Made in China 2025

Made in China 2025 (MIC25,[1] MIC 2025,[2] or MIC2025; Chinese: 中国制造2025; pinyin:
Zhōngguózhìzào èrlíng'èrwǔ)[3][4] is a national strategic plan and industrial policy[5] of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to further develop the manufacturing sector of China, issued by CCP general
secretary Xi Jinping and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's cabinet in May 2015.[6] As part of the
thirteenth and fourteenth five-year plans, China aims to move away from being the "world's
factory"—a producer of cheap low-tech goods facilitated by lower labour costs and supply chain
advantages. The industrial policy aims to upgrade the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese
industries, growing from labor-intensive workshops into a more technology-intensive powerhouse with
more value added.[7]

Logo

Made in China 2025's goals include increasing the Chinese-domestic content of core materials to 40
percent by 2020 and 70 percent by 2025.[8] To help achieve independence from foreign suppliers,
the initiative encourages increased production in high-tech products and services, with its
semiconductor industry central to the industrial plan, partly because advances in chip technology
may "lead to breakthroughs in other areas of technology, handing the advantage to whoever has the
best chips – an advantage that currently is out of Beijing’s reach."[4][9][10][11]

Since 2018, following a backlash from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, the phrase "MIC
2025" has been de-emphasized in government and other official communications,[12][13] while the
program remains in place. The Chinese government continues to invest heavily in identified
technologies.[12] In 2018, the Chinese government committed to investing roughly US$300 billion
into achieving the industrial plan.[11] In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, at least an additional
$1.4 trillion was also invested into MIC 2025 initiatives.[14] Given China's current middle income
country status, the practicality of its disproportionate expenditure on pioneering new technologies has
been called into question.[15][16]

In October 2024, Bloomberg published an article titled, "US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech
Supremacy Are Faltering" and indicated that China's "Made in China 2025" initiative has largely
succeeded, with China achieving a leadership position in five out of 13 key technologies, which
includes high speeds rail, graphene, unmanned aerial vehicles, solar panels, and electric vehicles and
lithium batteries, as well as rapid progress in seven others. It concludes that this progress underscores
China's increasing influence in industries critical to future economic growth.[17]

Background and stated goals

Since the 2010s, China has become an emerging superpower as the second largest economy and the
largest one on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.[18] It faces manufacturing competition from
countries with lower wages, like Vietnam, as well as from highly industrialized countries.[11][19] To
maintain economic growth, standards of living, and meet the demand of its increasingly educated
workforce, China undertook stimulating the potential of its economic and technological
competitiveness with MIC 2025,[19] to become a "world-leading manufacturing power."[20] Alan
Wheatley of British think tank Chatham House indicated, in 2018, that a broad and growing Chinese
middle class is necessary for the country's economic and political stability.[21]

China believes in its industrial policy programs, which it sees as key to its economic success.[22] Its
leaders hope that government investment in crucial technology sectors will lead to a strong position in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution.[22] The key objective of the Made in China 2025 program is, in a
world which it views as increasingly dominated by U.S.-China competition, to identify key
technologies, such as AI, 5G, aerospace, semiconductors, electric vehicles and biotech, indigenize those
technologies with the help of national champions, secure market share domestically within China, and
ultimately capture foreign markets globally.[23]

The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. described MIC 2025 as an
"initiative to comprehensively upgrade Chinese industry", which is directly inspired by Germany's
proposed Industry 4.0 strategy.[3] It is a comprehensive undertaking to move China's manufacturing
base higher up the value chain[24] and become a major manufacturing power in direct competition
with the United States.[25][26]

Policies

To achieve the stated goals, a number of specific policies have been implemented, including:[27]

High-tech companies are subject to reduced taxation rates.

Incentivization of mergers and acquisitions of foreign technology companies

Increased R&D funding by large manufacturing enterprises

Direct state-funding of R&D

 Roadmap stating specific targets for factors such as R&D spending share, productivity, digitization
and environmental protection.

Policy support for Made in China 2025 has also included government guidance funds, national
laboratories, and state funded incentivization for research grants.[28]: 116

Strategic initiatives

For better implementation of the policies the Chinese Communist Party also implemented 5 strategic
initiatives[29]

1. Building Research and Development Centers across China (40 to be built by 2025)

2. Development of High-End Projects across all of the key industries

3. Sustainable production and worldwide leading green manufacturing practices

4. Smart Manufacturing incl. robotics and digitalization

5. New materials production to be less dependent

Key industries

Industries integral to MIC 2025 include aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart
manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced rail, electric vehicles, electrical equipment, new
materials, biomedicine, agricultural machinery and equipment, pharmaceuticals, and robotics
manufacturing, many of which have been dominated by foreign companies.[30] China views revenue
streams in these areas as lucrative and important to China's efforts to establish a high-tech and high-
value economy.[31]: 37–38 MIC 2025 emphasizes green and sustainable production in these
areas.[31]: 38

MIC 2025 lists the following 10 key industries that the Chinese government targets for becoming a
world leader.[32]
Key Industries of the Made in China 2025

Industry sector Description

Information technology AI, IoT, smart appliances

Robotics AI, machine learning

Green energy and green vehicles energy efficiency, electric vehicles

Aerospace equipment

Ocean engineering and high tech ships

Railway equipment

Power equipment

New materials

Medicine and medical devices

Agriculture machinery

Premier Li has indicated advanced standards in industries are absolutely essential to foster innovation
and eliminate bottlenecks in industrial development. China has a growing middle class who are
demanding higher quality goods and services. Compared with overseas competition, the quality and
innovation of Chinese goods have not caught up. Premier Li talked about the quality revolution. This
revolves around entrepreneurship and craftsmanship. It will involve embracing a culture of continuous
innovations and refinement in quality of goods produced.[33]

Some companies that have been named as leaders of the key industries are:[34][35]

Baidu (AI, autonomous vehicles) Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit

(DRAM manufacturing)[38]
Alibaba (e-commerce)
Huawei (semiconductors,
Tencent (e-commerce)
telecommunications and consumer
Megvii (AI) electronics)
DJI (AI, drones) BBK Electronics (consumer electronics)
BAIC (new energy vehicles) Xiaomi (consumer electronics)
Geely (new energy vehicles) Aviation Industry Corporation of China
NIO (new energy vehicles) (aerospace)

BYD (new energy vehicles) CRRC (rail)

SMIC (semiconductors)[36][37] Sinopharm (medicine)

 CRRC carbon fibre DJI Mavic Pro BYD Han EV Goldwind turbines in
metro concept Platinum Drone in operation at a wind
flight farm Outside Ürumqi

Comac C919 Aircraft Huawei P60 Pro BYD blade battery Sinovac COVID-19
Smartphone packs showcased at Vaccine
the IAA Summit
2023, Germany

Tencent Beijing Office

Funding and evaluation

The amount of state funding to support the MIC 2025 industries has not been publicized, but is
estimated to be "in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars" of state funding, low interest loans, tax
breaks and miscellaneous subsidies.[39][40] This amount includes US$2.9 billion for the Advanced
Manufacturing Fund and US$20.2 billion for the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment
Fund.[27]
China's investment in 5G is seen as part of the MIC 2025 program. As of early 2020, China had
around 200,000 5G towers in use; by the end of the year, it aimed to have more than 500,000, with
an ultimate goal of 5 million.[14] In its 14th five-year plan, China's National People's Congress
approved the spending of $1.4 trillion in 5 to 6 years to build 5G networks, "install cameras and
sensors to create smart cities, and integrate this network with industry to accelerate progress in smart
manufacturing."[12][14]

Barry Naughton, a professor and China expert at the University of California, San Diego, questioned
whether it is sensible for China, considering it is still a middle income country, to be taking "such a
disproportionate part of the risky expenditure involved in pioneering new technologies". He
commented that while it does not make sense from a purely economic perspective, Chinese
policymakers have "other considerations" when implementing their industrial policy such as Made in
China 2025.[15]

A 2024 analysis by the South China Morning Post found that of the more than 260 goals proposed
under the plan, more than 86 percent of the targets have been achieved. The report found targets in
sectors such as electric vehicles and renewable energy were well surpassed, all the goals in robotics,
agriculture machinery, biopharmaceuticals and marine engineering were fulfilled, though some
targets such as advanced photolithography technology, intercontinental passenger aircraft and
broadband internet satellite networks were unfulfilled. The sector with the lowest completion rate was
new materials, at 75 percent.[41]

In October 2024, Bloomberg published a series of articles underscoring China’s steady strides in
positioning itself as a global leader in future-focused industries, despite more than six years of U.S.
tariffs, export controls, and financial sanctions. Research from Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg
Intelligence concludes that the "Made in China 2025" initiative, designed to secure China’s leadership
in emerging technologies, has been "largely a success". Among the 13 critical technologies tracked by
Bloomberg, China has achieved global leadership in five: high-speed rail, graphene, unmanned aerial
vehicles, solar panels, and electric vehicles and lithium batteries, while swiftly closing the gap in seven
others. The research also points to a growing global acceptance of Chinese electric vehicles, an
increasing reliance on Chinese smartphones for internet access, and the widespread adoption of
Chinese solar panels for residential energy.[17][42][43]

Bloomberg's reporting raises concerns for the U.S., suggesting that policies intended to contain China's
rise may inadvertently isolate the U.S. and negatively impact its businesses and consumers. Adam
Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a researcher for various
governments and central banks, cautions that “China’s technological rise will not be stymied, and
might not even be slowed, by U.S. restrictions,” except for those “draconian measures” that could
simultaneously hinder innovation in the U.S. and globally.[17][44][45]

Reactions

European Union

A European Commission published report calling for the European Union (EU) to increase its
industrial and research performance and to "develop a trade policy that can ensure a level playing
field for EU companies in China and for Chinese companies in the EU", in response to the Made in
China 2025 (MIC 2025) policy. It recognizes MIC 2025 as being similar to the "German and
Japanese approaches to innovation and economic development".[46]

The EU Chamber of Commerce in China said that MIC 2025 would increase Chinese protectionism
favouring domestic companies.[47] In a report they have written that the MIC 2025 initiative distorts
the market, and that market-based innovation provides a better way to pass through middle-income
status than industrial policies. Jörg Wuttke, president of the chamber, said: "Very often these major
plans, with lots of money, where government bureaucrats decide who's the winner and who's the loser,
end up in tears."[16]

Japan

Japanese commentators note that MIC 2025 has led to growing exports of Japanese high-value goods
such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment and production line robotization equipment and see
it as a business opportunity, but fear that China may become a strong competitor in the long
run.[48][49]

South Korea

A report by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) sees MIC 2025 as a step towards
Chinese self-sufficiency, threatening Korean exports, but also acknowledges opportunities for Korea
due to changing industry demands. KITA calls for a response by improving Korean innovation,
preventing brain-drain and loss of intellectual property through mergers and acquisitions, preventing
unfair trade practices by China and actively playing into market opportunities that arise from MIC
2025.[50]
Taiwan

Aggressive campaigns to recruit Taiwanese chip industry talent with lucrative offers resulted in the
loss of more than 3,000 chip engineers to MIC 2025,[51] and raised concerns of a "brain
drain".[52][51] Charles Kao, considered Taiwan's "Godfather of DRAM" was among those to leave
Taiwan for a position in China, spending five years (2015–2020) with Tsinghua Unigroup which, two
years after Kao was hired, had also recruited Sun Shih-wei, former chief executive and vice chairman
of United Microelectronics, Taiwan's second-largest contract chipmaker.[53][54]

United States

At the start of the 2010 decade, United States policy makers began to make defensive adjustments
against China's growing position in the digital world. These adjustments consisted of regulating the
amount of imports and exports, regulating financial investments, creating financial sanctions and visa
bans.[55] In recent years, the United States has taken a more offensive strategy to compete against
China. The United States has inserted themselves into the digital world by increasing their own
investments in their research and development fields and also banning the use of certain Chinese-
made technology inside universities and other sites of academia. The offensive measures to compete
with China have been proven to be more effective in slowing Chinese influence over the technology
sector. However, they take more time to have a sufficient influence unlike their defensive counterparts.
Researchers believe the defensive measures being taken are meant to yield the rapid growth of China
to allow time for the United States strategy to take place.[55]

The growth of the Made in China 2025 initiative is seen by the United States as a threat to national
security. U.S. officials believe that if Beijing continues to create a significant gap throughout the
technology sector officials in Washington should be concerned about breaches inside government
departments and agencies. This has fostered the creation of a process by the United States government
called "technological decoupling". The United States is strategically finding different means of
separation away from technology originating in the borders of China. This is implemented through
establishing restrictions on Chinese goods and services or the creation of Made in USA corporations to
compete domestically.[55]

Throughout the 2010's, the rise in popularity of the technological decoupling theory has come
because of the United States' shifted view of China and the Xi Jinping's regime. In previous decades,
U.S. policy makers saw the growth and benefits in China as mutual gains in their own borders as well.
However, the unique intensity around Chinese policy decisions in recent years have proven to give a
voice to a growing wariness about their future agenda. The United States and China continue to
sustain a healthy amount of economic interaction, but how they view one another has shifted to a
more competitive level.[55]

In 2018, the Council on Foreign Relations, an American think tank, stated that MIC 2025, with its
government-sponsored subsidies, is a "threat to U.S. technological leadership".[56] The Li Keqiang
Government maintained that MIC 2025 aligns with the country's World Trade Organization
obligations.[57] On June 15, 2018, the Trump administration imposed higher tariffs on Chinese goods,
escalating trade tensions between China and the U.S. The tariffs primarily apply to manufactured
goods included in the Made in China 2025 plan, such as those integral to IT and robotics
industries.[58][59]

The U.S. began individual investigations over Chinese companies participating in the MIC 2025 plan,
such as Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit, based on concerns over technology theft and national
security.[38]

The U.S. has implemented several policy measures in response to China's MIC 2025 strategy.[60]
These measures include barring certain Chinese companies from participating in U.S. infrastructure
projects, closely examining China's involvement in U.S. government-funded research, and limiting the
transfer of aerospace technology from the U.S. and EU to China. In 2018, the U.S. Congress enacted
legislation to enhance foreign investment scrutiny and fortify export control authorities. More
recently, in August 2022, President Biden signed into law the CHIPS and Science Act to bolster U.S.
capabilities in semiconductors and other technologies.[60]

See also

Made in China

Made in USA

Buy American Act

Berry Amendment

Industrial policy

Techno-nationalism

Thousand Talents Program

China–United States trade war

Middle income trap

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