Chapter 1

Introduction and Review of Related Literature

The main argument of this paper is that using the natural moral law is unsound

because it is anchored on ambiguous notions of “natural” as illustrated by problems in

divine command theory, issues in mathematical computations, and normality in biology.

While these problems are discussed, ways to modify the natural moral law shall also be

given.

How important is the natural moral law? Philosophers and non-philosophers,

academics and non-academics, theists and atheists, still usually use some form of it in

everyday reasoning. People commonly say that something or some course of action is

good because it is natural, it agrees with nature, or it is according to human nature.

Conversely, something is bad because it is unnatural. This way of thinking, the natural

moral law, is employed to pass judgment on various important issues like euthanasia,

homosexuality, and human rights. To illustrate, euthanasia is bad because euthanasia is

killing, killing is against living, and living is natural. Homosexuality is immoral because

same-sex mating is against nature. Human rights should be upheld because it is human

nature that women and men are naturally equal just by being born women and men.

However, what does one really mean by “natural”? How do the different

meanings of “natural” affect the use of the natural moral law? The significance and

motivation of this paper lies in analyzing and clearing up this popular way of reasoning.

The three objectives in this paper are to examine how the natural moral law is

used to come up with ethical conclusions, to critique the most-widely used definitions of

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“natural,” and to suggest how the natural moral law can be modified in light of these

critiques.

By the end of this paper, answers should be given to the following three

questions: how does the natural moral law work, what are the possible definitions of

“natural” and the complications of each, and how can the natural moral law accommodate

these complications.

For the natural moral law to work, it needs a satisfactory definition of “natural.”

This paper is limited to the most widely-used conceptions of “natural”: as what God

wants, as what is found in nature, as what is usually or commonly found in nature, and as

what is normally found in nature.

Another reason why these characterizations of “natural” are chosen is because

they include deeply-entrenched and sometimes overseen issues in philosophy and

science. “Natural” as what God wants is made problematic by issues in divine command

theory. “Natural” as what is usually or commonly found in nature is made problematic by

issues in mathematical computations. “Natural” as what is normally found in nature is

made problematic by the concept of normality in biology.

Although specific ethical dilemmas will be used as examples and illustrations, this

paper is focused on the more fundamental method of how conclusions in these dilemmas

are generated and the complications of this method.

Before the thesis gets argued, it is useful to review the long history of the natural

moral law in philosophy.

2
 Review of Related Literature

From the ancient period, through the medieval and modern periods, up to the

contemporary period, several philosophers have contributed to the current understanding

of the natural moral law.

During ancient times, Diogenes of Sinope (a Cynic) and Aristotle taught that one

should do what is natural.

Information about Diogenes of Sinope, who was part of the ancient Greek school

of Cynicism, can be found in Diogenes Laërtius’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers.

According to Laërtius, Diogenes of Sinope preferred nature to convention (Lives of

Eminent Philosophers VI 38). He lived an impoverished life that was closer to nature as

opposed to what society dictated (Russell, 1961, p. 91). For instance, one day, upon

seeing a child drinking from his hands, Diogenes threw away the cup from his bag and

said: “A child has beaten me in the plainness of living” (Lives VI 38).

For Diogenes, man becomes happy by doing things according to nature (Lives VI

71). One specific example where he invoked nature was when he told an effeminate man

to not act like a woman because nature made him a man (Lives VI 65).

While Diogenes teaches that one should do what is according to nature, this

instruction needs elaboration. What is it to be according to nature?

Aristotle provides an answer by talking about the nature of man.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, he writes that what is good depends on function. One

can consider a flute player. The function of a flute player is to play the flute. A flute

player can be described as a good flute player if she can play the flute well. Thus,

whether she is good or not depends on her function—playing the flute. This analysis

3
proceeds similarly with sculptors, artists, and anything that has a function or activity

(1097b25-28).

One should now consider man. How can one say that man is good? It also

depends on his function (1097b28-29). What is his function? Just like how the function of

flute-playing is unique to someone who actually plays the flute, the function of man

should be unique to him. Aristotle first rules out growth and nutrition as man’s functions

because they are also common to plants. He, then, eliminates perception because it is also

common to other animals. What is unique to man is the rational principle or reasoning

(1097b34-1098a4). Thus, for a man to be called good, he has to be good at reasoning,

which is his function.

This function unique to man, his reason, is the basis for how something is natural

for man. Something is natural for man if it is rational. To be rational is the main

characteristic of human nature. Reason can also be said to be the essence of man. A

thing’s nature is its essence (Metaphysics 1029b14-15). Thus, reason is man’s main

function or essence or nature.

During medieval times, Thomas Aquinas considered the proposition “Man is a

rational being” as self-evident. For him, the most basic consideration of natural law is:

"good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided" (Sum I-II, 94, ii). Man is

naturally inclined to the good.

For Aquinas, the natural law participates in the eternal law of God (Sum I-II, 91,

ii). Thus, ultimately, what is natural is what God wants.

4
 During modern times, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke theorized about the state

of nature of man, that is, what man is like even before societies become established. In

the state of nature, man can be seen as how he naturally is.

For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war (Leviathan, xiii.8). In this state,

what is good is what man wants, and what is evil is what man does not want (Leviathan,

vi.7). Thus, it is natural for man to consider good what he wants and to consider evil what

he does not want.

Unlike Hobbes, Locke believes that the state of nature is not a state where

everyone can do anything they want. Because everyone in the state of nature is equal, no

one should harm another. It is natural for man to be equal to other men. The avoidance of

harm is especially true because man is God’s creature made for His pleasure and not for

the pleasure of other men (Second Treatise II.6).

During contemporary times, the natural moral law lives on as it is criticized

directly or indirectly by Bertrand Russell, Michel Foucault, Michael Moore, David Hull,

and developed by Philippa Foot.

In A History of Western Philosophy, Russell very briefly mentions his

disagreement with Aristotle’s conception of nature as “a source of much that was bad in

ethics. In the latter respect, it is still harmful” (1961, p. 205).

While Russell’s criticism is a starting comment, Foucault develops a substantial

criticism. He critiques certain so-called scientific truths as merely products of biases

possessed by different people who can wield power and control over others. For instance,

in Madness and Civilization, he analyzes the history of how someone can be diagnosed as

insane. In some ways, this diagnosis may reflect preferences of those who give the

5
diagnoses rather than indubitable scientific truth (1988). The importance of Foucault is

his contribution to an unearthing of potential biases in how people think, including in

what people think are natural.

The theistic nature of the natural moral law can also get critiqued. Moore, in his

essay, Good Without God, argues that the notion of a god does not help in establishing

objective moral properties, and is in fact, damaging to this endeavor. In particular, he

points out that basing morality on what a god wants is still making morality subjective to

someone (1996, p. 261). His argumentation may affect the discourse on natural moral law

given how theistic the famous Scholastic version is.

The most direct criticism comes from Hull. Hull, in his article, On Human Nature,

argues against the notion of human nature. He says that there is no significant

characteristic that can uniquely be found in one species and not found in other species

while at the same time, this unique characteristic is found in all members of that

particular species (1986, p. 6).

In addition, because of evolution, in any species, a rare characteristic now can be

common in the future. Conversely, what is common now can be rare in the future (1986,

p. 9).

Despite all the preceding criticism, Foot, in Natural Goodness, argues for a non-

theistic species-specific natural moral law where what is good for a species is based on

what would make that species flourish in nature (2001).

Through the years of the history of philosophy until the contemporary scene, the

natural moral law lives on in different philosophers’ works. Emmanuel Fernando, in Mga

Teorya ng Batas: Ang Pananaw ng Klasikong Etika at Agham Panlipunan, gives a useful

6
list of three characteristics of Classical natural moral law: (1) it is composed of objective,

unchanging bases of behavior, (2) these bases of behavior are true based on human

nature, and (3) these bases can be discovered via reasoning from and empirical

investigation of human nature (2002, p. 48). Reasoning and empirical evidences will be

used in this paper to examine the supposed objective, unchanging bases of the natural

moral law and the notion of human nature that supports it.

For this paper, usage of the natural moral law (NML) is illustrated using the

following argument form. Let x be any action or event.

Premise 1: If x is natural, then x is moral.

Premise 2: x is natural.

Conclusion: x is moral.

This form of argumentation, a modus ponens, provides a useful snapshot of how

people use the NML. Another advantage of framing NML usage in this manner is that the

relation of the premises with the conclusion can be more visibly exposed.

According to Copi, Cohen, and McMahon’s Introduction to Logic, a modus

ponens is composed of two premises and a conclusion. In the NML modus ponens, the

first premise is “If x is natural, then x is moral.” The second premise is “x is natural.” The

conclusion is “x is moral.” The first premise in a modus ponens has two parts: an

antecedent and a consequent. The if-phrase is the antecedent, and the then-phrase is the

consequent. In the first premise of the NML modus ponens, the antecedent is “If x is

natural.” The consequent is “then x is moral.”

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 “Modus ponens” is derived from the Latin ponere, which means “to affirm.” What

specifically are affirmed? The second premise affirms the antecedent, and the conclusion

affirms the consequent (2014, p. 284).

A modus ponens is a valid argument. In a valid argument, the conclusion must be

true if all the premises are true. That is, the truth of the premises compels the truth of the

conclusion. However, a valid argument may have a combination of true and false

premises and conclusions. A valid argument may have all its premises and conclusion

true, all its premises and conclusions false, or all its premises false and its conclusion

true. What is not permitted is a combination of true premises and a false conclusion.

These combinations are possible because validity is only concerned with the form of

argumentation. Form refers to the relationship among the premises and conclusion.

A concept related to validity is soundness. An argument is sound if it satisfies two

conditions: it is valid, and all the premises are true. Thus, an argument may be unsound

even if it is valid. In this case, at least one premise is false (2014, pp. 30-31).

In the next chapter, the NML modus ponens will be scrutinized, in particular, the

second premise regarding what makes something natural. This scrutiny will affect the

soundness of the NML modus ponens.

8
 Chapter 2

Definitions of “Natural”

and Their Implications on the Soundness of the Natural Moral Law

“Natural” needs to be clearly defined to avoid problems of ambiguity. When two

or more people use the NML, they may have different meanings of “natural” in mind. If

in the first place, the meaning of “natural” is clear, then misunderstanding can be avoided

among people conversing or arguing.

Misunderstanding from this ambiguous use of words is mentioned by John

Langshaw Austin in his article A Plea for Excuses. He discusses the snag of loose usage,

which, among other things, results when the usage of the same word differs (1956, p. 9).

A snag is an unexpected difficulty. The difficulty is misunderstanding. Usage is loose

because people engaged in a conversation should be careful not to be too loose with how

they convey meaning through the words they choose.

Not only can misunderstanding result inter-subjectively but also intra-

subjectively. Ambiguity can be involved within one person’s reasoning. This ambiguity

occurs when a person using the NML may think that her usage of “natural” in Premise 1

is the same as her usage of “natural” in Premise 2 of the NML modus ponens. When there

is an inconsistency of usage or meaning of a word in Premise 1 and in Premise 2, then a

fallacy of equivocation occurs (Copi, Cohen, & McMahon, 2014, p. 144).

To avoid these problems of ambiguity and misunderstanding, “natural” needs to

be defined. Another benefit of examining “natural” is that its truth or falsehood can be

evaluated.

9
 How true or false are certain definitions of “natural”? This issue affects the

soundness of the NML modus ponens. If a certain definition of “natural” is false making

Premise 2 false, then this falsity makes the NML unsound with this specific definition of

“natural.”

With these motivations for defining “natural,” what follows are the definitions

and the examinations of each.

What is natural is what God wants

The first definition to be considered is:

x is natural if x is what God wants. (N1)

This definition shall be labelled as natural-1 or N1, being the first definition

discussed. This definition is discussed first because the most influential NML philosopher

is Aquinas and his Aristotelian leaning. As such, part of the paradigmatic NML is that

God gives the natural law. This interpretation of Aquinas is by Mark Murphy in his

article The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics (2011, para. 15).

For Aquinas, the most natural thing is to do good and avoid evil. How can

someone know what is good from evil? Ultimately, the commandments of the Christian

God determine good and evil. What is good or moral is what God commands or wants.

According to Aquinas’s NML, for something to be moral, it has to be natural. Thus, what

is natural is what God wants. This interpretation that what is natural is set up by God is

not surprising considering that He supposedly created the universe. He made the universe

according to how He willed it to be like. God’s will is the same as eternal law (Sum I-II,

10
93, iv), and all laws, including the natural law, proceed from the eternal law (Sum I-II, 93,

iii).

Piers Benn in Ethics mentions that a morality that dictates good or bad according

to what a god says is termed “divine command theory” (1998, p. 47). This theory of

morality is “divine” because it comes from a divine god, and it is a “command” because

good and bad are commanded. On a stricter note, the divine command theory does not

explicitly say that what is natural is what is commanded by a god or the Christian God of

Aquinas. However, similar to the deductions that were made in the previous paragraph

using Aquinas, the same sort of equivalence between what is good and what is natural

will be employed here using the divine command theory instead. That is, according to the

NML, what is good is natural. If good is commanded by God, then natural is also

commanded by God. Thus, issues set forth by the divine command theory regarding God-

given good or bad can be used to assess God-given natural or unnatural from the aspect

of both being commanded by God.

If what is natural is commanded by God, then the specifics of how something can

be natural can be known from what God wants. Aquinas does give three general things

that are more specific than the call to do good and avoid evil. First, by virtue of humans

sharing a nature that is in common with all substances, people are naturally inclined to

self-preservation. Second, by virtue of humans sharing a nature in common with other

animals, people are naturally inclined to have sex, educate their offspring, and other

things. Third, by virtue of humans having reason that is unique to them, people are

naturally inclined to know about God and to live with others in a society (Sum I-II, 94, ii).

11
 The list above can still be more specific. For instance, the second one, the list of

natural inclinations by virtue of humans’ commonality with other animals, is an explicitly

incomplete list as presented in the Summa. Even the third list can raise questions, as in

how does one specifically know about God, and how does one specifically live with

others in a society.

To address the need for specificity, the Bible serves as a guide for Christians.

However, even the Bible needs interpretation. Did God really create the universe in

literally six days? “You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a female” (Leviticus

18:22). What does “lie” mean specifically? Do all Leviticus laws need to be obeyed?

What does it mean to say that Jesus Christ replaced the Old Testament Laws?

Interpretation is important in the Christian tradition. People spend decades in both

informal and formal education trying to study the Bible in the hopes of producing a

reasonable interpretation of it. The Roman Catholic institution continues to be engaged in

interpretation up to now for the application of Biblical teaching to specific moral issues.

The Magisterium is the authority of the Roman Catholic Church to give the final

interpretation of the Bible. This authority is possessed by the Pope and the bishops. The

term “Magisterium” is also used to refer to the Pope and bishops themselves. What they

say is what should be followed, even in the interpretation of the natural law (Catechism of

the Catholic Church, 2003, para. 85). The basis of this Magisterium comes from the

Bible:

"He who hears you, hears me; he who rejects you rejects me, he who rejects me,

rejects Him who sent me" (Luke 10:16).

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 In this passage, Jesus says that anyone who hears an apostle hears Him, and

anyone who rejects an apostle rejects Him. In other words, Jesus supposedly gave the

apostles authority to deliver His teaching. Peter is one of the original apostles and is the

first Pope or Bishop of Rome; all the subsequent Popes and bishops of the Roman

Catholic Church have this direct unbroken descent from Peter (Catechism of the Catholic

Church, 2003, para. 87).

Here lies a potential problem of circularity. The Bible needs interpretation. The

Pope and bishops are the official interpreters. However, the authority of the Pope and

bishops is based on the Bible, the book that needs interpretation in the first place. To

solve this issue, one needs to have faith—faith that what God says is good, faith that the

Bible truly is the Word of God, and faith that what the Pope and the bishops say are

congruent with what God and the Bible say.

The problem with faith is that one can have faith at just about anything and in just

about anyone. Faith in God, the Bible, and the Magisterium: faith as a means of knowing

what God wants and how something can be natural is a breeding ground for battles of

interpretation. This is the first problem of divine command theory in this paper: that of

faith as a means of knowing what God wants as good and natural.

Interpretation is controversial. Martin Luther ignited the Protestant Reformation

when he decided to separate from the Roman Catholic tradition. He disagreed with

important teachings of the Church, one of which is the sale of indulgences.

The problem of faith in interpreting what God says can be extended not only to

Martin Luther and Protestantism but also to other religions. Which god should one be

faithful to? Which god should matter? The choice of god matters for whichever specific

13
characterizations of good and natural are to be followed. Even generalities like “do not

kill” can have different specifications within and among different religions. There are

Muslims who will kill people for portraying Allah in certain ways. There are Muslims

who will attach bombs to their bodies to kill themselves and the people around them.

There are Muslims who are against these killings. The Crusades resulted to killings in the

name of the Christian God. Humans have been killing each other for the sake of their

gods’ conception of what is good and natural. The case of multiple religions is the second

problem of divine command theory as presented in this paper.

Then, there is the problem of atheists and agnostics. These people are hesitant to

accept the existence of any god and the morality that is supposed to come from a god.

The existence of God is an important question because if there is no God, then there is no

one to command anything. The existence of God is such an intractable problem. A theist

moralist who claims that God is the ultimate arbiter of good and natural needs proof that

God does indeed exist, with the properties of God that the theist claims. If the proof of

God’s existence is questionable, then the source of authority of the divine command

becomes questionable, especially if one’s faith is solely the ultimate assurance of God’s

existence. The case of atheism and God’s existence is the third problem of divine

command theory as presented in this paper.

Going back to the NML modus ponens:

Premise 1: If x is natural, then x is moral.

Premise 2: x is natural.

Conclusion: x is moral.

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 Substituting “natural” in the modus ponens with N1, “x is natural if x is what God

wants”:

Premise 1: If x is what God wants, then x is moral.

Premise 2: x is what God wants.

Conclusion: x is moral.

When two or more people are conversing, they need to clarify to each other what

God wants. The danger of not doing so is they might have a different list of things of

what God wants resulting to actually differing Premise 2s. As discussed, what God wants

may differ among people with different interpretations of their holy book, among people

of different religions, and among people who are not theists. These differences may be

the reason why even if two or more people use the same term “natural,” they can still

come up with dissimilar moral conclusions. Misunderstanding or Austin’s snag of loose

usage occurs.

From the three problems of divine command theory presented so far—faith as a

means of knowing and interpreting what God wants as good and natural, multiple

religions and different gods, and atheism and the assurance of God’s existence—a

common thread is faith. Faith is present in all three problems: one can use faith to know

what God wants, people with different religions have different faiths, and faith can be

used as an assurance of God’s existence.

Faith is not enough; reason should be used as well. One way of interpreting

Aquinas is that he is actually not advocating a divine command theory. That is, another

way of framing the relation between God and morality is that the reason why God wants

15
something is because that thing is already good. God commands x because x is good.

Translating to what is natural, God commands x because x is natural.

These two ways of conceptualizing the relationship between God and goodness is

expressed by the Euthyphro dilemma. Is something good because God wants it, or does

God want something because it is good? (Euthyphro 10a). This dilemma is named after

its source material, Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro.

To translate this dilemma closer to the NML, is something natural because God

wants it, or does God deem something as natural because it is truly natural? If something

is natural (and therefore good) because God commands it, then the three problems of

faith in divine command theory become relevant. On the other hand, if it is argued that

God only commands something because it is already natural or good, then a non-theistic

examination of the NML becomes even more relevant. It should not really matter if one

uses religious sources or not; one should be able to arrive at the correct conclusions about

morality using non-religious sources.

Is it unfair to advocate a search for morality using reason alone? What about

reason and faith combined together? The problem with this approach is the basis of such

a combination. How can one defend that an ethical approach based on reason and faith is

superior to an approach based on reason alone? If faith is used to defend the reason plus

faith approach, then there is still the problem of faith that can be given to anyone or

anything. Ultimately, faith with all its problems is still the foundation. If one uses reason

to defend the reason plus faith approach, then ultimately, reason and not faith is what

determines the foundation.

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 Because of the three disadvantages of using a faith-based definition of “natural,”

including the issue of the Euthyphro dilemma, what follows are possible non-theistic

definitions of “natural.”

What is natural is what is found in nature

The second definition to be considered is:

x is natural if x is found in nature. (N2)

What does it mean to say that something is found in nature? It would be prudent

to start with uncontroversial instances. Plants growing are found in nature; animals

growing are found in nature. Animals perceiving are found in nature. Animals mating,

taking care of their young, living with each other, and killing each other are also found in

nature. “Nature,” in the usage here, is a place where all these actions and events involving

plants and animals occur.

Can a similar analogy be made for humans? Can it be said that humans growing,

mating, taking care of their young, living with each other, and killing each other are also

found in nature? In the primitive sense of humans living in wild forests or in pre-

historical times, then it can be said that all these activities and events involving humans

are indeed found in nature. Hobbes has this conception of humans found in nature when

he speaks of pre-social contract times for humans. He mentions the different savage

peoples of America as an example of humans with no government (Leviathan, XIII.11).

However, when the social contract kicks in, can it be said that human activities of

growing, mating, taking care of their young, living with each other, and killing each other

are already not found in nature? For a more specific picture, one can consider

17