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Vision and Action Reinventing Schools Through

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 Charles M. REIGELUTH Jennifer R.
KARNOPP

VISION
AND
ACTION
Reinventing Schools Through
Personalized Competency-Based Education
Copyright © 2020 by Marzano Resources
Materials appearing here are copyrighted. With one exception, all rights are
reserved. Readers may reproduce only those pages marked “Reproducible.”
Otherwise, no part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means (electronic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise) without prior
written permission of the publisher and the authors.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Reigeluth, Charles M., author. | Karnopp, Jennifer, author.
Title: Vision and action : reinventing schools through personalized competency-
based education / Charles M. Reigeluth, Jennifer R. Karnopp.
Description: Bloomington, IN : Marzano Resources, 2020. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019040251 (print) | LCCN 2019040252 (ebook) | ISBN
9781943360185 (paperback) | ISBN 9781943360192 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Competency-based education--United States. | Individualized
instruction--United States. | Educational change--United States.
Classification: LCC LC1032 .R45 2020 (print) | LCC LC1032 (ebook) | DDC
371,39/4--dc23
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Production Team
President and Publisher: Douglas M. Rife
Associate Publisher: Sarah Payne-Mills
Art Director: Rian Anderson
Managing Production Editor: Kendra Slayton
Production Editor: Laurel Hecker
Content Development Specialist: Amy Rubenstein
Proofreader: Mark Hain
Cover Designer: Rian Anderson
Editorial Assistant: Sarah Ludwig
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Paul Jaeger and Layne Sherwood at
the Minnesota New Country School and Nikolaus Namba and Barry
Sommer of Lindsay Unified School District for their descriptions of
their respective school systems, which provide powerful examples of
personalized competency-based education.

Marzano Resources would like to thank the following reviewers:

Emily Batchelder
Assistant Principal
East Clayton Elementary School
Clayton, North Carolina

Jennifer Evans
Principal
Burnham School
Cicero, Illinois

Shanna Martin
Social Studies Teacher and Instructional Coach
Lomira Middle School
Lomira, Wisconsin

Brian Stack
Principal
Sanborn Regional High School
Kingston, New Hampshire

Chris Stogdill
Principal
Otte Blair Middle School
Blair, Nebraska
Visit MarzanoResources.com/reproducibles to
download the free reproducibles in this book.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Authors

Introduction
Why Transform to Personalized Competency-Based
Education?
What Is the Vision?
What Are the Actions?
What Are the Criticisms of PCBE?
How Is This Book Organized?

PART I: VISION

1 Competency-Based Education
Principles for Competency-Based Education
Detailed Guidance for Competency-Based Education
Summary

2 Learner-Centered Instruction
Principles for Learner-Centered Instruction
Detailed Guidance for Learner-Centered Instruction
Summary

3 Restructured Curriculum
 Principles for Restructured Curriculum
Detailed Guidance for Restructured Curriculum
Summary

4 New Roles
Principles for New Roles
Detailed Guidance for New Roles
Summary

5 A Nurturing Culture
Principles for a Nurturing Culture
Detailed Guidance for a Nurturing Culture
Summary

6 New Organizational Structures

Principles for New Organizational Structures
Detailed Guidance for New Organizational Structures
Common Problems With Visions
Summary

7 The Principles in Action

Case 1: The Minnesota New Country School
Case 2: Lindsay Unified School District

PART II: ACTION

8 Overview of the Change Process

 A Framework for Fundamental Change
The Scope of Your Change
Common Obstacles in the Transformation Process

9 Change Process for a District

Overview of Sequential Activities for the District Change
Process
Detailed Guidance for the Sequential Activities

10 Change Process for an Independent

School
Overview of Sequential Activities for the Independent
School Change Process
Detailed Guidance for the Sequential Activities

Epilogue: Transforming Education

Appendix A: Ideas for New Curricula

Appendix B: Helpful Resources for the

Vision
Organizations That Help With the Vision
Schools to Consider Visiting to See Their PCBE Visions
Implemented

Appendix C: District Readiness Criteria

Appendix D: Helpful Resources for the

Transformation Process
References and Resources

Index
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Charles M. Reigeluth, PhD, is professor emeritus at Indiana

University, Bloomington. He is a distinguished educational researcher
and consultant who focuses on paradigm change in education,
including the design of high-quality personalized competency-based
education, the design of technology systems to support such
education, and the process for transforming school systems to the
learner-centered paradigm of education. When he was sixteen years
old, he walked out of a classroom feeling disillusioned with his
educational experience and decided to dedicate his life to making
education more enjoyable and relevant to students’ lives. He taught
high school science for three years, was a professor in the
Instructional Systems Technology Department at Indiana University
for twenty-five years, and was chairman of the department for three
years. He facilitated a paradigm change effort in the Decatur
Township Schools in Indianapolis for eleven years to advance
knowledge about how to help school systems to transform. He has
devoted forty years to advancing knowledge about both what a
school system should be like to better meet students’ needs and
interests and how to help school systems to transform to such a
different paradigm of education. He is internationally known for his
work on instructional methods and theories.
Charles has been a long-time member of the American
Educational Research Association (AERA), Association for Educational
Communications and Technology (AECT), Association for Supervision
and Curriculum Development, Phi Delta Kappa, and the Aurora
Institute. He received the Honored Alumnus award from Brigham
Young University’s School of Education and the Distinguished Service
award from AECT, where he founded the Division for Systemic
Thinking and Change. He has published twelve books and almost
two hundred journal articles and book chapters on those subjects,
and six of his books received outstanding book of the year awards
from AECT. He also received seven awards for outstanding journal
article or book chapter from AERA, AECT, and International Society
for Performance Improvement. His books include Reinventing
Schools: It’s Time to Break the Mold (2013) and Instructional-Design
Theories and Models, Volume IV: The Learner-Centered Paradigm of
Education (2017). He has given keynote addresses to a variety of
organizations around the world, including the National School Boards
Association and the International Conference on Media in Education
in Japan.
Charles received a bachelor’s degree in economics from Harvard
University and a doctorate in instructional psychology from Brigham
Young University.
Visit www.reigeluth.net or www.reinventingschools.net to learn
more about Reigeluth’s work.
Jennifer Karnopp is completing a PhD in education leadership and
policy studies at Indiana University, Bloomington. Her dissertation
examines the implementation of a districtwide change initiative in a
rural context. Her experience as founding principal of a small,
independent charter school in New Hampshire, which provided a
personalized, competency-based learning experience to students in
grades K–8, inspired Jennifer to earn her doctorate to better support
other communities as well as policymakers in their efforts to engage
in student-centered change. Igniting the curiosity of children through
quality learning experiences has been the driving force behind
Jennifer’s varied career in education. For over twenty years she has
worked in a variety of traditional and nontraditional learning
environments, from developing and providing educational
programing through children’s museums, to being a classroom
teacher in traditional public and charter school classrooms, to
working as a special educator. She also developed curriculum and
training experiences for early childhood educators across the country
through a curriculum development and training company that she
founded.
Jennifer is the coauthor of Reinventing Schools: It’s Time to
Break the Mold (2013). She is also the author of three books
designed to help early childhood educators create child-centered
learning environments: Focus on Babies, Focus on Toddlers, and
Family Child Care Basics.
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mediation, and prevailed on the disputants to accept the terms which
she offered. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau (8 Nov. 1785) the Emperor
agreed to waive his exorbitant claims in consideration of the payment
of 15,000,000 florins, for the half of which sum the Court of Versailles
became responsible. That so heavily burdened a State should add to
its financial difficulties excited some surprise; but in the political sphere
Vergennes gained a signal triumph. By becoming paymaster to
Joseph, he kept that wayward ruler in French leading strings; and, by
saving Maestricht and the Scheldt navigation to the Dutch, he ensured
the supremacy of France in that land. This compact was followed two
days later by a Franco-Dutch treaty of alliance whereby the Court of
Versailles guaranteed the possessions of the United Provinces; and
each of the two States undertook to furnish ships and men to the other
442
in case of attack.
Meanwhile Pitt awoke to a sense of the danger, and urged Harris
to use his utmost endeavours (short of an open breach with France) to
prevent the ratification of the treaty by the United Provinces. All that
the envoy could do was to present to the States General at The Hague
a Memorial declaring the continued interest taken by England in the
affairs of the Republic. But of what avail was this academic statement
without a conditional and secret offer of armed support, which
everybody knew France would give rather than forego her triumph?
Again, early in December, Pitt warned Carmarthen that Harris should
“redouble every possible effort” to prevent the Franco-Dutch
443
alliance. This was merely to bid him fight with his hands tied.
France now held a most commanding position in Europe. By the
new compacts she influenced Hapsburg policy, she forced Frederick
the Great into almost abject deference, she allured Catharine, and she
controlled the Dutch Netherlands. This last triumph crowned the life-
work of Vergennes. The recent treaties relieved him from the
disagreeable alternative of choosing between Austria and the United
Provinces in case of a rupture. They emphasized the isolation of
England. Above all, they prepared the way for joint action of the
French and Dutch East India Companies which might prove to be fatal
444
to British ascendancy in India.
 The meagre correspondence of Pitt at this time contains scarcely a
reference to this very serious crisis. His letters turn mainly on finance,
Irish affairs, and domestic topics such as the purchase of Holwood. On
the Dutch problem there is not a word except the curiously curt
reference in his letter of October 6 to Grenville: “I have written to Lord
445
Carmarthen on the Dutch business much as you seem to wish.”
The phrase is interesting as marking the commencement of the
influence which Grenville was soon to gain over Pitt in foreign affairs;
but its nonchalance is astounding. In part, no doubt, the passivity of
the Prime Minister resulted from the determination of George III to hold
aloof as King of England from all complications, however much, as
Elector of Hanover, he might irritate Austria and Russia. As we shall
see in the next chapter, George was beginning to be alarmed at the
growing expenses of his family, and viewed the Dutch crisis mainly as
involving burdensome demands on the Civil List. Here, then, as at so
many points in his career, Pitt was handicapped by the King.
But it is also probable that in the disappointing year 1785, marked
by the failure of his Reform and Irish measures, he suppressed the
concern which he must have felt at the deepening isolation of England.
We must remember that he had formed a resolve to play a waiting
game in foreign affairs. On August 8 he wrote to the Duke of Rutland
that, if the commercial treaty with Ireland became law, and peace
lasted for five years, England would be able to look any Power in
446
Europe in the face. That explains why he tied the hands of Harris at
The Hague and sent to Berlin overtures so cautious as to be received
with polite disdain. His great aim was to lessen the National Debt; and
the year 1785, with all its disappointments, witnessed a most
extraordinary rise in Consols, viz. from 54¼ to 73½. There was the
strength of England’s position. If she reduced her debt, while all the
Continental Powers were ruinously increasing theirs, she must have
the advantage when turmoil ended in war.
Pitt therefore adopted a policy of delay. So long as he could
strengthen the navy, maintain the army at the ordinary peace footing,
and enhance the nation’s credit, he was content to bide his time,
leaving Harris to combat French influence in Holland as best he
447
could. Such a policy was very far from brilliant; and, had not France
in the next two years entered on a period of rapid decline, he might be
censured for tamely waiting on events. For it is possible that a bold
initiative at Whitehall in October, while Vergennes’ Dutch treaties were
taking shape, might have gained active support either from Prussia or
from Joseph II, who had been on very cool terms with France. Pitt,
however, preferred to hold back, even though the Bourbons gained
control of the United Provinces. By his passivity in face of that
diplomatic disaster we may measure his devotion to the cause of
peace. And just as Queen Elizabeth often reassured her people at the
gravest crisis by displays of frivolity, so too Pitt’s absorption in tree
planting at Holwood may have been a device for hiding his anxiety,
reassuring the public, and preventing a fall in the Funds.
Serene hopefulness in the future of his country is a strong feature
in the character of this great man; and we shall find occasions when he
displayed this quality to excess. Certain it is that he never lost hope or
relaxed his energies, even now, when Ministers and envoys evinced
signs of gloom or despair. A proof of the prevalence of these feelings
appears in one of the closing passages of a Memorandum which the
Duke of Richmond, Master of the Ordnance, on 30th December 1785,
sent to his colleague, Carmarthen. It was written owing to a singular
circumstance, which reveals the impulsiveness of Pitt. The Duke had
almost casually suggested the desirability of recovering some foothold
in the Dutch Netherlands by inducing them to propose to include
England in their recent treaty with France. This hint, which the Duke
threw out in conversation, was at once taken up by Pitt, who, without
consulting the Cabinet, urged Carmarthen to take steps to carry it into
effect, and suggested that one of the Patriots might be bribed to make
the proposal of including England, as if it were to test the sincerity of
her offers of friendship. Of course the matter came to nothing; but the
surprise of the Duke at Pitt’s speedy adoption of the hint led him to
descant on our isolation, and to harp on the well-worn theme of an
alliance with Austria:—

Goodwood, December 30, 1785.

... If the Emperor and France keep well together, Leghorn will
448
be also an inimical port, as may Algiers and Marocco if their
treaties with Spain go on. Holland seems lost to us both in Europe
 and the East Indies; and should the Emperor and Russia unite
with France, Sweden must follow, and Denmark dare not be our
friend. Under such circumstances what are we to look for but utter
ruin! If France is disengaged on the Continent and assisted by
Spain, Holland and Russia (to say nothing of America), we must
be attacked with greatly superior forces in the East and West
Indies and perhaps in Canada; but, what is still worse, we shall
undoubtedly have the war brought into Ireland, and I very much
doubt whether we can by any means avoid that country being
divided, and a large part acting against us. If any of these points of
attack succeed, and above all, if our navy should meet with any
disaster from superior forces, the next step will be to bring the war
into this country, and the best issue of such an event must be
attended with much distress. In short, the natural and political
advantages of France are such that I very much fear the
consequences. To divert her attention by stirring up some powerful
enemy on the Continent has been long and universally considered
as our only resource, and yet unfortunately we seem to be
obstructing the only Power capable of creating that diversion,
449
which is the Emperor....

It was amidst fears so intense and prejudices so deep-seated that

Pitt undertook the negotiations for a friendly commercial treaty with
France which is the chief event of the year 1786.
 CHAPTER XIV
L’ENTENTE CORDIALE

(1786)

Thy father’s fame with thine fair Truth shall blend.

His vigour saved from foreign foes the land,
Thy prudence makes each foreign foe a friend.
Rev. W. Mason to Pitt, 1786.

T HE nation is but the family writ large; and, just as families after a
ruinous quarrel sometimes win their way back towards prudence
and friendliness, so too nations now and again feel the force of the
sociable instincts. Such a time was now at hand for Great Britain and
France. The eight years of the American War of Independence had
450
increased the debt of the Island Power by £115,000,000; and so
wasteful had been the conduct of the war by France that in the years
1778–1783, she had exceeded the total of her already large peace
451
expenditure by £66,000,000. Further, as that struggle brought to her
few results beyond the satisfaction of rending the British Empire in
twain, she was scarcely the better for it. In truth, while defeat led
patriotic Britons to tread the humble paths of retrenchment and reform,
the triumph of France allured her politicians into the stately avenues
ending in bankruptcy and Revolution.
During the period of war, philosophy, science, and industry had
been waging their peaceful campaigns; and now in the exhaustion or
quiescence which beset both peoples, the still small voice of reason
was heard. The responsiveness of thought in England and France is
one of the most remarkable facts in the eighteenth century. Though
political rivalry had five times over embroiled those peoples in deadly
strife, yet their thinkers had never ceased to feel the thrill of
sympathetic ideas, originated by “the natural enemy,” which proved to
be no less potent than the divulsive forces of statecraft. The
Marconigrams of thought pass through storms, whether atmospheric or
political; and it may be that finally the nations will become sounding-
boards responding more and more to progressive ideas, and less and
less to the passions of mankind.
Certainly the mental sympathy of England and France in that
century was strongly marked. As is well known, the philosophy of
Locke supplied Voltaire and Rousseau with most of the weapons of
their intellectual armoury. From the English constitution Montesquieu
drew many of the contentions which lend significance to his Esprit des
Lois. The ideas of naturalism and sensibility were wafted hither from
the garner of Rousseau. Philanthropy became a force in both lands
about the same time but in diverse ways. In France it was in the main
anti-clerical, springing from the indignant protests of Voltaire against
atrocities such as that inflicted by the Church on Calas. In this land it
may be traced to the Wesleyan revival, the motive which impelled
Howard, Clarkson, and Wilberforce being distinctly religious.
On a lower plane we notice the immense vogue of English
fashions in France, and of French modes in England. Grands
seigneurs sought to copy our field sports, swathed themselves in
English redingotes, and rose in the stirrups à l’Anglaise. The Duc de
Chartres (the future Philippe Egalité) set the rage for English ways and
fabrics, so that French industries seriously suffered. In 1785 the
French Minister complained to our envoy that French draperies could
452
not be sold unless they looked like English stuffs. Britons returned
the compliment. They swarmed into France. We find our envoy
complaining that English families were settling in every French town,
so that it might be well to devise an absentee tax which would drive
453
them homewards.
But no influence helped on the new cosmopolitanism so much as
the spread of ideas of Free Trade. Here the honours lie with French
thinkers. It was by residence in France and contact with the
Economistes, Quesnay and Turgot, that Adam Smith was able to
formulate the ideas soon to be embodied in the “Wealth of Nations.”
Here we may note a curious paradox. The practical islanders supplied
their neighbours with political ideas which, when barbed by Voltaire
and Rousseau, did much to gall France into violent action. On the
other hand, the more nimble-witted people gave to its trading rival the
fiscal principles (neglected at home) which furthered the extension of
its commerce. Venomous use might be made of this contrast by that
fast diminishing band of Anglophobes who see in all British actions
perfidious attempts to ruin France; but it must be remembered that
everything depends on the men who introduce and apply the new
ideas, and that, whereas France was unfortunate in the men who
promulgated and worked the political principles learnt in England, the
islanders on the contrary had the wisest of counsellors. Contrast
Voltaire, Rousseau, and Robespierre with Adam Smith and Pitt, and
the riddle is solved at once.
Amidst the exhaustion of war, both nations were now ready to
listen to all that was most convincing in the arguments of the
Economistes and of Adam Smith. These exponents of the nascent
science of Economics rendered a memorable service to the cause of
peace by urging nations, like sensible traders, to rejoice in the
prosperity of their neighbours, not in their poverty. Propinquity, said
they, should be an incentive to free intercourse, not to hatred. Adam
Smith pointed out in his “Wealth of Nations” (1776) that France could
offer us a market eight times as populous as that of our North
American colonies, and twenty-four times as advantageous if the
frequency of the returns were reckoned. The British market, he said,
would be equally profitable to France. He laughed to scorn the notion
that France would always drain Great Britain of her specie, and
showed that the worship of the “balance of trade” was accountable for
454
much folly and bloodshed. It is difficult to say whether these views
had much hold on the English people. If we may judge from the
passions aroused by Pitt’s Irish Resolutions, it was slight. On the other
hand the absence of any vehement opposition to the commercial treaty
with France a year later, shows either that public opinion here was
moving forwards, or that the Opposition felt it impossible to bring to
bear on the absolute government of Louis XVI those irritating
arguments which had had so potent an influence on the Irish people.
 The influence of the Economistes in France probably did not count
for very much. But they had shown their power during the brief but
beneficent ministry of Turgot; and even when Marie Antoinette
procured the dismissal of that able but austere Minister, one of his
disciples remained in office, and was now Minister of Foreign Affairs.
This was Vergennes. Few men at that time did more for the cause of
human brotherhood than this man, whom Carlyle described as “solid
phlegmatic ... like some dull punctual clerk.” A man’s importance
depends, after all, not so much on external brilliance as on the worth of
his achievements; a statesman who largely decided the Franco-
American alliance, the terms of peace in 1783, and the resumption of
friendly relations with England, need not fear the verdict of history. In a
little known fragment written in April 1776, Vergennes thus outlines an
intelligent policy:

Wise and happy will that nation be which will be the first to
adapt its policy to the new circumstances of the age, and to
consent to see in its colonies nothing more than allied provinces
and no longer subject States of the mother-land. Wise and happy
will that nation be which is the first to be convinced that
commercial policy consists wholly in employing lands in the way
most advantageous for the owners, also the arms of the people in
the most useful way, that is, as self-interest will enjoin if there is no
coercion; and that all the rest is only illusion and vanity. When the
total separation of America [from Great Britain] has forced
everybody to recognize this truth and weaned the European
nations from commercial jealousy, it will remove one important
cause of war, and it is difficult not to desire an event which ought
455
to bring this boon to the human race.

Two years later, when France drew the sword on behalf of the
Americans, Britons naturally scoffed at these philanthropic
pretensions. The conduct of her Court and nobles was certainly open
to the charge of hypocrisy, especially when Louis XVI issued the
ordinance of 1781 restricting the higher commissions in his army to
those nobles who could show sixteen quarters of nobility. Singular,
indeed, to battle for democracy in the new world and yet draw tighter
the bands of privilege in France! Yet Vergennes, Necker, and other
friends of reform were not responsible for this regal folly; and they
were doubtless sincere in hoping that the downfall of England’s
colonial system would inaugurate a new era in the politics and
commerce of the world.
A proof of the sincerity of Vergennes is to be found in the 18th
Article of the Treaty of Versailles (1783), which stipulated that,
immediately after the ratification of the treaty, commissioners should
be appointed to prepare new commercial arrangements between the
two nations “on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, which
arrangements are to be terminated and concluded within the space of
two years from the 1st of January 1784.” For this clause Lords
Shelburne and Grantham on the British side were chiefly responsible;
456
and it is certain that the former warmly approved it. Pitt, as
Chancellor of the Exchequer in that Ministry, doubtless also welcomed
the proposal; but I have found no sign of his opinions on the subject.
The credit for this enlightened proposal may probably be assigned to
Vergennes, seeing that he dictated terms, while the British Cabinet
accepted them. There is a ring of sincerity in his words written on 1st
February 1783 to de Rayneval, then his diplomatic agent in London: “It
is an old prejudice, which I do not share, that there is a natural
incompatibility between these two peoples.... Every nation must strive
for the utmost prosperity; but this cannot be based on exclusiveness,
otherwise it would be a nullity. One does not get rich from very poor
457
nations.” This seems to be an echo of Adam Smith’s dictum: “A
nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to
do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial
458
nations.”
Statesmen on this side of the Channel were slower than their rivals
in seeking to realize these enlightened aims. The fall of Shelburne’s
Ministry and the triumph of the Fox-North Coalition led to no important
change in the Treaty, which was signed at Versailles in September
1783; but the commercial treaty was shelved for the present. With all
his enlightenment in matters political, Fox had a limited outlook in the
commercial sphere. He held the old Whig views, which for wellnigh a
century had been narrowly national and mercantilist. Further, he hotly
contested the claim put forward by the French Government to consider
all trading arrangements at an end, including those of the Treaty of
Utrecht, if no arrangement were formed before the end of the year
459
1785.
Such was the state of things when Pitt and Carmarthen took office
at the close of the year 1783. The events described in the previous
chapter will have enabled the reader to understand the need of great
caution on the part of Pitt. Though the language of Vergennes was
redolent of human brotherhood, his actions were often shrewdly
diplomatic. In the United Provinces, as we have seen, his policy wore a
twofold aspect. While supporting the Patriots, he claimed to be
supporting the cause of democracy, but he also dealt a blow at British
influence. Though he maintained the Austrian alliance, he coquetted
with Prussia; and, while dallying with the Czarina in order to keep out
England, he made a profitable bargain with Russia’s enemy, Sweden,
respecting Gothenburg. Thus on all sides he advanced the cause of
enlightenment and the interests of France.
It is not surprising that this dextrous union of philosophy and
statecraft (which resembles that by which Napoleon utilized
Rousseau’s advocacy of natural boundaries) earned the hatred of
nearly every Briton. Carmarthen and Harris were deeply imbued with
these feelings; and it is certain that Pitt, while taking the outstretched
hand of Vergennes, half expected a dagger-thrust. We find Grenville
writing to Carmarthen on 25th February 1785 concerning a plan, which
Pitt had formed, for provisionally buying over a Mr. D. S. M. at Paris to
send confidential news, especially respecting the plans and
movements of the French in the East Indies. He was to receive 60
guineas a month for news sent to Daniel Hailes, Secretary at the
British Embassy, and 250 guineas at the end of three months if his
460
information gave satisfaction. Other items make if clear that Pitt
viewed with concern the activity of France in the East. The formation of
a French East India Company in March 1785 was a threatening
461
sign; and in the summer came a report from Sir Robert Ainslie,
British ambassador at Constantinople, that France was intriguing to
gain a foothold in Egypt on the Red Sea. Part of his despatch of 23rd
July 1785 is worth quoting:
 ... The Porte has varied in her general opposition to
establishing a trade through Egypt, by opening the navigation of
the Red Sea to the flag of Christian Powers. The present
undertaking and the late French mission to Cairo was in
consequence of a plan devised by the late French ambassador to
ruin our East India Company by an illicit trade under the protection
of France, in which it was thought the Company’s servants would
join most heartily. It is clear that France adopted this scheme, but I
can pledge myself the Porte was not consulted and that she will
never protect a project by far more dangerous to her own interests
than even to ours. It seems Count Priest hoped to elude the
Ottoman bad humour by employing the navigation of the flags of
all Christian Powers indiscriminately and to secure his trade by the
protection of the Beys of Egypt, who certainly have aimed at
462
absolute independence ever since the time of Ali Bey.

The correspondence of Sir James Harris with Carmarthen shows

that our Ministry kept a watchful eye on any symptoms which
portended a union of the Dutch East India Company with that of
France. Indeed, as we shall see, the reasons which prompted the
resolute action of Pitt at the crisis of 1787 in Holland were largely
based on naval and colonial considerations. Matters in the East were
in an uneasy state. Once again, in January 1786, Hailes reported that
the unsettled state of Egypt was known to be attracting the notice of
463
the French Foreign Office, probably with a view to conquest. The
efforts which France put forth in 1785–6 for the construction of a great
naval fortress at Cherbourg also claimed attention; and Britons were
not calmed by the philosophic reflections of some peace-loving Gauls
that the completion of that mighty harbour would render it impossible
for England to make war on France.

* * * * *
In view of the lowering political horizon, is it surprising that Pitt was
very cautious in responding to the proposals of the French Cabinet for
a friendly commercial treaty? It is incorrect to say, as Harris did in a
rather peevish outburst, that Pitt was too occupied with Parliament to
 464
attend to foreign affairs. We now know that he paid much attention
to them, though the pressing problems of finance, India, Ireland, and
Reform perforce held the first place in his thoughts. But he must have
desired to gain a clearer insight into a very complex situation before he
465
committed his country to a commercial treaty with France. To have
done so prematurely might have prevented the formation of that closer
political union with Russia and Austria which British statesmen long
and vainly struggled to effect.
But another motive probably weighed even more with Pitt in favour
of delay. We have seen how fondly and tenaciously he clung to the
hope of a commercial union between Great Britain and Ireland through
the session of 1785. Surely it was of prime importance to complete the
fiscal system of the British Islands before he entered into negotiations
with a foreign Power. To have hurried on the French commercial treaty
before that with Ireland was concluded would have been a grave
tactical error. As a firm economic unit, Great Britain and Ireland could
hope for far better terms from France than as separate entities; and
this consideration almost certainly supplies the reason for Pitt’s
extreme anxiety to assure the industrial unity of these islands before
he began to bargain with France; while it may also explain the desire
of Vergennes to press on the negotiation before the British Islands had
acquired fiscal solidarity. In fine, everything conspired to impose on Pitt
a passive attitude. Vergennes, as the victor, could propose terms; Pitt,
representing the beaten Power, could only await them. Such was the
situation in 1784–5. An autocracy founded on privilege seemed to be
threatening our political existence, and yet made commercial
proposals which might have come from Adam Smith himself.
The British Government responded to them very slowly. In the
spring of 1784 it appointed George Craufurd to act as our
commissioner at Versailles for the drafting of a commercial
arrangement, as was required by the treaty of 1783; but he did not
receive his instructions until September. Rayneval, who had the full
confidence of Vergennes, was the French commissioner; and at their
first interview he asked that the principle of reciprocity should form the
basis of the negotiations. To this the British Court demurred, and the
affair remained in suspense for some months. On 3rd March 1785
Craufurd wrote to Carmarthen that he was still waiting for replies to his
notes of 30th September and 25th November, and that Vergennes had
repeatedly expressed to the Duke of Dorset, the British ambassador,
his annoyance at the loss of time. His resentment had recently taken a
tangible form; he had issued an ordinance (arrêt) imposing a tax of
sixty per cent on all carriages imported from the United Kingdom. This
action led Carmarthen to break his long silence on commercial matters
and to protest against the tax as tending to “prevent that spirit of
conciliation or friendly liberality so necessary at this time to produce
any good effect for those commercial arrangements now in
466
contemplation.” He also hinted that Great Britain might with perfect
justice retaliate. Further, he repudiated the French claim, once again
raised, that all commercial arrangements would lapse by the end of
1785, and maintained that the Treaty of Utrecht would afterwards
equally be in force. After further delays Rayneval demanded that there
should be absolute reciprocity in their commercial dealings, the basis
of the most favoured nation being adopted where it did not infringe
existing treaties. To this Carmarthen sent the following reply on 5th
August:

Mutual benefits and reciprocal advantages are indisputably the

objects we are inclined to pursue in the adjustment of this
business; but to say at once that the two nations shall be entitled
to those privileges which are alone allowed to the most favoured
nations, by way of a basis to the negotiation and without weighing
the nature and consequence of such privileges is totally
impossible; and of this I think M. de Rayneval must be convinced
when he recollects that it was a stipulation of this sort contained in
the 8th and 9th articles of the Treaty of Commerce of Utrecht in
1713 that prevented those articles from ever being carried into
467
effect.

Considering that reciprocity and the most favoured nation

treatment had been urged by Rayneval at his first interview with
Craufurd in September 1784, it is difficult to see why Carmarthen felt
flurried by the present proposal.
 Meanwhile Vergennes had struck another heavy blow. He issued
an arrêt forbidding foreigners to share in the French trade to the
Barbary States, and on 10th July he prohibited the import of foreign
cottons, muslins, gauzes, and linens into France. At once there arose
a cry of distress and rage throughout Great Britain; and Carmarthen
sent an energetic remonstrance against this further proof of the ill-
humour of the French Government. Hailes at once informed him that
the two arrêts had “been suspended with more forbearance than could
reasonably have been expected, considering the detriment French
manufactures have sustained, and the great advantage we have
derived from the balance of trade being so much and so long in our
favour. People in general think that this strong measure will hasten the
468
conclusion of an arrangement between us.” Vergennes soon
assured Hailes of his desire for a friendly arrangement, but he added
that meanwhile the French Government had to look to its own needs
and stop the enormous influx of British goods, for which the French
public clamoured. Commerce and finance were then the chief care of
the French Government. On 25th August Hailes reported the pains
secretly taken by the French to attract skilled English workmen. On
22nd September Craufurd stated that further disagreeable events
would happen unless some progress were made with the commercial
treaty; Rayneval observed that, if we objected to reciprocity and the
most favoured nation basis, it was for us to make a proposal. On 21st
October Vergennes issued another unfriendly arrêt prohibiting the
import of iron, steel, and cutlery; but Hailes continued to assure
Carmarthen that Vergennes and Rayneval were anxious for a final
settlement and that the arrêts were “meant to stimulate us to a
469
conclusion of the commercial treaty as soon as possible.”
Pitt now began to bestir himself on this matter. In order to have at
Paris a commissioner abler, or more acceptable, than Craufurd seems
to have been, he made overtures to William Eden (the future Lord
Auckland) with a view to his acting as special commissioner in his
place. In the Auckland Papers at the British Museum there is an
unpublished letter of Pitt to Eden, dated Brighthelmstone, 16th October
1785, in answer to one in which Eden had hinted that he would prefer
the Speakership of the House of Commons, as Cornwall “obviously
470
suffered while in the chair.” Pitt’s reply is as follows:
 It gives me great satisfaction to find that there remains no
obstacle to your acceptance of either of the situations mentioned
in my letter to Mr. Beresford, and that nothing seems left to settle
but the mode of carrying such an arrangement into effect. I
confess I am not aware of any means which could properly be
taken to induce the Speaker to retire at present; and therefore in
the interval I should very much wish to accelerate the execution of
471
the other idea.

Pitt then refers to some difficulties which make it desirable to defer

the actual appointment until the session had begun. He suggests
conferences, especially as in a fortnight he would be nearer to Eden.
All this bespeaks a degree of nonchalance quite remarkable
considering the importance of the questions at stake. Everything tends
to show that Pitt felt far less interest in this negotiation than in that with
Ireland, to which he had very properly given the first place. The effort
to free trade between the two islands having now failed, there was no
reason for further postponing the discussions with France.
Such seems to me the reasonable way of explaining his
procedure. The contention of the French historian of this treaty, that
Pitt was opposed to the commercial arrangement with France, and
472
was only forced into it by the hostile arrêts, is untenable. He
maintains that it was the last arrêt, that of 21st October, which brought
Pitt to his senses—“Mr. Pitt, who did not then wish for war,
surrendered.” This phrase reveals the prejudice of the writer, who,
publishing his work at the time of Cobden’s negotiations with Napoleon
III, obviously set himself to prove that Free Trade was French both in
the origin of the idea and in the carrying out in practice by statesmen.
Passing over these claims, we should remember that Pitt had made
his first overtures to Eden in the first week in October, some ten days
before the appearance of the arrêt, which, in Butenval’s version,
compelled him to “surrender.”
Pitt acted with much circumspection. He urged Eden to collect
information on trade matters; but it seems that not until December did
473
the new Council of Trade set on foot any official inquiries. Perhaps
the Irish negotiation, which was hurried on too fast, had given him
pause. Meanwhile, however, France had gained another success by
imposing her mediation on the Emperor Joseph II and the Dutch
Government and settling the disputes between them. As appeared in
the previous chapter, this treaty led to the conclusion of an alliance
(10th November 1785) both political and commercial, with the United
Provinces, which emphasized the isolation of England and secured the
Dutch markets for France. Thus the delay in meeting the advances of
Vergennes had been doubly prejudicial to British interests, and it must
be confessed that Pitt’s début in European diplomacy was far from
brilliant.
If, however, we look into details, we find that Carmarthen
hampered the negotiations at the outset by refusing to accept the
“most favoured nation” basis of negotiation, and by throwing on France
the responsibility for not proposing some “practicable” scheme. On
14th October 1785 he wrote to Hailes that Great Britain very much
desired a commercial treaty with France, and was waiting for “specific
proposals” from her; and again, on 4th November, that matters
seemed hopeless, owing to Rayneval’s obstinate adherence to his
474
original scheme. This pedantic conduct was fast enclosing the
whole affair in a vicious circle. Meanwhile the sands of time were
running out: and it seemed that England would be left friendless and at
the mercy of any commercial arrangement which France chose to
enforce after the close of the year. It is strange that Pitt did not insist
on the furtherance of a matter which he judged to be “of great national
475
importance.” But his only step for the present was to write a letter,
signed by Carmarthen, asking for an extension of time beyond the end
of that year. In reply Vergennes expressed the satisfaction of Louis XVI
that Great Britain was seriously desirous of framing a commercial
476
treaty and granted six months’ extension of time. A year was finally
granted.
Notwithstanding this further proof of Vergennes’ good will, the
negotiation began under conditions so unfavourable to Great Britain as
to call for a skilled negotiator; but the career of William Eden warranted
the hope that he would bear the burden of responsibility triumphantly.
Born in 1744, and educated at Eton and Christchurch, he early showed
marked abilities, which were sharpened by practice at the Bar. He also
devoted his attention to social and economic questions; and when, in
1780, he became Chief Secretary for Ireland under the Earl of Carlisle,
he did much to promote the prosperity of that land, especially by
helping to found the Bank of Ireland. He took keen interest in the
treatment of prisoners, and proposed to substitute hard labour for
transportation. The reform of the penal laws also engaged his
attention. He had long been attached to Lord North’s party, though his
views were more progressive than theirs. By his marriage with the
sister of Sir Gilbert Elliot he came into touch with the Whigs; and,
though his petulant conduct in 1782 with regard to the resignation of
the lord-lieutenancy by Carlisle caused general annoyance, he was
largely instrumental in bringing about the Fox-North Coalition.
Consistency sat lightly upon Eden; and when, in 1785, he hotly
opposed Pitt’s Irish proposals, similar in effect to his own of some
years earlier, he was roundly abused by one of his friends for his
477
factiousness. The same correspondent soon had cause to upbraid
him still further for his conduct in the autumn of 1785, when, leaving
the Opposition, he went over to the Government side in order to act as
special commissioner at Paris. The Duke of Portland coldly
commended him for placing country above party; but the many saw in
the move only enlightened self-interest and felt no confidence in him.
Wraxall expressed the prevalent opinion when he said that there
“existed in Eden’s physiognomy, even in his manner and deportment,
something which did not convey the impression of plain dealing or
478
inspire confidence.”
Undoubtedly Eden was the ablest negotiator whom Pitt could have
chosen for a difficult commercial bargain; Wedgwood at once wrote to
say that he would have been his choice; and the remarks as to Pitt
filching away a prominent member of the Opposition are clearly
prompted by spite. After hearing much evidence on commercial
matters at the Committee of Council, Eden set out for Paris at the end
of March 1786, and was welcomed by Vergennes as a kindred soul.
The Duke of Dorset was somewhat offended at his coming, and held
aloof. Fortunately he found it desirable to take a long holiday in
England, during which time the affairs of the embassy were ably
carried on by Eden and Hailes. A popular song of the day referred to
this in the lines:
 For Dorset at cricket can play
And leave Billy Eden in France, sir.

Dorset’s services were, in fact, mainly social. He was liked by

Marie Antoinette; and his thés dansants were frequented by the
479
leading nobles.
On Eden, then, and Pitt (for Carmarthen felt no trust in the French)
lay the chief burden of the negotiations. It is clear that Pitt now took a
keen interest in the affair; and as Vergennes, Rayneval, and Calonne
(Minister of Finance) showed a marked desire to come to a fair
compromise, the matter was soon in good train. The chief difficulties
arose from the suspicions of Carmarthen and the desire of Jenkinson,
head of the Council of Trade, to drive a hard bargain with France. Pitt
could not be indifferent to the opinions of his colleagues; and his
experience of British manufacturers was such as to make him press for
the best possible terms. That he still felt some distrust of the Court of
Versailles is clear from his letter of 19th April 1786 to Eden that their
financial embarrassments were such as “to secure, at least for a time,
480
a sincere disposition to peace.” By that time, too, he must have
received Eden’s letter of 13th April marked “Private and confidential,”
which referred in glowing terms to the prospects of the negotiation:

It is a circumstance which I shall think a just subject of pride to

us both in the present age and of merit with posterity if the result
should be what at this moment seems probable.... France shows a
disposition to encourage our trade if we remove the senseless and
peevish distinctions which fill so many lines in our Book of Rates;
and a decided resolution to obstruct it as much as possible if those
distinctions are suffered to remain. In the same time all the
speculations and exertions of our trade with this Kingdom are
suspended, and the manufactures, the navigation and the revenue
are suffering. Besides, all the trading and manufacturing parts of
England are at this hour disposed to go much greater lengths than
are now suggested.... It is even highly possible that this treaty may
481
form a new epoch in history.
 Over against the enthusiasm of Eden we may set the distrust of
Carmarthen, as evinced in his statement to that envoy on 29th April,
that if France could ever be sincere, Eden would doubtless bring the
482
bargain to a successful issue. Far less complimentary were his
references to Eden in private letters to Dorset and Harris. From the
former he inquired: “How is our paragon of perfection relished in
483
France?” In a letter to Harris, who constantly maintained that Eden
was playing the game for Versailles, not for London, Carmarthen
referred to “the absurd and officious letter of our great commercial
484
negotiator.” It is well to remember these jealousies; for, as Harris
was the bosom friend of Carmarthen, he succeeded in persuading him
that the whole negotiation with France was a trick of our arch-enemy.
The letter of Harris, which called forth Carmarthen’s ironical reply,
ended with the statement that France sought “to depress us
everywhere, to keep us in an isolated and unconnected state, till such
time as they think they can cripple us irrecoverably by an open hostile
485
attack.” These suspicions must have been passed on to Pitt after
due sifting; and it speaks much for the evenness and serenity of his
mind that he persevered with the negotiation in spite of the prejudices
of his Foreign Minister. Naturally, also, he kept the affair in his own
hands.
In truth, Pitt occupied a position intermediate between that of the
incurably suspicious Carmarthen and of the pleased and rather self-
conscious Eden. When the latter very speedily arrived at a preliminary
agreement, or Projet, with Rayneval, and begged that it should be
adopted as speedily, and with as few alterations as possible, Pitt
subjected it to friendly but close scrutiny. His reply of 10th May has
been printed among the Auckland Journals; but his criticisms were
even more practical in a long letter of 26th May, which is among the
Pitt Papers. The following sentences are of special interest:

The Principles on which the Projet is founded are undoubtedly

those on which it is to be wished that this business may be finally
concluded, both as they tend to the mutual advantage of the two
Countries in their commercial intercourse, and as they include the
abolition of useless and injurious distinctions. But on the fullest
 consideration it has not appeared to His Majesty’s servants that it
would be proper to advise the immediate conclusion of a treaty on
the footing of that Projet without some additions to it which may
tend to give a more certain and permanent effect to these
principles.... In addition to this, the Projet, as it now stands affords
no security that general prohibitions or prohibitory duties may not
at any time take place in either Country to the exclusion of
whatever may happen to be the chief articles of trade from the
other. It is true that the same motives which should guide both
parties in the present negotiation might for a long time prevent
their adopting a conduct so contrary to the spirit of the proposed
agreement. But it cannot be the wish of either Court to trust to this
security only. We ought by all the means in our power to remove
even the possibility of future jealousy on these subjects. And it
appears from the observations of the French Government on the
first sketch of this Projet that they felt the force of this remark.
There can therefore be no doubt of their readiness to concur in
anything which can give it a greater degree of stability and
certainty. And we shall probably arrive sooner at the great object—
a solid and comprehensive settlement of the commercial
intercourse between the two countries than by beginning with a
Preliminary Treaty, unexceptionable indeed in its principles, but
which would necessarily reserve some very important points for
separate discussion, and would in the meantime leave the whole
486
system incomplete and precarious.

Pitt then pointed out to Eden that the discussion of a compact of a

temporary nature would tend to unsettle the minds of traders and
perhaps even to discredit the whole undertaking. Accordingly he
enclosed a Declaration, which comprised the substance of the French
Projet, but gave it a more permanent form and set limits to the duties
which might thereafter be levied. The letter shows that he had got over
his first suspicions and was now working for a more thorough and
permanent settlement than that sketched by Rayneval. The draft of the
British Declaration is in Pitt’s writing—a proof that he had taken this
matter largely into his own hands. The replies of Eden to him are both
long and frequent; but most of those preserved in the British Museum
are too faded to be legible. In that of 6th June he warned Pitt that