Conduct Prejudicial Jurisprudence
Conduct Prejudicial Jurisprudence
The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent's official functions. In Pia
v. Gervacio, we explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office.
The following acts or omissions have been treated as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without
prior notice; failure to safe-keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents;
falsification of court orders; a judge's act of brandishing a gun; and threatening the complainants during
a traffic altercation.46
Here, we cannot deduce from the records and circumstances how petitioner's act amounted to conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner's assailed act did not tarnish the image of her
public office, the NAP. Definitely, when petitioner served as resource speaker at the seminar, she shared
her expertise before another government unit, the City of Bacoor. The records also do not show that
petitioner's failure to inform and secure prior office approval to act as a resource speaker, needlessly as
explained above, tarnished the image and integrity of his or her public office that would have eroded the
public's trust and confidence in the government. This is evident from the fact that the City of Bacoor sent
the NAP a letter after the seminar thanking it and its employees, petitioner and Austria, for their
invaluable contribution to the professionalization of its basic records management.
Hence, it cannot be said that petitioner is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Let us be clear about petitioner's acts. She participated at a seminar for the benefit of the local
government unit and people of the City of Bacoor. There is no evidence that she disseminated the NAP's
materials (to which the NAP did not have proprietary rights to, in any event) at the seminar. She did not
materially profit from her attendance thereat. She did not defraud the government of anything - she was
in fact on leave of absence when she was there. As there was no perpetration of fraud, there could have
been no intent to defraud on her part.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service deals with a demeanor of a public officer which
"tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, is defined by Largo v. Court of
Appeals[17] as any misconduct "which need not be related or connected to the public officers['] official
functions [but tends to tarnish] the image and integrity of his/her public office."[18]
The penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service is provided for under Rule 10, Section
46(B)(8) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As a grave offense, it is
punishable by a suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and
dismissal from service for the second offense.
While there is no specific list of acts that may constitute the offense, this court has previously
characterized certain acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service: seeking the assistance of
an elite police force for a purely personal matter;[19] changing the internet protocol (IP) address on a work
computer to gain access to restricted websites;[20] and fencing in a litigated property in order to assert
ownership.
The public's impression of its government is sketched by its experiences with the behavior of their
acquaintances who are public officers when these officers are part of one's social circles and
communities. Between them and the public officers they read about in the newspaper and encounter in
other media, the former's presence is more immediate and more concrete, and this impression is more
salient in their daily lives. Delegated governmental power, no matter how miniscule, is not to be abused.
Rather, it is to be used with the expectation that it be wielded justly in the interest of society in general
and not for the personal disposition of the public officer who wields it. Titles of public officer are
burdens on their holders as much as they are privileges. While they enjoy tenure, these titles accompany
them. It is thus a stewardship that they should carry responsibly. It is, while they sit as public officers, a
public trust.
While Borromeo's acts are not connected to his official functions as a Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose, he is, first and foremost, a public servant. As a public servant, he is bound by the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6713 to exhibit the highest degree of professionalism not only in his
official duties but also in his personal endeavors. As a court employee, he is expected to uphold the
image of the judiciary not only within the confines of the Hall of Justice but also in his personal dealings
with the public. In Marquez v. Clores-Ramos:[24]
It cannot be overemphasized that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with
other people, to preserve the Court's good name and standing. This is because the image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred
duty of each and every one in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of
justice.[
In this regard, it is well to stress that the purpose of administrative penalties is to restore and preserve
the public trust in our institutions.181 The imposition of penalties is part of public accountability, which
arises from the State's duty to preserve the public trust.
152415212a
Considering that the basis for the imposition of administrative liabilities rests on the core
constitutional principles of public trust, accountability, responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
patriotism and justice and modest living, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is, in
reality, a summation of these standards by which all in the public service must measure up to.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST OTELIA LYN G. MACEDA, COURT INTERPRETER, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, PALAPAG, NORTHERN SAMAR
(In re Maceda, A.M. No. P-12-3093, (26 March 2014), 730 Phil 401-413)
First, Maceda questions the anonymity of the complainant and suspects that the complainant is not
really a student at UEP but another court employee, who is Maceda's rival for the same vacant Clerk of
Court position. The complainant is concealing his/her true identity to avoid the disciplining authority of
the Court.
At the outset, we stress that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating
as it does from an unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright
dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without
much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. [9] As this Court ruled in
Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson A. Araula: [10] SAcaDE
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are accepted in which the
charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus needing no corroboration by
evidence to be offered by complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the
matter involved is of public interest. . . . .
Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. [11] Hence, anonymous complaints of
this nature should be acted upon by this Court.
(In re Maceda, A.M. No. P-12-3093, (26 March 2014), 730 Phil 401-413)