The UK Response To The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Proposals For A Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan, 1980 - 1981
The UK Response To The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Proposals For A Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan, 1980 - 1981
Richard Smith
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Abstract Although not unexpected, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was still largely
a shock to the West. It was the first time since the Second World War that the Soviets had
directly intervened in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. Despite the intervention
eventually being seen as Moscow’s ‘Vietnam’ the West was initially unsure about what the
invasion meant for stability in the region or the future conduct of East – West relations.
In response to the crisis the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) proposed that
Afghanistan revert to a neutral and non-aligned status in an attempt to create the basis for
a viable political settlement, one that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw troops
without losing face. It launched the proposal in early 1980, lobbying other countries to
support and champion the idea, culminating in a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Secretary,
Lord Carrington, in July 1981. In this early phase of Soviet intervention the British
proposals were premature but not without merit. They anticipated the strategy the Soviets
would eventually adopt in their attempt to achieve an orderly withdrawal.
Introduction
In February 1986, at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) in Moscow, President Gorbachev announced his intention to close the
‘bleeding wound’ he thought intervention in Afghanistan had become and sought
to find a solution that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw from its
commitment with the least cost to its international reputation. He called for a
negotiated political solution that might leave Afghanistan a friendly, independent
and non-aligned state with guarantees against external interference in its affairs,
and subsequently dropped Babrak Karmal, the Afghan President, in search of a
more acceptable nationalist government. It would be another two years before
withdrawal was achieved following the signing of the Geneva Accords in April
1988. These consisted of a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan
providing for non-intervention and non-interference, with international guaran-
tees by the Soviet Union and the United States (US), and a Soviet agreement
to withdraw by February 1989 (Braithwaite 2011, 274– 275, 281; Kalinovsky 2011,
88 –90, 142).
The views expressed here are those of the author alone, and do not represent those of
any government department.
In fact, the search for a framework for withdrawal had begun soon after the
Soviet invasion of December 1979, with Britain as a leading promoter. The
invasion revived fears of Russian advances into Central Asia not experienced
since the nineteenth century. Despite the Soviet intervention eventually being seen
as Moscow’s ‘Vietnam’ (Barras 2009, 225), there was initial uncertainty about what
the invasion meant for stability in the region and the future conduct of East –West
relations. The first instinct was to have Soviet troops leave Afghanistan as soon
as possible. The UK moved quickly to develop a plan that attempted to see
Afghanistan revert to the traditional role of a buffer state, with a government that
the Russians could live with but which was not wholly committed to them; one
ready to pursue a policy of genuine neutrality and non-alignment. In doing so,
Britain was drawing on hard-learned lessons of dealing with Afghanistan from
the era of the Great Game. Although unsuccessful at the time, the British proposal
for a neutral and non-aligned status for Afghanistan prefigured the solution
eventually adopted by the Soviet Union. The initiative was one way in which
Britain, as a medium-sized European power, could help to resolve the crisis: one
that attempted to find a way between the posturing of the superpowers and was
distinct from the attitudes of France and West Germany, which had different, more
active relationships with the Soviet Union.
The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, in power since March
1979, ascribed the considerable increase in Soviet power over the past decade
(relative to the West) largely to weak leadership by the US, French insistence on
an independent posture, and a growing West German economic interdependence
with Eastern Europe which was beginning to have disquieting political
manifestations. It was therefore felt all the more important that Britain, despite
its more limited economic resources, should contribute a strong political and
ideological lead during the Afghan crisis (Smith et al 2012, 159). This article
outlines Britain’s response to the crisis and examines its diplomatic initiatives in
the 18 months following the invasion, based on documents recently released by
the UK government. The invasion was the Thatcher government’s first Cold War
test following its decision to adopt a tougher line towards the Soviet Union. It
shows a government demonstrating a new diplomatic confidence following the
settlement of the long-running sore that had been Rhodesia and believing again
that Britain held a unique position in relation to Europe, the US and the
Commonwealth, which it could use to positively influence international relations.
state. Britain’s strategic interest in the country ended entirely with the withdrawal
from India in 1947.
In April 1978, the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) took power in Kabul after a coup (the ‘April Revolution’). The British
response was intended to be calm and rational. It was not automatically assumed
that the country would fall under the sway of the Soviet Union and the British
government sought to increase contact and continue providing aid. The
Ambassador to Kabul advocated waiting for some sort of order to emerge whilst
continuing to keep the ‘non-Soviet’ option open. He thought there was a chance
the Soviet Union might overplay its hand and, if relations with the PDPA cooled,
there might be opportunities for the West to regain influence.1 Following the coup,
the PDPA attempted to impose radical land and social reforms on the country.
These met with a backlash from fiercely conservative and devoutly Muslim tribal
leaders, many of whom either left the country for sanctuary in Pakistan or took up
arms against the government. On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet troops moved into
Afghanistan. On the evening of 27 December they launched a coup, killing
President Hafizullah Amin and replacing him with Babrak Karmal. The Soviet
leadership had gradually lost faith in Amin due to his despotic behaviour and his
suspected drift towards US influence (Westad 2005, 299 –326).
The Soviet invasion did not alter the British government’s view of the Soviet
Union but rather served to reinforce it. The new Conservative government had
already determined to take a robust line with the Soviets as set out in a key policy
document entitled ‘British policy in East– West relations’, dated 7 December 1979
(Smith et al 2012, 1– 6). It was intended as a blueprint for handling relations with
the Soviet Union and was circulated widely to overseas missions. The impetus
came from Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) Minister Peter Blaker, a
longstanding critic of the Soviet Union who had co-authored a pamphlet in 1976,
Coping with the Soviet Union. He, in turn, took his lead from Mrs Thatcher, who
held strong anti-communist views and who in opposition had not been afraid to
attack détente, which she thought often amounted to little more than appeasement
of the Soviet Union. She quoted Brezhnev’s statement that ‘peaceful co-existence
in no way implied the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle’ as evidence
that the Soviet Union was still bent on world domination, and considered that this
could only be prevented by a strong and united Western alliance (Thatcher 1995,
348 –352).2
In July 1979, Blaker had been presented with a paper drafted by the FCO
Planning Staff entitled ‘Managing Russia’ which characterized the Soviet Union as
‘a military giant but an economic and political pygmy’,3 and concluded that any
threat would need to be kept in proportion but would be perfectly manageable by
a healthy, united West. This view was deemed complacent by Blaker, who instead
believed British policy should aim to secure the respect of the Soviets rather than
1
The National Archives (TNA): FCO 37/2127: Afghanistan Annual Review for 1978 by
KR Crook, 14 January 1979.
2
See also speeches of 26 July 1975, ,http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/
102750. and 31 July 1976, , http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103086..
3
Interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite (former head of Planning Staff) in 1998 given
to the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge
(BDOHP 30). The 1976 Planning Staff paper can be found in TNA: FCO 33/3839.
358 Richard Smith
their good opinion. Britain should not necessarily seek to match what the
Americans, French and Germans were doing, but should develop a businesslike
relationship based on a realistic calculation of respective interests. The new policy
document subsequently depicted the Soviet threat in robust terms, stating that the
Soviet Union sought to defeat the West by all means short of war, and that détente
was little more than a tactic to secure technology, grain and credits without
slowing its military build-up, relaxing its internal repression, loosening its grip on
Eastern Europe or renouncing its freedom to intervene in developing countries
(Smith et al 2012, 1). The invasion subsequently served to reinforce these
assumptions about Soviet behaviour and to make the new policy’s application
more pressing.
The immediate response to the invasion was intended to register strong
disapproval of Soviet action and included measures to dissuade the Soviets from
considering similar action in the future. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
informed President Brezhnev that she was ‘profoundly disturbed’ at develop-
ments and made clear her belief that the people of Afghanistan had a right to
choose their own government without outside interference. On 24 January, the
British government announced measures against the Soviet Union which
included ending special preferential credit rates, cancelling military exchanges,
restricting exports of sensitive technology and avoiding high-level contact with
the Soviets. The UK also attempted to ensure that the US and European allies
did not drift too far apart in their respective responses to the crisis. President
Carter described the invasion as the gravest threat to world peace since the Second
World War.
However, West European governments were more sanguine and less inclined
to want to jeopardize the framework of détente. Belgium was anxious to avoid
action that might jeopardize prospects for new arms control talks. The West
German government saw a need to prevent the Soviets from engaging in similar
ventures but thought the ‘acquis of détente’ should be preserved. Likewise, the
French stressed the need for cool heads, lest détente be sacrificed by hasty action
(Smith et al 2012, 49 –50). The Europeans complained at a lack of consultation by
the US, whilst the Americans criticized the irresolution of the European response.
Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to Washington, noted the US had no
coordinated plan for responding to the new Soviet threat and their criticism of the
Europeans was made up ‘partly of scapegoatism, partly of ignorance and partly of
genuine disappointment’ (Smith et al 2012, 138). Britain worked within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community (EC) to
persuade members of the need for a unified voice on Afghanistan to complement,
if not completely coincide with, the view of the US, and sought to convey to the
Americans the need to take into account the Europeans’ particular interest
in détente.
Britain also attempted to reassure countries in the region in the immediate
aftermath of the invasion. In January, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Carrington, toured Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India to look at
ways of supporting these countries against any further Soviet encroachment. He
returned home with a list of actions which included: encouraging non-aligned
(particularly Muslim) countries to continue denouncing Soviet actions; accelerat-
ing the sale of defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states;
providing friendly states with assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 359
4
TNA: FCO 37/2132: minute by Christopher Mallaby, 8 November 1979.
5
TNA: FCO 37/2270: ‘Afghanistan: neutrality’ by the Research Department, February
1980.
360 Richard Smith
6
Ibid.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 361
7
TNA: FCO 37/2272: ‘A neutral Afghanistan’ by G Beel (Research Department), 28
February 1980.
8
TNA: FCO 37/2269: Sir Iain Sinclair (Legal Adviser) to Lord N Gordon Lennox, 21
February 1980.
9
TNA: FCO 37/2269: Brief by SAD for a meeting of the European Council, 15 February
1980.
10
TNA: FCO 37/2269: FCO Guidance tel no 20 of 22 February 1980.
362 Richard Smith
The immediate reaction of Sir Curtis Keeble was that the international pressure for
withdrawal had made some impression on the Soviet leadership, who now saw
that the neutrality idea might gain an ‘embarrassing degree of support’.11 David
Broucher, of EESD, thought the Soviets might well feel that the proposal had a
chance of catching on with the non-aligned and that it would be tactically better to
roll with the punches before later claiming that any proposal had been scuppered
by continuing Pakistani and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interference in
Afghanistan. But there was also a small chance of the Soviets ‘eventually needing
a ladder to climb down’.12
Christopher Mallaby suggested using Brezhnev’s words to present the
neutrality idea to the Soviets. He thought an early formal approach was needed to
avoid their dismissing the idea as ‘public posturing’. The UK’s policy of avoiding
high-level contacts with the Soviets made this awkward but the Italians, who held
the EC presidency, could speak to them on behalf of the EC.13 Carrington wanted a
meeting of the Asia Working Group in Rome on 28 February to agree to an
approach by the Italian Ambassador in Moscow the following day. The French,
however, were sceptical of an early approach, thinking the substance should be
properly prepared first, and then discussed with the Soviets in conditions of
secrecy. A démarche by the presidency would leak and the Russians would
respond by publicly rejecting it. Carrington consulted Hans Dietrich Genscher, the
West German Foreign Minister, who suspected the French were put out because
11
TNA: FCO 37/2269: Moscow tel nos 161 and 162 of 23 February 1980.
12
TNA: FCO 28/4004: minute by David Broucher, 26 February 1980.
13
TNA: FCO 37/2269: Christopher Mallaby to Julian Bullard, 20 February 1980.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 363
the initiative was not their idea.14 However, a lack of agreement at the Asia
Working Group meant the initiative was carried forward by national diplomacy
rather than collectively by the EC.
The FCO quickly took matters in hand and, during a visit to the Foreign Office
on the evening of 28 February, largely to talk about Rhodesia, the Soviet
Ambassador was briefed on the neutrality proposal. Sir Curtis Keeble followed up
the discussion with a visit to see Igor Zemskov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on
3 March.15 In pitching their idea, officials deliberately steered between being too
vague and providing excessive detail, either of which they felt would have made it
easier for the Soviets to reject.16 During these talks the Soviets made it clear they
were not prepared to depart from their precondition—that they would only
withdraw once alleged interference from outside Afghanistan had stopped. They
also stuck doggedly to the line that they were there to repel ‘external’ interference.
But they were careful to avoid saying that the concept of a neutral and non-aligned
Afghanistan was unacceptable and stated that they were not opposed to a political
solution. The FCO interpreted this as an invitation to continue dialogue, whilst
remaining aware that the Soviets could be engaged in wedge-driving or trying to
rebuild their international reputation.17 Any thoughts the Soviets themselves had
of leaving Afghanistan were quickly receding. In February, major protests erupted
in Kabul and over subsequent months Soviet troops were drawn into military
operations designed to improve the security situation in the country and stabilize
the Karmal regime. The Soviet strategy for stabilising Afghanistan was three-fold:
military, for Soviet troops to support and train Afghan forces until they were able
to stand alone; political, to unify the PDPA and make it more acceptable to the
population; and diplomatic, to secure recognition for the Karmal regime and end
interference from Pakistan (Kalinovsky 2011, 52 –53).
14
TNA: FCO 37/2270: Paul Lever to PS/Donald Maitland, 27 February 1980.
15
TNA: FCO 37/2271: FCO tel no 158 to Moscow of 28 February 1980 and Moscow tel
no 180 of 3 March 1980.
16
TNA: FCO 37/2271: FCO tel no 127 to Paris of 4 March 1980.
17
TNA: FCO 37/2271: FCO tel no 175 to Moscow of 7 March 1980.
18
However, at this stage officials did not think the economic cost of intervention would
be too onerous for the Soviets. Nor did they think military considerations would dictate
withdrawal. Although insurgent activity would continue, Soviet troops would have little
difficulty controlling the roads and towns, and if they kept ‘search and destroy’ operations
to a minimum then casualties were thought likely to be trivial. TNA: FCO
37/2269. ‘Afghanistan: Treaty of Neutrality’, 15 February 1980.
364 Richard Smith
19
A Loja Jirga was used in 1987 and 2003 to ratify new constitutions for Afghanistan but
Andrew Barfield suggests that by this point they had become a good example of an
‘invented tradition’ (see Barfield 2010, 294– 299).
20
TNA: FCO 37/2272: ‘Afghanistan/elections’ by JE Hoare (Research Department), 22
February 1980, and ‘A neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan’ by William White (SAD),
6 March 1980.
21
TNA: FCO 37/2273: Christopher Mallaby to Sir Donald Maitland, 18 March 1980.
22
TNA: FCO 37/2272: revised version of ‘A neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan’ by
William White, 18 March 1980.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 365
to the Soviets without proper consultation with the US.23 Mallaby also recognized
this danger and believed they would have to work hard to prevent the ‘weaker
brethren’ in the West from moderating their line on East – West relations. There
was also a need to guard against the Soviets appearing to take a reasonable stance
towards negotiations but, once Western criticism had been blunted, filibustering
until the idea ‘ran into the sand’.24 But for Britain the neutrality proposal was
meant to complement, rather than replace, a tough stance by the West. Indeed it
only made sense when backed up by a hostile reaction to, and measures against,
the Soviet Union. Otherwise there would be little inducement for the Soviet Union
to withdraw.25
The Permanent Under-Secretary visited Washington for talks in March 1980
aimed at reassuring the Americans and met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Brzezinski. The British reading
of the discussion was that the Americans supported the neutrality idea but with
varying degrees of scepticism—the State Department were interested in pursuing
the plan as a genuine proposal whereas the White House saw it as a useful tactic
for embarrassing the Russians and sustaining pressure.26 Warren Christopher
then chaired a meeting with ambassadors from Britain, France, West Germany,
Italy and Japan to discuss a framework for a possible proposal for neutrality.
Whilst the British government welcomed the new interest shown by the
Americans (or at least the State Department) they instructed the Washington
Embassy that it would be the ‘kiss of death’ for the proposal if the US were seen
publicly to be taking the lead, adding, ‘I hope that you can tactfully persuade them
of this’.27 Like the Soviet Union, the US had imposed its own precondition: the
prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces as the first step to any agreement.
The British were not so prescriptive. What the FCO was trying to do was find a
path between the polarized positions held by the two superpowers. For them,
‘who should give what commitment first’ was a sterile argument. Instead, they
believed that the sequence in which all the elements of a neutrality arrangement
might be put in place was open to negotiation, that neither side should ask the
other to do something first, but that everyone should ‘step forward together’.28
23
TNA: FCO 37/2272: John Fretwell (Washington) to Ewen Fergusson, 12 March 1980.
24
TNA: FCO 37/2270: Christopher Mallaby to William White, 27 February 1980.
25
TNA: FCO 37/2271: Giles Fitzherbert (EC Department) to Mallaby, 29 February 1980.
26
TNA: FCO 37/2272: Washington tel nos 1145 and 1146 of 19 March 1980.
27
TNA: FCO 37/2274: FCO tel no 619 to Washington of 29 March 1980.
28
TNA: FCO 37/2271: FCO tel no 158 to Moscow of 28 February (sent 29 February) 1980.
29
TNA: FCO 37/2274: note entitled ‘Afghanistan: work in hand’ by SAD, 27 March
1980.
366 Richard Smith
take the idea forward.30 Chatty put his own spin on the plan: the gradual, phased
introduction of agreed neutrality, starting with acceptance by neighbouring states;
contact with the rebels and the Afghan government for a ceasefire (perhaps
supervised by UN); the formation of an interim government of national unity;
with the whole process underwritten by an international conference of all
neighbouring states.31 There were recognized problems with the plan—the rebels
were disunited and any ceasefire would work against them by allowing the
Soviets to consolidate their hold. But the British were happy to endorse the
initiative, as they were keen to get away from the neutrality proposal being seen as
an exclusively ‘European’ idea. The 11th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers
in May set up a standing committee consisting of Chatty and the Iranian and
Pakistani foreign ministers to work for a comprehensive solution by consultations
and the convening of an international conference; but they made little progress.
As support for a political solution appeared to grow, or at least refused to
subside, the Soviet government looked to use the interest to create more
favourable conditions for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan: one that
took into account its own interests and security concerns, rather than the current
proposals which it saw as thinly veiled attempts to achieve the rapid withdrawal
of Soviet troops and regime change. In March, the Soviets encouraged Cuba, as
current chair of the NAM, to use its good offices to set up negotiations between
Afghanistan and its neighbours and work out guarantees of non-interference in
the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (Westad 1996/1997,
169– 171). This provided Moscow with a diplomatic counter to Western or
regional proposals. The Soviets were also undoubtedly behind the Afghan
government plans for a settlement launched on 14 May 1980. The proposals called
for bilateral talks with Iran and Pakistan to discuss normalization of relations, an
agreement from those countries not to permit hostile acts from the territory of one
against the other, and immunity for returning Afghan refugees. There were no
specific undertakings about Soviet withdrawal. The 14 May proposals were
considered a tactical ploy, coming on the eve of meetings between Western foreign
ministers and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in Vienna and just
prior to the opening of the Islamic Conference.
Lord Carrington discussed the neutrality proposal with Gromyko in Vienna in
May 1980 and again at the UN in September. Gromyko was also a member of the
Politburo’s Afghanistan Commission, which directed policy towards Afghani-
stan. The only requirement from Britain was that a political solution must lead to
the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and to guarantees of non-intervention in
the future by other states, including the Soviet Union. The Soviets preferred to see
the conclusion of bilateral treaties between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, aimed
at ending armed incursions and recognizing the Karmal regime. Complete
withdrawal could not be discussed before guarantees had been given and seen to
be effective. Lord Carrington thought these positions were not irreconcilable, and
that it should be possible to work out a formula that made commitments to both
withdrawal and undertakings simultaneous, with a timetable settled at the outset.
30
TNA: FCO 37/2274: record of the discussion held between Mr Chatty and the
Lord Privy Seal on 3 April 1980.
31
TNA: FCO 37/2276: Doha tel no 73 of 6 May 1980.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 367
The two ministers promised to keep in touch (Smith et al 2012, 143 –147, 185 – 186).
The Soviet desire for a regional solution was designed to strengthen the position of
the Karmal regime and localize the issue to prevent it from further affecting wider
East –West relations. It also allowed for action to end external interference in
Afghanistan without addressing the issue of the presence of Soviet troops. The
British considered regional negotiations inadequate. They thought the problem
had global implications, as a superpower was involved, and thus regional stability
could only be brought about by global action.
32
TNA: FCO 37/2412: ‘Afghanistan – discussion points’, c March 1981.
33
TNA: FCO 37/2412: minutes by Sir John Graham, 7 January 1981, and John Coles, 16
January 1981.
368 Richard Smith
Pakistan, Iran, India and the Islamic community. There would be no need for the
Afghan government to participate, since the conference would deal with ending
external interference so that Afghanistan could reaffirm its non-aligned status.
The British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Reginald Hibberd, thought the timing
and substance of initiative was probably dictated by Giscard’s need to
demonstrate the independence of French foreign policy in the run-up to the
forthcoming presidential elections. Whilst the French proposal did internationa-
lize the issue and kept the focus on Afghanistan he thought it was badly timed, cut
across the Pakistan initiative and went against the UK strategy of keeping Islamic
and non-aligned opinion to the fore (not to mention a failure to adequately
consult with allies).34 But Sir John Graham thought the French proposal had
a nice logic in that all parties maintained that the primary cause of the trouble in
Afghanistan was foreign interference and differed only on the source and nature
of that interference (Smith et al 2012, 205). Ministers thought it definitely worth
considering. However, FCO Minister Peter Blaker, who had just returned from a
visit to Islamabad to stiffen Pakistani resolve, did not want to alienate Pakistan by
cutting across its efforts to initiate talks. In February, Perez de Cuellar had been
appointed by the UN Secretary General as his ‘personal representative’ and was in
the process of visiting Kabul, Islamabad and Moscow. The Foreign Secretary
agreed, and Graham proposed instead that current initiatives be allowed to run
their course before any further action was taken.35
34
TNA: FCO 37/2584: FCO tel no 85 to Islamabad of 30 January 1981.
35
TNA: FCO 37/ 2584: minutes by John Macgregor, 13 February 1981, and Roderic
Lyne, 16 February 1981.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 369
recognized that the Soviets were unlikely ever to negotiate about withdrawal
unless there was an internal political solution in sight which would not only be
acceptable to world opinion but would also recognize that the Soviet Union had a
legitimate interest in a stable and friendly regime in Afghanistan.36
What followed was a period of intense diplomatic activity as the FCO
consulted the US, EC members, NATO, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic
Conference, the UN Secretary General and members of the Commonwealth to
ensure that the initiative was favourably received. Sir John Graham thought there
was a risk that all the activity would encourage expectations that were bound to be
disappointed. ‘But to do less’, he added, ‘would irritate friends who were omitted
and lend colour to the accusation that it was purely a cold-war propaganda move.’
US Secretary of State Al Haig wrote to Lord Carrington giving the US’s
enthusiastic support for the proposal but he thought the agenda should not be
enlarged to include the Gulf or the Indian Ocean and ‘we should anticipate Soviet
refusal to participate and try to move forward with a conference despite Moscow’s
obstructionist tactics’. Coles thought this would be an empty propaganda gesture.
He preferred the tactic of refusing the rejection and arguing for the proposal over a
period of several months.37
36
TNA: FCO 37/2415: FCO tel no 789 to Washington of 26 May 1981.
37
TNA: FCO 37/2415: minute by Sir John Graham, 2 June 1981, and submission by John
Coles, 2 June 1981; TNA: FCO 37/2416: Alexander Haig to Lord Carrington, 12 June 1981.
38
TNA: FCO 37/2416: letter from Michael Alexander to Roderic Lyne, 10 June 1981.
370 Richard Smith
countries, not by the Soviet Union. Carrington countered that the main cause of
the problem was the presence of 85,000 Soviet troops but emphasized that the
European proposal envisaged discussion of all forms of external intervention.
What had Soviet leaders meant when they had expressed a willingness to discuss
the international aspects of the situation? Then Gromyko insisted on the Karmal
regime being present at negotiations from the start. Carrington stressed that the
problem of Afghan representation could not be solved at the outset in a way
acceptable to all potential participants. It would be easier to solve when
negotiations had started, and an atmosphere of confidence and trust had been
established. But it was to no avail. Gromyko made little attempt to enter into
serious discussion and dismissed the proposal as ‘unrealistic’ (Smith et al 2012,
257– 262).
Carrington declared that he was disappointed but unsurprised by Gromyko’s
reaction but stressed that the offer remained on the table as a reasonable proposal
for negotiations. He thought it important that as many governments as possible
should now make their support known, both publicly and privately, to the Soviet
Union and a lobbying effort was again mounted by Britain’s overseas missions
prior to the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1981. (This undoubtedly
helped secure another condemnatory vote in the UN calling for the immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops, passed by 116 votes to 23, with 12 abstentions.) Haig
wrote supporting Carrington’s decision to continue to push the EC initiative. He
believed it essential to point out that Gromyko’s reaction contradicted the Soviet
line that Moscow was interested in a political settlement. The US would keep
raising the issue in bilateral exchanges, ‘pressurizing hard for total Soviet
withdrawal to make clear that this issue will not go away’.39 Lord Carrington
reported back to EC foreign ministers at a meeting on 13 July and was given
discretion to continue promoting the proposal, in consultation with partners, as
necessary.40 Meanwhile, the Soviets’ position was formalized in an aide-memoire
presented by their embassy on 22 July, which described the EC proposals as both
‘unrealistic’ and ‘unacceptable’ but added little to Gromyko’s previous line.
Encouragement was drawn from the fact that the Soviets had obviously felt
under enough pressure to have to try to stop any momentum building up
behind the proposals, but there had been a hope that the wide international
support for the initiative would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to reject
them.41 But, as Sir Curtis Keeble concluded from Moscow in October 1981, ‘The
fact is there is no choice open to the Soviet Union other than that between
soldiering on in a long colonial war or admitting defeat. They are not yet ready for
the latter’ (Smith et al 2012, 284).
39
TNA: FCO 37/2418: Alexander Haig to Lord Carrington, 15 July 1981.
40
TNA: FCO 37/2418: UK Rep Brussels tel no 2659 of 13 July 1981.
41
TNA: FCO 37/2418: minute by Nigel Broomfield (Head of EESD), 23 July 1981.
The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 371
42
Phrase used by Sir John Coles (former head of SAD) in an interview given in 1999 to
the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge
(BDOHP 46).
372 Richard Smith
The Soviets were on the defensive in relation to world opinion and this might as
well be exploited.43
Conclusion
Britain’s neutrality proposal was designed to serve Western purposes on two
levels. It underlined the message that it was the presence of Soviet troops (and not
‘outside interference’) which was responsible for the crisis and it helped to
demonstrate that the West wanted a solution to the crisis rather than
confrontation. It was thus a useful political weapon to rally non-aligned support
and put pressure on the Soviet Union. In this aim it largely succeeded. But it was
hoped the neutrality idea might also have substantive value as the nucleus for an
eventual settlement. The Soviets might eventually welcome this as a way of
cutting their losses inside Afghanistan and rebuilding their reputation with the
non-aligned. The logic behind the British initiative was correct but premature.
Keeble wrote to Carrington on the eve of his trip to Moscow, ‘If, like an ageing
imperial power, the Russians really wanted to get out we could help them to do so
honourably. But they are not yet quite at this stage’ (Smith et al 2012, 253). The
Soviets were still in an initial period of false optimism that their counter-
insurgency campaign would stabilize the country and make it possible to
withdraw troops. They had made a major political and military investment in
sustaining in Afghanistan a regime that was both compliant and socialist, and
would not easily give that up. Only following the death of President Brezhnev did
Moscow start looking seriously for a way out of the country. However, by then the
issue had become linked to broader US – Soviet relations (with hard-line
Republicans now occupying the White House). The immediate impact of the
invasion had been contained and securing the withdrawal of Soviet troops was no
longer such an imperative for the West, which was now increasingly content to
leave the Soviets in their ‘mountainous and inhospitable Vietnam’.
Notes on contributor
Richard Smith (PhD, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) is a senior historian
at the FCO and editor of the series Documents on British Policy Overseas. He
is currently working on a volume examining UK relations with Eastern Bloc
countries in the early 1980s. Email: [email protected].
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