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Title: Oxford Atlas + 5–6 Format: 276mm (H) x 230 mm (W) Spine: (216 pp) 11.9 mm Colours used: CMYK

OXFORD

ATLAS +
5–6

OXFORD ATLAS+ FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS 5 – 6

Stage three of the Oxford Atlas+ for Australian Schools series The online Student Dashboard includes videos; digital
provides coverage of the Years 5–6 Science and HASS interactives, including coding and mapping skills; and interactive
Australian Curriculum content, and fosters the application of maps to enrich and supplement the print atlas.
STEM knowledge within and across content areas. In the The online Teacher Dashboard includes professional support FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS HASS | STEM | Inquiry | Coding
print atlas, students will explore more advanced map-reading notes, with teaching activities, ideas and experiments; pre- and
skills. Visually stunning thematic spreads and a wide range of post-assessment activities; and tracking of student quiz results.
detailed maps complemented by case studies enable students to
explore and deepen their learning.

OXFORD OXFORD OXFORD

ATLAS+ F–2 ATLAS+ 3–4 ATLAS+ 5–6

OXFORD ATLAS+ FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS F –2

OXFORD ATLAS+ FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS 3 – 4

OXFORD ATLAS+ FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS 5 – 6

Introduce Discover Explore

Students are introduced to Students discover formal mapping Students explore advanced map-reading
mapping skills, highly engaging skills and conventional map symbology, skills, visually stunning thematic spreads
thematic spreads and world maps. engaging thematic spreads and case and a wide range of detailed maps
studies from around the world. complemented by case studies.

Did you know?

I’m an emu. I’m the second-
largest bird in the world. But www.oxfordowl.com.au
my ancestors were even bigger
Oxford Owl — the online
than me – I’m descended destination for Oxford
from therapod (two-legged) Atlas+ resources.
dinosaurs, such as the T. rex!

ISBN 978-0-19-031078-3

9 780190 310783
visit us at: oup.com.au or
contact customer service: [email protected]

PVN_OA_5-6_10783_CVR_SI.indd 2-4 cyan magenta yellow black 3/07/2017 11:13 AM

60°W 30°W A 0° B 30°E C 60°E D 90°E E 120°E F 150°E G 180° H 150°W I 120°W J 90°W K 60°W L 30°W M 0° N 30°E

World: Human Svalbard

(Norway) A R C T I C O C E A N
Kalaallit Nunaat
6 Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland)
(Greenland) (Denmark) 6
(Denmark)
Jan Mayen
(Norway)

NORWAY Arctic Circle

Alaska
ICELAND (USA) ICELAND
Reykjavik FINLAND Reykjavik
Faroe Islands SWEDEN
(Denmark) Oslo Helsinki RUSSIA
60°N Tallinn 60°N
Stockholm ESTONIA
UNITED Riga LATVIA
KINGDOM DENMARKCopenhagen LITHUANIA Moscow CANADA
Vilnius
Dublin 2 POLAND Minsk
IRELAND London Berlin BELARUS
Warsaw
3GERMANY Kyiv Astana
Paris 1 10 11 UKRAINE
7
12 14 KAZAKHSTAN Ulan Bator
5 4 15 13
FRANCE 16 ROMANIA MONGOLIA Ottawa St Pierre and Miquelon 5
Bucharest (France)
5 8 17 19 GEORGIA UZBEKISTAN Bishkek
6 Rome 18 20 BULGARIA
PORTUGAL Madrid
9
22
21 Sofia Tbilisi
Ankara ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
Tashkent KYRGYZSTAN
Beijing NORTH KOREA
AT L A N T I C
Lisbon SPAIN ITALY Yerevan Baku TURKMENISTANDushanbe Pyongyang UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Washington DC Azores
Algiers Tunis GREECE Athens TURKEY Ashkhabad TAJIKISTAN (Portugal)
Seoul JAPAN
Gibraltar (UK) Nicosia SYRIA SOUTH
Madeira Islands 23 Tehran Tokyo
(Portugal) Rabat TUNISIA CYPRUS 24 Damascus Baghdad Kabul Islamabad CHINA KOREA
Canary Islands
MOROCCO Tripoli
Cairo
25 Amman IRAQ IRAN AFGHANISTAN
JORDAN
Bermuda (UK) OCEAN
30°N (Spain) 26 30°N
ALGERIA New Delhi NEPAL BHUTAN
SAUDI 27
Western LIBYA
EGYPT ARABIA 28
PAKISTAN Kathmandu Thimphu
BANGLADESH Taipei
P A C I F I C BAHAMAS
Nassau
Sahara Riyadh 29 Tropic of Cancer
Dhaka Havana CUBA
Muscat INDIA TAIWAN
MYANMAR Hanoi Socorro Island MEXICO
MAURITANIA OMAN Hawaii (Mexico) Mexico City HAITI DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Naypyidaw LAOS (USA) Port-au-Prince Santo Domingo CAPE
Nouakchott MALI Vientiane NORTHERN 42 45 VERDE
NIGER MARIANAS Clarion Island GUATEMALA 43
Asmara San’a Yangon THAILAND PHILIPPINES Saipan (Mexico) HONDURAS 44
4 30 BURKINA Niamey CHAD Khartoum VIETNAM Manila Guatemala City 46 Praia 4
YEMEN Tegucigalpa
31 Bamako FASO SUDAN ERITREA Aden Bangkok CAMBODIA Guam (USA) San Salvador NICARAGUA 49 4748
Ouagadougou N’Djamena EL SALVADOR
32 GUINEA
Conakry 37 NIGERIA
Djibouti DJIBOUTI Phnom Penh FEDERATED STATES
OF MICRONESIA MARSHALL O C E A N Clipperton
Managua
COSTA RICA San Jose Caracas
50 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Port of Spain
33 36 Abuja CENTRAL SOUTH Addis Ababa SRI LANKA ISLANDS (France) Panama City GUYANA
34 35 AFRICAN ETHIOPIA Colombo Melekeok Palikir Majuro PANAMA VENEZUELA Georgetown
Monrovia REPUBLIC SUDAN PALAU
CAMEROON Juba BRUNEI Bandar Seri Begawan Paramaribo
LIBERIA Bangui SOMALIA MALDIVES Male Bogota French Guiana (France)
Kuala Lumpur MALAYSIA COLOMBIA
38 Yaounde UGANDA Mogadishu SURINAME
Libreville CONGO Kampala SINGAPORE Singapore NAURU Bairiki Quito Equator
0° 39GABON DEMOCRATIC KENYA 0°
Nairobi Yaren Galapagos Islands ECUADOR
REPUBLIC 40 KIRIBATI (Ecuador)
Brazzaville OF CONGO 41 Victoria INDONESIA PAPUA
Kinshasa Dodoma SEYCHELLES Jakarta NEW GUINEA SOLOMON
Ascension (UK) TANZANIA Chagos Archipelago (UK) ISLANDS Funafuti
Luanda Dili
Christmas Island TIMOR-LESTE Port Moresby Honiara TUVALU PERU
COMOROS BRAZIL
AT L A N T I C ANGOLA MALAWI Moroni (Australia) SAMOA Lima
ZAMBIA Lilongwe Cocos Islands
Apia American Samoa French 3
3
St Helena (UK) Lusaka MADAGASCAR INDIAN (Australia) VANUATU FIJI (USA) Polynesia La Paz Brasilia
Harare MOZAMBIQUE Port Vila NIUE COOK (France) BOLIVIA
MAURITIUS Suva Alofi Sucre
NAMIBIA ZIMBABWE Antananarivo Port Louis TONGA ISLANDS
OCEAN Windhoek BOTSWANA Reunion (France)
New Caledonia
(France)
Nukualofa Avarua
PARAGUAY Tropic of Capricorn
Gaborone Pretoria Pitcairn Island
Mbabane Maputo
OCEAN AUSTRALIA (UK) Rapa Nui San Felix
Asuncion

International Date Line

Norfolk Island (Easter Island) (Chile) CHILE
SWAZILAND
Bloemfontein Maseru (Australia) (Chile)
30°S 30°S
SOUTH LESOTHO Lord Howe
AFRICA Island Juan Fernandez Islands Santiago URUGUAY
Cape Town (Australia)
Canberra (Chile) Buenos Aires Montevideo
Tristan da Cunha (UK) Amsterdam (France) ARGENTINA
St Paul (France)
1 Luxembourg – Luxembourg 18 Montenegro – Podgorica 34 Ivory Coast – Yamoussoukro
2 Netherlands – Amsterdam 19 Serbia – Belgrade 35 Ghana – Accra Wellington LEGEND
3 Belgium – Brussels 20 Kosovo – Pristina 36 Togo – Lome NEW ZEALAND Country border
Chatham Islands
2 4 Switzerland – Bern 21 Macedonia* – Skopje 37 Benin – Porto-Novo (New Zealand)
5 Andorra – Andorra-la- Vella 22 Albania – Tirane 38 Equatorial Guinea – Malabo Disputed country border
2
6 Monaco – Monaco 23 Malta – Valletta 39 Sao Tome and Principe – Sao Tome Country capital city
7 Liechtenstein – Vaduz 24 Lebanon – Beirut 40 Rwanda – Kigali
Auckland Islands Azores N
8 San Marino – San Marino 25 Israel – Jerusalem 41 Burundi – Bujumbura (New Zealand) (Portugal) Dependency Falkland Islands (UK)
9 Vatican City 26 Kuwait – Kuwait 42 Belize – Belmopan
10 Czech Republic – Prague 27 Bahrain – Manama 43 Jamaica – Kingston Heard Island
(Australia) Macquarie Island W E South Georgia (UK)
11 Slovakia – Bratislava 28 Qatar – Doha 44 St Kitts and Nevis – Basseterre (Australia)
12 Austria – Vienna 29 United Arab 45 Antigua and Barbuda – St John’s
13 Hungary – Budapest Emirates – Abu Dhabi 46 Dominica – Roseau S
14 Moldova – Kishinev 30 Senegal – Dakar 47 St Lucia – Castries
60°S 31 Gambia – Banjul 0 1000 2000 3000 km 60°S
15 Slovenia – Ljubljana 48 Barbados – Bridgetown
16 Croatia – Zagreb 32 Guinea Bissau – Bissau 49 St Vincent
17 Bosnia and
Herzegovina – Sarajevo
33 Sierra Leone – Freetown and the Grenadines – Kingstown
50 Grenada – St George’s
S O U T H E R N O C E A N Scale 1:75 000 000 at 40°N and S
1 centimetre on the map measures
1 1
750 kilometres on the ground. Antarctic Circle
A N T A R C T I C A A N TA R C T I C A
30°W A 0° B 30°E C 60°E D 90°E E 120°E F 150°E G 180° H 150°W I 120°W J 90°W K 60°W L 30°W M 0°
* Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Oxford Atlas 5/6 20-6-17

FEP World Political - 0498_10783_wld_pol
06_PVN_OA_5-6_10783_ENDS_SI.indd 1 cyan magenta yellow black 3/07/2017 11:20 AM
60°W 30°W A 0° B 30°E C 60°E D 90°E E 120°E F 150°E G 180° H 150°W I 120°W J 90°W K 60°W L 30°W M 0° N 30°E

World: Human Svalbard

(Norway) A R C T I C O C E A N
Kalaallit Nunaat
6 Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland)
(Greenland) (Denmark) 6
(Denmark)
Jan Mayen
(Norway)

NORWAY Arctic Circle

International Date Line

Oxford Atlas 5/6 20-6-17

FEP World Political - 0498_10783_wld_pol
06_PVN_OA_5-6_10783_ENDS_SI.indd 1 cyan magenta yellow black 3/07/2017 11:20 AM
OXFORD

ATLAS
FOR AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS
+

5–6
HASS | STEM | Inquiry | Coding
Co n t e n t s
ap skills
Exploringg thme world
in
2 Observ
a d in g maps
4 Re
legend
6 Using a ps
t kinds of ma
8 Differen
irection
10 Using d latitude and lo
ngitude
n g g ri d s,
12 Usi
ale
14 Using sc g graphs
re tin
16 Interp

p lo r in g o u r world
Ex gE ar th
Our changin ace
sp
20 Earth in and earthquakes
oe s
22 Volcan isasters
M a n a g ing natural d
2 4 ustralia
N a tu ra l disasters in A
26
tes
Changing sta states of water
g
28 Changin cycle
e w a te r
30 T h light and colo
ur
R a in b o w s,
32
in oceans
34 Water vironments
different en
Sur viving in nd their habitats
36 Animals a nmentsnviro
le adapting to e
3 8 Pe o p d vegetation
u st ra lia ’s climate an
40 A deserts
S u rv iv a l in Australia’s
42
stralia
Living in Au we live?
do
44 Where w n?
H o w h av e places gro
46
communities
48 Living in places
for
50 Caring s e r ving resour y
ce s
n d c o n
Using a nd energ
A u st ra lia’s minerals a
52
able energ y
54 Renew
electricit y
56 Making
in the home
58 Power ld
the wor
Australia in nd Asia
lia a
60 Austra
population
62 World living conditio
ns
o n tr a st s in
64 C
es
66 Refuge
Asia
and Central
148 Russia
Natural
150 Africa:
colonies Human
Australian ralian colonies 152 Africa:
68 First A
ust rn Africa
154 Northe
n ia l settlement rn Africa
70 Colo 156 Southe tural
72 Gold ru
sh America: Na
158 North u man
74 E xplora
tion America: H
a n ation 160 North sk a and Greenla
nd
Australia as n a d a , A la
162 Can rica
Federatio e d S tates of Ame ean
76 nd migration 16 4 U n it
c a a n d the Caribb
78 Population a 166 Centra
l A m e ri
ral
Indigenous ri
ghts
o u th A merica: Natu
80 168 S an
Governm e n t merica: Hum a
82 and the law 170 South A eric
84 Democracy 2 N o rt h e rn South Am a
tizenship 17 eric
Australian ci rn South Am
86 174 Southe
d world tica
A globalise 176 Antarc
citizenship
88 Global 178 Arctic
consumer
90 Being a d services
rov id ing goods an statistics
9 2 P 180 World
in g o u r co u ntr y 184 Map in
de x
Ex plor 208 Subje c t index
: Natural
96 Australia uman
:H
98 Australia
rn Australia
10 0 Weste
rn Territory
102 Northe
ustralia
104 South A d
slan
106 Queen
outh Wales
108 New S C apital Territo
ry
u st ra lia n
110 A
a
112 Victori
a n ia
114 Tasm

x p lo r in g co ntinents
E s
and countturie ral
: Na
118 World
: H um an
120 World
122 Pacific
uinea
124 New G
ealand
126 New Z
atural
128 Asia: N
uman
130 Asia: H
ast Asia
132 South-E
sia
134 East A
sia
136 South A
East
138 Middle
: Natural
140 Europe
: Human
142 Europe
rn Europe
144 Northe
rn Europe
146 Southe
EXPLORING
MAP SKILLS
2

Observing the world

EXPLORING MAP SKILLS

The boy’s hat and

thongs suggests the
Perhaps the most important tool that any geographer can temperature is warm.
carry in their tool kit is the power of observation.
Geographers ask questions that allow them to begin to
understand the environment through personal observation
or with the aid of maps, photographs and satellite images.

Technology is low.
• Is the land flat or steep? Harvested rice is
• What are the people doing? transported on a
• How are they dressed? cart drawn by an ox.
or dry?
• Do you think it is hot or cold/wet
• What type of buildings can be seen?
• Is the technology modern or old?

Rice farming in Vietnam

Steep land surrounding the city cannot be built on.

Rice is grown
on flat land
and needs
lots of water.

Buildings are
multi-storey
and packed
tightly together
in the valley.

La Paz in Bolivia is the highest capital city in the world.

The clothing suggests the weather is cold.

3
explore!
Different views Look at the photograph at the
top of
you r obs erv ations
To become a good map reader you need to be able to recognise features from page 129. What do
ut this env iron men t?
tell you abo
the plan view. Maps can only be drawn from the plan view because the scale is
Gold
the same across the entire image. In the ground view or oblique view, the scale Look at the photograph of the
kind of
changes between the foreground and the background. Coast on page 99. What
view is it?

Ground view
This ground view shows how a feature
looks if
you were standing near it. You get an
idea of the height and shape of the foo
excellent
tballers,
Oblique view
but the objects in the background are angle from high in the
hidden. This oblique view is at an
a of the height, shape
stands. It gives a good ide ts
ts, however some objec
and relationship of objec
stand. The players in
The umpire in the remain hidden behind the
ger than those in the
background is the foreground appear lar
use the scale varies
hidden by the player background. This is beca
and background.
in the foreground. between the foreground

The height and shape Some background

of objects in ground objects are hidden
view photographs by the grandstand.
are easy to see.
Objects look different
in the plan view.

The players in the foreground

appear larger than those in
Plan view the background.
Cricket
This plan view shows the Melbourne
ve. In this view it is
Ground from directly abo
. The re is no
easy to see the whole stadium
scale is
foreground and background, and the
h.
the same throughout the photograp
4

Reading maps
EXPLORING MAP SKILLS

What is a map?
A map is a simplified plan of an area.
Maps are drawn in the plan view
(looking down from directly above)
because the scale is the same across
the entire area.

Maps are different from photographs.

The aerial photograph to the right
shows Sydney at a particular point in
time. You can see the detail of the
buildings, the depth of the water and
even the movement of boats on the
harbour.

Aerial photograph of Sydney

Harbour and the city

Unio
Manns Waverton n St
Point Park
Kurra

Lavender
Bay Hig
ba

hS
t
M
Rd

Balls Head
ils

McMahons
on
sR

Reserve Point
d

Cremorne
Milsons
Kirribilli Point
Point Milsons
Point Kirr
ibilli
Blues Point
Reserve Ave
Sydney Harbour Tunnel
y
Hw

Goat Island Sydney Harbou r

ld
dfie

Mort Bay
Bra

Park Dawes
Clyne
Point
Balmain Illoura
Reserve
The map of the same area is
simplified to show the main
Darling St East Millers Point
Reserve

features—the harbour is pale

The Rocks
White
Bay Park
Pyrmont
Barangaroo Cahill Exp
Circular
blue and the parks are green.
Fur ther information is added
Garden
Point Park Quay Royal Botanic Island
Bridge St
such as road names, place
Phillip ST
ist

Gardens
nD

Darling
names and places of interest.
ster

Pitt St

Island
We

The Domain
HMAS
N Sydney Kuttabul
Woolloomooloo
Kent St

Pyrmont
George St

Potts Point
St James Map of Sydney Habour
Ha

0 500 m St James
rr
is S

Hyde Park and the city

t
B 144°E C 146°E D 148°E E 150°E F 152°E G

Tweed Heads
154°E
28°S
5
explore!
A 142°E G 154°E
F 152°E Murwillumbah
E 150°E 28°S Mt Warning 1156 m
148°E

A 142°E B 144°E C 146°E D

l aHeads
Q u e e n s Murwillumb
Tweed n d Boggabilla Kyogle Byron Bay
ah Du Cape Byron

Ma
Lismore

New South WalesQ

Mt Warning 1156 m ma

u e e n s l a n d
res Casino

cin
q Ballina

t yr

R A N G E
Byron Bay Mungindi

r
5

e
Boggabilla

e
Kyogle

Riv
Bonshaw

Clarence Riv
Du Cape Byron

Ma
Lismore

r
ma Goodooga Tenterfield

Rive
re Casino

cin
5 sq Ballina

t yr

R A N G E
Mungindi ir

r
Lightning Ridge5 Gw yd

Riv
e
“Thurloo Downs” Mt Bajimba

Riv
Bonshaw

Clarence Riv
“Lake Stewart” Moree Riv Woody Head

er
er 1446 m

r
g
Goodooga Tenterfield Maclean

What transport route crossin

Rive
Warialda

er
5 Tibooburra Collarenebri
ir
Gw yd “Korindina” R
Glen Innes Grafton

on
Riv
“Thurloo Downs” Lightning Ridge Mt Bajimba Woody Head

rw
“Lake Stewart” Moree ive

er
1446 m

the
Inverell

Ba
r Maclean
on
Brewarrina
wn
Warialda

River
sho

er
Tibooburra “Mount Browne” Collarenebri
Glen Innes Grafton Walgett Burren Junction
Sydney Har bou r is 30°S

G
Bourke

rw
“Korindina” Namoi Wee Waa Woolgoolga
Mt Kaputar 1508 m
aerial
Inverell

Ba
map on page 4, but not on the
Brewarrina 30°S River Guyra

Paroo
River
Dorrigo

I D I N
“Mount Browne” Pilliga Barraba Round Mountain Coffs Harbour
“Yancannia” Narrabri

Cast le
Walgett Burren Junction Carinda 30°S 1608 m Sawtell

G
Bourke Namoi Woolgoolga

A u s t r a l i a
Wee Waa Mt Kaputar 1508 m Armidale

Bog
30°S River “Tongo” Louth
Guyra Gwabegar

Paroo
y?

reagh
Dorrigo Uralla

photograph? Wh
Nambucca Heads

an
I D I N
Pilliga Barraba Round Mountain Coffs Harbour
Byrock Boggabri
“Yancannia” Narrabri “Curraweena ” Manilla

Cast le
Carinda 1608 m Sawtell Trial Bay

M Rive
A u s t r a l i a

Armidale

Bog

ac r
Walcha

River
“Tongo” Louth “Nundooka” Gwabegar White Cliffs Quambone Coonamble South West Rocks

lea
reagh
Uralla Nambucca Heads Gunnedah

I V
an
Byrock “Koonawarra” Boggabri

y
4
“Curraweena” er
Manilla
WARRUMBUNGLE Tamworth Kempsey
Riv

River
Trial Bay Black Sugarloaf

M Rive
RANGE Coonabarabran
h

ac r
Walcha

River

R AN
Look carefully at the photograp
“Nundooka” White Cliffs 4Quambone m
Coonamble South West Rocks Werris Creek 1494

lea

D
Gunnedah

I V
“Koonawarra” g

y
4 Port Macquarie
r Darlin Kempsey Nundle

RIER
Rive WARRUMBUNGLE Tamworth Cobar Nyngan Binnaway Quirindi
GE

Wauchope

River
ran
Wilcannia
RANGE Coonabarab Black Sugarloaf

ld a
RAN

B AR
Warren m
Werris Creek 1494
Cou

T
Gilgandra

of Sydney on page 108 .

D
Man
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find on the map

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people Delegate Twofold Bay E 1
ple) 500 000 to 1 000 000 people Homestead Wagga Wagga 25 000 to 100 000 W Cape Howe 0 50 100 150 km
Shrubland 5000 to 25 000 people
gong 100 000 to 500 000 people 1 Orange Disaster Bay S Scale 1:4 200 000
River Under 5000 people 1 centimetre on the map measures
Wagga 25 000 to 100 000 people Forest Gilgandra
Cape Howe 0 50 100 150 km
Lake State capital city 42 kilometres on the ground.
5000 to 25 000 people
Mountains Mt Kosciuszko Mountain Scale 1:4 200 000 152°E G 154°E
Under 5000 people 2228 m 1 centimetre on the map measures 150°E F
E

Scale: relates distance on the19-4-

148°E

map
17 to
State capital city Sea floor relief 38°S C 146°E on the ground.D
42 kilometres
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152°E G
150°E F
148°E E
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the real distance on the ground

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Oxford Atlas 5-6 S E A
To r r e s S t r a i t
0258_10783_nsw
Cape York
Melville

Legend: explains the meaning of the colours, patterns and symbols on the map Bathurst
Island
Island

T I M O R Cape Arnhem PACIFIC

Ashmore Reef S E A
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Maps at different scales

ly Princess Charlotte
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OCEAN
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LEGEND Cre
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1383 m communications
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S E A
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4.2 kilometres on the ground.
Orroral 1 centimetre on the map measures Tasmania
Rive

Gudge
Rive

Large-scale maps show detailed Small-scale maps show basic

A 149°E B
Park 160 kilometres on the ground.
r

Sea floof relief

Oxford Atlas 5-6 21-4-17
r

Bimberi Peak
1912 m 0265_10783_act
Country border
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information about an area. information about a larger area. South West Cape
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Glendale State/territory border

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us

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1845 m Boyle 1791 m Highest mountain

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6

Using a legend
EXPLORING MAP SKILLS

A legend (or key) is an essential part of every

map. It explains the colours, patterns and
symbols used on the map. Symbols and colours
are used to represent the features on the map.
Easily recognised symbols and colours are used
to help the reader quickly understand them.
Desert

There are three main types

of symbols used on maps.
LEGEND
Desert
Area symbols Open savannah
Area symbols use colours or (mostly grassland)
Woody savannah
patterns to represent larger (grassland with trees)
features such as a forest or
Forest
a lake.
Mountains
Line symbols
Sea floor relief Open savannah
Line symbols are lines that
border or connect places Country border
on the map like roads, rivers Disputed border
and country borders. National park
Highest mountain
Point symbols
Point symbols show features
at one particular place such
as a railway station, a
mountain or a capital city.

Woody savannah

Mountains

Highest mountain

Forest
7
explore!
show
What colour has been used to
map below? Wh y?
forest on the
Understanding the world
bols
The maps and keys in this atlas have been designed to help What do you think these sym
represent?
you quickly see the natural and human-made patterns on
Earth. On this map of Africa, the colours help you easily
see natural area features such as the driest desert regions Go to the map on page 12 to
check
in brown, forests in dark green and lakes in light blue. your answers.

By carefully selecting area symbols,

the reader can quickly recognise
Africa: Natural environments such as deserts.
M E D I
T
E Sicily E U RO P E
Strait of Gibraltar R
R
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N Crete
S
E A N
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NT
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Nile
S a h a r a D e s e r t

RE
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A
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AT L A N T I C INDIAN
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Zanzibar Island OCEAN
show the main
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Comoro
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Red line symbols show

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the countries of Africa. Desert Tropic of Capricorn
Desert

INS

N
MOUNTA

Orange River
W E
RG
S BE S
EN
AK
DR 0 400 800 1200 km
Scale 1:34 000 000
Cape of 1 centimetre on the map measures
Good Hope 340 kilometres on the gound.

Oxford Atlas 5-6 6-3-17

0433_10783_afr_nat_map
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considerable proportion, however, still remained, hoping that the
enemy might yet be prevented from getting possession of it. But
about ten o’clock on the morning of the first, there was suddenly an
alarm that the enemy was approaching; the report was soon
magnified into his having entered; and at one burst the whole of the
remaining inhabitants ran shrieking from the town. The bridge,
which is very long and narrow, was at once choked by the crowds
which were pouring upon it; and the unhappy fugitives, who found
their flight impeded, threw themselves into the river, and waded
through it. The Mondego was fortunately not deep at this time, the
dry season had kept it shallow; but there were three or four feet of
water in many of the places where the unfortunate inhabitants
passed it. In the midst of all the horrors of this scene; of the cries of
the wretched people who were separated from their families; of
those who were leaving their homes, their property, their only means
of subsistence, without the prospect of procuring wherewithal to live
for the next day, and of those who believed the enemy (with his
train of unheard-of cruelties) at their heels; the ear was most
powerfully arrested by the screams of despair which issued from the
gaol; where the miserable captives, who saw their countrymen
escaping, believed that they should be left victims to the ferocity of
the French.
The shrieks of these unhappy people were fortunately heard by
Lord Wellington; who sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to relieve
them from their situation; and thus the last of the inhabitants of
Coimbra escaped from the enemy.
It is not in the nature of this work to dwell upon scenes of misery,
such as have been now described; but the recollection of them will
last long on the minds of those who witnessed them. The cruelties
of the French had made an impression upon the Portuguese, that
nothing could efface; it seemed to be beyond the power of man to
await the enemy’s approach. The whole country fled before him; and
if any of the unhappy fugitives were discovered and chased by a
French soldier, they abandoned every thing to which the human
mind is devoted, to escape from what they looked upon as more
than death, the grasp of their merciless invaders.—Innumerable
instances of these melancholy truths might be detailed; but it would
waste the time of the reader, and the relations of the horrid acts
committed by the French would be too shocking to dwell upon.
When Lord Wellington retired to Coimbra, he passed his divisions
to the rear, and placed them in echellons upon the road to Leyria. As
soon as he was convinced of Massena’s approach, he directed each
division to move one march in retreat, and he fixed his head-
quarters at Redinha. The cavalry which covered the army skirmished
with the French in the plains of the Mondego, and obtained some
advantages over those who attempted to pass the river. The
following day, Lord Wellington moved to Leyria, where he remained
till the enemy marched upon him. Massena had hoped to have
overtaken some part of Lord Wellington’s infantry, when he
advanced to Coimbra; but having failed, he pushed forward on the
evening of that day to Condeixa; still he was deceived; Lord
Wellington’s columns were not to be overtaken; and he was obliged
to halt for three days. His army was fatigued with the severe
marches it had made; his provisions were exhausted; he was obliged
to sack the town of Coimbra, to collect what the inhabitants had left;
and he was constrained to make some arrangement for his sick and
wounded, who amounted to 5,000 men, and who were too
numerous to be carried with him. Massena’s intercepted despatch to
Buonaparte, proves how strongly he felt the difficulty of his
situation: he says, that he is unable to leave a guard of any strength
to protect his wounded, as it would weaken his army; and that the
best security he can afford them, is by pursuing the allies with the
whole of his force, and driving them from the country. It is
surprising, that the French officers should still have entertained this
hope. In a letter from Marshal Ney to his wife, he says, that every
thing is going on better than could be expected; that the English are
flying before the French army, and that they appear to have no other
object in view than to escape to their transports, and to carry away
as great a number of the youth of Portugal as they can entrap, by
way of dédommagement, for the great expenses of the war.
On the 4th of October Massena closed his divisions to his
advanced guard at Pombal, and early on the 5th pushed forward
with great rapidity on Leyria, hoping to reach some part of the allied
army, but he was again deceived; Lord Wellington had placed his
troops in echellons to the rear, and as soon as he was apprized of
the movement of the French, he directed them to fall back; the
advanced guard of the British cavalry had a sharp rencontre with the
enemy, where three French officers and a considerable number of
dragoons were taken; this was the only reward Marshal Massena
derived from the rapidity of his advance.
Lord Wellington moved to Alcobaça, the next day to Rio Mayor, the
next to Alemquer, and on the 8th of October he entered a part of his
lines at Arruda. The French army pressed forward during these days
with very great exertion, but by the able arrangements of Lord
Wellington it was unable to overtake any part of his troops; several
skirmishes took place between the cavalry of the two armies; they
were universally in favour of the British, who closed their operations
by bringing in a squadron of French. The rains set in on the 8th; the
allied army did not suffer from them, as it entered its positions on
the 9th, and was generally placed in villages and under cover; the
French were materially annoyed by them; the roads became
extremely bad; their horses, which had been short of forage, and
had made some most distressing marches, were in many instances
unable to get forward with the artillery; great numbers of them
perished, and the troops who were without cover, suffered most
severely from the inclemency of the weather.
We have thus conducted the British army to the termination of
one of the most extraordinary operations which was ever carried into
effect; the boldness of the original conception, as well as the
perseverance and success with which it was executed, will command
the admiration of all military men. The ascendency which the
character and talents of Lord Wellington had obtained over the
minds of all those who were within his guidance or control, could
alone have enabled him to effect a plan which involved in it such
fearful consequences. To have persuaded a foreign government and
army, but lately subjected to his direction, to abandon the greater
proportion of their country almost without a struggle, to the ravages
of an invader; to see his approach to the capital without fear or
hesitation, speaks of itself a confidence in the talents of the
commander which is without example. Not less extraordinary was
the mode in which a movement in retreat was executed from
Almeida to Torres Vedras, a distance of 150 miles, in presence of a
superior army, whose object was, by every exertion in its power, to
harass the corps opposed to it; yet not a straggler was overtaken;
no article of baggage captured; no corps of infantry, except where
the invaders were routed at Busaco, was ever seen or molested. Of
all the retreats which have ever been executed, this deserves most
to be admired. The steady principle on which it was carried into
effect could alone have secured its success. Lord Wellington never
swerved from his purpose; the various changes which every day
occur in war, made no impression on his determination. The great
event of a battle, such as that of Busaco, won over an enemy who
was surrounded by an hostile nation, never induced him to change
the plan of operations which he was convinced would in the end
produce the most decisive advantages. Guided by such a principle,
Lord Wellington was enabled triumphantly to execute his plan; the
successes which have since attended his career are the best
evidences of its wisdom. It is a singular circumstance, that when in
his turn Massena had to conduct his army in retreat over nearly the
same ground to the frontiers of Spain, although he had the
advantages of making his preparations in secret, and of disguising
the moment of putting it into execution, yet he was constantly
overtaken; the corps of his army beaten and harassed; and in every
action which he was compelled to fight, he was driven with loss and
disaster from his positions.
Lord Wellington placed his army on the ground marked out for it
in the course of the 8th, 9th, and 10th of October. The lines, as they
have been termed, extended from Alhandra to the mouth of the
Zizandra; the whole distance may be computed at about twenty-five
miles from right to left. The term of lines was but little applicable to
them; the defences procured by art were confined to closed
redoubts placed upon the most essential points, and calculated to
resist, although the enemy’s troops might have established
themselves in their rear. They were thus enabled to protect the
formation of the army upon any point attacked, before the enemy
could bring cannon in operation with the troops which he might have
pushed forward between them.
These forts were occupied, (with very few exceptions), not by the
regular army destined to act in the field, but by the militia, of which
that of Lisbon formed a part, mixed up with a certain number of
troops of the line. Their defence was thus intrusted to a description
of force, capable of the service imposed upon it, but which would
have been of trifling assistance in a field of battle. Each redoubt was
provisioned for a certain time, and was supplied with the
ammunition, &c., necessary for its protracted defence. The post of
Alhandra, which formed the right of the whole position, was strong
by nature, and was, besides, fortified by several redoubts; its
defence was assisted by the gun-boats in the Tagus. The corps
under the orders of Lieutenant General Hill occupied this part of the
position. It defended the great approach to Lisbon, and its
possession was of the greatest importance. Lieutenant General Hill
communicated by his left, which was placed on the ground at the
back of Arruda, on the Sierra de Monte Agraça, with the corps of the
centre, which occupied the heights above Sobral. These heights,
over which passed the second great road to Lisbon, having been
fortified as much as the nature of the ground would admit, formed
the principal point of defence on this part of the line. From this place
towards the left, and in the vicinity of Ribaldiera, there were several
passes into the main position, all of which were fortified; and the
principal force of the army was concentrated in rear of them. The
next points of importance were Runa and Undesquiera, supported by
the line of heights in their rear; they were upon the road leading
from Sobral to Torres Vedras, and were of the most essential
consequence, since they commanded the only pass to the latter
place within the Monte Junto; an advantage important to the
strength of the whole position, and which never could with safety be
abandoned. These posts were well fortified; were occupied by a
considerable corps, and supported by the force under Major General
Picton at Torres Vedras.
It is necessary to give some description of Monte Junto, which has
just been mentioned; for, although it was without the position, yet it
was one of the main features which contributed to its general
strength. This mountain runs directly north from Runa, for a distance
of twelve or fourteen miles; there are no great roads or
communications leading over it; the valley to the eastward, which
divides it from Sobral, is impassable; it prevents, therefore, all
military communication for an army from that town to Torres Vedras
(excepting that stated as being occupied,) but round its northern
point, and thus requiring a march of at least two days. The difficulty
of passing across this mountain was so great that two corps
separated by it could have carried no assistance to each other, if
either had been attacked. There were therefore two portions of the
British position, one that might be assailed from the east of Monte
Junto, the other, (of which Torres Vedras was the right, and the sea
at the mouth of the Zizandra the left) which might be attacked from
the west. Lord Wellington’s communication from one to the other of
these branches of his whole position was perfectly safe and easy;
and in a few hours the greater part of his troops could be
transported to the defence of either; whereas the direct contrary
was the case, as has been shewn, with the enemy. This formed one
of the main features of the strength of the lines.
Torres Vedras and the ground about it was strongly fortified; forts
were continued, at intervals, to the sea; and, although this part of
the position was never menaced, yet it was occupied by garrisons,
and was prepared to resist any attack that should be made upon it.
In rear of this line of positions was a second, extending from the
back of Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Sierra di Serves and
the Sierra di Barca to Montachique, from whence by the park wall of
Mafra to the rear of Gradel, and along the line of heights to the
mouth of the St. Lorenzo. Betwixt these two lines of positions, there
were strong works at Enxara di Cavalhieros, at Carasquiera, and
Mattacores, covering the communication between them. To the
south, and on the other side of the Tagus, the heights which
commanded the town and anchorage of Lisbon were also fortified,
and a corps of 10,000 men, partly marines from the fleet, were
destined to defend them; they extended from Almada to the fort
called Bugia, opposite Fort St. Julian’s. These last defences were
carried into effect with a view to resisting any force the enemy might
bring through the Alemtejo against the capital, which at one time
was menaced by the corps under Marshal Mortier, then assembled
on the frontier of that province.
Massena arrived with the 6th and 8th corps of his army at Sobral
on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of October. The 2d corps followed
Lieutenant General Hill upon Alhandra. These troops were
considerably fatigued with the forced marches they had in vain been
making to come up with Lord Wellington’s army; the rain which had
fallen since the 8th instant had rendered the roads extremely bad,
particularly about Sobral; so that the men, and particularly the
horses, were almost exhausted when they arrived in front of our
positions.
Massena occupied himself the first days with reconnoitring the
ground on which Lord Wellington had placed his army; the task was
difficult; it was so concealed behind the hills that a very small part of
it could be discovered; enough, however, was perceptible to
convince him that an attack was no easy undertaking. Lord
Wellington occupied a redoubt at the foot of the great height above
Sobral; the French established one at a short distance, and opposite
to it. After several reconnoitres, Massena determined to carry the
British redoubt. The troops which occupied it were commanded by
Colonel the Honourable H. Cadogan, of the 73d Regiment. Massena
placed himself on a hill to see the success of his first operation
against our lines. He was disappointed, his chosen troops were
repulsed, and in sight of both armies the French redoubt was carried
and maintained. From this moment no event of any consequence
took place for a considerable length of time. Skirmishes in the rear
of the French army, and particularly from the village of Ramalhal,
where the brigade of British cavalry under Major General De Grey
was posted, were almost the only military events which took place.
These were chiefly brought about by parties of the French, who, in
search of provisions, were continually met by Lord Wellington’s
patroles, and in which a number of prisoners were taken.
It is of consequence here to take a general view of the situation in
which the French army was placed. Massena, when he entered
Portugal, commanded a force of 72,000 effective men. The plan of
operations he adopted was to break in at once upon Lord
Wellington’s defences; to pursue him till he forced him to a battle; to
allow no circumstances to arrest this decision, and finish thus at one
blow the campaign intrusted to his conduct. In pursuance of his
system, he marched, with all the corps of his army concentrated,
into the heart of Portugal, taking his line direct upon Coimbra, at
which place, by turning Lord Wellington’s left, he hoped to have
arrived almost without resistance. In effecting this movement, he left
no garrisons behind him; he occupied no posts to secure even his
communication with Spain, or to ensure him any supplies or
protection from the rear of his army. Such considerations were all
sacrificed to preserve his greater numerical force for the battle by
which he hoped at once to decide the fate of Portugal. The first
interruption to this arrangement of the campaign, was the
assembling of the whole British army at Busaco, and the subsequent
defeat of the French. On the day on which this took place, Massena’s
communication with Spain was cut off by a force of Portuguese
militia, upon the frontiers near Pinhel and Celorico. He determined,
however, to continue his original movement; and, hoping to conceal
his march through the Sierra of Caramula, expected again to turn
Lord Wellington, and fight a battle to advantage in the open country,
between Busaco and Coimbra. These hopes were frustrated.
Perceiving the difficulties into which the enemy was plunging, Lord
Wellington retired through Coimbra, and abandoned to him that
deserted town and country. Arrived at this point, Marshal Massena
must have begun to feel the difficulties of his situation. He was
encumbered with 5,000 wounded from the battle of Busaco; he was
without the security of any supply of provisions, in the midst of a
most inimical and exasperated population; he was without the
means of communicating with Spain. If he remained where he was,
the boasted conquest of Portugal in a campaign was at an end; the
difficulties to which he must have exposed himself, by the extension
of his army to procure provisions, must also have had weight with
him; and the uncertainty as to our real object in so rapid a retreat,
must have induced him to expect some great result from the bolder
measure of pursuing the allied army. In conformity to this feeling,
without leaving any protection for his rear, or even for his wounded,
Marshal Massena conducted his army to Sobral. His progress here
was totally arrested.
The strength of the position occupied by us was such, as, with the
recollection of Busaco fresh upon him, Massena dared not attack; he
was, therefore, reduced at once to the defensive; his mighty
vengeance was conducted harmless to this unpromising position.
The first news, which must have been unpleasant to Marshal
Massena, was the capture of Coimbra, with all the French wounded,
by a corps of Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant. The loss of the
troops was not alone to be lamented in this case; it brought with it
the disastrous conviction, that the French army was insulated on the
ground on which it stood; no line of communication, no extent of
country in subjection, from which to draw resources, remained to it.
Wherever a Frenchman stood, for the moment, he commanded and
desolated the spot; removed from it, all was in hostility against him.
The march of the French, through Portugal to the lines, was most
singular. The troops seldom saw an inhabitant; they could procure
no guides; deserters from them, or prisoners, could never state the
towns or villages from whence they came, though, in some
instances, they had been weeks in the same places; they had seen
no native to instruct them in their names. In this state of things, the
French army began early to suffer from privations of every sort; its
foraging parties were scouring the country in the rear, and upon
their success depended chiefly the provisioning of the troops. The
fatigue and sickness, consequent on this mode of living, were
considerable. The French soldiers were generally bivouacked along
the line they occupied, which, without shelter in the rainy season,
increased the misery of their situation. By these causes, their army
gradually diminished; while, on the contrary, that under Lord
Wellington, excellently provided with all that was necessary, and
mostly under cover in the villages within the position, was gaining
strength and improving in discipline every day. The Spanish corps,
under the orders of the Marquis of Romana, had joined the allied
army from the frontiers of Estremadura; so that the force at this
time, (the end of October and beginning of November) within the
lines, was considerably greater than that of the enemy. Under these
circumstances, Lord Wellington saw there was an opportunity of
attacking Massena with advantage. The problem, whether it were
wise to do so or not, engaged his most serious attention. He was
persuaded, that if he attacked, he could secure a victory; to attempt
it he was induced by every personal consideration; the glory which
would have accrued to him in success would at that time have been
immense; in England the word of Buonaparte, that his eagles should
be planted on the towers of Lisbon, was generally looked upon as a
decree which no talent or ability could avert; to have learnt at such a
time that our army had defeated the boasted instruments Of this
prophesying emperor, would have carried the man who executed
such a plan to the pinnacle of greatness. Yet this inducement, as
well as the anxious wish of the whole army to attack, had no effect.
Lord Wellington was persuaded that the sounder line of conduct was
to wait with patience, and in safety, the mischief, which he was
satisfied would be brought upon the enemy by want and sickness,
and by the continual hostility of the natives. He therefore decided
steadily to pursue that plan; he was ever watchful to profit by any
advantage which should be afforded; but unless a decided one was
given him, he determined to remain on the defensive.
About the beginning of November, Massena found his sick so fast
increasing, and his means of obtaining provisions so much
diminished, that he was obliged to detach General La Borde’s
division of the 6th corps, to form a garrison at Santarem for the
protection of an hospital, as well as to assist the foraging parties in
that quarter. Lord Wellington made a corresponding movement to
prevent the passage of the Tagus, by detaching Major General Fane
with a brigade of cavalry into the Alemtejo to assemble opposite to
La Borde. In this situation the armies remained in perfect tranquillity
till the 15th in the morning, when it was found that during the night
the whole French army had retreated. This movement had been
carried into effect in such silence, that no suspicion of it had been
entertained.
It was the great triumph of Lord Wellington’s skill and foresight,
that, without exposing a single man in action, he had since the 10th
of October retained at first a superior army in inactivity before him;
he had seen it diminish in numbers every day; and, in the end,
without its having effected a single purpose, he had obliged it to
retire, oppressed with fatigue and sickness. Towards reducing the
country it occupied, it had not made the slightest progress; the
provisions of the British army were drawn from the northern
provinces in its rear; Coimbra continued occupied by the Portuguese
militia; Abrantes by the Portuguese garrison; so that it may truly be
described as commanding only the ground on which it stood.
The state of Lisbon during the period when the enemy was hardly
twenty miles distant from it, deserves to be mentioned. Massena had
expected that his near approach would have caused tumult and a
revolution; but far from this, as a proof of the extraordinary
confidence entertained of Lord Wellington, no town was ever in
more perfect quiet; there never appeared in it the slightest symptom
of fear or apprehension. The ordinary occupations were continued,
although the enemy was but a single march from it. Yet total ruin
was known to await the town, if Massena, by succeeding against the
allied army, forced an entry into it. The apprehension of such a
catastrophe was, however, at no time entertained; implicit reliance
on the skill of their chief, and the bravery of the troops, was the
universal sentiment of the Portuguese.
The persons whose property had been surrendered to be laid
waste by the enemy, shewed the same feelings; the poor peasants,
who had abandoned every thing they possessed, were alike
persuaded that all was done for the best; and in the whole country
there was not a dissenting voice in giving unlimited confidence to
Lord Wellington.
As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known, the allied army
was put in motion to follow him; his movement was, however, so
rapid, that he was not overtaken till within a few miles of Santarem.
The rear guard was pushed over the bridge in front of that place,
where it took up a strong and formidable position.
Lord Wellington had not pursued the enemy with the whole of his
force; suspecting, that it might, in the first instance, be the intention
of Massena to move round Monte Junto, he retained Major General
Picton’s division in its position at Torres Vedras; he afterwards
detached Lieutenant General Hill with the corps under his orders
across the Tagus at Valada, with a view of communicating with
Abrantes, which it might be the intention of the French to attack,
and also to protect the Alemtejo from any offensive operation.
The rest of the army was brought opposite to Santarem. Lord
Wellington having received a report from Major General Fane, that
the baggage of the French army was retiring towards Thomar,
conceived that Massena was altogether falling back; with this idea
he determined to attack what appeared to be his rear guard, which
was placed upon a small river, the Rio Mayor. A disposition with this
view was made; a part of Brigadier General Pack’s brigade was to
have passed, supported by a detachment of cavalry, on the right of
the French position, about a mile beyond it; Sir William Erskine’s
brigade, supported by the Guards, was to have stormed the bridge;
while Major General Crawford, with the light division, was to have
attacked the enemy’s left, and along the Tagus to have menaced the
rear of his advanced position. The rain, which had been very heavy
during the preceding days, had, however, so much swelled the river
where Brigadier General Pack was to have passed, that it was found
impracticable; the enemy also appearing in considerable force, the
operation was given up; Lord Wellington still determining to adhere
to his defensive system, and deciding rather to fall back again upon
his lines than seek the French army, or give it an opportunity of
meeting him upon any thing like equal terms.
Massena continued the succeeding days to strengthen his position
at Santarem; Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front
of it, and placed the rest of his army in echellons to the rear. The
head-quarters were placed at Cartaxo; Sir Brent Spencer, with the
Guards and Major General Cameron’s brigade, in the same place;
Lieutenant General Cole’s division at Azambujo; Major General Leith’s
at Alcoentre; Major General A. Campbell’s at Alemquer; Major
General Picton’s at Torres Vedras, and the Spaniards at Villa-Franca.
Massena threw a bridge over the Zezere at its confluence with the
Tagus, as if with the intention of passing a corps for the siege of
Abrantes; he was contented, however, with reconnoitring that place,
which he never after molested. He placed his army in cantonments
stretching as far back as Thomar, Torres Novas, and Alcanede; and
in this situation, protected by the position at Santarem, remained in
quiet, apparently awaiting reinforcements and orders how to
proceed. Lord Wellington saw this with perfect indifference; he was
persuaded that the more the enemy was reinforced the greater
would be his suffering, and the less the general advantage to his
cause in the Peninsula. He determined, therefore, to undertake no
operation to prevent it, nor any other which could either cause him
risk, or could draw him from his general system of defensive
measures.
From this period, the 12th of November 1810, to the 4th of March,
1811, both armies retained their respective positions; the only
events of any importance, were the arrival of the 9th corps of
10,000 men, commanded by General Cte. Erlon, which was placed
by Massena to protect his right at Leyria; and the junction of 5,000
men, who were brought by General Foy upon his return from Paris,
where he had been sent by Massena, soon after his arrival opposite
our lines, to render an account of the operations of the French army,
and of its situation. Buonaparte received the relation of these events
with much indifference; and observed upon the excuses General Foy
was directed to make, for the loss of the battle of Busaco, “Ah bah!
les Anglais de tout temps ont battu les Français.”
General Gardane, in attempting to carry a corps of 3,000 men to
join Massena, was driven back by some Portuguese militia. General
Claparede posted himself, with a corps of 8,000 men, in the environs
of Guarda; from whence he had several actions with the irregulars in
that part of the country, by whom the communication of the French
army with Spain had been totally cut off.
During the whole of this period, the French subsisted solely on the
plunder of the country they occupied. The irregular manner in which
this mode of obtaining supplies was conducted, led to the
perpetration of the most revolting atrocities. Torture inflicted upon
the inhabitants, to extract from them the secret of their depôts of
provisions and property, was one of the expedients most common to
the French soldiery. The murder of the peasantry seemed to be
committed without remorse; the capture of the women was
converted often into a source of profit. Nothing more revolting to the
mind of civilized man can be produced, than the list of horrors
committed during this lamentable period.
Buonaparte directed Massena to continue his occupation of
Portugal, till he could operate with Marshals Mortier and Soult, (to
whom he had given orders to advance into the Alemtejo,) and
thence combine their movements for an attack on Lord Wellington.
In conformity with these views, Marshal Mortier arrived in the
beginning of January in Spanish Estremadura; he soon after
captured Olivenza, and laid siege to Badajos. Lord Wellington, upon
the first notice of these movements, had detached the Spanish corps
which had joined him in the lines, to reinforce the corps of General
Mendizabel, which was already destined to the protection of these
places; he, at the same time, strongly recommended that officer not
to fight a battle, but, by taking up a defensive position, (which he
pointed out to him,) to give every assistance to the defence of
Badajos, and the other fortresses in that quarter.
Unfortunately for Spain, for the interests of the allies, and for
those persons who, acquainted with the Marquis of Romana, loved
and cherished him for the virtues which adorned his character, he
had expired in the beginning of January at Cartaxo; less able hands
were now intrusted with the army he had commanded. On the 19th
of January, General Mendizabel was attacked in a position close to
Badajos by the French army which was besieging it, and totally
defeated. Mortier, from that moment, pushed on without interruption
the operations of the siege. The place surrendered on the 11th of
March, notwithstanding the governor was informed by telegraph that
a strong corps of the allied army was coming to his relief, and that
Massena was already on his retreat from Santarem. It is a fact
worthy of remark, that, in the articles of capitulation for this place, it
was stipulated that the garrison should march out by the breach; but
when this came to be examined; it was found so far from
practicable, that it was necessary to employ some time to make it fit
for the passage of the troops. The garrison was stronger than the
corps which besieged it; so that taking all the circumstances into
consideration, the giving up this important fortress was as
extraordinary as it was disastrous.
Throughout the month of February, Lord Wellington had been
looking out with great anxiety for a reinforcement from England,
which was, coming to him, and which, by the unfavourable state of
the weather, had been unusually delayed, and did not arrive till the
7th of March. The distressed state of the French army, as well as the
menaced movement of Soult and Mortier, had determined him, upon
the arrival of this reinforcement, (which amounted to 7,000 English,)
to attack; and his plans for this purpose were already decided upon.
The night of the 4th of March, however, put an end to this project:
Massena broke up from all his positions, and commenced his retreat.
The country he had occupied was totally exhausted; his army could
no longer subsist in it. The sickness and misery the French had
suffered, together with the hostility of the peasants, had
considerably reduced their numbers. Lord Wellington had triumphed
in his calculations; without the loss of a single man, he had obliged
the enemy, weakened and disheartened, to abandon all his objects.
Massena, after having previously moved off his sick and baggage
upon the road to the Peunte de Marcella, directed his effective army
upon Pombal, where it appeared he had intended to fight a battle;
some altercation is stated to have taken place here, between him
and the Count Erlon; that officer having received instructions to act
in Spain, insisted upon being allowed to retire from Portugal, and
immediately commenced his movement to effect that object. Lord
Wellington had on the 11th, concentrated a part of his army
opposite Pombal; the enemy was driven from it, and the next day
was attacked at Redinha, from the positions about which place he
was also obliged to retire with considerable loss: from thence he was
pushed upon Condeixa, where, appearing to take up his ground as if
to defend it, Lord Wellington instantly detached a corps to menace
his left, and his communication with Miranda do Corvo. This had the
desired effect; Marshal Ney, who commanded the French rear-guard,
retired upon Miranda, thus abandoning the chance of occupying
Coimbra (which was without defence,) or of retaining any advanced
position in Portugal.
To the activity and vigour with which Lord Wellington pushed the
French army, this advantage was entirely due; Massena conceived
that an officer who, for so long a period, had acted with so much
caution, would never seriously venture to disturb his retreat; he had,
therefore, relied upon being able to conduct it at his own discretion:
when he found, on the contrary, that he was most vigorously
attacked, he was obliged to precipitate his movements. To this alone
can be attributed his having been unable to ascertain that there was
no garrison in Coimbra, a position to which it appears he was
anxious to have led his army.
Lord Wellington pursued the enemy, and obliged him precipitately
to abandon Miranda do Corvo, leaving a great part of his baggage,
and destroying, at Foz d’Arouse, a considerable number of his carts
and baggage-horses. Ney took up a position on the Ciera; but
having left a considerable part of his advanced guard on the left
bank of that river, it was vigorously attacked by the allies, and, in
complete disorder, and with great loss, driven into the main position.
A French eagle was taken in the river, into which, in the hurry of
defeat, a considerable number of the enemy had been precipitated,
and drowned.
On the 17th, Massena formed his army in a strong position behind
the Alva, occupying the Puente de Marcella, and the heights along
the banks of that river. Believing himself secure in this formidable
position, he had sent out detachments from the different corps, to
collect provisions; but Lord Wellington passed the Alva on the left of
the French army, and obliged it to retire without having reassembled
the parties sent out to forage, a considerable number of which were
taken.
The whole of these operations were conducted with the most
transcendent skill and ability; whenever the enemy halted to defend
himself he was out-manœuvred, and driven from his ground; he was
constantly attacked and beaten. Besides the loss in battle, his
stragglers, his sick and wounded, and a considerable part of his
baggage, became a prey to the allied army.
Lord Wellington was now obliged, for a moment, to give up the
active pursuit he had hitherto maintained. His army had out-
marched its supplies; he was forced to give time for them to join
him; he had besides been obliged to detach a considerable force into
the Alemtejo, which, having reduced his numbers below those of the
enemy, forced him to proceed with caution.
When Massena commenced his retreat, Lord Wellington had
decided to send the second British division, together with that of
General Hamilton of Portuguese, with the 13th Light Dragoons, and
a Portuguese brigade of cavalry, to protect the Alemtejo, and to
oblige Mortier to raise the siege of Badajos; a part of this corps
having, however, passed to the north of the Tagus at Abrantes, and
driven the enemy from the Zezere at Punhete, its march to the
southward was delayed till Lord Wellington, receiving intelligence of
the surrender of Badajos, was obliged to add to this force the 4th
division, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the heavy brigade of
British cavalry, under Major-General De Grey. This immense
detachment from his army was rendered necessary from the very
great importance of defending the southern frontier of Portugal,
while the remainder of his forces pursued the enemy in the north. It
was intrusted to the command of Marshal Beresford, and began its
march towards Portalegre and Campo Mayor on the 17th. Lord
Wellington considered the possession of Badajos as of the greatest
importance to his future operations; and therefore directed Marshal
Beresford, if possible, to invest it before the enemy should have had
time to repair the fortifications, and provision it. This object was
unfortunately not accomplished; and the recapture of that fortress,
at a later period, was most dearly purchased.
After a few days’ halt upon the Alva, the allied troops continued
the pursuit of Massena’s army; it had taken a position at Guarda,
where it appeared determined to defend itself. The ground about
that town is extremely strong; being at a considerable height, it
commands the country around it, and is most difficult of access.
Massena had availed himself of these advantages, and hoped to
maintain his army, protected by them, within the frontier of Portugal.
He had held out this hope to Buonaparte, and therefore made every
disposition within his means to secure his object; but Lord
Wellington, on the 27th, in the morning, had manœuvred with seven
columns, so as to turn him on every side, and having gained
possession of his position, to force him to a precipitate retreat; a
brigade of French infantry, under General Maucune, was near being
taken, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa.
Massena here made a last effort to maintain some footing within the
frontiers of the country, of which he had so triumphantly predicted
the entire conquest; he placed his army along the Coa, and in
occupation of Sabugal; he was attacked, however, on the 2d of April;
his hopes were blasted; he was driven into Spain. Lord Wellington
had directed the light division to pass the Coa on the left, and in rear
of General Regnier’s corps, while two divisions attacked in front;
from the badness of the weather, a battalion of the Rifle Corps,
under Colonel Beckwith, was deceived in the ford at which it was to
cross, and got engaged alone for a considerable time with almost
the whole of the French force. Colonel Beckwith, at the moment of
being charged by the French cavalry, took advantage of a stone
enclosure, from whence he defended himself with the most
distinguished gallantry; an opportunity offering, he charged and took
a howitzer, which he maintained; and, after having caused a severe
loss to the enemy, was relieved by the arrival of the rest of the light
division, and afterwards of the other corps which had been destined
to the attack. Regnier was obliged to retire with great precipitation,
leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded, and losing
many prisoners on his march to Alfaiates, where he entered the
Spanish territory.
Thus were the last of Massena’s troops chased from the country,
of which they still maintained the pompous appellation. “The Army
of Portugal,” was yet the title they were distinguished by, though
they could boast of that country but as the scene of disaster and
defeat; and out of which, with the loss of half their numbers, they
had been driven headlong, leaving only the sad remembrance of the
atrocities they had committed.
Lord Wellington having reconnoitred Almeida, decided immediately
to blockade it; having appointed the corps for that purpose, and
distributed the rest of his army in cantonments, he went to the
Alemtejo, to visit the army commanded by Marshal Beresford. This
force had arrived at Campo Mayor on the 25th of March; the town
had, two days before, after a spirited resistance, surrendered to the
enemy, but the wretched state of its defences obliged Marshal
Mortier to abandon it on the approach of the allies. The advanced
guard, composed of the 13th Light Dragoons, and some Portuguese
cavalry, came up with the enemy’s convoy, protected by a corps of
cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and a brigade of artillery, as it
was retiring to Badajos; Colonel Head charged the French cavalry,
defeated it, and drove it to the gates of Badajos; from the walls of
which place the 13th Light Dragoons suffered some loss, having, in
the ardour of the pursuit, exposed themselves to the fire from them.
The heavy brigade of British cavalry, composed of the 3d Dragoon
Guards, and the 4th Dragoons, came up to the French infantry soon
after this charge had taken place; but at the moment of attacking it,
were halted by Marshal Beresford, who, in doubt of the event of the
charge made by the 13th, did not venture to expose the rest of his
cavalry to any risk. This infantry therefore was allowed to move off
without molestation; and in the night the French were enabled to
carry into Badajos a great part of the guns, stores, and ammunition,
which, in the charge of the 13th Dragoons, had been taken in the
morning. The result of this affair, after so brilliant a commencement,
was unfortunate; the return of the infantry was a considerable
reinforcement to a garrison we were about, to attack; and the
artillery, stores, and provisions were objects of the first necessity to
its defence.
The French having thus been driven over the Guadiana, Marshal
Beresford sought as early as possible to pass that river, to invest
Badajos, according to the instructions he had received. He was
delayed, however, by the state of the river, and his unwillingness to
risk its passage, without having previously secured his after
communications across it; so that he did not effectually establish
himself on the left bank, till the 6th and 7th of April, by which time
the enemy had provisioned and repaired the place, and Marshal
Mortier (leaving it in a state of defence,) had retired with his corps
towards Seville.
The blockade of Badajos was immediately established; and
Lieutenant-General Cole was directed to conduct the siege of
Olivenza, which, having only a garrison of 370 men, was
surrendered at discretion on the 15th.
Immediately after this event, and while Marshal Beresford was
preparing for the attack of Badajos, Lord Wellington arrived. He was
strongly impressed with the importance of this fortress to his future
plans, in the new system of warfare which the late events had laid
open to him. Snatched from him at the moment all his other
calculations had triumphed, it had already been most detrimental to
his general success. By the large detachment he had been obliged to
make from his army, in consequence of its fall, it had prevented his
more vigorous pursuit of Massena, and had destroyed his hope of
undertaking the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo (as well as that of
Almeida,) before it could be re-victualled, and placed in a state of
defence; and it still menaced, as long as it remained in the hands of
the French, to curb all his offensive movements into Spain, by
protecting their positions in the south of the country, and by
enabling them at all times to threaten the southern provinces of
Portugal.
Lord Wellington found the army of Marshal Beresford in
possession of the whole of Estremadura; an affair of cavalry which
had taken place at Usagre, in which the 3d Dragoon Guards had
most gallantly charged and defeated the French, had, terminated
their attempt to maintain themselves within it. Lord Wellington
immediately reconnoitred Badajos with two battalions of infantry,
and some Portuguese cavalry; a sharp affair was engaged by these
troops with part of the garrison, but he effected his purpose, and
decided to besiege the place, and fixed upon such points to attack
as he hoped would lead to the capture of the fortress within
fourteen or sixteen days. He had neither the means nor the time to
undertake a regular siege; besieging artillery, stores, and
ammunition could all be but very inefficiently supplied from Elvas,
the only depôt from whence they could be drawn; and it was evident
that Soult would make every effort to prevent the capture of the
place, and that he would, in about three weeks, be able to collect an
army strong enough to attempt its relief.
The heights of St. Christobal, on the right of the Guadiana,
seemed to offer a favourable emplacement for the establishment of
batteries to protect an attack on the old castle; it was therefore
decided to carry, if possible, the fort which occupied them, and
afterwards, from that position, to endeavour to destroy the defences
of the castle, while its walls should be breached from the batteries in
the plain below, and on the left of the river. Preparations were
immediately made to carry this plan into effect, which Lord
Wellington hoped would be in operation on the 24th. The
movements of Massena recalled him to the north; he therefore left
the prosecution of the siege to Marshal Beresford, recommending, if
the enemy attempted to disturb him, to fight a battle, rather than be
driven from his object.
The commencement of the siege was most unfortunately delayed
by the swelling of the Guadiana on the 24th, and the consequent
destruction of the bridge across it, till the 8th of May, when Major-
General Lumley completed the investment on the right of that river,
Major-General Sir W. Stewart having previously effected it on the
left. The means provided for the siege were found very unequal to
the undertaking; before any progress could be made, Marshal Soult
had collected his army as had been anticipated; on the night of the
15th, the attack of the place was discontinued, and the troops
marched to Albuhera, where, on the 16th, Marshal Beresford
obtained a signal victory over the French army.
Lord Wellington returned to his head-quarters at Villa Formoso on
the 28th of April. Massena had collected his army at Ciudad Rodrigo;
it consisted of the 2d, 6th, 8th, and 9th corps, with the cavalry and
artillery which belonged to them, and of 1,500 cavalry of the
Imperial Guard, commanded by the Duke of Istria. The whole force
amounted to 40,000 men, the remnant of the army of Portugal,
which, six months before, had counted above 90,000 rank and file.
Lord Wellington saw the approach of the enemy without dismay;
the French force was superior to his own,—its object, the relief of
Almeida. To thwart this attempt it was necessary to accept a battle;
and, from the situation of Almeida, on the right of the Coa, the
position to defend the approach to it must necessarily be taken up in
front of the town, thus having the river in rear of the allied army.
The banks of the Coa are extremely steep; there are few fords at
which it can be passed, none in the part of it near Almeida
serviceable for an army: the bridge over it, under the guns of that
fortress, is extremely narrow, and at the time was nearly impassable.
The bridge at Castel de Bom was also a most difficult
communication. From Ciudad Rodrigo a road leads to Sabugal,
where there is another bridge over the Coa, which, in case of defeat,
might have served the allied army to retire over. Lord Wellington
(though not entirely from his own conviction) determined to take up
a defensive position, covering both the approach to Almeida, and the
road to Sabugal. He perceived, from the beginning, that this double
object was more than the forces he had with him might be able to
maintain; the extension to the road above mentioned weakened his
position; whereas, he was persuaded that, by confining himself to
the protection of Almeida alone, he could bid defiance to the enemy.
The object, however, of defending the entry by Sabugal into
Portugal, and of securing a second road to retire upon, was not
without mature consideration to be given up; and Lord Wellington
felt convinced, that if the necessity of so doing should arise, he
could always withdraw his army to the more concentrated position.
With these views Lord Wellington took up the ground along the
Duas Casas. He placed the fifth division on his extreme left, near the
fort of La Conception, to defend the great road to Almeida, which
crosses the river at a ford immediately in front of that fortification.
The light and sixth divisions he placed opposite to the village of
Almada; the first, third, and seventh, were placed in rear of Fuentes
d’Honor, with the light infantry of the third division and of the
brigades of Major-Generals Nightingale and Howard occupying the
village, supported by a battalion of the German Legion, the 2d
battalion of the 83d, and the 71st and 79th Regiments. A Spanish
corps, under Don Julian Sanches, was posted on the extreme right,
at Nava d’Aver. Brigadier-General Pack, with a brigade of Portuguese
infantry and the 2d British or Queen’s Regiment, blockaded Almeida.
Massena advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 2d of May; and
our troops having retired from the Agueda, he arrived, on the 3d,
opposite to the position occupied by the allied army. In the evening
he made a desperate attempt to carry the village of Fuentes
d’Honor; but after a severe contest, most gallantly maintained, his
troops were totally repulsed. Defeated with considerable loss in his
first attempt, he spent the whole of the 4th in reconnoitring our
position. Lord Wellington penetrated his intention of attacking the
right of the allied army, and in the night moved the seventh division
to Porco Velho, the only ford at which the enemy could cross the
Duas Casas, and where the banks of that river opposed but a trifling
obstacle to his advance.
On the morning of the 5th, the eighth corps was discovered
opposite to this village, and preparing to attack it; Lord Wellington
moved the light division to support the seventh, while he directed
the first and third divisions to occupy some high ground between the
Turon and Duas Casas rivers; thus observing the sixth and ninth
corps of the French army, which had made a movement to their left,
and had approached the ground occupied by the eighth corps.
Massena began the action of this day by an attack on the
advanced guard of the seventh division; which, overpowered by
numbers, was obliged to retire, giving up the village of Porco Velho.
The French cavalry, under General Montbrun, (which had already
driven Don Julian Sanches from Nava d’Aver) charged with a very
superior force the cavalry of the allies, and though (in the first
rencontre) its advance was driven back, yet it afterwards succeeded
in penetrating to the infantry, which, supported in the most gallant
manner by the artillery, received the French cavalry and repulsed it
with considerable loss. At this moment Lord Wellington decided to
withdraw his army into the more concentrated position, to which
from the beginning he had felt inclined to confine himself.
He directed the light and seventh divisions, supported by the
cavalry, to retire and to take up the ground extending from the Duas
Casas towards Frenada, on the Coa. This movement, as bold as it
was decisive, was executed with the greatest precision; the enemy
could make no impression on the allied columns while on their
march, and the new position, at right angles with the old one, was
taken up with perfect regularity. Massena declined making any
attempt on the troops now formed on their new alignement; he
confined his efforts for the remainder of the day to successive
attacks, made by the sixth corps, upon Fuentes d’Honor; the contest
was most severe in this quarter, and lasted till night, when, with
great loss on both sides, the allied troops, having completely
repulsed the enemy, retained possession of this most obstinately
disputed village.
So terminated this memorable action, the only one throughout the
whole war in which the enemy had to boast of a momentary success
against the allies; the ground at Porco Velho, from which the
advance of the seventh division was obliged to retire, afforded no
decisive position, and if the French infantry had been attacking at
the moment of the charge of cavalry under General Montbrun, our
loss in the retreat to the new alignement might have been
considerably greater. Not such, however, as the French officers
assert; the novelty of an advantage to them was so great, that on
our change of position they predicted the entire destruction of the
allied army; and although these hopes were so blasted, that they
dared not afterwards make a single movement in attack upon us, yet
they still persuaded themselves, that if the proper moment had been
seized, we were in total confusion, and must inevitably have been
defeated.
The British army can seldom be calculated upon to verify such
predictions; if the French had attempted to pursue, they would, as
on other occasions of the same nature, have had more to repent
than to boast of[4]. The message of General Foy to Buonaparte,
before the action of Waterloo, “that in the whole war in the
Peninsula, the French had never once beaten the British infantry,”
would have been as true in its application to any attack made at the
moment above alluded to, as it proved to be in the tremendous
battle of Mont Saint Jean.
4. See Book the 5th, Chapter 1st of Sir Walter Raleigh’s History of the World,
“where, in deciding this controversie, whether the Macedonian or the Roman were
the best warriors,” he answers, “the Englishman,” and quotes the French historian,
who says, “The English comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was
accustomed to gain every where without any stay.”
Defeated in all his projects, Massena, on the morning of the 6th,
withdrew his troops from the front of the allied position, and, having
given up all hope of forcing his way to Almeida, confined his views to
a simple communication with the place, directing General Brenier to
evacuate and destroy it. The French army remained in a position
opposite the allies till the 10th, when it retired to Ciudad Rodrigo.
Lord Wellington had employed the time since the battle of the 5th, in
entrenching his new position, and had rendered it so strong that the
enemy did not make any attempt against it. Marshal Marmont
arrived on the 7th, and soon after superseded Marshal Massena in
his command.
As soon as the French army had retired, Lord Wellington made
arrangements to secure Almeida; aware of the distressed situation of
that place, he detached General Campbell, on the 10th, to resume
the blockade, and to relieve Brigadier-General Pack. In the night of
the same day, however, at 11 o’clock, General Brenier, having
previously destroyed the defences of the place, marched out at the
head of his garrison, and, taking the road to Barba del Puerco,
forced his way through the pickets of the allies, and with the loss of
not more than 200 men escaped to the French army. There were a
variety of circumstances which favoured this undertaking. The order
for the march of the 4th Regiment upon Almeida had been delayed
by Sir W. Erskine; the 2d queen’s Regiment, not believing the enemy
had escaped, remained on their position; the orderly drummer of the
36th Regiment was not at General Campbell’s quarters to give the
alarm, and this regiment did not, in consequence, overtake the
enemy so soon as it otherwise might have done. Brigadier General
Pack, having been relieved by General Campbell, had gone from his
quarters, and, during his absence, Colonel Campbell had marched
his brigade to more distant villages; when Brigadier General Pack
returned, he found General Campbell in possession of the house he
had occupied, but as it was 9 o’clock he remained there for the
night; he joined the pickets of his brigade, which were still on duty,
on the first alarm, and at the point where the enemy had forced the
chain. He immediately pursued with from 30 to 40 men, but this
force was totally insufficient to give any serious disturbance to the
enemy. The 4th and 36th Regiments did not arrive at Barba del
Puerco till day-light: at this moment Brenier was passing the bridge,
and immediately afterwards joined the French corps which was
stationed there to receive him.
By this event the operations in Portugal were brought to a close;
that country was delivered from the enemy, and was freed for ever
after from his odious oppression.
The glorious and transcendent services of Lord Wellington were
duly appreciated throughout the kingdom; his name was blest, and
to the latest posterity will be handed down in that country with
grateful recollection. He was hailed as one to whom a whole people
owed their emancipation. The governors vied with the governed in
expressing to him their admiration of the exalted achievements
which had immortalized his name, and which had sustained the
honour of the combined armies.
Lord Wellington, immediately after the capture of Almeida,
detached two divisions to the southern army, and soon after
proceeded himself to join Marshal Beresford.
He arrived at his head-quarters after the battle of Albuhera had
been fought, and as soon as the means could be collected,
commenced a second time the siege of Badajos.
The detail of these events which followed the deliverance of
Portugal, does not, however, belong to the present work. To describe
the capture of the important fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajos, in the face of superior armies, and the destruction of that
of Almaraz, by which the armies of Marmont and Soult were
connected; to follow Lord Wellington through the brilliant operations
which led to the battle of Salamanca, and to the re-conquest of
Madrid and all the southern provinces of Spain; to trace the
execution of that magnificent movement, by which, all the French
defences in the northern provinces of Spain being turned without a
blow, their armies were completely overthrown, with the loss of all
their cannon and baggage, at the battle of Vittoria, and Spain, like
Portugal, was delivered from foreign rule—these glorious
transactions must be left to others to record. They will be handed
down, with the rest of those great events which have distinguished
the triumphant career of Lord Wellington, as a beacon to guide
hereafter all military men in the pursuit of fame, combined with
justice, with moderation, and with virtue.

THE END.

London: Printed by W. CLOWES,

Northumberland-court.
NOVEMBER, 1827.

VALUABLE
STANDARD WORKS,
PRINTED FOR

LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN, LONDON.

VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

TRAVELS
IN THE
INTERIOR OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.
By WILLIAM J. BURCHELL, Esq.

With an entirely new Map, and numerous other Engravings

from the Author’s own Drawings. In 4to.

Nearly ready.
Mr. Burchell’s Researches in the Interior of Africa, during five
years, over 4,500 miles of ground, besides numberless lateral
excursions, have produced a multitude of discoveries and
observations which have never yet been laid before the public.

TRAVELS IN PALESTINE,
Through the Countries of Bashan and Gilead, East of the River
Jordan: including a Visit to the Cities of Geraza and Gamala, in the
Decapolis.
By J. S. BUCKINGHAM, Esq.

Member of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta; and of the Literary Societies

of Madras and Bombay.

1 Vol. 4to. with Maps, Plates, & Vignettes. 3l. 13s. 6d. Bds.

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