Chinese Religiont
Chinese Religiont
John Lagerwey
To cite this article: John Lagerwey (1990) John Lagerwey's Response to Julian F. Pas' Review
of His Book Taoist Ritual in Chinese Societyand History (JCR #16, 1988, 96-106)., Journal of
Chinese Religions, 18:1, 173-174, DOI: 10.1179/073776990805307900
Article views: 5
Your review of my book, together with that by Catherine Bell in History of Religions!,
raise a number of issues which I believe merit a response.
First, as regards the title, your remarks would be justified if I had meant "the role
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played by Taoist ritual in Chinese society and politics through the course of Chinese history".
Inasmuch as no one will be in a position to write such a book for at least another twenty
years, it should be obvious that I had nothing of the kind in mind. My aim was the much
more modest one of showing that the "deep structures" of Taoist ritual (on which, more
below) are not only compatible with certain basic features of Chinese society and polity, but
that reference to Taoist ritual is necessary if we are to make sense of Chinese social and/or
political history.
Second, yes, Taoism is "the religion of nature", and it is "the national religion" of the
Chinese dynasties. On the latter point, incidentally, I begin by citing M. Strickmann, who
is simply stating what has come to be generally accepted by specialists of Taoism, including
those in Mainland China, where the standard phrase to express this is l'u-sheng l'u-chang tia,
that is, "of indigenous origin and growth". This somewhat ambiguous phrase refers both to
the fact that Taoism is a purely native product (not "fake Buddhism") and to the important
role played by Taoism in shoring up the political legitimacy of successive dynasties, as traced
rapidly in my Chapter 15. Recent research, by myself and others, on Wu-tang shan
convinces me that I 'under', rather than 'over'stated the case for the Yiian and the Ming.
Third, if I chose to focus on the ritual practice of a single priest, it is because he
represents one of the major traditions of Taoist liturgical practice. We do not yet know how
wide a geographic spread that tradition covers, but we do know, (i) that it covers a fairly
wide area (much of Chiang-nan), and (ii) that its roots may be traced to texts in the Tao-
Isang (something on which I spend a fair amount of time in my book).
Fourth, you question my translation of the term chiao as "offering." My reasons for
this translation are as follows: (i) it is what the word means; (ii) the word "offering" has long
been linked to the word "sacrifice" in Western religjous history, and chiao is often glossed
as chi, "to sacrifice"; (iii) the Taoist preference for the term chiao - in state sacrifices, the
term chi is more customary - is linked, I believe, to a fundamental choice not altogether
unlike that referred to in Psalm 51 ("For thou delightest not in sacrifice ..."), and its use
Since Catherine Bell's review was not published in our Journal, it would not be appropriate to
reproduce here that pan of J. Lagerweys response. (Ed.)
• J:.'t t~ fJ~
173
174 Journal of Chinese Religions
was indispensable to the understanding of both the Chiao and the Kung-te. Viewed in that
manner, some rituals are more important than others: for example, the Fen-teng, however
interesting, is nowhere near as crucial as the Announcement of the Tao-ch'ang. As to how
to deal with "crucial" rituals, my view remains that these rituals explain themselves, that is,
we know what they mean when we know what is done in them. This, in Western liturgical
history, is known as lex orandi, lex credendi, a principle to which I wholeheartedly subscribe.
It can hardly be used alone, of course, and that is why I also have recourse to ritual history,
to myth, and even to speculation. Indeed, other readers than yourself find I "over-interpret".
Sixth, as regards the Kung-te, considerable work has been done in the last several
years on the question of why some Taoists, in Taiwan and on the Chinese Mainland, do not
perform them, and it is becoming increasingly clear that it is because "Taoism is a religion
of life, not death". I have yet to encounter a Taoist who does Kung-te "of his own free will":
most say it is "to earn money", or because "the people ask us to". Early Celestial Masters
did not perform rituals for the dead and may very welJ have eschewed the ancestor cult
altogether. All of this conspires to make the Kung-te problematic, from a Taoist point of
view. My conclusion is that a Taoist can perform such rituals, not because he "brings all
things to their origin in the Way" so much as because he gives a "certificate" of immortality
to the deceased.
Finally, you question a number of my translations. Your point regarding ,'an is well-
taken: "altar", however convenient, is misleading; "sacred area" being a paraphrase, perhaps
"platform" is the best alternative. "Land of the Way" for lao-ch 'ang is a case of "poetic
literalism", chosen because of the resonance of the term '1and": "homeland", "fatherland",
"land of the free", etc. The term as such, of course, is of Buddhist origin. Finally, I have
translated fu as symbol not only because of the striking etymological convergence of the two
words, but also and above all, because this convergence helps me to underscore the
following points: (i) the idea of "joining tallies" is°essential to the understanding of Taoism
as a "religion of synthesis"; (ti) the terms "talisman" and "charm" hitherto used to translate
fib fIrSt, do not translate it , and second, mislead the reader into thinking of Taoism not as
a sophisticated process of synthesis, but as superstitious "magic"; and (iii) our understanding
of "symbol" as "mere symbol" is a particularly harmful instance of the "rationalistic
reductionism" which continues to haunt Western thinking.