Felixberto C. Sta. Maria vs. Salvador P. Lopez, et.al., G.R. No.

L-30733,
February 18, 1970
Facts: Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria was elected Dean of the College of
Education by the Board of Regents, on the nomination of the UP President. His
appointment was for a five-year term. In 1969, the graduate and undergraduate
students of the UP College of Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez
a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic program and the
physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response,
President Lopez created a committee which met times with Dean Sta. Maria. The
dean gave the president a written summary of the dialogues he had with the
committee and enumerated in connection with the demands, the steps taken, the
steps being taken, and the steps to be taken in consultation with the faculty.
But the students were not to be appeased. According to them, the dean did not act
on some of their demands. The students threatened to boycott their classes.
Although, President Lopez asked that they desist, suggested that they instead
attend a student-faculty meeting in his office, the Education Graduate Student
Organization boycotted their classes just the same. On the other hand, the dean
offered to sit down with the students. The latter, however, refused to enter into
a dialogue unless he were first ousted. The boycott fever infected other colleges
and led President Lopez to issue the transfer order from the College of Education
to the Office of the President as Special Assistant 8 with the rank of Dean.
President Lopez explained in a press statement that he “cannot permit the
continued disruption of the academic life of the institution”; that the transfer
order was made “[i]n the interest of the service” and “as an emergency measure”
because the meetings with the faculty, students, Sta. Maria and the UP President
had “proved fruitless in the face of the refusal of the College of
Education students to discuss any further their demands unless and until
Dean Sta. Maria resigns his position”; and that, therefore, “the complete shut-
down of classes in the Diliman campus has compelled” him to “transfer Dean Sta.
Maria to other duties”.
Issue: Whether or not the transfer of petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Maria from his
post of Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines (UP), to the
Office of respondent UP President Salvador P. Lopez, there to become Special
Assistant in charge of public information and relations, is valid.
Ruling: No. The argument that the transfer of Sta. Maria was made in the interest
of public service has dwindled in strength on the face of the circumstances. Of
course, the university is under compulsion to bring normalcy to the campus, to
end the boycott of classes. The decision to transfer could really refract the
temper of the times. However, that emotion or muscle need not displace reason.
Nor the Court believed it too difficult for the authorities to hew to the line
drawn by the due process clause, to cause charges to be formalized, Sta. Maria
suspended, and given a fair chance to defend himself. This procedure does not
necessarily bring about humiliation. On the contrary, it exudes the spirit of
fairness. More than these, such transfer undermined the integrity of UP. The
university buckled under strain, yielded where it should have upheld its
commitment to the rule of law. Peace may not be secured at the expense of
consecrate constitutional principles. A contrary rule could lead to more serious
disorders. The Court is left under no doubt that petitioner Felixberto Sta. Maria
is entitled to be restored to his position as Dean of the college of Education.
VARGAS VS RILLORAZA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:49
PM
G.R. No. L-1612 February 26
1948 [Composition of the
Supreme Court, ]
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity
of Sec. 14 of the The People's
Court Act, Commonwealth
Act 682, which provided that
the President could designate
Judges of First Instance,
Judges-at-large of First
Instance or Cadastral Judges
to sit as substitute Justices of
the
Supreme Court in treason
cases without them
necessarily having to
possess the
required constitutional
qualifications of a regular
Supreme Court Justice.
G.R. No. L-1612 February
26, 1948
JORGE B. VARGAS, petitioner,
vs.
EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE
BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO,
Judges of the
People’s Court, and the Solicitor
General of the Philippines,
respondent.
FACTS:
In a Motion dated August
28, 1947, petitioner, through
his counsel, assails the
constitutionality of Section 14
of the People’s Court Act
(Commonwealth Act No.
682). That the President could
designate Judges of First
Instance, Justice-at-large of
First Instance or Cadastral
Judges of First Instance to sit a
substitute Justices of the
Supreme Court in treason
cases without having to
possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a
regular Supreme Court Justice.
Section 14 of the People’s Court
Act provides:
-Any justice of the
Supreme Court who held
any office or position under
the
Philippine Executive
Commission or under the
government called Philippine
Republic
may not sit and vote in any
case brought to that Court
under section 13 hereof in
which the accused is a person
who held any office or position
under either or both
the Philippine Executive
Commission and the
Philippine Republic or any
branch,
instrumentality and/or agency
thereof.
-If, on account of such
disqualification, or because of
any grounds of disqualification
of Judges, in Rule 126, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, or on
account of illness,
absence or temporary disability
of Judges, in Rule 126, Section
of the Rules of Court,
or on account of illness,
absence or temporary disability
the requisite of Justices
necessary to constitute a
quorum… or to render
judgment in any case is
not
present, the President may
designate such number of
Judges of First Instance,
Judges-at-large of First
Instance or Cadastral
Judges, having none of the
disqualifications set forth in said
section one hereof, as may be
necessary to sit…
temporarily as Justice of said
court, in order to form a quorum
or until a Judgment in
said case is reached”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of
the People’s Court Act,
Commonwealth Act 682 is
constitutional.
RULING:
NO, the Court declared and
ordered that Section 14 of
the People’s Court is
unconstitutional in the respects
specified in the body of the
resolution.
In the face of the constitutional
requirement (Art VIII, Section 5)
that the members
of the Supreme Court should be
appointed by the President with
the consent of the
Commission on Appointment,
the court are in the opinion that
no person not so
appointed may act act as Justice
of the Supreme Court and that
the “designation”
authorized in Section 14 of the
People’s Court Act to be made
by the President of
any Judge of First Instance,
Judge-at-large of First
Instance or Cadestral Judge
cannot possibly be a
compliance with the provision
requiring that appointment. An
additional disqualifying
circumstances of the
“designee” is the lack of
confirmation
by or consent of the
Commission on Appointments
G.R. No. L-1612
February 26, 1948 JORGE B. VARGAS, petitioner vs. EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE,
MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People’s Court, and the Solicitor General of the
Philippines, respondent.
FACTS: In a Motion dated August 28, 1947, petitioner, through his
counsel, assails the constitutionality of Section 14 of the People’s Court Act
(Commonwealth Act No.682). That the President could designate Judges of First
Instance, Justice-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges of First
Instance to sit a substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason
cases without having to possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
Section 14 of the People’s Court Act provides:-Any justice of the Supreme
Court who held any office or position under the Philippine
Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not
sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section 13 hereof in which
the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any
branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
-If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any grounds of
disqualification of Judges, in Rule 126, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on
account of illness, absence or temporary disability of Judges, in Rule 126,
Section of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary
disability the requisite of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum…
or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President
may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-
large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges, having none of the
disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to
sit…temporarily as Justice of said court, in order to form a quorum or until a
Judgment in said case is reached”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of the People’s Court Act, Commonwealth Act
682 is constitutional.
RULING: NO, the Court declared and ordered that Section 14 of
the People’s Court is unconstitutional in the respects specified in the
body of the resolution. In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art VIII,
Section 5) that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment, the court are in
the opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme
Court and that the “designation “authorized in Section 14 of the People’s Court
Act to be made by the President of any Judge of First Instance, Judge-
at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge cannot possibly be a
compliance with the provision requiring that appointment. An additional
disqualifying circumstances of the “designee” is the lack of confirmation by or
consent of the Commission on Appointments
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Julio Pomar, G.R. No. L-22008, November 3,
1924
Facts: Accused Julio Pomar is the manager and person-in-charge of La Flor de la
Isabela. In 1923, he employed a woman named Macaria Fajardo as a cigar-maker in
said factory, to whom he granted vacation leave to by reason of her pregnancy.
However, Pomar willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay
Fajardo the sum of eighty pesos (P80), to which she was entitled as her regular
wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and
confinement, despite and over the demands made by the latter. The Court of First
Instance accused the defendant of a violation of Section 13 in connection with
Section15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. Pomar appealed alleging
that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense and contended that
the provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based were
illegal, unconstitutional and void. Said Section 13 was enacted by the
Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police
power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women
laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring
to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one
month after their delivery.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 of the
Philippine Legislature are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power
of the state.
Ruling: No.
A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law
and the particular facts to which it is to be applied. The particular statute
before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of
contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The said section creates a term
or condition in every contract made by every person, firm, or corporation with
any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant, and a
failure to include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine and
imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm,
or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts
of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law
creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such
persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution
of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his
liberties is the liberty to contract. The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the
contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may
deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice Case G.R. No. 203335
Facts:
This case involves multiple petitions filed before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The petitioners, coming
from various sectors including legal practitioners, lawmakers, journalists, and
internet users, argued that specific provisions of the law infringe on
constitutionally guaranteed rights such as freedom of expression, due process,
equal protection, and privacy of communication. Following the enactment of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, several petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court. These petitions were consolidated due to the similarity of the
issues raised. The petitioners questioned the law’s provisions, including those
on cyber libel, cybersex, and the authority given to the government to shut down
websites and monitor internet traffic without court order. They argued that these
provisions were overbroad, vague, and violated the freedom of expression and the
right to privacy. The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, defended the law stating it was a necessary measure to address the
growing number of cybercrimes and protect the rights of the victims of these
crimes. They asserted that the law provided adequate safeguards to prevent abuse.
The case went through the Supreme Court, where both parties presented their
arguments. The Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
implementation of the law, indicating the need for deeper examination of its
provisions.
Issues:
1. Whether certain provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violate
the freedom of expression.
2. Whether the law infringes on the right to privacy and due process.
3. Whether the law is vague and overbroad in its definitions and penalties.
4. The validity of the law’s provision on cyber libel.
5. The authority granted by the law to the government to restrict or control data
on the internet.
Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court declared certain provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 as G.R. No. 203335.
April 22, 2014 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2 invalid and
unconstitutional, while upholding the validity of others. 1.
Doctrine:
The decision established the principle that certain measures intended to combat
cybercrime cannot infringe on fundamental rights such as freedom of expression
and privacy. It clarified the parameters within which the government can regulate
cyberspace, emphasizing the need for laws to have clear definitions to avoid
being vague and overbroad.
Title: Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove: A Legal
Examination on Employee Dismissal on Grounds of Morality in a Catholic
Educational Institution
Facts:
Cheryll Santos Leus (“Leus”) was employed by St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove
(“SSCW”), a Catholic school, in May 2001. In 2003, Leus became pregnant out of
wedlock and informed by SSCW’s Directress, Sr. Edna Quiambao (“Quiambao”), to
resign, which Leus refused. Quiambao then formally asked Leus to explain why her
pre-marital sexual relations and consequent pregnancy should not be deemed
grounds for dismissal due to misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of
a Catholic school. Leus contested, citing lack of awareness of policies against
pregnancy out of wedlock as grounds for dismissal.
Despite Leus’s marriage to the father of her child before her dismissal, SSCW,
invoking the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (“1992 MRPS”) and
citing disgraceful or immoral conduct, terminated her employment. Leus filed for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against SSCW and Quiambao. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed her complaint, finding valid grounds for dismissal, which was affirmed
by the NLRC and subsequently by the CA upon appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether the 1992 MRPS applies over the Labor Code regarding termination of
employment in private educational institutions.
2. Whether pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes valid grounds for termination of
employment.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA, ruling that Leus was illegally
dismissed. It clarified that challenges to the validity of the 1992 MRPS were
raised too late in the legal proceedings to be considered. Furthermore, it found
that Leus’s dismissal based on pre-marital sexual relations and subsequent
pregnancy did not constitute “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as per the 1992
MRPS when assessed against prevailing societal norms of conduct. The Court
differentiated between secular and religious moral standards, emphasizing that
employment law is grounded in secular morality. The Court also criticized the
labor tribunals and CA for not requiring SSCW to provide substantial evidence
that Leus’s conduct was indeed scandalous or had undermined the institution’s
moral standing. The Court ruled that SSCW’s decision was not a valid exercise of
managerial prerogatives and ordered Leus’s separation with full backwages and
attorney’s fees, instead of reinstatement due to the impracticality of her
returning to the institution.
G.R. No. 211833
April 7, 2015FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New
Bataan, Compostela Valley Province petitioner vs. Judicial and Bar Council,
respondent.
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September
27, 2013, he appliedfor the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the
following Regional Trial Courts(RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao
City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. However, according to the letter
dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. JBC
Executive Officer decided not to include his name in the list of applicants due
to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-
level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only
for more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts is constitutional.
RULING: YES, The Court held that the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. According to the Court,
petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees
for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand
that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the
JBC One's inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the
JB Cover the selection of nominees for a particular judicial post.
Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but
simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound
discretion. Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional
appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second
level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion
to second-level courts. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level
judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the
exercise of sound discretion by the JBCAs an offspring of the 1987
Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and
only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the
JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest
as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the
1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures
and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The Court, however,
DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication
requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the
Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar
Council is or will be implementing.