Detailed guidance for implementation of the aerodrome restart checklist

A- Aerodrome infrastructure

A1 – Visual aids for navigation

General requirements/objectives: In accordance with Annex 14 — Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations, information on the
condition of the movement area and the operational status of related facilities shall be provided, and inspections of the movement area shall be carried
out each day, at least once where the code number is 1 or 2, and at least twice where the code number is 3 or 4. In addition, procedures on carrying out
daily inspections of the movement area are given in the PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981).

COVID 19 - induced scenario(s): Stemming from the outbreak of COVID-19, many flights have been suspended with aerodromes reducing or, in
some cases, suspending operations until flights resume to normal frequency. Consequently, certain facilities and services, such as aerodrome lighting,
may have been switched off and other visual aids, such as markings and signs, may have not been maintained according to schedule. Since they have
not been used for prolonged periods, it is imperative that these facilities be adequately inspected for the resumption of flight operations. Moreover,
major changes and/or difficulties encountered by the aerodrome operator arising from the lockdown should be communicated in a timely manner to
the regulator. As part of the recovery process necessary checks on the infrastructure, including visual aids, should be carried out by the operator with
the objective of ensuring the infrastructure complies with the regulations.

Focus area(s) pertaining to restart: In respect to visual aids, it will be necessary to verify that no planned inspection became overdue since
operations were scaled or shut down. If any, overdue inspections should be carried out before resuming normal operations. Functional testing of
lighting systems in collaboration with other stakeholders, in particular air navigation service providers, should be carried out to undertake a visual
inspection of components for any damage, obstructions (animal nests, overgrown plants, etc.). Capabilities of airfield lighting systems, such as dimming
in all intensity steps, should be tested; cleaning and calibration of PAPI and lens to be carried out if they were not used for 3 months or more. Routine
visual ground inspections should be augmented by flight checks from time to time. Other visual aids, such as markings and signage, should be inspected
to ensure their conspicuity.

Note: The checklist below provides specific reference to ICAO provisions related to the areas for restart.

Page 1 of 112
A1 Checklist and references:
Item Areas/Topic to be covered ICAO reference Action taken Remarks
Item No. Item description Specific references
1 Visual aids for Navigation VA-1 Frequency of Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
Including but not limited to the status inspection of visual 2.9.1 to 2.9.3; ☐ NA
of all markings, lights including
calibration of PAPI, signs, status of aids.
obstacle lights, etc. Annex 15, para 6.3.2.3

Aerodrome Design
Manual (Doc 9157)
Part 4;
8.3.17, 17.1 to 17.3.
VA-2 Condition of Airport Services ☐ Checked
movement area Manual (Doc 9137) ☐ NA
and related Part 8, Chapter 4 & 5 ;
facilities
VA-3 Maintenance of Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
visual aids 10.5.1 to 10.5.13; ☐ NA

Doc 9137 Part 9,

Chapter 2

VA-4 Inspection of Doc 9981 PANS- ☐ Checked

movement areas AERODROMES, Part II, ☐ NA
Chapter 3

A2- Electrical systems

General requirements/objectives: In accordance with Annex 14, Volume I, an adequate primary power supply shall continue to be available at
aerodromes for the safe functioning of air navigation facilities. The design and provision of electrical power systems for aerodrome visual and radio
navigation aids shall be such that equipment failure will not leave the pilot with inadequate visual and non-visual guidance or misleading information.
Page 2 of 112
COVID 19 - induced scenario(s): The airfield electrical system may have been switched off and/or not maintained according to schedule since it has
not been used for prolonged periods of time. It is imperative for the resumption of flight operations that aerodromes be adequately prepared. Prior to
start, and/or resuming, of operations, aerodrome operators shall undertake appropriate inspections of electrical systems.

Focus area(s) pertaining to restart: To ensure the required serviceability of installations and equipment, a constant power supply needs to be
maintained. Regular inspection and maintenance work is required for airport equipment and installations, distributing primary power as well as the
equipment supplying secondary power when there is a circuit breakdown. This includes individual elements of the power supply systems, such as power
cables, control cables, transformers, transformer stations, regulators, relay and switch cabinets and secondary power supply equipment.

Note: The checklist below provides specific reference to ICAO provisions related to the areas for restart.

A2 Checklist and references:

Item Areas/Topic to be covered ICAO reference Action taken Remarks
Item No. Item description Specific references
2 Electrical systems ES-1 Electrical power Annex 14, Vol. I; ☐ Checked
Including but not limited to the status
supply systems for 8.1.1 to 8.1.11; 8.3.1 ☐ NA
of primary and secondary power supply
AN facilities & to 8.3.5;
systems supporting airfield lighting and visual aids
radio navigation aids, etc.
ES-2
Monitoring &
Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
Maintenance of
8.1.1 to 8.1.11; 8.3.1 ☐ NA
to 8.3.5;
electrical systems
Doc 9157 Part 5;
10.10, 15.1 – 15.8.

Doc 9137 Part 9

Chapter 3.

A3 - Non visual aids for navigation

General requirements/objectives: In accordance with Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications – Volume I, Radio Navigation Aids, the aids
available for use by aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall be the subject of periodic ground and flight tests. Also, ILS critical and sensitive
areas need to be identified and managed to ensure ILS signal protection.
Page 3 of 112
COVID 19 - induced scenario(s): The agency responsible for flight inspection activities may not be the aerodromes. However, necessary coordination
should be carried out with the agencies conducting the flight or ground inspection of radio navigational aids leading up to the restart of service to ensure
that up-to-date information on navaid facility conformance with ICAO performance Standards is available. Also, the ILS critical and sensitive areas in force
before the interruption should be fully reinstated.

Focus area(s) pertaining to restart:

It is essential to ensure that non-visual aids used for navigation such as ILS, VOR-DME, NDB, GBAS, among others, are functioning effectively during
aerodrome restart after extensive aerodrome closures or reduced operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this regard, the key areas to be considered
are:

● Flight/ground inspection of radio navigational aids

● Management of ILS critical and sensitive areas

a) Flight/ground inspection of radio navigational aids

During aerodrome restart, necessary actions should be taken for ensuring that up-to-date flight inspections results for radio navigation aids are
available, as necessary. Constraints on conducting regular flight inspection of radio navigation aids in accordance with Doc. 8071, Volume 1, during
the COVID-19 pandemic, and related mitigations are addressed in the following Quick Reference Guide (QRG):

https://www.icao.int/safety/COVID-
19OPS/Documents/QRGs%20files/QRG_ANS_Periodicity%20of%20flight%20inspection%20of%20radio%20navigation%20aids_V1.0.pdf.

The alleviation/mitigation approach discussed in the QRG is subject to the establishment of an appropriate time limit leading up to the resumption
of full compliance with the provisions of Doc 8071, Volume I.

b) Management of ILS critical and sensitive areas

Presence of large reflecting objects within the ILS coverage volume, whether fixed or mobile (including aircraft), can potentially cause degradation of the
ILS guidance signal, with the consequence that the tolerances defined in Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, 3.1 may be exceeded. The objective of identifying
ILS critical and sensitive areas and associated management procedures is to prevent such degradation and ensure that aircraft using the ILS can rely on
the signal-in-space meeting the Annex 10 requirements. As part of the restart of regular operations, it is necessary to ensure that extended
closures/reduced operations have not led to encroachment on such areas, as they were in force before the interruption (e.g., by parking of aircraft in
non-designated areas, temporary installations or vegetation ) and that related operational procedures have been reinstated as required.

Note: The checklist below provides specific reference to ICAO provisions related to the areas for restart.
Page 4 of 112
A3 Checklist and references:
Item Areas/Topic to be covered ICAO reference Action taken Remarks
Item No. Item description Specific references
3 Non-visual Aids for Navigation NVA-1 Flight/ground Annex 10, Vol. 1, 2.2.1 ☐ Checked
Status of radio navigation aids,
inspection of radio ☐ NA
especially of those which were not in
navigational aids Manual on Testing of
use during the lockdown period i.e. Radio Navigation Aids
VOR/DME, ILS for a specific runway. (Doc. 8071), Vol 1
Chapter 1

NVA-2 Management of ILS Annex 10, Vol. 1, Att. ☐ Checked

critical and C, 2.1.9, 2.1.9.1, ☐ NA
sensitive areas 2.1.9.2, 2.1.9.3

A4 - Rescue and fire fighting

General requirements/objectives: In accordance with the provisions of Annex 14, Volume I, States are required to provide rescue and firefighting
equipment and services at an aerodrome.

COVID 19 - induced scenario(s): Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, aerodromes may have downgraded the level of protection due to the reduction in
flights. A low level of RFF activities may also have negatively affected performance of RFF services, including personnel training and fitness, response time,
the condition of vehicles as well as other fire-fighting equipment and infrastructure, availability of communication and alerting systems, etc. In particular,
training may have been affected during extended period of furloughs as well as by the restrictions imposed by national/local regulations on social
distancing.

Focus area(s) pertaining to restart: It is paramount that the aerodrome operator, and the Civil Aviation Authority in their oversight role, ensure that
rescue and firefighting services have remained functional or will be restored, before the aerodrome returns to normal operations. Items to be considered
are predominantly dynamic in nature, which can be summarized into the following four main points:

a) Level of protection provided and its publication

b) RFF personnel
c) Response time
d) Communication and alerting systems

Page 5 of 112
a) Level of protection provided and its publication
The level of protection to be provided at an aerodrome should be based on the dimensions of the aircraft normally using the aerodrome as adjusted
for their frequency of operations. In determining the level of protection, consideration should be given to several factors such as the aerodrome
category types and amount of extinguishing agents, quantities of water, discharge rate, supply and storage of extinguishing agents, response time,
fire station, communicating and alerting system, and number of vehicles. Details are provided in Doc. 9137, Part 1, Chapter 2.

Information or any change of the information concerning the level of protection provided at an aerodrome stemming from, in particular, the COVID-
19 pandemic, shall be communicated to the appropriate air traffic service units and aeronautical information service units to enable those units to
provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. Changes in the level of protection from that normally available at the aerodrome
could be due to a change in the availability of extinguishing agents, equipment to deliver the agents or personnel to operate the equipment, etc.

b) RFF Personnel

All rescue and firefighting personnel shall be properly trained and shall be provided with protective clothing and respiratory equipment to enable
them to perform their duties in an effective manner.

The total number of personnel, whether regular or auxiliary, required to be deployed for RFF services should be determined to meet the following
criteria:

● the RFF vehicles should be staffed so as to ensure their ability to discharge principal or complementary extinguishing agents at their maximum
designed capability during an aircraft accident/incident; and
● any control room or communications facility operated by, and serving, the RFF service can continue to provide this service until alternative
arrangements to undertake this function are initiated by the aerodrome emergency plan

In addition, while determining the minimum number of RFF personnel required, a task resource analysis (see Doc. 9137, Part 1, 10.5) to be completed
and the level of staffing documented in the Aerodromes Manual. Finally, as the nature of RFF operations involves periods of intense physical activity,
all RFF personnel have to possess a minimum level of physical and medical fitness to be able to perform the tasks associated with these operations.

The current COVID-19 pandemic may have resulted in airport staff being furloughed for extended periods with the consequence that skills, knowledge
and competency may have been adversely affected when staff return to work. Retraining or recertification of RFF personnel may be required,
depending on how long they have been away from the job. For staff training during initial phases of recovery, the use of distance learning and virtual
classrooms could be considered.

Page 6 of 112
 c) Response time
The operational objective of the RFF service should be to achieve response times of not exceeding three minutes (Standard)/two minutes
(Recommendation) to the end of each runway, as well as not exceeding three minutes (Recommendation) to any other part of the movement area,
in optimal conditions of visibility and surface conditions. To meet the operational objective during traffic/apron congestion or in less than optimal
conditions of visibility, it may be necessary to provide suitable guidance, RFF vehicles, equipment, access routes and/or procedures for RFF vehicles.
Details are provided in Doc. 9137, Part 1.

d) Communication and alerting systems

A discrete communication system should be provided linking a fire station with the control tower, any other fire station on the aerodrome and the
RFF vehicles. An alerting system for RFF personnel should be provided at a fire station, capable of being operated from that station, any other fire
station on the aerodrome and the aerodrome control tower.

Note: The checklist below provides specific reference to ICAO provisions related to the areas for restart.

A4 Checklist and references:

Item Areas/Topic to be covered ICAO reference Action taken Remarks
Item No. Item description Specific references
4 Rescue and Fire Fighting RFF-1 Level of Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
Including but not limited to the status
protection 2.11.1 to 2.11.4; ☐ NA
of fire-fighting equipment,
provided and its 9.2.4 to 9.2.7; 9.2.26;
extinguishing agents and readiness of publication 9.2.41; 9.2.8 to 9.2.25,
personnel to meet the RFF category 9.2.41;
and response time requirements, status
of access roads, disabled aircraft
Doc. 9137, Part 1
removal plans/equipment, etc.
2.1, 2.2, 2.3
RFF-2 RFF personnel Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
9.2.42 to 9.2.46; ☐ NA

Doc. 9137, Part 1

10.3, 10.4 & 10.5

Page 7 of 112
RFF-3 Response time Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked
9.2.27; 9.2.34 to 9.2.36 ; ☐ NA

Doc. 9137, Part 1 2.7

RFF-4 Communication Annex 14, Vol. I ☐ Checked

and alerting 9.2.39 ;9.2.40 ; ☐ NA
systems
Doc. 9137, Part 1
Chapter 4

Page 8 of 112
Module 1 – Aerodrome Infrastructure
Extracted pages from Annexes and Docs

Unit 1 – Visual aids for navigation

VA-1

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

2.9 Condition of the movement area and related facilities

2.9.1 Information on the condition of the movement area and the operational status of related
facilities shall be provided to the appropriate aeronautical information services units, and similar
information of operational significance to the air traffic services units, to enable those units to
provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. The information shall be
kept up to date and changes in conditions reported without delay.
Note.— The nature, format and conditions of the information to be provided are specified in the
PANS-AIM (Doc 10066) and the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444).

2.9.2 The condition of the movement area and the operational status of related facilities shall be
monitored, and reports on matters of operational significance affecting aircraft and aerodrome
operations shall be provided in order to take appropriate action, particularly in respect of the
following:
a) construction or maintenance work;
b) rough or broken surfaces on a runway, a taxiway or an apron;
c) snow, slush, ice, or frost on a runway, a taxiway or an apron; [applicable until 4 November
2020]
d) water, snow, slush, ice, or frost on a runway, a taxiway or an apron; [applicable 5
November 2020]
e) water on a runway, a taxiway or an apron; [applicable until 4 November 2020]
a) anti-icing or de-icing liquid chemicals or other contaminants on a runway, taxiway or
apron;
b) snow banks or drifts adjacent to a runway, a taxiway or an apron;
c) other temporary hazards, including parked aircraft;
d) failure or irregular operation of part or all of the aerodrome visual aids; and
e) failure of the normal or secondary power supply.

Note 1.— Until 3 November 2021, other contaminants may include mud, dust, sand, volcanic ash,
oil and rubber.
Annex 6, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes, Attachment C provides
guidance on the description of runway surface conditions. Additional guidance is included in the
Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 2.

Note 2. — Until 3 November 2021, particular attention would have to be given to the
simultaneous presence of snow, slush, ice, wet ice, snow on ice with anti-icing or de-icing liquid
chemicals.

Page 9 of 112
Note 3. — Until 3 November 2021, see 2.9.11 for a list of winter contaminants to be reported.

Note 1.— As of 4 November 2021, other contaminants may include mud, dust, sand, volcanic ash,
oil and rubber.
Procedures for monitoring and reporting the conditions of the movement area are included in the
PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981).

Note 2.— As of 4 November 2021, the Aeroplane Performance Manual (Doc 10064) provides
guidance on aircraft performance calculation requirements regarding the description of runway
surface conditions in 2.9.2 c), e) and f).

Note 3.— As of 4 November 2021, origin and evolution of data, assessment process and the
procedures are prescribed in the PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981). These procedures are intended
to fulfil the requirements to achieve the desired level of safety for aeroplane operations
prescribed by Annex 6 and Annex 8 and to provide the information fulfilling the syntax
requirements for dissemination specified in Annex 15 and the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444).

2.9.3 Until 3 November 2021, to facilitate compliance with 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, inspections of the
movement area shall be carried out each day at least once where the code number is 1 or 2 and at
least twice where the code number is 3 or 4.
Note.— Guidance on carrying out daily inspections of the movement area is given in the Airport
Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 8 and in the Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control
Systems (SMGCS) (Doc 9476).

2.9.3 As of 4 November 2021, to facilitate compliance with 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, the following
inspections shall be carried out each day:
a) for the movement area, at least once where the aerodrome reference code number is 1 or
2 and at least twice where the aerodrome reference code number is 3 or 4; and
b) for the runway(s), inspections in addition to a) whenever the runway surface conditions
may have changed significantly due to meteorological conditions.

Note 1.— Procedures on carrying out daily inspections of the movement area are given in the
PANS-Aerodromes(Doc 9981). Further guidance is available in the Airport Services Manual (Doc
9137), Part 8, in the Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc
9476) and in the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) Manual
(Doc 9830).

Note 2.— The PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981) contains clarifications on the scope of a significant
change in the runway surface conditions.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services, Sixteenth Edition, July 2018

6.3.2.3 A NOTAM shall be originated and issued concerning the following information:
a) establishment, closure or significant changes in operation of aerodrome(s) or heliport(s)
or runways;

Page 10 of 112
b) establishment, withdrawal or significant changes in operation of aeronautical services
(aerodromes, AIS, ATS, communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS), meteorology
(MET), search and rescue (SAR), etc.);
f) establishment, withdrawal or significant changes in operational capability of radio
navigation and air-ground communication services. This includes: interruption or return
to operation, change of frequencies, change in notified hours of service, change of
identification, change of orientation (directional aids), change of location, power increase
or decrease amounting to 50 per cent or more, change in broadcast schedules or contents,
or irregularity or unreliability of operation of any radio navigation and air-ground
communication services or limitations of relay stations including operational impact,
affected service, frequency and area;
g) unavailability of back-up and secondary systems, having a direct operational impact;
h) establishment, withdrawal or significant changes to visual aids;
i) interruption of or return to operation of major components of aerodrome lighting
systems;
j) establishment, withdrawal or significant changes to procedures for air navigation
services;
k) occurrence or correction of major defects or impediments in the manoeuvring area;
l) changes to and limitations on availability of fuel, oil and oxygen;
m) major changes to search and rescue facilities and services available;
n) establishment, withdrawal or return to operation of hazard beacons marking obstacles to
air navigation;
o) changes in regulations requiring immediate action, e.g. prohibited areas for SAR action;
p) presence of hazards which affect air navigation (including obstacles, military exercises,
displays, fireworks, sky lanterns, rocket debris, races and major parachuting events
outside promulgated sites);
q) planned laser emissions, laser displays and search lights if pilots’ night vision is likely to
be impaired;
c) erecting or removal of, or changes to, obstacles to air navigation in the take-off/climb,
missed approach, approach areas and runway strip;
d) establishment or discontinuance (including activation or deactivation) as applicable, or
changes in the status of prohibited, restricted or danger areas;
e) establishment or discontinuance of areas or routes or portions thereof where the
possibility of interception exists and where the maintenance of guard on the VHF
emergency frequency 121.5 MHz is required;
f) allocation, cancellation or change of location indicators;
g) changes in aerodrome/heliport rescue and firefighting category provided (see Annex 14,
Volume I, Chapter 9, and Attachment A, Section 17);

Page 11 of 112
 h) presence or removal of, or significant changes in, hazardous conditions due to snow, slush,
ice, radioactive material, toxic chemicals, volcanic ash deposition or water on the
movement area;
i) outbreaks of epidemics necessitating changes in notified requirements for inoculations
and quarantine measures;
j) observations or forecasts of space weather phenomena, the date and time of their
occurrence, the flight levels where provided and portions of the airspace which may be
affected by the phenomena;
k) an operationally significant change in volcanic activity, the location, date and time of
volcanic eruptions and/or horizontal and vertical extent of volcanic ash cloud, including
direction of movement, flight levels and routes or portions of routes which could be
affected;
l) release into the atmosphere of radioactive materials or toxic chemicals following a nuclear
or chemical incident, the location, date and time of the incident, the flight levels and routes
or portions thereof which could be affected and the direction of movement;
m) establishment of operations of humanitarian relief missions, such as those undertaken
under the auspices of the United Nations, together with procedures and/or limitations
which affect air navigation; and
n) implementation of short-term contingency measures in cases of disruption, or partial
disruption, of ATS and related supporting services.
Note.— See Annex 11, 2.31 and Attachment C to that Annex.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157) Part 4 Visual Aids

Routine inspection
8.3.17 The initial set-up will be accomplished either by the manufacturer’s agent or under strict
compliance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions. Thereafter the competent authority
should establish a reasonable interval between ground checks. It will be necessary to ground
check the units more often on sites where the ground is less stable or where extremes of weather
may result in movement of the bases. In many circumstances a monthly alignment check of the
setting angles is adequate.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Page 12 of 112
Chapter 17

Maintenance of Lighting Performance

GENERAL
17.1.1 The lighting systems specified in Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 5, are designed to provide
the visual aids that pilots need to operate their aircraft safely and efficiently in all weather
conditions by day and by night. To be effective, the characteristics of each aid must be maintained
at all times. This objective can only be achieved through the development and application of
appropriate maintenance procedures. The environment within which the equipment is required
to function is such that maintenance procedures used for other types of lighting equipment are
often inadequate.

17.1.2 The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on the specifications in Annex 14,
Volume I, Chapter 9, 9.4, on the system of preventive maintenance to be employed for approach
and runway lighting systems intended to support operations in Category II and III conditions.

17.1.3 A review of the maintenance practices for visual aids and electrical systems required at an
airport is contained in the Airport Services Manual, Part 9 — AirportMaintenance Practices (Doc
9137).

17.2 THE MAINTENANCE ENVIRONMENT

17.2.1 Lighting equipment on an aerodrome is subjected to a wide range of temperatures, high-
velocity engine efflux, contaminants such as aviation fuel, oil and de-icing fluids and rubber
deposits from aircraft tires. The lighting is also subjected to mechanical shock caused by aircraft
landing and manoeuvring on the airport.

17.2.2 The performance of light fittings can change significantly over a short period of time,
especially at large aerodromes with high movement rates. For example, it has been shown that a
single application of anti-icing fluid to a runway can reduce the light output of centre line light
fittings by up to 70 per cent.

17.3 MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

17.3.1 All lighting aids used on aerodromes are specified using parameters that should ensure
that pilots can see and identify the visual cues that are provided over a range of defined
operational conditions. For each type of aid, the extreme positions from which the light must be
seen are clearly defined in terms of viewing angles and detection range required in the lowest
visibility conditions in which operations are to take place.

17.3.2 From a knowledge of the operational requirements, an isocandela diagram and the
associated aiming parameters are computed and standardized for each lighting system. Where
colour is part of a system, this is also specified.

17.3.3 Operational criteria for aircraft are developed on the assumption that the lighting aids will
be functioning in accordance with the published specifications. Any shortfall in performance will
adversely affect the ability of a pilot to acquire the required cues. This may result in overshoots

Page 13 of 112
or create difficulties during ground movements. In low visibility conditions, a reduction in light
output of 50 per cent reduces the range of the lighting aid by approximately 10 per cent. Such a
reduction in range can be critical and may result in the pilot not seeing the necessary cues.
Furthermore, especially for in-pavement light fittings, reductions in light output well in excess of
50 per cent will frequently occur unless a good maintenance regime is in operation. The
reductions in light output are mainly due to contamination by dust, rubber deposits and de-icing
fluids, misalignment of the optics within the light fitting and misalignment of the fitting.
17.3.4 In practice the most demanding situations occur in low visibility conditions by day. These
conditions define the performance requirements, and in order to meet these circumstances it is
essential that lighting performance is maintained at the specified values.

17.3.5 The requirements of Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8, clearly indicate that, to achieve the
high levels of reliability necessary for the visual aids to properly support operations, attention
must be given to the design, operation and monitoring of the electrical supplies. Strict limits are
set on the levels of availability of the various aids. Reliable indications of the levels of
serviceability should be an integral part of any system design.

17.3.6 The requirements of Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8, also indicate that a system of
monitoring visual aids should be employed to ensure lighting system reliability.

17.3.7 Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 9, specifies, as a Standard, that a system of preventive
maintenance of visual aids shall be employed to ensure lighting and marking system reliability.
Maintenance of visual aids is further addressed in a series of requirements that define the
performance level objectives. Defining the minimum serviceability level below which operations
should not continue is the responsibility of the relevant regulatory authority.

17.3.8 Furthermore, Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 9, recommends that the system of preventive
maintenance to be employed for a precision approach runway Category II and III should include
at least the following checks:

a) visual inspection and in-field measurement of the intensity, beam spread and orientation
of lights included in the approach and runway lighting systems;
b) control and measurement of the electrical characteristics of each circuitry included in the
approach and runway lighting systems; and
c) control of the correct functioning of light intensity settings used by air traffic control.

17.3.9 Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 9, also recommends that for lights included in approach and
runway lighting systems for a precision approach runway Category II and III:

a) the in-field measurement of intensity, beam spread and orientation of lights should be
undertaken by measuring all lights, as far as practicable, to ensure conformance with the
applicable specification of Annex 14, Volume I; and
b) the measurement of intensity, beam spread and orientation of lights should be
undertaken using mobile measuring equipment of sufficient accuracy to analyse the
characteristics of the individual lights.
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Page 14 of 112
VA-2

Doc 9137 – Part 8: Airport Operational Services, First Edition, 1983

Chapter 4

Ground Checks of Visual Aids

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.l The integrity and reliability of lighting aids should be comparable with those of non-visual
aids. The integrity of the lighting system will depend upon the design of both the internal airport
circuits and the external power supply. The reliability of the system will depend upon the
programme of preventive maintenance employed and the degree of inspection carried out.
Guidance on preventive maintenance of visual aids is contained in the Airport Services Manual Part
9 - Airport Maintenance Practices.

4.1.2 The operational checking of lighting is normally carried out by the Movement Area Safety
Unit but rectification is the responsibility of Airport Maintenance. At some smaller airports the
checking may be delegated to Airport Maintenance.

4.1.3 Faults in the lighting systems will be detected by monitoring. Monitoring by visual display on
the Control Panel will ensure detection of circuit failures and verification that brilliancy selection
by air traffic control provides the desired light output. Monitoring by visual inspection will,
however, be necessary to detect failed lamps, contamination of fittings by dirt and rubber.

4.2 FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION

4.2.1 The frequency and detail of inspections will depend to some extent on the complexity of the
visual aids provided. In the case of precision approach runways, both flight checks and ground
inspections of visual aids should be more frequent and detailed than those carried out on other
runways.

4.3 ROUTINE GROUND INSPECTIONS

4.3.1 Daily checks

a) all inset and elevated approach lighting systems and runway and taxiway lights should be
checked for lamp failures, breakage or gross misalignment, also stop bars and illuminated
Category II or III holding position signs. Lamp failures on runway centre line lights of
precision approach runways Category II and III should be repaired as soon as possible;
and

b) major deficiencies in electrical circuits affecting the integrity of visual aids, e.g. breaks in
the distribution network or unserviceability of the standby power generators, should be
reported to airport operations, maintenance and air traffic control, and NOTAM action
taken.

Page 15 of 112
4.3.2 Weekly checks
a) check all approach lighting systems for burnt out lamps. Check obstacle lights in the
vicinity of the airport which are the responsibility of the airport operator. Ensure grass
cutting, etc., has been carried out and approach lighting systems are not becoming
obscured;
b) check all runway lighting where it is likely to become contaminated and arrange for
cleaning programmes to be carried out as necessary;
c) on all precision approach runways Category II and III, light cleaning should be followed up
by photometric measurements of the light output of runway centre line lights from
threshold for a longitudinal distance of 910 m down the runway. This will be carried out
by either the Movement Area Safety Unit or Airport Maintenance, depending on local
circumstances. These checks can be readily carried out by mounting a photometer in an
inverted box which carries wheels at its front end and can be moved swiftly from fitting to
fitting:
d) the visual approach slope indicator systems should be checked for accuracy and realigned
if necessary;
e) the serviceability of retro-reflective markers should be examined and any unserviceable
ones replaced;
f) all other markers should be checked; and any taxi-holding position lights at side of stop
bars should be checked for serviceability.

4.4 INSPECTION PROCEDURES

4.4.1 Before commencing any runway lighting, inspection permission must be obtained from
air traffic control on R/T or, if the runway is closed, from ground movement control. On
entering the runway a positive entry call (e.g. "checker entering for inspection") must be made
and on leaving the runway air traffic control must be advised when the inspection vehicle is
clear of the runway strip. Most inspections are carried out on an ON/OFF basis and the above
calls must be made on each occasion that the inspection vehicle enters the runway.

4.4.2 It is essential to maintain a listening watch on the appropriate R/T channel during any
runway lighting inspection.

4.4.3 If during an ON/OFF inspection air traffic control requests the inspection team to
clear the runway, the vehicle must move outside the runway cleared and graded area
before advising air traffic control that they are clear. They must then remain outside the
runway strip while awaiting re entry instructions.
Note. - Inspectors should never leave a runway by entering an /LS critical/sensitive area.

4.4.4 All runway lighting inspections are carried out in the direction opposite to that being
used for landing or taking off, primarily for safety reasons. Touchdown zone lighting cannot
be checked easily from the upwind direction and is the subject of a separate inspection
carried out immediately following the main inspection.

Page 16 of 112
4.4.5 On final completion of a runway lighting inspection the team should advise air traffic
control of the fact and the serviceability state reported.

4.5 EMERGENCY GROUND LIGHTS

4.5.1 A stock of ground lights which have interchangeable filters and can indicate green,
blue, red or white light should be held.

4.5.2 These lights are used in emergency situations, or where no other form of lighting can
be used.

4.6 APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEM INSPECTIONS

4.6.1 Approach lighting systems should be inspected every 24 hours. In addition they may be
inspected on request from airport operations or air traffic control.

4.6.2 The inspection should cover all elements of the approach lighting including the side
row (red) barrettes of a precision approach Category II and lII lighting system.

Note.- These barrettes are also checked when switched on in Category III conditions.

4.6.3 The inspecting team should inform air traffic control before commencing the approach
lighting system inspection, normally by telephone. Separate clearance must be obtained on
R/T to enter the runway strip or runway end safety area.

4.6.4 The ILS localizer critical/sensitive areas must not be infringed.

4.6.5 Air traffic control should be informed when the check is complete in order that non-
operational lighting can be turned off.

4.6.6 Reporting. If a major failure is discovered during the inspection, air traffic control and
airport maintenance should be informed immediately by R/T.

4.6.7 Long grass or trees obscuring approach lighting systems should be reported to airport
operations.

4.7 VISUAL APPROACH SLOPE INDICATOR SYSTEM INSPECTIONS

4.7.I Introduction

4.7.1.1 Visual approach slope indicator systems are installed to indicate to landing aircraft
the correct approach slope. Annex 14 specifies the following four types of systems:

VASIS
3-BAR VASIS
T-VASIS
PAPI

Page 17 of 112
 4.7.1.2 Under certain circumstances, it is possible to use abbreviated configurations of
VASIS, 3-BAR VASIS and T-VASIS. These abbreviated configurations are known
respectively as AVASIS, 3-BAR AVASIS and AT-VASIS.

4.7.2 Inspection details

4.7.2.1 The following inspection procedures are common to all the visual approach slope
indicator systems:
a) the system should be checked for alignment at regular intervals. The system should also
be checked on request from operations or air traffic control, and after an aircraft landing
incident/accident;
b) on each runway inspection a visual check is made of the system in use to ensure
serviceability;
c) before commencing alignment checks air traffic control and telecommunications
engineering must be informed if entry into the !LS glide path critical/sensitive area is
required;
d) checking at night and in bad visibility should be avoided if at all possible;
e) alignment checks should be carried out with the system set at 30 per cent intensity;
f) during the system check the vehicle must remain clear of the strip and one member of
the team must remain in the vehicle monitoring the R/T while the checking team
proceeds on foot to the system location;
g) if the system is located within the ILS glide path critical/sensitive area, the vehicle
must be parked outside, and upwind of, the glide path critical/sensitive area
boundary. The checking party must proceed on foot to the runway edge, remaining
clear of the ILS glide path critical/sensitive area, then turn and walk along the grass
adjacent to the runway edge to the system, leaving by the same route;
h) a previous arrangement should be made between the lookout and the checking party
to agree on a signal should it become necessary for them to clear rapidly (e.g. portable
radio); and;
i) care must be taken not to obstruct the front of the system when aircraft are on final
approach to land.

4.7.2.2 VASIS and 3-BARD VASIS alignment checks.

The alignment checks of these systems should be carried out as follows:
a) select the correct sighting stick;
b) place the sighting stick upon the relevant checking peg located approximately 31 m
downwind from the VAS! unit, ensuring that the stick is held vertically;
c) align the eyes with the top edged line on the green perspex and the VASI unit. A thin
pencil line of even white light should appear below the red light;
d) lower the eyes to the lower edged line and the pencil line of white light should
disappear;
e) any variation to c) and d) indicates that the VASI unit is out of alignment;
f) any unserviceabilities should be dealt with by the engineer accompanying the
checking party; and
g) the procedures described above should be repeated for each unit of the system.

4.7.2.3 T-VASIS alignment checks. T-VASIS units are factory-adjusted and the optical units
being compact and stiff, the subsequent check on beam angles is only confirmatory. The unit

Page 18 of 112
should be levelled laterally and longitudinally and then checked periodically. To achieve a
sharp signal and maximum system range, it is essential that the most intense sector of the
lamp be utilized This can be achieved by means of a target which is temporarily installed at
the front of the light unit so that each lamp can be correctly aimed by adjustments in
azimuth and elevation.

4.7.2.4 PAPI alignment checks. The PAPI units are optically set in the factory and all that is
required is the setting of the unit to the required approach angle. In some cases there may be
a levelling device which is incorporated into the unit. In other cases a clinometer should be
utilized to ensure that the desired angle is achieved.

4.7.3 Reporting
4.7.3.1 VASIS. When the VASIS has an unserviceability or when units. have to be unplugged
the following standards apply:

 Failure of one lamp in one unit - UNIT SERVICEABLE.

 Failure of two lams in one unit – UNIT UNSERVICABLE.
 Not more than two units of a 12-unit system unserviceable - SYSTEM REMAINS IN
USE
 More than two units of a 12-unit system unserviceable on one side - REMAINDER OF
THAT SIDE UNPLUGGED AND THE OTHER SIDE USED AS AN AVASIS.
 More than one unit unserviceable on the remaining side - SYSTEM UNSERVICEABLE.

4.7.3.2 In the case of AVASIS the following applies:

 Failure of one lamp in one unit - UNIT SERVICEABLE.
 Failure of two lamps in one unit - UNIT UNSERVICEABLE.

Single sided system

 More than one unit unserviceable - SYSTEM UNSERVICEABLE
Two sided system
 More than one unit of system unserviceable on one side - REMAINDER OF THAT SIDE
UNPLUGGED AND OTHER SIDE USED.
 One or more of the remaining side unserviceable - SYSTEM UNSERVICEABLE.

4.7.3.3 3-BAR VASIS. When the 3-BAR VASJS has an unserviceability or when units have to
be unplugged the following standards apply:

In the case of 3-BAR AVASIS the standards are the same. as for AVASIS.

4.7.3.4 T-VASIS. In the case of T-VASIS the following applies:

 Failure of more than two lamps out of four of the day lamps - UNIT UNSERVICEABLE.
 Failure of one or more of the two night lamps - UNIT UNSERVICEABLE.

4.7.3.5 The system shall be regarded as having failed when the following failures occur in units:
 Two out of eight reference light units.
 One out of six fly-up light units.
 One out of six fly-down light units.

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4.7.3.6 In the event that more failures occur than described above, provided that they are on the
same side of the runway, the failed side may be withdrawn from service and remaining side used
as an AT-VASIS. In that event no further unit failures can be tolerated.

4.7.3.7 PAPI. In the case of PAPI the following applies:

 Failure of more than one lamp in each unit - UNIT UNSERVICEABLE.
 Failure of any one unit - SYSTEM UNSERVICEABLE.

4.7.3.8 If PAPI is provided on both sides of the runway, failure of a light unit in a symmetrical
PAPI system may be tolerated by switching off completely the failed side, leaving PAPI
operating only on the serviceable side of the runway.

4.7.3.9 Long grass obstructing light units should also be reported.

4.7.4 Further guidance on the subject is included in the Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 4 -
Visual Aids.

Chapter 5

Flight Checks of Visual Aids

5.1 GENERAL

5.1.1 Flight checking of visual aids is very important and arrangements for flight checking
will be made at designated intervals. Airport operations staff should take part in these
inspections.

5.1.2 Approach lighting systems, approach side row (red) barrettes where fitted, visual approach
slope indicator systems, threshold lights, touchdown zone lights, runway edge lights and runway
centre line lights will be checked for failures and alignment. The visual approach slope indicator
systems will be checked for compatibility with the non-visual approach system. The brilliancy
control system will be exercised. Taxiway lighting and stop bars will be checked on those routes
in use at the time of the flight check. Further information on flight checking of visual approach
slope indicator systems is contained in the Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 4 - Visual Aids.

5.2 FLIGHT CHECKS AFTER MAJOR MAINTENANCE

5.2.1 After major maintenance or developments affecting operational facilities within the
movement area, special flight checks will be arranged as necessary.

5.2.2 Daylight visual aids checks. At least once per year checks should be carried out in
daylight to inspect surface markings, VASIS for range and beam spread and the balance of
the runway and approach lighting system at maximum brilliancy.

5.2.3 New installations. Before any new installations are brought into use or when there
have been substantial changes to existing installations, a flight check should be arranged.

Page 20 of 112
5.3 APPROACH AND RUNWAY LIGHTING SYSTEMS
Note.- For simplicity in presentation the following is written in a series of logical steps, but
persons with in-flight experience may wish to combine these steps in a reduced number of
approaches.

5.3.1 Approach lighting pattern

5.3.1.1 Carry out a normal approach from about 6-8 km starting with all elements of the
approach lighting system excluding side row barrettes (red) at the maximum brilliancy
setting. Check that a uniform pattern! is presented to an aircraft on the normal approach
path. Variations should be made about the approach path. Small variations in elevation and
azimuth should not produce any noticeable change in the intensity of the lights. Large
variations will produce a progressive reduction in intensity as the aircraft leaves the area of
primary cover of the lights. These changes in intensity should be substantially the same for
a!! lights. Ragged changes are normally attributable to incorrect setting angles of individual
units, and a note of these lights should be made for subsequent checking on the ground.

5.3.1.2 During the approach, call for progressive reductions in brilliancy down to the
minimum setting. Check that all lights respond correctly and simultaneously to the setting
changes. With the lights set at a suitable brilliancy setting (the lowest at which the individual
lights are discernible in the conditions is normally best), check that all the individual lights
are illuminated. Note and record all failures.

5.3.2 Approach side row (red) barrettes (when installed)

5.3.2.1 Repeat checks I and 2 above for side row barrettes (red) of the approach lighting
system.

5.3.2.2 Repeat with all the elements of the approach lighting systems including the side row
barrettes (red).

5.3.3 Runway edge, threshold and end lights

5.3.3.1 With edge, threshold and end lights at maximum brilliancy, check that a uniform pattern is
presented to an aircraft taking off, landing and overshooting. Check that there is a progressive
reduction in the intensity as the aircraft leaves the area of primary cover of the lights.

5.3.3.2 From the downwind leg, check that all omni-directional runway edge lights are visible and
clearly define the runway edges.

5.3.3.3 During a normal approach, and starting with the runway lights at maximum intensity, call
for progressive reductions in the light intensities down to the minimum setting. Check that all
lights respond correctly and simultaneously to the setting changes. At a low brilliancy setting
carry out a low overshoot and check for any light failures.

5.3.4 Runway centre line lights

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5.3.4.1 Repeat checks 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.3 above for the runway centre line lights.

5.3.5 Touchdown zone lights

5.3.5.1 Repeat checks 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.3 above for touchdown zone lights.

5.3.6 Complete check of approach and runway lighting systems

5.3.6.1 With the approach (including side row red barrettes where installed) and runway lighting
systems set at the brilliancy levels appropriate to the conditions carry out a normal approach.
Check that a balanced lighting system is presented to the pilot. Call for brilliancy adjustments
appropriate to other conditions and check that balance is maintained.

5.3.6.2 Repeat the above check with the addition of side row barrettes of the approach lighting
systems and touchdown zone lights.

5.4 LOCATION/IDENTIFICATION BEACON

5.4.1 Check that the beacon is clearly discernible at a range appropriate to the conditions, and
that the coding/flash rate is correct.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

VA-3

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

10.5 Visual aids

Note 1.— These specifications are intended to define the maintenance performance level
objectives. They are not intended to define whether the lighting system is operationally out of
service.

Note 2.— The energy savings of light emitting diodes (LEDs) are due in large part to the fact that
they do not produce the infra-red heat signature of incandescent lamps. Aerodrome operators
who have come to expect the melting of ice and snow by this heat signature may wish to evaluate
whether or not a modified maintenance schedule is required during such conditions, or evaluate
the possible operational value of installing LED fixtures with heating elements.

Note 3.— Enhanced vision systems (EVS) technology relies on the infra-red heat signature
provided by incandescent lighting. Annex 15 protocols provide an appropriate means of notifying
aerodrome users of EVS when lighting systems are converted to LED.

Page 22 of 112
10.5.1 A light shall be deemed to be unserviceable when the main beam average intensity is less
than 50 per cent of the value specified in the appropriate figure in Appendix 2. For light units
where the designed main beam average intensity is above the value shown in Appendix 2, the 50
per cent value shall be related to that design value.

10.5.2 A system of preventive maintenance of visual aids shall be employed to ensure lighting
and marking system reliability. Note.— Guidance on preventive maintenance of visual aids is
given in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 9.

10.5.3 Recommendation.— The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision

approach runway category II or III should include at least the following checks:

a) visual inspection and in-field measurement of the intensity, beam spread and orientation of
lights included in the approach and runway lighting systems;
b) control and measurement of the electrical characteristics of each circuitry included in the
approach and runway lighting systems; and
c) control of the correct functioning of light intensity settings used by air traffic control.

10.5.4 Recommendation.— In-field measurement of intensity, beam spread and orientation of

lights included in approach and runway lighting systems for a precision approach runway
category II or III should be undertaken by measuring all lights, as far as practicable, to ensure
conformance with the applicable specification of Appendix 2.

10.5.5 Recommendation.— Measurement of intensity, beam spread and orientation of lights

included in approach and runway lighting systems for a precision approach runway category II
or III should be undertaken using a mobile measuring unit of sufficient accuracy to analyse the
characteristics of the individual lights.

10.5.6 Recommendation.— The frequency of measurement of lights for a precision approach

runway category II or III should be based on traffic density, the local pollution level, the reliability
of the installed lighting equipment and the continuous assessment of the results of the in-field
measurements but, in any event, should not be less than twice a year for in-pavement lights and
not less than once a year for other lights.

10.5.7 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision approach runway
category II or III shall have as its objective that, during any period of category II or III operations,
all approach and runway lights are serviceable and that, in any event, at least:
a) 95 per cent of the lights are serviceable in each of the following particular significant
elements:
1) precision approach category II and III lighting system, the inner 450 m;
2) runway centre line lights;
3) runway threshold lights; and

Page 23 of 112
 4) runway edge lights;
b) 90 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the touchdown zone lights;
c) 85 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the approach lighting system beyond 450 m;
and
d) 75 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the runway end lights.

In order to provide continuity of guidance, the allowable percentage of unserviceable lights shall
not be permitted in such a way as to alter the basic pattern of the lighting system. Additionally, an
unserviceable light shall not be permitted adjacent to another unserviceable light, except in a
barrette or a crossbar where two adjacent unserviceable lights may be permitted.

Note.— With respect to barrettes, crossbars and runway edge lights, lights are considered to be
adjacent if located consecutively and:
— laterally: in the same barrette or crossbar; or
— longitudinally: in the same row of edge lights or barrettes.

10.5.8 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a stop bar provided at a runway-
holding position used in conjunction with a runway intended for operations in runway visual
range conditions less than a value of 350 m shall have the following objectives:
a) no more than two lights will remain unserviceable; and
b) two adjacent lights will not remain unserviceable unless the light spacing is significantly
less than that specified.

10.5.9 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a taxiway intended for use in runway
visual range conditions less than a value of 350 m shall have as its objective that no two adjacent
taxiway centre line lights be unserviceable.

10.5.10 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a precision approach runway
category I shall have as its objective that, during any period of category I operations, all approach
and runway lights are serviceable and that, in any event, at least 85 per cent of the lights are
serviceable in each of the following:
a) precision approach category I lighting system;
b) runway threshold lights;
c) runway edge lights; and
d) runway end lights.
In order to provide continuity of guidance an unserviceable light shall not be permitted adjacent
to another unserviceable light unless the light spacing is significantly less than that specified.

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Note.— In barrettes and crossbars, guidance is not lost by having two adjacent unserviceable
lights.

10.5.11 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a runway meant for take-off in
runway visual range conditions less than a value of 550 m shall have as its objective that, during
any period of operations, all runway lights are serviceable and that in any event:
a) at least 95 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the runway centre line lights (where
provided) and in the runway edge lights; and
b) at least 75 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the runway end lights.
c) In order to provide continuity of guidance, an unserviceable light shall not be permitted
adjacent to another unserviceable
d) light.

10.5.12 The system of preventive maintenance employed for a runway meant for take-off in
runway visual range conditions of a value of 550 m or greater shall have as its objective that,
during any period of operations, all runway lights are serviceable and that, in any event, at least
85 per cent of the lights are serviceable in the runway edge lights and runway end lights. In order
to provide continuity of guidance, an unserviceable light shall not be permitted adjacent to
another unserviceable light.

10.5.13 Recommendation.— During low visibility procedures the appropriate authority should
restrict construction or maintenance activities in the proximity of aerodrome electrical systems.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Doc 9137 – Part 9: Airport Maintenance Practices, First Edition, 1984

Chapter 2-Maintenance of Visual Aids

2.1- INTRODUCTION
2.1. I The basic purpose of visual aid systems is to aid in the safe operation of aircraft. Therefore,
the highest standards of maintenance are required. Once a system has been installed, its usefulness
is dependent on its service-ability, which in turn depends upon the effectiveness of the
maintenance work carried out. Annex 14, Chapter J defines a light to have failed when its light
output falls below 50 per cent of that specified for a new light. The causes for the loss in light output
can be contaminants outside and inside the light unit, and degradation of the lamp and optical
system clue to aging. The light can and should be restored to its original condition by cleaning or
replacing the lamp and any parts which have apparently become degraded. For this purpose it is
essential to establish a comprehensive routine maintenance system for servicing lights and other
equipment so that the installation complies with the specified requirements. Reference is made to
Annex 14, Chapter 9.

Page 25 of 112
2.2 PERSONNEL

2.2.1. The task of maintaining lighting aids should be entrusted only to reliable and skilled
electricians who have had experience with high voltage, series circuits and lighting. These
individuals should be present or on call during the operating hours of the airport to correct any
deficiencies that might develop. Training programmes should be established to maintain the
competence of maintenance personnel and to keep them abreast of new developments.

2.3 SPARE PARTS

2.3.1 An adequate stock of spare parts should be available. The level of stock will vary depending
on the time required to re-supply a particular item and its shelf life.

2.4 AS-BUILT DRAWINGS

2.4.1 A set of as-built drawings should be kept readily available. These drawings must be kept up
to date and any changes at site should be reflected immediately on these drawings. The
completeness and the accuracy of all circuit diagrams, drawings and descriptions should be
checked at least annually.

2.5 LIGHT MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE

General

2.5.1 When servicing lights the instructions of the appropriate authority and recommendations of
the equipment manufacturer should be followed to ensure the required service standard. Service
records showing maintenance schedules recommended by the manufacturer or local standards
should be prepared for each piece of equipment. These can be arranged in a dated reminder file
to make sure all equipment is serviced regularly. This record should have space to enter
observations, measure-ments and initials of the servicing individual. If local conditions indicate a
change in time interval of servicing to be desirable then the schedule can be altered in
consultation. with the equipment manufacturer.

2.5.2 The frequency at which routine inspection, cleaning and servicing are to be performed will
vary according to the type of equipment, its location and usage. A maintenance programme must
be drawn up for each individual airport based on past experience and its aim should be to
achieve the required service standard. The following schedules are presented as guidance
material in establishing a preventive maintenance programme. More frequent checks may be
necessary for the lights serving precision approach category II and Ill runways. The time
schedules shown should not take precedence over manufac-turers' instructions or be applied to
similar equipment not mentioned. Each check should be followed by appropriate corrective
action.

Basic maintenance programme for approach, runway and taxiway lighting systems

2.5.3 Maintenance for all types of approach, runway and taxiway lights should include checking
and, if necessary, taking indicated corrective action, as follows:
Daily:
- system for burnt-out lamps; replacing burnt-out lamps
- system for gross misalignment (if applicable); adjusting
- control equipment for proper operation on each brightness step (if applicable); correcting
or repairing malfunctions

Page 26 of 112
- glass for breakage; replacing broken parts.
Annually:
- fasteners of each light unit; tightening
- lights for corrosion; painting or replacing rusted parts
- reflector of each light unit (if applicable); cleaning or replacing
- glass of each light; cleaning or replacing
- tamps of the whole system; replacing of the unservice- able lamps or entire system (see
2.6. l 8)
- elevation setting (if applicable); adjusting
- horizontal alignment; adjusting
- plug connexions for cleanness and faultless contact; cleaning or replacing of dirty parts
- light fittings and their supporting structure (if existing) for adequacy of fastening and for
corrosion and rust; tightening fasteners; painting or spraying
- general condition of the whole system, and recording results.
Unscheduled:
- elevation setting and the horizontal alignment (if applicable) of the light units after severe
storms and snowfalls; adjusting
- light units for obstruction by grass or snow, etc. (not applicable for inset lights); removing
any obstacles found.

Additional maintenance programme for special types of lights

2.5.4 ln addition to the maintenance programme specified in 2.5.3, the following should be
carried out for visual approach slope indicators, runway threshold and end lights, and inset
lights.

2.5.5 Visual approach slope indicator maintenance should include checking and, if necessary,
taking the indicated corrective action, as follows:

Twice monthly:
- elevation setting (vertical angle) of the light units; adjusting
- spreader glasses, filters and lamps for cleanness; cleaning
Annually:
- system from the air, and recording results; adjusting and replacing lamps
- supporting structure and the foundation of each unit; repairing.

2.5.6 Runway threshold and runway end light maintenance should include checking and, if
necessary, taking the indicated corrective action as follows:
Twice weekly:
- fasteners of the lights; tightening
- glass of each light for wear and tear; replacing.

2.5.7 Inset lights (runway centre line lights, touch-down zone lights, taxiway centre line lights,
stop bar lights) maintenance should include checking and, if necessary, taking the indicated
corrective action, as follows:
Daily:
- lenses for cleanness; cleaning
Twice weekly (not applicable to taxiway and stop bar lights):

Page 27 of 112
- light output of lights within 900 m from each threshold including measuring and
recording the results; cleaning of the lenses
- top parts of lights within 900 m from each threshold; replacing.
Quarterly (not applicable to taxiway and stop bar lights):
- light our put of all ligh1s within the system including measuring and recording the results;
cleaning of the lenses
- top parts of the lights; replacing.
Semi-annually (not applicable to taxiway and stop bar lights):
- lights for cleanness inside and our; cleaning
- lights for moisture; drying
- electrical connexions of the lights; tightening; spraying with contact agent
- alignment of lights; adjusting.
Annually:
- prisms and filters; cleaning or replacing
- sealing compound; resealing.
Unscheduled:
- top parts of the lights two to four weeks after replacement; tightening
Maintenance programme for other airport lights

2.5.8 Other airport lights include, for example, airport beacons, obstacle lights and wind direction
indicators. These normally need less maintenance than approach, runway or taxiway lighting
systems. Their maintenance should include checking and, if necessary, taking the indicated
corrective action, as follows:
Daily:
- lamps; replacing if necessary
- control equipment for proper operation (not applicable in the case of obstacle lights);
correcting or repairing
- fabric of the wind cone; repairing or replacing.
Semi-annually (only for airport beacon):
- power supply (brushes and slip-rings); cleaning or replacing
- electrical connexions; tightening
- rotating parts; fastening.
Annually:
- optical system of the airport beacon
- glasses and the gaskets of obstacle lights; cleaning or replacing
- function of the flashing relays and of the twilight switches of the obstacle lights; deaning,
repairing or replacing
- power supply and the lighting of the wind direction indicator; repairing or replacing
electrical connexions; tightening; spraying with contact agent
- fasteners of obstacle lights
- structure and the fasteners of the wind direction indicator; tightening or repairing the
structure
- lights for corrosion; painting
- colour of the fabric cone or the wind direction indicator; replacing.
- location of obstacle lights for easy access for mainten-ance; arranging of change of
location if required and possible.
Unscheduled:
- wind direction indicator after severe storms; repairing..

Page 28 of 112
Docking guidance systems

2.5.9 Maintenance programmes for various types of aircraft docking guidance systems are
provided at airports and it is very difficult to describe a generally applicable maintenance
programme for these very different systems. Principal requirements to be checked and
maintenance action to be taken, if necessary, include:
Daily:
- system for over-all operation; repairing
- lamps; replacing burnt-out lamps.
Semi-annually:
- alignment of the system; adjusting.
Annually:
- electrical connexions (if provided) for corrosion, wear and tear; cleaning, tightening and
replacing
- function of relays (if provided); cleaning or replacing
- structure of the system and the function of all mechanical parts; repairing
- system for cleanness and moisture; cleaning and drying.

2.6 LIGHT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

General hints for maintenance of lights
2.6.1 For reasons of efficiency the maintenance of lights should, as far as practicable, be carried
out indoors. Inconveniences of working out of doors, such as heat, cold, precipitation and aircraft
noise can be avoided and traffic restrictions or interruptions will be reduced to a minimum. The
quality of service will also be higher in workshops than out of doors. This is particularly
appli-cable when, in the interest of unrestricted traffic flow during day hours, the work has to be
carried out during the night.

2.6.2 The maintenance procedure commonly used comprises two steps:

- removal of defective lights and immediate replacement by new or repaired ones
- servicing and overhaul of deficient lights in the workshop where all required tools,
measuring and adjusting equipment are available.

2.6.3 This procedure has proven to be practical, particularly for the maintenance of inset lights.
Provision of a sufficient number of stored spare lights is a prerequi-site. The number of spare
parts depends on the over-all requirement of the airport and the experience with the sensitivity
to damage of the various types of lights on the airport. It is useful to select lights which are
designed to permit removal and installation within a short time, without the use of very
sophisticated technical equipment.
Furthermore, all mechanical and optical parts of the light should be incorporated in the
removable part.

Cleaning procedures for lights

2.6.4 The type and degree of contamination of the various lights on an airport will be different.
While elevated approach and edge lights are normally contaminated by weather effects only
(dust carried by wind and rain), more severe contamination can be observed on inset lights,
particularly on runways. Rubber deposits from tires on touchdown and exhaust from engine

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reverse thrust procedures create firmly sticking deposits on the exterior glassware of lights. The
very different degree of contamination must be reflected in the maintenance schedule of different
categories of lights or sections in the runway/taxiway system.

2.6.5 When cleaning the glassware of lights, the manufacturer's recommendations should be
observed. Normally, cleaning is accomplished by washing the glassware with a cleansing mixture
of water and a special solvent that will neither affect the sealing material nor produce a residual
film on the glass. The solvent must be given sufficient time to dissolve the deposits. If necessary,
rubber spots may be scraped off by using plastic tools or powder before using the solvent. Other
mechanical aids for cleaning may be sponges, cloths, hand brushes or electric rotating brushes.
The cleaning technique and the materials used should not scratch or groove the glass surface nor
damage the sealing material.

2.6.6 Dry cleaning of glassware should be avoided. However, if cleaning becomes necessary for
some reason, no sand or otl1er abrasive material should be used. In such cases cleaning can be
done by using clean ground-up walnut or pecan shells and dry compressed air. Special treatment
can normally be avoided by following a maintenance schedule with wet cleaning at suitable
intervals.

2.6.7 For cleaning light fittings on site special maintenance vehicles equipped with air
compressors, vacuum cleaners and solvent tanks should be used. A low working seat at the rear
or from, or an opening in the bottom of the maintenance vehicle facilitates the work considerably.
In some cases, these vehicles can carry 1he required tools for all types of maintenance work,
including the removal of old lights and the installation of new ones.

2.6.8 Thorough cleaning or the interior of the lights to remove mud, moisture or rust should be
carried our in workshops. Only minor contaminants, such as dust, should be removed on site.
light measurement

2.6.9 The light output will diminish with the lapse of time due to lamp aging. Contamination of
reflector and lens will result in a further degradation of light output. According to Annex 14 a
light is considered to have failed when its output is less than 50 per cent of the required intensity.
For practical reasons replacement of a light is recommended when its output falls below 70 per
cent of that specified for a new light.

2.6.10 Light measurements should be carried out regularly to detect early light output reduction.
Appropriate equipment for both field and bench measurement of light output is available. The
equipment produced by light manufacturers does not, however, indicate the absolute intensity
values but provide ratios between measured and original light intensities of each individual type.

2.6. 1 1 Field measurements are particularly necessary for inset lights. Wheel loads on inset lights
may frequently cause damage. One type of measuring equipment offered by the light
manufacturers for field use consists of a photocell and a microammeter. Such measuring devices
are placed over the light fitting and the meter reading observed is compared with the calibration
value. Before measuring, the lights should be cleaned and switched to the highest available
intensity setting.

2.6.12 Light measurements can also be made by using

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a photographic 1 ° spot meter, which is not placed on the light casing directly, but moved
vertically and horizontally through the light beam at a fixed distance. The intensity is checked by
comparison with the results of a calibration test with a new light.

2.6.13 The measuring procedures described above are quite time-consuming. With the special
device each measurement will take about 2 minutes. Often a much faster visual observation
carried our by experienced personnel will achieve comparable results for discovering and
reporting single lights with unacceptable light output. For visual checks the level or brightness
must be switched to "low" (3 to 10 per cent of maximum).

2.6.14 For adjustment of the correct angle of the beam, lights are normally furnished with
alignment markings. Furthermore, light manufacturers offer suitable adjustment equipment for
their product. Beam misalign-ment caused by displacement of the optical system inside, however,
cannot be corrected by adjusting the casing. When such misalignment is observed visually, the
light should be adjusted in the workshop.

2.6.15 For measuring light output in the workshop the measuring equipment produced by the
light manufacturer concerned should be used. The equipment consists of a bench to fix the light
and a photocell sensor element. Microammeter readings should be compared with the calibration
value. Directional adjustments can be made using the alignment screws.

2.6. 16 Where light measurements have to be ac-complished without the manufacturer's special
equipment, a useful technique is to check the isocandela curve on a vertical surface located
approximately 3 m in front of the light unit. With photocells at the vertical and horizontal limit
lines of the isocandela curve, comparison with the light output of a new light will be possible.
Lights should be switched to the maximum brightness level before testing.
Lamp replacement

2.6.17 The life span of lamps varies from 100 to some I 000 hours of operation. The life time
depends on the percentage of operation at high brightness levels and on the number of
switchings. Also, dynamic stresses imposed by aircraft wheel loads (inset lights) and
temperature-induced stresses inside the casing affect the lamp life. Lamps which have failed
should be replaced as soon as possible since the lighting system of an airport has to meet
specified service-ability requirements. Reference is made to Annex 14, Chapter 9.

2.6.18 Lamp replacement can be organized in two different ways:

- only lamps which have failed or lamps showing major output reduction are replaced upon
checking; this method requires checks to be carried out at short intervals;
- bulk changing of lamps in certain sections of the entire lighting system, in accordance with
a fixed time schedule. The intervals between replacements have to be derived from local
experience with the average life of lamps in use. Lamps should be changed when they have been
operated for 80 per cent of their average life. For this maintenance method a reliable record of
operating hours for the individual sections of the airport's lighting system is a prerequisite. This
method requires less frequent checks.

2.6.19 Lamp replacement in the workshop is prefer-able, particularly with inset lights. The
unserviceable light should be removed from its position and replaced by a serviceable light.

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Lamp replacement of elevated lights may be carried out on site provided that the casing can be
opened easily and quickly, and the socket of the lamp needs no realignment afterwards.
Removal of water

2.6.20 Inset lights may sometimes collect water. Water inside the light increases corrosion,
causes damage to electrical parts and deposits on lens and lamp and, further more, reduces the
life of the lamp. Before insetting a light into the pavement good drainage of the opening must be
ensured. Nevertheless, penetration of moisture and accumulation of water cannot be precluded
completely. Regular inspection is necessary to check lights for the presence of water. Lights
found to be wet inside should be removed and replaced, if such a procedure is possible with the
type of light. Other wise, drying must be carried our on the spot. After drying, the sealings should
be checked carefully and replaced when necessary. Before closing a dried light, the lamp should
be switched on for some time to permit any residual moisture to evaporate due to the
temperature increase inside.

2.6.21 Attention should be paid to the presence of water on and in front of the glass of inset
lights. Water may bend the light beam, thus misaligning the light direction. If such a situation is
observed, the drainage has to be improved.

2.7 SIGNS
2.7.1 Signs give pilots directional information for taxiing and holding. Maintenance should ensure
integrity and perfect legibility of the information provided by the signs. The design and
construction of signs varies consider-ably but the following general checks and, if necessary,
maintenance action, are recommended for each sign:
Daily:
- lighting; replacing burnt-out lamps
- inscriptions for legibility and absence of obstructions; repairing the signs and removing
obstructions.
Annually:
- mounting of both the sign and its lighting if provided; repairing
- structure and its paint; cleaning, repairing or replacing.
Unscheduled:
- after snowfall for legibility; removing obstructions
- after severe storms; re-positioning tumbled signs and repairing damaged signs.

2.8 MARKINGS
2.8.1 All markings on paved areas should be inspected at least semi-annually. Local conditions
will determine when to inspect. In general, a spring and fall inspection will suffice to detect
deterioration due to the winter and summer weather extremes.

2.8.2 Markings which are faded or discoloured by soil should be repainted. When rubber deposits
have been removed from the pavement all defaced markings should be restored as soon as
possible.

BACK TO CHECKLIST

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VA-4

Doc 9981 PANS-AERODROMES, Part II, Third Edition, 2020

PART II
Chapter 3

INSPECTIONS OF THE MOVEMENT AREA

3.1 GENERAL

3.1.1 The inspection of aerodrome movement areas (including runways, taxiways and aprons,
and their lighting systems, markings, signs, etc.) is required to ensure that hazards to aircraft are
minimized and to create a safe and efficient operation. Aerodrome movement areas are complex
and maintaining them in an optimal condition for safety depends on a large number of variables
relating to the mix of aircraft operations, pavement materials and environmental conditions at
each aerodrome. Inspection procedures are an integral part of ensuring the serviceability of the
aerodrome and the detection of foreign object debris (FOD).

Note.— Provisions on FOD control can be found in Part II, Chapter 5 of this document.

3.1.2 Movement area inspections are mainly intended for:

a) ensuring that the conditions of the movement area and associated equipment are fit for
the intended operational use;

b) identifying faults and potential hazards to the safety of aircraft or aerodrome operations
and take appropriate action; and

c) providing periodic, timely and accurate updates on the condition of the movement area
and the operational status of related facilities, to be reported to air traffic services (ATS),
aerodrome operations and aeronautical information services (AIS).

3.1.3 Several types of inspections are normally performed:

a) daily inspections or “Level 1 inspections” provide an overview of the general condition of

the movement area and its associated facilities; and

b) regular inspections or “Level 2 inspections” are part of the preventive maintenance of the
aerodrome and consist of a more detailed verification of the conditions of the movement area
and its associated facilities.

Note 1.— Daily inspections are referred to in Annex 14 — Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome
Design and Operations, section 2.9.

Note 2.— Guidance on carrying out daily inspections of the movement area and on control of FOD
is also given in the Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc

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9476), the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) Manual (Doc
9830) and the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 8 — Airport Operational Services.

3.1.4 Due to the potentially large areas and distances covered, Level 1 inspections may
necessitate the use of vehicles. However, the higher the speed of the vehicle, the potentially less
effective the inspection. The speed of the vehicle should therefore be kept as low as practical.

3.1.5 Detailed Level 2 inspections of paved surfaces, coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit,
are best completed on foot, thus enabling a far more comprehensive assessment, as part of
preventive maintenance.

3.1.6 Faults in the lighting systems will normally be detected via monitoring. Monitoring by
visual display on the lighting control panel in the ATS unit will enable detection of circuit failures
and verification that brilliancy selection by ATS is providing the desired light output. Monitoring
by visual inspection also enables the detection of failed lamps and the contamination of fittings
by dirt and rubber deposits or misalignment.

3.1.7 Although this chapter covers planned inspections, in certain circumstances, unplanned
inspections may need to be carried out to ensure the safety of operations. These circumstances
may include:

a) following the completion of works;

b) a reported incident;

c) a pilot/ATC report;

d) adverse meteorological conditions; and/or

e) an emergency response.

3.2 OBJECTIVES

3.2.1 Inspections of the movement area shall be planned so as to ensure that an appropriate
level of vigilance is maintained at all times. The inspections shall cover, at a minimum, the
following items:

a) the runway;

b) the remaining manoeuvring area, including taxiways and adjacent areas;

c) the apron and service areas;

d) surface conditions;

e) detection of FOD;

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f) status of visual aids, including visible electrical systems or parts thereof; and

g) status of obstacles outside the aerodrome boundary.

3.2.2 An inspection programme of the movement area commensurate with the size and
complexity of the aerodrome, along with the objectives set in 3.2.1 shall be established by the
aerodrome operator.

3.2.3 All aerodrome inspections shall be formally documented in a log by the aerodrome
operator and all records shall be maintained for future reference.

3.2.4 Each inspection shall include a reporting and follow-up mechanism to ensure that
appropriate action is taken.

3.3 OPERATIONAL PRACTICES

3.3.1 Frequency of inspections

3.3.1.1 The frequency and detail of inspections may be increased from the minimum specified in
Annex 14, depending on the traffic expected and the type of inspection being performed.

3.3.1.2 The frequency of aerodrome inspections should be commensurate with the level of risk
identified in the aerodrome safety management system (SMS).

Note 1.— The minimum mandatory frequency of Level 1 inspections is given in Annex 14,
Volume 1, 2.9.3. Note 2.— Guidance on SMS is given in the Safety Management Manual (SMM)
(Doc 9859).

3.3.2 Inspection of the manoeuvring area

Runways

3.3.2.1 A runway inspection may involve the deliberate entry to an active runway. It is therefore
essential that any potential hazards associated with this activity are identified and addressed so
that staff with inspection duties have a clear understanding of what is involved and how the task
is to be safely carried out.

3.3.2.2 All runway inspections undertaken on an active runway shall be conducted according to
documented procedures developed to ensure the safety of aircraft operations and aerodrome
personnel.

3.3.2.3 Procedures for the access to runways shall be established with the appropriate ATS unit.
Prior to any runway inspection, radio contact shall be established with ATS and permission to
begin the inspection shall be obtained and acknowledged by the inspection team.

Note.— The Appendix to this chapter elaborates on the factors to be considered in the
development of these procedures.

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3.3.2.4 If runway lighting is installed, inspections should be undertaken with the lights
illuminated in order to enable the identification of unserviceable lamps and possible failures of
light fittings.

3.3.2.5 When aircraft parts or aircraft tire pieces are found during a runway inspection,
aerodrome operations and the appropriate ATS unit shall be informed immediately, so as to trace
the origin of the parts and pieces and notify the appropriate aircraft operators.

Note.— Provisions on foreign object debris (FOD) control can be found in Chapter 5.

Taxiways

3.3.2.6 A daily inspection should be undertaken on taxiways in regular, active use. The frequency
of inspections for remaining taxiways should be assessed to ensure that they remain suitable for
use when required. All inspections undertaken on an active taxiway shall be conducted according
to appropriate procedures developed for the location, which ensure the safety of aircraft
operations and aerodrome personnel.

Note.— The Appendix to this chapter elaborates on the factors to be considered in the
development of these procedures.

3.3.2.7 Procedures for access to taxiways shall be established with the appropriate ATS unit. Prior
to any taxiway inspection, radio contact shall be established with ATS and permission to begin
the inspection shall be obtained and acknowledged by the inspection team, unless a local safety
assessment, taking into account also the aerodrome characteristics, size, complexity and level of
traffic, has proven that a taxiway inspection can be safely conducted without radio contact with
ATS, and a corresponding procedure has been documented and promulgated.

Note.— The safety assessment methodology is included in Part I, Chapter 3 of this document.

3.3.3 Inspection of the apron

3.3.3.1 Inspections of the apron area should be undertaken at defined frequencies. Considering
the level of operations undertaken at each aerodrome, the frequency may be adjusted in
accordance with the level of risk identified by the aerodrome SMS.

3.3.3.2 Inspections may be undertaken in segments to account for the size and complexity of the
operation.

3.3.4 Inspection of the visual aids

3.3.4.1 A routine ground inspection of all aerodrome ground lighting systems should be made
daily or before use. Any deficiencies should be remedied as soon as possible, and the identified
lights should again be inspected before use after the remedial action is taken. All deficiencies and
associated remedial action should be logged.

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3.3.4.2 Approach lighting systems should be inspected at adequate, defined frequencies. They
may also be inspected upon request from aerodrome operations or ATS. The inspection should
cover all the light units of the approach lighting system.

3.3.4.3 The inspecting team shall inform ATS before commencing the approach lighting system
inspection.

3.3.4.4 ATS shall be informed when the inspection is complete in order to turn off any lights not
required for regular operations.

3.3.4.5 If a major failure is discovered during the inspection, ATS and aerodrome maintenance
shall be informed immediately.

Appendix to Chapter 3

GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR THE INSPECTION AND DOCUMENTED REPORTING OF THE

MOVEMENT AREA

1. PROCEDURE

1.1 Prior to entering the runway, an entry request (e.g. “[vehicle call sign] holding at […] for
runway inspection”) shall be made. Upon leaving the runway, the control tower shall be advised
when the inspection vehicle is clear of the runway. Some inspections are carried out on an
ON/OFF basis (i.e. where the inspection vehicle may be required to enter or leave the runway on
short notice). The request for runway entry and the notification that the vehicle is clear of the
runway shall be made on each occasion that the inspection vehicle enters and leaves the runway.
A listening watch shall be maintained on the appropriate radiotelephony channel during any
runway inspection.

Note.— Provisions on aerodrome vehicles and drivers can be found in Chapter 9.

1.2 If, during an inspection, the control tower requests the inspection personnel to vacate the
runway, the vehicle shall move outside the runway before advising the control tower that they
are clear. The inspection personnel shall not re-enter the runway until in receipt of specific
clearance to do so. The inspection team shall never vacate a runway by driving through an
instrument landing system (ILS) critical/sensitive area.

1.3 ATC clearance shall be obtained before crossing or entering any runway.

1.4 Runway inspections should be carried out in the direction opposite to that being used for
landing or taking off, primarily to ensure the visibility of, and by, the operating aircraft.

1.5 Upon final completion of a runway inspection, the control tower shall be advised of the
completion of the inspection, and on the status of the manoeuvring area, as necessary.

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1.6 The times of commencement and completion of the inspection shall be noted and included
in the record of inspection log.

2. REPORTING

2.1 If a dangerous unserviceability is discovered during a runway inspection (e.g. damaged pit
covers or broken lights), it shall be immediately reported to ATS by radiotelephony (RTF) for
appropriate ATS action to be considered. The entity in charge of aerodrome operations should
also be informed.

2.2 If unserviceability is found during an inspection, but which does not affect the use of the
runway, it should be reported to the entity in charge of aerodrome maintenance.

2.3 An inspection log should include:

a) description and exact location of the failure;

b) details of the task(s) and any remedial action(s) necessary or taken, such as notification to
ATS and AIS, recording of events for further analysis (including as part of the aerodrome SMS)
and informing maintenance services for further action;

c) identifying the person/entity responsible for undertaking the task and/or further action;
and

d) identifying the timescale by which it should be completed.

3. LEVELS OF INSPECTION

Inspection procedures on several levels are key to ensuring that the highest standards of safety
and efficiency are maintained for all stakeholders on the movement area.

3.1 A typical two-level inspection system has the following main elements:

a) daily inspections (Level 1): covering the entire movement area and zones adjacent to the
aerodrome boundary; and

b) regular inspections (Level 2): carried out by specialists whereby all runways, taxiways
and aprons are divided up into a number of areas and inspected in more detail.

Inspections shall be performed using checklists which cover the various inspection areas and a
sketch of the aerodrome, which enables the location and marking of detected problems.

3.2 A log shall be kept for all inspections, and will include:

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a) details of inspection intervals and times;

b) names of persons carrying out the inspection; and

c) results and observations, if any.

A log of all remedial actions identified following an inspection shall be recorded and verification
of their implementation shall be undertaken.

3.3 Daily Inspections (Level 1)

3.3.1 Level 1 inspections are ideally carried out at defined intervals during the day, typically:

a) a first light inspection prior to daytime operations;

b) a last light inspection prior to night operations; and

c) other inspections may be planned in between those described above, their frequency
being dictated by the hours of peak traffic.

3.3.2 Additional Level 1 inspections, particularly relating to the runway, may be carried out
depending on local circumstances, the aerodromes hazard identification and analysis, and the
safety risk assessment process (see Part I, Chapter 3).

3.3.3 Standard inspection routes should be defined and followed so that an area cannot be
forgotten.

3.3.4 Inspection personnel should report anything that affects safety and the serviceability of
the following:

3.3.4.1 Runways

a) The runway, including its shoulders with regard to cleanliness, rubber build-up and
pit/drain covers;

b) runway cleanliness, particularly FOD which could cause engine ingestion damage;

c) presence of contaminants affecting runway friction characteristics;

d) signs of pavement surface damage, including the cracking and spalling of concrete, and
looseness of aggregate material;

e) runway signs and paint markings for damage and wear;

f) the runway strip and runway end safety area (RESA) including drainage;

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g) failure of precision approach path indicator (PAPI) units, runway guard lights and any
other runway lights and wing bars;

h) any object that may affect the runway strip;

i) all areas of work in progress on or adjacent to the runway;

j) the condition of all wind direction indicators for day/night operations; and

k) wildlife activity on and near the runway.

3.3.4.2 Taxiways and taxilanes

a) All taxiway pavement surfaces, particularly with regard to pavement damage, cleanliness
and FOD;

b) all taxiway signs and paint markings for damage or wear;

c) any objects and excavations that may affect the taxiway strip;

d) all work in progress on or adjacent to the taxiway system;

e) all taxiway centre line and/or edge light fittings and markers;

f) the general condition of drains and covers; and

g) the state of the grass edge, including any waterlogged areas.

3.3.4.3 Apron areas

a) All apron pavement surfaces, particularly with regard to pavement damage, cleanliness
(fuel/oil spillages) and FOD;

b) all apron signs and paint markings for damage or wear;

c) any incorrect parking of aircraft, vehicles, equipment, passenger loading bridges, etc.;

d) any work in progress areas; and

e) the general condition of drains and covers.

3.3.4.4 Aerodrome lighting

a) All runway approach lighting (including any Category III supplementary systems) should
be inspected every evening at dusk prior to night operations and any defects reported;

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b) all runway lighting should be checked as soon as practicable after the lighting has been
switched on. Individual light outages and circuit failures should be reported;

c) all taxiway lighting should be checked as soon as practicable and should include all centre
line lights, edge lights, stop bars, runway guard lights and lead-on/lead-off lights; and

d) during the night period, all apron lighting should be inspected and any deficiencies
reported.

Note.— Lighting inspections may be integrated with other on-runway inspections and be flexible
in timing to cater for the variability of daylight hours.

3.3.4.5 Grass areas (or other areas adjacent to the taxiway system)

a) The general condition of the vegetation, particularly any areas of jet blast erosion;

b) the grass length and the amount of weeds, particularly near lights and signs;

c) any areas of standing water (waterlogged grass areas should be noted and reported,
particularly since they may be an attraction to birds);

d) depressions or aircraft wheel tracks;

e) excessive difference in levels at the edge of paved surfaces;

f) the cleanliness of these areas with regard to FOD; and

g) any work in progress areas.

3.3.5 When conducting routine daily inspections, general attention should be paid to the
following points:

a) general cleanliness with particular attention to FOD which could cause engine ingestion
damage. This may include debris from runway maintenance operations or excessive grit
remaining after runway gritting. Any build-up of tire rubber deposits should be noted;

b) signs of damage to the pavement surface including cracking and spalling of concrete,
condition of joint sealing, cracking and looseness of aggregate in asphalt surfaces or break-up of
friction courses. Damage or deterioration which could cause aircraft damage should be reported
immediately for inspection by maintenance services and, if the damage is sufficiently serious, the
area should remain closed to aircraft pending the results of such an inspection;

c) after rain, flooded areas should be identified and marked, if possible, to facilitate later
resurfacing;

d) damage of light fittings;

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e) cleanliness and visibility of runway markings; and

f) the condition and fit of pit covers.

3.3.6 The extremities of the runway should be inspected for early touchdown marks; jet blast
damage to approach lights, marker cones and threshold lights; cleanliness; and obstacles in the
runway end safety area.

3.3.7 The main objective of grass cutting shall be to ensure that lights and markers are not
obscured by tall vegetation. It should also be managed in such a fashion as to limit the attraction
of the aerodrome to birds and other wildlife. It will be necessary to ensure that mounds of grass
cuttings are not left on areas where engine ingestion is possible.

3.3.8 Zones outside the aerodrome boundary

3.3.8.1 A cursory visual inspection of the areas surrounding the aerodrome shall be made by the
aerodrome operations staff to verify that no objects seem to affect any protected surfaces,
particularly in the approach and departure areas of all runways.

3.3.8.2 The status of the lighting and marking of authorized obstacles shall be inspected.

3.3.8.3 Any unauthorized detected obstacles, and marking or lighting deficiencies of authorized
obstacles, shall be immediately reported to the designated persons, appropriate organizations or
authorities, for corrective actions to be taken.

Note.— Further guidance on obstacle control and management is contained in the Airport
Services Manual
(Doc 9137), Part 6 — Control of Obstacles.

3.4 Regular Inspections (Level 2)

3.4.1 Level 2 inspections consist of a more detailed verification of the condition on the
movement area and its associated facilities than those carried out at Level 1. The Level 2
inspections should be carried out on foot, thus enabling a far more comprehensive assessment.

3.4.2 Within the Level 2 inspections process, it is recommended to proceed by dividing the
movement area up into a number of zones depending on the size of the aerodrome. Each zone
should be inspected in detail at defined, regular intervals. Level 2 inspections may be carried out
at a time that best suits the stand demand, runway in use or other operational requirements.

3.4.3 In the case of precision approach runways, Level 2 inspections of visual aids will be more
frequent and detailed than those carried out on other runways.

3.4.4 In case of a detected damage, photos should be taken to assess the evolution of the
damage, in order to facilitate decision-making.

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3.4.5 Inspection teams should report anything that affects the serviceability and safety of the
items below.

Runways

3.4.6 Runways should be inspected in detail every three months or at a reduced frequency
based on runway usage, unless a documented analysis indicates a different frequency that would
not affect the safety of aircraft operations. Typically, the runway may be divided up into a
number of sections. Depending on the movement rate on the day of the inspection, a number of
sections can be checked, as follows:

a) Surfaces. The full length and width of the runway should be inspected during the cycle.
The inspections should record cracks, general break-up and any other surface failure, particularly
if there are signs of debris. Special attention should be paid to the touchdown zones and other
areas highly trafficked by aircraft. The touchdown zones should also receive particular attention
to assess the degree of rubber build-up that may affect the runway surface friction co-efficient.
Attention should also be given to rapid exits, access taxiways and runway turn pads.

b) Signs, markings and lighting. The general condition of all signs along the runway should be
inspected to ensure compliance with Annex 14, Volume I requirements. All runway markings
should be inspected for conspicuity, particularly in the touchdown zones where rubber deposits
may have blackened certain markings. A selection of light fittings should be inspected for general
safety, particularly with regard to the torque setting of the fixings. The regularity of testing
should be adjusted to achieve the target level of serviceability applicable to the service being
tested.

c) Runway strip. The area surrounding the runway, including the strip, clear and graded
area, and runway end safety area (RESA) should also be inspected. Attention should be given to
its general bearing strength, the nature of the surface, any obstacle that should be frangible and
any other features that could cause damage to an aircraft, should it overrun into these areas.

d) Runway approach lighting systems. Twice a year, each full approach lighting system, its
cables, light fittings, masts and other support structures should be analysed for their general
safety and serviceability by a physical check on foot. During the lighting check, a general
assessment of the lighting pattern will be made and any outages or gross misalignments noted
and reported.

e) Zones surrounding the aerodrome. At least once a week, aerodrome operations staff
should conduct a review of the areas adjacent to and surrounding the aerodrome boundary to
verify that there are no obstructions infringing protected surfaces, particularly in the approach
and departure areas. Items of concern will include tall trees, cranes, lights that may cause
confusion to pilots, and agricultural practices that could cause an increase in wildlife activity.

Taxiways

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3.4.7 At a time dictated by traffic movements and runway(s) in use, each section of the taxiway
area should be inspected on foot and all deficiencies should be marked on a specialized
map/diagram of the area. The taxiways should be inspected for the following:

a) Surfaces. All taxiway surfaces including any hard shoulders should be inspected. Surfaces
should be inspected for cracks, deterioration and debris.

b) Signs, markings and lights. All taxiway paint markings should be inspected and any
repainting requirements noted. All signs should be checked for their conspicuity and stability,
particularly where they may be affected by jet blast. A selection of taxiway light fittings should be
verified for general safety.

c) Surrounding areas. All taxiway strips and associated grass or other paved areas should
also be inspected for their general safety, particularly with regard to obstructions and surface
conditions in a similar way as the clear and graded areas of the runway are inspected.

Aprons and stands

3.4.8 The aprons and stand areas should be inspected and all defects noted on a specialized
map/diagram of the area. All aprons and stands should be inspected for the following:

a) Surfaces. All aprons, stands and associated equipment parking areas should be inspected
for surface break-up, particularly where FOD is being created.

b) Signs, markings and lights. All surface paint markings associated with aircraft movement
and parking should be inspected and any repainting requirements noted. Additionally, all signs,
markings and lights associated with the visual docking guidance systems (VDGS) and advanced
visual docking guidance systems (A-VDGS) should be checked for correct functionality and
conspicuity.

c) Surrounding areas. All service roads and equipment parking areas supporting each stand
should also be inspected for general serviceability and condition, particularly where the surface
may cause damage to vehicles or injury to passengers or personnel. These areas should also be
inspected for general cleanliness and parking discipline.

d) Equipment. When installed, all emergency telephones should be checked for

serviceability.

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Page 44 of 112
Unit 2 - Electrical systems
ES-1

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

CHAPTER 8. ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS

8.1 Electrical power supply systems for air navigation facilities

Introductory Note.— The safety of operations at aerodromes depends on the quality of the
supplied power. The total electrical power supply system may include connections to one or
more external sources of electric power supply, one or more local generating facilities and to a
distribution network including transformers and switchgear. Many other aerodrome facilities
supplied from the same system need to be taken into account while planning the electrical power
system at aerodromes.

8.1.1 Adequate primary power supply shall be available at aerodromes for the safe functioning of
air navigation facilities.

8.1.2 The design and provision of electrical power systems for aerodrome visual and radio
navigation aids shall be such that an equipment failure will not leave the pilot with inadequate
visual and non-visual guidance or misleading information.

Note.— The design and installation of the electrical systems need to take into consideration
factors that can lead to malfunction, such as electromagnetic disturbances, line losses, power
quality, etc. Additional guidance is given in the Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157), Part 5.

8.1.3 Recommendation.— Electric power supply connections to those facilities for which
secondary power is required should be so arranged that the facilities are automatically
connected to the secondary power supply on failure of the primary source of power.

8.1.4 Recommendation.— The time interval between failure of the primary source of power and
the complete restoration of the services required by 8.1.10 should be as short as practicable,
except that for visual aids associated with non-precision, precision approach or take-off runways
the requirements of Table 8-1 for maximum switch-over times should apply.

Note.— A definition of switch-over time is given in Chapter 1.

8.1.5 The provision of a definition of switch-over time shall not require the replacement of an
existing secondary power supply before 1 January 2010. However, for a secondary power supply
installed after 4 November 1999, the electric power supply connections to those facilities for
which secondary power is required shall be so arranged that the facilities are capable of meeting
the requirements of Table 8-1 for maximum switch-over times as defined in Chapter 1.

Visual aids

Application

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8.1.6 For a precision approach runway, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the
requirements of Table 8-1 for the appropriate category of precision approach runway shall be
provided. Electric power supply connections to those facilities for which secondary power is
required shall be so arranged that the facilities are automatically connected to the secondary
power supply on failure of the primary source of power.

8.1.7 For a runway meant for take-off in runway visual range conditions less than a value of 800
m, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the relevant requirements of Table 8-1 shall be
provided.

8.1.8 Recommendation.— At an aerodrome where the primary runway is a non-precision

approach runway, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the requirements of Table 8-1
should be provided except that a secondary power supply for visual aids need not be provided
for more than one non-precision approach runway.

8.1.9 Recommendation.— At an aerodrome where the primary runway is a non-instrument

runway, a secondary power supply capable of meeting the requirements of 8.1.4 should be
provided, except that a secondary power supply for visual aids need not be provided when an
emergency lighting system in accordance with the specification of 5.3.2 is provided and capable
of being deployed in 15 minutes.

8.1.10 Recommendation.— The following aerodrome facilities should be provided with a

secondary power supply capable of supplying power when there is a failure of the primary power
supply:

a) the signalling lamp and the minimum lighting necessary to enable air traffic services
personnel to carry out their duties;

Note.— The requirement for minimum lighting may be met by other than electrical means.

b) all obstacle lights which, in the opinion of the appropriate authority, are essential to
ensure the safe operation of aircraft;

c) approach, runway and taxiway lighting as specified in 8.1.6 to 8.1.9;

d) meteorological equipment;

e) essential security lighting, if provided in accordance with 9.11;

f) essential equipment and facilities for the aerodrome responding emergency agencies;

g) floodlighting on a designated isolated aircraft parking position if provided in accordance

with 5.3.24.1; and

h) illumination of apron areas over which passengers may walk.

Note.— Specifications for secondary power supply for radio navigation aids and ground elements
of communications systems are given in Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 2.

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8.1.11 Recommendation.— Requirements for a secondary power supply should be met by
either of the following:

— independent public power, which is a source of power supplying the aerodrome service from a
substation other than the normal substation through a transmission line following a route
different from the normal power supply route and such that the possibility of a simultaneous
failure of the normal and independent public power supplies is extremely remote; or

— standby power unit(s), which are engine generators, batteries, etc., from which electric power
can be obtained.

Note.— Guidance on electrical systems is included in the Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157),
Part 5.

Page Break
Table 8-1. Secondary power supply requirements
(see 8.1.4)

RUNWAY LIGHTING AIDS REQUIRING POWER MAXIMUM

SWITCH-OVER TIME
NON-INSTRUMENT Visual approach slope See 8.1.4 and 8.1.9
indicatorsᵃ
Runway edgeᵇ
Runway thresholdᵇ
Runway endᵇ
Obstacleᵃ

NON-PRECISION APPROACH Approach lighting system 15 seconds

Visual approach slope indicatorsᵃ˒ᵈ 15 seconds
Runway edgeᵈ 15 seconds
Runway thresholdᵈ 15 seconds
Runway end 15 seconds
Obstacleᵃ 15 seconds

PRECISION APPROACH CATEGORY I Approach lighting system 15 seconds

Runway edgeᵈ 15 seconds
Visual approach slope indicatorsᵃ˒ᵈ 15 seconds
Runway thresholdᵈ 15 seconds
Runway end 15 seconds
Essential taxiwayᵃ 15 seconds
Obstacleᵃ 15 seconds
PRECISION APPROACH CATEGORY II/III Inner 300 m of the approach lighting system 1 second
Other parts of the approach lighting system 15 seconds
Obstacleᵃ 15 seconds
Runway edge 15 seconds
Runway threshold 1 second
Runway end 1 second
Runway centre line 1 second
Runway touchdown zone 1 second
All stop bars 1 second
Essential taxiway 15 seconds

Page 47 of 112
RUNWAY MEANT FOR TAKE-OFF IN Runway edge 15 secondsᶜ
RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE CONDITIONS Runway end 1 second
LESS THAN A VALUE OF 800 M Runway centre line 1 second
All stop bars 1 second
Essential taxiwayᵃ 15 seconds
Obstacleᵃ 15 seconds

a. Supplied with secondary power when their operation is essential to the safety of flight
operation.
b. See Chapter 5, 5.3.2, regarding the use of emergency lighting.
c. One second where no runway centre line lights are provided.
d. One second where approaches are over hazardous or precipitous terrain.

8.3 Monitoring

Note.— Guidance on this subject is given in the Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157), Part 5.

8.3.1 Recommendation.— A system of monitoring should be employed to indicate the

operational status of the lighting systems.

8.3.2 Where lighting systems are used for aircraft control purposes, such systems shall be
monitored automatically so as to provide an indication of any fault which may affect the control
functions. This information shall be automatically relayed to the air traffic services unit.

8.3.3 Recommendation.— Where a change in the operational status of lights has occurred, an
indication should be provided within two seconds for a stop bar at a runway-holding position
and within five seconds for all other types of visual aids.

8.3.4 Recommendation.— For a runway meant for use in runway visual range conditions less
than a value of 550 m, the lighting systems detailed in Table 8-1 should be monitored
automatically so as to provide an indication when the serviceability level of any element falls
below the minimum serviceability level specified in 10.5.7 to 10.5.11, as appropriate. This
information should be automatically relayed to the maintenance crew.

8.3.5 Recommendation.— For a runway meant for use in runway visual range conditions less
than a value of 550 m, the lighting systems detailed in Table 8-1 should be monitored
automatically to provide an indication when the serviceability level of any element falls below
the minimum level specified by the appropriate authority below which operations should
not continue. This information should be automatically relayed to the air traffic services unit and
displayed in a prominent position.

Note.— Guidance on air traffic control interface and visual aids monitoring is included in
the Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157), Part 5.

BACK TO CHECKLIST

Page 48 of 112
ES-2

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

See excerpts above.

BACK TO CHECKLIST

Doc 9157 -Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 5 — Electrical Systems, Second Edition, 2017

Chapter 15

ACCEPTANCE AND MAINTENANCE TESTING

15.1 APPLICATION

The test procedures described in this section apply to the acceptance tests of new installations
and should be performed before making the system operational.

15.2 GUARANTEE PERIOD

Damp or dirty cable connectors and cable damage due to faulty installation practices often fail
several months after installation. Each installation contract should include a guarantee clause
specifying a period of at least one year during which the installing contractor can be held
responsible for repairing and replacing all cables and equipment failures resulting from poor
work or defective materials and equipment.

15.3 INSPECTION PROCEDURES

15.3.1 Visual examination. The most important of all inspection and test procedures are
thorough visual inspections. Visual inspections should be made frequently during installation, at
completion of installation, and before energizing the circuits. A careful visual inspection will
reveal defects that can be corrected prior to acceptance tests and energization. Serious damage
may occur if defects are subjected to electrical tests or energization. Visual inspections should
include inspection appraisal of:

a) correctness of external connections;

b) good work performance;

c) cleanliness;

d) safety hazards; and

e) specific requirements for individual items.

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15.3.2 All equipment manufactured under specifications should pass strict factory tests prior to
shipment, but it should be visually inspected for shipping damage immediately upon receipt.

15.4 CABLE, CONNECTORS AND ISOLATING TRANSFORMER INSPECTION

The primary and secondary cable leads of the transformers should be supplied with factory-
installed moulded connectors. Visual inspection of these items during installation is especially
important, as minor cuts, bruises or mishandling may result in a progressive deterioration, which
will eventually cause complete failure but not until sometime after acceptance tests. During
installation, these items should be inspected to determine the following:

15-1

a) that the mating surfaces of moulded connectors are clean and dry when plugged together.
If clean and dry inside, these high-voltage connectors with taping form a connection equal to, or
superior to, a conventional high-voltage splice. Conversely, if they are wet or dirty inside, no
amount of taping can produce a satisfactory connection. Two or three turns of tape are
recommended to hold the connector together and keep the parting lines clean. Cleanliness of
mating surfaces can best be ensured by keeping the factory-installed caps in place until the final
connection is made. The mating surfaces of uncapped connectors should not be laid down,
touched, or breathed upon. If it is necessary to break a connection, the connectors should be
immediately capped;

b) that the connectors are completely plugged together. After initial plugging, trapped air
pressure may partially disengage the plug and receptacle. If this happens, wait a few seconds and
push them together again. Apply two or three turns of tape to hold them in place;

c) that the cables have not been cut by shovels, kinked, crushed by vehicle wheels, bruised
by rocks, or damaged in any way during handling and installation;

d) that the cables are buried to the specified depth below finished grade and all other
detailed requirements of the installation specification are accomplished;

e) that the cables do not directly cross each other and are separated by the required
distances;

f) that screened material has been placed under and over the cables, and that rocks or
pebbles do not contact the cables; and

g) that the cables have not been bent sharply where they enter (or leave) a conduit and are
supported properly by tamped ground, so future settling cannot cause sharp bends.

15.5 CONSTANT CURRENT REGULATOR INSPECTION

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Each constant current regulator should be inspected to ensure that porcelain bushings have not
been cracked, no shipping damage has occurred, connections are correct, switches and relays
operate freely and are not tied or blocked, fuses (if required) are correct and that the oil level of
oil-filled regulators is correct. Only relay panel covers should be removed for this inspection. It is
not necessary to open the main tank of oil-filled regulators. Information on the regulator
inspection plate must be followed. All covers should be cleaned and tightly replaced after
inspection and tests are completed.

15.6 LIGHT FIXTURE AND BEACON INSPECTION

An inspection should be made to determine that the colour, quantity and locations of lights are in
accordance with the installation drawings. Each light should be inspected to determine that it is
operable, that glass is not broken or cracked, that correct lamps are installed and that it has been
properly levelled and aimed.

15.7 INSPECTION OF MISCELLANEOUS COMPONENTS

Components such as control panels, relay cabinets, panel boards, etc., should be visually
inspected for damage, correct connections, proper fuse and circuit-breaker ratings, and
compliance with the installation drawings.

15.8 SYSTEM OPERATION TEST

After components and circuits have been inspected, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the
entire system should be tested as follows:

a) each switch of the lighting panels in the control tower should be operated so that each
switch position is reached at least twice. During this process, all lights and vault equipment
should be observed to determine that each switch properly controls the corresponding circuit;

b) the above test should be repeated using the panels in the alternate control station (vault)
and then repeated again using the local control switches on the regulators; and

c) each lighting circuit should be tested by operating it continuously at maximum intensity

for at least six hours. Visual inspection should be made at the beginning and at the end of this test
to determine that the correct number of lights are operating at full intensity. Dimming of some or
all of the lights in a circuit is an indication of ground faults. In addition, the lamp-terminal voltage
should be measured on at least one light in each multiple circuit, to determine that it is within ±5
per cent of the rated lamp voltage as marked on the lamp.

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Page 51 of 112
Doc 9137 Part 9 Chapter 3

3.1 GENERAL

3.1.1 The service ability and operational reliability of air navigation equipment and installations
are require-ments for the safe operation of aircraft in the airport area. Apart from visual aids, the
air navigation equipment and installations include electronic landing aids, navigation equipment,
radar and equipment of the meteorological services. Guidance on the maintenance of visual aids
is given in Chapter 2 of the manual, maintenance pro- grammes for other equipment and
installations are to be established by the appropriate authorities (ATC, Meteoro- logical Services).

3.1.2 2 The required service ability of installations and equipment will only be achieved as
long as a constant power supply is maintained. To this end, regular maintenance work is
required for airport equipment and installations distributing primary power and equipment
supplying the secondary power when there is a circuit breakdown. The following paragraphs
contain guidance on establishing maintenance programmes for the individual elements of the
power supply systems, such as power cables, control cables. transformers, transformer stations,
regulators, relay and switch cabinets and secondary power supply equipment. Furthermore,
guidance is given on the regular maintenance of the floodlighting systems for aprons. Chapter 9
of the manual includes guidance on the maintenance of lighting systems in and around passenger
terminal buildings.

3.2 PERSONNEL

3.2.1 Maintenance work on airport electrical systems should be assigned Lo s killed electricians,
fully acquainted with the work to be done. As work is often required in high voltage areas, they
should be well informed and kept up to date on safety measures. To protect personnel the
required safety devices should always be kept in good condition.

3.2.2 The maintenance personnel should be present or on call during the operating hours of the
airport.

3.3 SCHEDULE OF MA INTENANCE

3.3.I Schedules of routine maintenance of the individual elements of the airport electrical system
should be based on manufacturers' recommendations adjusted to the operator's own experience
regarding the frequency of malfunctions. Therefore, a record of maintenance work carried out
will need to be maintained.

3.3.2 As the frequency of servicing depends on the type of equipment., it is not possible to set
up generally applicable maintenance programmes. Therefore, the following schedules provide
only general guidance on the setting up of a programme of preventive maintenance.

Power cables and distributors in field

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3.3.3 Cables and distributors outside of buildings can only be checked where installed in
channels. Preventive maintenance is not possible where power cables are buried in the soil. In
such cases, work is restricted to repair when malfunction s have been noticed. Their maintenance
should include semi-annual checking and, if necessary, taking the indicated corrective action, as
follows:

- distributor s located in manholes for cleanness and moisture; cleaning and drying
- plug-in and clamp connexions in the distributor s for good contact; tightening and
spraying
- manholes for condition of the interior; pumping-out, drying up or cleaning
- insulation resistance by measuring the earthing resistance of each circuit; recording
readings and taking necessary corrective action.

Transformers and regulators {including stand by units)

3.3.4 Maintenance of transformers and regulators should include checking and, if necessary,
taking the indicated corrective action, as follows:

Monthly:
- power supply transformers and regulators for cleanness and oil losses; cleaning and
replacing oil
- switches at all light intensity positions for malfunctions; restoring
- switch over to standby units for serviceability; restoring.

Annually:
- transformers for noise; investigating reason for any unusual sound and repairing
- over-all condition; repairing
- insulators; repairing or replacing
- collector bar system; cleaning
- voltage and amperage at all intensity levels, measuring and recording; adjustment of
voltage to nominal level.

Transformer sta1ions for electric power supply

3.3.5 Maintenance of transformer stations for electric power supply should include checking
and, if necessary, taking the indicated corrective action, as follows:

Weekly:
- over-all condition visually; restoring
- fuse boxes for completeness of contents; adding missing fuses.

Semi-annually:
- insulators and electrical connexions; cleaning and restoring
- station for dirt and moisture; cleaning and drying
- locks to stations for service ability; repairing and locking.

Annually:
- protection relay: adjusting

Page 53 of 112
- high voltage cable insulation; recording condition of each cable; taking preventive
measures
- earthing and its resistance; cleaning
- electrical supply system for noise and damage; repairing
- for rust, corrosion or defective coaling; cleaning and painting
- warning signs and safety devices a represent and in correct positions; cleaning or
replacing
- safety grids for completeness, rust or coaling de-ficiencies; completing, cleaning and
painting
- safety grids for stability and earthing; tightening and restoring proper earthing.

Relay and switch cabinets (including switch cabinets in sub-s1atio11s)

3.3.6 Maintenance of relay and switch cabinets should include checking and, if necessary, taking
the indicated corrective action as follows:

Semi-annually:
- turn and plug-in connexions for cleanness and good electrical contact
- relays for positive closing of contacts; cleaning or replacing
- electrical contacts for corrosion and wear; cleaning and replacing
- cabinet condition including proper weather seal, cleanness and mechanical damage;
cleaning and repairing
- monitoring relay of series circuits for proper feedback; repairing
- voltage switch-over - if available - of two circuits for service ability; repairing.

Annually:
- cabinet outer condition for dirt, moisture, easy access; cleaning and drying
- fuses (if provided) and fuse sockets; cleaning and spraying sockets and replacing fuses
- voltage output for all series circuits; recording results; taking corrective action.

Control cables, monitoring uni1s, control desk

3.3.7 Maintenance of control cables, monitoring units and control desk should include checking
and, if necessary, taking the indicated corrective action, as follows:

Daily:
- optical and acoustical signal for feedback; restoring.

Weekly:
- nominal control voltage; charging battery
- voltage and ammeter readings; adjusting
- acid level in batteries; adding distilled water.

Monthly:
- functions of the monitoring unit
- parts for cleanness and condition; cleaning and repairing or replacing.

Quarterly:

Page 54 of 112
- system components for loose connexions; tightening, repairing or replacing
- control desk for over-all operation; investigating any malfunctions; repairing or replacing
parts
- mimic panel indications for conformation to field condition s; correcting or adjusting
- mechanical structure of the desk for stability, repairing.

Semi-annually:
- replace lamps in monitoring units.

Annually:
- cables and distributors; cleaning and repairing
- relays for cleanness; cleaning
- control and monitoring units; replacing
- connexions; tightening and spraying.

Unscheduled:
- insulation of cables after each lightning strike, i.e. insulation between wire and wire, and
insulation between wire and ground; improving insulation.

Secondary power supplies(generators)

3.3.8 Maintenance of secondary power supplies should include a monthly test run and checking
and, if necessary, taking the indicated corrective action, as follows:

- switch -over time from primary to secondary power supply for conformation to the
requirement
- voltmeter readings to ensure that the voltage remains within acceptable tolerances
- transfer equipment for excessive heating and mal- functions
- genera1 or for vibrations and excessive heating
- diesel engine for any irregularities and oil leak age
- fuel level in the tank after the test run; refilling with fuel if necessary
- abnormal or undesirable performance; La king corrective action and repairing
- recording the meter readings of the test run and comparing with former records to detect
potential deficiencies.

Fixed 400 Hz ground power supplies

3.3.9 Maintenance of ground power sup plies should include checking and, if necessary, ta king
the indicated corrective action, as follows:

Daily:
- plugs, cables and cable holdings; repairing.

Weekly:
- proper functioning
- tightness (oils pillage) and loose connexion s; repairing.

Monthly:

Page 55 of 112
- service ability of control lamp s; replacement
- screw connectors at the contact rail for potemial temperature rise; improvement of
contact
- cleanness of cables; cleaning
- ventilator flaps and orifices for cleanness; cleaning
- cone belts, driving the ventilator system; adjustment of belt stress.

Quarterly :
- current -input cables for potential deformation; removal of deficiencies
- connector boxes for:
- mechanical damage
- proper mounting of plug sockets
- condition of contact clips in the plug sockets
- bearings for lubrication .

Semi-annually:
- cables (wires and insulation) for serviceability; repairing or replacing
- main conductor cables for temperature rise under nominal electric power; removal of
discovered deficiencies
- connectors, plugs and cable holdings; adjusting and tightening
- switches for proper operation; removing of dust and
dirt from switch elements
- fixings holding the regulator and switch cabinet housings; tightening of mounting screws
or bolts.

Apron floodlighting

3.3.10 Maimenance of apron floodlighting should include checking and, if necessary, ta king the
indicated corrective aclion, as follows:

Daily:
- lamp outage; replacing lamps
- switching o operation from remote control; repairing.

Annually:
- turn and plug-in connexions for cleanness and good electrical contact
- relays for serviceability; cleaning or replacement
- contacts for corrosion and wear; cleaning or replacement
- relay cabinet condition including proper weather seal, moisture, cleanness, mechanical
damage; cleaning, drying and repairing
- fuses and fuse sockets; cleaning and spraying sockets and replacing fuses
- relay cabinet outside condition including free access thereto.

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Page 56 of 112
Unit 3 - Non visual aids for navigation

NVA-1

Annex 10 – Aeronautical Telecommunications, Vol 1 Radio Navigation Aids, Seventh Edition,

July 2018

2.2 Ground and flight testing

2.2.1 Radio navigation aids of the types covered by the specifications in Chapter 3 and available
for use by aircraft engaged in international air navigation shall be the subject of periodic ground
and flight tests.

Note.— Guidance on the ground and flight testing of ICAO standard facilities, including
the periodicity of the testing, is contained in Attachment C and in the Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids (Doc 8071).

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Doc 8071 – Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids, Vol 1 Testing of Ground-based Radio
Navigation Systems, Fifth Edition, 2018

Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 2, 2.2 states, “Radio navigation aids of the types covered by
the specifications in Chapter 3 and available for use by aircraft engaged in international air
navigation shall be the subject of periodic ground and flight tests”.

1.1.2 Volume I of the Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids (Doc 8071, Fifth Edition)
addresses ground-based radio navigation systems. This document contains “guidance
material” only. The texts and procedures outlined do not have the status of Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) except for identified quotations from Annex 10.

1.1.3 Guidance on ground and flight validation of instrument flight procedures is described in
the Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design (Doc 9906), Volume 5 — Validation of
Instrument Flight Procedures.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT

This document is intended to provide general guidance on the extent of testing and inspection
normally carried out to ensure that radio navigation systems meet the SARPs in Annex 10. The

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guidance is representative of practices existing in a number of States with considerable
experience in the operation and maintenance of these systems.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT

1.3.1 This document describes the ground and flight testing to be accomplished for a specific
radio navigation aid, and provides relevant information about special equipment required to
carry out certain major tests. It is not intended to recommend certain models of equipment, but
rather to provide general details relative to the systems under consideration.

1.3.2 System testing is addressed in this document in general terms. System testing is normally
done as part of design and development activities, prior to volume production and individual site
installations. System testing includes design qualification testing, operational testing and
evaluation, and “shakedown” tests.

1.3.3 In this document, the terms “testing” and “inspection” have the following meanings:

— Testing: A specific measurement or check of facility performance that may form a part of an
inspection when integrated with other tests.
— Inspection: A series of tests carried out by a State authority or an organization as authorized
by the State to establish the operational classification of the radio navigation aid.

1.4 GROUND VERSUS FLIGHT TESTING/INSPECTION

1.4.1 Ground tests are carried out by a trained specialist using appropriate test equipment at the
facility or at a point on the ground remote from the site. Flight tests are those carried out in the
air by a trained flight inspection crew using a suitably equipped platform. Serious consideration
should be given to the relative merits of these two methods, taking into account both technical
and economic factors.

1.4.2 Ground tests are usually more appropriate and less costly for accurate and quick evaluation
of the facility performance. Flight tests are required to examine the signals-in-space as received
at the aircraft after being influenced by external factors such as site conditions, ground
conductivity, terrain irregularities, metallic structures, propagation
effects, etc. Certain tests that may initially appear to be ground-based may be more appropriate
as flight tests or vice versa.

1.4.3 Ground tests are normally carried out more frequently and can be used as indicators to
determine when a flight test is required. It is often worthwhile to expend considerable effort in
developing accurate and meaningful ground tests to minimize the costs and disruption of normal
operations associated with flight tests. The demonstration of
correlation between ground and flight test measurements will allow intelligent decisions to be
made based on experience.

1.4.4 Flight testing will continue to be important in the proof of facility performance because it
represents in-flight evaluation and provides a sampling of the radiated signals in the operating
environment.

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1.4.5 Where the small number of radio navigation aids in a State, or other reasons, make the
establishment of a flight inspection unit uneconomical or impractical, it may be possible to obtain
services through other States or a commercial company. Information regarding flight inspection
service providers can usually be obtained from the appropriate ICAO Regional Office or online
from the International Committee for Airspace Standards and Calibration (ICASC) at
http://www.icasc.co.

1.5 CATEGORIES AND PRIORITIES OF TESTS AND INSPECTIONS

1.5.1 The establishment of appropriate intervals between various types of testing/inspections
must take into account many associated factors specific to different States. Factors such as
stability of equipment, extent of monitoring, weather, experience of maintenance crews,
availability of standby equipment, etc., are all relevant. The intervals between tests/inspections
of a new facility or type of facility may be shorter during early operation and may be extended as
satisfactory experience is gained.

1.5.2 This document contains suggested schedules for each radio navigation aid, which should be
considered (and modified, if necessary), based on the conditions relevant to each State and each
site. The manufacturer’s equipment manual may contain recommendations that are useful in this
regard. Facility testing can be considered in the
following general categories.

Ground testing/inspection

1.5.3 Site proving: Tests carried out at proposed sites for the ground element of radio navigation
aids to prove suitability in cases where site surveys and simulations do not provide sufficient
confidence. Portable ground installations are used for this purpose.

1.5.4 Initial proof of performance: A complete inspection of the facility after installation and prior
to commissioning to determine whether the equipment meets the Standards and specifications.

1.5.5 Periodic: Regular or routine inspections carried out on a facility to determine whether the
equipment continues to meet the Standards and specifications.

1.5.6 Special: Tests after a failure of the facility or other circumstances that indicate special
testing is required. The results of special tests will often identify corrective maintenance work
necessary to restore the facility. (In some cases, a special flight inspection is also required.)

Flight testing/inspection

1.5.7 Site proving: In the case where a portable ground installation is used, a flight test is
conducted at the proposed site at the option of the responsible authority to determine the effects
of the environment on the performance of the planned radio navigation aid.

1.5.8 Commissioning: An extensive flight inspection following ground proof-of-performance

inspection to establish the validity of the signals-in-space. The results of this inspection should be

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correlated with the results of the ground inspection. Together they form the basis for
certification of the facility.

1.5.9 Periodic: Flight inspections to confirm the validity of the signals-in-space on a regular basis
or after major scheduled facility maintenance.

1.5.10 Special: Flight inspections required as a result of certain corrective maintenance activities,
reported or suspected degradation of signal-in-space performance, aircraft accidents, etc.
Typically, it is necessary to test only those parameters which have or might have an effect on
facility performance. However, it may be economically advantageous in many cases to complete
the requirements for a periodic inspection.

Priority of inspections

1.5.11 Flight inspections should be scheduled and conducted using a priority system. The
following is a suggested grouping:

a) Priority 1: accident investigation, restoration of established facilities after unscheduled

outages that require a flight inspection and investigation of reported corruption of the
signal-in-space;
b) Priority 2: periodic inspections, commissioning of newly installed facilities; and
c) Priority 3: evaluations of proposed sites for new installations and other investigations.

1.6 OPERATIONAL STATUS

Facility status can be identified as follows:

a) Usable: Available for operational use.

1) Unrestricted: Providing safe, accurate signals-in-space conforming to established
Standards within the coverage area of the facility.
2) Restricted: Providing signals-in-space not conforming to established Standards in all
respects or in all sectors of the coverage area, but safe for use within the restrictions
defined.
b) Unusable: Not available for operational use as providing (potentially) unsafe or erroneous
signals, or providing signals of an unknown quality.

1.7 AUTHORITY FOR FACILITY STATUS DETERMINATION

The responsibility for determining facility status rests with the appropriate State authority or the
organization authorized by the State. The status determination should include all factors
involved. This includes judgement (by the pilot) of the flyability of the signal-in-space, analysis of
airborne measurements of the facility (by the flight inspection technician/engineer), and a
statement of readiness (by ground maintenance personnel). The flyability of the instrument
procedures is assessed as part of the validation activity conducted in accordance with the Quality
Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design (Doc 9906), Volume 5 — Validation of Instrument
Flight Procedures.

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1.8 NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE OF STATUS

1.8.1 Notification of a permanent change of the facility status is to be done through the
appropriate Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP); differences from Standards are to be
notified to ICAO and in the AIP.

1.8.2 Notification of temporary changes in the status of facilities are to be promptly and
efficiently advertised. A change in the status of a commissioned facility as a direct result of
ground or flight inspection procedures, and resulting in a change of operational status
(“unrestricted/restricted/unusable”) or “unusable” designation, should be advertised
immediately by air traffic control (ATC) personnel, and promptly by a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM).

1.8.3 A facility having an “unusable” status is normally removed from service and can operate
only for test or troubleshooting purposes.

1.8.4 Particular attention should be given to periodic or corrective maintenance procedures that
involve false guidance signals being temporarily radiated. These conditions should be
coordinated with ATC and promulgated to users by NOTAM, before the procedures commence.
Additional guidance on special measures preventing the operational use of ILS-radiated test
signals is given in Chapter 4, 4.1.

1.9 AIRBORNE AND GROUND TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION

The selection and utilization of ground and flight inspection equipment used to determine the
validity of navigation information should minimize the uncertainty of the measurement being
performed. This equipment should be periodically calibrated to ensure traceability of
measurements to appropriate standards.

1.10 COORDINATION BETWEEN GROUND AND FLIGHT TESTING/INSPECTION

1.10.1 Comparison of the results, obtained during successive tests on the ground and in the air,
can determine the extent of degradation in the performance of the installation as monitored on
the ground. These results can also be used to determine the choice of the periodicity of the flight
test/inspection.

1.10.2 Flight test/inspection may involve a coordinated effort with ground specialists who may
make adjustments or participate in the flight test/inspection. Efficient two-way communications
should be established between ground and air. An additional communication means is often
installed in the flight inspection aircraft and a portable unit is employed at the facility to provide
these communications without interfering with the air traffic control communications.

1.11 FLIGHT INSPECTION UNIT

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1.11.1 This document considers the flight inspection unit to be comprised of three parts: the
flight inspection crew, the flight inspection aircraft and the position-reference system.

Flight inspection organization

1.11.2 The organization has a clearly defined management structure and is capable of showing
the reporting lines up to the accountable manager, or board, as appropriate. Where the flight
inspection operation is part of a larger organization, it is important to ensure that all contributing
departments, divisions or other organizations (e.g. subcontractors) involved directly or indirectly
with the flight inspection operation comply with the flight inspection organizations’ exposition or
quality management system as appropriate.

1.11.3 The organization ensures that all changes to the area of operation are assessed and
recorded through a change management process. Changes would normally include, but are not
limited to, organizational, system and procedural changes. Significant equipment modifications
and renewal might need approval by the accountable entity within the organization or by the
civil aviation authority before implementation.

1.11.4 The organization ensures that all personnel concerned with the flight inspection are
competent to conduct their job functions. The organization establishes a written procedure for
determining required job competencies and continued competence checking of all personnel
through regular assessment. Competence should be recognized
through certification or qualification as detailed within the organization’s procedures.

1.11.5 The flight inspection crew normally consists of two pilots and one or two technicians or
engineers. It is important that members of the flight inspection crew be experts in their
individual fields, have sound knowledge and experience in flight testing/inspection procedures
and requirements, and be capable of working as a team.

1.11.6 The State authority or flight inspection organization, as authorized by the State authority,
should formally certify flight inspection personnel. The objectives are to:

a) grant authority to the flight crew member who ensures the satisfactory operation of air
navigation facilities;
b) provide a uniform method for examining employee competence; and
c) issue credentials that authenticate inspection authority.

1.11.7 The organization should establish a written procedure for determining required job
competencies and continued competence checking of all personnel through regular assessment.
The procedure should consider all personnel directly engaged in the flight inspection operation;
this includes, but is not limited to, the pilot (in terms of flying the correct flight inspection
procedure), flight inspector, surveyor, documentation controller and auditor.

Flight inspection aircraft

1.11.8 The flight inspection aircraft shall be airworthy and approved by the airworthiness
authorities for the intended operation in the area it operates.

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1.11.9 More guidance on the flight inspection aircraft instrumentation, antennas and other
aspects is provided in Attachment A to this chapter.

Position-reference systems

1.11.10 Appropriate aircraft position reference information for all types of flight
testing/inspection is required when the accuracy of the navigation signal is being determined.

1.11.11 The position-reference system is independent from the facility under testing/inspection.
The position-reference system and the flight testing/inspection receiver contribute to the error
budget. The overall error budget should be five times better than the performance standard of
the navigation signal.

1.11.12 The position-reference system generates position reference information using the same
system parameters as the navigation system under testing, e.g. a reference distance for a DME,
a reference localizer deviation, or a reference glide path signal. A great variety of technical
solutions have been developed, either using position reference equipment, which provides
information already in the correct coordinate system, or using computer systems, which calculate
the reference information from one or more sensors.

Position-reference systems for approach and landing aids

1.11.13 Theodolites with electric readouts have traditionally been used as a position reference
for ILS testing. If the output signal is transmitted to the flight inspection aircraft, this avoids the
need for data to be recorded on the ground with later requirements for post-flight evaluation or
transmitted to the flight inspection aircraft. ILS testing requires two different theodolite sites for
azimuth and elevation data. The addition of ranging equipment allows ILS testing from a single
site. The theodolite-based position referencing requires minimum visibility of 11 km (6 NM). A
skilled theodolite operator is required to minimize manual tracking errors.

1.11.14 Manual theodolite tracking may result in significant contribution to the overall error
budget of the flight inspection; therefore caution should be exercised when approach and landing
aids, particularly Category III facilities, are evaluated using theodolite. Automatic tracking
systems have been developed to optimize the error budget.

1.11.15 Alternative position-reference systems are based on inertial navigation systems (INSs)
integrated with other sensors. Accuracy is aided by various sensor inputs such as global
navigation satellite system (GNSS), laser trackers and on-board camera systems which provide
independent reference update information. GNSS, augmented by
differential corrections as required, also serve as a position-reference system. With these
technologies, certain flight inspection operations can be conducted under limited visibility
conditions.

1.11.16 Additional information on position-reference systems may be found in chapters specific

to each navigation aid.

Position-reference systems for en-route navigation aids

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1.11.17 The basic solution of a position-reference system for flight inspection of en-route
navigation aids is the use of charts. Aeronautical charts should be used if possible. Large scale
charts that provide the greatest possible amount of detail are desirable so that ground position-
reference points can be better defined. The charts are to be marked for preparation of the flight
inspection mission. Typically, charts provide reference information only for some parts of
the flight path. Information has to be evaluated manually by the flight crew.

1.11.18 The equipment described in 1.11.13 to 1.11.16 may be used for the inspection of en-route
navigation aids if better accuracy or continuous reference data are required.

Position reference system integration

1.11.19 A more general approach is the use of a position reference system that provides
information for all phases of the flight inspection. A state-of-the-art solution is the combination of
different sensors for the testing, including INSs, barometric altimeters, tracking of several DME
facilities, and GNSS augmented as necessary. A high degree of automation can be achieved for the
flight inspection since continuous position reference information is available.

Human-machine interface aspects

1.11.20 The operator’s console should be designed and located in such a way as to offer the
proper interface between the flight inspection crew and test and data-processing equipment. The
console location should be determined based on noise and vibration levels, lighting, outside
visibility, proximity of the centre of gravity of the aircraft, air
conditioning, and forward-facing orientation.

1.12 ORGANIZATION, SAFETY AND QUALITY

1.12.1 The management of organizational features that can cause a risk to safety should be
conducted systematically. The effective management of safety should be achieved by the
derivation of policy and application of principles and practices designed to prevent the
occurrence of factors that could cause accidents or serious incidents.

1.12.2 The minimum requirements for the safety system should include written procedures that
document all of the actions necessary to ensure the safe operation of the flight inspection aircraft
and system.

1.12.3 The minimum requirements for the quality system should include written procedures that
document all of the actions necessary to ensure the verification of the radio navigation aids. The
ISO 9000 quality management model provides a useful framework, and particular note has to be
made of the following features expected in the quality management system:

a) Organizational and individual accountability. Accountability and responsibility should

be documented, traceable, and verifiable from the point of action through to
the accountable manager (in most cases the Chief Executive).

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 b) Management review. The system for management review should be effective and
should ensure that senior management is fully cognizant of the systems and features that
affect quality.
c) Exposition or company documentation. An exposition or company documentation
should be provided to clearly describe the organizational structure, personnel,
accountabilities, responsibilities, resources, facilities, capabilities, policies, and purposes
of the organization.
d) Record keeping. Records should be accurate, legible, and capable of independent
analysis. The retention period for records should be defined. Commissioning records and
those documenting system modifications (e.g. changes to ILS antenna configuration from
sideband reference to capture effect) should be kept for the entire life cycle of the facility.
e) Customer satisfaction. The organization should establish a procedure to request
feedback from their customer(s) on the service provided. This information should be used
to improve service.

Personnel training and qualification

1.12.4 The organization should establish methods for determining required job competencies:

a) all personnel directly engaged in the flight inspection, maintenance, or installation of an

aeronautical navigation aid should be adequately qualified and trained, as well as
experienced in their job functions;
b) the management system should include a written procedure for ensuring the continued
competence of personnel through regular assessment; and
c) initial and recurrent training programmes for aeronautical navigation aid specialists
should include a detailed explanation of maintenance procedures and their effect on the
integrity of the radiated signal.

Documentation control

1.12.5 Under the quality system all test/inspection procedures should be controlled so that the
correct version of any procedure can be easily identified and used.
1.12.6 Retention of data is required in order to permit trend analysis of ground and airborne
flight inspection equipment. Such analysis will assist in the identification of fault conditions
or substandard performance before development of any safety hazard. Examples of items that
might be identified in this way are: a decreasing mean time between outages (MTBO); a slow drift
in one or more radiated parameters; or a specific component that may appear to have a high
failure rate.

1.12.7 More guidance on documentation and data recording is provided in Attachment B to this
chapter.

1.12.8 The organization shall ensure that all documents that support the flight inspection
operation should be controlled so that the correct version of any document can be easily
identified and used.

Design qualification of ground equipment

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1.12.9 A new design of equipment is subject to design qualification tests. These tests ensure that
the equipment meets its design requirements. These tests are normally made on the “first
production equipment” or on the first batch of equipment. If no serious problems are
encountered, those tests are not repeated for future installations of similar equipment. Items to
be addressed during these tests include:

a) Environmental performance. These tests show that the equipment meets the tolerances
under the range of environmental conditions specified by the manufacturer
and purchaser. Environmental tests include all parts of the equipment, both internal and
external.
b) Mean time between failures (MTBF). Before commencing such tests, it is essential to
define the test conditions; for example, what constitutes a failure, what confidence level
will be used during the demonstration, will modifications be permitted during the tests.
See Annex 10, Volume I, Attachment A; Attachment C, 2.8 (Integrity and continuity of
service — ILS ground equipment); Attachment F and Attachment G, 11 (Integrity and
continuity of service — MLS ground equipment) for additional guidance on reliability
aspects.
c) Manufacturer’s quality system. The equipment is manufactured under an effective
quality management system. There should be traceability from modules and components
back through to system design requirements.
d) Integrity. The manufacturer should have made an in-depth study of system integrity.
Safety critical components of the system are to be identified and all components used in
these areas are to be traceable to their source. The integrity analysis should also define
the maintenance and test intervals for the safety critical components of the system. Where
a system is claimed to have automatic integrity checks, it is important to fully understand
the depth of tests made by the automatic procedure. See Annex 10, Volume I, Attachment
A; Attachment C, 2.8 (Integrity and continuity of service – ILS ground
equipment); Attachment F and Attachment G, 11 (Integrity and continuity of service – MLS
ground equipment) for additional guidance on integrity aspects.
e) Monitor correlation tests. Many systems use integral monitors or monitors in the near
field area of the antenna array. Tests should show that simulated faults in the system
produce the same response on monitors as in the far field. This investigation should
concentrate mainly on simulated antenna faults, including individual elements and the
signal distribution equipment.
f) Safety assessment. A system safety assessment should be conducted by the
manufacturer of a navigation system element to provide evidence that the system
meets the safety requirements as part of the overall design qualification requirements.
The safety assessment process includes specific assessments conducted and updated
during system design and development, and interacts with the system development
supporting processes. The requirements for conducting safety assessments may vary on a
national or regional basis.
g) Hardware/software design assurance. The roles of hardware and software in
implementing the functional requirements of a system must be clearly specified
and justified. The partitioning of functions between hardware and software should take
into account safety criticality, testability, reliability, verification, validation,
maintainability and life cycle costs. A system development assurance level (as defined in
RTCA and EUROCAE documents) will be based upon the contribution
of hardware/software to potential failure conditions as determined by the system safety

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 assessment process. The hardware/software level of development implies that the level of
effort required to show
compliance with the safety requirements varies with the failure condition category.

1.12.10 Quality maintenance measurements of the ground transmitting equipment can help
ensure that the radiating signal generation has not changed since the last periodic correlation.
Restricting the adjustment of the safety critical parameters without a flight inspection, and the
establishment of ground maintenance methods to verify that the equipment is operating within
clearly defined specifications, should be considered as parts of a quality maintenance regime.

1.13 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

1.13.1 Electromagnetic interference to a navigation aid is a rare occurrence, but the possibility of
it happening should not be excluded. All reports of suspected interference should be investigated.
During a flight inspection of a radio navigation aid following a report of suspected interference,
the interference might affect the signals from the navigation aid being inspected or it might affect
the signals used for some types of position-referencing, such as GNSS.

1.13.2 Attachment C to this chapter gives guidance on this subject, including types of
interference, possible sources, methods of detection, and steps which can be taken to eliminate or
mitigate the effects.

1.14 SIGNAL ANALYSIS

1.14.1 The use of a signal analyser (i.e. spectrum analyser or other capability which may be part
of a multifunction device) on the flight inspection aircraft and on the ground at navigation aid
sites can be an effective means of resolving problems with radio navigation aids. The following
are some of the applications for signal analysis as it relates to testing of radio navigation
systems.

1.14.2 Signal measurements at specific points in the service volume should be accomplished on a
flight inspection aircraft. It is recommended that the signal analyser set-up information, aircraft
antenna position, and measurement time be recorded with spectrum measurements. At remote
sites, the signal analyser on a flight inspection aircraft may be used for verification of the radiated
signal spectrum from the ground system when the required test equipment is not available at the
site.

1.14.3 The signal analyser can be used to measure carrier frequency (Doppler shift should be
taken into account), sideband modulation levels and spurious emission levels. Residual frequency
or phase modulation components on ILS transmitters can be identified from the radiated
spectrum components. If present, frequency or phase modulation may affect the AM sideband
amplitudes as measured on the signal analyser. Care should be taken to account for the
Doppler shift in signals as the aircraft moves at high speed toward or away from the
transmitter. Computer-aided acquisition and set-up of the signal analyser will be of great
advantage in the air.

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1.14.4 The signal analyser can be used in the periodic flight inspection for dual frequency ILS to
measure the power ratio between the course and clearance transmitters. The course and the
clearance signal frequencies can be measured simultaneously and any error in frequency
alignment of the ground facility can be detected. This technique greatly improves the
effectiveness and accuracy of the measurement, eliminating the need to switch between the
two transmitters on the ground and position the aircraft at exactly the same position in space for
two sequential measurements. Course/clearance power ratio can be checked simultaneously
with the normal clearance procedure using this technique.

1.14.5 The signal analyser can also be used to identify the frequency and relative power of the
interfering source when interference has been detected through loss or erratic behaviour of the
cross-pointer, audio or automatic gain control (AGC) signal. Information on the types of sources
and testing techniques is provided in Attachment C to this chapter.

1.15 GROUND AND FLIGHT INSPECTION PERIODICITY

General

1.15.1 This document includes suggested periodicities for various ground and flight tests that
should be considered in the light of conditions relevant to each State and each site.

1.15.2 The suggested periodicities are given as general guidance and may be modified based on
the manufacturer’s recommendation or operational experience. In some cases, it may be
necessary to carry out more frequent inspections, e.g. following initial installation. It may also be
reasonable to extend the inspection intervals in some circumstances, if the factors outlined in this
section have been taken into account. It is recommended that States have a documented
procedure for determining and changing the test/inspection interval.

1.15.3 The manufacturer’s equipment manual usually contains recommendations which are also
useful in this regard.

Determination of test/inspection intervals

1.15.4 Many factors influence the choice of appropriate intervals for both ground and flight tests.
These include the reliability and stability of operation of the equipment, the extent of ground
monitoring, the degree of correlation between ground and flight measurements, changes in the
operating environment, manufacturer recommendations, and
the quality of maintenance. The complete programme of ground and flight inspections should be
considered when determining test intervals.

1.15.5 Reliability and stability of equipment is related to age, design technology, and the
operational environment. Stability of operation may also be affected by excessive maintenance
adjustments attributable to either human factors or variation in test equipment performance.
This is particularly true with some older test equipment where the accuracy and stability of the
test equipment is not significantly better than the equipment under test. A major contribution to
the demonstration of stability of navigation aids is the design of modern flight inspection systems
and ground facility test equipment, where the standard resolution and accuracy are very high.

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1.15.6 Ground maintenance activity and its frequency is dependent upon the design, reliability
and stability of a particular equipment and the quality of the ground test equipment employed as
a transfer standard. It has been shown that equipment reliability may be adversely affected by
frequently scheduled major maintenance activity. It is, therefore, desirable to limit such activity
to essential testing only, particularly for tests that require the disconnection of cables. There is a
requirement for additional supplementary flight inspection when some engineering activities,
such as glide path antenna changes or adjustments are made. Further investigation may be
initiated if the independent monitor calibration indicates any adjustments are required.

Example of criteria to be considered for the modification of ILS flight inspection intervals

1.15.7 The correlation of air and ground measurement records and historic demonstration of
equipment stability have allowed some States to extend the intervals between flight inspections.
This is supported by the use of routine monitor readings, strict environmental safeguarding and
closer tolerances on flight inspection results to ensure
operational stability is maintained. Example criteria for the extension of ILS flight inspection
intervals are given in 1.15.8 and 1.15.9.

1.15.8 This section gives an example of criteria applied to extend the nominal interval between
flight inspections of selected facilities. The procedure requires:

a) an initial demonstration of stability over four consecutive periodic flight inspections

with no transmitter adjustments;
b) good correlation between concurrent ground and airborne results;
c) a record of independent monitor test results;
d) a record of equipment monitor readings taken at regular intervals not to exceed 50
percent of the extended flight inspection interval;

Note.— A shorter interval between monitor readings is suggested for ILS Facility
Performance Categories II and III.

e) evidence that the quality of the maintenance is high and that the recorded test result
and monitor readings of critical parameters indicate that the equipment consistently
meets performance requirements;
f) that the facility is adequately safeguarded against changes in the operational
environment, e.g. building development; and
g) a recommended decrease in tolerances applied to the flight inspection results for
critical parameters to 75 per cent of the normal acceptance standards. Examples of critical
parameter(s) include:

1) localizer alignment and displacement sensitivity;

2) glide path angle and displacement sensitivity; and
3) VOR approach radial alignment and structure.

1.15.9 Examples of cases in which the flight inspection interval should be decreased include:

a) if the above criteria are no longer met; or

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b) if a facility fails to meet the same performance requirement on successive inspections; or
c) if several requirements are not met on any one inspection.

Correlation as the basis for extending periodicity

1.15.10 A typical basis for extending the interval between required measurements without
degrading ILS integrity is correlation. Any individual measurement is normally expected to be
repeatable over time without adjustments to the equipment. Correlation between ILS
measurements made both on the ground and in the air at the same or nearly the
same time is also expected. This places equal responsibility on ground and airborne personnel
and helps identify common-mode measurement errors. An additional requirement to extend
flight inspection intervals is the influence of near- and far-field environments on the signals.
These effects can be determined with a flight inspection aircraft. The following paragraphs give
illustrations of the correlation technique.

1.15.11 Preliminary requirements. Certain fundamental requirements should be met prior to any
measurement activity if correlation between ground and airborne measurements over time can
be expected. Typical requirements include functionally similar training for personnel,
appropriate calibrated test equipment, completion of all prescribed ground maintenance
tasks, availability of commissioning reports and recent periodic inspection reports, and frequent
use of measurement skills by both ground and airborne personnel.

1.15.12 Techniques. Achieving good correlation places the same or similar weight on both
ground and airborne testing, and demands that both be conducted with great care. Initial or
commissioning-type flight measurements should be made with special care, as the corresponding
ground measurements will be used as references for ground maintenance personnel. The
portable maintenance receiver is readily used in the far-field for localizer facilities, while glide
path facilities may require measurements in the near- or mid-field with an auxiliary antenna
placed near the transmitting antennas.

1.15.13 Tolerances. New tolerances may be developed to define acceptable correlation between
measurements. A rigorous application of correlation principles might include the following
types:

a) Setting tolerance — defines the exact value for a parameter, which should be achieved
(within the measurement uncertainty) when adjustment is required.
b) Adjustment/maintenance tolerance — defines the limit within which a parameter may
vary without requiring adjustment.
c) Operational tolerance — defines the ICAO Standard for a parameter.
d) Discrepancy tolerance — defines, for certain parameters only, the limits of divergence
between various measurements:

1) Ground/ground discrepancy — applies to a divergence over time, or between

different methods of measuring the same parameter (e.g. alignment monitor,
portable ILS receiver, and far-field monitor).
2) Ground/air discrepancy — applies to a divergence between measurements of
the same parameter at the same or nearly the same time by ground and airborne
testing personnel.

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1.15.14 Activities during flight inspection. Typical correlation activities begin with a confirmation
that airborne and ground test equipment is operating within tolerances. This may be achieved by
comparing ground and flight test generators and receivers. (If the tolerances are not met, the
flight inspection is delayed until the cause of the problem is eliminated.) If the ground or airborne
results are out of discrepancy tolerances during the flight inspection and the cause cannot be
determined, then the ground monitor alarm limits should be tightened, the facility declassified
appropriately or removed from service. The successful completion of the flight inspection (all
tolerances are met) establishes that the ground maintenance activities are effective and the
interval between inspections may be maintained at the optimum periodicity.

Expiration of nominal intervals

1.15.15 To account for operational restrictions, States may permit the completion of a recurrent
test/inspection within a certain time window following the nominal recommended interval. This
extension is not to be intended as a means to systematically extend the test/inspection interval.

1.15.16 If a test/inspection is not conducted prior to the expiration of the appropriate time
window, various actions may be considered:

a) extension of the expiration after engineering evaluation and/or ground maintenance

reinforcement;
b) degrading of the category of ILS (Category III down to Category I) in cases where
intervals vary according to the category of ILS; and
c) temporarily removing the navigation aid from service.

1.16 FLIGHT INSPECTION AT NIGHT

1.16.1 Certain areas have high densities of air traffic during daylight hours. Conducting flight
inspections in these areas during daylight can cause delays to normal traffic if safety is not to be
compromised. It is possible to make many of the flight inspections, described in this manual,
during the night to avoid interfering with normal flight operations. Noise abatement
considerations may inhibit this.

1.16.2 Several additional factors need to be considered for night-time flight inspection. These are
detailed in the following paragraphs.

1.16.3 Effect of the environment on the radiated signal. The signals radiated by some types of
radio navigation aids are affected by propagation which differs between day and night. For
example, the level of background radio noise over a city may be different.

1.16.4 Effect of environment on the navigation aid. The ground facility maintenance engineer
should inform the flight inspector of any equipment variations, such as field monitor
performance which may change at night. The effect of the local environment, such as changes in
the position of reflecting obstacles, should be considered.

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1.16.5 Position reference. Flight inspection at night will normally use an independent reference
system but the use of ground tracking equipment is not excluded.

1.16.6 Evaluation of results. The State authority or the organization authorized by the State
should decide whether differences from measurements made during the daytime are due to night
conditions, problems with the equipment or making the measurements at different positions.

1.16.7 Flight inspection reports. The flight inspection report should indicate whether the
inspection was made at night.

1.16.8 Types of flight. The inspection flights should be made in accordance with the guidance
given in this manual, with the exception of measurements that specifically need low-level flights.
It is recommended that at specific intervals an inspection is made under the same conditions as
prevailed at the time of commissioning.

1.16.9 Safety of flight. Flights should be conducted 300 m (1 000 ft) above the level normally used
for daytime flight inspection in areas having obstructions. It will be necessary to change some
horizontal distances in order to retain the same vertical angle from the navigation aid, where this
is important to the measurements. Low-level below path (safety approach) glide path inspection
flights should not be made during the night or when the level of natural light is low. Flights
should normally be carried out in accordance with VFR. The probability of birdstrike during night
flight should also be considered.

1.17 COMBINED FLIGHT INSPECTION OF COMPLEMENTARY FACILITIES

1.17.1 The combining of flight inspection activities for complementary or collocated facilities,
where practical, may offer cost and schedule efficiencies for the flight inspection operation while
reducing impacts to other air traffic operations.

1.17.2 Examples of opportunities for combined flight inspection activities include:

a) simultaneous measurements of flight inspection parameters for collocated VOR/DME

or ILS/DME facilities;
b) inspection of associated position fixes based on other navigation aids during flight
inspection of VOR facilities;
c) simultaneous measurements of selected flight inspection parameters for ILS localizer
and glide path facilities; and
d) assessment of visual approach aids during flight inspection of ILS facilities.

1.17.3 The realization of benefits from combined flight inspection activities will depend upon the
incorporation of appropriate provisions in flight inspection procedures and equipment.

1.17.4 While guidance relating to flight validation is contained in Volume 5 of Doc 9906, in some
cases it may also be possible to combine flight inspection and flight validation activities.

1.18 USE OF REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

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1.18.1 A basic principle of flight inspection to assess compliance with Annex 10 Standards is to
use representative avionics at normal aircraft speeds. While flight inspection aircraft and
their avionics are not representative of all aircraft and avionics, they nonetheless facilitate
making judgements on the operational relevance of signal anomalies. This principle does not
prevent the use of more advanced measurement capabilities both in ground and flight testing;
however, it requires that good correlation (impact of filtering, etc.) needs to be established.

1.18.2 Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) should be
assessed to determine that they provide the payload capability, speed and range necessary to
conduct a flight inspection for navigation aids as recommended herein in a cost-effective manner.
RPAS can and have been used for special and advanced measurement applications which are
difficult to achieve with traditional ground and flight measurement capabilities. Nothing in this
manual is intended to prevent the development of such capabilities. Some States are studying
how the use of RPAS can help in making more regular measurement checks with the aim to
reduce the periodicity of a full flight inspection with a typical flight inspection aircraft. These
studies should take into account the guidance in section 1.15.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

NVA-2

Annex 10 – Aeronautical Telecommunications, Vol 1 Radio Navigation Aids, Seventh Edition,

July 2018

2.1.9 ILS multipath interference

Note 1.— This guidance material reflects how new larger aeroplanes (NLA) may impact the size
of the ILS critical and sensitive areas. It also documents established engineering practices for
determining critical and sensitive area dimensions, outlines the associated operational trade-offs,
and presents indicative examples of the resulting sizes of the areas. In practice, however, the size
of critical and sensitive areas at an aerodrome may need to be determined by specific
assessments at that aerodrome.

Note 2.— This guidance material is not intended to create a need to review established critical
and sensitive area dimensions which have been demonstrated to be satisfactory at a particular
aerodrome, unless the operational environment has evolved significantly (such as through the
introduction of NLA operations at the aerodrome or the construction of new buildings) or the ILS
installation has been changed in a way that may affect the dimensions of the areas.

2.1.9.1 ILS environmental effects. Large reflecting objects within the ILS coverage volume,
whether fixed objects or vehicles, including aircraft, can potentially cause degradation of the
signal-in-space, through signal blockage and/or multipath interference, with the consequence
that the signal-in-space tolerances defined in Chapter 3, 3.1 may be exceeded. The amount of
degradation is a function of the location, size and orientation of the reflecting surfaces, and of the
ILS antenna characteristics. The objective of identifying critical and sensitive areas (see 2.1.9.2)
and associated management procedures is to prevent such degradation and ensure that aircraft
using the ILS can rely on the signal-in-space meeting the requirements of Chapter 3, 3.1.

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2.1.9.2 ILS critical and sensitive areas. States differ in the way they choose to identify ILS
protection areas. Practices also differ in how vehicle movement restrictions are managed. One
method is to identify critical areas and sensitive areas as follows:

a) the ILS critical area is an area of defined dimensions about the localizer and glide path
antennas where vehicles, including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS operations. The
critical area is protected because the presence of vehicles and/or aircraft inside its
boundaries will cause unacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal-in-space;

b) the ILS sensitive area is an area where the parking and/or movement of vehicles,
including aircraft, is controlled to prevent the possibility of unacceptable interference to
the ILS signal during ILS operations. The sensitive area is protected against interference
caused by large moving objects outside the critical area but still normally within the
airfield boundary.

Note 1.— In some States, the term “critical area” is used to describe an area that combines the
critical and sensitive areas identified in this guidance material. In cases where the critical area
overlaps operational areas, specific operational management procedures are required to ensure
protection of aircraft using the ILS for intercept and final approach guidance.

Note 2.— It is expected that at sites, where ILS and MLS are to be collocated, the MLS might be
located within ILS critical areas in accordance with guidance material in Attachment G, 4.1.

2.1.9.3 Technical and operational logic associated with critical and sensitive areas. Ideally, the
critical area is enforced during all ILS operations with protection afforded down to at least the
Category I decision height. A critical area disturbance would normally impact all aircraft using
the ILS signal at a given time (entire approach). The critical area is typically safeguarded through
marked boundaries, limiting access to the area or through procedural means if there are overlaps
into operational areas. From an operational perspective, the sensitive area would ideally protect
aircraft operations at least from the Category I decision height down to the runway, and be
activated during low visibility conditions only (e.g. Category II and III). A sensitive area
disturbance would normally be of a transient nature, and produce a local disturbance affecting a
single aircraft only. However, at many locations, it may not be possible to achieve this ideal
situation, and corresponding technical and operational mitigations will be required.

Note.— Guidance on operational procedures for the protection of critical and sensitive areas is
provided in ICAO EUR DOC 013, “European Guidance Material on All Weather Operations at
Aerodromes”.

BACK TO CHECKLIST

Page 74 of 112
Unit 4 - Rescue and fire fighting
RFF-1

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

2.11 Rescue and firefighting

Note.— See 9.2 for information on rescue and firefighting services.

2.11.1 Information concerning the level of protection provided at an aerodrome for aircraft
rescue and firefighting purposes shall be made available.

2.11.2 Recommendation.— The level of protection normally available at an aerodrome should

be expressed in terms of the category of the rescue and firefighting services as described in 9.2
and in accordance with the types and amounts of extinguishing agents normally available at the
aerodrome.

2.11.3 Changes in the level of protection normally available at an aerodrome for rescue and
firefighting shall be notified to the appropriate air traffic services units and aeronautical
information services units to enable those units to provide the necessary information to arriving
and departing aircraft. When such a change has been corrected, the above units shall be advised
accordingly.

Note.— Changes in the level of protection from that normally available at the aerodrome could
result from a change in the availability of extinguishing agents, equipment to deliver the agents
or personnel to operate the equipment, etc.

2.11.4 Recommendation.— A change should be expressed in terms of the new category of the
rescue and firefighting service available at the aerodrome.

9.2.4 Recommendation.— The level of protection provided at an aerodrome for rescue and
firefighting should be equal to the aerodrome category determined using the principles in 9.2.5
and 9.2.6.

9.2.5 The aerodrome category shall be determined from Table 9-1 and shall be based on the
longest aeroplanes normally using the aerodrome and their fuselage width.
Note.— To categorize the aeroplanes using the aerodrome, first evaluate their overall length and
second, their fuselage width.

9.2.6 If, after selecting the category appropriate to the longest aeroplane’s overall length, that
aeroplane’s fuselage width is greater than the maximum width in Table 9-1, column 3, for that
category, then the category for that aeroplane shall actually be one category higher.

Note 1.— See guidance in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1, for categorizing
aerodromes, including those for all-cargo aircraft operations, for rescue and firefighting
purposes.

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Note 2.— Guidance on training of personnel, rescue equipment for difficult environments and
other facilities and services for rescue and firefighting is given in Attachment A, Section 18, and in
the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.7 During anticipated periods of reduced activity, the level of protection available shall be no
less than that needed for the highest category of aeroplane planned to use the aerodrome during
that time irrespective of the number of movements.

Table 9-1. Aerodrome category for rescue and firefighting

Aerodrome category Aeroplane overall length Maximum fuselage width (3)

(1) (2)
1 0 m up to but not including 9 m 2m
2 9 m up to but not including 12 2m
m
3 12 m up to but not including 18 3m
m
4 18 m up to but not including 24 4m
m
5 24 m up to but not including 28 4m
m
6 28 m up to but not including 39 5m
m
7 39 m up to but not including 49 5m
m
8 49 m up to but not including 61 7m
m
9 61 m up to but not including 76 7m
m
10 76 m up to but not including 90 8m
m

Rescue equipment

9.2.26 Recommendation.— Rescue equipment commensurate with the level of aircraft

operations should be provided on the rescue and firefighting vehicle(s).

Note.— Guidance on the rescue equipment to be provided at an aerodrome is given in the Airport
Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

Extinguishing agents

9.2.8 Recommendation.— Both principal and complementary agents should normally be

provided at an aerodrome.

Note.— Descriptions of the agents may be found in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part
1.

Page 76 of 112
9.2.9 Recommendation.— The principal extinguishing agent should be:

a) a foam meeting the minimum performance level A; or

b) a foam meeting the minimum performance level B; or
c) a foam meeting the minimum performance level C; or
d) a combination of these agents; except that the principal extinguishing agent for aerodromes in
categories 1 to 3 should preferably meet a performance level B or C foam.

Note.— Information on the required physical properties and fire extinguishing performance
criteria needed for a foam to achieve an acceptable performance level A, B or C rating is given in
the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.10 Recommendation.— The complementary extinguishing agent should be a dry chemical

powder suitable for extinguishing hydrocarbon fires.

Note 1.— When selecting dry chemical powders for use with foam, care must be exercised to
ensure compatibility.

Note 2.— Alternate complementary agents having equivalent firefighting capability may be
utilized. Additional information on extinguishing agents is given in the Airport Services
Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.11 The amounts of water for foam production and the complementary agents to be provided
on the rescue and firefighting vehicles shall be in accordance with the aerodrome category
determined under 9.2.3, 9.2.4, 9.2.5, 9.2.6 and Table 9-2, except that for aerodrome categories 1
and 2 up to 100 per cent of the water may be substituted with complementary agent. For the
purpose of agent substitution, 1 kg of complementary agent shall be taken as equivalent to 1.0 L
of water for production of a foam meeting performance level A.

Note 1.— The amounts of water specified for foam production are predicated on an application
rate of 8.2 L/min/m2 for a foam meeting performance level A, 5.5 L/min/m2 for a foam meeting
performance level B and 3.75 L/min/m2 for a foam meeting performance level C.

Note 2.— When any other complementary agent is used, the substitution ratios need to be
checked.

9.2.12 Recommendation.— At aerodromes where operations by aeroplanes larger than the

average size in a given category are planned, the quantities of water should be recalculated and
the amount of water for foam production and the discharge rates for foam solution should be
increased accordingly.

Note.— Guidance on the determination of quantities of water and discharge rates based on the
largest theoretical aeroplane in a given category is available in Chapter 2 of the Airport Services
Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.13 From 1 January 2015, at aerodromes where operations by aeroplanes larger than the
average size in a given category are planned, the quantities of water shall be recalculated and the

Page 77 of 112
amount of water for foam production and the discharge rates for foam solution shall be increased
accordingly.

Note.— Guidance on the determination of quantities of water and discharge rates based on the
largest overall length of aeroplane in a given category is available in Chapter 2 of the Airport
Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

Table 9-2. Minimum usable amounts of extinguishing agents

Foam meeting Foam meeting Foam meeting Complementary agents

performance performance performance
level A level B level C
Aerodrome Water Discharge Water Discharge Water Discharge Dry Discharge
category (L) rate (L) rate (L) rate chemical Rate
foam foam foam powders (kg/second)
solution/ solution/ solution/ (kg)
minute minute minute
(L) (L) (L)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1 350 350 230 230 160 160 45 2.25
2 1 000 800 670 550 460 360 90 2.25
3 1 800 1 300 1 200 900 820 630 135 2.25
4 3 600 2 600 2 400 1 800 1 700 1 100 135 2.25
5 8 100 4 500 5 400 3 000 3 900 2 200 180 2.25
6 11 800 6 000 7 900 4 000 5 800 2 900 225 2.25

7 18 200 7 900 12 100 5 300 8 800 3 800 225 2.25

8 27 300 10 800 18 200 7 200 12 800 5 100 450 4.5

9 36 400 13 500 24 300 9 000 17 100 6 300 450 4.5

10 48 200 16 600 32 300 11 200 22 800 7 900 450 4.5

Note.— The quantities of water shown in columns 2, 4 and 6 are based on the average overall length of
aeroplanes in a given category.

9.2.14 The quantity of foam concentrates separately provided on vehicles for foam production
shall be in proportion to the quantity of water provided and the foam concentrate selected.

9.2.15 Recommendation.— The amount of foam concentrate provided on a vehicle should be

sufficient to produce at least two loads of foam solution.

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9.2.16 Recommendation.— Supplementary water supplies, for the expeditious replenishment of
rescue and firefighting vehicles at the scene of an aircraft accident, should be provided.

9.2.17 Recommendation.— When a combination of different performance level foams are

provided at an aerodrome, the total amount of water to be provided for foam production should
be calculated for each foam type and the distribution of these quantities should be documented
for each vehicle and applied to the overall rescue and firefighting requirement.

9.2.18 The discharge rate of the foam solution shall not be less than the rates shown in Table 9-2.

9.2.19 The complementary agents shall comply with the appropriate specifications of
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).*

9.2.20 Recommendation.— The discharge rate of complementary agents should be no less than
the values shown in Table 9-2.

9.2.21 Recommendation.— Dry chemical powders should only be substituted with an agent that
has equivalent or better firefighting capabilities for all types of fires where complementary agent
is expected to be used.

Note.— Guidance on the use of complementary agents can be found in the Airport Services
Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.22 Recommendation.— A reserve supply of foam concentrate, equivalent to 200 per cent of
the quantities identified in Table 9-2, should be maintained on the aerodrome for vehicle
replenishment purposes.

Note.— Foam concentrate carried on fire vehicles in excess of the quantity identified in Table 9-2
can contribute to the reserve.

9.2.23 Recommendation.— A reserve supply of complementary agent, equivalent to 100 per

cent of the quantity identified in Table 9-2, should be maintained on the aerodrome for vehicle
replenishment purposes. Sufficient propellant gas should be included to utilize this reserve
complementary agent.

9.2.24 Recommendation.— Category 1 and 2 aerodromes that have replaced up to 100 per cent
of the water with complementary agent should hold a reserve supply of complementary agent of
200 per cent.

9.2.25 Recommendation.— Where a major delay in the replenishment of the supplies is

anticipated, the amount of reserve supply in 9.2.22, 9.2.23 and 9.2.24 should be increased as
determined by a risk assessment.

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9.2.41 Recommendation.— The minimum number of rescue and firefighting vehicles provided at
an aerodrome should be in accordance with the following tabulation:
Aerodrome category Rescue and firefighting vehicles
1 1
2 1
3 1
4 1
5 1
6 2
7 2
8 3
9 3
10 3
Note.— Guidance on minimum characteristics of rescue and firefighting vehicles is given in the Airport Services Manual
(Doc 9137), Part 1.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Doc 9137 – Airport Services Manual, Part 1: Rescue and Firefighting, Fourth Edition, 2015

Chapter 2

LEVEL OF PROTECTION TO BE PROVIDED

2.1 AIRPORT CATEGORY

2.1.1 The level of protection to be provided at an airport should be based on the dimensions of
the aeroplanes normally using the airport as adjusted for their frequency of operations.

2.1.2 The airport category for RFF should be based on the overall length of the longest aeroplanes
normally using the airport and their maximum fuselage width. The airport category should be
determined using Table 2-1 by categorizing the aeroplanes using the airport, by first evaluating
their overall length and second, their fuselage width. If after selecting the category appropriate to
an aeroplane’s overall length that aeroplane’s fuselage width is greater than the maximum width
in column (3) for that category, then the category for that aeroplane is actually one category
higher.

Table 2-1. Airport category for rescue and firefighting

Airport Aeroplane overall length Maximum fuselage width

category

(1) (2) (3)

1 0 up to but not including 9 m 2m

2 9 m up to but not including 12 m 2m

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 3 12 m up to but not including 18 m 3m

4 18 m up to but not including 24 m 4m

5 24 m up to but not including 28 m 4m

6 28 m up to but not including 39 m 5m

7 39 m up to but not including 49 m 5m

8 49 m up to but not including 61 m 7m

9 61 m up to but not including 76 m 7m

10 76 m up to but not including 90 m 8m

2.1.3 Airports should be categorized for RFF purposes by counting the aeroplane movements in
the busiest consecutive three months of the year as follows:

a) when the number of movements of the aeroplanes in the highest category normally using
the airport is 700 or greater in the busiest consecutive three months, then that category
should be the airport category (see examples nos. 1 and 2); and

b) when the number of movements of the aeroplanes in the highest category normally using
the airport is less than 700 in the busiest consecutive three months, then the airport
category may be one less than the highest aeroplane category (see examples nos. 3 and 4)
even when there is a wide range of difference between the dimensions of the aeroplanes
which are included in reaching 700 movements) (see example no. 5).

2.1.4 It should be noted that the level of protection provided based on frequency of operations in
2.1.3 b) shall not be less than one category below the determined category.

2.1.5 Either a take-off or a landing constitutes a movement. Movements of scheduled, non-

scheduled and general aviation operations should be counted in determining the airport
category. A classification of representative aeroplanes by the airport category shown in Table 2-1
is included in Appendix 2.

2.1.6 The following examples illustrate the method for determining the airport category.

Example No. 1

Aeroplane Overall length Fuselage width Category Movements

Airbus A320 37.6 m 4.0 m 6 600

Bombardier CRJ 900 36.4 m 2.7 m 6 300

Embraer 190 36.2 m 3.0 m 6 500

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 ATR 72 27.2 m 2.8 m 5 200

The longest aeroplanes are categorized by evaluating, using Table 2-1, first their overall length
and second, their fuselage width, until 700 movements are reached. It may be seen that the
number of movements of the longest aeroplanes in the highest category totals more than 700.
The airport in this case would be category 6.

Example No. 2

Aeroplane Overall length Fuselage width Category Movements

Airbus A350-900 66.8 m 6.0 m 9 300

Boeing 747-8 76.3 m 6.5 m 10 400

Airbus A380 72.7 m 7.1 m 10 400

The longest aeroplanes are categorized by evaluating, using Table 2-1, first their overall length
and second, their fuselage width, until 700 movements are reached. It may be seen that the
number of movements of the longest aeroplanes in the highest category totals more than 700. It
may also be noted that when evaluating the category appropriate to the Airbus A380 aeroplane’s
overall length, e.g. category 9, the category selected is actually one higher as the aeroplane’s
fuselage width is greater than the maximum fuselage width for category 9. The airport in this
case would be category 10.

Example No. 3

Aeroplane Overall length Fuselage width Category Movements

Boeing 737-900ER 42.1 m 3.8 m 7 300

Bombardier CRJ 900 36.4 m 2.7 m 6 500

Airbus A319 33.8 m 4.0 m 6 300

The longest aeroplanes are categorized by evaluating, using Table 2-1, first their overall length
and second, their fuselage width, until 700 movements are reached. It may be seen that the
number of movements of the longest aeroplanes in the highest category totals only 300. The
minimum category for the airport in this case would be category 6, which is one category below
that of the longest aeroplane.

Example No. 4

Aeroplane Overall length Fuselage width Category Movements

Airbus A380 73.0 m 7.1 m 10 300

Boeing 747-8 76.3 m 6.5 m 10 200

Page 3 of 112
 Boeing 747-400 70.7 m 6.5 m 9 300

The longest aeroplanes are categorized by evaluating, using Table 2-1, first their overall length
and second, their fuselage width, until 700 movements are reached. It may be seen that the
number of movements of the longest aeroplanes in the highest category totals only 500. It may
also be noted that when evaluating the category appropriate to the Airbus A380 aeroplane’s
overall length, e.g. category 9, the category selected is actually one higher as the aeroplane’s
fuselage width is greater than the maximum fuselage width for category 9. The minimum
category for the airport in this case would be category 9, which is one category below that of the
longest aeroplane.

Example No. 5

Aeroplane Overall length Fuselage width Category Movements

Airbus A321 44.5 m 4.0 m 7 100

Boeing 737-900ER 42.1 m 3.8 m 7 300

ATR 42 22.7 m 2.9 m 4 500

The longest aeroplanes are categorized by evaluating, using Table 2-1, first their overall length
and second, their fuselage width, until 700 movements are reached. It may be seen that the
number of movements of the longest aeroplanes in the highest category totals only 400. It would
appear from 2.1.3 b) above that the minimum category for the airport would be category 6;
however, even when there is a relatively wide range of difference between the length of the
longest aeroplane (Airbus A321) and the aeroplane for which the 700th movement is reached
(ATR 42), the minimum category for the airport may only be reduced to category 6.

2.1.7 Notwithstanding the above, during anticipated periods of reduced activity the airport
category may be reduced to that of the highest category of aeroplane planned to use the airport
during that time irrespective of the number of movements.

2.1.8 Cargo operations. The level of protection at aerodromes used for all-cargo aeroplane
operations may be reduced in accordance with Table 2-2. This is based on the need to protect
only the area around the cockpit of an all- cargo aeroplane in the critical area concept. Using this
rationale, the aerodrome category for an all-cargo aeroplane may be reduced by providing
enough water quantity Q1 for the control of fire. Information on the critical area concept and the
method by which the scale of extinguishing agents has been related to the critical area may be
found in 2.4.

Table 2-2. Airport category for all-cargo aeroplanes

Aerodrome category Reclassification of aerodrome category for

all-cargo aeroplanes

1 1

2 2

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 3 3

4 4

5 5

6 5

7 6

8 6

9 7

10 7

Note 1.— This table has been determined using the average size of aeroplane in a given category.

Note 2.— An all-cargo aeroplane is an aeroplane operated for the transportation of goods,
without fare- paying passengers.

2.2 TYPES OF EXTINGUISHING AGENTS

Both principal and complementary agents should normally be provided at an airport. Principal
agents produce a permanent control, i.e. for a period of several minutes or longer.
Complementary agents have rapid fire suppression capability but offer a “transient” control
which is usually only available during application.

2.2.4 The principal extinguishing agent should be:

a) a foam meeting the minimum performance level A; or

b) a foam meeting the minimum performance level B; or

c) a foam meeting the minimum performance level C; or

d) a combination of these agents.

The principal extinguishing agent for airports in categories 1 to 3 (see 2.4.10) should preferably
meet the minimum performance levels B or C foam.

2.2.3 The complementary extinguishing agent should be:

a) dry chemical powders (classes B and C powders); or

b) other extinguishing agents with at least the same firefighting capability.

When selecting dry chemical powder for use with foam, care must be exercised to ensure
compatibility.

Page 5 of 112
2.2.4 Characteristics of the recommended extinguishing agents may be found in Chapter 8.

2.3 AMOUNTS OF EXTINGUISHING AGENTS

2.3.1 The amounts of water for foam production and the complementary agents to be provided
on the RFF vehicles should be in accordance with the airport category determined under 2.1.2
and Table 2-3, except that for airport categories 1 and 2, up to 100 per cent of the water may be
substituted with a complementary agent.

2.3.2 The amounts in Table 2-3 are the minimum amounts of extinguishing agents to be provided
and are based on the average overall length of aeroplanes in a given category. If the aeroplane
operating at an airport is larger than the median aeroplane, the amounts should be recalculated
in accordance with 2.3.7.

2.3.3 The amounts in Table 2-3 have been determined by adding the quantity of extinguishing
agents which are required to obtain a one-minute control time in the practical critical area and
the quantity of extinguishing agents which are required for continued control of the fire
thereafter and/or for possible complete extinguishment of the fire. Control time is the time
required to reduce the initial intensity of the fire by 90 per cent. Information on the critical area
concept and the method by which the scale of extinguishing agents has been related to the critical
area may be found in 2.4.

2.3.4 The quantity of foam concentrate separately provided on vehicles for foam production
should be in proportion to the quantity of water provided and the foam concentrate selected. The
amount of foam concentrate should be sufficient to supply at least two full loads of such quantity
of water where sufficient additional water supplies are immediately available to ensure a rapid
replenishment of the water content carried.

2.3.5 The amounts of water specified for foam production are predicated on an application rate of
8.2 L/min/m2 for a foam meeting performance level A, 5.5 L/min/m 2 for a foam meeting
performance level B and 3.75L/min/m2 for a foam meeting performance level C. These
application rates are considered to be the minimum rates at which control can be achieved
within one minute.

2.3.6 The amounts of foams given in Table 2-3 have been determined on the assumption that the
foams meet minimum specifications approved by the State. Guidance on basic characteristics of
foams is contained in Chapter 8.

2.3.7 From 1 January 2015, at aerodromes where operations by aeroplanes larger than the
average size in a given category are planned, the quantities of water shall be recalculated and the
amount of water for foam production and the discharge rates for foam solution shall be increased
accordingly.

2.3.8 Table 2-4 provides guidance on the calculation of the quantities of water and discharge
rates based on the largest overall length of aeroplane in a given category. The table is based on
the use of performance level A foam with an application rate of 8.2 L/min/m 2. Where
performance level B or C foam is used, similar calculations should be made using the appropriate

Page 6 of 112
application rates. The formulae indicated in Table 2-4 are used only for the recalculation of
quantities in accordance with 2.3.7.

Table 2-3. Minimum useable amounts of extinguishing agents

Foam meeting Foam meeting Foam meeting Complementary

performance performance level performance level agents
level A B C

Aerodrome Discharge Discharge Discharge Dry

category rate foam rate foam rate foam chemical Discharge
solution/ solution/ solution/ rate
Water Minute Water minute Water minute Powders(kg/second)
(L) (L) (L) (L) (L) (L) (kg)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1 350 350 230 230 160 160 45 2.25

2 1 000 800 670 550 460 360 90 2.25

3 1 800 1 300 1 200 900 820 630 135 2.25

4 3 600 2 600 2 400 1 800 1 700 1 100 135 2.25

5 8 100 4 500 5 400 3 000 3 900 2 200 180 2.25

6 11 800 6 000 7 900 4 000 5 800 2 900 225 2.25

7 18 200 7 900 12 100 5 300 8 800 3 800 225 2.25

8 27 300 10 800 18 200 7 200 12 800 5 100 450 4.5

9 36 400 13 500 24 300 9 000 17 100 6 300 450 4.5

10 48 200 16 600 32 300 11 200 22 800 7 900 450 4.5

Note.— The quantities of water shown in columns 2, 4, and 6 are based on the average overall
length of aeroplanes in a given category.

2.3.9 As of 1 January 2015, at aerodromes where the level of protection is reduced in accordance
with the remission factor allowed in 2.1.3 b) and where operations by aeroplanes larger than the
average size in a given category are planned, the recalculation of quantities of extinguishing
agents required in 2.3.7 would need to be computed based on the largest aeroplane in the
reduced category. As an example, an Airbus A380 (category 10) is operating infrequently into a
B747 aerodrome (category 9). If the number of movements of the A380 is less than 700
movements in the busiest consecutive three months, the aerodrome is allowed to provide a

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category 9 level of protection, as permitted in 2.1.3 b). However, as of 1 January 2015, the
quantities of an agent are to be recalculated for aerodromes where operations by aeroplanes
larger than the average size in a given category are planned (see 2.3.7). As the A380 is larger than
the average aeroplane used for calculation of quantities of extinguishing agents for category 9 in
Table 2-3, the actual quantities to be provided need to be recalculated. Since 2.1.3 b) permits a
remission factor of one, the largest quantity for category 9, i.e. 41 483 L (for performance level A
foam) should be provided. As a comparison, this quantity is more than the median quantity of 36
400 L for category 9 in Table 2-3 but less than the maximum quantity of 54 242 L for category 10
in Table 2-4.

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Table 2-4. Maximum quantities of extinguishing agents based on the largest dimension of an
aeroplane (performance level A foam, application rate 8.2 L/min/m2)

RFF Largest Fuselag Total Theoretic Practic Q1 Q2 =k2 ∑Q = Discharge

categor theoretic e width of al critical al = x Q1 rate
y
al length width, protecti area, AT = critical (see Q1+Q2 (L/min)
8.2 x
of W on area Lx area, 2.4.10 = AP x
1x
aeroplan (k1 + W) (k1+W) AP = for (litres (applica-
(m) AP )
e, L ⅔ AT values tion rate
(m) of k2) of 8.2
(m)
L/min/m
2)

1 9 2 12+2 = 126 84 68 0, 0 689 689

14 9
2 12 2 12+2 = 168 112 91 0.27 x 1 166 918
14 8 918=24
8
3 18 3 14+3 = 306 204 1 0.30 x 1 2 175 1 673
17 67 673=50
3 2
4 24 4 17+4 = 504 336 2 0.58 x 2 4 353 2 755
21 75 755=1
5 598
5 28 4 30+4 = 952 635 5 0.75 x 5 9 112 5 207
34 20 207=3
7 905
6 39 5 30+5 = 1 365 910 7 1.0 x 7 14 7 462
35 46 462=7 924
2 462
7 49 5 30+5 = 1 715 1 144 9 1.29 x 9 21 9 381
35 38 381=12 482
1 101
8 61 7 30+7 = 2 257 1 505 12 1.52 x 31 12 341
37 34 12 099
1 341=18
758
9 76 7 30+7 = 2 812 1 876 15 1.70 x 41 15 383
37 38 15 483
3 383=26
100
10 90 8 30+8 = 3 420 2 281 18 1.9 x 18 54 18 704
38 70 704=35 242
4 538

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2.3.10 There may be aerodromes that use more than one type of performance level foams, such
as a combination of level A and B foams, which could lead to error in quantity calculation or
replenishment. The use of a combination of different performance level foams at an aerodrome
is therefore not encouraged.

2.3.11 For the purpose of replacing water for foam production by complementary agents, 1 kg of
a complementary agent shall be taken as equivalent to 1.0 L of water for production of a foam
meeting performance level
A. Higher equivalencies for complementary agents may be used if results of tests conducted on the
complementary agents used by the State have indicated higher efficiencies than those recommended
above. When any other complementary agent is used, the substitution ratios need to be checked.

BACK TO CHECKLIST

RF-2

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition, July
2018

9.2.42 All rescue and firefighting personnel shall be properly trained to perform their duties in
an efficient manner and shall participate in live fire drills commensurate with the types of
aircraft and type of rescue and firefighting equipment in use at the aerodrome, including
pressure-fed fuel fires.

Note 1.— Guidance to assist the appropriate authority in providing proper training is given in
Attachment A, Section 18, and the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

Note 2.— Fires associated with fuel discharged under very high pressure from a ruptured fuel
tank are known as “pressure-fed fuel fires”.

9.2.43 The rescue and firefighting personnel training programme shall include training in
human performance,
including team coordination.

Note.— Guidance material to design training programmes on human performance and team
coordination can be found in the Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683).

9.2.44 Recommendation.— During flight operations, sufficient trained and

competent personnel should be designated to be readily available to ride the rescue and
firefighting vehicles and to operate the equipment at maximum capacity. These personnel
should be deployed in a way that ensures that minimum response times can be achieved and
that continuous agent application at the appropriate rate can be fully maintained. Consideration
should also be given for personnel to use hand lines, ladders and other rescue and firefighting
equipment normally associated with aircraft rescue and firefighting operations.

9.2.45 Recommendation.— In determining the minimum number of rescue and firefighting

personnel required, a task resource analysis should be completed and the level of staffing
documented in the Aerodrome Manual.

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Note.— Guidance on the use of a task resource analysis can be found in the Airport Services
Manual (Doc 9137), Part 1.

9.2.46 All responding rescue and firefighting personnel shall be provided with protective
clothing and respiratory equipment to enable them to perform their duties in an effective
manner.
BACK TO CHECKLIST

Doc 9137 – Airport Services Manual, Part 1: Rescue and Firefighting, Fourth Edition, 2015

10.3 MANAGEMENT OF REF PERSONNEL

10.3.1 Full-time RFF personnel, where provided, may be assigned other duties, provided that the
performance of these duties does not impair their ability to respond immediately to an
emergency, or restrict their performance of essential training, inspections and equipment
maintenance. These subsidiary duties could include fire prevention inspections, fire guard
duties or other functions for which their equipment and training make them particularly
suitable. Arrangements must exist for their immediate mobilization in the event of an
emergency and, wherever possible, a crew assigned to subsidiary duties should travel in the RFF
vehicle to which they are appointed, maintaining constant contact with the fire station by radio.

10.3.2 The airport emergency plan should provide for the alerting of all personnel who may
contribute to the effective performance of post-accident operations in a support role to the RFF
crews. (See 4.4.)

10.4 PHYSICAL AND MEDICAL FITNESS ASSESSMENTS FOR RFF SERVICES

10.4.1 As the nature of RFF operations involves periods of intense physical activity, all RFF
personnel have to possess a minimum level of physical fitness and medical fitness to be able to
perform the tasks associated with these operations. Physical fitness and medical fitness is often
described as the overall physical condition of the body, which can range from peak condition for
performance at one end of the spectrum to extreme illness or injury at the other. The key fitness
components for RFF are generally aerobic fitness, anaerobic fitness, flexibility and medical
fitness. Optimum physical fitness and medical fitness for RFF personnel would mean that a
firefighter is able to carry out RFF activities safely, successfully and without undue fatigue.

10.4.2 Aerobic fitness is the ability to continue to exercise for prolonged periods of time at low
to moderate or high intensity. This is typically what limits the ability to continue to run, cycle or
swim for more than a few minutes and is dependent upon the body’s heart, lungs and blood to
get the oxygen to the muscles (VO2) providing the sustained energy needed to maintain
prolonged exercise. Typical aerobic activities include walking, jogging, cycling, rope skipping,
stair climbing, swimming, or any other endurance activities.

10.4.3 Anaerobic fitness works differently to aerobic fitness. It is an activity that requires high
levels of energy and is done for only a few seconds or minutes at a high level of intensity. The
term anaerobic means “without oxygen”. Participation in anaerobic activities leads to anaerobic
fitness, which may be defined as higher levels of muscular strength, speed and power. Examples

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of anaerobic activities include heavy weight lifting, running up several flights of stairs, sprinting,
power swimming, or any other rapid burst of hard exercises.

10.4.4 Flexibility refers to the ability to move the limbs and joints into specific positions at the
end of their normal range of movement. Flexibility is important as it will allow the body to work
in cramped positions without unduly stressing the muscles, tendons and ligaments and may
reduce the risk of injury. Flexibility is best developed using slow controlled stretching exercise

10.4.5 The physical fitness assessment should be catered to the components mentioned above.
RFF services should develop various types of tests to ensure that these components are tested to
determine if the RFF personnel has the required physical fitness level for the job. The physical
fitness assessment should also be conducted at least once a year. The physical fitness
assessment should be conducted for pre-employment entry as a firefighter as well as ongoing
physical fitness assessments for existing RFF staff to ensure they are maintaining their level of
physical fitness.

10.4.6 Medical fitness assessments specific to RFF services should be developed. The medical
fitness assessments should be conducted for pre-employment entry as a firefighter as well as
ongoing medical fitness assessments for existing staff. The frequency of medical fitness
assessments should be determined by each agency. The medical fitness assessments should be
used to identify any underlying medical conditions, which may pose a risk to the individual
firefighter during physically demanding activities.

10.5 TASK RESOURCE ANALYSIS

10.5.1 Introduction. The following guidance describes the stages that should be considered by
an airport operator in carrying out a Task Resource Analysis (TRA) to establish justification as
to the minimum number of qualified/competent personnel required to deliver an effective
airport RFF service (RFFS) to deal with an aircraft incident/accident. If an airport operator
requires the RFFS to attend structural incidents and road traffic accidents in addition to aircraft
incidents/accidents, due regard must be given to the inability of not meeting required response
times and robust procedures should be introduced accordingly.

10.5.2 Purpose. By using a qualitative risk based approach, which focuses upon probable and
credible worst- case scenarios a task and resource analysis should be done to identify the
minimum number of personnel required to undertake identified tasks in real time before
supporting external services are able to effectively assist RFFS (see Table 10-1).

10.5.2.1 Consideration should also be given to the types of aircraft using the aerodrome, as well
as the need for personnel to use self-contained breathing apparatus, handlines, ladders and
other RFF equipment provided at the aerodrome associated with aircraft RFF operations. The
importance of an agreed framework for incident command should form a primary part of the
considerations.

10.5.3 General information. The airport operator should first establish the minimum
requirements including: minimum number of RFFS vehicles and equipment required for the
delivery of the extinguishing agents at the required discharge rate for the specified RFF category
of the airport.

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 10.5.4 Task analysis/risk assessment. A task analysis should primarily consist of a qualitative
analysis of the RFFS response to a realistic, worst-case, aircraft accident scenario. The purpose
should be to review the current and future staffing levels of the RFFS deployed at the
aerodrome. The qualitative analysis could be supported by a quantitative risk assessment to
estimate the reduction in risk. This risk assessment could be related to the reduction in risk to
passengers and aircrew from deploying additional personnel. One of the most important
elements is to assess the impact of any critical tasks or pinch points identified by the qualitative
analysis.

10.5.5 Qualitative approach. The task analysis including a workload assessment aims to
identify the effectiveness of the current staffing level and to identify the level of improvement
resulting from additional staffing. A credible worst-case accident scenario should be analysed to
assess the relative effectiveness of at least two levels of RFFS staffing.

10.5.6 Quantitative risk assessment. This assessment will generally be used to support the
conclusions of the qualitative analysis by examining the risks to passengers and aircrew from
aircraft accidents at the airport. This comparison of the risk allows the benefit of employing
additional RFFS staff to be evaluated in terms of the risk reduction in passengers and aircrew
lives saved. This could be expressed in monetary terms and may be compared with additional
costs incurred in employing the additional personnel. However, this is of little, if any, value in
determining minimum levels of personnel.

10.5.7 Task analysis. The following items will assist in determining the basic contents of an
analysis:

a) Description of aerodrome(s) including the number of runways;

b) Promulgated RFFS categories (Aeronautical Information Publication);

c) Response time criteria (area, times and number of fire stations);

d) Current and future types of aircraft movements;

e) Operational hours;

f) Current RFFS structure and establishment;

g) Current level of personnel;

h) Level of supervision for each operational crew;

i) RFFS qualifications/competence (training programmes and facilities);

j) Extraneous duties (to include domestic and first aid response);

k) Communications and RFFS alerting system including extraneous duties;

l) Appliances and extinguishing agents available;

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 m) Specialist equipment— fast rescue craft, hovercraft, water carrier, hose layer, extending
boom technology;

n) First aid — role responsibility;

o) Medical facilities — role responsibility;

p) Pre-determined attendance: local authority services — police, fire and ambulance, etc.;

q) Incident task analysis — feasible worst-case scenarios) (workload assessment) (human

Performance/Factors. To include: mobilization, deployment to scene, scene management,
firefighting, suppression and extinguishment, application of complementary agent(s),
post fire security/control, personnel protective equipment, rescue team(s), aircraft
evacuation and extinguishing agent replenishment;

Note.— The aim is to identify any pinch points within the current workload and proposed
workload.

r) Appraisal of existing RFFS provision;

s) Future requirements. Aerodrome development and expansion;
t) Enclosures could include: airport maps, event trees to explain tasks and functions
conducted by the RFFS, etc.); and
u) Airport emergency plan and procedures.

Note.— The above list is not exhaustive and should only act as a guide.

10.5.7.1 Phase 1

The airport operator must be clear as to the aims and objectives for the RFF services, and the
required tasks that personnel are expected to carry out.

Example

Aim: To maintain a dedicated RFFS of qualified and competent fire and rescue personnel
equipped with vehicles and specialist equipment to make an immediate response to an aircraft
incident/accident on or in the immediate vicinity of the airport within the specified response
time criteria.

Principal Objective of the RFFS: The principal objective of an RFFS is to save lives in the event of
an aircraft accident or incident. For this reason, the provision of means of dealing with an
aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome assumes
primary importance because it is within this area that there are the greatest opportunities of
saving lives. This must assume at all times the possibility of, and need for, extinguishing a fire
that may occur either immediately following an aircraft accident or incident, or at any time
during rescue operations.

Tasks:

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 a) meet the required response time;
b) extinguish an external fire;
c) protect escape slides and exit routes;
d) assist in the self-evacuation of the aircraft;
e) create a survivable situation;
f) rescue trapped personnel;
g) maintain post fire security/control; and

h) preserve evidence;

Note.— The above list is not exhaustive and all relevant tasks must be identified before moving
to Phase 2.
Each task/mission may include numerous functional activities/actions.

10.5.7.2 Phase 2

Identify a selection of representative realistic, feasible accidents that may occur at the airport.
This can be achieved by a statistical analysis of previous accidents on airports and by analysing
data from international, national and local sources.

Note.— All incidents should involve fire to represent a feasible worst-case scenario that would
require an RFFS response.

Examples:

a) aircraft engine failure on take-off with a fire (aborted take-off);

b) aircraft aborts and overruns into the runway end safety area (RESA) with a fire on take-
off;
c) aircraft into aircraft with fire (collision);
d) aircraft into structure- terminal building(s) with a fire;
e) aircraft leaves the runway on landing into the runway strip (full emergency evacuation);
and
f) internal aircraft fire (cabin fire, baggage hold, cargo hold, avionics bay(s).

10.5.7.3 Phase 3

Identify the types of aircraft commonly in use at the airport; this is important as the type of
aircraft and its configuration has a direct bearing on the resources required in meeting Phase 1.
It may be necessary to group the aircraft types in relation to common aircraft configurations for
ease of analysis or identify precise aircraft type that may have a unique configuration.

Example:

a) long wide-bodied aircraft with multiple passenger decks and multiple aisles;
b) long narrow-bodied aircraft with single aisle, high passenger density; and
c) short narrow-bodied aircraft with single aisle, high passenger density.

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A representative aircraft type can then be chosen, i.e. Airbus A 380, Airbus A 340, Airbus A
320, Boeing 747, Boeing 777, Boeing 757 and Boeing 737.

10.5.7.4 Phase 4
10.5.7.4.1 Every airport is unique in that the location, environment, runway and taxiway
configuration, aircraft movements, airport infrastructure and boundary, etc., may present
specific additional risks.

10.5.7.4.2 In order that the feasible accident scenario can be modelled/simulated, a major factor
is to consider the probable location for the most realistic accident type that may occur.

10.5.7.4.3 To confirm the location of the scenario, it is important that a facilitator using a team of
experienced fire service personnel, who have knowledge of the airport and the locations in
which an aircraft accident is likely to occur, evaluate the scenario.

10.5.7.4.4 The role of the facilitator is to seek agreement in identifying the credible worst-case
locations and, by using a scoring system place, these locations in order of relevance and priority.
The team must determine why the locations have been identified and provide a rationale for
each location. One methodology would be to award a weighted number to each location, then
total the numbers in relation to each identified location.

Example:

The team may have identified that the following contributed to a worst-case location:

a) response time;
b) route to the accident site (on or off paved surfaces);
c) terrain;
d) crossing procedures for active runway(s);
e) aircraft congestion on route (taxiways);
f) surface conditions;
g) communications;
h) supplementary water supplies;
i) adverse weather conditions — low visibility procedures; and
j) daylight or darkness.

10.5.7.4.5 An additional time delay for any of the factors listed above should be estimated and
recorded, then the location with the highest additional response time could be identified as the
worst-case location.

10.5.7.4.6 It is important to note that the location of an accident could have an impact on the
resources and tasks that will be required to be carried out by RFF personnel.

10.5.7.4.7From the above analysis, a location or a number of locations could be identified, in

agreement with the airport operator and the TRA facilitator.

Example:

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 1) Taxiway Bravo: Runway holding position Bravo 1- leading onto runway 06L;

2) Runway 13— Runway and service road crossing point (grid reference A5);

3) Runway 28 overrun RESA;

4) Runway 24 undershoot RESA;

5) Aircraft stand A33 (Alpha apron);

6) Grid reference A6 (Runway 06 localizer road);

7) Taxiway Alpha: Intermediate taxi-holding position — A3; and

8) Aircraft stand A5 (on taxilane).

10.5.7.5 Phase 5

10.5.7.5.1 Phase 5 combines the accident types to be examined as described in Phase 2, with the
aircraft identified in Phase 3 and the locations as described in Phase 4; the accident types should
be correlated with the possible location. In some cases this could be in more than one location
on an airport, for which a task and resource analysis needs to be carried out.

10.5.7.5.2 The above information is to be built into a complete accident scenario that can be
analysed by experienced supervisors and firefighters for the task and resource analysis in Phase
6.
Example:

Scenario No 1:

Accident type: Aircraft overrun into Runway 06 RESA — Phase 2. Aircraft identified:
Boeing 747-400 — Phase 3.
Accident location: Runway 06 RESA — Phase 4.

10.5.7.5.3 The Boeing 747 400 is a wide-bodied multi-deck aircraft. Its typical seating
configuration can be 340 economy, 23 business, and 18 first class passengers on the lower deck.
On the upper deck, provision is made for a further 32 business class passengers, giving an
estimated aircraft seating capacity of 413 excluding the crew. The aircraft typically has four exits
on both sides of the lower deck and one on each side of the upper deck.

10.5.7.5.4 During the take-off phase, the aircraft suffers a fire in the number 3 engine and the
pilot decides to abort the take-off. During this phase, the fire develops rapidly and impinges on
the fuselage. The aircraft overruns the runway and comes to rest in the RESA. The flight deck
crew orders an evacuation.

10.5.7.5.5 The RFF services are informed by air traffic control (ATC) and respond accordingly
and the aerodrome emergency procedures are activated.

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10.5.7.6 Phase 6
10.5.7.6.1 By using a TRA facilitator with teams of experienced airport supervisors and
firefighters the accident scenario(s) developed in Phase 5 is subject to a task and resource
analysis carried out in a series of tabletop exercises/simulations.

10.5.7.6.2 When carrying out a task and resource analysis, the principal objective should be to
identify in real time and in sequential order the minimum number of RFF personnel required at
any one time to achieve the following:

a) receive the message and dispatch the RFF service (the dispatcher may have to respond as
part of the minimum riding strength);

b) respond utilizing communications, taking appropriate route and achieving the defined
response criteria;

c) position appliances/vehicles in optimum positions and operate RFF appliances

effectively;

d) use extinguishing agents and equipment accordingly;

e) instigate incident command structure — supervisors;

f) assist in passenger and crew self-evacuation;

g) access aircraft to carry out specific tasks if required, e.g. firefighting, rescue;

h) support and sustain the deployment of firefighting and rescue equipment;

i) support and sustain the delivery of supplementary water supplies; and

j) need to replenish foam supplies as needed.

10.5.7.6.3 The task and resource analysis should identify the optimum time when additional
resources will be available to support/augment and/or replace resources supplied by RFF
services (aerodrome emergency plan). It can also provide vital evidence to support the level of
RFF vehicles and equipment.

10.5.7.6.4 In order to start a task and resource analysis the required category of the airport must
be identified as required by the regulatory authority. This should confirm the minimum number
of vehicles, and the minimum extinguishing agent requirements and discharge rates, this should
also determine the minimum number of personnel required to functionally operate the vehicles
and equipment.

10.5.7.6.5 The results of the analysis should be recorded in a table or spreadsheet format and
should be laid out in a method that ensures that the following is recorded:

a) receipt of message and dispatch of the RFF response;

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 b) time — this starts from the initial receipt of call and the timeline continues in minutes
and seconds until additional external resources arrive or the facilitator decides an end-
time;

c) list of assessed tasks, functions and priorities achieved;

d) the resources (personnel, vehicles and equipment) required for each task should be
defined;

e) comments to enable team members to record their findings; and

f) identified pinch points.

10.5.7.7 Working example of a qualitative task resource analysis — Scenario 1.

10.5.7.7.1 Key to working example:

 Major foam tenders are identified as MFT A, B, C and D.

 Minimum number of personnel riding the MFTs are identified as: A1, A2, B1, B2, etc. See
Table 10-1.

10.5.7.7.2 Major foam tenders:

 four MFTs carrying 11,00 Litres with a total water capacity of 44 000 Litres: (A, B, C and
D).
 Minimum number of RFFS personnel: total 14.

10.5.7.7.3 Supervisors:

 Watch commander: 1= A1
 Crew commanders: 3 = B1, C1 and D1

10.5.7.7.4 Firefighters:

 Total — 10.
 A2 and A3.
 B2 and B3.
 C2, C3 and C4.
 D2, D3 and D4.

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Table 10-1. Minimum numbers of appliances/vehicles and personnel riding the MFTs

Notes:

1) For this example, the RFFS is deployed from a single fire station at an airport with a
single runway, designated 06-24.

2) Time has been defined in minutes and seconds.

3) For this TRA the dispatcher is outside of the minimum number of RFF personnel.

Stated objectives for the RFFS:

a) instigate aerodrome emergency plan;

b) respond within the required response time;

c) select appropriate route and communications;

d) position appliances in optimum positions and operate effectively;

e) instigate incident command system;

f) suppress/extinguish any fires;

g) assist with self-evacuation of the aircraft;

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 h) if appropriate, extinguish any internal fire;

i) if required, ventilate aircraft to create survivable conditions;

j) maintain post fire control of the critical area; and

k) preserve evidence.

Table 10-2. Task and resource analysis

Time Tasks Resources Comments

00.00 Call received from ATC as aircraft Dispatcher Achieved
accident runway 06 RESA. Boeing 747-
400.
00.00 RFF personnel mobilized by Dispatcher Achieved
dispatcher.
00.15 Call made to operate the airport ATC/dispatcher/opera Achieved ATC
emergency plan. tions unit
00.30 Personnel donning in appropriate PPE. Minimum riding Achieved
strength
00.40 Route selected and all appliances MFTs A, B, C and D Achieved supervisors
mobile en route to 06 RESA. and drivers.
00.50 Supervisor(s) utilize appropriate Supervisor(s) Achieved
communications (RTF): discreet Note.— Aircraft may
frequency, ATC, local authority, etc. have already instigated
evacuation (air crew).
02.00 All appliances in position: Supervisors and Achieved
Priority identified by supervisor(s) to drivers MFTs A, B, C
extinguish ground pool fire and fire in and D A, B and C deploy
number 3 engine that is impinging on monitors.
fuselage.
A1 supervisor B1
supervisor C1
A1 instigates ICS. supervisor D1
supervisor
Create and maintain survivable A2 A3
conditions for the passengers to reach B1 B2 B3 C1 C2
a place of safety. C3 D1 D2 D3 deploy,
02.15 Complementary agent required. D1 is use complementary
supervisor. agent donned in RPE
D2 is pump operator. D4
Breathing apparatus entry control
officer (BAECO).
03.15 All external fires extinguished. MFTs A, B, C and D All Achieved
crewmembers

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03.20 Assist with self-evacuation, and MFTs A B Achieved: hand-lines
maintain survivable conditions for the B1 A2 A3 B2 B3 deployed accordingly
passengers to reach a place of safety.
03.20 Crew prepares to enter aircraft in RPE. MFT D Achieved
D1 D3 and D2 (pump) D1 D3 briefed by
BAECO
03.20 Crew prepares appropriate entry point C1 C2 C3 C4 Achieved by use of:
and hand-line. specialist
vehicle/equipment/
ladder
Note.— MFT A maintains post fire A2 A3 Achieved
control.

Time Tasks Resources Comments

03.55 Crew enters aircraft in RPE with hand- D1 D3 D4 Achieved Achieved
line (BAECO). C4 Achieved
Achieved
B2 B3
Ladder made safe for internal crew.

Crews assist with hand-line for BA

entry team.
04.15 Following self-evacuation of aircraft, C1 C2 C3 Achieved. Assistance
provide assistance with gathering provided by aircraft
passengers and crew to place of safety. crew and additional
responders from
airport in accordance
with the emergency
procedures
04.15 A2 remains as monitor/turret MFT A Achieved
operator, and provides escape route
protection.
04.30 Supervisor A1 liaises with ATC, A1 Achieved
rendezvous point officer and arriving
emergency services to ensure
appropriate resources are brought
forward to the accident site/location.
04.50 Supervisor A1 instructs airside A1 Achieved
operations to assist in containing
exiting passengers and crew and
obtaining a head count of survivors.
04.55 D1 reports 20 survivors still on board D1 A1 Achieved
aircraft require medical aid and
assistance. There is no smoke in cabin
or flight deck areas and survivors are
having no difficult with breathing.

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 05.05 External emergency services are A1 and external Achieved
brought forward to the accident site commanders:
with additional equipment to support • police
the removal of the remaining • fire
survivors and to transport the • ambulance
survivors to the appropriate safety • medical, etc.
zone.

Additional Points
Note 1.— At this point, the airport
emergency plan is fully instigated and
the supporting services can relieve D1
D3, provide supplementary water if
required from the nearest hydrant or
emergency water supply, assist in the
deployment of specialist fire ground
equipment and if required support the
teams that are engaged in removing
the survivors to a place of safety.
Note 2.— The facilitator may decide to
terminate the analysis at this point or
continue with the exercise to evaluate
specific elements of the emergency
plan, e.g. preservation of evidence.

Notes:

1) It can be seen that ten firefighters and four supervisors including the officer in charge are
required to achieve the above supported by four major foam tenders.

2) The timeline can be further verified by the use of practical exercises and individual
analysis to establish if the times are realistic and achievable for each task and function.

3) Each of the above tasks can be subdivided into individual functions associated with the
specific task performed at a particular time.

Example (see Table 10-3):

a) How long does it take to don protective clothing?

b) How long does it take to don self-contained breathing apparatus?

c) How long does it take to slip and pitch a ladder?

d) How long does it take to open an aircraft door from the head of a ladder? (If required).

e) How long does it take to deploy one, two, three (etc.) lengths of delivery hose?

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 f) How long does it take to carry any item of rescue equipment over a specified distance and
get to work?

Table 10-3. RFFS activities

Timeline assessment for personnel: firefighters and supervisors.

This table gives an indication of the timeline from the above analysis and can be utilized to
verify an individual task, function or identify “pinch points” ensuring each task is achievable
effectively within the timeline.

Task A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4

Time

00.00

00.15

00.30

00.40 A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4

00.50

02.00 A1 B1 C1 D1

02.15 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3 D4

03.15

03.20 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3

03.20

03.20 A2 A3

03.55 B2 B3 C4 D1 D3

04.15 C1 C2 C3

04.15

04.30 A1

04.50 A1

04.55 A1 D1

05.05 A1

Notes.— From the above table it can be seen that a potential pinch point exists with firefighters
A2 and A3. However, the tasks that they are performing are achievable as A2 and A3 are already

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utilizing a foam hand-line to maintain the evacuation route and maintaining post fire control.
This is considered logical and an achievable process for this crew.

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10.5.7.8 Conclusion. A task analysis can be as detailed as necessary. The aim is to itemize
the knowledge and practical skills (doing) involved in carrying out the task or function
effectively and to the correct the standard of competence based on a qualitative analysis.
Having gathered the appropriate data and agreed to the outcome, the TRA should enable an
RFFS to confirm and subsequently provide the correct level of vehicles, equipment and
personnel. It would also enable the RFFS to develop a training specification, and a learning
programme can then be designed around role and task. When planning a task and resource
analysis, ask the following questions:

a) What is done?

b) Why is it done?

c) When is it done?

d) Where is it done?

e) How is it done?

f) Who does it?

10.5.7.9 It is often difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of a complete unit by

observation only. However, observation/demonstration does allow you to assess the
effectiveness of individual units and any element(s) of the emergency arrangements.
Documentary evidence relating to previous accidents or exercises may also assist in
establishing if the current RFFS is staffed at an appropriate level. The overall objective is to
be satisfied that the RFFS is organized, equipped, staffed, trained and operated to ensure
the most rapid deployment of facilities to the maximum effect in the event of an accident.
The above process can also be used to identify equipment shortages and training needs for
personnel required to deal with identified tasks.

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RF-3

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition,

July 2018

Response time

9.2.27 The operational objective of the rescue and firefighting service shall be to achieve a
response time not exceeding three minutes to any point of each operational runway, in
optimum visibility and surface conditions.

Emergency access roads

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9.2.34 Recommendation.— Emergency access roads should be provided on an aerodrome
where terrain conditions permit their construction, so as to facilitate achieving minimum
response times. Particular attention should be given to the provision of ready access to
approach areas up to 1 000 m from the threshold, or at least within the aerodrome
boundary. Where a fence is provided, the need for convenient access to outside areas
should be taken into account.

Note.— Aerodrome service roads may serve as emergency access roads when they are
suitably located and constructed.

9.2.35 Recommendation.— Emergency access roads should be capable of supporting the

heaviest vehicles which will use them, and be usable in all weather conditions. Roads
within 90 m of a runway should be surfaced to prevent surface erosion and the transfer of
debris to the runway. Sufficient vertical clearance should be provided from overhead
obstructions for the largest vehicles.

9.2.36 Recommendation.— When the surface of the road is indistinguishable from the
surrounding area, or in areas where snow may obscure the location of the roads, edge
markers should be placed at intervals of about 10 m.

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Doc 9137 – Airport Services Manual, Part 1: Rescue and Firefighting, Fourth Edition,
2015

2.7 RESPONSE TIME

2.7.1 The operational objective of the RFF service should be to achieve response times of
two minutes and not exceeding three minutes to the end of each runway, as well as to any
other part of the movement area, in optimum conditions of visibility and surface
conditions. Response time is considered to be the time between the initial call to the
RFF service and the time when the first responding vehicle(s) is(are) in position to apply
foam at a rate of at least 50 percent of the discharge rate specified in Table 2-3.
Determination of realistic response times should be made by RFF vehicles operating from
their normal locations and not from positions adopted solely for test purposes.

2.7.2 Consideration of response times should also be given to landing and take-off areas for
the exclusive use of helicopters.

2.7.3 Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents specified
in Table 2-3 should arrive in three minutes and no more than four minutes from the initial
call so as to provide continuous agent application.

2.7.4 The requirements in 2.7.1 may require an evaluation of the RFF vehicles at airports
where the first responding vehicle(s) is(are) not capable of applying foams at the rate of at

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least 50 per cent of the recommended discharge rate for the airport category. This should
be considered as an objective to be achieved as the airport vehicle fleet is upgraded.

2.7.5 To meet the operational objective as nearly as possible in times of traffic/apron

congestion or in less than optimum conditions of visibility, it may be necessary to provide
suitable guidance, equipment, access routes and/or procedures for RFF vehicles. These
may include navigation equipment installed in the vehicles such as:

a) a driver enhanced vision system (DEVS) with on-board navigation equipment

utilizing the global navigation satellite system to provide the driver with the
vehicle’s location thus serving as an aid in navigating to the accident sites;
b) tracking using digital radio datalink to assist the vehicle driver in locating and
navigating to the accident site, thereby reducing driver communications workload
and improving situational awareness; and
c) low visibility enhanced vision using a forward looking infrared (FLIR) device (or
other comparable state-of-the-art low visibility enhanced vision technology) by
sensing thermal radiation instead of visible light to improve visual awareness in a
smoky, foggy or dark environment.

2.7.6 In addition, other suitable provisions such as bypass access roads as well as the
provision of ground movement guidance instructions by radiotelephone from air
traffic control based on surveillance radar, accident site location by air traffic control and a
collision avoidance facility either from equipment installed in the vehicles or provided
by surveillance radar from air traffic control. For the guidance of the RFF vehicles from
their station(s) or standby position(s) to the accident site, vehicles can move in a convoy
and air traffic control can direct the leading vehicle(s).
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RF-4

Annex 14 – Aerodromes: Volume 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations, Eighth Edition,

July 2018

Communication and alerting systems

9.2.39 Recommendation.— A discrete communication system should be provided linking a

fire station with the control tower, any other fire station on the aerodrome and the rescue
and firefighting vehicles.

9.2.40 Recommendation.— An alerting system for rescue and firefighting

personnel, capable of being operated from that station, should be provided at a fire station,
any other fire station on the aerodrome and the aerodrome control tower.

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Doc. 9137, Part 1, Chapter 4

4.1 SYSTEM FACILITIES

4.1.1 The efficiency of an RFF service is significantly dependent on the reliability and
effectiveness of its communication and alarm system. In addition, the successful conduct of
the total firefighting and related rescue operation will be facilitated by the system for
alerting and mobilizing other participating emergency support personnel. The importance
of prompt and clear communications cannot be over-emphasized.

4.1.2 Consistent with the individual requirements of each airport there should be
provision for:

a) direct communication between air traffic control (or other activating authority
provided by the airport authority) and the airport fire station(s) to ensure the prompt
dispatch of RFF vehicles in the event of an aircraft emergency;

b) communication between air traffic control and the RFF crews en route to, or in
attendance at, an aircraft accident/incident. To provide guidance to the RFF vehicles during
low visibility conditions, some form of navigational assistance may be required (see 2.7.5);

c) communication between the fire station, or the main station, where more than one
is provided, and the RFF vehicles;

d) communication between the RFF vehicles, including where necessary, a system to

provide inter- communication between the crew members of an RFF vehicle; and

e) emergency alarm systems to alert auxiliary personnel and appropriate

organizations located on or off the airport.

4.1.3 Additionally, direct communication may be provided between the RFF services and
the flight crew of an aircraft in an emergency on the ground.

4.2 FIRE STATION COMMUNICATIONS

4.2.1 In considering the scope of fire station communications, two important factors need
to be considered. The first is the extent of the workload in the watchroom when an aircraft
accident or incident occurs. The range of communication facilities will naturally be related
to this workload and if some part of the emergency mobilization can be undertaken
elsewhere, at the airport telephone exchange room or emergency operations centre, for
example, then the fire station watchroom can be more effectively equipped and operated in
its primary role. The second consideration relates to those airports operating more than
one fire station. Where two or more stations are provided it is usual to designate one as the

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main station and its watchroom as the master watchroom, which is continuously staffed. A
satellite station may also have a watchroom with fewer facilities commensurate with its
subordinate role and usually staffed only until the satellite’s vehicles respond to a call. In
discussing fire station communications, it is essential to differentiate between the
minimum requirements in main and satellite fire stations and to identify the systems which
can serve both.

4-1

4.2.2 Calls to the airport fire station(s) for attendance at an aircraft accident/incident
normally originate from air traffic control. Air traffic control should be linked with the main
fire station by a direct telephone line not passing through any intermediate switchboard so
as to avoid delays. This line is usually provided with a distinctive buzzer in the watchroom
and is safeguarded against buzzer defects by a warning light. This line can be linked to the
alarm system in the main and satellite fire station(s) so that the initiation of a call by air
traffic control simultaneously alerts all personnel. The alarm system may also be used to
activate RFF vehicle room doors. A separate switch for activating the alarm system should
be provided in each fire station watchroom.

4.2.3 Fire stations should be provided with a public address system so that details of the
emergency, giving location, type of aircraft involved, preferential routing for RFF vehicles,
can be conveyed to crew members. Control of this system would normally be located in the
master watchroom, which would also have a switch for silencing the alarm system to avoid
any interference with the effective use of the broadcast facility.

4.2.4 Some calls for emergency services may reach the main fire station from the airport
telephone switchboard and it is usual to have a special telephone circuit for these priority
calls. As some of these calls will be of lower priority than that associated with an aircraft
accident/incident, e.g. response to fuel spills, special services, etc., it is not necessary to link
this circuit with the alarm system. The alerting and directing of these responses can be
controlled from the master watchroom. A separate telephone circuit, for calls of a non-
emergency nature, should also be provided in each watchroom.

4.2.5 Where the master watchroom is required to mobilize off-airport support services
for aircraft-related or other emergency situations, direct telephone circuits with
appropriate priority indications should be provided to the appropriate control centres.

4.2.6 Satellite fire station watchrooms should be linked to the master watchroom by a
direct telephone line. The satellite fire station should be served by the public address and
alarm system operated by the master watchroom as well as having the ability to activate
the alarm system and make public address broadcasts within its station. A grid reference
map(s) should be displayed.

4.2.7 In many instances, the master fire station watchroom tends to become overloaded
with alarms, switches, buzzers, coloured lights, radio equipment, public address system,

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etc. The watchroom should be designed in such a way as to minimize the workload on the
watchroom attendant during an emergency call. The objective should be to set out the
watchroom in such a manner that a call can be received and dealt with by a minimum of
movement on the part of the watchroom attendant. Grid reference maps, etc., should be
placed directly in front of the watchroom attendant’s position. Details on the design of the
fire station watchroom can be found in 9.3.

4.2.8 All telephone and radio equipment in each watchroom should be regularly
monitored for its serviceability and arrangements should exist for emergency repair and
maintenance of this equipment. The continuity of electrical supplies to fire stations should
be ensured by connection to secondary power supplies.

4.3 RFF VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS

4.3.1 When RFF vehicles leave their fire stations and enter the manoeuvring area they
come under the direction of air traffic control. These vehicles must be equipped with two-
way radio communications equipment, through which their movements can at all times be
subject to direction by air traffic control. The choice of a direct air traffic control/fire
service frequency, monitored in the master watchroom, or a discrete airport fire service
frequency, relaying air traffic control instructions and fresh information, will be a matter
for the airport or appropriate authority to determine, based on local operational and
technical considerations. A discrete frequency minimizes the extent to which fire service
activities involve an air traffic control channel at a busy airport. It is important to provide
the fire service with the facility to communicate with flight crew members in certain types
of incidents, particularly where undercarriage situations are involved or aircraft
evacuation may be proposed. Technical solutions are available to permit both a discrete
frequency and an aircraft “talk-through” facility, subject to air traffic control approval. All
transmissions should be recorded once an emergency situation has been declared.

4.3.2 The radio equipment on RFF vehicles must accommodate communication between
vehicles, en route to, and in operation at, an aircraft accident. Within individual vehicles
there should be an intercommunication system, particularly between drivers and monitor
operators, to optimize the deployment of the vehicles at an accident. The provision of a
communication facility within an appliance must recognize the likelihood of high noise
levels and this may require the use of noise-cancelling microphones, headsets and
loudspeakers for effective intercommunication.

4.3.3 The RFF vehicles should be provided with communication equipment capable of
communicating directly with an aircraft in an emergency situation using an aeronautical
radio frequency. The aeronautical radio frequency permits the RFF service and the aircraft
to communicate with each other directly allowing the RFF crew to issue critical information
regarding the exact nature of, and the hazards associated with, an emergency in progress
along with recommendations for actions. Where provided, the aeronautical radio frequency
may be selected by air traffic control and notified to the aircraft and the RFF service. The

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requirements and responsibilities for the utilization of a radio frequency between the RFF
service and the flight crew of an aircraft in an emergency situation should be detailed in a
procedure agreed to between the air traffic services and the airport operator.

4.3.4 Communications between the flight crew, air traffic control and the RFF service
should be maintained throughout the emergency response. Due to the critical and timely
nature of the information transmitted on this frequency, transmissions should be limited to
air traffic control, the pilot of the aircraft and the officer-in-charge of the RFF operations.
The officer-in-charge of the RFF operations should delay transmissions to the aircraft until
cleared by air traffic control, unless the nature of the transmission is critical to emergency
operations.

4.3.5 One of the prerequisites for effective communication between the RFF service and
the flight crew of the aircraft is language proficiency. Steps should be taken to ensure that
the rescue and firefighting crew, in particular the officer-in-charge of the RFF operations,
demonstrates knowledge of the ICAO language designated for use in air-ground
communications and the ability to speak clearly so as not to adversely affect radio
communication.

4.3.6 Standard operating procedures (SOP) explaining the use of the dedicated radio
frequency should be developed outlining why, when and how it should be used.

4.3.7 At the accident site the officer-in-charge of RFF operations may leave the vehicle
and make observations on foot, and can then direct and inform crew members in all
aspects of fire-ground operations using a portable megaphone. This equipment may also
serve a subsidiary role in communications with aircraft crew members, the occupants of
the aircraft and other persons responding to the accident.

4.3.8 Rescue boats or other specialized vehicles intended for use in water, swampy areas
or other difficult terrain should also be provided with two-way radio equipment. Special
attention should be given to the selection of units intended for use in marine applications,
particularly to their protective containment systems.

4.4 OTHER COMMUNICATION AND ALERTING FACILITIES

4.4.1 The mobilization of all parties and agencies required to respond to an aircraft
emergency on a large airport will require the provision and management of a complex
communications system. The requirement is examined in the Airport Services Manual (Doc
9137), Part 7 — Airport Emergency Planning, Chapter 12. Part 7 covers all aspects of
airport emergency planning of which communications is a vital element, and which must be
subject to individual consideration by airport authorities in relation to local facilities.

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4.4.2 Where auxiliary personnel, not on standby duty, are required to respond to an
emergency, an audible alarm (siren or air horn) should be provided which can be clearly
heard in appropriate areas above normal noise level and all wind conditions. Personnel
responding to alarm signals of this nature must have access to a telephone number, from
which more precise information as to the nature of the emergency and their response
requirement can be acquired and to appropriate transport facilities to achieve this
response.

4.4.3 Direct communication between the RFF personnel and the flight crew during an
emergency does not necessarily involve speech only as the possible use of hand signals, in
particular at smaller airports, may be considered. Annex 2 — Rules of the Air, Appendix 1
contains standard emergency hand signals for emergency communication between the RFF
personnel and the cockpit and/or cabin crews of the incident aircraft

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