Prof Max
Prof Max
Karaivanov
Department of Economics Econ 301
These notes are intended to help you understand the firm’s problem of maximizing profits
given the available technology. Both a general algebraic derivation of the problem and the
optimality conditions and specific numerical examples are presented. This is done separately
for the short and long run.
Notation
To simplify things, in the discussion below we will use an example with 2 inputs and one
output. We will use the following notation:
- x1 , x2 - the quantities of the two inputs hired by the firm
1
- y = f(x1 , x2 ) − the amount of output produced from x1 and x2 where f (x1 , x2 ) is the
production function
- w1 , w2 - the per unit market prices (wages) for the two inputs
- p - the market price of output
We will assume that the firm takes input and output prices w1 , w2 and p as given - i.e. it
cannot influence them. Thus we are looking at the case where both input and output markets
are competitive (each firm is too small to affect the prices).
In words, the above says - maximize profits (=revenue (py) minus costs (w1 x1 + w2 x̄2 )) by
choosing the optimal quantity of input 1 (x1 ) to hire. It looks like the consumer problem but
there is no constraint. Why? Aren’t firms constrained? Yes, they are, the constraint is actually
there - it is just plugged in into the profit function - remember that the constraint on firm’s
behavior is put by nature - it is the production function, saying that output, y must equal
f (x1 , x̄2 ) - i.e. that y cannot be chosen independently of x1 .
where we denote by f1 (x1 , x̄2 ) the derivative of the production function with respect to x1 .
Notice that x̄2 is treated as a parameter, a constant which it is.
The above equation can be solved for the optimal quantity of factor 1, x∗1 that the firm
will use to achieve highest profits. We call x∗1 the factor demand for input 1. Just as in the
consumer theory, it will be a function of the prices in general, i.e. x∗1 = x∗1 (p, w1 , w2 ).
This equation has a very nice economic interpretation. Remember what is f1 (x1 , x̄2 ) (the
derivative of the production function with respect to x1 ) − it is simply the slope of the pro-
duction function at x1 , or in other words - the marginal product of factor 1.
Thus equation (1) is saying that at optimum we must have:
pMP1 = w1 (2)
2
What does this mean? Remember what was the marginal product (MP1 ) - it was the
increment in output obtained by hiring one more unit of input 1. Multiply this by the price of
output and the left hand side above can be interpreted as the value of marginal product of
input one, i.e. the increment in revenue (money) that we would obtain if hiring one more unit
of input 1. What is the right hand side then? It is simply the cost of hiring an additional
unit of the factor. Thus optimality requires that we set the additional revenue we get from
hiring one more unit of the input equal to the cost of obtaining that unit.
Why is this optimal? Well, suppose that pMP1 > w1 at our profit maximizing optimum,
i.e. that the additional revenue obtained from hiring one more unit of the factor is larger than
the cost of doing so. Then we can increase our profits by hiring more of the factor until pMP1
decreases to a level equal to w1 (remember hiring more units of the input holding the other input
constant decreases its marginal product (MP1 ) due to the law of diminishing marginal product).
Since we are able to increase profits we must not have been profit maximizing. Similarly, if we
suppose that pMP1 < w1 at the profit maximizing point we see that if we reduce our usage of
input 1 we can actually increase our profits since this last unit brings us less value (pMP1 ) than
what we have to pay for it (w1 ).
Let us compute the optimal choice of x1 (the factor demand) for the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function f (x1 , x2 ) = xα1 xβ2 . The firm’s problem is:
pαxα−1
1 x̄β2 − w1 = 0
since x̄2 is just a constant. We can solve the above equation for the factor demand,
x∗1 (p, w1 , w2 ). We have:
w1
xα−1
1 =
pαx̄β2
1
or (rasing both sides to power α−1
)
w1 α−1 1
x∗1 = ( β
)
pαx̄2
Notice that for the Cobb-Douglas function the factor demand for input 1 depends on w1
and p but not on the price of the second input, w2 .
3
Taking the derivative and setting to zero:
1 −1/2
4 x1 −2=0
2
or,
−1/2
2x1 =2
or
−1/2
x1 =1
i.e.
x∗1 = 1
(you could have obtained the same expression by substituting the specific numerical values
used here for p, x̄2 , w1 , α, β in the general expression from before).
Having the optimal quantity demanded of the input we can compute the optimal amount
of output that will be produced by simply plugging x∗1 into the production function. We get,
y ∗ = f (x∗1 , x̄2 ) = (1)1/2 (1)1/2 = 1. We can also find the maximized profit, π ∗ = py ∗ − w1 x∗1 −
w2 x̄2 = 4(1) − 2(1) − 1 = 1. (everything turns out to be equal to one in this example :-) )
4
Once again the partial derivatives are simply the marginal products of the two factors, i.e.
we have at optimum:
pMP1 = w1
pMP2 = w2
The interpretation is the same as before - the value of marginal product of each factor must
equal its price at optimum otherwise factor usage can be either decreased or increased yielding
higher profits.
The above represents a system of two equations that can be solved for the optimal factor
demands, x∗1 and x∗2 (notice that MP1 and MP2 are functions of x1 and x2 ).
Let us look at our Cobb-Douglas example and derive the factor demands as we did in the
SR case. The long run firm’s problem is:
pαxα−1
1 xβ2 = w1
pxα1 βxβ−1
2 = w2 (3)
Notice that these are two equations in two unknowns (x1 and x2 ). How to solve them?
The easiest way is to divide them through (i.e. divide both sides of the first equation by the
respective sides of the second):
pαxα−1
1 xβ2 w1
β−1
=
pxα1 βx2 w2
Cancelling the p0 s and collecting the powers of x1 and x2 we get:
α x2 w1
= (4)
β x1 w2
β β−1
(since xα−1
1 /xα1 = x−1
1 = 1/x1 and x2 /x2 = x2 ).
From above we can express x2 in terms of x1 :
βw1
x2 = x1 (5)
αw2
Now use this expression and plug in the first derivative equation (pαxα−1
1 xβ2 = w1 ) to get:
βw1 β β
pαxα−1
1 ( ) x1 = w1
αw2
Notice that we can
or,
βw1 β α+β−1
pα( ) x1 = w1
αw2
5
Then we have:
w1
xα+β−1
1 = βw1 β
pα( αw2
)
1
or, raising to power α+β−1
:
w1 1 pα 1−β pβ β
x∗1 = ( βw1 β
) α+β−1 = ( ) 1−α−β ( ) 1−α−β
pα( αw2 ) w1 w2
i.e. some messy function of w1 , w2 and p. We can then use (4) to get x∗2 as an even messier
function of the prices.
Remembering that y = xα1 xβ2 we get an equation for the optimal output y ∗ :
pαy ∗ α pβy β
y∗ = ( ) ( )
w1 w2
or,
pα α pβ β
(y ∗ )1−α−β = ( ) ( )
w1 w2
α β 1−β β α 1−α
i.e. y ∗ = ( wpα1 ) 1−α−β ( wpβ2 ) 1−α−β and hence: x∗1 = ( wpα1 ) 1−α−β ( wpβ2 ) 1−α−β , x∗2 = ( wpα1 ) 1−α−β ( wpβ2 ) 1−α−β .
The advantage in this method is that everything is more symmetrical and it stresses the inter-
dependence between the inputs and the output.
The above is general but pretty incomprehensible (although you can simplify it a bit). Let’s
look at a:
Numerical Example:
1/3 1/3
Assume that f (x1 , x2 ) = x1 x2 , w1 = 1, w2 = 2, p = 3. Then the firm’s problem is:
1/3 1/3
max 3x1 x2 − x1 − 2x2
x1 ,x2
6
Taking the partials and setting them to zero we get:
1 −2/3 1/3
3 x1 x2 = 1
3
1/3 1 −2/3
3x1 ( x2 ) = 2
3
As in the general case we have two equations in the two unknowns, x1 and x2 . The simplest
way to proceed is once again to divide the equations through:
x2 1
=
x1 2
i.e. x2 = x1 /2. Substitute that into the first equation to get:
−2/3
x1 (x1 /2)1/3 = 1
or
−1/3
(2)−1/3 x1 =1
raising both sides to power 3:
x−1
1 = 2
or, x∗1 = 1/2. Thus x∗2 = x∗1 /2 = 1/4. Output is: y∗ = (1/2)1/3 (1/4)1/3 = (1/8)1/3 = 1/2,
optimal profit is: π∗ = 3y ∗ − x∗1 − 2x∗2 = 1/2.