I.

​ PRAGMATICS - YULE
In attempting to express themselves, people do not only produce utterances containing
grammatical structures and words, they perform actions via those utterances. If you
work in a situation where a boss has a great deal of power, then the boss's utterance of
the expression in [1] is more than just a statement.
[1] You're fired.
The utterance in [1] can be used to perform the act of ending your employment.
However, the actions performed by utterances do not have to be as dramatic or as
unpleasant as in [1]. The action can be quite pleasant, as in the compliment performed
by [2a.], the acknowledgement of thanks in [2b.], or the expression of surprise in [2c.].
[2] a. You're so delicious.
b. You're welcome.
c. You're crazy!
Actions performed via utterances are generally called speech acts and, in English, are
commonly given more specific labels, such as apology, complaint, compliment,
invitation, promise, or request.
These descriptive terms for different kinds of speech acts apply to the speaker's
communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker normally expects that
his or her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and
hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding the
utterance. These circumstances, including other utterances, are called the speech
event. In many ways, it is the nature of the speech event that determines the
interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act. On a wintry day,
the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been freshly made, takes a
sip, and produces the utterance in [3]. It is likely to be interpreted as a complaint.
[3] This tea is really cold!
Changing the circumstances to a really hot summer's day with the speaker being given
a glass of iced tea by the hearer, taking a sip and producing the utterance in [3], it is
likely to be interpreted as praise. If the same utterance can be interpreted as two
different kinds of speech act, then obviously no simple one utterance to one action
correspondence will be possible. It also means that there is more to the interpretation
of a speech act than can be found in the utterance alone.
Speech acts
On any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three
related acts. There is first a locutionary act, which is the basic act of utterance, or
producing a meaningful linguistic expression. If you have difficulty with actually
forming the sounds and words to create a meaningful utterance in a language (for
example, because it's foreign or you're tongue-tied), then you might fail to produce a
locutionary act. Producing 'Aha mokofa' in English will not normally count as a
locutionary act, whereas [4] will.
[4] I've just made some coffee.
Mostly we don't just produce well-formed utterances with no purpose. We form an
utterance with some kind of function in mind. This is the second dimension, or the
illocutionary act. The illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an
utterance. We might utter [4] to make a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for
some other communicative purpose. This is also generally known as the illocutionary
force of the utterance.
We do not, of course, simply create an utterance with a function without intending it to
have an effect. This is the third dimension, the perlocutionary act. Depending on the
circumstances, you utter [4] on the assumption that the hearer will recognize the effect
you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful smell or to get the hearer to
drink some coffee). This is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect.
Of these three dimensions, the most discussed is illocutionary force. Indeed, the term
'speech act' is generally interpreted quite narrowly to mean only the illocutionary force
of an utterance.
The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it 'counts as'. The same locutionary act,
as shown in [5a.], can count as a prediction [5b.], a promise [5c], or a warning [5d..].
These different analyses [5b.-d.] of the utterance in [5a.] represent different
illocutionary forces.
[5] a. I'll see you later. (= A)
b. [I predict that] A.
c. [I promise you that] A.
d. [I warn you that] A.

One problem with the examples in [5] is that the same utterance
can potentially have quite different illocutionary forces (for ex-
ample, promise versus warning). 2, ume, that
he intended illocutionary force wil] be re nized by the hearer?
That question has been addressed by considering two things:
Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and felicity conditions.

IFIDs
The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force
(the Illocutionary Force Indicating Device, or IFID) is an expression of
the type shown in [6] where there is a slot for a verb that explicitly
names the illocutionary act being performed. Such a verb can be
called a performative verb (Vp).
[6] 1 (Vp) you that...
In the preceding examples, [5c.,d.], 'promise' and 'warn' would
be the performative verbs and, if stated, would be very clear
IFIDs. Speakers do not always 'perform' their speech acts so
explicitly, but they sometimes describe the speech act being per formed. Imagine the
telephone conversation in [7], between a
man trying to contact Mary, and Mary's friend.
[7] Him: Can I talk to Mary?
Her: No, she's not here.
Him: I'm asking you—can I talk to her?
Her: And I'm telling you—SHE'S NOT HERE!
In this scenario, each speaker has described, and drawn attention
to, the illocutionary force ('ask' and 'tell') of their utterances.
Most of the time, however, there is no performative verb men tioned. Other IFIDs
which can be identified are word order,
stress, and intonation, as shown in the different versions of the
same basic elements (Y-G) in [8].
[8] a. You're going! [I tell you Y-G]
b. You're going? [I request confirmation about Y-G]
c. Are you going? [I ask you if Y-G]
While other devices, such as a lowered voice quality for a warn ing or a threat, might
be used to indicate illocutionary force, the
utterance also has to be produced under certain conventional
conditions to count as having the intended illocutionary force.
Felicity conditions
There are certain expected or appropriate circumstances, tech nically known as
felicity conditions, for the performance of a
speech act to be recognized as intended. For some clear cases,
such as [9], the performance will be infelicitous (inappropriate) if
the speaker is not a specific person in a special context (in this
case, a judge in a courtroom).
[9] I sentence you to six months in prison.
In everyday contexts among ordinary people, there are also pre conditions on speech
acts. There are general conditions on the par ticipants, for example, that they can
understand the language
being used and that they are not play-acting or being nonsensical.
Then there are content conditions. For example, for both a promise
and a warning, the content of the utterance must be about a
future event. A further content condition for a promise requires
that the future event will be a future act of the speaker.
The preparatory conditions for a promise are significantly differ ent from those for a
warning. When I promise to do something, there are two preparatory conditions: first,
the event will not happen by itself, and second, the event will have a beneficial effect.
When I utter a warning, there are the following preparatory conditions: it isn't clear
that the hearer knows the event will occur, the
sneaker does think the event will occur, and the event will not have
a beneficial effect. Related to these conditions is the sincerity condition that, for a
promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out
the future action, and, for a warning, the speaker genuinely
believes that the future event will not have a beneficial effect.
Finally, there is the essential condition, which covers the fact
that by the act of uttering a promise, I thereby intend to create an
obligation to carry out the action as promised. In other words, the
utterance changes my state from non-obligation to obligation.
Similarly, with a warning, under the essential condition, the utterance changes my
state from non-informing of a bad future event
to informing. This essential condition thus combines with a
specification of what must be in the utterance content, the context, and the speaker's
intentions, in order for a specific speech act
to be appropriately (felicitously) performed.

The performative hypothesis

One way to think about the speech acts being performed via utter ances is to assume
that underlying every utterance (U) there is a
clause, similar to [6] presented earlier, containing a performative
verb (Vp) which makes the illocutionary force explicit. This is
known as the performative hypothesis and the basic format of the
underlying clause is shown in [10].
[10] I (hereby) Vp you (that) U
In this clause, the subject must be first person singular (T),
followed by the adverb 'hereby', indicating that the utterance
'counts as' an action by being uttered. There is also a perform ative verb (Vp) in the
present tense and an indirect object in sec ond person singular ('you'). This
underlying clause will always
make explicit, as in [11b.] and [12b.], what, in utterances such as
[na.] and [12a.], is implicit.
[11] a. Clean up this mess!
b. I hereby order you that you clean up this mess.
[12] a. The work was done by Elaine and myself.
b. I hereby tell you that the work was done by Elaine and
myself.
Examples like [nb.] and [12b.] (normally without 'hereby'), are
used by speakers as explicit performatives. Examples like [iia.]
and [12a.] are implicit performatives, sometimes called primary
performatives.
The advantage of this type of analysis is that it makes clear just
what elements are involved in the production and interpretation
of utterances. In syntax, a reflexive pronoun (like 'myself' in [12])
requires the occurrence of an antecedent (in this case T) within
the same sentence structure. The explicit performative in [12b.]
provides the T element. Similarly, when you say to someone, 'Do
it yourself!', the reflexive in 'yourself is made possible by the
antecedent 'you' in the explicit version (T order you that you do it
yourself). Another advantage is to show that some adverbs such
as 'honestly', or adverbial clauses such as 'because I may be late',
as shown in [13], naturally attach to the explicit performative
clause rather than the implicit version.
[13] a. Honestly, he's a scoundrel.
b. What time is it, because I may be late?
In [13a.], it is the telling part (the performative verb) that is being
done 'honestly' and, in [13 b.], it is the act of asking (the perform ative again) that is
being justified by the 'because I may be late'
clause.
There are some technical disadvantages to the performative
hypothesis. For example, uttering the explicit performative ver sion of a command
[11b.] has a much more serious impact than
uttering the implicit version [11a.]. The two versions are con sequently not
equivalent. It is also difficult to know exactly what
the performative verb (or verbs) might be for some utterances.
Although the speaker and hearer might recognize the utterance in
[14a.] as an insult, it would be very strange to have [14b.] as an
explicit version.
[14] a. You're dumber than a rock.
b. ? I hereby insult you that you're dumber than a rock.
The really practical problem with any analysis based on identifving explicit
performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not
know how many performative verbs there are in any language.
Instead of trying to list all the possible explicit performatives, and
then distinguish among all of them, some more general
classifications of types of speech acts are usually used.
Speech act classification
One general classification system lists five types of general func tions performed by
speech acts: declarations, representatives,
expressives, directives, and commissives.
Declarations are those kinds of speech acts that change the
world via their utterance. As the examples in [15] illustrate, the
speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific con text, in order to
perform a declaration appropriately.
[15] a. Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.
b. Referee: You're out!
c. Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.
In using a declaration, the speaker changes the world via words.
Representatives are those kinds of speech acts that state what
the speaker believes to be the case or not. Statements of fact,
assertions, conclusions, and descriptions, as illustrated in [16],
are all examples of the speaker representing the world as he or she
believes it is.
[16] a. The earth is flat.
b. Chomsky didn't write about peanuts.
c. It was a warm sunny day.
In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world
(of belief).
Expressives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the
speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be state ments of pleasure,
pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow. As illus trated in [17], they can be caused by
something the speaker does
or the hearer does, but they are about the speaker's experience.
[17] a. I'm really sorry! b.
Congratulations! c Oh, yes, great,
mmmm, ssahh!
In using an expressive, the speaker makes words fit the world
(of feeling).
Directives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to get
someone else to do something. They express what the speaker
wants. They are commands, orders, requests, suggestions, and, as
illustrated in [18], they can be positive or negative.
[18] a. Gimme a cup of coffee. Make it black.
b. Could you lend me a pen, please?
c. Don't touch that.
In using a directive, the speaker attempts to make the world fit the
words (via the hearer).
Commissives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to
commit themselves to some future action. They express what the
speaker intends. They are promises, threats, refusals, pledges,
and, as shown in [19], they can be performed by the speaker
alone, or by the speaker as a member of a group.
[19] a. I'll be back.
b. I'm going to get it right next time.
c. We will not do that.
In using a commissive, the speaker undertakes to make the world
fit the words (via the speaker).
These five general functions of speech acts, with their key fea tures, are summarized
in Table 6.1.
Direct and indirect speech acts
A different approach to distinguishing types of speech acts can be
made on the basis of structure. A fairly simple structural distinction
between three general types of speech acts is provided, in English,
by the three basic sentence types. As shown in [20], there is an easily
recognized relationship between the three structural forms
(declarative, interrogative, imperative) and the three general
communicative functions (statement, question, command/request).
[20] a. You wear a seat belt. (declarative)
b. Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative)
c. Wear a seat belt! (imperative)
Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, we have a
direct speech act. Whenever there is an in direct relationship between a structure and
a function, we have an
indirect speech act. Thus, a declarative used to make a statement is
a direct speech act, but a declarative used to make a request is an
indirect speech act. As illustrated in [21], the utterance in [21a.] is
a declarative. When it is used to make a statement, as paraphrased
in [21b.], it is functioning as a direct speech act. When it is used to
make a command/request, as paraphrased in [21c], it is function ing as an indirect
speech act.
[21] a. It's cold outside.
b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.
Different structures can be used to accomplish the same basic
function, as in [22], where the speaker wants the addressee not to
stand in front of the TV. The basic function of all the utterances in
[22] is a command/request, but only the imperative structure in
[22a.] represents a direct speech act. The interrogative structure
in [22b.] is not being used only as a question, hence it is an in direct speech act. The
declarative structures in [22c] and [22d.]
are also indirect requests.
[22] a. Move out of the w

ay!

b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?

c. You're standing in front of the TV.
d. You'd make a better door than a window.
One of the most common types of indirect speech act in -
nglish, as shown in [23], has the form of an interrogative, but is not typically used to
ask a question (i.e. we don't expect only an
answer, we expect action). The examples in [23] are normally
understood as requests.
[2.3] a. Could you pass the salt?
b. Would you open this?
Indeed, there is a typical pattern in English whereby asking a
question about the hearer's assumed ability ('Can you?', 'Could
you?') or future likelihood with regard to doing something ('Will
you?', 'Would you?') normally countsas a request to actually do
that something.
Indirect speech acts are generally associated with greater
politeness in English than direct speech acts. In order to under stand why, we have to
look at a bigger picture than just a single
utterance performing a single speech act.
Speech events
We can treat an indirect request (for example, the utterances in
[23]) as being a matter of asking whether the necessary conditions
for a request are in place. For example, a preparatory condition is
that the speaker assumes the hearer is able to, or CAN, perform the
action. A content condition concerns future action, that the hearer
WILL perform the action. This pattern is illustrated in [24]. [24]
Indirect requests
'WILL you do X?'
Future act of
hearer
(= hearer WILL
doX)
b. Preparatory Hearer is able to 'CAN you do X?'
condition perform act
(= hearer CAN
doX)
c. Questioning a hearer-based condition for making a
request results in an indirect request.
There is a definite difference between asking someone to do X and
asking someone if the preconditions for doing X are in place, as in [2.4c-]• Asking
about preconditions technically doesn't count as
making a request, but does allow the hearer to react 'as if the
request had been made. Because a request is an imposition by the
speaker on the hearer, it is better, in most social circumstances, for
the speaker to avoid a direct imposition via a direct request. When
the speaker asks about preconditions, no direct request is made.
The preceding discussion is essentially about one person trying
to get another person to do something without risking refusal or
causing offense. However, this type of situation does not consist
of a single utterance. It is a social situation involving participants
who necessarily have a social relationship of some kind, and who,
on a specific occasion, may have particular goals.
We can look at the set of utterances produced in this kind of situ ation as a speech
event. A speech event is an activity in which par ticipants interact via language in
some conventional way to arrive
at some outcome. It may include an obvious central speech act,
such as 'I don't really like this', as in a speech event of 'complain ing', but it will also
include other utterances leading up to and sub sequently reacting to that central
action. In most cases, a 'request'
is not made by means of a single speech act suddenly uttered.
Requesting is typically a speech event, as illustrated in [25].
[25] Him: Oh, Mary, I'm glad you're here.
Her: What's up?
Him: I can't get my computer to work.
Her: Is it broken?
Him: I don't think so.
Her: What's it doing?
Him: I don't know. I'm useless with computers.
Her: What kind is it?
Him: It's a Mac. Do you use them?
Her: Yeah.
Him: Do you have a minute?
Her: Sure.
Him: Oh, great.
The extended interaction in [25] may be called a 'requesting'
speech event without a central speech act of request. Notice that
there is no actual request from 'him' to 'her' to do anything.
we might characterize the question 'Do you have a minute?' as a ‘pre-request’,
allowing the receiver to say that she’s busy or that she has to be somewhere else. In
this context, the response “Sure” is taken to be an acknowledgement not only of
having time available, but a willingness to perform the unstated action. The analysis
of speech events is clearly another way of studying how more gets communicated than
is said.
The usefulness of speech act analysis is in illustrating the kinds of things we can do
with words and identifying some of the conventional utterance forms we use to
perform specific actions.
However, we do need to look at more extended interaction to
understand how those actions are carried out arid interpreted
within speech events.