legal easement of right of way
exists in favor of the government over the land that was originally a public land awarded by
free patent even if the land is subsequently sold to another.

• Thus, no payment of just compensation is required. [Republic v. Spouses Alforte, G.R. No.
217051, August 22, 2018]

• One of the reservations and conditions under the Original Certificate of Title of land granted
by free patent is that the said land is subject to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110,
111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

• Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands granted by patent shall be
subjected to a right-of-way in favor of the Government.

• With the existence of the said easement of right-of-way in favor of the Government, the
government may appropriate the portion of the land necessary for the construction of the
bypass road or right of way without paying for it, except for damages to the improvements.

• Landowners would be required to execute the corresponding quitclaim in favor of the State.
[Republic v. Spouses Alforte, G.R. No. 217051, August 22, 2018]

• Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the

rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.

• It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands. (National Power Corp. v. Spouses Malijan, G.R. Nos. 211731 & 211818,
December 7, 2016)

Remedy of landowner if there is non-payment of just compensation

• It does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated property.

• However, if the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality
of judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners shall have the right to recover
possession. [Republic v. Lim]

CASES:

Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303- There are at least
two crucial differences between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67.
Under the statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas Rule 67,
the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value
of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012- When the State
exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian program, the
constitutional provision which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution which
provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of paying
landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the government’s agrarian reform
purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the taken property.

LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust account to provisionally
pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, we struck down as void the DAR administrative circular that provided for the
opening of the trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in
Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying
the government’s payment of just compensation.

FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION VS. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION

CORPORATION (HAVING BEEN SUBSTITUTED IN LIEU OF THE NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION), G.R. Nos. 231655 and 231670, July 02, 2018.

Q. How is just compensation determined by the court?

A. The general rule is that upon the filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the
right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.
An exception to this procedure is provided by RA 8974 with respect to national
government projects, which requires the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the property
to be expropriated as the provisional value.] It must be emphasized, however, that whether a
deposit is made under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or the provisional value of the property
is paid pursuant to RA 8974, the said amount serves the double-purpose of: (a) pre-payment
if the property is fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceedings are
dismissed.

Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the expropriator to deposit the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property to be expropriated prior to entry. The
assessed value of a real property constitutes a mere percentage of its fair market value based
on the assessment levels fixed under the pertinent ordinance passed by the local government
where the property is located. In contrast, RA 8974 requires the payment of the amount
equivalent to 100% of the current zonal value of the property, which is usually a higher
amount.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Gingoyon, the Court recognized that while
expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private
property, the deposit requirement under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court "impeded immediate
compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final
amount of compensation would prove highly disputed." Thus, it categorically declared that
"[i]t is the plain intent of [RA] 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with
the scheme of 'immediate payment' in cases involving national government infrastructure
projects." The same case further ruled:

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive
matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did
through the enactment of [RA] 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standard in
determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national
government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. Of course, rules of procedure, as
distinguished from substantive matters, remain the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Court
by virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, Section 14 of the
Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects
when it provides "all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on
uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and
such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on
expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court."

Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by

the owner of the property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary
right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of
the legislature to legislate on.

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive
application. It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive
effect only governs rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law. However,
if a right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law, it shall take effect from that time
even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not
prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

xxx It must be emphasized that RA 8974 does not take away from the courts the power to
judicially determine the amount of just compensation. It merely provides relevant standards
in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, and sets the minimum price of
the property as the provisional value to immediately recompense the landowner with the
same degree of speed as the taking of the property, which reconciles the inherent unease
attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity.

Nonetheless, it is settled that where actual taking was made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property
prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the
value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation. Any other interpretation would be repugnant to the Constitution which
commands the exproriator to pay the property owner no less than the full and fair equivalent
of the property from the date of taking.

xxx However, it must be emphasized that in determining just compensation, the courts must
consider and apply the parameters set by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
in order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount as just compensation that is
contradictory to the objectives of the law. Be that as it may, when acting within such
parameters, courts are not strictly bound to apply the same to its minutest detail, particularly
when faced with situations that do not warrant its strict application. Thus, the courts may, in
the exercise of their discretion, relax the application of the guidelines subject to the
jurisprudential limitation that the factual situation calls for it and the courts clearly explain
the reason for such deviation.

xxx Moreover, it must be clarified that the government's initial payment of the land's
provisional value does not excuse it from avoiding payment of interest on any difference
between the amount of final just compensation adjudged and the initial payment
(unpaid balance). Legal interest shall be imposed on the unpaid balance at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking, i.e., from entry in the subject land on
September 21, 1989, until June 30, 2013; thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully
paid, the just compensation due petitioner shall earn interest at the rate six percent (6%) per
annum.

Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The government’s failure to
initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said
expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of
the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. Thus,
the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the
long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the
time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’
is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the
actual value of the property at the time it is taken.

The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of
the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just compensation,
contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies – a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of.
Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.

For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the
time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with
constitutional requirements in taking private property.

Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does
not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are
government properties, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment
or pending appeal.

It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either
by general or special law, it may limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered
by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970).

The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof
and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural,
matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition
of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically
prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation
cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of
its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this case.

RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to the
expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for national government infrastructure
projects. On the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of right-of-way sites or
locations for national government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court shall still govern.

DPWH vs. Ng, November 9, 2017- Just compensation: involves the implementation of a
national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes of determining the just compensation, RA
8974 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), which were effective at the time of
the filing of the complaint, shall govern.

The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of substitution, which means that
"all things being equal, a rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than
the cost of building an acceptable substitute with like utility."

Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider: (a) construction costs or the current
market price of materials, equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and overhead;
and (b) attendant costs or the cost associated with the acquisition and installation of an
acceptable substitute in place of the affected improvements/structures. In addition, the case of
Republic v. Mupas instructs that in using the replacement cost method to ascertain the value
of improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant standards provided under Section
5 of RA 8974, as well as equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is a concept
of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount
of the owner's investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by eminent domain,
that is guaranteed to the owner.

While there are various methods of appraising a property using the cost approach, among
them, the reproduction cost, the replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement cost,
Mupas declared that the use of the depreciated replacement cost method is consistent with the
principle that the property owner shall be compensated for his actual loss, bearing in mind
that the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone, but
must likewise be just to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The
property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he loses
is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking. Hence, even as
undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

When municipal property is taken by the State:

Compensation is required if the property is a patrimonial property, that is, property acquired
by the municipality with its private funds in its corporate or private capacity. However, if it
is any other property such a public buildings or legua comunal held by the municipality for
the State in trust for the inhabitants, the State is free to dispose of it at will.

Point of reference for valuating a piece of property:

General rule: The value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation.

Exception: When the filing of the case comes later than the time of taking and meanwhile
the value of the property has increased because of the use to which the expropriator has put it,
the value is that of the time of the earlier taking. BUT if the value increased independently of
what the expropriator did, then the value is that of the latter filing of the case.

MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION VS. PANAY ELECTRIC

COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 248061, September 15, 2020

Q. What are the requirements of the delegation of eminent domain to an agent of the State?

A. When the power of eminent domain is exercised by an agent of the State and by means of
expropriation of real property, farther limitations are imposed by law, [Republic Act No.
8974] the rules of court [Rule 67] and jurisprudence. [National Power Corporation v. Posada,
755 Phil. 613, 623 (2015)] In essence, these requirements are:

A valid delegation to a public utility to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;

An identified public use, purpose or welfare for which eminent domain or expropriation is
exercised;
Previous tender of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but which offer is not accepted; and

Payment of just compensation.

xxx That the government let the franchise lapse without initiating expropriation directly or
through an agent does not mean that it is no longer able to do so. There is no shelf-life to the
power to expropriate. There is no prohibition against the government initiating expropriation
of the distribution system for as long as all the requirements of a valid expropriation are met.

xxx the current state of that jurisprudence is that taking for the same public purpose, but in
favor of a local government or for a similar, but not identical public purpose is valid.

Ruling in MR, March 09, 2021

The power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated
by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to
private enterprises performing public services.

The exercise of the right to expropriate given to MORE under its franchise is a delegated
authority granted by Congress. The restrictive view that expropriation may be exercised by
the State alone, without any consideration for the State's authority to delegate its powers,
cannot be upheld. Being a private enterprise allowed by the Congress to operate a public
utility for public interest, the delegation by Congress of the power to expropriate PECO's
distribution system is valid.

It is settled that a property already devoted to public use can still be subject to expropriation,
provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority
to a delegate.

xxx incidental private benefit MORE enjoys does not override the paramount public interest
on which the right of eminent domain is hinged. It would be unfair for the public to be
deprived of access to uninterrupted supply of electricity, an important tool to economic
growth, simply because of some incidental benefit MORE may gain from its legislative
franchise.

Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin elements of just
compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee does
not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private property
taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the
expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of
property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be
strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting
public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least
reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now
acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or advantage,
or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity the
very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a
private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the governments
retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct
use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive
to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play

ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to prove
the commitment of the government to allow them to repurchase their land.

Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through
expropriation proceedings may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this
property again to another private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking.

Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to
expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.

MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD to
exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its
board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.

Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but
a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.

-While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle
the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is
in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation.

Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to judicial
review (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community).
Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial), in any
expropriation proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or
otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).

To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated, September
18, 2009- The Court said that the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that the State also cannot
impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.

Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR
vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 – The tax credit given to
commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is
a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since the
privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from private
establishments concerned.

Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private entities may
benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized
housing is for public use.

Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government lands;
2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands
within the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum
improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS sites which
have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar,
350SCRA 487 2001).

SECTION 10- NON IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS

When does a law impair the obligation of contracts:

i. If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the

time or mode of performance

ii. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed

iii. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided
in its terms.

A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change the substance of the
contract, and which still leaves an efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the
obligation of contracts.
Contemporary application of the contract clause

1. The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The non-
impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts
by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties (BANAT
Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 595 SCRA 477).

2. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the
parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for
the enforcement of the rights of the parties (Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702).

3. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time. The non-
impairment clause must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government
(GoldenwayMerchanidising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 19554, March
13, 2013)

Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year
period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the
date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of
the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties
foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under
Act No. 3135.

EXCEPTIONS:

1) Police Power
2) Eminent Domain Power
3) Taxation Power (Except: Tax exemption based on valuable consideration)
4) Waiver by the parties
5) Franchises issued by government
6) Freedom of Religion

A valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.

There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions entered
or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the
exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted
for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

Instances When the Non-impairment Clause is Inapplicable

The parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic

discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only
are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
 parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government, which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a
tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, Oct. 30, 1995)

These contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are
annotated on the Torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with
the legitimate exercise of police power. (Presley v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 86774, Aug. 21, 1991) (Ortigas & Co. Limited
Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, Dec. 14, 1979)

Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. Section 47

of the General Banking Law did not divest juridical persons of the right to
redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise
of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No.
3135. (Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No.
195540, March 13, 2013)

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights.

In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. (Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, G.R. No. L-25246, Sept. 12, 1974)

EXCEPTIONS:

1) Police Power
2) Eminent Domain Power
3) Taxation Power (Except: Tax exemption based on valuable
consideration)
4) Waiver by the parties
5) Franchises issued by government
6) Freedom of Religion

Contemporary application of the contract clause

1. The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the

Constitution, which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed. The non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws
that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties (BANAT Party-list v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 595 SCRA 477).

2. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract

between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed
upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties
(Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702).
 3. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which
affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time. The non-impairment clause must yield to
the loftier purposes targeted by the government (Goldenway Merchanidising
Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 19554, March 13, 2013)

Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem
their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such
right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The
new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and
expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application
of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

A valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts. There is

no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions
entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a
limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a
tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec.
of Finance)

The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair

contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

SECTION 11- FREE ACCESS TO COURTS & ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE

1. Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010. The term legal services to be performed by a lawyer
refers to any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and
the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative
and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar
services as may be defined by the Supreme Court (Sec. 3, RA 9999).

a. For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or
professional partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating
that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme
Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the
private counsel.

b. Incentives to Lawyers. For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships

rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an
allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the
actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived
from the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the
actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-
hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued
by the
Supreme Court (Sec. 5, RA 9999).

2. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants:

a. Whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double
the monthly minimum wage of an employee and,

b. who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration of more than three hundred thousand (Php 300,000.00) pesos Shall be exempt
from the payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided,
the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with the fair value aforementioned,
supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s
affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit. Any
falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss
the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

3. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other
lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and
other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made
within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose (Sec.21, Rule 21, Rules of Court).

SECTION 12- CUSTODIAL RIGHTS

Availability

1. They exist only in custodial interrogation (People v. Judge Ayson, 175SCRA 216).

Custodial investigation

a. Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers (PNP, DOJ,

NBI) after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
 his freedom of action in any significant way, i.e., Signing of arrest
reports and booking sheets.

b. It shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who

is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for
any violation of law (Sec.2, RA 7438 [An Act Defining Certain Rights
Of Person Arrested, Detained Or Under Custodial Investigation As Well
As The Duties Of The Arresting, Detaining And Investigating Officers,
And Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof]).

c. They are available when the investigation is no longer a general

inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, and the police
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements. The rule begins to operate at once as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
question which tend to place him at the crime scene.

2. The constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous

statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to
admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is
placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth (People v. Baloloy, G.R. No.140740. April 12,
2002).

Requisites

The Court, as guardian of the rights of the people laid down the procedure, guidelines and
duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the
custodial interrogation in accordance with the Act No. 7438. It is high-time to educate our
law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called
Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light
of new legal developments:

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation

must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any;
Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times
and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer,
preferably of his own choice;

4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the

services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer
may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed
by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;

5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be

informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted
except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been
made;

6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the
right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means –
telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from be visited by/confer
with duly accredited national or international nongovernment
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must

be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of
counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police
may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his
right of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during
the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;

11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case
may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence (People v.Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455).
When rights are not available:

1) During a police line-up. Exception: Once there is a move among the investigators to
elicit admissions or confessions from the suspect.
2) During administrative investigations.

3) Confessions made by an accused at the time he voluntarily surrendered to the police

or outside the context of a formal investigation.

4) Statements made to a private person.

Exclusionary rule

1) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him (the accused).

2) Therefore, any evidence obtained by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is also

inadmissible, being the fruit of a poisoned tree.

Waiver

Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect (Sec. 2 [e], RA7438).

Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that
protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must
prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the
accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
confession (People v. Jara, G. R. No. L-61356-57, September 30, 1986).

CASES:

Calleja vs. Executive Secretary- Does the 14-day or 24-day period violate the 3-day limit
for detention without judicial charge under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?

No. Section 29 of the ATA is an exception to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code based on
Congress’ own wisdom and policy determination relative to the exigent and peculiar nature
of terrorism and hence, requires as a safeguard, the written authorization of the ATC, an
executive agency comprised of high-ranking national security officials.

Section 29 does not amend Article 125 of the RPC but supplements it by providing an
exceptional rule with specific application only in cases where: 1) there is probable cause to
believe that the crime committed is that which is punished under Section 4 to 12 of the ATA;
and 2) written authorization is secured for that purpose.
Moreover, the three-day period in the last paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is irrelevant to terrorism because it is applicable only in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it.

What is the remedy of a detainee under Section 29?

Writ of habeas corpus.

Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay based organizatios in the
nature of watch groups, as in the case of bantay bayan, are recognized by local government
unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting and the specific scope of
duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The Supreme Court, therefore,
finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible
in evidence.

Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor it can be
considered a formal arrest, by the very nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.

Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited”
for questioning.

PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in
evidence.

PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong vs.
CSC, 563 SCRA 293).

Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court sustained the
admissibility of the sworn statements of the other accused, explaining that the investigations
performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature.

Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity
to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated
with counsel.

SECTION 13- RIGHT TO BAIL

1. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required
(Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

2. Bail is accorded to a person in custody of the law who may by reason of the presumption
of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his
appearance before any court, as required under specific circumstances (People v.Fitzgerald,
GR 149723, October 27, 2006).

3. The right to bail can be availed of only by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty, and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed (Cortes v. Judge Catral,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1508, December 15, 1999).

Exceptions:

a. Those charged with capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong. Since the evidence in
this case (rebellion) is hearsay, the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail is allowed (Enrile v.
Perez, G.R. No. 147780 May
10, 2001).

b. Military men. Military men who participated in failed coup d’état because of their threat to
national security (Comendador v. De Villa, 200
SCRA 80). The denial of the right tobail to military does not violate the equal protection
clause because there is substantial distinction between military and civilians (Nachura,
Outline Reviewer in Political Law).

5. Bail as a Matter of Right. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law:

a. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and,

b. Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

6. Bail when Discretionary (Sec. 5, Rule 114).

a. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

b. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty after
the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
c. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon
showing by the following or other similar circumstances:

i. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,

or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteracion;

ii. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

iii. That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or
under conditional pardon;

iv. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicates the
probability of flight if released on bail; or

v. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.

7. Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion- reasonable notice of hearing is required to

be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in
fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors (Sec.
5, Rule 114).

8. Factors considered in setting the amount of bail:

1) Ability to post bail

2) Nature of the offense
3) Penalty imposed by law
4) Character and reputation of the accused
5) Health of the accused
6) Strength of the evidence
7) Probability of appearing at the trial
8) Forfeiture of previous bail bonds
9) Whether accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
10) If accused is under bond in other cases

9. Implicit limitations on the right to bail:

1) The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the law.
2) The constitutional right is available only in criminal cases, not, e.g. in deportation
proceeding

10. Bail in extradition. After the potential extradite has been arrested and placed under the
custody of the law, bail maybe applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
 a. Once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and

b. There exists a special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including,

as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting
state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
(Government of US v. Judge Purganan and Mark Jimenez, GR 148571,
December 17, 2002).

NOTE: Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from trial for the offenses for which
he is charged. The extradite should apply before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court (Ibid).

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases (Government of Hong Kong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, Jr., GR 1533675,
April 19, 2007).

11. Waiver of Bail. The right to bail is another of the constitutional right which can be
waived (People v. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130). The failure of the accused to call the
attention of the trial court to the unresolved petition for bail is deemed a waiver of the right to
bail (People v. Manes, GR 122737, February 17, 1999).

12. Bail and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The right to bail is
not impaired by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Sec. 15,
Art. III)

CASES:

In bail application where the accused is charged with a capital offense, will it be proper
for the judge to grant bail without conducting hearing if the prosecutor interposes no
objection to such application?

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in
bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the
judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
familiarity with the case. “Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty
of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty
will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.”

Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the
prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
(Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3rd
Div. [Panganiban])

Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned before he could
be granted bail valid?
In the first place x x x in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if
the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage
of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, Sec. 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,” while under Rule 116, Sec. 1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321,
Feb. 1, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])

Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia- The decision

of the SC in Government of the USA v. Judge Purganan which says that “no bail rule applies
in extradition since bail is available only to one who had arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws” was re-examined and, after re-examination, the rule now is that
an extraditee may be allowed to post bail during the pendency of an extradition proceeding.
However, for him to be allowed to post bail, still he must prove that (1) once granted bail he
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exists special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances that will justify the grant of bail to him, by a
clear and convincing evidence.

The reason why the Purganan ruling was re-examined is because of the modern trend in
public international law where an individual person is no longer considered a mere object of
international law but rather as a subject thereof, and the primacy given to human rights,
among which is the right to liberty.

Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, En
Banc (Bersamin) A close reading of the ruling of the SC in this case allowing former
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to post bail although he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable
offense, was because of the Olalia ruling.

In this case, former Senator Enrile was shown not to be a flight risk or a danger to the
community (his voluntary surrender to the authorities and his record of respect for court
processes in earlier cases), and that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances (his advanced age, fragile state of health and medical predicament that will
require the services of doctors of his choice) that will justify the grant of bail to him. After
all, the main purpose of bail is to assure the presence of an accused during the trial of the case
as required by the court.

“Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling hid health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

“It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

“On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.”

Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later convicted of non-
capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266
SCRA 281).

The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is not
available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any
provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting bail,
as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines
to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

SECTION 14- RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Rights of a person charged with a criminal offense

1) Right to due process of law

2) Right to be presumed innocent
3) Right to be heard by himself and counsel
4) Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
5) Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial
6) Right to meet the witnesses face to face
7) Right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf

“DUE PROCESS”

This means that the accused can only be convicted by a tribunal which is required to comply
with the stringent requirements of the rules of criminal procedure.
“PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE”

The Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from providing that proof of certain facts
leads to a prima facie presumption of guilt, provided that the facts proved have a reasonable
connection to the ultimate fact presumed.

Presumption of guilt should not be conclusive.

“RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL”

1. The right to be heard includes the following rights:

a. Right to be present at the trial

b. The right to be present covers the period from ARRAIGNMENT to

PROMULGATION of sentence.

c. After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused,

provided 2 requisites are met. Note, that trial in absentia is allowed only if the
accused has been validly arraigned.

1) Accused has been duly notified; and

2) His failure to appear is unjustifiable.

The accused may waive the right to be present at the trial by not showing up. However, the
court can still compel the attendance of the accused if necessary for identification purposes.
Exception: If the accused, after arraignment, has stipulated that he is indeed the person
charged with the offense and named in the information, and that any time a witness refers to a
name by which he is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him.

While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgement, the absence of
his counsel during such promulgation does not affect its validity.

2. Right to counsel

a. Right to counsel means the right to EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.

b. If the accused appears at arraignment without counsel, the judge must:

a. Inform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment

b. Ask the accused if he desires the aid of counsel

c. If the accused desires counsel, but cannot afford one, a counsel de oficio
must be appointed

d. If the accused desires to obtain his own counsel, the court must give him
a reasonable time to get one.

3. Right to an impartial judge

4. Right of confrontation and cross-examination

5. Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses

“RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM”

Purposes of the right:

i. To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defenses

ii. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal against a further prosecution for the
same cause

iii. To inform the court of the facts alleged.

If the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense, the accused cannot be
convicted thereof even if the prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial with
respect to such elements.

The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in the information.
It is not determined based on the caption or preamble thereof nor from the specification of the
provision of law allegedly violated

“RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL”

RA 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a speedy trial (Uy v. Hon.
Adrian, GR 159098, October 27, 2006).“The arraignment of an accused shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared
before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15)
days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as
fixed by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may
modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing evidence”(Sec. 7, RA 8493, [The Speedy
Trial Act])

Factors used in determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated.

i. Time expired from the filing of the information

ii. Length of delay involved

iii. Reasons for the delay

 iv. Assertion or non-assertion of the right by the accused

v. Prejudice caused to the defendant.

Effect of dismissal based on the ground of violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial

If the dismissal is valid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used as basis to claim double
jeopardy. This would be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the consent of the
accused

Remedy of the accused if his right to speedy trial has been violated

He can move for the dismissal of the case. If he is detained, he can file a petition for the
issuance of writ of habeas corpus.

Reyes v. Director of Camp Bagong Diwa, et. al., G.R. No. 254838 (January 17, 2023)

Whether or not Gigi Reyes is entitled to the remedy of habeas corpus.

HELD: Yes. This is on the ground that her constitutional right to speedy trial has been
violated. While the writ is generally not available to a person whose liberty is under custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, when such custody becomes vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive amounting to an infringement on the constitutional right to speedy
trial of an accused, habeas corpus may be provisionally availed of. In this light, the Supreme
Court provided the following:

Guidelines in availing habeas corpus when speedy trial is invoked:

1. Petitioner must be illegally restrained;

2. If not illegally restrained, there must be a violation on the petitioner’s constitutional right.
Mere allegation of a violation of a constitutional right is not enough. The violation of
constitutional right must be shown to be sufficient as to possibly void the proceedings;

3. One of the constitutional rights violated must be the right to speedy trial. Any of these
grounds must be shown and may be proven to exist under the Barker Balancing Test or the
Cagang Guidelines:

a. The proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;

b. Unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
c. Without cause of justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
Petitioner having his or her case tried.

4. The petition is only to seek provisional liberty and not to determine the merit of the case

In this case, the Prosecution was at fault for the delays. Even though some of the delays were
caused by Reyes, still, the Prosecution should have justified the delays they caused. Here,
they merely invoked that under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, Reyes is not entitled to
habeas corpus because her detention was ordered by the Sandiganbayan. Due to the
protracted hearing, Reyes’ detention has become vexatious, capricious, and excessive.

Reyes was ordered released. She was not directed to post bail but was ordered to attend the
scheduled hearings, give periodic reports, and cannot leave the country without authority
from the Sandiganbayan.

What is the Barker Balancing Test?

Under the BBT, the following must be considered:

1. Length of delay
2. Reasons for the delay
3. Assertion or non-assertion of the right by the accused
4. Prejudice caused by the delay

What is the Cagang Guidelines?

1. Burden of proof in proving violation of the speedy trial rule is on the Accused;
2. Entire context of the case must be considered, i.e., complexity or simplicity of the case;
volume of evidence to be considered;
3. Right to speedy trial must be timely raised.

Definition of impartial trial

The accused is entitled to the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. It is an element of due
process.

Definition of public trial

The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespective of their relationship to the accused.
However, if the evidence to be adduced is “offensive to decency or public morals”, the public
may be excluded.

The right of the accused to a public trial is not violated if the hearings are conducted on
Saturdays, either with the consent of the accused or if failed to object thereto.

“RIGHT TO MEET WITNESS FACE TO FACE”

Purposes of the right:

a) To afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the

witness
b) To allow the judge the opportunity to observe the deportment
of the witness

Failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness

If the failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due
to the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should be excluded.
When the right to cross-examine is demandable

It is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be availed of during preliminary

investigations.

Principal exceptions to the right of confrontation

a. The admissibility of “dying declarations”

b. Trial in absentia under Section 14(2)
c. With respect to child testimony

Failure to present as witness poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case, because what is required is merely proof of the consummation
of the sale transaction if there is convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana
peddler and not simply the victim of instigation (see People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339).
Failure to present as witness poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case, because what is required is merely proof of the consummation
of the sale transaction if there is convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana
peddler and not simply the victim of instigation (see People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339).

PP VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO, ET AL., G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019-
(J. Hernando)

The terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample
opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat
the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and
Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed
questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge
shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by
the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of
Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of
the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their
proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any
objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross
interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's
answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy
thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As
aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will
be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her
ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although
the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and
deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her both by the
prosecution and the defense.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized

exceptions to the right to confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state
that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying
declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written interrogatories
under the consciousness of an impending death - or execution by a firing squad to be exact.
To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment and sentenced to death by firing
squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all available legal remedies and there is no
expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the Indonesian authorities. The only
purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane to assist the prosecution in erecting
its case against her recruiters and traffickers. There was nary any mention that the outcome of
the legal proceedings here in the Philippines will have a concomitant effect in Mary Jane's
conviction by the Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is
undisputed considering the nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore
not a stretch of imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in her deposition "are made
in extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone;
when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth,"45 to vindicate oneself, and to secure justice to her
detractors.

CASES:

PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused
appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the information
to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process.

A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is bereft of the right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will call into operations all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditee’s right to notice and
hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court- it is only then when
he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion,
343 SCRA 377, 2000).

Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11, 2014- the burden of
demonstrating political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence.

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE

MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN,
ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in
a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or
accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable
number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of
the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the
Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by
television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases,
subject to the guidelines outlined therein.

Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy trial maybe waived
except when otherwise expressly provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition of his
case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his right, he is
considered to have waived it.

The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of

plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the deceased’s testimony inadmissible. Where no
fault can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all that
has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

SECTION 16- RIGHT DISPOSITION OF CASES

Distinction between Section 14 and Section 16

While the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of criminal cases, the right to a
speedy disposition of cases covers ALL phases of JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL or
ADMINISTRATIVE proceedings.

CASES:

Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary investigation
with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple
nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the
accused’s right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends to
preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

NOTE: Recent decision of the Supreme Court on the Inordinate delay Doctrine (Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 206438 and 206458, 2018-07-31)- The Supreme Court
interpreted the reckoning period for the right to ‘speedy disposition of…cases’ under Article
III, Section 16, to start from the preliminary investigation of cases, and not before the
preliminary investigation and not from the fact-finding stage,”

People vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. No. 240776, 20 November 2019, the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule that in determining whether there is inordinate delay by the
Office of the Ombudsman in resolving criminal complaints filed before it, the period taken
for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint for the conduct of
preliminary investigation should be excluded. Consequently, the period should start to run (or
be counted) only from the time that a formal complaint is filed against the respondents -
where they are required to file their counter-affidavits - and not during case build-up where
the proceedings are not adversarial in nature.

SECTION 17- SELF INCRIMINATION CLAUSE

Scope and coverage

1. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but testimonial compulsion only (Alih
v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279).

2. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of his guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sough
to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence (People v. Malimit,
264 SCRA 167).

NOTE: Handwriting in connection with a prosecution for falsification is not allowed. Ratio:
writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in
the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states (Beltran
v. Samson 53 Phil 570).

3. The prohibition extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers and
chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where that State has a right
to inspect the same such as the books of accounts of corporations, under the police or taxing
powers (see Regala v. Sandiganbayan , 262 SCRA 122).

When is a question incriminating:

A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would
establish a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the
commission of a crime by the accused or the witness.

Distinction between an accused and an ordinary witness

i. An accused can refuse to take the witness stand by

invoking the right against self-incrimination.
ii. An ordinary witness cannot refuse to take the stand.
He can only refuse to answer specific questions which would incriminate him in the
commission of an offense.

Scope of right

1) What is PROHIBITED is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort

communication from the witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist
were it not for the actions compelled from the witness.

2) The right does NOT PROHIBIT the examination of the body of the accused or the
use of findings with respect to his body as physical evidence. Hence, the fingerprinting
of an accused would not violate the right against self-incrimination. However,
obtaining a sample of the handwriting of the accused would violate this right if he is
charged for falsification.

3) The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his possession

which might tend to incriminate him. However, a third person in custody of the
document may be compelled to produce it.

Who can invoke the right:

Only natural persons. Judicial persons are subject to the visitorial powers of the state in
order to determine compliance with the conditions of the charter granted to them.
When the right can be invoked:

1. It is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government
proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations.
May be claimed not only by accused but by any witness to whom an incriminating
question is addressed (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law).

a. Administrative proceedings with penal aspect i.e. medical board investigation

(Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345);

b. Forfeiture proceeding (Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1064).

c. Fact-Finding investigation by an ad hoc body (Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R.Nos.

71208-09 August 30, 1985).

d. The right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents

in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous
to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to
all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not (Bengzon, Jr. v.
Senate Blue RibbonCommittee, 203 SCRA 767).

NOTE: Petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by
the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether
decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded (Standard Chartered Bank v... Senate
Committee on Banks, G.R. 167173, December 27, 2007)

2. A corporation may be compelled to submit to the visitorial powers of State even if this will
result in disclosure of criminal acts of the corporation (Hale v.Henkel 201 US 43).

Immunity Statutes

1. Transactional Immunity Statute provides that the testimony of any person or whose
possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in
any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which
such compelled testimony relates (see Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783);

Example: One of the functions of the Commission on Human Rights is to grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by
it or under its authority (Art. XIII, Sec. 18[8]).

2. Use Immunity Statute/ Use-and-Derivative prohibits the use of a witness’ compelled

testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness (Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 272)
What are the two types of immunity statutes? Which has broader scope of protection?

Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two
types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional
immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is
broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In
contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only
assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not
be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 797-798, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])

CASES:

In its ruling in People vs. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, Supreme Court ruled that when an arrested
person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet
is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the
fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention
against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a
judgment of conviction.

In the cases of People vs. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 and People vs. Turla, 167 SCRA 278, we
held that the signature of the accused-appellant on the Receipt of Property Seized is a
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged, for mere
unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The signature of the accused-
appellant on the receipt is tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession outlawed
by the Bill of Rights (Sec. 12[i], Art. III, 1987 Constitution). It is, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible against him.

It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually
proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness (US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) and morphine
forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him (US v. Ong
Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]). Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress. (People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, 399-401, Dec. 9, 1999, En Banc [Per
Curiam])

Does the right against self-incrimination extend to administrative proceedings?

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right
against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings
which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to
practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan (6
SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one’s license as a medical
practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. (Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 184, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])

May the Right against Self-incrimination be validly invoked during Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation?

[I]t has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is ‘subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,’ including ‘the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights’.” One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
an individual is the right against self-incrimination. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767, Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc [Padilla])

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456- The right
against self incrimination is extended in an administrative investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held
to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in which punishment is sought to
be visited upon a witness, whether a party of not.

The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of documents sought to
be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).

In the case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the
first ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: “how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests”

In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended “that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to
remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III
of the Constitution”.

The Court rejected the argument. It held that “the kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion”, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23
June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that “the right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt” and that “it
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence”.

Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the Court
held that “although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.”

Hence, according to the Court, “a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,

photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved”. It
cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where
immediately after the incident, “the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel”. In that case, the Court ruled that “there was no violation of the right
against self-incrimination”. It further stated that “the accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused”.

SECTION 18- RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Definition of involuntary servitude

It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no matter under

what form such servitude may be disguised.

Exceptions:

1) Punishment for a crime;

2) service in defense of the state
3) naval enlistment;
4) posse commitatus;
5) return to work order;
6) patria potestas

Kaisahang Manggagawa sa Kahoy Gotamco Sawmills- Striking workers in industries

affected with public interest may be required to return to work pending settlement of
the labor dispute. The purpose of the compulsion is to prevent disruption, to the detriment of
the public, of essential services being performed by the strikers.

SECTION 19- PROHIBITION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES & CRUEL

PUNISHMENT

1) A penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or lingering suffering. Ex. Being
drawn and quartered.

2) A penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public humiliation. Ex. Being tarred

and feathered, then paraded throughout town.

Standards used:

1) The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2) It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3) It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4) It must not be excessive, i.e. it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less
severe punishment would.
Excessive fine

A fine is excessive, when under any circumstance, it is disproportionate to the offense.

Note: Fr. Bernas says that the accused cannot be convicted of the crime to which the
punishment is attached if the court finds that the punishment is cruel, degrading or inhuman.

Reason: Without a valid penalty, the law is not a penal law.

CASE:

The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the death
penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition
because of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA
682).

SECTION 20- NON IMPRISONMENT FOR NON PAYMENT OF DEBT

Definition of debt under Section 20

i. Debt refers to a CONTRACTUAL obligation, whether express or implied, resulting in

any liability to pay money. Thus, all other types of obligations are not within the scope
of this prohibition.

ii. Thus, if an accused fails to pay the fine imposed upon him, this may result in his
subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is ex delicto and not ex contractu.

iii. A FRAUDULENT debt may result in the imprisonment of the debtor if:

i. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa and

ii. The accused has been duly convicted

The civil liability from a crime is not “debt” within the purview of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for non payment of “debt”.

Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a civil debt
or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by
the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Lozano Case-The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

POLL TAX -Since a tax is not a debt but arises from the obligation of the person to
contribute his share in the maintenance of the government, failure to pay the same
can be validly punished with imprisonment. The only EXCEPTION is failure to pay a
poll tax, which is defined as a specific fixed and evied upon every person belonging to a
certain class without regard to his property or occupation.

SECTION 21- DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy:

1) First jeopardy must have attached prior to the second.

2) The first jeopardy must have terminated.

3) The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

When does jeopardy ATTACH: (1st requisite)

1) A person is charged
2) Under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction
3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction
4) After the person is arraigned
5) Such person enters a valid plea.

When does jeopardy NOT attach:

a. If information does not charge any offense

b. If, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents evidence of complete self-
defense, and the court thereafter acquits him without entering a new plea of
not guilty for accused.

c. If the information for an offense cognizable by the RTC is filed with the MTC.

d. If a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed.

When does first jeopardy TERMINATE: (2ND REQUISITE)

a. Acquittal

b. Conviction

c. Dismissal W/O the EXPRESS consent of the accused

d. Dismissal on the merits.

Examples of termination of jeopardy:

1) Dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial. This amounts to an

acquittal.
2) Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence. This is a dismissal on the merits.

3) Dismissal on motion of the prosecution, subsequent to a motion for reinvestigation

filed by the accused.

4) Discharge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an acquittal.

When can the PROSECUTION appeal from an order of dismissal:

1) If dismissal is on motion of the accused. Exception: If motion is based on violation

of the right to a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence.

2) If dismissal does NOT amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits

3) If the question to be passed upon is purely legal.

4) If the dismissal violates the right of due process of the prosecution.

5) If the dismissal was made with grave abuse of discretion.

What are considered to be the “SAME OFFENSE”: (under the 1st sentence of Section
21)

1) Exact identity between the offenses charged in the first and second cases.

2) One offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other offense.

3) One offense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.

Note: where a single act results in the violation of different laws or different provisions
of the same law, the prosecution for one will not bar the other so long as none of the
exceptions apply.

Definition of double jeopardy (2nd sentence of Sec. 21)

Double jeopardy will result if the act punishable under the law and the ordinance are the
same. For there to be double jeopardy, it is not necessary that the offense be the same.

SUPERVENING FACTS

1) Under the Rules of Court, a conviction for an offense will not bar a prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former information where:

I. The graver offense developed due to a supervening fact arising from

the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
II. The facts constituting the graver offense became known or were
discovered only after the filing of the former information.
III. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent
of the fiscal and the offended party.
2) Under (1)(b), if the facts could have been discovered by the prosecution but were not
discovered because of the prosecution’s incompetence, it would not be considered a
supervening event.

Effect of appeal by the accused:

If the accused appeals his conviction, he WAIVES his right to plead double jeopardy. The
whole case will be open to review by the appellate court. Such court may even increase the
penalties imposed on the accused by the trial court.

Effect of Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal by the prosecution:

1. A judgment of acquittal, even if erroneous, ends the case finally (People v. Hernando, 108
SCRA 121) A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and
cannot be recalled for correction or amendment, because of the doctrine that nobody may be
put twice in jeopardy for the same offence (Kepnerv. United States, 195 U.S. 100).

2. No error, how flagrant, committed by the court against the State, can be reversed by it for
decision of the Supreme Court when the defendant has once been place in jeopardy and
discharged even though the discharge was the result of the error committed (State v. Rook, 49
L.R.A.186, quoted in People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475).

3. The rule prohibiting appeal should not be avoided in the guise of certiorari (Central Bank
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41859, March 8, 1989). The special civil action for certiorari
is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy for
errors of judgment (People v. CA, G.R.No. 142051, February 24, 2004)

4. However an appeal from the order from the order of dismissal shall not constitute double
jeopardy:

a. Dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant;

b. Dismissal is not acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or on

the merits of the case;

c. The question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant (People of the Philippines v.City of Manila, G.R.
No. L-36528, September 24, 1987).

5. The accused cannot appeal a judgment of acquittal, except to strike out and expunge from
the records the hurtful and irrelevant remarks against the accused (People v. Mendoza, 74
Phil. 119).
Dismissal with consent of accused

1. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party. (Rule 117, Sec. 8[1]).

2. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting for the
same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 9th Revised Edition, p. 442; People v. Bellosillo, 9 SCRA 835 (1963)

CASES:

READ: CASE OF TRILLANES re REVOCATION OF HIS PARDON- Sen. Antonio

“Sonny” F. Trillanes IV v. Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, et al; People of the Philippines v.
Antonio F. Trillanes IV, People of the Philippines v. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, G.R. Nos. 241494,
256660 & 256078, April 3, 2024

The Supreme Court ruled that the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty long after it became final
and without prior notice violated his constitutional right to due process. Further, Proclamation
No. 572, in seeking the revival of the criminal cases against Trillanes after they had been
dismissed with finality, violated his constitutional rights against ex post facto laws and double
jeopardy.

Finally, the Court found that there is convincing evidence that Trillanes did file his amnesty
application. The Executive’s decision to revoke only Trillanes’ amnesty, notwithstanding the
fact that the application forms of all the other amnesty grantees could similarly no longer be
located, constituted a breach of his right to the equal protection of the laws.

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. SANDRA REYES AND JOCELYN

REYES, G.R. No. 236686, February 05, 2020 (J. Caguioa)

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to
know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Bonsubre vs. Yerro, et al., February 11, 2015, Bernabe

A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur:

a. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused,
moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;

b. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;

c. The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
 d. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional
dismissal of the case.

In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear that the
respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise
Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s approval nor filed the
required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional
dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are estopped from
invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.

Accordingly, the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of
respondents’ right to speedy trial being a final order that cannot be subject of reconsideration
or an appeal, no error can be imputed against the CA in upholding the RTC Ruling denying
due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal relative to the criminal aspect of the case. That
being said, the Court reminds petitioner that nothing precludes him from preserving his
interest over the case but only with respect to its civil aspect as aptly observed by the courts a
quo.

PP vs. Bienvinido Udang, Sr., G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 (B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE ARE

SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CRIMES

Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610,
not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a
felony under the Revised Penal Code. They have different elements. The two are separate and
distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.

Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of Clause
20, Section 1(now Sec. 21), Article III of the Constitution ordains that “no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” The second sentence of said
clause provides that “if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first
sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one
may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include,
the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged
are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the
other a violation of statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction
or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under
one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either
case.

Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an
identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. The
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. (People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24,
1996)

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) A first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA
159, April 15, 1998 [Panganiban])

As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under
double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a series of
events prompted the Senate to declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither
acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent.
Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double jeopardy must fail.
(Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).

Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case becomes
permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years.

For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the following
must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the
provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr.
or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a subsequent case
beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of conviction. It
merely approved the agreement between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the
accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)

Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the offender under both
section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC is unconstitutional because it
constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging
the offender under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography
constitute double jeopardy.

Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double jeopardy if the subsequent
information charges the accused with different offense, even if it arises from the same act or
set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is prosecution for
the same offense.
SECTION 22- EXPOST FACTO LAW & BILL OF ATTAINDER

Definition of ex-post facto law.

1. One which makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.

2. One which aggravates the crime or makes it greater than when it was committed.

3. One which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than that
which the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

4. One which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
accused.

5. One which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only BUT, in effect,
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right, which, when done, was lawful.

6. One which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to

which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Note: The prohibition on ex post facto laws only applies to retrospective PENAL laws.

Definition of BILL OF ATTAINDER

1. A bill of attainder is a LEGISLATIVE act which inflicts punishment W/O

JUDICIAL trial.

2. The bill of attainder does not need to be directed at a specifically named person. It
may also refer to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without judicial trial.

3. Elements of the bill of attainder

a. There must be a LAW.

b. The law imposes a PENAL burden on a NAMED INVIDIDUAL/EASILY
ASCERTAINABLE MEMBERS of a GROUP.
c. The penal burden is imposed DIRECTLY by the LAW W/O JUDICIAL trial.

CASES:

What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?

[T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential
to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last
element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of
the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding
punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that
may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense.
There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether
the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances attached to it has been
established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.
(Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659-660, Jan. 30, 1990, En Banc [Cortes])

What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode
of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and
being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover,
the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.

At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been
convincingly overcome. (Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No.
128096, Jan. 20, 1999 [Martinez])
 ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

NATURALIZATION

the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing
him or her with the privileges of a citizen.

A. Modes: It may be direct or derivative. a) Direct naturalization is effected: (1) by

individual proceedings, usually judicial, under general naturalization laws; (2) by
special act of the legislature, often in favor of distinguished foreigners who have
rendered some notable service to the local state; (3) by collective change of
nationality (naturalization en masse) as a result of cession or subjugation; and (4) in
some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are
born. b) Derivative naturalization in turn is conferred: (1) on the wife of the
naturalized husband; (2) on the minor children of the naturalized parent; and (3) on
the alien woman upon marriage to a national.

A. Direct Naturalization under Philippine Laws:

1. Judicial Naturalization: Act No. 2927 (March 26, 1920), then CA

473

2. Administrative Naturalization: (1) of Foreign women married to

Filipino citizens before or after November 30, 1938 who might
themselves be lawfully naturalized: Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Comsr.
of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (2) RA 9139- Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000 would grant Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the
Philippines: So vs. Rep., GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007.

3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by

Congress, bestowing Philippine Citizenship to an alien. Examples:
Fr. James Moran (1981) and Fr. James Reuter (1984)

B. Naturalization under CA 473

1. Qualifications/Disqualifications
2. Procedure
3. Effects of Naturalization
a) wife
b) minor children

4. Effects of Denaturalization

Case Law: Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179120, April 1, 2009- It is the
State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally
or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that
may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizen’s descendant.

C. RA 9139-The native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications to be determined by the Special Committee on Naturalization.
 a. Qualifications/Disqualifications
b. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children
c. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization

Who are natural born citizens?

Natural-born Citizens- Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Section 2,
Article IV, 1987 Constitution)

In general, there are only two (2) kinds of Filipino citizens, i.e., natural-born and
naturalized. There is no third category. If one did not have to undergo the
cumbersome process of naturalization, it means that he is natural-born. (Antonio
Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

Is a Foundling a Natural-born Citizen? To deny full Filipino citizenship to all

foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance
that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural-born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such
status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable
Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation
and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of fact, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the numeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of
the framers. X x x x

The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. X x x

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of “unknown parentage” are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. X x x

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic

efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos, under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. X x x

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather,
the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. X x

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. X x x
The common thread of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights),
UNCRC (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) and ICCPR (International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet ungratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,”
x x x.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found.

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness x x x.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc [Perez])

RA 11767 or the “Foundling Recognition and Protection Act” - promotes the

rights and ensures additional protection for children with unknown facts of birth and
parentage. Under the new law, foundlings in the Philippines and in Philippine
embassies, consulates, or territories abroad will be presumed a natural-born Filipino
citizen, regardless of the status of their birth circumstances. This will guarantee the
best interest of children with unknown facts of birth and parentage because they will
immediately be accorded the rights and protection of a Filipino citizen at the moment
of birth (effective May 6, 2022)

Natural born: Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act"
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous
to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

Who must be natural-born citizens:

i. President: Section 2, Art VII

ii. Vice-President: Section 3, Art VII
 iii. Members of Congress : Sections 3 and 6, Art VI
iv. Justices of SC and lower collegiate courts: Section 7(1), Art VIII
v. Ombudsman and his deputies: Section 8, Art XI
vi. Members of Constitutional Commissions
vii. Members of the Central Monetary Authority, Section 20, Art XII
viii. Members of the Commission on Human Rights: Section 17 (2), Art
XIII*

Note: As per ARTICLE XII, Section 8, 1987 Constitution, a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may still be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law

Grounds for Loss of Citizenship:

Commonwealth Act No. 63, dated 20 October 1936, provides that Philippine citizens
may lose citizenship in any of the following ways or events:

a. By naturalization in a foreign country (Read RA 9225);

b. By express renunciation of citizenship: Board of Immigration Commissioners vs.
Callano, 25 SCRA 890; Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1; Valles vs.
COMELEC; Yu vs.
Santiago, 169 SCRA 364
c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided, however, that a
Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country.
d. By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, except in certain
specified cases. EXCEPT: 1) with the consent of the Rep. such as the Rep. has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or the said
foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic;
e. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization (CA 473);
f. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted; and
g. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. She remains Filipino
citizen if the foreign law is silent on the matter.

* 1987/1973 constitutions- Filipino citizen who marries an alien retains his/her

citizenship, unless by his/her act or omission he/she is deemed, under the law to
have renounced it, such any of those enumerated under CA 63. Otherwise, the
Filipino spouse will have dual citizenship

Go Gullian v. Government

Expatriation is a constitutional right. No one can be compelled to remain a Filipino if

he does not want to.
 EXCEPTION: A Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any
manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country. (Sec. 1(3),
Com. Act No. 63)

Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance- an individual maybe compelled by municipal law

to retain his original nationality even if he has already renounced or forfeited it under
the laws of the second state whose nationality he has acquired. Thus, a Filipino may
not divest himself of the Philippine citizenship in the foregoing manner when the
Philippines is at war at any country.

Aznar v COMELEC
Loss of Philippine citizenship CANNOT BE PRESUMED. Considering the fact that
admittedly, Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
certificate stating that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
since there has been NO EXPRESS renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013-
The act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen
who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position. Xxx The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens
citizenship issue to attack.

How may citizenship be reacquired?

1. Naturalization (CA No. 63 and CA No. 473)

now an abbreviated process, with no need to wait for 3 years (1 year for declaration
of intent, and 2 years for the judgment to become executory)

Requirements: a.) be 21 years of age b.) be a resident for 6 months c.) have good
moral character d.) have no disqualification

Republic vs. Guy

Naturalization is never final and may be revoked if one commits acts of moral
turpitude.

2.Repatriation

a. RA 9225
b. By repatriation of the deserters of the AFP and Filipina who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage

APPLICABLE PHILIPPINE LAWS

PD 725- allows the repatriation of former natural born Filipino citizens who lost
Filipino citizenship: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC- it was not repealed by Aquino’s
Memorandum of
 March 27, 1986, and thus, was a valid mode for the reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by Sorsogon Governor Juan Frivaldo.

Republic Act No. 8171, approved 23 October 1995, provided a mechanism allowing
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their
minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, to reacquire Philippine
citizenship. Repatriation is effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic and registration in the proper civil registry and in the BID- Tabasa vs, CA,
GR No. 125793, August 29, 2006.

Registration of applicant’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the BID
a perquisite in effecting repatriation (Altarejos vs. COMELEC, Nov. 10, 2004).

Republic Act No. 9225, approved 29 August 2003, provided that natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who had lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country would be deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, and that
their children whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years
of age, shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

Bengson III vs. HRET

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. Therefore, if he is a
natural- born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural- born Filipino.

Frivaldo v COMELEC
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Repatriation requires an express and equivocal act.

Labo v COMELEC
In the absence of any official action or approval by proper authorities, a mere
application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.

3. Legislative Act
both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring citizenship

Notes:

Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007- Naturalization

signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her the privileges of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws,
there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of
a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

R.A. No. 9139 may be availed of only by native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that
they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines
and affinity to the
customs and traditions of the Filipino people. To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. What the legislature had in mind was
merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s citizenship may be done
through a direct action for its nullity.

Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election
of Philippine citizenship is effective:
a. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
b. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.

Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the “evolvement from election
of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under
the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the
obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.

The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of
the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected
Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the
civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they
have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject
to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.”

Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. CA 625- election within
reasonable time is 3 years from reaching the age of majority

Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the
armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other
time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic
necessity.

REPATRIATION

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for
the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA
8171, the children must be of minor age at the time of the petition for repatriation
was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No.
125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine
citizenship “on account of political or economic necessity”].
EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPATRIATION

Under RA 8171
Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of
Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s application for repatriation.
Supra.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a

natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as natural born Filipino.

Under RA 9225

Citizens who lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a

foreign country are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance.

This reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at
all.

Reacquisition v. Retention

Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign

country shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign country. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No, 199113, March 18,
2015)

Vivenne K. Tan vs. Vincent "Bingbong" Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993,

November 8, 2017- once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a
foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a
Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.

Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003. If we were to effect as retroactive
Tan's Philippine citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine citizenship, then the
different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225 would
effectively be futile.

An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have lost
their Philippine citizenship through naturalization by a foreign country prior to R.A.
No. 9225 would cause confusion to what is stated in Section 3: "natural-born citizens
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic." To go beyond what the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and
plain meaning would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as
regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country
prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law
would readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No.
9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country
after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship.

DAVID vs. AGBAY, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos
under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

Repatriation and Domicile

To reacquire domicile he must provide proof of intent to stay in the Philippines. After
he does that, his occasional absence from the recovered domicile does not have the
effect of removing him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus
manendi et revertendi.

The domicile is not established strictly from the time that a person was repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225. The Court said that other evidence may be admitted to
determine the time that domicile is established. Also, issue of residence could be
decided particularly on the facts-of-the-case basis, as what would a series of
jurisprudence would also dictate. Hence, domicile cannot strictly be established only
from a person's repatriation. (Poe- Llamanzares v. Comelec et al., G.R. Nos. 221697
& 221698-700, March 8, 2016)

DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase
“dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance
(especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person
with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of
allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation
of his foreign citizenship.

The phrase “dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of
their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.

Dual allegiance (Sec 5, Art IV)

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. (PHIL CONST., art. 4, § 5)
 a. aliens who are naturalized as Filipinos but remain loyal to their country of
origin
b. public officers who, while serving the government, seek citizenship in another
country disqualified from running for any elective local position. (Sec 40d,
Local Government Code)

Dual Allegiance and the Constitution

The specific target of this new provision is not dual citizenship but dual allegiance
arising from e.g., mixed marriages or birth in foreign soil. This was seen as more
insidious than dual citizenship

To the extent, however, that dual citizenship also imports dual allegiance, then it must
also be "dealt with by law." In other words, the Constitution leaves the disposition of the
problem of dual citizenship and dual allegiance to ordinary legislation.

Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)

Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme Court
recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship
having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the
twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court
En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases “which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, [private
respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA
No. 9225 do not apply to him.”

LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 – Valles and Mercado
Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for
public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is
necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 – Mercado case was
decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not
yet enacted.

Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to
point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic
Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time,
both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the
Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run
for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.

Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225
was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who
wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does
not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No.
9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because
R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

Condon vs. COMELEC, August 10, 2012- It is an additional qualification for

elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for
public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the
exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to
regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines.

In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino

American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on
the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized
to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing
all foreign citizenship.
Mariz Lindsey Tan Villegas Gana-Carait vs. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), August 12, 2022

- In ruling to set aside COMELEC’s cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, the Court

held that Gana-Carait, who was born to a Filipino father and an American mother, is
a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization. The Court also found that the
subsequent positive acts made by Gana-Carait’s mother to request confirmation from
the United States Consular Service of Gana-Carait’s US citizenship is not considered
a naturalization process but a mere presentation of documentary evidence to establish
the fact that Gana-Carait is an American citizen by birth.

The Court held that since Gana-Carait is a dual citizen by birth, and not by
naturalization, she is not covered by the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act requiring candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce their
foreign citizenships in order to become eligible for elective office. As a dual citizen
by birth, Gana-Carait is thus considered a Filipino qualified to run for public office.
Hence, she could not be said to have made a false representation in her COC, ruled
the Court.

BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M.
Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by
leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will
restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What
Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens
who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether
or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with,
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self- executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for
the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.

Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC,
March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, suh that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between

legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a
distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

Application of the principle of Res Judicata

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When citizenship
is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a
person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is
a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme
Court.

JIMMY GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO vs. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND

DEPORTATION, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015

Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis, meaning; they are in a class of
their own. Thus, in cases where the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case and whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein, citizenship is not considered as res
judicata and can be retried again and again. Res judicata may only be applied in cases
of citizenship when the following concur:

1. A person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy

where said person is a party;

2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in

the resolution thereof; and

3. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

* In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through

a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009-

Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate
of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons
in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing
substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books
and other repositories of law.

The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural

requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA
8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996).

G.R. No. 263590, Macalintal v. COMELEC; G.R. No. 263673, Hidalgo,

et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (June 27, 2023)

The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional the law which postponed the
holding of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (BSK) Elections (BSKE), from
its initial schedule of December 5, 2022 to the last Monday of October 2023, but
recognizes the legal practicality and necessity of proceeding with the conduct of the
BSKE on the last Monday of October 2023, pursuant to the operative fact doctrine.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the Court En Banc
granted the consolidated petitions of Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal)
and of Attys. Alberto N. Hidalgo, Aluino O. Ala, Agerico A. Avila, Ted Cassey B.
Castello, Joyce Ivy C. Macasa, and Frances May C. Realino (Atty. Hidalgo, et al.)
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11935 (RA 11935), or “An Act
Postponing the December 2022 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9164, as amended, Appropriating Funds
therefor, and for Other Purposes.”

In granting the petitions, the Supreme Court made the following salient points:

First, the Court declared that the free and meaningful exercise of the right to vote, as
protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, requires the holding of genuine
periodic elections which must be held at intervals which are not unduly long, and
which ensure that the authority of government continues to be based on the free
expression of the will of electors.

Second, the Commission on Elections does not have the power to postpone
elections on a nationwide basis. This power lies with the Congress pursuant to (i) its
plenary power to legislate, and (ii) its power to fix the term of office of barangay
officials under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution. As such, the Congress did not
unconstitutionally encroach on the power of the COMELEC to administer elections
when it enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 11935. Neither did the provision for “hold-
over” capacity amount to an unconstitutional “legislative appointment.”

Third, the case has not been rendered moot to preclude the exercise by this Court of
its judicial review power because RA 11935’s transgression on the people’s right of
suffrage is continuing and did not cease upon the lapse of the December 5, 2022
election schedule. Thus, despite the intervening expiration of the previous election
date, the case undoubtedly presents an actual case or controversy that justifies the
continued exercise by this Court of its judicial review power.

Even on the assumption of mootness, the Court can decide the case, because grave
violation of the Constitution attended the enactment of RA 11935. Another, the case
calls for the resolution of a novel and unprecedented issue that affects the people’s
right of suffrage at the grassroots level. Lastly, the constitutional issue raised under
the circumstances surrounding this case is capable of repetition yet evading review
and thus, demands formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public.

Fourth, RA 11935 violates the freedom of suffrage as it failed to satisfy the requisites
of the substantive aspect of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The Court found that there was no legitimate government interest or objective to
support the legislative measure, and that the law unconstitutionally exceeds the
bounds of the Congress’ power to legislate.

The Court likewise lamented that the means employed by Congress are
unreasonably unnecessary to achieve the interest of the government sought to be
accomplished, and that the said means are unduly arbitrary or oppressive of the
electorates’ right of suffrage. The Court underscored that the primordial purpose
stated in the various bills presented in the Senate and House of Representatives
sought the realignment of the budget allocation of the COMELEC for the 2022
BSKE to the Executive for the latter’s use in its projects cannot be done without
violating the explicit prohibition in the Constitution against any transfer of
appropriations.

The Court also ruled that the enactment of RA 11935 was attended with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court said that the
postponement of the 2022 BSKE by RA 11935 for the purpose of augmenting the
Executive’s funds is violative of the Constitution because it unconstitutionally
transgresses the constitutional prohibition against any transfer of appropriations, and
it unconstitutionally and arbitrarily overreaches the exercise of the rights of suffrage,
liberty, and expression.

The Court, nevertheless, clarified that in so ruling, it is not asserting its power over
Congress; rather, the Court is simply enforcing and upholding the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Fifth, the Court recognized the existence of RA 11935 as an operative fact which had
consequences and effects that cannot be reversed nor ignored. As such, the Court said
that the pronouncement on the constitutionality of RA 11935 shall retroact to the date
of its enactment, subject to the proper recognition of the consequences and effects of
the said law’s existence before the instant ruling. It likewise held that the declaration
of unconstitutionality of RA 11935 results in the revival of RA 11462, the law
governing the BSKE prior to the enactment of the assailed act.

The Court also declared that the BSKE scheduled for October 2023 shall proceed.
The Court, however, stressed that the term of office of the sitting BSK officials shall
be deemed to have ended on December 31,2022, following the provisions of RA
11462, the law impliedly repealed by RA 11935. In the interim, the sitting BSK
officials shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected
and qualified. This notwithstanding, the Court clarified that the continued discharge
of functions by the sitting BSK officials in a “hold- over” capacity, following the
provisions of RA 11935, shall in no way constitute as an unconstitutional “legislative
appointment.”

The Court further ruled that the succeeding BSKE shall be held on the first Monday
of December 2025 and every three years thereafter, pursuant to RA 11462, and that
the Congress is not precluded from further amending RA 9164 (as amended), the law
which provides for synchronized BSKE.

Finally, the Court found it imperative to set forth guidelines and principles for the
bench, the bar, and the public as regards any government action that seeks to
postpone any elections. The Court outlined the criteria as follows:

1. The right of suffrage requires the holding of honest, genuine,

regular, and periodic elections. Thus, postponement of the elections is
the exception.

2. The postponement of the election must be justified by reasons

sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling under the
circumstances:

a. The postponement must be intended to guarantee the conduct

of free, honest, orderly, and safe elections;

b. The postponement must be intended to safeguard the

electorate’s right of suffrage;

c. The postponement must be intended to safeguard other

fundamental rights of the electorate; or

d. Such other important, substantial, or compelling reasons that

necessitate the postponement of the election, i.e., necessitated
by public emergency, but only if and to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation.

Reasons such as election fatigue, purported resulting

divisiveness, shortness of existing term, and/or other
superficial or farcical reasons, alone, may not serve as
important, substantial, or compelling reasons to justify the
postponement of the elections. To be sufficiently important,
the reason for the postponement must primarily be justified by
the need to safeguard the right of suffrage or other
fundamental rights or required by a public emergency
situation.

3. The electorate must still be guaranteed an effective opportunity to enjoy

their right of suffrage without unreasonable restrictions notwithstanding
the postponement of the elections.

4. The postponement of the elections is reasonably appropriate for the

purpose of advancing a sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling
governmental reasons.

a. The postponement of the elections must be based on

genuine reasons and only on objective and reasonable
criteria.
b. The postponement must still guarantee that the elections
will be held at regular periodic intervals that are not
 unduly long.

i. The intervals must still ensure that the

authority of the government continues to be
based on the free expression of the will of
the electorate.
ii. Holding the postponed elections at a date so
far remote from the original election date
may serve as badge of the unreasonableness
of the interval that may render questionable
the genuineness of the reasons for the
postponement.

c. The postponement of the election is reasonably narrowly

tailored only to the extent necessary to advance the
government interest.

5. The postponement must not violate the Constitution or existing laws.

Kabataan Party-list, et al., v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318,

December 16, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)- “With these considerations in
mind, petitioners’ claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and
implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, 10013, must perforce
fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of
the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the Existing Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996. X x x

“Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a

literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of
the Constitution – that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is
bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good – the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in
this case.”

Applying the Strict Scrutiny Test to RA 10367

“Petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,

considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with
compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage. X x x. “Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the regulation passes
the
strict scrutiny test.” In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection. X x x the United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,
judicial access, and interstate travel.

“Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

“In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement
under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to
facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing – if not
eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. X x x the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter
registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections
were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. The foregoing consideration
is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

“Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the
above- said interest. Section 6 of Resolution 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics
validation x x x. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one’s registration for those
already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The
re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a
novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that
has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may
be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain
days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are
remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an
administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not turned a blind eye to
these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies x x x. “That being said, the
assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least
restrictive means in promoting that interest.

Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is

synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the
Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means
an individual’s permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or
for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent.

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new
one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any
given time.

Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception to the

six-month/one-year residency requirement.

Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual

citizenship law -

R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A.
9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is synonymous to

“domicile,” not necessarily with a person’s home address. A man may have several
places of residence but has only one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling
salesman with no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile for
him.

There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of origin—that is, a child follows the
domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice
made freely by a person of legal age.

Domicile of choice “imports not only the intention to reside in one fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent for
business or pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return.” Makalintal vs.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question of fact. One
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent (animus revertendi).

Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a person’s domicile: First,

everyone must always have one of the three kinds of domicile; second, once
established, a domicile remains the same until a new one is acquired; and third, a
person can have only one domicile at any given time.

Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3.
an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held that “the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, [is] decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residence qualification
requirement.” The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos made an honest
mistake in writing “seven months residence” in her certificate of candidacy for a
congressional seat, a period less than the constitutional requirement of “not less than
one year” for that position.

Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held that residency is not
dependent on citizenship because even a foreigner can establish a Philippine
domicile.

More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a former Filipino who
was naturalized abroad may choose to reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to
the reacquisition of citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.

Said the Supreme Court: “[I]n order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur: 1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, 2) an intention to remain
there, and 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. “The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.”
Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the abandonment of a home
in Australia, renunciation of Australian citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and settling down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an “intent to change
domicile for good.”

Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the use of an American
passport after a renunciation of American citizenship effectively reverses such
renunciation and disqualifies one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual
Citizenship Law from being elected to a public office.

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizen’s acquisition of
permanent resident status abroad constitutes abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of
one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.

But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 have the effect of
restoring his Philippine domicile?

A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay in the

Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence from the recovered domicile
does not have the effect of removing him from the domicile for as long as he
manifests animus manendi et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)

ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER:

1) tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)

2) emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI
3) people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4) local governments (Art X)
5) administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation

What may Congress delegate:

Congress can only delegate, usually to administrative agencies, RULE-MAKING
POWER or LAW EXECUTION. This involves either of two tasks for the
administrative agencies:
a) “Filling up the details” on an otherwise complete statute; or
b) Ascertaining the facts necessary to bring a “contingent” law or provision
into actual operation.

Sections 2-4. SENATE Composition

24 senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as
may be provided by law.

Qualifications
a) Natural-born citizen;
b) At least 35 years old on the day of election;
c) Able to read and write;
d) A registered voter; and
 e) Philippine resident for at least 2 years immediately preceding the day of
the election.

Note: The qualifications of both Senators and Members of the House are limited to
those provided by the Constitution. Congress cannot, by law, add or subtract from
these qualifications.

Term of Office:

6 years, commencing (unless otherwise provided by law) at noon, 30 June next

following their election.

Term Limitations:
a. No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms.
b. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Sections 5-7. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Composition:
1) Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law; and
2) Party-list Representative

Election of 250 members

1) They shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the

provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.
2) Legislative districts are apportioned in accordance with the number of
inhabitants of each area and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio.

a. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and

adjacent territory;

b. Each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants will be entitled to at least one
representative.

c. Each province will have at least one representative.

d. Legislative districts shall be re-apportioned by Congress within 3 years

after the return of each census. While the apportionment of districts is NOT
a political question, the judiciary CANNOT compel Congress to do this.

e. The standards used to determine the apportionment of legislative districts is

meant to prevent ‘gerrymandering’, which is the formation of a legislative
district out of separate territories so as to favor a particular candidate or
party.
CASES:

SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress cannot validly
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts.
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and
to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no specific

provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum population that must
compose legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative with nothing mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In this case,
there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of
Malolos is not qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution.

Qualifications
1) Natural born citizen of the Philippines;
2) At least 25 years old on the day of the election;
3) Able to read and write;
4) Registered voter in the district he seeks to represent; and
5) A resident of such district for at least one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.

Term of Office

1) Each member of the House shall be elected for a term of three (3) years
which shall commence (unless otherwise provided for by law) at noon on
30 June next following their election.

2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be

considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Term Limitations

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms.

Distinctions between Term and Tenure

1. Definition

a. Terms means the period during which the elected officer is legally
authorized to assume his office and exercise the powers thereof.
b. Tenure is the actual period during which such officer actually holds his
 position.

2. Limitation/Possible Reduction
a) Term CANNOT be reduced.
b) Tenure MAY, by law, be limited. Thus, a provision which considers an elective
office automatically vacated when the holder thereof files a certificate of
candidacy for another elective office (except President and Vice-President) is
valid, as it only affects the officers tenure and NOT his constitutional term.

Party-List Representatives

1) Constitute 20% of the total number of representatives, including those under the
party-list system (thus a maximum of 50 party-list members of the House)
2) However, for 3 consecutive terms from 2 February 1987 (i.e., the 1987-92, 92-95
and 95-98 terms), 25 seats shall be allotted to sectoral representatives. Under Art.
XVIII, Sec. 7, the sectoral representatives are to be appointed by the President
until legislation otherwise provides.
3) Mechanics of the party-list system:

a) Registered organizations submit a list of candidates in order of

priority.
b) During the elections, these organizations are voted for at large.
c) The number of seats that each organization gets out of the 20%
allotted to the system depends on the number of votes they get.

4. Qualifications
a. Natural born citizen of the Philippines
b. At least 25 years of age on the day of the election
c. Able to read and write

Cases:

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000; Partido
Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 – Section VI 5(2) of Article of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in
the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and
RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the
combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those
parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are
qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional
representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in relation
to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11

of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3)
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled.

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list

representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-
list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013- In
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-
list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

a) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.

b)National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

c) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.

d)Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and

underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

e) A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent

the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

f) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

g) The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist

elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
 Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the “marginalized and underrepresented.” Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party
may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees,
under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.

ANGKLA VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020

The only instance every vote obtained in a party-list election can be given equal
weight is when the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives is
based on absolute proportionality. But this is not required under, nor the system
envisioned in, Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Instead, the manner of
determining the volume and allocation of party-list representation in the House of
Representatives is left to the wisdom of Congress.

Heeding the call of duty, Congress enacted RA 7941. Its features preclude the
allocation of seats based solely on absolute proportionality (1) to bar any single
party-list party, organization or coalition from dominating the party-list system, and
(2) to ensure maximization of the allotment of 20% of seats in the House of
Representatives to party-list representatives.

Too, RA 7941 ordains a two-tiered seat allocation wherein those who reach the 2%
threshold are guaranteed seat in the first round and get to keep their votes intact for
the first stage of the second round. To recall, the original application of RA 7941 in
Veterans limited the allocation of guaranteed and additional seats to two-percenters
alone. Though the Court opened the system to non-two percenters, this was only to
abide by the 20% composition decreed by the Constitution. Given the reasonable
distinction between two-percenters and non-two-percenters, we see no cogent reason
to nullify their advantage.

But this is not to say that there is a double counting of votes in favor of the two-
percenters. Ultimately, each vote is counted only once. All votes are tallied at the
beginning of the BANAT formula.

Just because a party-list was allocated a guaranteed seat and an additional seat does
not mean that its votes were counted twice. It just means that the party-list concerned
surpassed the proportional thresholds prescribed under the law in both rounds of seat
allocation. Similarly, just because a party-list is not awarded a guaranteed seat or an
additional does not mean that its votes were not counted. Failure of a party-list to
obtain a seat only means one thing - it lost the elections. It was outvoted or
outperformed by other party-lists. It was simply left without a seat in the game of
musical chairs. Under these circumstances, their remedy is not to wrest others of their
allocated seats by changing the rules of the game, but by doing better in the
subsequent elections.

The rules of the game are laid down in RA 7941. As stated, the BANAT formula
mirrors the textual progression of Section ll(b) of the law. The BANAT formula
withstood the test of time and the Court is offered no cogent reason to depart
therefrom.

G.R. No. 257610 and UDK No. 17230, January 24, 2023, Albano v. COMELEC;
Pizarro v. COMELEC

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the Court granted the
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Injunction, filed in 2021, by Catalina G.
Leonen-Pizzaro and Glen Quintos Albano (petitioners), candidates for party-list
representatives in the 2019 National Elections, assailing the constitutionality of
Section 8 of RA 7941.

R.A. No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, and Sections 5(d) and
10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10717 which governs the submission of nominees
of groups or organizations participating under the party-list-system of representation,
insofar as the said provisions prevent a candidate for any elective office or a person
who has lost in the immediately preceding elections from being included in the list of
nominees for party-list representatives.

Petitioners likewise argued that Congress does not have the power to add additional
qualifications set forth in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution with respect
to party- list representatives.

In granting the petitions, the Court declared invalid and unconstitutional the phrase
“a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding
election,” under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System Act), and the phrases
“have lost in their bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local
Elections” and “or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the May 13,
2019 National and Local Elections,” under Sections 5(d) and 10, respectively, of
COMELEC Resolution No. 10717.

The Court found that the prohibition placed on losing candidates violates the
constitutional guaranty of substantive due process as it effectively intrudes on the
right of losing candidates in the immediately preceding elections from participating
in the present elections. It added that the State cannot require eligibility for public
office to be conditioned on a candidate’s ill performance in the previous election, nor
may such performance be used as a rubric to gauge the person’s ability to serve.

The Court also ruled that by the express wording of Section 5(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, Congress is empowered to determine, by law, who shall be
elected through the party-list system and, therefore, determine the qualifications of
the party-list representatives elected. Reviewing the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, the Court found the clear intent of the framers to
delegate to Congress, who is in the best position to draft, study, and enact all the
details regarding the implementation of the party-list system, the determination of the
 qualifications of nominees of the party-list system.

The Court said that given these, there is nothing constitutionally repugnant on the
part of Congress to provide for the selection of party- list nominees as reflected in
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 and as later adopted and reproduced by the respondent
COMELEC in its Resolution No. 10717.

The Court likewise ruled that regardless of the power of Congress to provide for the
qualifications of party-list representatives by law, it must still yield to the general
limitations on legislation, particularly the equal protection clause. Applying the
rational basis test, the Court held that the assailed portion of the provisions under
R.A. No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10717 must be struck down, as no
substantial distinction exists between candidates who lost in the immediately
preceding election vis-à- vis those who won or did not participate therein.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that
Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the
exacting standards that the “marginalized and underrepresented sector must
demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an
immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define them
as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.”

The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown “that the LGBT sector has been
historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of negative public
perception, and has even alleged acts of violence perpetrated against members of the
LGBT community by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity.” It
added that the magnitude of opposition against petitioner’s participation in the party
list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sector’s lack of political power; so, too,
is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment
against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITIES

1.) Immunity from arrest:

a) Legislators are privileged from arrest while Congress is “in session” with respect to
offenses punishable by up to 6 years of imprisonment. Thus, whether Congress is in
regular or special session, the immunity from arrest applies.

b) If Congress is in recess, members thereof may be arrested.

c) The immunity is only with respect to arrests and NOT to prosecution for criminal
offenses.

2.) Legislative privilege:

No member shall be questioned or held liable in any forum other than his/her
respective Congressional body for any debate or speech in the Congress or in any
Committee thereof.
 Limitation on the privilege:

1) Protection is only against forum other than Congress itself. Thus for inflammatory
remarks which are otherwise privileged, a member may be sanctioned by either the
Senate or the House as the case may be.

2) The ‘speech or debate’ must be made in performance of their duties as members of

Congress. This includes speeches delivered, statements made, votes cast, as well as
bills introduced, and other activities done in performance of their official duties.

3) Congress need NOT be in session when the utterance is made, as long as it forms
part of ‘legislative action,’ i.e. part of the deliberative and communicative process
used to participate in legislative proceedings in consideration of proposed legislation
or with respect to other matters with Congress’ jurisdiction.

CASES:

PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) – The history of the provision granting Senators
and Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense.

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not
necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.

Trillanes vs. Marigomen, G.R. No. 179817, March 14, 2018- Parliamentary non-
accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or utterance is made
outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning
of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews is not
an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a
component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to
discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A
lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political
in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate
Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot
invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's
Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker,
but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of

expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmeña vs. Pendatun).
CONGRESSIONAL DISQUALIFICATIONS:

DISQUALIFICATION WHEN APPLICABLE

1. Senator/Member of the House During his tenure. If he does
cannot hold any other office or so, he forfeits his seat.
employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or
Instrumentality thereof,
including GOCCS or
their subsidiaries.
2. Legislators cannot be IF the office was created or the
appointed to any office. emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which
he was elected.
3. Legislators cannot personally During his term of office.
appear as counsel before any
court of justice, electoral
tribunal, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
4. Legislators cannot be During his term of office.
financially interested directly or
indirectly in any contract
with or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any GOCC
or its subsidiary.
5. Legislators cannot intervene When it is for his pecuniary
in any matter before any office benefit or where he may be
of the government. called upon to act on
account of his office.
Q er of members within the “jurisdiction” of the Congress (those it can order
U arrested for the purpose of questioning). In Avelino v. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-
O 2821 (1949)], one Senator was out of the Philippines which is not within
R the “jurisdiction” of the Senate, so that the working majority was 23
U Senators. There is a difference between a majority of "all members of the
M House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than
the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all members of the Senate
“ less one (23) constitutes a constitutional majority of the Senate for the
M purpose of the quorum
a
j Case:
o
r Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did
i not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of
t the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
y Governors. PNRC is a “private organization merely performing public
” functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not a government official or
s employee.” Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may
h be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of
a Congress. NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of the Philippine
l Government. It is a voluntary organization that “does not have government
l assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress”. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches.
t PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for
a purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon can
k validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
e position.

i Internal Rules:
n
t 1. Each House shall determine its own procedural rules.
o
2. Since this is a power vested in Congress as part of its inherent powers,
c under the principle of separation of powers, the courts cannot intervene in
o the implementation of these rules insofar as they affect the members of
n Congress.
s
i 3. Also, since Congress has the power to make these rules, it also has the
d power to ignore them when circumstances so require.
e
r CASES:
a
t Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the
i allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
o with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a
n constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
t
h Baguilat vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017- Under Section 16
e of Article VI, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also
n states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other
u than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers
m are chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-
b Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate
M e Supreme Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the
i manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
n however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the
o Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that '[e]ach House shall choose
r such other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the method of
i choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
t exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
y provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court."
L
e Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the
a House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the
d rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do
e not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
r effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure,
d their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
u waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
r of a majority [of the House of Representatives]." Hence, as a general rule,
i "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
n exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it
g is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from
t
prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives]."
h
e
Discipline:
1
1 1.) Suspension
t
h 1) Concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its members and
2) Shall not exceed 60 days.
C
o 2.) Expulsion
n
g 1) Concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its members.
r
e Other measures:
s
s a) Deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the record

( b) Fine
1
9 c) Imprisonment Censure
9
8
- CASES:
2
0 Osmeña vs Pendatun- The House of Representatives is the judge of what
0 constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in
1 any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department
) with the legislature.
,
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not
t thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him,
h pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed
to attend sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full
a nd movement.
w
a It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a
r member of congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member
e of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively
n minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
e
s Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague
s is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a
penalty but a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
o the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
f
Congressional Journals and Records:
t
h 1) The Journal is conclusive upon the courts.
e
2) BUT an enrolled bill prevails over the contents of the
l Journal.
i
m 3) An enrolled bill is the official copy of approved
i legislation and bears the certifications of the presiding
t officers of each House. Thus where the certifications are
a valid and are not withdrawn, the contents of the enrolled
t bill are conclusive upon the courts as regards the
i provision of that particular bill.
o
n G.R. No. 236118, ACT Teachers v. Duterte, January 24, 2023
s
The Supreme Court held that the supposed absence of a quorum in the
o House of Representatives was belied by the official Journal of the House of
n Representatives, both on the day that the TRAIN’s Bicameral Conference
Report was ratified and the immediately subsequent session on January 15,
h 2018. As between the livestream video and photographs presented by the
i petitioners, and the Congressional Journal, the latter must prevail as to the
s events on the Congressional floor on that fateful day given that no less than
the Constitution itself grants the Congressional Journal its imprimatur.
f
r Adjournments:
e
e 1) Neither House can adjourn for more than 3 days during the time
d Congress is in session without the consent of the other House.
o
m 2) Neither can they adjourn to any other place than that where the two
houses are sitting, without the consent of the other.
o
f Section 17: THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

a The Senate and the House shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
c composed of:
t
i 1. 3 Supreme Court Justices to be designated by the Chief Justice; &
o 2. 6 Members of the Senate or House, as the case may be.
n
The senior Justice of SC in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
a
 ces indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures that representatives
Reyes from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present to constitute a
vs. quorum.
HRE
T, The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides
Octob that "[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This
er 16, means that only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should
2018 always be one member of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members
inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme Court will designate another Justice to
Consti chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
tution Constitution.
ality
of the In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the
follow Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only
ing three Justice- members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET.
provis Hence, there is a valid classification. The classification is justified because it was
ions of placed to ensure the presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative
the branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the
2015 equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HRET
Rules: The HRET states that it only has jurisdiction over a member of the
House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of
(1) Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
Rule requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3)
6(a) assumption of office. Hence, the requirement of concurrence of these
requiri three requisites is within the power of the HRET to make.
ng the
prese Note: The congressional members of the ET’s shall be chosen on the basis of
nce of proportional representation from the political parties and party-list
at organizations.
least
one Jurisdiction:
Justic
e in 1.) Each ET shall be the sole judge of all CONTESTS relating to the election,
order returns, and qualifications of their respective members. This includes determining
to the validity or invalidity of a proclamation declaring a particular candidate as the
consti winner.
tute a
quoru 2.) An ‘election contest’ is one where a defeated candidate challenges the
m qualification and claims for himself the seat of a proclaimed winner.

Rule 3.) In the absence of an election contest, the ET is without jurisdiction. However,
6(a) the power of each House to expel its own members or even to defer their oath-
of taking until their qualifications are determined may still be exercised even without
the an election contest.
2015
HRE ROBERTO "PINPIN" T. UY, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
T No. 260650. August 08, 2023
Rule
s The doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect
does has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest
not involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been
make immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
the COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no
Justi
jurisd oner's qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
iction petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed
to such action.
revie
w Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
resol Member of the House of Representatives, x x x
ution
s or From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
decis Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
ions proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
of
the xxxx
COM
ELE Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made
C, (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
whet Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication
her that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
issue whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
d by
a Here, Romeo had not satisfied the requisite of a proper oath of office. The Rules of
divisi the House of Representatives require its members to take their oath or affirmation
on or collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. The oath enables the
en members to enter into the performance of their functions and participate in the
banc. House deliberations and other proceedings. The Office of the Deputy Secretary-
General and Chief Counsel of the Legal Affairs Department informed this Court
In this that the Office of the House of Representatives for the First District of Zamboanga
case, del Norte remains vacant as Mr. Romeo Jalosjos, Jr. has not taken an oath or
the affirmation of office with the Honorable Speaker of the House of Representatives in
COM open session.
ELEC
retains The "oath or affirmation" before the Speaker of the House in open session is not an
jurisdi empty ritual. To be sure, the third sentence of Rule II, Section 6 of the Rules of the
ction House of Representatives provides for the significant consequential effects of the
for the oath or affirmation before the Speaker in open session, viz.:
follow
ing Also, Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. - Members shall take their oath
reason or affirmation collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. The
s: oath of office administered by the Speaker in open session to all Members present is
a ceremonial affirmation of prior and valid oaths of office administered to them by
First, duly authorized public
the officers. Following parliamentary precedents, Members take their oath before the
HRE Speaker in open session to enable them to enter into the performance of their
T functions and participate in the deliberations and other proceedings of the House.
does (Emphasis supplied)
not
acqui The rule has two scenarios - (1) oath before the Speaker of the House; and (2) oath
re before duly authorized public officers. In the first scenario, only an oath is required
juris before the Speaker of the House and not an affirmation. In the second scenario, the
dicti oath of office before the Speaker of the House in open session is a ceremonial
on affirmation of a prior and valid oath before duly authorized public officers. In both
over cases, the oath before the Speaker of the House in open session will enable the
the members to "enter into the performance of their functions and participate in the
issue deliberations and other proceedings of the House." Here, Romeo did not take an
of oath before the Speaker of the House in open session which bars him from
petiti
perfo 1.) Since the ET’s are independent constitutional bodies, independent even of the
rmin House from which the members are respectively taken, neither Congress nor the
g his Courts may interfere with procedural matters relating to the functions of the ET’s,
funct such as the setting of deadlines or filing their election contests with the respective
ions ETs.
and
parti 2.) The ETs being independent bodies, its members may not be arbitrarily
cipati removed from their positions in the tribunal by the parties which they represent.
ng in Neither may they be removed for not voting according to party lines, since they are
the acting independently of Congress.
cong
ressi 3.) The mere fact that the members of either the Senate or the House sitting on the
onal ET are those which are sought to be disqualified due to the filing of an election
delib contest against them does not warrant all of them from being disqualified from
erati sitting in the ET. The Constitution is quite clear that the ET must act with both
on. members from the SC and from the Senate or the House. If all the legislator-
Thus, members of the ET were to be disqualified, the ET would not be able to fulfill its
the constitutional functions.
requi
red 4.) Judicial review of decisions of the ETs may be had with the SC only insofar
oath, as the decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
as a or with grave abuse of discretion constituting denial of due process.
cere
moni Cases: Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate validly suspended the
al oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the
affir electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which
mati contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into
on of office.
a
previ - LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles
ous & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been
valid proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of
oath Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election contests relating to
befor his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRET’s own
e jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate divests
duly the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
autho the time of the proclamation.
rized
publi - RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. - clearly
c under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru its reps. Designated
offic by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured
ers, certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
is not proceedings. HRET no matter how complete and exclusive, does not
prese carry with it authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
nt. naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule
otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Issues the father which is not permissible. (Aug. 23, 2011).
regar - Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
ding congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s
the eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file
Electo before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for
ral quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules.
Tribu
nals: - Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002- Since
p deration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the
e proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
t divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
i 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
t finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the
i execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in
o office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the
n 4th District of Leyte.
e
r - At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
( Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by
C the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue was
o still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
d resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
i
l - Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase “election, returns
l and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
a matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is
) necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct
s of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
e campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” to the
a canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
s questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
o authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that
n could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
a winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
b certificate of candidacy.
l - Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
y jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective
officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-
f proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, V-
i President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives.
l -
e What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificate of
d canvass or election returns”. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of
the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
a objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
M
o
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the
t
certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-
i
opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.
o
n
- This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of
HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
f
part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
o
grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
r
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic
R
exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs.
e
Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
c
o
- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
n
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as
s
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
i
 C quired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
o the case is terminated.
n
s - Tañada vs. HRET, GR 217012 March 1, 2016-HRET lacks the
t authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate. xxx
i Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over
t two types of election contests: election protests and quo warranto cases.
u xxx An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions
t constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling precincts,
i and for the revision of ballots. xxx On the other hand, the eligibility of a
o member representative is impugned in a quo warranto case. But the
n HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural guidelines on how the
. COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he
or she is a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is
- R instituted in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule
o 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
b
l - xxx HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on
e cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the SC
s which has jurisdiction and the power to review such rulings from the
v Commission. xxx The jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under
s Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the election,
. returns, and qualification of the members of the House of
H Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest involving a
R non- member. xxx To be considered a member of the Lower House,
E there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
T proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
-
J - Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s
u jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only
r upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
i Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
s jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
d whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
i arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
c hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
t amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is
i absent in this case.
o
n - Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506,
respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are
o considered as “elected members” of the House, the HRET has
f jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
H
R - Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26,
E 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC with
T “jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and
prescribing the qualifications of each nominee” and that no grave abuse
o of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC’s First Division and
n COMELEC En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the
c proper party to submit CIBAC’s Certificate of Nomination instead of
e Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As provided in
Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also possesses the
a authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
c
c and register political parties. “The power to rule upon questions of party
o identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to
n its enforcement powers,” the Court declared
s
t - Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET
i which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel
t involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a
u member of the Senate.
t
i
o Section 18: THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
n
a Composition:
l
l 1.) Senate President as ex-officio chairman;
y
2.) 12 Senators; and
m
a 3.) 12 Members of the House.
n
d Note: The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are elected on the basis of
a proportional representation from the political parties and party-list
t organizations.
e
d Voting/Action

p 1) The chairman shall only vote in case of a tie.

o
w 2) The CA shall act on all appointments within 30 session days from their
e submission to Congress.
r
t 3) The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
o
1. Heads of the Executive Departments (except if it is
e
nJurisdiction
f
o1.) CA shall confirm the appointments by the President with respect to the following
rpositions:
c
e 1. Heads of the Executive Departments (except if it is the Vice-President who is
appointed to the post).
e
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls.
l
3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain: and
e
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution (e.g.
c
COMELEC members).
t
i
2.) Congress CANNOT by law prescribe that the appointment of a person to an office
o
created by such law shall be subject to confirmation by the CA.
n

l3.) Appointments extended by the President to the above-mentioned positions while

aCongress is not in session shall only be effective until disapproval by the CA or until
wthe next adjournnment of Congress.
s
Meeti d either at the call of the Chairman or a majority of all its members.
ngs of
the 3.) Since the CA is also an independent constitutional body, its rules of procedure
CA are also outside the scope of congressional powers as well as that of the judiciary.

1.) C Note: The ET and the CA shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and
A the House of Representative shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker.
m
e Cases:
e
t DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is
s authorized to change its representation in the Commission on
o Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
n the political alignments of its membership. The changes must be
l PERMANENT and do not include temporary alliances or factional
y divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
w disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party
h to another.
il
e The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory
C in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the
o Senate to disobey or disregard. A political party must have at least two
n senators to be able to have a representative in the Commission on
g Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party
r a membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).
e
s Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming
s that party- list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
i agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their
s primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not
i with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
n Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that
s they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the
e HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive
s of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in
s the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to
i this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of
o primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before
n petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently,
. petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of
the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not
2.) M absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
e proportional representation.
e
ti Sections 21-22: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
n
g Scope:
s 1. Either House or any of their committees may conduct inquires ‘in aid of
a legislation’.
r 2. “In aid of legislation” does not mean that there is pending legislation
e regarding the subject of the inquiry. In fact, investigation may be needed for
h purposes of proposing future legislation.
e 3. If the stated purpose of the investigation is to determine the existence of
l
v t ‘in aid of prosecution’. This violates the principle of separation of powers
i and is beyond the scope of congressional powers.
o
la Enforcement:
ti 1. Since experience has shown that mere requests for information does not
o usually work, Congress has the inherent power to punish recalcitrant
n witnesses for contempt, and may have them incarcerated until such time that
s they agree to testify.
o 2. The continuance of such incarceration only subsists for the lifetime, or term,
f of such body. Once the body ceases to exist after its final adjournment, the
t power to incarcerate ceases to exist as well. Thus, each ‘Congress’ of the
h House lasts for only 3 years. But if one is incarcerated by the Senate, it is
e indefinite because the Senate, with its staggered terms, is a continuing body.
la 3. BUT, in order for a witness to be subject to this incarceration, the primary
w requirement is that the inquiry is within the scope of Congress’ powers. i.e. it
, is in aid of legislation.
t 4. The materiality of a question is determined not by its connection to any
h actually pending legislation, but by its connection to the general scope of the
e inquiry.
i 5. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in Congress and this power is
n sui generis. It cannot be exercised by local government units unless they are
v expressly authorized to do so.
e
st Limitations:
i
1. The inquiry must be conducted in accordance with the ‘duly published rules
g
of procedure’ of the House conducting the inquiry; and
at
2. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
i
be respected. Ex. The right against self-incrimination
o
n
is
n
o
l
o
n
g
e
r
‘i
n
ai
d
o
f
le
g
is
la
ti
o
n
’
b
u
Cases:

G.R. No. 257401, March 28, 2023, Ong v. Senate

In Ong v. Senate, the Court held that the Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing contempt and arrest orders against Pharmally resource
persons.

The Court ruled that while the Senate has the power to conduct legislative
inquiries, it must observe the Constitutional right to due process of the persons
appearing before such proceedings. The Court stressed that Congress is not
precluded from causing the appearance of a resource person. Such power being
inherent and necessary for Congress to effectively perform its function of
inquiry in aid of legislation, it need not find textual basis in the Senate Rules of
Procedure. The Court, however, stressed that Congress’ power of legislative
investigation is subject to three limitations: (1) the inquiry must be in “aid of
legislation”; (2) the inquiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure; and (3) the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Further, where there is factual
basis for contempt, the resource person’s detention should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry.

In the case of the Pharmally resource persons, the Court found that while the
Senate complied with the first two restrictions, it failed to meet the last when it
cited the petitioners in contempt and ordered their arrests without giving them
the opportunity to be heard.

Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.

The Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23
of Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the
inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members.

Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members
who do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from
the approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports
concurring in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken
into account in determining whether the Report has been approved by a
majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who
submits both a concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered
as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for the
majority position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions,

 shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same
in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business,
shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.
(emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report

after the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report
is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the
consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry.
The said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its
members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of
the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the
Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or
disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate
whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of
business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained
witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention
of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing
institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the
final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that
expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks
the determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but
in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers. To allow
the Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy
would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that
had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial

proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2,
2009).
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No. 167173,
December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to punish

contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as the branch of
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of
contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of
criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it
may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of
persons who may appear liable.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the

President to withhold information requested by other branches of the
government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the
President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if
“necessary and proper” in carrying out powers and functions expressly
granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction,
several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the

President is ultimately responsible for military and national security matters
affecting the nation. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may
find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security secrets
from the Legislature or the public.

As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by virtue of the

President’s control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the State.
The President’s role as chief implementer of the State’s foreign policy is
reinforced by the President’s constitutional power to negotiate and enter into
treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility, the
President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic
secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted
diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state
will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it.

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal

deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage
candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the President’s
communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the
glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may
be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive
matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving
the President of candid advice.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting

military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential
communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized
interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the
power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial
and documentary evidence in deciding cases.

The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one hand and

the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand
 - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on
the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive
privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive
and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the
principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of
the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be
“ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even
after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic
confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair
the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations,
therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a
type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which
the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.

“Operational Proximity Test” (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No.

180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the three (3)
questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b)
Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go
ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Appearance by department heads before Congress:

1. Since members of the executive department are co-equals with those of the
legislative department, under the principle of separations of powers, department
heads cannot be compelled to appear before Congress. Neither may the
department heads impose their appearance upon Congress.
2. Department heads may appear before Congress in the following instances.
3. Upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President (and that of the House
concerned); or
4. Upon the request of either House (which cannot compel them to attend)
5. The appearance will be conducted in EXECUTIVE SESSION when:

a) Required by the security of state or required by public interest; and

 b) When the President so states in writing

Cases:

- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Philippines, GR No.

180308, June 19, 2012- the wide latitude given to the Congress in the
conduct of legislative inquiries and would not fault the Senate for approving
the resolution on the very same day that it was submitted. The court also
held that the petitioners were invited as resource persons at the inquiry,
and as such, they do not have the constitutional right to counsel.

- The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under

custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. Since
petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource
persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of

Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress’ power
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is
their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed
for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen
is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision
of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the
absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of
the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objective.
2. informer’s privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of
that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated.
 - Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is executive privileged,
it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.

- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond
the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be

construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in the question
hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to

enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight

powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny;
investigation and supervision.

Power of Impeachment:

- The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment. ... (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.

Cases:

Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit
and the consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the
impeachment proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of
impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses
committed.

READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003-

definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.
 Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No.
193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or
override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan
Pambansa, September 3, 1995.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR

GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018- quo warranto and impeachment
may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy
to determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while
in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment.

- Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and
may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the
usurper does not prevent the State from commencing quo warranto proceeding.

- Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of quo warranto

action against an impeachable officer. After all, quo warranto petition is
predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions
the validity of public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-
called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.

- Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution specifies the penalty of "removal from
office" and "disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines" in impeachment cases.There is nothing in the said provision that
deliberately vests authority on the impeachment court to impose penalties lower
than those expressly mentioned.

- The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition is
not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined
instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for
quo warranto involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official
had it not been for disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the
Senate.

- In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., the Supreme

Court further explained the court's authority to issue writ of quo warranto, as
complementary to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, as
 follows:

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings,

neatly complements the traditional separation of powers that come
to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the
adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their
rights and obligations under law. The question of whether
franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by
Congress is one inherently suited to court of law, and not for an
administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of
judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking
its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the
viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating
thelegislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises extended to
them.

Sections 23-24. DECLARATION OF WAR/EMERGENCY POWERS

Vote requirement: (to declare the existence of a state of war)

1. 2/3 of both Houses, in joint session

2. Voting separately

Emergency powers:

1. During times of war or other national emergency, Congress may, BY LAW, authorize
the President to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy.

1. Limitations:
1. Powers will be exercised for a limited period only; and
2. Powers will be subject to restrictions prescribed by Congress

1. Expiration of emergency powers

1. By resolution of Congress or
2. Upon the next adjournment of Congress

Sections 24-27, 30-31 LEGISLATION

Bills that must originate from the House of Representatives (Section 24)

CODE: A R T Pu Lo P

1. Appropriation bills
2. Revenue bills
3. Tariff bills
4. Bills authorizing the increase of public debt
5. Bills of local application
6. Private bills
Note: The Senate may, however, propose or concur with amendments.

Appropriation bills

 The primary and specific aim of an appropriation bill is to appropriate a sum of

money from the public treasury.
 Thus, a bill enacting the budget is an appropriations bill.
 BUT: A bill creating a new office, and appropriating funds therefor is NOT an
appropriation bill.

Revenue Bill
 A revenue bill is one specifically designed to raise money or revenue through
imposition or levy.
 Thus, a bill introducing a new tax is a revenue bill, but a provision in, for instance,
the Videogram Regulatory Board law imposing a tax on video rentals does not
make the law a revenue bill.

Bills of local application

A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
is deemed to have originated from the House provided that the bill of the House was filed
prior to the filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own
version.

Limitations:

1. For appropriation bills:

1. Congress cannot increase the appropriations recommended by the President for

the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
2. Each provision or enactment in the General Appropriations Bill must relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein and any such provision or
enactment must be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill must specify the purpose for which it is intended and
must be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

2. Transfer of appropriations:

1. Rule: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations

2. BUT the following may, BY LAW, be authorized to AUGMENT any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations

 President
 President of the Senate
 Speaker of the House of Representatives
 Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court
 Heads of the Constitutional Commissions

Case: Macalintal vs. COMELEC & Office of the President, G.R. No. 263590.
June 27, 2023-a valid realignment requires: (1) the existence of savings in the
 programmed appropriation of the transferring agency; and (2) the existence of an
item, project, or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency to which the
savings will be transferred

Pursuant to the strict constitutional limitations, the postponement of the December

2022 BSKE in order to realign the COMELEC's budget allocation for the same under
the 2022 General Appropriations Act to the executive's COVID-19 and economic
recovery programs constitutes as an impermissible transfer of appropriations. As
explicitly provided under Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution, this
COMELEC allocation can only be constitutionally transferred by the COMELEC's
chairperson, and only with respect to the COMELEC's "item, project, or activity with
an appropriation." It cannot be transferred to another branch or constitutional body.
Verily, this intended transfer by the legislature — no matter how well-intentioned it
might have been — constitutes an arbitrary and unconstitutional consideration that
renders RA 11935 unconstitutional.

3. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be:

1. Disbursed only for public purposes;
2. Should be supported by appropriate vouchers; and
3. Subject to guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

4. If Congress fails to pass General Appropriations Bill (GAB) by the end of any fiscal
year:
i. The GAB for the previous year is deemed reenacted

ii. It will remain in full force and effect until the GAB is passed by
Congress.

5. For law granting tax exemption

It should be passed with the concurrence of a MAJORITY of ALL the

members of Congress.

6. For bills in general

7. Every bill shall embrace only one (1) subject, as expressed in the title thereof

i. As a mandatory requirement

ii. The title does not have to be a complete catalogue of everything stated
in the bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the bill
and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.

iii. A bill which repeals legislation regarding the subject matter need not
state in the title that it is repealing the latter. Thus, a repealing clause in the
bill is considered germane to the subject matter of the bill.

8. Readings

1. In order to become a law, each bill must pass three (3) readings in both Houses.
2. General rule: Each reading shall be held on separate days & printed copies thereof in
its final form shall be distributed to its Members three (3) days before its passage.
3. Exception: If a bill is certified as urgent by the President as to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency, the 3 readings can be
held on the same day.
 4. First reading – only the title is read, bill number and author’s name are read on the
floor; the bill is passed to the proper committee
5. Second reading – Entire text is read and debates are held, and amendments
introduced. Voting on the second reading version of the bill. If approved, the bill is
calendared for a 3rd reading.
6. Third reading – only the title is read, no amendments are allowed. Nominal voting is
held. Vote shall be taken immediately thereafter and the yeas and nays entered in the
journal. If passed, the approved bill is referred to the other house for concurrence.
7. The other Chamber follows the same procedures (First Reading, Second Reading and
Third Reading).
8. Back to the house of origin. If the House-approved version is compatible with that of
the house of origin, the final version’s enrolled form is printed. If there are certain
differences, a Bicameral Conference Committee is called to reconcile conflicting
provisions of both versions of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
Conference committee submits report on the reconciled version of the bill, duly
approved by both chambers. The Senate prints the reconciled version in its enrolled
form.
9. Submission to Malacañang.

Veto power of President:

1. Every bill, in order to become a law, must be presented to and signed by the
President.
2. If the President does not approve of the bill, he shall veto the same and return it with
his objections to the House from which it originated. The House shall enter the
objections in the Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
3. The President must communicate his decision to veto within 30 days from the date of
receipt thereof. If he fails to do so, the bill shall become a law as if he signed it.
4. This rule eliminates the ‘pocket veto’ whereby the President would simply refuse to
act on the bill.
5. To OVERRIDE the veto, at least 2/3 of ALL the members of each House must agree
to pass the bill. In such case, the veto is overridden and becomes a law without need
of presidential approval.
6. Item veto
7. The President may veto particular items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
8. This veto will not affect items to which he does not object.
9. Definition of item

TYPE OF BILL ITEM

1. Revenue/tax bill Subject of the tax and the tax rate imposed thereon

2. Appropriations bill Indivisible sum dedicated to a stated purpose

10. Veto of RIDER

1. A rider is a provision which does not relate to a particular appropriation

stated in the bill.
2. Since it is an invalid provision under Section 25(2), the President may veto it
as an item.

Specific limitations on legislation

1. No law shall be enacted increasing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction

 without the SC’s advice and concurrence.
2. No law shall be enacted granting titles of royalty or nobility.

Notes:

Q: What are confidential and intelligence funds?

A: A 2015 joint circular between the Commission on Audit (COA), Department of

Budget and Management (DBM), Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Governance Commission for Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GCG)
and the Department of National Defense laid down guidelines on confidential and
intelligence funds.

Confidential and intelligence funds are lump sum allocations set aside in the national
budget for expenses that involve surveillance and intelligence information gathering
activities.

As its name suggests, confidential funds are for confidential expenses related to
surveillance activities in civilian government agencies that are intended to support their
mandate or operations.

Similarly, intelligence funds are for intelligence expenses related to information gathering
activities of uniformed and military personnel and intelligence practitioners that have
direct impact on national security.

Q: What can confidential and intelligence funds be used for?

A: According to the 2015 joint resolution, confidential funds can only be used for the
following expenses:

 Purchase of information necessary for the formulation and implementation of

program, activities and projects relevant to national security and peace and
order

 Rental of transport vehicle related to confidential activities

 Rentals and the incidental expenses related to the maintenance of safehouses

 Purchase or rental of supplies, materials and equipment for confidential

operations that cannot be done through regular procedures without
compromising the information gathering activity concerned

 Payment of rewards to informers

 [Uncovering and preventing] illegal activities that pose a clear and present
danger to agency personnel or property, or other facilities and resources under
the agency protection, done in coordination with appropriate law enforcement
agencies

Intelligence funds, meanwhile, can only be used for the following expenses:

 Intelligence and counterintelligence activities that have direct impact on national

security
  Special projects and case operation plans as approved by the head of agency involving
covert or semi-covert psychological, internal security operation, and peace and order
activities, as well as programs, projects and campaigns against lawlessness and
lawless elements involving intelligence activities.

Confidential and intelligence funds cannot be used for:

 Salaries, wages, overtime, additional compensation, allowance or other fringe benefits
of officials and employees who are employed by the government in whatever
capacity or elected officials, except when authorized by law

 Representation, consultancy fees or entertainment expenses

Construction or acquisition of buildings or housing structures

Q: Who gets confidential and intelligence funds?

A: National government agencies (NGAs) can get both confidential and intelligence
funds, while local governments and GOCCs can only get confidential funds.

The source of confidential and intelligence funds for NGAs come is the General
Appropriations Act or the national budget that has passed the scrutiny of Congress and
signed into law by the president.

On the other hand, confidential funds for GOCCs come from their corporate operating
budget as authorized by the GCG and the DBM, while confidential funds for local
governments are sourced from annual appropriations ordinances.

Q: How are confidential and intelligence funds audited?

A: Due to the nature of these funds, auditing them could be quite difficult as the COA is
left to trust whatever NGAs, local governments and GOCCs submit for them to
countercheck.

But the 2015 joint circular provides that NGAs, local governments and GOCCs should
prepare a physical and financial plan supporting their request for confidential and/or
intelligence funds containing the estimated amount per project, activity and
program.

Cases:

- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the

requirement that appropriations bills original exclusively in the House of
Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments.

- While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-

ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the
annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds
for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's
own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, there is no usurpation of the legislature'ʹs power to appropriate
funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office (Pichay v. Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative
and Adjudication Division, 667 SCRA 408).
- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of individual menbers
of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was
merely recommendatory in nature and is also recognized that individual
members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project (LAMP vs.
DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)

- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November 19, 2013-

Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Legislature, although its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the Executive. Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. Insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred
unto the legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which
they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriation bills, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process
denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence
of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy; and again insofar as it has conferred to the President the power
to appropriate funds intended by law for energy related purposes only to
other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the
broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has
once transgressed the principle of non delegability.

- In this recent per curiam ruling, meaning a ruling of the court as a whole,
the SC said the PDAF case clearly distinguished a legal lump-sum from
a prohibited lump-sum, and that the 2014 lump-sum funds followed the
rules.

- A lump-sum fund is legal if it has singular correspondence.

- "(It means) an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified

singular purpose, otherwise known as a line-item. This treatment not only
allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same," said the 2013 PDAF ruling.
 Legal
- Here are the reasonings of the SC why the 2014 lump-sum funds were
constitutional:

- 1. Unprogrammed Fund - "It specifically identified the public purposes for

which the fund may be used and contained singularly corresponding
purposes."

- 2. Contingent Fund - "Its purpose was to cover the funding requirement of

new or urgent projects that need to be implemented during the year, and the
foreign travel expenses of the Office of the President which were not and
could not have been anticipated during budget preparation and
authorization. Hence, the same cannot be itemized."

- 3. E-Government Fund- "Its nature as a cross-agency fund required it to be

subject to the determination by the administrative agencies of the ongoing
strategic information and communication technology projects in the priority
sectors identified by the Legislature in the budget."

- 4. Local Government Support Fund - "It provided sufficient standards

which set the limits of the Executive’s authority to disburse the LGSF, the
legislative policy behind the fund, and identified the conditions under which
the fund may be utilized."

- The SC said that it applied another rule from the 2013 PDAF ruling,
which said: "An appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value
must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to
be considered as a proper line-item.”

- The Power of Augmentation- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July

1, 2014- the transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under section 25(5),
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1)
there is law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds
to be transferred are saving generated from the appropriations of their
respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. The following
were declared unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments
from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of the savings
of the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded
the revenue targets for non compliance with the conditions provided in the
relevant GAA (Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).
 - The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President the year's
program of expenditure for each agency of the government on the
basis of authorized appropriations. The approved expenditure program
shall constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period,
subject to such policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by
the President [TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 196418, February 10,
2015]

- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to spend funds

made available by Congress.xxx there was no instance of executive
impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment is prohibited by the GAA, unless
there will be an unmanageable government budget deficit.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any
government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress
is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans,
whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a
prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to
fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National
Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must
appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or
services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch.
When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law
authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National
Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by
the automatic appropriation.

Section 28. POWER TO TAX

Limitations:

1. The rule of taxation should be UNIFORM

2. It should be EQUITABLE
3. Congress should evolve a PROGRESSIVE system of taxation.
4. The power to tax must be exercised for a public purpose because the power exists for the
general welfare
5. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution should be observed.

Delegation of power to fix rates

1) Congress may, BY LAW, authorize the President to fix the following:

a. Tariff rates
b. Import and Export Quotas
c. Tonnage and wharfage dues
d. Other duties and imposts

2) Within the framework of the national development program of the Government

3) The exercise of such power by the President shall be within the specified limits fixed by
Congress and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose.

Constitutional tax exemptions:

1) The following properties are exempt from REAL PROPERTY taxes

(CODE: Cha Chu M- CA)

a. Charitable institutions
b. Churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto
c. Mosques
d. Non-profit cemeteries; and
e. All lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes.

2) All revenues and assets of NON-STOCK NON-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL institutions

are exempt from taxes and duties PROVIDED that such revenues and assets are actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. (Art. XIV Sec 4 (3))

3) Grants, endowments, donations or contributions used actually, directly and exclusively

for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. This is subject to conditions prescribed
by law. (Art. XIV. Sec 4 (4))

TAX EXEMPTION

REQUISITES:

G.R. No. 192694, Feb 22, 2023, BASES CONVERSION v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF
BAGUIO CITY

The payment of fees for the issuance of business permits is regulatory in nature under the
local government unit's police power. It is not a tax for revenue generation. Tax-exempt
entities, therefore, cannot claim to be exempted from paying fees for business permits.

What is the meaning of the term “exemption from taxation"?

Tax exemption is an immunity or privilege from a charge or burden to which others are
subject. It is the grant of immunity, express or implied, to particular persons or corporations
of a particular class, from the obligation to pay taxes generally within the same state or taxing
district to which others are obliged to pay. (Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil 394)

What is the nature of tax exemption?

1. The tax exemptions provided in the Constitution are self-executing and need no
legislation to enforce them.
2. The grant of tax exemption is a matter of legislative policy that is within the exclusive
prerogative of Congress.

3. Exemption from taxes is personal in nature and covers only taxes for which the
taxpayer-grantee is directly liable. In any case, it cannot be transferred or assigned by
the person to whom it is given without the consent of the State. He who claims tax
exemption should prove by convincing proof that he is exempted. Therefore, an
exemption granted to a corporation does not apply to its stockholders.

4. Tax exemptions are not presumed, but when public property is involved, tax exemption
is the rule, and taxation, the exception.

5. There can be no simultaneous tax exemptions under two laws, one partial and the other
total.

6. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are
looked upon with disfavor and may almost be said to be odious to the law.

7. He who claims that he is exempted from tax must be able to justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law by words to plain to be mistaken. If ambiguous,
there is no tax exemption

May tax exemptions be revoked?

Yes. As a general rule, grants of tax exemption are revocable. The Congressional power to
grant an exemption necessarily carries with it the consequent power to revoke the same. In
the case of franchises to operate public utilities, the Constitution provides that no franchise
shall be granted unless subject to the condition that it shall be subject to repeal or
amendment. Therefore, any exemption granted under a franchise maybe revoked by
Congress.

Exception:

On the other hand, there is a recognized exception as regards contractual exemptions, on

the theory that revocation without the consent of the grantee would impair the obligation
of contract. There is no vested right in a tax exemption, more so when the latest expression
of legislative intent renders its continuance doubtful. Being a mere statutory privilege, a
tax exemption may be modified or withdrawn at will by the granting authority. To state
otherwise is to limit the taxing power of the State, which is unlimited, plenary,
comprehensive and supreme. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, it is subject only to restrictions which rest on the discretion of the
authority exercising it. (Republic v. Caguioa, GR 168584, Oct. 15, 2007)

Escape From Taxation

What are the forms of escape from taxation?

Taxpayers escape paying their taxes thru the following modes, although the modes used
may not necessarily be legal, and therefore, sanctionable.

a. Shifting the tax burden to another taxpayer.

b. Tax avoidance.
c. Tax evasion
Shifting of tax burden- simply means that the imposition of tax is transferred from the
statutory taxpayer, or the person who is required by law to pay the tax, to another person who
shall bear the burden of the tax without violating the law. Only the payment of indirect taxes
may be shifted to another taxpayer, but not direct taxes. Example: Under the VAT system, the
seller can shift the burden of the VAT to the buyer, the said tax (VAT) being an indirect tax.

Tax avoidance is the other term for "tax minimization." It is a legal tax saving device within
the means sanctioned by law the object of which is merely to minimize the payment of taxes.
This method should be used by the taxpayer in good faith and at arm's length. A taxpayer has
the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes or altogether
avoid them by means which the law permits. A taxpayer may therefore perform an act that he
honestly believes to be sufficient to decrease his tax liability or to exempt him from taxes. He
does not incur fraud thereby even if the act is thereafter found to be insufficient. (Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co. v. CTA, 1 SCRA 160 (1961)

Tax evasion is the other term for “tax dodging.” It is the use of the taxpayer of illegal means
to avoid or defeat the payment of the tax. Itis a scheme used outside of those lawful means
and when availed of is punishable by law because its main purpose is to entirely escape the
payment of taxes thru illegal means. It usually subjects the taxpayer to further or additional
civil or criminal liabilities. (CIR v. CA, 327 Phil. 1)

Section 29. Power of the Purse

1) No money shall be paid out of the National Treasury EXCEPT in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law.

a. This places the control of public funds in the hands of Congress.

b. BUT: This rule does not prohibit continuing appropriations. e.g. for debt
servicing. This is because the rule does not require yearly, or annual
appropriation.

2) Limitations.

a. Appropriations must be for a PUBLIC PURPOSE

b. Cannot appropriate public funds or property, directly or indirectly, in favor
of

i. Any sect, church, denomination, or sectarian institution or

system of religion or
ii. Any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such.

EXCEPT if the priest, etc is assigned to:

 the Armed Forces; or

 any penal institution; or
 government orphanage; or
 leprosarium

c) BUT the government is not prohibited from appropriating money for a

valid secular purpose, even if it incidentally benefits a religion, e.g.
appropriations for a national police force is valid even if the police also
protects the safety of clergymen.
 d) ALSO, the temporary use of public property for religious purposes is
valid, as long as the property is available for all religions

3) Special Funds

a) Money collected on a tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated

as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.

b) Once the special purpose is fulfilled or abandoned, any balance shall be

transferred to the general funds of the Government

Section 32. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

1) Through the system of initiative and referendum, the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.

2) Required Petition

a) Should be signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered

voters

b) Every legislative district should be represented by at least 3% of the

registered voters

c) Petition should be registered

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is
only the President, as Chief Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as
provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as
the calling-out powers under Section 18, Article VII thereof. (Jamar Kulayan v. Gov.
Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno, CJ]),

The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively
throughout the whole territory of the Philippines in accordance with constitutional provision
on national territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of
executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and
waters embraced therein and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction. X x x To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with
authority over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the
people and the state. X x x. In addition, the Executive is constitutionally empowered to
maintain peace and order, protect life, liberty, and property, and promote the general welfare.
In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that the President must oversee,
ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities against external and internal threats and, in
the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately prepared for all national and local
emergencies arising from natural and man-made disasters. To be sure, this power is limited
by the Constitution itself. X x x (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])
The Faithful Execution Clause- This Court has interpreted the faithful execution clause as
an obligation imposed on the President, and not a separate grant of power. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and includes it in the
provision regarding the President’s power of control over the executive department x x x.
Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is
intimately related to the other executive functions. X x x

These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot function with crippled
hands, but must be capable of securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine
Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for
instance, limit or take over the President’s power to adopt implementing rules and regulations
for a law it has enacted.

More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in
nature. xxx The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the President’s execution of
the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by
law, since the President must “take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the
law.” X x x

In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President’s prerogative to do whatever is legal and
necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the constitutional
provision on the faithful execution clause was followed by that on the President’s
commander-in-chief powers, which are specifically granted during extraordinary events of
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing,
even in times when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such
times, the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.

It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution clause
of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the
military’s defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that hold a
common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an offending
state.

This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential initiatives in respect of foreign

affairs is not novel to the Court. The President’s act of treating EDCA as an executive
agreement is not the principal power being analyzed x x x. Rather, the preliminary analysis is
in reference to the expansive power of foreign affairs. We have long treated this power as
something the Courts must not unduly restrict. x x x

Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with the same perspective and
understanding, knowing full well the constitutional and legal repercussions of any judicial
overreach. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,
G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

Qualifications of President and Vice-President (Secs 3-4):

PRESIDENT VICE-
PRESIDE
NT
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years old on the day of
election
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least
10 years immediately preceding the
election
6. Term of 6 years
7. Unless otherwise provided by law,
term of office commences at noon of
June 30 next
following the election
Single term only; Term limitation; 2
not eligible for any successive terms
reelection (but can
run if no longer
incumbent president,

like President
Estrada in May
2020)
Any person who has
succeeded as
President, and
served as much for
more than 4 years
shall NOT be
qualified for election
to the same office at
any
time
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service

Term of Office
The President and Vice President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of 6 years (PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 4).

The president shall not be eligible for any re- election. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served for more than 4 years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time. (PHIL. CONST., art VII, § 4, ¶ 1).

No Vice-President shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms. (PHIL. CONST., art.
VII, § 4, ¶ 2).

Election
Regular: 2nd Monday of May, every 6 years

Special (Requisites)
 Death, Permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of both
President and Vice-President
  Vacancies occur more than 18 months before the next regular presidential
election; and
 A law passed by Congress calling for a special election to elect a President
and Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days
from the time of such call (PHIL. CONST., art VII, § 10)

Congress as Canvassing Board

The proclamation of presidential and vice presidential winners is a function of Congress
and not of the COMELEC (Macalintal v COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, June 10, 2003)

SC as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) The SC, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Macalintal v.
PET, G.R. No. 191618, Nov. 23, 2010)

Oath of Office
Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, Vice President or the
Acting President shall take the oath or affirmation (PHIL. CONST., art. VII, § 5)

DISQUALIFICATIONS

SUBJECT SOURCE OF DISQUALIFICATION

President PROHIBITED FROM:

Vice President Holding any office or employment during

Cabinet Members their tenure

Deputies or Assistants of Cabinet Exceptions:

members  Otherwise provided in the Constitution
(e.g., Vice President appointed as a
member of the Cabinet, Secretary of
Justice sits as an ex- officio member
on Judicial and Bar Council)

 The positions are ex- officio and they

do not receive any salary or other
emoluments therefor (e.g. Sec. of
Finance is head of Monetary Board)

 Practicing, directly or indirectly, any

other profession during their tenure

 Participating in any business

 Being financially interested in any

contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the
government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries
 (PHIL. CONST., art VII, § 13)
Spouses and 4th degree relatives of the Cannot be appointed during
President (consanguinity or affinity) President's tenure as:

a) Members of the
Constitutional Commissions
b) Office of the Ombudsman
c) Department Secretaries
d) Department Under- secretaries
e) Chairman or heads of bureaus or
offices including GOCCs and their
subsidiaries

If the spouse, etc., was already in any of the

above offices before his/her spouse became
President, he/she may continue in office.
What is prohibited is appointment and
reappointment, not continuation in
office.

Spouses etc., can be appointed to

the judiciary and as ambassadors and consuls

INHIBITIONS

 No increase in salaries until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent
during which such increase was approved (PHIL. CONST., art. VII, §6).

 Shall not, during tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries (PHIL. CONST., art. VII, § 13).

 Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other
source (PHIL. CONST., art. II, § 6)

 Shall avoid conflict of interest in conduct of office (PHIL. CONST., art. VII, §
13).

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president evolved

through case law.

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution (Rubrico, et al. v. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, Feb. 18, 2010).

Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. Once out of office, even
before the end of the six-year term, immunity for non-official acts is lost (Estrada v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001).

Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, the President's immunity from suit
cannot be invoked because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely
those of a Department Secretary (Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, Aug. 15, 2000).

It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his
or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege
of immunity cannot be invoked by a non--sitting president even for acts committed
during his or her tenure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545; Estrada v. Disierto,
356 SCRA 108).

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office. There is
nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the President
extends to the end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure
(representing the period during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term
(the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only during the
incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper to implead President Arroyo
as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law.

EXCEPTION:

Former President cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
himself/herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of a
person (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).

Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility
and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in amparo proceedings. The

president, as commander-‐-in-‐-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable
for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To hold someone liable under the
doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and
the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason
to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof (Ibid). Commanders may therefore be
impleaded – not actually on the basis of command responsibility – but rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability (Balao v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).

LEILA M. DE LIMA v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE G.R. No. 227635,

October 15, 2019- the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and
constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of
the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions
prevents us from making any distinctions.

PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE

Executive Privilege is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information
from the court, the Congress, and the public. (Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25
2008).

For the presidential communications privilege to apply, the following must concur:

a. Communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the

President. (e.g. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence)

b. Communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the

"operational proximity" test, Secretary Neri of NEDA can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet.

c. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the

limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

Scope of Executive Privilege

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President
and the public officers covered by this executive order; including:

a) Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered
by this executive order (Chavez v Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9,
2002)
b) Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged;
c) Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, Dec. 9, 1998);
d) Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, Dec. 9,
1998);
e) Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
G.R. No. 133250, Jul. 9, 2002).
f) performed in pursuit of legislation" (Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008).

Person Covered by the Privilege

The person covered by the executive privilege is a person in possession of information

 which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged

Operational Proximity

Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter
how remote and removed from the President, can qualify for the privilege. The privilege
should apply only to communications authored or solicited and received by those
members of an immediate White House advisor's staff who have broad and significant
responsibility for investigation and formulating of the advice to be given the President
on the particular matter to which the communications relate (Neri v. Senate Committee,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing In re: Sealed, No. 96-3124, 121 F.3d 729,326
U.S. App. D.C. 276, 1997).

Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and such presumption can be

overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
conversations. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process ONLY to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation" (Neri v.
Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008).

When To Apply Executive Privilege:

i. Must fall within one of the above.
ii. Must be stated with sufficient particularity so the Congress or Court can
determine the legitimacy of the claim of privilege.

Exception to Executive Privilege:

o The President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,

specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. (U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 1974).
o Executive privilege cannot be used to conceal a crime or a possible wrongdoing.
Thus, the specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial outweighs the
President's generalized interest in confidentiality (Neri v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006).

While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there
should be "ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty is approved" - the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the
JPEPA is published. Diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the
deliberative process and residential communications' privilege. Clearly, the
privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the
privileged character of the deliberative process (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July
16, 2008).

When To Apply Executive Privilege:

(a) Must fall within one of the above.
(b) Must be stated with sufficient particularity so the Congress or Court can determine the
legitimacy of the claim of privilege.

Exception to Executive Privilege:

• The President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. (U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 1974).
• Executive privilege cannot be used to conceal a crime or a possible wrongdoing. Thus,
the specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial outweighs the President's
generalized interest in confidentiality (Neri v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).

Difference between Presidential Communications Privilege and Deliberative Process

Privilege

Presidential Communications Privilege Deliberative Process Privilege

Pertains to communications, Includes advisory opinions,
documents or other materials that recommendations and deliberations
reflect presidential decision- making and comprising part of a process by
deliberations which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated
Includes advisory opinions, Applies to decision- making of executive
recommendations and deliberations officials (and judiciary
comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated
Applies to decision- making of executive Based on common law privilege
officials (and judiciary
Requisites: Requisites:
(a) It must involve a quintessential and non- (a) Predecisional - it precedes, in
delegable power of the President temporal sequence, the decision to which it
(b) Operational Proximity relates
(c) Important and compelling need to be (b) Deliberative
confidential, not merely based on general interest - reflects the give and take of
the consultative process
such that disclosure would discourage
candid discussion within the agency (In
Re: Production of Court Records
and Documents, Feb. 14,
2012

Ruling on President Duterte's Disclosure of his Health and Medical Records (Dino S. De
Leon Vs. Rodrigo Roa Duterte, President of the Republic of the Philippines, and the
Office of the President through Salvador C. Medialdea, G.R. No. 252118. May 8, 2020)

- It bears stressing that for a petition for mandamus to sufficiently allege a cause of action,
petitioner must satisfy the following elements:

1. the legal right of the plaintiff;

2. the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
3. an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. The cause of
action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly,
to comply with the duty.

After a punctilious evaluation of the petition, the Court finds that the averments and
arguments in the petition failed to establish a prima facie case for mandamus, i.e., that the
reliefs sought constitute ministerial duties on the part of respondents, and that there is a clear
legal right on petitioner part to demand the performance of these ministerial duties.

Furthermore, petitioner alleges the serious illnesses purportedly suffered by the President,
together with the personality disorders which complicate the management of the President’s
illnesses. xxx However, the claims are merely based on what he perceived from the online
news articles discussing the President’s illnesses. Worse, these news articles are, as the Court
has consistently ruled, characterized as "'hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted.”

Based on the allegations in the petition itself, petitioner failed to establish the existence of a
clear legal right that was violated, or that he is entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for.

APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs.

Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution
by increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.

Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC; GR No.

191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary; GR
No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420,
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition
under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the
outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. “Although Valenzuela
came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed
that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about
the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.“ Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22, 2015-The prohibition under Article
VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those made by local
executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is effective until
disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during
a recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a new
appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law
allows the President to make such acting appointment. The President may even appoint in
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems
that person competent.
Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case
of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time there is
vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006- Under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to
the heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers
to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of
officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional.

PROHIBITIONS AGAINST EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS FROM HOLDING

ADDITIONAL POSITIONS

CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR ASSISTANT

SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation
therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of

Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional
prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13

plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments
or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to
the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.

Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply
in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to
justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as
Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding
of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” To claim
the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly
allowed by the Constitution.

Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as board member of GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the
CSC, and for violating the rule against holding of multiple government positions as well as
the concept ex-officio positions.

The scope of the prohibition provided in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The persons cited in the constitutional provision are the "Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants." These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as
referring to the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or
Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected
thereby. (Underscoring supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions. (PUBLIC INTEREST
CENTER INC., et al. v. MAGDANGAL ELMA, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006)

DISCIPLINARY POWERS

4. The power of the President to discipline officers flows from the power to
appoint the, and NOT from the power control.

5. BUT While the President may remove from office those who are not entitled
to security of tenure, or those officers with no set terms, such as Department
Heads, the officers, and employees entitled to security of tenure cannot be
summarily removed from office.

Sulit vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, September 4, 2012- Under the doctrine of implication,
the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all
officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when
the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested
in an office or authority other than the appointing power.

CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora,

July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or
offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws,
has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010- The creation
of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency -
is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be
no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds.

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo,
GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 – The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization
of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an
adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution.

The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual
powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President
must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies,
to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that “all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 – The President’s power (EO 292)
to reorganize offices outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies and vice-versa. The DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch.
Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office
of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to
the Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the
“functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports development” to the PSC,
making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential power of control over
the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing
and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s
power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that the President “shall have
control of all executive x x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does
not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. xxx The
President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive
branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to
revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE)

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency- Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of
the Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon
Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21,
2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])

Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers
vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an
agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this
clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and
the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised
by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no
means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President
to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the
decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to
any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any
extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes-The doctrine of qualified political agency may not be
validly invoked if it is the Constitution itself that provides that the act should be performed by
the President no less, especially since what are involved are natural resources.
The doctrine of qualified political agency would not be applicable to acts of cabinet
secretaries done in their capacity as ex officio board of directors of a government-owned or
controlled corporation which they become members not by appointment of the President but
by authority of law (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014 ed., p. 412; see also Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang Demigillo, G.R.
185571, March 5, 2013).

Alter-ego of the President cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed
against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President (Gloria v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. 119903, August 15, 2000).

POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LGUs

6. This is the power of a superior officer to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed by subordinates.
7. The power of the president over local government units is only of general
supervision. Thus, he can only interfere with the actions of their executive
heads if these are contrary to law.
8. The execution of laws is an OBLIGATION of the President. He cannot
suspend the operation of laws.
9. The power of supervision does not include the power of control; but the power
of control necessarily includes the power of supervision.

Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any
of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it
violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations (Judge Dadole v Commission on
Audit, GR. 125350, December 3, 2002).

Section 187 (of the Local Government Code) authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure.

Section 4, Administrative Order 327 which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment
of the Local Government Units, is unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local
governments is only one of general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of
local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue.
This is mandated by no less than the Constitution (Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988,
July 19, 2000).

Joson vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998- The power of the President over
administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of
general supervision over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that
laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of
the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the
alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. This is corollary to the
president’s power of control.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP

Courts Martial. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities
"for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions
of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation (Ruffy v. Chief of
Staff, 75 Phil 875; see also Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282).

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that the Constitution vests the title
as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying
the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff
refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking
such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are
simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President
as Commander-inChief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives (Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144).

Lacson vs. Perez, May 10, 2001- The declaration by the President of ‘state of rebellion”
during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the
separation of powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3, 2004- The President’s
authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her
calling out power.
Calling out Power

President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather

information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on- the- spot decisions
may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human
lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military
to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider
the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over
the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out
power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for
disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised (Integrated Bar of The
Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81).

Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The President does not need any
congressional authority to exercise his calling out power. While it is true that the Supreme
Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of these powers it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment.

Is the President’s power to call out the armed forces as their Commander-in-Chief in order to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion subject to judicial review, or is it a
political question? When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute
its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this
Court's duty of “purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain. (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc
[Kapunan])

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. Similarly, the President'ʹs power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-‐- in-‐-Chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and
as Commander-‐-in-‐-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence (The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402).

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora – The President has full discretion to call the
military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision dealing with the revocation
or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.

David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP 1017 constitutes the call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2)
to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as
well as decrees promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the absence of
legislation, the President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

Colmenares, et al. vs. Department vs. National Defense Secretary, et al., GR No. 212426-
212244- January 12, 2016- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the
armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater
are the limitations.

Emergency Power- Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation
must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
Congress may prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.

David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of the
Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant
it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the
President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency
even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is different matter. This requires a
delegation from Congress.
With respect to “laws,” the President cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. The President can only order the military to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence (David v. Ermita, supra).

Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 – Only the President can exercise the
powers of the Commander in Chief, which must be exercised by him in person. Executive
power is only granted to the President. It is only the President, who is authorized to exercise
emergency power as provided under Section 23 of Article VII, as well as calling out power
under Section 7 of Article VII of the Philippine constitution.

The calling out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President of
the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that a provincial governor is not endowed with
the power to call upon the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the President is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the
calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the President
exercises full supervision and control over the police, a local chief executive, such as a
provincial governor, only exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise
control only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, only the President has “full discretion to call the military when in his judgment
it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion,” the Court stressed.

Provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra
vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.

Declare martial Law/Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus- Lagman vs.
Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658- The Court may strike down the presidential
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, it which does not
look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition
"in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism
is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the
power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of
Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he
power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts
within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is xx x not
subject to judicial review.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the
same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say,
the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of
revocation of Congress.

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and
public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise
of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by
Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent
danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law. They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with
possibilities of abuse;" besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for
handling imminent danger."
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the
emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their
exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court.

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises
police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of
government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State.

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's

(Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006,
stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief
may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance
of Presidential Decrees x x x".
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give
him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is
because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it
supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees
under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those
judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.

This so called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose. It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial
review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions.

The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of
the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as
provided in Lansang.

The parameters for determining the sufficiency the/actual basis/or the declaration of martial
law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ habeas corpus: 1. Actual invasion or
rebellion; 2. public safety requires it; the two requirements must concur; and 3. there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not
piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts
stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to
verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will
practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the
reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able
to dictate.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed.

Facial review of the proclamation of martial law on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted
because the proclamation does not regulate speech and judicial review does not cover
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest
orders ab dither orders issued after proclamation for being irrelevant to its review.

Nullification of the proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a proclamation in
the exercise of the calling out powers because the President can exercise one power
independently of the other.

Lagman vs. Pimentel, GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155 February 6, 2018- The
Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress on the manner re
President’s request for extension in the absence of any constitutional violation.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of
the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

The Congress has the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that
the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.

PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The pardoning power of the
President is final and unappealable.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective,and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that
the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-‐-Vidal against former President
Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-‐-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public
elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes
a statement expressing "ʺhe is hereby restored to his civil and political rights."ʺ
Risos-‐-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor
of Manila in he May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former
President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the
remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration
of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office.
She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her
theory. (ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)

Trillanes v. Medialdea; People v. Trillanes; and People v. Trillanes, G.R. Nos. 241494,
256660, and 256078, April 3, 2024

A President cannot revoke a grant of amnesty without concurrence from Congress. The
Court also grounded its ruling on the primacy of the Bill of Rights and reaffirmed that neither
the Government nor any of its officials, including the President, are above the law.

The Court ruled that the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty long after it became final and
without prior notice violated his constitutional right to due process. Further, Proclamation No.
572, in seeking the revival of the criminal cases against Trillanes after they had been
dismissed with finality, violated his constitutional rights against ex post facto laws and
double jeopardy.
Finally, the Court found that there is convincing evidence that Trillanes did file his amnesty
application. The Executive’s decision to revoke only Trillanes’ amnesty, notwithstanding the
fact that the application forms of all the other amnesty grantees could similarly no longer be
located, constituted a breach of his right to the equal protection of the laws.

The Decision affirms that in balancing the exercise of presidential prerogatives and the
protection of the citizens’ rights, the Constitution and the laws remain as the Court’s
anchor and rudder.

AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.- The text of Proclamation
No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it extends
to all persons who committed the particular acts described in the provision, and not just rebels
or insurgents.

LIMITATIONS:

1. Pardon cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19, VII);

2. Pardon cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable

recommendations of the COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. IX [C]);

3. Pardon can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty)
(see People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581; People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512, March
7, 1997);

4. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt (Nachura,

Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 Ed., p. 305);

5. It cannot absolve convict of civil liability (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in

Political Law, 2009Ed., p. 305; see also People v. Nacional, G.R. 11294,
September 7, 1995);

6. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political

Law, 2009 Ed., p. 305; Monsanto v. Factoran, supra).

DIPLOMATIC POWER:

TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is inconsequential
whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE
Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power
is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was
echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State,
is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the
President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the
external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.”

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the
lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied) The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary where the Court ruled:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and
exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may
be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be
used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the
conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but
for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all
treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows
from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not
interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a
whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.

Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our Constitution, the power to
ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners
as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit
the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

MIAA v. COA, G.R. No. 218388 | October 15, 2019

The Loan Agreement expressly referenced the Exchange of Notes between the Philippines
and Japan. In the Exchange of Notes between the two governments executed in 1993, Japan
agreed to extend loans to the Philippines to promote economic development and stability.
Thus, the loan agreement which stemmed out of the Exchange of Notes should be treated as
an executive agreement.

• This means that international law should apply in the interpreting the Loan Agreement.
Further, following the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Philippine government is bound to
comply with the terms of the loan agreement.

• It follows that the Agreement for Consulting Services, which was an accessory to the Loan
Agreement, is to be also treated as an executive agreement, subject to the principle of pacta
sunt servanda.

SAGUISAG v. OCHOA G.R. No. 212426 En Banc Decision: January 12, 2016 | Chief
Justice Sereno; Motion for Reconsideration: July 26, 2016 |Chief Justice Sereno
The Court held that the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities. The EDCA is not a treaty, but an executive agreement. The
EDCA is also an offshoot of the Visiting Forces Agreement, a treaty already concurred in by
the Senate. Executive agreements inconsistent with the law or with existing treaties are
ineffective. In this case, the EDCA remains consistent with the provisions of existing treaties,
specifically the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the VFA.

LAND BANK v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, G.R. No. 193796 | July 02, 2014

Subsidiary loan agreements which are attached to a principal loan agreement that partakes the
nature of an executive agreement are also governed by international law.

IPAP v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204605 | July 19, 2016

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without the Senate’s concurrence. The
right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. The accession of the Philippines
to the Madrid Protocol is authorized by an act of Congress and can be seen in the declaration
of state policy found in the IP Code.

WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT/S

Pangilinan vs, Cayetano, et al., G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954, March 16, 2021

DOCTRINE:
As the chief architect of Philippine foreign policy, the President enjoys a degree of leeway to
withdraw from treaties which are contrary to the Constitution or our laws. However, this
power to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative participation in the agreement. The
President cannot unilaterally withdraw in the following cases:

• the treaties entered into pursuant to the legislative intent as seen in prior laws, or
subsequently affirmed by succeeding laws.

• the Senate concurrence for accession was expressly premised on the same concurrence for
withdrawal

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of showing that this
case is justiciable?

2. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale
delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual?

3. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the Philippines in
breach of its obligations under international law?

4. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will diminish the Filipino
people's protection under international law; and even if it does, whether or not this is a
justiciable question?

RULINGS:
I
No. Petitioners insist that the protection of human rights will be weakened, yet their
contentions are mere surmises. Ample protection for human rights within the domestic sphere
remain formally in place. It is a canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, these cases do not deal with the results of the ongoing
preliminary examination by Prosecutor Bensouda. Article 127 of the Rome Statute covers
that.54 Neither at issue here is whether a future president may decide to re-enter the Rome
Statute and secure the requisite Senate concurrence. It is possible that whatever the results in
these cases are, a future administration under a new president can make that decision. The
Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or controversy that impels this
Court's review. In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an "existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." On
March 19, 2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon Kwon, the
president of the Assembly of States Parties, announced the Philippines' departure from the
Rome Statute effective March 17, 2019. Any discussion on the Philippines' withdrawal is, at
this juncture, merely a matter of theory.

II

Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may
withdraw from it:
a. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date
of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

b. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising
from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which
may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Cour in
connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing
State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of
any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective.

The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism
provided in the treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's
withdrawal. A state party and its agents cannot be faulted for merely acting within what the
Rome Statute expressly allows.

Treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the president.
Nevertheless, a treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordance with
the Constitution's system of checks and balances. While Senate concurrence is expressly
required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism concerning
withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any
statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the unilateral
power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present
consolidated Petitions revolve. Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of
relevant foreign concepts, and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal
system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases
concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements:

First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she
determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes. Thus, a valid treaty or international
agreement may be effective just as a statute is effective. It has the force and effect of law.
Still, statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case of conflict between a
law and a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail.

Second, the president cannot withdraw unilaterally from agreements which were entered into
pursuant to congressional imprimatur.

Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the
Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its
concurrence.

At no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to
withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored
on a determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination
must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious
withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending
Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's
specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the
president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal.

III

No. The Philippines aspired to the establishment of an international criminal court that
would dispense justice efficiently and effectively; an institution that was ineffective in
addressing the problem of impunity of the perpetrators of the most heinous violations of the
laws of humanity would not serve justice or help to maintain international peace and security.
The position of the Philippines, consistent with its constitutional and legal traditions, was
based on those considerations and on its desire to uphold the current evolution of
international law.

IV
No. This fear of imagined diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. The Constitution,
which embodies our fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by the withdrawal. A litany
of statutes that protect our rights remain in place and enforceable .Republic Act No. 9851, or
the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity, echoes the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. It was
signed into law on December 11, 2009, two years before the Senate concurred with the Rome
Statute. Republic Act No. 9851 covers rights similarly protected under the Rome Statute.
Consequently, no new obligations arose from our membership in the International Criminal
Court. Given the variances between the Rome Statute and Republic Act No. 9851, it may
even be said that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No. 9851.

It has been opined that the principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally accepted
principles of international law. Assuming that this is true and considering the incorporation
clause, the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute would be a superfluity thus,
ultimately ineffectual. The Philippines would remain bound by obligations expressed in the
Rome Statute. Treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States
which are not parties to treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such
agreements, if widely accepted for years by many States, may transform into customary
international laws, in which case, they bind even non-signatory States. Thus, petitioners'
concern that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectly and reversibly subverts
our basic human rights appears to be baseless and purely speculative. All told, the
consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing to demonstrate justiciability.

The unfolding of events, including the International Criminal Court's acknowledgment of

withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from initial notice, rendered the Petitions moot,
removing any potential relief from this Court's sphere. Mechanisms that safeguard human
rights and protect against the grave offenses sought to be addressed by the Rome Statute
remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, the International Criminal Court retains
jurisdiction, over any and all acts committed by government actors until March 17, 2019.
Hence, withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals
charged before the International Criminal Court for acts committed up to this date.

As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of foreign policy,
the President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are bonafide deemed
contrary to the Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with the national policy
adopted pursuant to the Constitution and our laws. However, the President's discretion to
withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative involvement on the manner by which a
treaty was entered into or came into effect. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from
treaties that were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or
subsequently affirmed by succeeding laws.

The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form executive agreement that
becomes binding through executive action. Om the other hand, executive agreements
concluded by the President sometimes take form of more formal documents
denominated “agreements” or “protocols”. Under international law, there is no
difference between treatises and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries
have remained within their power (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244).

An executive agreement, according to the Supreme Court, is a treaty within the

meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law
(Nicolas v. Romulo,578 SCRA 438). Unlike a treaty though, an executive
agreement does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less formal and deals
with a narrower range of subjects (China Machinery and Equipment Corporation v.
Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA 189). All that would be required for its efficacy would be
the agreement must be between states; it must be written; and it must be governed
by international law (Ibid).

An executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the
product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate (Ibid).

RELATED POWERS

1) Power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.

2) Power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers accredited to the Philippines

3) Power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic

4) Power to deport aliens

a. This power is vested in the President by virtue of his office, subject only to
restrictions as may be provided by legislation as regards the grounds for
deportation.

b. In the absence of any legislative restriction to authority, the President may

still exercise this power.

c. The power to deport aliens is limited by the requirements of due process,

which entitles the alien to a full and fair hearing. BUT: The alien is not
entitled to bail as a matter of right.

POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME- The power to
classify lands as alienable belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been classified as
alienable, may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation by the President
or by another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf of the government
(Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797-
The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on her sole will.
Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.

ARTICLE VIII
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

JUDICIAL POWER-There are two distinct situations where the exercise of both modes of
judicial power may be sought. Each situation carries requirements distinct to the nature of each
situation, which should be recognized in the specific remedy to be used under each situation.

The first is the constitutional situation where the constitutionality of acts is questioned. In the
constitutional situation, the exercise of either the expanded or traditional mode of judicial power
involves the exercise of the power of judicial review, or the power of the courts to test the validity
of executive and legislative acts, including those of constitutional bodies and administrative
agencies, for their conformity with the Constitution and through which the judiciary enforces and
upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.148 The second is the non-constitutional situation
where no constitutional questions or violations are raised, but which may include challenges
against acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion. (Macalintal vs. COMELEC & Office of the
President, G.R. No. 263590. June 27, 2023)

Scope:

1. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving

rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.

2. To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

JUDICIAL REVIEW:

Definition: Judicial review is the power of courts to test the validity of executive and
legislative acts if the same are in accordance with the 1987 Philippine Constitution. It is an
expression of supremacy of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2009 Ed., p16). It is vested in one Supreme Court and in such courts as may be
established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII).

Function of Judicial Review: (a) checking; (b) legitimating; (c) symbolic (Salonga v.
Pano, 134 SCRA 438)

REQUISITES:

ACTUAL CASE

An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 583 SCRA 119).
EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to
adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet
evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27,
2004.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first,
there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA
577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial
review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its EXPANDED
JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.

Political Questions:

1. A "political question‟ is one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution
exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereigncapacity, or in which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the Government.

2. Thus, while courts can determine questions of legality with respect to governmental action,
they cannot review government policy and the wisdom thereof, for these questions have been
vested by the Constitution in the Executive and Legislative Department

KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have standing to
file the suit simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue
of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the
citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter
of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial
competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,
respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.

PROPER PARTY- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran
(petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party);
Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper party).

A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to
the assertion of JKG-‐Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure of
public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates, the
bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate, that the government shall bear the
burden of paying for the project. Every portion of the national treasury, when
appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an
allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a
project that has undergone an improper procurement process cannot be easily
brushed off by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille, vs. Hon. Joseph Emilio A.
Abaya, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
et.al., G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of
judicial review and the great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation of
powers among the three great branches of the government.

The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24, 2009- Although the courts are
without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to
execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court
may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with
grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary
to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle
of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of
government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016- Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy.

The High Court also said the petitioners failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer
direct and personal injury as a result of Marcos' burial at the heroes' cemetery. They likewise
violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts; the
SC said the petitioners should have sought reconsideration of the order for Marcos' burial
with the defense department, or to file the petitions first with the proper regional trial court.

In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the “DIRECT INJURY” test. In People vs.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result.

Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.

AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have standing, he
must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter – must show that the action concerns his right of suffrage
2. taxpayer – he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the third party
cannot assert his constitutional right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim.

As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned with
whether the petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA
BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.

Rules on Locus Standi

-General Rule:

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when:

(a) He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(b) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and,
(c) A favorable action will likely redress the injury (Francisco v. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173).

EXCEPTION:

Transcendental importance

(a) For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it

must establish:

(b) The character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case,

(c) The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and

(d) The lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised (Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1)

(e) A related but distinct concept which case law has considered as an exception to the actual
or threatened injury requirement is third-party standing. Generally, a person may assert only
his/her rights or interest in the litigation, and not challenge the constitutionality of a statute or
governmental act based on its alleged infringement of the protected right of other or others.
However, under the third-party standing, a person is permitted to bring actions on behalf of
another or third parties not before the court. To be permitted, a party asserting third-party
standing must satisfy the following requisites: (i) the litigant must have suffered an "injury-
in-fact," thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; (ii) the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and (iii) there must exist
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.(Macalintal vs.
COMELEC, et al.)

Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the petitioners have failed to
show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the “principle of transcendental
importance”; of overreaching significance to society or of paramount public interest.
DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7,
2010.

Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, GR 180771 April 21

2015- The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A
citizen’s suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement
of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a
representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions
on behalf of the real party in interest.

Arigo vs. Swift- The public right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016- Taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. As concerned citizens- the issues are of
transcendental significance or of paramount public interest. In cases involving such issues,
the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence.

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF TIME

the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial and if not raised in the

EXCEPTIONS

1) In criminal cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any time in the discretion of
the court;
2) In civil cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the
determination of the case itself; and
3) In every case, except where there is estoppel, the constitutional question may be raised at
any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court (People v. Vera, 53 SCRA 678).

LIS MOTA:

The decision must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. As a rule, the courts
will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other
grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before
it was finally enacted and approved (Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760).

Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or Executive Act-

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the
Civil Code, which provides. “Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non--observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice
to the contrary” (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May
30, 2011). The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule.

The nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects.
However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the
operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the
impact on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the
nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic
services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these
projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the
Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact
doctrine. For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot sustain the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
February 3, 2015).

The doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior
to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
that always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. xxx It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances
exist and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that
will permit its application. Xxx Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play.
The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or
could no longer be undone.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration
(Ibid). The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality
in reliance upon a law creating it (Ibid). The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be
applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and would send
a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional
provision of law (Ibid).

The Doctrine of Operative Fact Extends as well to a Void or Unconstitutional Executive Act:
The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation (G.R. No. 187485,
October 8, 2013), the Supreme Court likewise declared that “for the operative fact doctrine
to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law or executive
issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not apply to a
mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its
related issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely
administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by
issuing various memoranda and circulars. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc
[Bersamin])

FISCAL AUTONOMY

Bengzon vs. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150)

the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based.

the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that (its) needs require". The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. the Chief Justice and the Court En
Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and
benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine
the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches
upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En
Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.

AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court en banc
determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they
may extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters
of the court’s granted power.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBC’s principal function is to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at
least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any
vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally
named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership of
the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the
list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named ex-officio Chair does not
sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the JBC is preferable and
pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It
ruled that the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the position
of Chief Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the
said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally
named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948,
which reads: “In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of
his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice
who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.”

Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held that the use of the singular
letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The word
“Congress” is used in its generic sense. Considering the language of the subject constitutional
provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as the
records of the Constitutional Commission.

The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create a JBC as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a
holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches
of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of
the Judiciary. “To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a vote each, would,
as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, ‘negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution,’” declared
the Court.

The Court also held that the JBC’s seven-member composition “serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.” It further held that under
the doctrine of operative facts where actions prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBC’s prior official acts are valid.

The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as sole
representative of Congress in the JBC and that such is best left to the determination of
Congress.

Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017- President Aquino
validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the
16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino
merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the
37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at
least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum
requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should
at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted
for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid
and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In cases where an objection to an
applicant’s qualification is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The “unanimity rule” of the
JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his right to due process.

While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The functions of
searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC'ʹs
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants'ʹ qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in
the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the
applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties. (FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
MCTC, COMPOSTELA-‐-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE,
v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015)

REPUBLIC V. SERENO, G.R. No. 237428, JUNE 19, 2018- The Court has supervisory
authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means
“overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform
their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is
more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the
Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC
in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived
or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”
Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving
the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure
that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

RECENT ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT TO SC: Aside

from the qualifications for appointments to the SC provided in art VIII, sec 7(1), there is a
new rule issued by the JBC which is the JBC No. 2020-01 or THE 2020 REVISED RULES
OF THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL which provides additional requirements for the
applicants to the judiciary which took effect June 8, 2020.

1. have at least two and one-half (2.5) years remaining to serve as an Associate Justice or
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court if they have served as

1. Associate Justice or Presiding Justice of an appellate court

2. Court Administrator;
3. Chairperson of a Constitutional Commission;
4. Solicitor General; or
5. Department Secretary; or

2. have at least five (5) years remaining to serve as an Associate Justice or Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, if they had not served any of the positions in the immediately
preceding paragraph or if they are private practitioners.”

The Rule Making Power- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the
admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. NOTE:
Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.

GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010- Unlike the 1935 and 1973
constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the
Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the 1987 constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court has now the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, viewed from this
perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017- Section 23 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional for two reason. First, it violates the equal protection clause since other
criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not,
considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole
prerogative of the Supreme Court.
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. HON.
ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, G.R. No. 165922 : February 26, 2010- The rule
making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The
Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

Pimentel v. LEB- Republic Act No. 7662 is constitutional as it does not encroach on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and legal assistance to underprivileged, thus, it does not violate the doctrine of separation
of powers. x x x

WRIT OF AMPARO – The right to enforce and protect a person’s rights guaranteed and
recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing
their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be extended to the
officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions
shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court,
justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place
or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court,
justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of
the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make
 the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection
and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce
and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the
movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of
the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or
judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for
admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the
witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety

Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition for a writ of amparo is
improper remedy to regain parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was legally
put up for adoption.

Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start off with the basics,
the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security – the personal concern that
the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed
criminal case.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires that the petition must
sufficiently allege the manner in which the right to privacy is violated or threatened with
violation and how such violation, or threats affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.

Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission was not unlawful act as that violates or
threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the petitioner to
the writ of habeas data.

Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the plenary
legislative power. The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires full
payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires
only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 – While the fundamental law requires mandatory
review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The
Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court
of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress. The rule
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court,
before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a procedural
matter.
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

1) Reached in consultation before being assigned to a member for the writing of

the opinion.

2) A certification to this effect must be signed by the Chief Justice and attached to
the record of the case and served upon the parties.

3) Members of the SC who took no part, or who dissented or abstained must state
the reasons therefore. Note: This procedure shall also be observed by all lower
collegiate courts (CA, CTA, and the Sandiganbayan)

MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate Section 14.
Resolutions are not decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review decision of the CA is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain
the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA
decision.

German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate under
Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases “submitted for
decision”, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the
legal basis thereof.

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional mandate that “no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases”, does not preclude the validity of “memorandum
decisions”, which adopt by reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme Court
stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in
lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court explained that
the grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA, there is no need to
fully explain the Court’s denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the
findings and conclusions of the CA. “There is no point in reproducing or restating in the
resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed”.The constitutional
requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws applies to
decisions, where the petition is given due course, but not where the petition is denied
due course, with the resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal.

Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude the validity
of “Memorandum Decision” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid cumbersome
reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.
 ARTICLE IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Appointments to civil service shall be:

A. Competitive positions

According to merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examinations, as far as

practicable except to positions which arepolicy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical.

B. Non-competitive positions

1). No need for competitive examinations.

2). 3 kinds

a) Policy-determining
- formulate a method of action for the gov‟t
b) Primarily confidential
- more than ordinary confidence; close intimacy
insures freedom of intercourse without betrayals of personal trust…
c) Highly technical
–requires technical skill to a superior degree.

C. The TEST to determine whether non/competitive is the Nature of the responsibilities,

NOT the administrative or legislative description given to it.

D. Both types of positions are entitled to security of tenure. They only differ in the
MANNER in which they are filled

SECURITY OF TENURE

1) Officers or employees of the Civil Service cannot be removed or suspended EXCEPT for
cause provided by law. It guarantees both procedural and substantive due process.

2) For “LEGAL CAUSE” –

Cause is: a). related to and affects the administration of office, and b). must be substantial
(directly affects the rights & interests of the public)

3) Security of tenure for Non-competitive positions

a). Primarily confidential officers and employees hold office only for so long as
confidence in them remains.

b). If there is GENUINE loss of confidence, there is no removal, but the expiration of
the term of office

c). Non-career service officers and employees do not enjoy security of tenure.
 d). Political appointees in the foreign service possess tenure coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure.

4) One must be VALIDLY APPOINTED to enjoy security of tenure. Thus, one who is not
appointed by the proper appointing authority does not acquire security of tenure.

Abolition of Office

To be valid, abolition must be made:(a) In good faith; (good faith is presumed) (b) Not for
political or personal reasons; and (c) Not in violation of law

Temporary employees are covered by the following rules:

1). Not protected by security of tenure: can be removed anytime even without cause

2). If they are separated, this is considered an expiration of his term

3). BUT: They can only be removed by the one who appointed them.

4). Entitled only to such protection as may be provided by law.

Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the appointment to the positions in the
Career Executive Service may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.

Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued only to a
“person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to “depend on the nature of
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.

Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order,
or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the
CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

ELECTIONEERING

No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage in any electioneering or in partisan
political activity

1) Cannot solicit votes in favor of a particular candidate.

2) Cannot give campaign contributions or distribute campaign materials.
3) BUT: Allowed to express views on political issues, and to mention the names of the
candidates whom he supports.
4) Prohibition does not apply to department secretaries
DISQUALIFICATIONS

1) Losing candidates in any election

a). Cannot be appointed to any office in the government or GOCC‟s or their

subsidiaries

b). Period of disqualification: One (1) year after such election.

2) Elective officials

a). Not eligible for appointment or designation ANY CAPACITY to

ANYPUBLIC OFFICE or position during their tenure

.b). EXCEPTION: May hold ex officio positions.

c). To be eligible to hold any other office, the elected official must first resign his
office

d). Even Congress cannot, by law, authorize the appointment of an elective

official.

3). Appointive officials

a). Cannot hold any other office or employment in the government, any
subdivision, agency, instrumentality, including GOCC‟s and their
subsidiaries.

b). EXCEPTION: Unless otherwise allowed by law, or by the primary functions

of his position.

c). This exception DOES NOT APPLY to Cabinet members, and those officers
mentioned in Art. VII, Sec. 13. They are governed by the stricter prohibitions
contained therein

PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE COMPENSATION

1. Prohibitions: applies to elected or appointed officers and

employees Cannot receive:

a. Additional - an extra reward given for the same office i.e. bonus
b. Double - when an officer is given 2 sets of compensation for 2 differentoffices
held concurrently by 1 officer
c. Indirect Compensation

2) EXCEPTION:
Unless specifically authorized by law

A. “SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED” means a specific authority

particularly directed to the officer or employee concerned.
B. BUT: per diems and allowances given as REIMBURSEMENT for expenses actually
incurred are not prohibited

3) Cannot accept any present, emolument, office, title of any kind from foreign governments
UNLESS with the consent of Congress.

4) Pensions and gratuities are NOT considered as additional, double, or indirect

compensation

Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double compensation not applicable to
pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to which another compensation
is attached.

PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES

Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an employee is illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the
decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.

DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The Supreme Court follows as a precedent,
the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages
can be awarded in his favor.

David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or employee, who
has been found illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to back
wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to
his reinstatement, and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is already
of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back wages but also to full retirement
benefits.

CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a
civil service employee of administrative charges.

CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by petitioner CSC to
protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on
administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and
power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article
IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified
their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations
of the law or the rules of the service.

RIGHT TO ORGANIZE

The right to organize does NOT include the right to strike

SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the Labor Code
are silent as to whether government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking
by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as
implied in E.O. 180.

COMELEC

REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The

phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes
his term of office which could be seven, five or three years. There must be a confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on
reappointment can apply.

POWERS:
1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall

2) Exercise:

A. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective: 1. Regional ,2. Provincial, and 3. City officials

B. Appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving:1. Elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction 2. Elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.

C. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,and not appealable
.Exception: Appealable to the SC on questions of law.1.

CONTEMPT POWERS

1. COMELEC can exercise this power only in relation to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions. It CANNOT exercise this in connection with its purely executive or ministerial
functions.

2. If it is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC exercises quasi-

judicial/administrative powers. Its jurisdiction over "contests‟ (after proclamation), is in
exercise of its judicial functions..

3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.

4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
 a). This power is NOT limited to the election period.
b). Applies to both criminal and administrative cases

5) Registration of political parties, organizations, or coalitions/accreditation of

citizens‟ arms of the Commission on Elections.

a). The political parties etc. must present their platform or program of government.
b). There should be sufficient publication
c). Groups which cannot be registered: i. Religious denominations; ii. sectoral.
Groups which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means; iii.
Groups which refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution; iv. Groups which are
supported by any foreign government
d). BUT: Political parties with religious affiliation or which derive their principles
from religious beliefs are registerable.
e). Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs. If accepted, it is an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties
that may be prescribed by law

6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion of
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting elections frauds, offenses and
malpractices.

1. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases for

violations of election laws.

2. COMELEC can deputize prosecutors for this purpose. The actions of the
prosecutors are the actions of the COMELEC

3. Preliminary investigation conducted by COMELEC is valid.

7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize elections pending, including

limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize
all forms of election frauds, offenses ,malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or
the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard or, or disobedience
to its directive, order, or decision.

9) Submit to the President and the congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Section 3. RULES OF PROCEDURE/DECISION-MAKING

Rules of Procedure

1) COMELEC can sit en banc or in two divisions

 2) It has the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition
of election cases, including pre-election controversies.

Decision-Making

1) Election cases should be heard and decided in division. Provided that,

2) Motions for reconsideration of decisions should be decided by COMELEC en banc.

3) ”Decisions” mean resolutions on substantive issues.

4) If a division dismisses a case for failure of counsel to appear, the Motion for
Reconsideration here may be heard by the division.

5) EXCEPTION: COMELEC en banc may directly assume jurisdiction over a petition to

correct manifest errors in the tallying of results by Board of Canvassers.

ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC possesses the
power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
"Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code.7

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific
persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense
had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial
power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue
and support their respective positions.

The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution

hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the
hearings or proceedings.

In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential
incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections.
In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner
obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the
various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession
and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time
it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of
the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial
functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them
are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the results of the elections
in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates
posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of
whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When
petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of
its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
Grace Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their
grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from
those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are
based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility,"
on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa.

Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8 2016- The minimum functional

capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory.
xxx The law is clear that a “voter verified paper audit trail” requires the following: (a)
individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b)
that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must implement is RA 8346 which requires
the automated election system to have the capability of providing a VVPAT. The
COMELEC’s act of not enabling this feature runs contrary to why the law requires this
feature in the first place.

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date
of elections is essentially legislative in nature xxx
Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not have the requisite power to
call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.

LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The COMELEC correctly stated
that “the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers” is a
matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise
of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and
honest elections.

LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 – COMELEC has jurisdiction to
decide questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and
leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and “considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great
objectives for which it was created to promote free and orderly honest elections.

Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010- While the question of party
leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2
of Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Ateinza, et
al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership
and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited scope of its power
over political parties.

Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February 22, 2011)- In election cases
involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall
be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005- Despite the silence of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1,
Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration,
decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was
yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc does not have the
authority to hear and decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-
proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the provision of
the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the authority to hear
and decide these special cases.

Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-
C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b)
a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and
the “sufficient standard” tests.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in
each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of plebiscite and determination of
its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a
case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico- Corporations covered
by the COA’s auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or
entity handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-
governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
government are required to submit to post audit.

DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit government
agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA
will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still
bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly,
the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one
indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as
when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the
government borrows money from abroad.

BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer may not,
without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.

MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has no authority
to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating
to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which has the
jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.

PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COA’s power over the
settlement of accounts is different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is
within the ambit of judicial power.
Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper officer to withhold a
municipal treasurer’s salary and other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage
but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still
being litigated.

NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or
unnecessary expenditures.

DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]- There is nothing in
the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions
and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found
in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement
that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The appointment of members of any
of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven years; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot validly
shorten the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in
the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;

Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or

impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);

Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission;

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the unexpired period
of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further that the
vacancy in the position of Chair resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment; and that

Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity.
Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits officials
and employees of COA from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other
emoluments from any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA out of
its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.

ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

Replacing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was formed with the ratification of
its basic law, the Bangsamoro Organic Law following two-part legally-binding plebiscite in
Western Mindanao held on January 21 and February 6, 2019. The ratification was confirmed
a few days later on January 25 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Organizational structure

Based on the Organic Law, the autonomous Bangsamoro government system is

parliamentary-democratic similar to the one practised in the United Kingdom which is based
on a political party system.

Ceremonial

The ceremonial head of the region is a Wa'lī. The Bangsamoro Parliament selects and
appoints the Wa'lī. The Wa'lī has ceremonial functions and powers such as moral
guardianship of the territory and convocation and dissolution of its proposed legislature.

Executive

The regional government is headed by a Chief Minister. Murad Ebrahim is the current Chief
Minister who was appointed by the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on an interim basis.
The Interim Chief Minister also the head of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority which also
serves the function of the transitional Bangsamoro Parliament.

Once the first regular session of the Bangsamoro Parliament is organized in 2022, the Chief
Minister will be elected by the members of the Bangsamoro Parliament. The Chief Minister
of the Bangsamoro is the chief executive of the regional government, and is assisted by a
cabinet not exceeding 10 members. The holder of this position appoints the members of the
cabinet, subject to confirmation by the Bangsamoro Parliament. The chief minister has
control of all the regional executive commissions, agencies, boards, bureaus, and offices.

Cabinet

The Bangsamoro Cabinet is composed of two Deputy Chief Minister and Ministers from the
members of the Parliament. The Deputy Chief Ministers are selected through nomination of
the Chief Minister and are elected by the members of the Parliament. The Ministers in the
cabinet on their part are appointed by the Chief Ministers.
Council of Leaders

The Council of Leaders advises the Chief Minister on matters of governance of the
autonomous region. It is roughly an equivalent of an unelected Senate, though only advisory,
without legislative powers, and not part of the Parliament.

The council consist of the:

1) Chief minister
2) Members of the Congress from the Bangsamoro
3) Governors and mayors of chartered cities in the Bangsamoro
4) Representatives of traditional leaders, non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler
communities, the Ulama, youth, and Bangsamoro communities outside the region.
5) Other sector representatives subject to mechanism laid out by the

parliament Legislative

The Bangsamoro Parliament convening at the Shariff Kabunsuan Cultural Complex in

Cotabato City.

Under the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the Bangsamoro Parliament serves as the legislature of
the autonomous region, mandated to have 80 members and is led by the Speaker. The Wa'lī, a
ceremonial head, could dissolve the parliament.

Regional ordinances are created by the Bangsamoro Parliament, composed of Members of

Parliament. Members are meant to be elected by direct vote. Regional elections are planned
to be held one year after general elections (national and local) depending on legislation from
Congress. The first Bangsamoro regional elections are to be held in 2022. Regional officials
have a fixed term of three years, which can be extended by an act of Congress.

Under the Bangsamoro Organic Law ratified in 2019, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority
(BTA), was organized as a transition body pending the election of the new region's
government officials in 2022, with the first regular session of the parliament to be held in
2022.

Judiciary

See also: Shari'ah in the Philippines § Organization

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region has its own regional justice system which applies
Shari'ah to its residents like its predecessor the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Unlike its predecessor though, the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which became effective as of
August 10, 2018,[61] has a provision for the creation of a Shari'ah High Court, which, if and
when realized, would consist of five justices including a presiding justice and would oversee
appellate courts, district courts, and circuit courts. Non-Muslims could also volunteer to
submit themselves under the jurisdiction of Shari'ah law. The Bangsamoro justice system also
recognizes traditional or tribal laws but these would only apply to disputes of indigenous
peoples within the region.

Relation to the central government

Bangsamoro Organic Law provides that BARMM "shall remain an integral and inseparable
part of the national territory of the Republic." The President exercises general supervision
over the regional Chief Minister. The regional government has fiscal autonomy or the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges, subject to
Constitutional provisions and the provisions of No. 11054. The regional government has to
gain approval from the central government's Department of Finance to receive donations and
grants from foreign entities

G.R. No. 244587, Sula v. COMELEC, January 10, 2023

The Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of Cotabato City in the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao.

Local Autonomy-

Local Autonomy means that local governments have certain powers granted by the
Constitution which may not be curtailed by the National government, but that outside
of these, local governments may not enact ordinances contrary to statutes (Bernas,
1987 Philippine Constitution, Reviewer, 2011).

Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16, 2011- LGUs, though granted local
fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The
grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x."
Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the
purpose of enhancing self-government.

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was
explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable.

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country
to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
municipal governments are still agents of the national government.

Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014- At any rate, LGUs must be
reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not completely severe them from the
national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local
governments sovereign within the state. Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being
enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held
accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of
local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While the aforementioned provision
charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. xxx
The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation
and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented
locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014- The essence of this express reservation
of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. xxx The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the
local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of
the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts
to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.

SHARE OF LGUS IN THE NATIONAL WEALTH

1) LGUs are entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development
of the national wealth within their respective areas in the manner provided by law.
2) This includes share the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits. Under the
LGC) LGUs have a share of 40% of the gross collection derived by the national government
from the preceding fiscal year from
 a. Mining taxes
b. Royalties
c. Forestry and fishery charges
d. Other taxes, fees and charges
e. Share in any co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreement in the utilization and development of
the national wealth w/in their territorial jurisdiction

REPUBLIC VS. PROV. OF PALAWAN [ G.R. No. 170867, January 21, 2020 ]

A local government unit's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area. Thus, its 40%
share only pertains to the proceeds from the use and development of natural resources found
only in its land area:

To recapitulate, an LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers to its territorial boundaries or to its

territory. The territory of LGUs, in turn, refers to their land area, unless expanded by law to
include the maritime area. Accordingly, only the utilization of natural resources found within
the land area as delimited by law is subject to the LGU's equitable share under Sections 290
and 291 of the Local Government Code.

None of the parties have presented maps or statutes that conclusively prove that the Camago-
Malampaya reservoirs are within the Province of Palawan. This Court is, thus, constrained to
uphold the ruling that the area remains under the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic,
unless otherwise provided by law.

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income because they form part
of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252
SCRA 695).

Mandanas, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al./Honorable

Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. Vs. Honorable Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
199802/G.R. No. 208488. April 10, 2019- Although it has the primary discretion to
determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the
LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes. The
phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the phrase just share, and
cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding phrase in the national taxes. The intent of
the people in respect of Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the
LGUs should include all national taxes. To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just
share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount to the
unauthorized revision of the 1987 Constitution.

LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT

ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6,
Art. X of the 1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When passed, it
would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share”
in the national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be determined by law; (3) that “just share”
shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO,
429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora,
June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that “pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government
units shall be withheld” is declared in contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and
Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

TERM OF OFFICE

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms
of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that
would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.

- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view — like the extension of the elective term— is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also
create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover — whichever way it is
viewed — is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover
was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case
though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from
Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised
only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself
may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve
Senators obtaining the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-
President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms
of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated
three years as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmeña.
- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We
hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of
vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the
Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason
why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present
case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This
argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.

- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.

- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one
of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of
basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
(Emphasis ours.)

- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly
cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our
judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.

Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The preventive
suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit
rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive suspension, by its
nature does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore
not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is one that
involves no less than involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive
suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and
does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results
upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was serving his third term
as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning,
assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong
barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.

Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election cannot be
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall
election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The
period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes
an interruption in the continuity of service.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to apply, the local official
concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be
one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.

Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for Francis Ong,
“service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of
the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the
same position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation. There was actually no
interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001
term.

CREATION OF LGUS

Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April 12, 2011- All
the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income
requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the , explicitly
exempt the respondent municipalities from the said increased income requirement. The
respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the
year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion
exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the

delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a political unit of
government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
(MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by
the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of
police power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that
transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the
individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are
aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads
of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law,
which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect
must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).

MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009- MMDA has no authority to
dismantle billboards and other forms of advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro
Rail Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDA’s powers were limited to
the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it had no
power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.

MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007- In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence,
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the
MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with
the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s
subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is
not vested with police power.

LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as

embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of
local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that
accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle
of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that
deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax-exempt status, in
sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is
Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against
GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by
the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela, represented by Hon.
Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local
Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous
ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested in the
Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no
longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the Government refers
to “any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein;” while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations.” It had already become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or
“instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the
withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real
property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.

PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its facilities and
appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment of
real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the
petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the
port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary
business.

MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt
from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used
by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. As
properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of
man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities,
such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether
a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with
greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the
exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the
national government instrumentality.

PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27, 2004- Like the
local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.

The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he
or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her
alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the
President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).

Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is
ensured.

Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or legislative
authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.

ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003- definition of
“TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.

Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, February
15, 2011-

1-year period; When reckoned

The 1-year period shall be counted from the time of the filing of the first impeachment
complaint. Impeachment proceedings pertain to the proceedings in the House of
Representative which commences from the initiation of the complaint, to the referral to
proper committees, to submission of the report to the House, subsequent deliberation, and
ends with the transmittal of the Article of Impeachment to the Senate. An impeachment case
pertains to a trial in the Senate which commences at the time the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to the Upper House. (Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, G.R. 193459,
2011).

A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary
resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.

Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of impeachment
proceedings; he can still be impeached.

Effects of impeachment:

1. Removal from office of the official concerned

2. Disqualification to hold any public office
3. Public officer still Liable to prosecution, trial, and punishment if the impeachable offense
committed also constitutes a felony or crime. (Phil. Const., art. XI, sec. 3, par. (7))

Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT
OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE
RENATO C. CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS
WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021

The Court held that a judgment on an impeachment complaint results only in removal from
office and disqualification from holding any public office. Impeachment is a political
process aimed at removing an official, not punishing them. Impeachment does not imply
immunity from court processes or preclude other forms of discipline. Since Chief Justice
Corona was not judicially convicted of any criminal, civil, or administrative liability, he was
considered involuntarily retired from public service. Retirement laws are liberally construed
to achieve their humanitarian purpose. Chief Justice Corona was entitled to retirement
benefits under RA 9946, and Mrs. Corona was entitled to survivorship benefits. Equity
should fill the gaps in the law to ensure justice.

Removal from office

1. The Ombudsman may be removed only by way of impeachment. (Phil.
Const., art. XI, sec. 2)
2. Special Prosecutor may be removed from office by the President for any
of the grounds provided for the Ombudsman after due process. [Sec. 8(2),
RA 6670]
3. A Deputy Ombudsman is not subject to the discipline and removal of the
President [Gonzales v. OP, GR No. 196231, 2014].

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law
experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March
4, 2005).

POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

1.) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

1. The SC held that the power to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees has been transferred to the Ombudsman.

2. The Ombudsman may always delegate his power to investigate.

3.The power to investigate includes the power to impose preventive suspension.

4. This preventive suspension is not a penalty.

5.“INVESTIGATE” does not mean preliminary investigation.

6. The complaint need not be drawn up in the usual form.

7. The “ILLEGAL” act or omission need not be in connection with

the duties of the public officer or employee concerned.

8. ANY illegal act may be investigated by the Ombudsman. In this

regard, the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is CONCURRENT with that of the regular prosecutors.

2.) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act of duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.

1. The Ombudsman has PERSUASIVE POWER, and may require that proper legal steps are
taken by the officers concerned.

2. The public official or employee must be employed in: (I). The Government (II). Any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof; or (III). GOCC‟s with original charters

1. The SC has held that the SP may prosecute before the Sandiganbayan judges accused of
graft and corruption, even if they are under the Supreme Court.

3.) Direct the officer concerned to take the appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
1. The Ombudsman does NOT himself prosecute cases against public officers or
employees.Final say to prosecute still rests in the executive department.
2. The Ombudsman or Tanodbayan may use mandamus to compel the fiscal to prosecute.

4.) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds of
properties, and report any irregularity to COA for appropriate action.

5.) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge
of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6.) Public matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
process.

7.) Determine the cause of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud andcorruption in the
government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency

8.) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Notes:

The Office of the Ombudsman also has the duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality including GOCCs and their subsidiaries. In appropriate cases, it
should notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The power to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by
regular courts.

Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231, September 4, 2012 January 28,
2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman
is unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
over her deputies.

Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear constitutional design, the
Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the
Ombudsman. The inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the
Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the same levels of
constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held that the Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx

However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A.
No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion
is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.

Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004- The power of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the
cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not
encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases
refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is
only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take
over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. xxx While the
Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-
ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no
usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and com the head
of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006- the Court similarly
upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in
the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well
founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of
Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to
be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.

No Writ of Injunction shall be issued by any Court to delay an Investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman:

“No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.” (Sec. 14, R.A. No.
6770)

Caveat: The second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs
by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is declared INEFFECTIVE
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor. (Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals [Sixth Division],
GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe]).

Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.

Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the respondent is absolved of the
charge or in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or
suspension for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one month’s salary,
the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and unappelable, subject to judicial review.

Doctrine of CONDONATION ABANDONED:

Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015- In this case, the Court
agrees x x x that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions
do not reflect the experience of the Filipino people under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-examination.
Pascual’s ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts: First, the penalty of removal
may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct x x x.

- Second, an elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct,

thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

- Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and
character of candidates, of their right to elect officers x x x.

- The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (577 Phil. 52, 72 [2008]), also clarified
that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there
is no sovereign will to disenfranchise x x x.

- A thorough review of the cases post-1987 x x x would show that the basis for condonation
under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What
remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as
jurisprudential doctrine, was – and still remains – the above-cited postulates of Pascual,
which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their
own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of
condonation - that is, an elective official’s re-election cuts off the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term – was adopted hook, line, and sinker in
our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against
existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is – as it should be –
dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court
undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for
the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

- As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was

decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the
1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II
which states that “[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.” Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution’s silence on public accountability, and
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the
policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in
adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.

- With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that “[p]ublic office is a public trust.” Accordingly,
“[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.”

- After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and
adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.” Learning how
unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put
primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and
a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what
have been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be
accountable to the people at all times.
- The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the
Civil Service Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.

- For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an
elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on
October 10, 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992.

- Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective
local position.
- In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal
from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public
office.

- In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed
the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision
only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing
therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election
x x x.

- Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this
Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to
a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President
in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas
v. Orbos (279 Phil. 920, 937 [1991]) to apply to administrative offenses x x x.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline
enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to
the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions
wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a
constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a
misconduct committed during a previous term, or that the disqualification to hold the office
does not extend beyond the term in which the official’s delinquency occurred. X x x. Hence,
owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for
the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension
beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official’s term, and likewise allows said
official to still run for re-election. X x x. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section
66 (b) states that the elective local official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact
of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned.

Relatedly, it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts
would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not
to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again,
no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there
any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of
condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability would perhaps
be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has
it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has
been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official,
are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to
state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary
to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official’s
misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by
an elective public official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown. X x x.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine
in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine from one class of
US rulings way back in 1959 and thus out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by –
the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the
same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all
relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the Philippine legal system. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret
what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. x x
x

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general
rule, recognized as “good law” prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance
thereupon should be respected. X x x

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and
rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is
barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of
time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the
condonation doctrine.
Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the Ombudsman should be
filed before the CA, and not directly before the Supreme Court. In Office of the Ombudsman
v. Capulong (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of
the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to
grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President
in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas
v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses.

Yet, in Crebello v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019, it was underscored that
the prospective application of Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals should be reckoned from
April 12, 2016 because that was the date on which this Court had acted upon and denied with
finality the motion for clarification/motion for partial reconsideration thereon. HERRERA
V. MAGO, ET AL., G.R. No. 231120, January 15, 2020.

Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The decision of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal
shall not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power of the Ombudsman to
implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22, 2008 – Supreme
Court reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that
“the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.”
Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent
with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670
confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No.
4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified
by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17,
1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of
earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring
authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees,
with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members
of Congress and the Judiciary.

QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally created by

charter or not. What is decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to perform
functions related to government programs and policies.

JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power
to direct any officer or employee of government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters to perform any act or duty required by law or to stop any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.

PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto

, 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Distinction between Imperium and Dominium.

1. Imperium- Government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced

in sovereignty.
2. Dominium- 1. The capacity of the State to own and acquire property.2. It refers to lands
held by the government in a proprietary character can provide for the exploitation and use of
lands and other natural resources

Scope:
The following are owned by the State:1. Lands of the public domain: Waters, Minerals, coals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils; All sources of potential energy; Fisheries; Forests or
timber; Wildlife;Flora and fauna; and Other natural resources.

Alienation of Natural Resources

1. General Rule: All natural resources CANNOT be alienated

2. Exception: Agricultural land

Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural Resources

1. Shall be under the full control and supervision of the State

2. Means A. The state may DIRECTLY UNDERTAKE such activities B . The state may
enter into CO-PRODUCTION, JOINT VENTURE OR PRODUCTION-SHARING
arrangements with
a. Filipino citizen or
b. Corporation or association at least 60% of whose capital
is owned by such citizens
3. Limitations:
A. Period: It should not exceed 25 years, renewable for not more than 25years
B. Under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

3. In case of water rights/water supply/fisheries/industrial uses other than the development of

water power The beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant .

MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. VS. THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES ("DENR"),
G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019

Public Trust Doctine (Water rights)

Q. What is its basis?

A. Protruding from the basic tenet that water is a vital part of human existence, this Court
introduces the Public Trust Doctrine. It aims to put an additional strain upon the duty of the
water industry to comply with the laws and regulations of the land.

A number of doctrines already protect and sanctify public welfare and highlight the State's
various roles relative thereto. Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
elaborates on the ownership of the State over the nation's natural resources and its right and
duty to regulate the same:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The above constitutional provision is the embodiment of jura regalia, or the Regalian
doctrine, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources.[59] The Regalian
doctrine is an exercise of the State's sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain
and of the patrimony of the nation.[60] Sources of water form part of this patrimony.

The vastness of this patrimony precludes the State from managing the same entirely by itself.
In the interest of quality and efficiency, it thus outsources assistance from private entities, but
this must be delimited and controlled for the protection of the general welfare. Then comes
into relevance police power, one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power is
described in Gerochi v. Department of Energy[61]:

[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the
most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in
the Latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)
and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of
others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs,
police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae,
gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to "regulate"
means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the
interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.

Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of general welfare is the doctrine of parens
patriae. It focuses on the role of the state as a "sovereign" and expresses the inherent power
and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui
juris.[62] Under the doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons
of disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent
power to provide protection to persons non sui juris and to make and enforce rules and
regulations as it deems proper for the management of their property.[63] Parens patriae
means "father of his country", and refers to the State as a last-ditch provider of protection to
those unable to care and fend for themselves. It can be said that Filipino consumers have
become such persons of disability deserving protection by the State, as their welfare are being
increasingly downplayed, endangered, and overwhelmed by business pursuits.

While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is state
regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look
after the defenseless, there remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines
into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of
the people, rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own
excesses of the State. We fill this void through the Public Trust Doctrine.

The Public Trust Doctrine, while derived from English common law and American
jurisprudence, has firm Constitutional and statutory moorings in our jurisdiction. The
doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water.[64] Thus, "[p]arties who acquired
rights in trust property [only hold] these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert
no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust."[65] In National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,[66] a California Supreme Court decision, it
worded the doctrine as that which -

[T]he state had the power to reconsider past allocation decisions even though an agency
had made those decisions after due consideration of their effect on the public trust. This
conclusion reflected the view that water users could not acquire a vested property right in the
water itself; they merely obtained a usufructuary right to the water.

Academic literature further imparts that "[p]art of this consciousness involves restoring the
view of public and state ownership of certain natural resources that benefit all. [...]" The
"doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately
owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and society as a
whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of
public rights over private rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative
duties of a trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future
generations and embodies key principles of environmental protection: stewardship,
communal responsibility, and sustainability."[67]

In this framework, a relationship is formed - "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages
specific natural resources the trust principal - for the trust principal for the benefit of the
current and future generations - the beneficiaries."[68] "[T]he [S]tate has an affirmative duty
to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever feasible."[69] But with the birth of privatization of many
basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved to be quite challenging. The
State is in a continuing battle against lurking evils that has afflicted even itself, such as the
excessive pursuit of profit rather than purely the public's interest.

These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve from a mere principle to a
resource management term and tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social priorities and
address the correlative and consequent dangers thereof. The public is regarded as the
beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine even
against the government itself.[70]

Small-scale Utilization of Natural Resources

1. Congress may, by law, authorize small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens
2. Congress may also authorize cooperative fish farming with priority given to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in the rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons .

Large-Scale Exploration, Development and Utilization of Minerals/Petroleum/Other

Mineral Oils

1. The President may enter into agreements with foreign

owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration etc. of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils. These agreements should
be in accordance with the general terms and conditions
provided by law.

2. They should be based on the real contributions to economic

growth and general welfare of the country.

3. In the agreements, the State should promote the

development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

4. The President should notify Congress of every contract

under this provision within 30 days from its execution.

5. Management and service contracts are not allowed under

this rule.
Protection of Marine Wealth
1. The State shall protect its marine wealth in its Archipelagic waters Territorial sea & EEZ
2. The State shall reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens

Alienable lands of public domain

1. Only agricultural lands are alienable.
2. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.

Limitations regarding Alienable Lands of the Public Domain

1. For private corporations or associations
a. They can only hold alienable lands of the public domain
BY LEASE
b. Period: Cannot exceed 25 years, renewable for not more
than 25years
c. Area: Lease cannot exceed 1,000 hectares
d. Note: A corporation sole is treated like other private
corporations for the purpose of acquiring public lands.

2. For Filipino citizens

A. Can lease up to 500 hectares

B. Can ACQUIRE not more than 12 hectares by purchase, homestead or grant. Taking into
account the requirements of conservation, ecology and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, Congress shall determine by law the size of the lands of the
public domain which maybe acquired, developed, held or lease and the conditions therefore.

Means by Which Lands of the Public Domain Become Private Land

1. Acquired from government by purchase or grant;

2. Uninterrupted possession by the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial; and
3. Open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of ALIENABLE (agricultural) public land for
a period of 30 years.

a. Upon completion of the requisite period, the land becomes

private property ipso jure without need of any judicial or other sanction.
b. Here, in possession since time immemorial, presumption is
that the land was never part of public domain.
c. In computing 30 years, start from when land was converted
to alienable land, not when it was still forest land
d. Presumption is that land belongs to the State

Note: Under RA 11573 [effective July 16, 2021], the deadline for agricultural free patent
applications has been removed; and shortened the required period of possession for
confirmation of imperfect titles to 20 years.
Section 5. ANCESTRAL LANDS

Protection of Indigenous Cultural Communities

1. The State protects the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands
A. Subject to Constitutional provisions
B. Subject to national development policies and programs

2. In determining ownership and extent of ancestral domain, Congress may use customary
laws on property rights and relations.

3. “ANCESTRAL DOMAIN”
A. It refers to lands which are considered as pertaining to a cultural region
B. This includes lands not yet occupied, such as deep forests.

Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA
No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign
ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing
lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded,
cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of
the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract
that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license
or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the
State. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a
vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. Xxx

The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land
from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents
only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice,
abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting
conclusion by denying the petition.

CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically declares ancestral lands
and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands under
native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are
private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains
does not cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and
environmental protection.

Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 – recognized the existence of a native title to
land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial
as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and submerged areas form part
of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas are also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only be
leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain which the government could not sell to private
parties except if the legislature passes a law authrizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The ownership of lands
reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which declares that all
lands and waters of the public domain belong to the State.

But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable lands of the public
domain, they may not be sold to private corporations which can only lease the same. The
State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private corporations from
participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands.
What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for private
corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no prohibition on the
directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire
not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private land.

Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government owned lands, as
long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the government
under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even private corporations can acquire by
purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a
public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in
the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the
land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations.

Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract
with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public
domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation.
This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable
lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes
patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to
dispose of public lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The
NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed
lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to
the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties
of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are
owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA
since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it
cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to
qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the
foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property.
DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay
Island is owned by the State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a
vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court said that Boracay was
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400
hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.

Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678, April 24, 2009 – The
classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and
secondary classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural lands of the public domain may further be
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under
existing laws, granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.

Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The DENR Secretary is
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.

Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While the acquisition and the
purchase of real properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to
the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from the foreigner by a
Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is
valid.

PRIVATE LANDS

General rule

1. Private lands CAN only be transferred or conveyed to:

A. Filipino citizens
B. Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines, at least 60%of whose capital
is owned by Filipino citizens

2. Exceptions
A. In intestate succession, where an alien heir of a Filipino is the transferee of private land.
B. A natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of PRIVATE LAND, subject to limitation provided by law. Hence, land can be
used only for residential purposes. In this case, he only acquires derivative title.
C. Foreign states may acquire land but only for embassy and staff residence purposes.

3. Filipino citizenship is only required at the time the land is acquired. Thus, loss of
citizenship after acquiring the land does not deprive ownership.
4. Restriction against aliens only applies to acquisition of ownership. Therefore:
A. Aliens may be lessees or usufructuaries of private lands
B. Aliens may be mortgagees of land, as long as they do not obtain possession thereof and do
not bid in the foreclosure sale.

5. Land tenure is not indispensable to the free exercise of religious profession and worship. A
religious corporation controlled by non-Filipinos cannot acquire and own land, even for
religious purposes.

Remedies to recover private lands from disqualified aliens:

1. Escheat proceedings
2. Action for reversion under the Public Land Act
3. An action by the former Filipino owner to recover the land
A. The former pari delicto principle has been abandoned
B. Alien still has the title (didn‟t pass it on to one who is qualified)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY/INVESTMENTS

Power of Congress

1. Congress, upon the recommendation of NEDA, can reserve to Filipino citizens or to

corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investment. This may be done
when the national interest dictates.

2. Congress shall also enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

National Economy and Patrimony

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to QUALIFIED Filipinos.

FRANCHISES FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES

Power to grant:
1. Congress may directly grant a legislative franchise; or

2. Power to grant franchises may be delegated to appropriate

regulatory agencies and/or LGU‟s

Public utility

1. In order to be considered as a public utility, and thus subject to this provision, the
undertaking must involve dealing directly with the public.

2. Thus, a Build-Operate-Transfer grantee is NOT a public utility. The BOT grantee merely
constructs the utility, and it leases the same to the government. It is the government which
operates the public utility (operation separate from ownership).
To whom granted:
1. Filipino citizens or
2. Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines and at least60% of the capital
is owned by Filipino citizens.

Terms and conditions:

1. Duration: Not more than 50 years

2. Franchise is NOT exclusive in character

3. Franchise is granted under the condition that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or

repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

Participation of Foreign Investors

1. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital.
2. Foreigners cannot be appointed as the executive and managing officers because these
positions are reserved for Filipino citizens.

SPECIAL ECONOMIC POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. Temporary takeover or direction of operations:

A. Conditions
i. National emergency and
ii. When the public interest requires

B. May be used against privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public
interest.
C. Duration of the takeover: period of emergency
D. Takeover is subject to reasonable terms and conditions
E. No need for just compensation because it is only temporary.

2. Nationalization of vital industries:

A. Exercised in the interest of national welfare or defense
B. Involves either: i. Establishment and operation of vital industries; or ii. Transfer to public
ownership, upon payment of just compensation, public utilities and other private enterprises
to be operated by the government.

Foreign Equity Limitation

Q. What is the meaning of the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership requirement?

A. Both voting control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to determine
whether a corporation is a Filipino national.xxx The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Thus,
60 percent of the capital assumes, or should result in, controlling interest in the corporation.
Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of
the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with
the constitutional mandate.

Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both voting control test and beneficial
ownership test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a Filipino national.xxx
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
that can vote in the election of directors. Thus, 60 percent of the capital assumes, or should
result in, controlling interest in the corporation. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal
and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands
of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate.

Roy vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016- The interpretation of the term
"capital", as referring to interests or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a Philippine
national in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991. xxx A domestic corporation is a "Philippine
national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens." The Court
also reiterated that, from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is evident that
the term "capital" refers to controlling interest of a corporation, and the framers of the
Constitution intended public utilities to be majority Filipino-owned and controlled.

Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February 23, 2015- a franchise is not
required before each and every public utility may operate. There is no law that states that a
legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.

Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556 SCRA 742)- doctrine
states that the public utility has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper
inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

Long Island Water Supply Company vs Brooklyn: It matters not to whom the water
supply system belongs, individual or corporation, or what franchises are connected with
it; all may be taken for public uses upon payment of just compensation.

In sum, it does not appear that, in approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to
operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of
strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
taxing powers, we hold that §23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended
petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise
taxes.

Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National Telecommunications

Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs)
and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued legislative franchises on the
ground that the latter had violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are
extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate expression of State
policy.
- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under the Constitution, no
franchise shall be granted under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal
when the public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to alteration by the power to
tax, which cannot be contracted away.

- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 – The constitution is emphatic that the
operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

EXPLORATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

OCAMPO v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. No. 182734 | January 10, 2023

The Constitution requires that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources be under the full control and supervision of the State. This may be done through
four modes: (1) directly; (2) co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations; (3) For small-scale utilization of natural
resources: Congress may allow Filipino citizens by legislative enactment; (4) For large-scale
exploration: The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance. It is through the fourth mode where foreign-
owned corporations enter the picture, but only as to technical or financial assistance. It should
be in the form of either an FTAA or a service contract.

A. The Meaning of “Exploration” under §2, Article XII of the Constitution

• Using verba legis interpretation and the and the technical definitions under the Mining Act
and Petroleum Act, it can be deduced that exploration means searching or discovering
something. Thus, the JMSU involves the exploration of the country’s natural resources,
particularly petroleum.

• Even if the JMSU used the term “pre-exploration” activity, what it intends to do—to
discover petroleum—is tantamount to exploration.

• The JMSU employs seismic survey, a geophysical survey method. While a seismic survey
may have other uses in international law, as argued by the petitioners, within the context of
the JMSU, the seismic survey is used to discover if petroleum exists in the Agreement Area
and not for any other purpose.

• With this, the JMSU involves exploration of the country’s petroleum resource, and thus
falls within the ambit of §2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

B. Four Allowed Modes of Exploration, Development, and Utilization of Natural Resources

• The Constitution requires that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources be under the full control and supervision of the State.

• This may be done through four modes:

(1) Directly
(2) Co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations
(3) For small-scale utilization of natural resources: Congress may allow Filipino citizens
by legislative enactment
(4) For large-scale exploration: the President may enter into agreements with foreignowned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance

• Thus, for the JMSU to be valid, it must be executed and implemented under one of the four
modes.

The first mode is not feasible since it was not undertaken solely by the State. The second or
third mode is also not possible since the other parties to the agreement are wholly-owned
foreign corporations. The fourth mode is the most feasible route since this allows foreign
corporations to participate in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
petroleum. However, the fourth mode should either be in the form of a financial or technical
agreement (FTAA) or a service contract.

• In this case, the JMSU is neither an FTAA nor a service contract.

There is no financial or technical assistance involved among the three parties since under the
JMSU, each party shall shoulder the cost of its own personnel. There is also no provision on
technical assistance.

The JMSU is also not a service contract since in a service contract, the service and
technology needed are furnished by a service contractor entitled to the payment of a
stipulated service fee, while financing is provided by the Government to which all the
petroleum produced shall belong à In this case, the State even admitted that what they had
was not a service contract

But even assuming that the JMSU is a service contract, it had not complied with the
requirements for a valid service contract, particularly, the requirements that the service
contract be signed by the President and that within thirty days, the President shall report to
Congress. In this case, the agreement is signed not by the President but by PNOC through its
president and CEO.

• THUS, the JMSU is unconstitutional for allowing wholly-owned foreign corporations

to participate in the exploration of the country’s natural resources without observing the
safeguards under §2, Article XII of the Constitution.

C. Full Control and Supervision Requirement and the Binding Nature of the Agreement

• The JMSU provides that all the information acquired for the fulfillment of the seismic work
and their interpretation shall be jointly owned by the Parties. This set-up is invalid. The
Government cannot legally share the information since such information is a product of
exploration.

The PNOC and/or the government, in agreeing to such information sharing, has illegally
compromised the control and supervision of the State over such information. The PNOC had
bargained away the supposed full control of the State of all the information acquired from the
seismic survey, since it agreed to the provision in the JMSU that the consent of the two other
parties is necessary before any information may be disclosed.

• Further, the argument that the JMSU is an agreement among government corporations does
not hold water. In the first place, the PNOC has no power to enter into contracts involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources with foreign-owned
corporations, since under the Constitution, it is the President who exercises the power of
control in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources on behalf
of the State.

Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under
the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition in the Constitution
applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined
under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the
ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land
would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.

Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the
instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 – Foreign corporations are
confined to technical and financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize
the country’s natural resources by entering into the necessary agreements with individuals or
entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the macro level, through
the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar measures
that would enable the government to control the conduct of the affairs in various enterprises
and restrain activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.

-Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of Energy- As settled in the La

Bugal case, the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually
referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short,
used the term “service contracts” in referring to agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.

GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated, et al. v.

DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service
contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and mineral oils via “agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance” as provided by law. The Court said that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987 Constitution
allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who
would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State.

GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board
and its Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006-
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full control of
the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation
are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant
to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development,
and utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement with qualified entities.

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA 517 – Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply retroactively to a “license, concession or lease”
granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
constitution.

Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that possession, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 - The constitution does not
totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.

MONOPOLIES

1. The Constitution does NOT prohibit the existence of monopolies.

2. The State may either regulate or prohibit monopolies, when public interest so requires.
3. Combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition are prohibited,

ARTICLE IV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
ARTS, CULTURE, AND SPORTS

Right to Education and Academic Freedom

The right to education must be read in conjunction with the academic

freedom of schools to require “fair, reasonable, and equitable admission requirements.”

Power to Dismiss Students

1) Schools have the power to dismiss students, after due process, for disciplinary reasons.
2) Acts committed outside the school may also be a ground for disciplinary action if:
a) It involves violations of school policies connected to school-sponsored activities; or
b) The misconduct affects the student's status, or the good name or
reputation of the school.

Educational Institutions

I. Filipinization

A. Ownership:
1). Filipino citizens, or 2). Corporations incorporated in RP and 60% Filipino-owned.
EXCEPT: Schools established by religious groups and mission boards.3). Congress may
increase Filipino equity requirements in ALL educational institutions.

B. Control and Administration:

1). Must be vested in Filipino citizens 2). Refers to line positions, such as President, Dean,
Principal, and Trustees 3). Faculty members may be foreigners.

C. Student Population:
1). GENERAL RULE: Cannot establish school exclusively for aliens. Aliens can only
comprise up to 1/3 of total enrollment. 2). EXCEPTIONS: Schools established for foreign
diplomatic personnel and their dependents, and unless otherwise provided for by law for
other foreign temporary residents.

II. Tax Exemptions

A. Non-stock, non-profit educational institutions:

1) All revenues and assets actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes
are exempt from taxes and duties.2) This is self-executory

B. Proprietary educational institutions, including cooperatives:

1) Entitled to exemptions as may be provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and
re-investment2) Requires an enabling statute

3) Grants, endowments, donations and contributions actually, directly an exclusively used for
educational purposes are exempt from taxes, subject to conditions prescribed by law.

Did the 1997 Tax Code qualify the tax exemption constitutionally-granted to non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY,

INC. GR. No. 196596, November 9, 2016

No.

The Constitution holding that the term educational institution, when used in laws granting tax
exemptions, refers to the school system (synonymous with formal education); it includes a
college or an educational establishment; it refers to the hierarchically structured and
chronologically graded learnings organized and provided by the formal school system.

The Court then significantly laid down the requisites for availing the tax exemption under
Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1) the taxpayer falls under the classification non-stock,
non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.

The tax exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions is conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their assets, revenues
and income for educational purposes.

III. Academic Freedom

A. Educational Institutions

Schools have the freedom to determine:

1) Who may teach,
2) What may be taught,
3) How it shall be taught, and
4) Who may be admitted to study.

B. Faculty members
1) Full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of their other academic duties.
2) Freedom in the classroom in discussing their subjects, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subjects.
3) When faculty members speak or write in their capacity as citizens, then they are free from
institutional censorship or discipline.

C. Students
They have the right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

D. Limitations
1) Dominant police power of the State
2) Social interest of the community

E. Budgetary Priority:
1). Education must be assigned the highest budgetary priority.2). BUT: This command is not
absolute. Congress is free to determine what should be given budgetary priority in order to
enable it to respond to the imperatives of national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.

Religious Education in Public Schools:

Religion may be taught in public schools subject to the following requisites:1) Express
written option by parents and guardians;2) Taught within regular class hours;3) Instructors
are designated and approved by the proper religiousauthorities; and4) WITHOUT
ADDITIONAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT.

Language
1) National language: Filipino
2) Official Languages: Filipino, and unless otherwise provided by law, English.
3) Regional languages are auxiliary to the official languages.
4) (Spanish and Arabic are promoted only on an optional and voluntary basis.
CASES:

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A
“review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does
not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.”
Moreover, “[a] review course is only intended to ‘refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees,’” and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a
grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center course requirements or
take the licensure examination.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution and the members
of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil
service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner and even
promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to choose
who may teach or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, - The right of the school to discipline
its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school
certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. The school not only has the right but
the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110280, October 21,
1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360. - The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures
extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.

Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015- The PMA is not
different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the
right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.

- The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the
minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet’s
action. It is the cadet’s responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a
cadet’s stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members
of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called “Long Gray Line.”

- Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets’ character development.
It defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the
atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it makes them professional
military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the
society of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it
outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.

- The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the
cadets’ character development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify
those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet
Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character,
unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the
Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in
nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be
prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to
the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates."

Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As enunciated by this Court in the
case of University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part
of academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the University’s decision not
to confer honors to petitioner.

Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic freedom and
constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide
standards for its teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At the end
of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the
university as the employer alone.

UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.” Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who
should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and
other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong:
“As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with
the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls
or pressure.”

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis
in the freedom “what to teach.” Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education
Act of 1982 that students have a right “to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,” such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its
free choice of students for admission to its school.

Son, e t. al. vs. UST, G.R. No. 211273, APRIL 18, 2018- Notwithstanding the existence of
the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of
employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing
standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies
(presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of
private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of
their academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature
of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and
educators.

Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642/G.R. No. 242954. September 10,
2019:

Issues:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal

education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to
Bar Examination embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal
education embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to
Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

Rulings:

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education
unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to
supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal
education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the
political branches.

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and
supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal
education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of
law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education
in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon
itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that
regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the
practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of
Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal
education, it merely provides academic competency requirements for those who would like to
take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the
authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and this includes legal
education.

2. YES. T The Court held that the supposed absence of a quorum in the House of Representatives
was belied by the official Journal of the House of Representatives, both on the day that the
TRAIN’s Bicameral Conference Report was ratified and the immediately subsequent session on
January 15, 2018. As between the livestream video and photographs presented by the petitioners,
and the Congressional Journal, the latter must prevail as to the events on the Congressional floor
on that fateful day given that no less than the Constitution itself grants the Congressional Journal
its imprimatur.his requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to
determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the
Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of
legal education but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct
encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning
admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB
the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar.
Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in
such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon
the Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the
education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered the practice of law.

N.B. SC Reaffirms LEB’s Jurisdiction over Legal Education; Reiterates

Unconstitutionality of PhiLSAT, November 12, 2021

The Supreme Court has upheld the jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board (LEB) but
affirmed as unconstitutional its requirement for students to pass the Philippine Law School
Admission Test (PhiLSAT) before being allowed to pursue a Law degree.

The SC said on Friday that the issue was resolved on November 9 via a 13-1 vote, striking
down in its entirety LEB Memorandum Order (LEBMO) No. 7-2016 on the PhiLSAT
requirement for being “unreasonably exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying”.

The Court explained that LEB’s requirement for prospective students to take the PhiLSAT
does not per se render it unconstitutional for as long as the results will only be
recommendatory, with the law schools retaining the discretion to accept the applicant based
on their policies and standards.

However, as an eligibility requirement, PhiLSAT is not a lawful method to attain the lawful
subject of the State.

The ruling affirms its 2019 decision, which declared unconstitutional paragraph 9 of the
LEBMO which provides that all college graduates or graduating students must pass the
PhiLSAT to gain admission to any law school in the Philippines.
The Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS) recently sought a clarification regarding
the status and treatment of the PhiLSAT.

PALS said the requirement infringes upon academic freedom insofar as it prescribes a
passing score to qualify for admission to a law school.

Prohibitive

In its latest resolution, the SC said since "it is evident that unless prospective students have a
certificate of exemption, they are compelled to take and pass the said exam as an eligibility
requirement for law school. Under pain of sanction or fine, law schools are prohibited from
accepting prospective students who do not meet the said requirements”.

“Accordingly, it would be more appropriate to strike down all remaining provisions. This
gives the LEB a fresh start, devoid of any arbitrary preconceived ideas when it sits down with
the law schools or PALS for genuine and meaningful discussions on a possible acceptable
replacement of the present PhiLSAT,” the Court stressed.

The imposition of a minimum passing rate unreasonably infringes on the freedom of schools
to determine who to accept as students, the ruling stated.

“Requiring the schools to accept only those who took and passed the exam amounts to a
dictatorial control of the State, through LEB, and runs afoul of the intent of the Constitution.”

Further, the Court sustained its ruling that the prohibition against accepting applicants for the
Master of Laws without a Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree under Section 17 of
LEBMO No. 1-2011 is void for infringing the right of the school to determine who to admit
to their graduate degree programs while LEB issuances prescribing the qualifications and
classifications for faculty members, deans, and deans of graduate schools of Law violate the
academic freedom of schools on who may teach.

LEB’s power

The LEB was created under Republic Act (RA) No. 7662, also known as the Legal Education
Reform Act, signed on Dec. 23, 1993 by former president Fidel V. Ramos.

The agency administers the legal education system; supervises and accredits Law schools;
sets minimum standards for admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of
faculty members; prescribes the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the
requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other
courses; establishes a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar; and
performs such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of the Act.

The Court stressed that while it acknowledges and upholds the authority of the LEB to carry
out the purpose of the law, the questioned provisions unduly expand the scope of the
agency’s authority by giving a construction to the term “legal education” inconsistent with
the law’s clear intent.
“To be clear, the Court reiterates its stance that it will not arrogate unto itself the powers of
Congress vested upon the LEB. However, there is nothing in RA 7662 which states that the
LEB has authority over all matters relating to legal education to the absolute exclusion of all
others, including the Supreme Court. In fact, a fair and conscientious reading of the law
would support the view that Congress specifically intended for all stakeholders to have a say
in matters of legal education,” the SC stated.

The exercise of authority, through the LEB, must be merely supervisory and regulatory, and
should not amount to control, the SC added.

- Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology-elucidates

how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning: [I]t is to be noted that
the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would
follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself
its aims and. objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has
a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.

Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the
academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of
students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and ( d) the allocation of income among the different categories of
expenditure.

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)

Symbols of Nationality
1) Flag
Red, white, and blue.
With a sun and 3 stars

The design may be changed by constitutional amendment

2) Congress may, by law, adopt a new:(a) Name for the country ,(b) National anthem, or
(c) National seal.

Note: Law will take effect upon ratification by the people in a NATIONAL
REFERENDUM.

State Immunity (refer to Notes on Article II)

NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206
SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of
the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly abolished.

Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan
political activity, except to vote. They cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the
government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries
Composition:
A citizen armed force

Prohibitions and disqualifications:

1) Military men cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity,
except to vote.
2) Members of the AFP in active service cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the
government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

The Chief of Staff:

1) Tour of duty: Republic Act No. 11939 (May 17, 2023) Under the law, specific fixed
terms have been established for key positions within the AFP. The AFP Chief of Staff now
has a maximum tour of duty set at three years, which can be terminated earlier by the
President if deemed necessary. Similarly, the Chief of the Philippine Army, Chief of the
Philippine Air Force, Chief of the Philippine Navy, and the Superintendent of the Philippine
Military Academy will serve a maximum tour of duty of two years, subject to early
termination by the President.

2) EXCEPTION: In times of war or other national emergency as declared by Congress,

the President may extend such tour of duty.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY – 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established by religious

groups and mission boards.

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)

Note: (refer to Introduction)

The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951,
October 14, 2008- The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing
an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is itself a violation
of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel
nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through
an undue influence or interference with that process.

IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a Constituent Assembly
has full and plenary powers to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal
power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in providing for
mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot exercise such until
Congress provides for its implementation.

LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the framers of the
Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be
“ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.

DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774-

The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general
grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising
the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for amendments, it does
not have the final say on whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue
which is clearly subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary in the ratification of
amendments. A plebiscite may be validly held together with general elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece meal ratification.

Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of amendment/revisions. UNLESS,

the proposed amendments/revisions so provide.

ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)

Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification.

According to the SC, this took place on February 2, 1987, which was the day the people cast
their votes ratifying the Constitution.

Military bases agreements

1) Renewals of military bases agreements must be through a strict treaty.

2) Ratification of the agreement in a plebiscite is necessary only when Congress so requires.

3) Section 25 of Article XVIII allows possible local deployment of only AMERICAN forces.

LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April 11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions show a
marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of direct
exception.

- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the
Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a mere training
exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.

Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449-the VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United
States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate
for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry
out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress,
under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with
the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

Saguisag, et al. vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426-212444, January 12, 2016- The President also
carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The role of the
President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must
give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its
interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination. In specific
provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of Article
II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and
international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of
executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements
entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or
facilities.
- EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014,
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes
confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter
into force in the two countries.

- Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign relations,
the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the
provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions.

- The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only
to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the
Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.

- Executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of
Senate concurrence. Xxx Under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations. xxx Executive agreements may cover the
matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments.

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al., Petitioners - versus -

THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is
not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et al. G.R. No. 176051; and
Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA,
and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the
United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status
quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.