OSA Webinar Learning Series

Introduction to the
IOGP Process Safety Fundamentals (PSF)
January 27, 2022
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Presenters

Michael Bradshaw, Oil States

Tricia Grant, Hess
Jill Niswonger, Marathon Oil
Matthew Novia, Baker Hughes

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Introduction
To the Onshore Safety Alliance Program

WORKING TOGETHER
to improve safety and reduce serious injuries and fatalities
in U.S onshore operations

Companies commit to carry out defined OSA PARTICIPANT ACTIONS

within their organization and in return, the OSA provides resources,
guidance, tools and peer-to-peer SUPPORT to help companies
implement the actions.

VOLUNTARY TO JOIN. NO DUES REQUIRED.

Through the OSA, companies are raising the BAR on safety, together.

BRIDGE ADVANCE REDUCE

INDUSTRY SAFETY SERIOUS
KNOWLEDGE CULTURES INCIDENTS

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 Safety Share 1: Produced Water Tank Explosion

WHAT HAPPENED?
• Driver arrived between 5:30 and 5:45 am,
hooked truck up to tank manifold, and (at
some point) ascended catwalk to tanks
• Explosion occurs prior to 6:45 am (February,
sunrise at 7:17)
• One tank fails at shell-floor joint, ejected, and
thrown 110 feet (34 m)
• One tank fails at shell-roof joint, roof thrown
165 feet (50 m) WHAT WENT WRONG?
• Catwalk damaged and displaced, throwing • Driver was performing operations before sunrise.
driver from catwalk and outside tank battery,
approximately 30 feet (9 m); fatality. • Investigation indicates that driver likely used lighter,
possibly to check tank level
 Safety Share 1: Produced Water Tank Explosion

WHY DID IT HAPPEN? WHAT AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENT?

• Separator does not remove “all gas” from the • Hazard awareness may not be adequate among all
fluid, even when functioning properly and as personnel working at oil and gas production sites.
designed Workers should assume tank vapor space may be
flammable.
• Natural convection limits maximum fuel
concentration and can bring tank vapor space • Increase hazard awareness for all personnel working
into flammable range, particularly with a tank at site
which is stagnant for an extended period or
• Measure level at grade to eliminate routine access to
with a hatch left open
most hazardous location (i.e., tank roof)
• Inert tanks using natural gas
• Use a “lead tank” as a secondary separator
• Monitor tank vapor space
 Safety Share 2: Pryor Trust Gas Well Blowout

WHAT HAPPENED?
• A blowout and rig fire occurred shortly after drilling crew members removed the drill pipe from
the well, resulting in the death of five workers.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

• Rig crew members stopped drilling to remove the drill pipe from the well and change the drill
bit. They pumped mud into the well while removing the drill pipe to prevent natural gas from
entering the well.
• Mud was continuously circulated in the wellbore to keep the well full by replacing the volume
of the drill pipe removed with drilling mud. The driller closed the blind rams on the blow out
preventer to isolate the well after the drill pipe and drill bit were completely removed from the
well.
• The driller opened the blowout preventer blind rams so that a new piece of drilling equipment
called a bottom hole assembly could be lowered into the well. Mud was pumped through the
bottom hole assembly to test the new equipment.

• While the rig crew tested the bottom hole assembly equipment, the mud pits gained 107 barrels of mud. Mud pit gains are an
indication of a possible natural gas influx into the well. Data indicated that conditions existed that could have allowed a gas
influx into the wellbore during the drill pipe removal operation.
• After the bottom hole assembly was tested, it was lifted out of the wellbore and mud and gas blew upwards out of the well,
igniting and causing a large fire.
 Safety Share 2: Pryor Trust Gas Well Blowout

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

The cause of the blowout and rig fire was barrier failure:
• Primary barrier—hydrostatic pressure produced by drilling mud
• Secondary barrier—human detection of gas influx and activation of the blowout
preventer

WHAT AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENT?

• Underbalanced drilling was performed without needed planning, equipment, skills, or procedures
• The driller was not effectively trained in using a new electronic trip sheet, which is used to help monitor for gas influx
• Equipment was aligned differently than normal during the tripping operation, leading to confusion in interpreting the well data which
caused rig workers to miss indications of the gas influx
• Surface pressure was not identified two separate times before opening the BOP during operations before the blowout,
• Both the day and night driller chose to turn off the entire alarm system, contributing to both drillers missing critical indications of the
gas influx and imminent blowout
• The alarm system was not effectively designed to alert personnel to hazardous conditions during different operating states (e.g.,
drilling, tripping, circulating, and surface operations) and would have sounded excessive non-critical alarms during the 14 hours
leading to the blowout
• Key flow checks to determine if the well was flowing were not performed before the incident
• The drilling contractor did not test its drillers’ abilities in detecting indications of gas influx
• The operating company did not specify the barriers required during operations, or how to respond if a barrier was lost
IOGP Process Safety Fundamentals
https://www.iogp.org/oil-and-gas-safety/process-safety/fundamentals/

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 What Makes an Effective PSF?

Support frontline workers

Clear, simple, task-level

Day-to-day activities

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8 – Russ Holmes
 PSFs Complement Life Saving Actions

IOGP Life Saving Rules

IOGP Process Safety Fundamentals

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8 – Russ Holmes
Process Safety Fundamentals 1-4

Maintain Safe Isolation

Walk the Line
Apply Procedures
Sustain Barriers

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PSF 1 – Maintain Safe Isolation

We use isolation plans for the specific task, based on up-to-

date information.

We raise isolation concerns before the task starts and

challenge when isolation plans cannot be executed.

We check for residual pressure or process material before

breaking containment.

We monitor the integrity of isolations regularly and stop to

reassess when change could affect an isolation integrity.

We confirm leak-tightness before, during, and after

reinstating equipment.

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PSF 2 – Walk the Line

We use up to date documentation (e.g., Piping and

Instrumentation Diagrams, or P&IDs) that accurately
reflect installed systems and equipment.

We physically confirm the system is ready for the

intended activity (e.g., valve positions, line up of relief
devices, etc.).

We alert supervision to identified documentation and

readiness issues before operation.

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PSF 3 – Apply Procedures

We use operating and maintenance procedures, even

if we are familiar with the task.

We discuss the key steps within a critical procedure

before starting it.

We pause before key steps and check readiness to

progress.
We stop, inform supervision, and avoid workarounds if
procedures are missing, unclear, unsafe, or cannot be
followed.
We take time to become familiar with, and practice,
emergency procedures.

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PSF 4 – Sustain Barriers

We discuss the purpose of hardware and human

barriers at our location.

We evaluate how our tasks could impact process safety

barriers.

We speak up when barriers don’t feel adequate.

We perform our roles in maintaining barrier health and

alert supervision to our concerns.

We use an approval process for operations with

degraded barriers.

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Process Safety Fundamentals 5-7

Control Ignition Sources

Recognize Change
Respect Hazards

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PSF 5 – Control Ignition Sources

We identify, eliminate, or control the full range of

potential ignition sources during task risk assessments
and during job preparation and execution.

We minimise and challenge ignition sources even in

“non-hazardous” areas.

We eliminate ignition sources during breaking

containment and start-up and shutdown operations.

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PSF 6 – Recognize Change

We look for and speak up about change.

We discuss changes and involve others to identify the

need for management of change (MOC).

We review the MOC process for guidance on what

triggers an MOC.

We discuss and seek advice on change that occurs

gradually over time.

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PSF 7 – Respect Hazards

We improve our understanding of process safety

hazards at our location and our roles in controlling
them.

We are vigilant about the potential impacts of

uncontrolled process safety hazards.

We discuss process safety hazards before starting a

task.

We bring forward process safety hazards to be

included in activity risk assessments.

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Process Safety Fundamentals 8-10

Stay within Operating Limits

Stop if the Unexpected Occurs
Watch for Weak Signals

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PSF 8 – Stay within Operating Limits

We discuss and use the approved operating limits for

our location.

We escalate where we cannot work within operating

limits.

We alert supervision if an alarm response action is

unclear or the time to respond is inadequate.

We obtain formal approval before changing operating

limits.

We confirm that potential for overpressure from

temporary pressure sources has been addressed.

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PSF 9 – Stop if the Unexpected Occurs

We discuss the work plan and what signals would tell

us it is proceeding as expected.

We pause and ask questions when signals and

conditions are not as expected.

We stop and alert supervision if the activity is not

proceeding as expected.

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PSF 10 – Watch for Weak Signals

We proactively look for indicators or signals that

suggest future problems.

We speak up about potential issues even if we are not

sure they are important.

We persistently explore the causes of changing

indicators or unusual situations.

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Produced Water Tank Explosion with PSF Knowledge

WHAT AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENT?

Respect Hazards • Hazard awareness may not be adequate among all
personnel working at oil and gas production sites.
• We improve our understanding of process safety
hazards at our location and our roles in controlling Workers should assume tank vapor space may be
them. flammable.

• We are vigilant about the potential impacts of • Increase hazard awareness for all personnel working at
uncontrolled process safety hazards. site

Control Ignition Sources • Measure level at grade to eliminate routine access to

most hazardous location (i.e., tank roof)

• We minimise and challenge ignition sources even in • Inert tanks using natural gas
“non-hazardous” areas. • Use a “lead tank” as a secondary separator
• We eliminate ignition sources during breaking • Monitor tank vapor space
containment and start-up and shutdown operations.
 Pryor Trust Gas Well Blowout with PSF Knowledge

WHAT AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENT?

• Underbalanced drilling was performed without needed planning,
equipment, skills, or procedures Sustain Barriers
• The driller was not effectively trained in using a new electronic trip sheet, • We speak up when barriers don’t feel adequate.
which is used to help monitor for gas influx
• Equipment was aligned differently than normal during the tripping • We perform our roles in maintaining barrier health
operation, leading to confusion in interpreting the well data which caused and alert supervision to our concerns.
rig workers to miss indications of the gas influx
• Surface pressure was not identified two separate times before opening
• We use an approval process for operations with
the BOP during operations before the blowout, degraded barriers.
• Both the day and night driller chose to turn off the entire alarm system,
contributing to both drillers missing critical indications of the gas influx
and imminent blowout
Apply Procedures
• The alarm system was not effectively designed to alert personnel to
hazardous conditions during different operating states (e.g., drilling,
tripping, circulating, and surface operations) and would have sounded • We pause before key steps and check readiness to
excessive non-critical alarms during the 14 hours leading to the blowout progress.
• Key flow checks to determine if the well was flowing were not performed • We stop, inform supervision, and avoid workarounds
before the incident if procedures are missing, unclear, unsafe, or cannot
• The drilling contractor did not test its drillers’ abilities in detecting be followed.
indications of gas influx
• The operating company did not specify the barriers required during
operations, or how to respond if a barrier was lost
 Pryor Trust Gas Well Blowout with PSF Knowledge

WHAT AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENT?

• Underbalanced drilling was performed without needed planning,

•
equipment, skills, or procedures
The driller was not effectively trained in using a new electronic trip sheet,
Recognize Change
which is used to help monitor for gas influx
• Equipment was aligned differently than normal during the tripping • We discuss and seek advice on change that occurs
operation, leading to confusion in interpreting the well data which caused gradually over time.
rig workers to miss indications of the gas influx
• Surface pressure was not identified two separate times before opening
the BOP during operations before the blowout,
• Both the day and night driller chose to turn off the entire alarm system,
contributing to both drillers missing critical indications of the gas influx
and imminent blowout
Stop if the Unexpected
• The alarm system was not effectively designed to alert personnel to Occurs
hazardous conditions during different operating states (e.g., drilling,
tripping, circulating, and surface operations) and would have sounded • We pause and ask questions when signals and
excessive non-critical alarms during the 14 hours leading to the blowout
conditions are not as expected.
• Key flow checks to determine if the well was flowing were not performed
before the incident • We stop and alert supervision if the activity is not
• The drilling contractor did not test its drillers’ abilities in detecting proceeding as expected.
indications of gas influx
• The operating company did not specify the barriers required during
operations, or how to respond if a barrier was lost
Incorporating IOGP PSFs within Everyday Operations

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How to Use the IOGP PSFs?

Toolbox talks Pre-job Last minute Post-job Observations Intervention

& safety planning risk reviews & walk-
meetings assessment abouts

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 IOGP PSF Resources & Tools

Visit our website for…

www.iogp.org/oil-and-gas-safety/process-safety/fundamentals/

Videos Posters Presentations External

resources

Get in touch!
[email protected]
+44 (0)20 3763 9700
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Become an OSA Participant!

The OSA welcomes participation from both companies and trade

associations.

Voluntary to join, and no dues required.

For additional information, contact:

• Emily Hague – [email protected]

onshoresafetyalliance.org
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 Thank You!
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