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Performing Science and the Virtual
This dazzling new book from Sue-Ellen Case looks at how science has been
performed throughout history, tracing a line from eleventh-century alchemy to
the twenty-first-century virtual avatar.
Theatre and science are deeply interwoven in the European tradition, both in
historical development and in strategies of representation. As science and new
technologies become more pervasive in the social world, whilst at the same time
retreating into their own specialized disourses, performances of their power
provide a familiar, active interface with them. Performing Science and the Virtual
reviews how these performances borrow from spiritualist notions of transcen-
dence, as well as the social codes of race, gender and economic exchange.
In this daring and wide-ranging book we encounter Faust, glimpse Edison in
his laboratory, enter the soundscape of John Cage and raid tombs with Lara
Croft. Case looks at the intersection of science and performance in a way that
unsettles our assumptions across these disciplines.
Sue-Ellen Case
First published 2007
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Simultaneously published in the UK
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park,Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
© 2007 Sue-Ellen Case
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or
by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photo-
copying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Case, Sue-Ellen.
Performing science and the virtual / by Sue-Ellen Case. – 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Science—History—19th century. 2. Science—History—20th century. 3. Science—History—
21st century. 4.Technology—History—19th century. 5.Technology—History—20th century.
6.Technology—History—21st century. 7. Science and the arts. 8.Technology and the arts. 9.
Science—Social aspects. 10.Technology—Social aspects. I.Title.
Q125.C3837 2006
500—dc22 2006020716
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
List of illustrations x
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
Notes 223
Bibliography 228
Index 236
Illustrations
First, I would like to thank my editor, Talia Rodgers. During this project, I expe-
rienced several crises of confidence and Talia was always wonderfully supportive,
assuring me that a more “horizontal” organization was viable, and leading me to
other books with similar approaches. Several UCLA graduate students have
helped with research, writing, and thinking through some of the issues: Nikki
Eschen, Ayan Gangopadhyay, Jason Farman, Heidi Miller, Yael Prizant, Kaitrin
McDonagh, Cheryl Lubin, and Chantal Rodriguez. My thanks to Candace
Moore and the UCLA Center for the Study of Women for last-minute help with
illustrations. For questions of historical accuracy, I asked Marvin Carlson and
Simon Williams to read early drafts of certain sections. Their responses were
helpful and supportive. But most of all, my partner, Susan Leigh Foster, endured
the long, summer months of obsessive writing with humor; choreographed the
time so that I could work on this project; read numerous drafts; supplied insights
and additions, and corrected my awkward grammar. Moreover, she helped to
create a rich life together that could afford this project.
Introduction
Although I have seen it inscribed on some of the older buildings at some of the
better universities, replete with its capital “S,” the grand, singular noun Science
has lost some of its power to summon. Without the capital inscription, the
sciences join the ever-more-multiple postmodern pluralities of once singular
notions such as globalisms, genders, and feminisms. Yet those of us in academic
disciplines clustered in the Humanities continue to feel the economic and institu-
tional sting of Science, as do many in the mediatized realm of documentary
reportage. While the sciences and their technologies, proliferating wildly, seem to
assimilate more and more of our social, economic, ecological, and aesthetic
reserves, they have also increasingly withdrawn into their own specialized styles
of articulation, consorting exclusively with their chosen forms of so-called facts
and figures and actively rejecting any “humanistic” tracking of their ideas as
“uninformed.” Thus, Science both impounds the social in effect and affect and
retreats from its critical articulation. This book tracks performances inspired by
the reclusive, transcendent status that Science seems to hold in the cultural imag-
inary, from performative rites of its technologies to fearful expulsions of its
machines and ideologies.
My first encounter with the seductive spectacle of new technologies occurred
when I was approximately ten years old. The only entertainment my working-
class parents could afford was Friday nights at the Sears Roebuck department
store. With popcorn in hand, we strolled past the performances of new blenders
and power saws, but the performance that always caught me up in its power and
radiance was the chromed, wailing vacuum cleaner whose reverse air flow held
multiple balls high in the air. While the other apparati simply performed their
intended functions, the vacuum cleaner invoked an invisible power to elevate
those colored orbs into the air, spinning beautifully above the racks of clothes.
Not only did its chrome sheath seduce and its power of transcendence amaze,
but its ability to keep many balls in the air had a deep influence upon my
writing—as this project will demonstrate.
As I grew older, the Sears Roebuck performances were amplified by school
field trips to local laboratories and observatories and enforced participation in
science fairs. The science fairs required me to devise a “winning” demonstration
2 Introduction
of my own little research projects and to note, competitively, how many other
students from other schools were demonstrating their own. Meanwhile, my
parents gave me chemistry sets and telescopes for Christmas, which kept me busy
performing various science-oriented tasks as entertainment, and Hollywood
served up science-fiction films with scientists as heroes. The darker side of
science and technology appeared in various forms: we practiced hiding under
our desks at school in case of a nuclear attack; sonic booms split the skies above
our backyards as test pilots broke the sound barrier over nearby air fields; and, at
school, we were brought into the auditorium to listen to a radio countdown of an
execution in the electric chair.
At the time, I was not aware that these performances of science with its tech-
nological victories and threats had derived from years, even centuries of
imagining Science. Similar demonstrations of apparati had already been
performed in the nineteenth century, notably, in this study, by Thomas Edison;
the science fairs devolved from a century or more of museums of science and the
practices of display; fears of the darker side were as old as Faust legends, and the
performance of machines had inspired numerous playwrights, electronic
composers, and grassroots rites throughout the twentieth century. In order to
review the performance of science, I realized I needed to look to the apparatus
of theater and beyond to what I am calling grassroots performances that have
played out the psychic affect of the ever-imposing rise of science in various
invented rites and social organizations. From the canonical Faust by Goethe to
decoder rings in cereal boxes, then, a variety of performances have served to
locate and define the scientific discoveries of their times. However, the perfor-
mance of science is not simply a matter of the stage or adepts imagining science.
Theater and science are deeply interwoven in the European tradition, both in
historical development and in strategies of representation. As these few examples
illustrate, if theater staged science, science also staged itself as theater.
My studies have revealed two major strategies of representation that have
worked across the fields of science and performance: constructions of virtual
space and the avatar. Both the laboratory and the stage construct a space that is
organized as alternative to the ubiquitous, pedestrian realm. Acting within that
space requires particular codes of behavior, traditions of costuming, and training
in specialized gestures or functions. In order to imagine how that space can be
set apart from quotidian spaces and how behavior in that space might be recog-
nized as “special” or “specialized,” both theater and science have deployed
notions of the virtual and its avatar that are as old as The Upanishads and as new
as cyberspace and online avatars. One way to perceive the particular meaning of
the term “virtual” is to review its definition in the Oxford Dictionary. Usage of the
term in English spans at least four hundred years, referring to both science and
philosophy. “Virtual” is first defined as “Possessed of certain physical virtues or
capacities;” in 1660, it refers to herbs as “possessing certain virtues;” in 1683 it is
a power “capable of producing a certain effect or result; effective, potent,
powerful”; in 1654 it “is so in essence or effect although not formally or actu-
Introduction 3
ally”; in 1704, it refers to optics “applied to the apparent focus or image resulting
from the effect of reflection or refraction upon rays of light;” and, finally in 1883
from “Dynamics” “of velocity or momentum.” As for “virtuality,” the dictionary
offers three usages: “the possession of force or power;” “Essential nature or
being, apart from external form or embodiment” (1646), and “a virtual (as
opposed to actual) thing, capacity, etc; a potentiality” (1836). Thus, the English
usage of the terms “virtual” and “virtuality” moves across the fields of moral
philosophy, optics, physics, and ontology. This mix of immaterial and material
referents that all somehow display a sense of power and “otherness” is crucial to
the application of virtual space in producing theater and science. It is at once the
effect of an apparatus and a potent realm of essence, apart from function.
Today, one can experience Virtual Reality through new technologies and even
buy virtual property on eBay, finally turning the cyber-virtual realm into real
estate. The economic uses of the virtual do play into this concoction; however,
they are augmented by a crucial addition, one that I will here call “spiritualism.”
Although this term has certain nineteenth-century associations, which do pertain
here, I want to broaden “spiritualism” to include various practices that partici-
pate in alternative imagined spaces inspired by or in resistance to the reception
of science and technology. These notions are sometimes practiced by religions,
sometimes cults, sometimes eccentric individual inventions, and sometimes by
the scientists themselves. Celebrating technologies as transcendent surely partici-
pates in the tradition of elevated spaces and avatars as invented by spiritual
movements; performing spiritual spaces and avatars against science as a fallen
materialist practice also ironically recreates some of science’s own claims; and
perceiving discoveries as “damnable,” as against God and Nature repeats the
Faustian parable, even in the twenty-first century.
As noted above, costumes and specialized systems of gesture and function are
necessary for action in the virtual spaces of science and performance. The
virtual must somehow be made manifest. The tradition of avatars has been
made to represent the somehow “othered presence” in these virtual realms. From
actual scientists in lab coats manipulating their various apparati to Sun Ra with
antennae and Egyptian religious symbols performing the “Pharaoh from Outer
Space,” costumes and behavioral codes are required to mark the dimensions of
these techno-virtual spaces. Reading these codes, I begin with the alchemist, who
purposefully invoked the cosmological in the laboratory, and conclude with the
celebrated cyber-avatar of Lara Croft, who seems to belong solely to the corpo-
rate world of entertainment. Along the way, I hope to show the ways in which,
from alchemist to Lara certain borrowings from among scientific, spiritualist and
performance practices continue to produce the performance of science through
the avatar and the virtual.
While the materials of the book are organized in roughly chronological order,
I have subsumed them under headings that imitate the performative structure of
acts and scenes. My turn to the traditional structures of the play was caused by
several factors. First, as I have already argued in The Domain-Matrix (1996), I
4 Introduction
believe we are caught in an historical era that mixes the customs and beliefs of
print culture with the more performative and episodic spaces of the cyber.
Caught between books and the World Wide Web, ambivalent practices of
writing and reading suggest to me that I could not continue to frame my research
in a strictly print tradition. Thus, not strictly adhering to the confines of print
culture, I have not sought to develop one long sequential argument. While simi-
larities and resonances do prevail among these centuries-long practices, they are
not developmental. So I have assembled them under various rubrics. As the critic
Carolyn Allen remarked, this book might be read as a narrative of tropes.
Contemporary readers may want to read the book as they read the web, seeking
out certain examples of interest and ignoring others, or they may follow links, in
this case tropes that appear in various places throughout the text. I have listed
most of the examples in order to make that opportunity easier. Acts, meaning,
really, performative critical actions, inscribe sets of examples within the temporal
tropes of centuries in the same way that gestures and encounters are caught up
in the temporal form of a theatrical Act.
Even popular computer games have moved from narrative, linear forms to
topological ones, for example The Sims or the Grand Theft Auto series. In both,
players can freely roam the virtual spaces of the game. Grand Theft Auto: San
Andreas, the latest game in a series almost ten years old, even offers an entire state
to explore. Although some narrative form lingers in the game, in that the user
takes on a character and needs to accomplish missions set by the bosses, she or
he may decide to climb a mountain, play various betting games in the casino, get
a tattoo, eat, go to the gym, listen to music, and even have cyber-sex.1 Would that
I could provide these alternatives here, although during the time the reader
peruses this text, all of those activities might occur. With sales of over five million
dollars, what author wouldn’t envy this game?
Second, research today has been radically altered by the internet, particularly
when it concerns popular culture and specifically techno and internet cultures.
While my own training in print scholarship has led me to include a number of
traditional citations, much of the material has been derived from the internet
and may be considered specious by more traditional readers. Hanging on to the
authoritative power of print is becoming more and more anterior to contempo-
rary searches though, and while print does continue to offer some assurance to
the reader, it may actually be just as profligate as the digital. Error and plagia-
rism are not unique to the internet, nor indeed is the cache of documents
deemed “original.” For example, there is no better archive of materials than on
the website of The Newton Project (http://www.newtonproject.ic.ac.uk), funded
by the English Arts and Humanities Research Board and hosted by the Centre
for History of Science, Technology and Medicine at Imperial College London,
in collaboration with Cambridge University. Researchers have uploaded onto the
website an amazing number of Newton’s alchemical manuscripts, which had
previously been very difficult to access. The powerful Google search engine
provides links to many contemporary and historical practices, including images,
Introduction 5
orientalist fakir Mme. Blavatsky, the brooding, reclusive Strindberg, and catch
glimpses of Newton and Edison in their laboratories. We visit stage productions
of robots, Einstein and Darwin, enter the soundscape of John Cage, play a
computer game with the digital Lara Croft, and become a transgendered cyber-
Brandon.
Prologue
Theater’s rebirth
The curtain opens on the traditional history of theater’s rebirth in Europe. This
story is familiar to most of us who have endured standard coursework in theater
history. The following is a retelling of the myth, or history we have received,
narrated from a different perspective, and with a different emphasis. Here, it will
serve to illustrate the myth of origins deployed in the displacement of performances
designed to induce transformation, or transmutation with a theater of represen-
tation. Hopefully, revealing the specific cultural investment in this displacement
will help to clarify how theater, and its cultural partner, the “new” science have
served to construct a strictly European tradition of the mode of representation.
The ironic tone of this revised narrative has been encouraged by the omissions
and subjugations embedded in the traditional history of origins, particularly as
they have affected the participation of women in cultural production and the
construction of “othered” cultural ethnicities. It will be argued that two basic
strategies of extraction were deployed to displace sciences and rites dedicated to
change: the special role assigned to the human subject and the notion of a
virtual space that was designed for exclusive access.
As the curtain parts, we discover a gathering of men in vestments, near the
altar in the Christian Church, on Easter day, performing the story of the god’s
resurrection. This is the site traditional histories of European theater will insist
upon as the resurrection of theater itself. As the story goes, after centuries of
Christian censure in Western Europe, theater’s rebirth took place, propitiously,
around the performance of the quem queritis (Visitatio Sepulchri), or the liturgy
surrounding Christ’s own resurrection, in the tenth century. While certain trans-
formational practices still remained in the liturgy, such as the transubstantiation
of wine and bread into the body and blood of Christ, the liturgical tropes identi-
fied as those that encouraged theater were tropes concerning the narration of
the life of Christ, celebrated at specific times in the Christian calendar, particu-
larly at Easter. Cut off from its association with other rites, what would become
theater took its cue from the Christian history, re-imagining its own roots as from
an ancient source, Greece, (from around the same period and geographical loca-
tion as Christianity’s), along with its own birth, death, and resurrection—the
latter happily coinciding with the liturgical representation of Christ’s own.
8 Prologue
The action of our first medieval play embodies a quest which comes to a
successful conclusion in discovery. . . . The structure we may call comic in
that the play moves from complication to happy revelation, turning climacti-
cally on the two-phase revelation: the angel says, “He is risen,” the women
reacting with an Alleluia. . . .
At its rebirth, theater emulated the Christian narrative, emerging from its liturgy.
It did not spring from transformational rites, but as a plotted narrative with
certain specific characteristics of change resulting in a happy ending.
The notion of an actor, or performer, in the European tradition was not
derived from the priest’s ritual of the transformation of the wine and bread. Had
acting been understood as ritualistic and transformative, it might have found
consonance with different traditions in the world and different cosmologies. It
might have remained embedded in ritual, music, and dance and dedicated to
transformation. But the extraction of “theater” from the fusion of change,
dance, and music actually displaced those performances of transmutation. This
extraction constituted one of the major contributions of European culture—a
kind of historical dentistry that produced careful divisions among the arts,
leaving dancers mute and actors less mobile. The success of the extraction
depended on theater’s participation in narrative and representation. The struc-
ture of theater would not be the celebration of a god who corporealized through
ritual; instead the focus was shifted to a man-god who was represented as an absent
figure and whose absence evoked the presence of actors in the Easter liturgy: the
two Marys. Not to linger on the seductive theories of presence and absence as
many have done, the point here is merely that these first “actors,” took on the
representation of Biblical figures: they acted out a written story. The shift of
focus, from rites of transubstantion to representation ultimately differentiated
theater from liturgy.
In this model of theater, the god did not corporealize through, say, trance
dancing, nor was he somehow embedded in transmutating materials. In fact, as
we will see, this sanctioned form of representation was designed to displace trans-
formative rites and discourses, such as alchemy. The only transformation in the
story theater would tell was expressed through the narrative, not the enactment
of the resurrection. It was a story that promised deferred transformation to the
spectator/believers. Transformation would be an effect of spectatorship rather
than a performative action. This promise of resurrection, deferred to the end of
one’s life, became the central promissory note in the Christian economy and
created the sense that spectatorship could finally pay off. While transformational
Prologue 9
rites of the period, such as alchemy, or witchcraft, were designed to enhance the
participant, theater promised a pay off for the audience. Later, theater would
demand payment up front for its performance of deferred transformation, albeit
aesthetic rather than religious.
Although transformation was deferred in this new form, a particular form of
exchange was practiced in the casting. It seems that the two Marys were
primarily played by men, except, perhaps, in some convents (Ogden 2002: 143).
While Ogden and others, such as myself, have expended much energy to reclaim
those early performances by women, still, what is marked here, is how represen-
tation was founded, in this tradition, on a gender exchange.1 At first glance, such
an exchange might be construed as an aberration in a form designed to displace
transformation. Could gender exchange be the one remaining element, so to
speak, of alchemical practices that imagined a debased metal transmutated into
gold? Could a man be changed into a woman through performance? Perhaps.
But this exchange, though, in one sense, an unstable element, actually stabilized
the rite of representation as belonging to the exclusive all-male realm of men in
vestments. As theater became extracted, vestments became costumes, music an
accompaniment, and the all-male realm stable in marking places of privilege.
Enter the “new” science, also designed to displace, say, alchemy. These new
performance practices also carried over into the laboratory. Access would be
limited to men in robes, experimenting through equations of stable and unstable
elements, perceived through an iterative rather than transformative lens. Although,
by now, these observations belong to an obvious, overworked interpretation of
the traditional history of theater and science, they may prove useful in an exami-
nation of rise of the “new” theater and the “new” science as contingent practices
in Europe. The uses and discoveries of theater and science may be seen to found
a kind of social realm that would extend between their sites of practice.
Moreover, the sites of the laboratory, the Church, and the stage claimed to
provide an architecture of the virtual that would become crucial to the ways in
which they would inform one another. The medieval cathedral purported to
provide an architecture of the virtual space of heaven, where the “spirit,” or the
actor/character was cast as an effect of that space. The grandiose effort and
effect of the cathedral exclaimed the virtual as a transcendent space, appropri-
ating communal labor, investment, and a dominant place in the social and
natural landscape. David Wiles argues, this “sacred” space articulated “a
complete value system” outside of which, the participating nun, or priest, had no
identity (2003: 49). Thus, the architecture of a space that claimed the virtual not
only offered a structure of meaning, it also bestowed meaning upon the
performers it encased. In her book The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace (1999), Margaret
Wertheim emphasizes the promises of such virtual space to the exclusion of
decay and the embrace of the universal, relating these earlier, Christian claims to
the promises of the new, technological virtual in the late twentieth century. Thus,
as Wertheim and others argue, technology borrowed its sense of the virtual from
the Church architecture. Theater also borrowed the claims to these powers and
10 Prologue
Borrowing, then, from the virtual powers of the saint, the “liveness” of the
human seemed to raise “him” above the elements. As we will see, the “old”
science of alchemy provided a different epistemology, in which a shared subjec-
tivity extended across “man” and elements.
The slow development of the notion of “man” as superior subject occurred
in both the philosophies and sciences of the European tradition. In his book
The Open, Giorgio Agamben traces this development of “man” as an excep-
tional subject noting that, at first, “in the Ancien Regime the boundaries of
man are much more uncertain and fluctuating than they will appear in the
nineteenth century after the development of the human sciences” (2002: 24).
Even so, Agamben points to Linnaeus, the great taxonomer, as establishing
“man” as a special species. Through discursive strategies of self-recognition,
“man” established himself as a category (26). God-like, Christian notions of
“man,” and his special status as “live” were buttressed up by his participation
in virtual systems, such as language and self-consciousness. “Man” could
appropriate the virtual as a product of his own nature, rendering his powers as
unique. If god was in his heaven, it was man that had imagined him there.
Although, at first, the “new” science simply claimed this special role for “man”
the observer, later Darwinian notions of his origin from among the animals
challenged his virtual and saint-like genealogy and, in the twentieth century,
his role as special subject, the knowing observer, was both challenged and
maintained by physics.
Nonetheless, as special spectator, “man” claims a vitalistic dynamism for “his”
gaze, which renders the object as static. Blair notes how the seventeenth century
scientific deployment of the paradigm of theater displaced qualities of change
with the condition of stasis: “Renaissance natural philosophical authors”
observed “the static qualities of the theater of nature—its vast expanse . . . and
elaborate construction . . . ” (1997: 155). Tranformation, or transmutation, so
central to alchemy, was eschewed by the “new” science. Blair, like Agamben,
amplifies her argument by referring to the later development of the taxonomic
system by Linnaeus in 1785, which assigned organisms to fixed places within a
system of classification. The space of nature, then, as examined, would be one
that was enclosed, static and calibrated for isolated integers. The great furnaces
of the alchemists, firing up the transmutative essence of elements would be
displaced by apparati designed to reveal and record their static properties. The
objects of study would be static in their location, and self-referential in their
attributes. The emphasis is on regularity, not dynamism—iteration, not transmu-
tation. Representation.
12 Prologue
The fundamental cause of the development of a thing [as] not external but
internal. . . . There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its
motion and development. . . . Thus materialist dialectics effectively combats
the theory of external causes, or of an external motive force. . . . Simple
growth in plants and animals . . . is likewise chiefly the result of their
internal contradictions. Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to
external but to internal causes. . . . (46)
Combining cultural, social, and scientific operations, Mao insists that change is
an inherent part of the composition of a plant, animal, human, or social entity.
Prologue 13
Mao portrays a dynamic universe in which change is the essence rather than the
external engine of things. Thus, the so-called attributes of all elements are actu-
ally attributes of the dynamics of essential change rather than properties that
define a single, bounded element: they serve as adverbs, not adjectives. In this
way, it is possible to imagine a materialist critique that might move toward the
integration of social and ecological elements and away from the kind of static
partition Mao eschews above.
In spite of Mao’s utopian model, what theater stages, instead, is change
through an external force. In the theater of plots and characters, the human
subject, or “motivation,” causes change in the world and among elements. In as
much as later political theater practitioners, such as Brecht, would hope to put
theater in the service of change, their dramaturgical force still resides in the
human subject as if separate from and vitally transcendent to the elements. The
function of change remains located solely within the character.
To emphasize this perception of nature as a theater, as a space managed
and observed, is not to suggest that earlier European practices embraced some
Nietzschean notion of nature as wild, or even posited an origin of the “real”
and “pure” nature. “Nature,” in England, had already been managed through
various sorts of enclosures long before those parcels of private property would
begin to appear in the eighteenth century. The management of natural spaces
that were set aside and demarcated for specific uses were at least as old as the
New Forest—the Nova Foresta—founded by William the Conqueror in 1079 for
his deer hunting. The royal management of the woods both protected them
and devastated them. The woods were designed for the needs and pleasures of
the special human subject. Certain species were decimated in favor of those
that were useful to the humans. Rules and dispensations governed hunting and
woodcutting to conserve the young game and the saplings for further use. An
even more severe appropriation of the woods was exercised once they became
a supply for the Navy’s ships. Elizabeth I had begun “encoppicing” enclosures
of forest with the idea of supplying timber for her Navy. Thus, the woods, first
designed to supply heat and game for the royals and the locals became a
factory for the production of ships sent out to expand and protect the Empire.
For these ends, the woods, the forest, the trees—the undergrowth and the
canopy—were highly planted, cut, and managed through practices of owner-
ship and surveillance, even becoming a supply terminal for imperialist
ventures.2
Science and theater offered an organization of knowing and managing as a
viewing apparatus, a lens, through which the appearance of the object was trans-
lated, with the assumption that its translation would provide a more accurate
vision of it. If science emulated theater, theater also emulated science. In “The
Artificial Eye: Augustan Theater and the Empire of the Visible,” Joseph Roach
enforces this notion, interpreting “the Augustan theater as an instrument, closely
analogous to contemporary optical instruments, especially suited to the magnifi-
cation of behavior” as well as to classification (1991: 143). Further, this drive to
14 Prologue
classification was a kind of inventory, familiar to what Roach, like Mao, perceives
as a mechanism of representation and economic value. For Roach, theater offers
a “multinational corporate vision” of trade (138–139). Theater is the apparatus
that intercedes between subject and object, yielding a vision of its essential
elements, whether they be physical or behavioral.
Act One
Alchemy
To fully situate the operations of theater and “new” science in the seventeenth
century, it is necessary to understand how they functioned as interdictions against
the occult sciences and arts. Within this general era, as imagined by traditional
histories, the occult science most at issue was alchemy. Although alchemy
continued to inform both performance and science, it was sufficiently debased by
this new collusion to lose any institutional power it might have gained in earlier
centuries.
Part of the reason that alchemy has been constructed as the fallen “other” of
the rites of representation and the new science has to do with its social and polit-
ical associations. Alchemy came into Europe from Islam, taking its name from
the Arabic al-kimiya. The founder of alchemy was identified as the possibly-myth-
ical Egyptian, Hermes Trismegistus. Alchemy was part of what R.W. Southern
describes as a “one-way traffic in ideas” in the twelfth century, radiating out from
the major Muslim centers in Spain and Sicily. Southern notes the central role the
sciences played in this influx, particularly mathematics and astronomy, from
1150 onward and he describes the complex reception this influx encountered, as
the developing sense of “Europe” began to be formed (1963: 64–66).
An anxiety of influence within Europe, alongside the fear of the growing
territories of Islam to its South and East, catalyzed the need to establish a notion
of “Europe” that could compete with the political and intellectual spread of
Islamic influence. Edward Said, in Orientalism emphasizes that orientalist discrim-
ination is never far from the idea of Europe, which established its base upon the
notion of a superior cultural identity (1979: 7). Said further clarifies this position,
noting that discrimination in the form of orientalism actually operates through
its “distribution” into aesthetic and philological texts, by organizing “orthodoxies
and canons of tastes, texts, and values . . . ” (12). In the face of such a major
intellectual and practical influx of ideas from Islam, Europe required the
construction of an “intellectual authority” that could be identified as its own
(19). The displacement of alchemy by the “new” science was key to establishing
a new European “intellectual authority.”
In part, alchemy was made esoteric, or driven into secrecy by prejudices
against it based upon superstitious reactions to its contents as associated with
Figure 1 Frontispiece from Johann Gottfried Kiessling, Relatio practica, Leipzig, 1752
(A049. http://www.alchemywebsite.com © Adam McLean 2002)
Act One 17
Islamic beliefs. If alchemy was indeed superstitious, its reception was also super-
stitious. As Said notes, during the middle ages it was not the knowledge of
Islamic thought and practice that became more accurate, but the ignorance of it
that became more refined and complex (62). Indeed, that ignorance was lent a
certain moral value. Said illustrates how, instead of inquiry into Islamic sciences
and literature, they were constructed through a “narcissistic” approach that
made them into a mirror of European practices, but a bad, evil one (67–70). As
we will see, Goethe imagines the alchemist to be in league with the devil—the
practice to be the opposite of Christianity.
Alchemy, philosophy, and religion were all intertwined with medical and
arithmetical discourses, coloring their reception, while also establishing their
worth. Astronomy and astrology as well as chemistry and alchemy were directly
linked to philosophical traditions. As Christianity tied its discursive power to the
Latin tradition, a language elevated against Arabic, it needed to assimilate what
it could from these findings, while actively suppressing large portions of the
learning. Christian/Latin Europe devised a way to extract the findings, or the
data, as we would say today, from its embedded location within cosmological,
philosophical and occult dimensions. This extraction would “color” how scientific
knowledge was constituted. The isolation of elements for study, the sealed-off
isolation of the laboratory is a consequence of this mode of extraction.
Set against belief systems, the “new” science claimed empiricism as its differ-
ence from these ancient practices. Yet Adelard, in twelfth-century England,
recorded methods of inquiry practiced by the Arabs that suggest they may have
routinely practiced a similar experimental approach (Daniel 1979: 271). In fact,
it is easy to imagine that the Latin studies, based on disputation and iteration,
were less open to those experimental methods than the Arabs, whose science was
allied with the practical arts of metallurgy, pharmacy, and astronomy. Arguing
for the adoption of Arabic sciences with his nephew, who was ensconced in the
Latin tradition, Adelard notes: “from the Arabic masters I have learned one
thing, to be led by reason, while you are caught in the image of authority” (qtd.
in Daniel, 270). Alchemy was a science of experimentation. What knowledge
was passed down in the great emblems and poems was a result of the findings in
the labs. No alchemist was without his laboratory, or furnace. Alchemy was a
practice that fused methods derived from the various trades of metallurgy and
embalming with philosophy. Hands-on processes were well developed, alongside
the figurations of astrology. In working with the basic structures of matter,
alchemy sought to understand those structures as in consonance with those of
philosophy. While these sciences were experimental, they were not extracted
from philosophical inquiry. The emphasis on the extraction and isolation of
empiricism was the force with which the new European intellectual authority
installed itself. This European form of cultural dentistry was operating on several
fronts at once, then, in terms of theater and the “new” science.
As the active construction of Europe was proceeding through identifications
with the Latin and Chrstian traditions, it was deemed necessary to make these
18 Act One
There are two directions in which alchemical mercury leads us. On the one
hand, it is a complex elaboration of a chemical substance. . . . But there is
Act One 19
market. Maintaining value was a driving anxiety hostile to local and counterfeit
vagaries of exchange.
In this time of anxiety about monetary value it is small wonder that alchemy
was perceived as primarily a science for turning “base” metals into gold. In the
popular imagination, the alchemists became the magi of “real” money, who
could transform other materials into the substance of ultimate value. The
alchemists were used, then, not to celebrate the rites of the potential for change,
but to mint the stability of absolute value. Alchemy, as the science of the produc-
tion of gold, was reconstituted as a conservative rather than as a radical practice
of change. Yet, although many alchemists were employed by the crown to
provide it with gold, the alchemical tradition established a long history of the
esoteric and theological management of money outside the control of the crown
and state. For example, the Knights Templars, an esoteric, international Order
served as financial agents, while the monasteries and even some convents enjoyed
rights to coinage.4 Alchemy maintained a relation of monetary value to esoteric
philosophy; it could be managed by philosophers, alchemical scientists, and even
nuns rather than by those exploited by the crown. But, at a time of the differenti-
ation of value into different substances, the perception of alchemy seemed to
reverse the process, transforming things into the one single sign of ultimate
worth—gold. As we will see, the theater partners these projects with plays such as
Jonson’s Alchemist and Goethe’s Faust, which stages these anxieties between the
uses of alchemy, paper money and the crown as a conflict directly connected to
the powers of heaven and hell.
Alongside this panic over money, the plague was inducing a panic over the
sustainability of the human body. Thus, alchemy seemed also to be focused on
producing the elixir of life, which could both bank and issue a longer youthful,
continuance of the human body. Perhaps this notion was derived from the
earliest Egyptian influences on the art, which were related to the embalming
practices—the preservation of the body. Thus, security in value and vitality
seemed to be the worthwhile promise of alchemy, and the radical core of
alchemy, mercurial change, and the transmutation of materials was put to a
conservative use, in producing the essential substance of value, gold, while
money was on the way to becoming more and more virtual. The cosmology of
change was assimilated by the science of iteration.
drive to decode is a familiar one to critics and technologists in the late twentieth
century. Widespread software inventions/controls and online communications
have also inspired an obsession with decoding, from serious books like Code, to
popular science fiction novels such as Cryptonomicon. In the late twentieth century,
this decoding is related to conspiracy theories based on the seductive corporate
structuring of appearances that might not match real economic and social rela-
tions (as troped in the film The Matrix). For Newton, in the late seventeenth
century, decoding was likewise perceived as revealing the structure of things, but
in the more positive tradition of regarding the codes as inspired, prescient
models. In these studies, Newton strove to discover the principles of structure
embedded in theoretical/performative writings (Dobbs 1975: 175). In his time of
counterfeiting, Newton sought truth in the codes; in ours, we seek the structure
of the lie.
Newton’s fame is based upon his discovery of the notion of gravity by
watching an apple fall. In fact, Newton’s “discovery” of gravity has been received
as the paradigm of empirical knowledge. Yet, when situated alongside his
alchemical practices, his discovery of gravity may be understood as a byproduct
of alchemical decoding. Some critics suggest that his discovery emanated from
his study of one of the major emblems of alchemy: the star regulus (Dobbs 1975:
148–149). In this star, the power flow of the emblem is understood to draw from
the points in toward the center, through attraction, rather than emanating out
through the points. The emblem of the force of attraction, drawing in, in
contrast to the common notion of star light as radiance, projecting out, may
have inspired Newton to be able to imagine the attraction of gravity upon the
apple. My point, here, is not to discover an actual cause and effect relationship in
Newton’s work, but to excavate a mode of knowing through a familiar and
significant example of Newton. His thought contributed much to his alchemical
operations, as to the foundations of the empirical process.6 In other words, the
emblem provided a model of perception that could inform an empirical
discovery. If one could imagine the forces of attraction, one might actually
perceive them at work.
To further understand how alchemical decoding, or coding worked, we can
access a simple example on the web by “Eirenaeus Philalethes” or George
Starkey. Newton was greatly influenced by Philalethes in his most alchemical
period. Starkey (1628–65) immigrated to London in 1650, where he immediately
erected a laboratory and became the teacher of a man who would go on to
acquire fame as “the father of modern chemistry,” Robert Boyle (also an
alchemist). At the same time, Starkey wrote numerous alchemical treatises under
the nom de plume of “Eirenaeus Philalethes” (a peaceful lover of truth). These
works were read with interest by such other theorists as Locke and Leibniz. His
decoding of one rather simple poem (in contrast to other alchemical texts and
emblems) has been uploaded onto the alchemy website.7 Two lines of the poem,
followed by the decoding are downloaded here to illustrate how alchemical
images represented experiments and theories alike. In the following passages,
Act One 23
The poem: With drops of poysoned sweat, approaching thus his secret Den.
Philalethes: The following two Verses then are but a more Ample descrip-
tion of this work; of volatilization which is an ascension, and descension, or
circulation of the confections within the Glass. Which Glass here called the
secret Den, is else-where called by the same Author, a little Glassen-tun, and
is an oval Vessel; of the purest White Glass, about the bigness of an ordinary
24 Act One
In this passage, the specific apparati and effects required for the chemical process
are described as actions, “sweat,” and place, “den.” The toad is moving and
changing, both externally and internally. The tube in which the chemical effects
take place is a “den” where the toad lives. The alchemist is interacting with a
vital substance, rather than manipulating one that has a mere object-status. The
subject itself is changing, within its environment, rather than representing proper-
ties within an external force of change. Alchemical discourse does not read as an
address to the alchemist, such as “now add a drop of mercury, “ evoking him as
the subject who acts, but figures the actions in terms of the elements themselves.
Emblematic practice included more than the decoding of alchemical poems.
Newton’s projects, like the lines above, sought to think through experiments of
conjunction rather than through the isolation of elements. Using Pythagoras, he
sought a consonance among the lengths of strings and the distances among
planets. He spent many years of his life endeavoring to reorganize fragmentary
references to Solomon’s temple in order to compose a pattern, a mandala (in
New Age speak) of space that would organize all of history as well as the future.
He reconstructed its floor plan as an emblem of the world’s change through
time.8 Even his renowned anti-trinitarian stand, dangerous in terms of the collu-
sion of church and state, refused the partition embedded in the notion of the
trinity. In his era, this conjoining of practice and poetry, of science and art, of
rite and experiment within the emblem was being partitioned into discrete and
sometimes opposing practices. Finding the “big picture,” an integrated sense of
the world across species and elements, through history and future, was aban-
doned for smaller and more tightly focused projects. Charting movement and
change became numerical.
Even though the sense of the emblematic expresses the alchemical science in
figures more suitable to its sense of a shared, changing universe than the
language of numbers, there still lingers the sense that the practice of experimen-
tation has been encoded into these emblems. So the question remains, to what
end? This question prompts some consideration of alchemy as an esoteric, secret
practice. Part of what the esoteric tradition is designed to effect is social protec-
tion surrounding the knowledge of potential transformations of power—a
hermetic hermeneutics, if you will. As the twentieth century would witness, the
unleashing of transformative power, as in fission, can be threatening to the whole
planet. While the Faust legend individualized the dangers of that power,
rendering them a moral risk for the soul, alchemy, as esoteric, claims to shield the
social rather than the individual from the misuse of such powers. In its coded
Figure 2 Emblem of Solomon’s Temple sketched by Isaac Newton
(http://www.world-mysteries.com/awr_8sbynewton.gif)
26 Act One
Grind the mercury . . . the doves of Diana mediating, with its brother, philo-
sophical gold, from which it will receive spiritual semen. The spiritual semen
is the fire which will purge all the superfluities of the mercury, the fermental
virtue intervening.
(quoted in Dobbs 1975: 182)
Act One 27
The virgin Diana is not anthropomorphized here, made into a woman who
would receive sperm; instead, her “doves” serve as mediators of germination.
Her gender, her virginal status, is thus more adverbial than adjectival. Her doves,
her virginal gender, mediate the cleansing fire of sperm, to produce the base
material, the essential, at once both the philosophical and natural ferment of
change.9
Traditionally, such examples are read as a kind of “primitive” understanding
of matter, merely emulating the human condition. More radically, one can read
attributes of gender and sexuality as aspects of transmutations across substances
rather than codes of strictly human behavior. “Diana,” her virginity, and the
actions of “sperm” are not attributes of regulated gender identification, nor of
prescribed sexual practices. They are figures that ferment the action of transmu-
tation, momentary and progressive in their functions. As adverbs rather than
adjectives, gender and sex can be perceived as attributes of change across a field
of elements and processes.
The understanding of gender that grew up with the “new” science accompa-
nied its observance of elements as discrete units, with properties that help to
describe and bind them. Gender ceased to operate across elements as a dynamic
of change and became, instead, a fixed attribute of humans. As we will see, the
same year in which the alchemist took the stage as a character in The Alchemist,
the staging of gender as strictly human, and its change as strictly adjectival
appeared in The Roaring Girl. As an attribute that bounded identity, gender
became one of the most crucial and most socially devastating codes of partition
that accompanied the rise of science and theater.
The assignment of gender exclusively to the human subject accompanied the
general enhancement of the human subject. “Nature,” or the world of elements
became the object of the human subject: the “new” scientist. New Historicists
have brilliantly transcribed the empowering of the agency of the human subject
in this early modern period. In fact, they have focussed “new” history on studies
of human agency. What was lost, as the alchemical papers of Newton document,
was the ascription of that agency to any other substance.10 The scientific labora-
tory was cleansed of such a sharing of agency across materials. Theater’s
contribution to the partition resides in how it could preference motivation over
transformation, character rather than magus, and the stage as the virtual space.
Theater became the social mechanism of the new science, installing human
agency at the center of virtual space.
It is I that am corroded and exalted and sublimed and reduced and fetched
over and filtered and washed and wiped; what between their salts and their
sulfurs, their oils and their tartars, their brines and their vinegars, you might
take me out now a soused Mercury, now a salted Mercury, now a smoked
and dried Mercury, now a powdered and pickled Mercury: never herring,
oyster, or cucumber passed so many vexations. . . .
(1970: lines 47–55).
It seems that Mercury is less the catalyst of change than the object of the
alchemist’s machinations. In fact, his description of his ordeals suggests cooking,
the fallen practice of chemistry and pharmacy, rather than laboratory experi-
ment. The wit resides in bending the high-minded practice to a base one. This
Act One 29
Mercury is a fragment of court wit on its way to the bawdy joke: “Get all the
cracked maidenheads and cast ‘em into new ingots; half the wenches o’ the town
are alchemy” (lines 92–94). Alchemical terms offer a metaphoric discourse for
the expression of sexual peccadilloes. This Mercury is not a figure of elemental
change so much as a fickle lover. Through the form of the masque, Jonson uses
alchemical figures to flirt, concluding with a pleasurable and, hopefully,
promising dance for those who participate. Alchemy is made to seem antique,
while theatrical engines of illusion would appear as “early modern.” Moving
Mercury into character overlays alchemical scripting of transmutation with
theatrical representation.
Jonson’s play The Alchemist (1610), however, deals a more serious blow to the
perception of alchemy, leeching out its internal dynamics to firmly establish a
different order of change—motivation. As the title of the play suggests, the focus
is displaced from the practice of alchemy to the alchemist. Whatever seems to
appear in the way of transformation is undercut by revealing the cheating moti-
vations of the characters. Moreover, the characters are merely animations of
social taxonomies, catalogued, like elements in the “new” science, within a
taxonomy of characteristics, with names like Subtle, the Alchemist; Dapper, a
lawyer’s clerk; Abel Drugger, a druggist who sells tobacco; Sir Epicure Mammon,
a voluptuary; Pertinax Surly, a doubting Thomas; and Dame Pliant, a widow.
The adjectival overcomes the adverbial in a form that portrays characters as
representatives of static qualities. So, while the identity or identification of the
character is static, his or her motivation provides the engine of the plot. In this
way, motivation is foregrounded as the single element of change within the
otherwise static qualities of the characters.
Yet this motivation is a base one. In a lengthy argument about alchemy in Act
Two, Surly characterizes alchemy as “Tricks o’ the cards, to cheat a man/With
charming” (Jonson 1967: lines 181–182). “Charming” and “cheating” are the
focus of the play, illustrated through alchemy but referring to motivation. In one
sense, all change is debased as it becomes only the illusion deployed to cheat
others out of money. One can imagine how the theater worked its charm to
socially discredit the alchemical rites.
In Mercury Vindicated, the alchemical furnace is something to escape from, out
into the society of the court. In The Alchemist, the mythical alchemical lab is
tended by squatters in a house vacated by those who fled the plague. Staging the
fallen lab in a house may reflect, as David Noble suggests, the taint of the
domestic on the scientific, as the “new science” begins to form its special,
removed space, free of women (quoted in Shanahan 2002: 45). We have already
observed how the culinary terms for Mercury’s change in the masque are used to
denigrate the methods of alchemical experiment, but in The Alchemist their
domestication is also made illicit. The house does not even belong to the con
artists who pose as alchemists.
In Jonson’s The Alchemist, change itself is indicated through its association
with subterfuge. Alchemical practice is portrayed as a mere farcical trick—a
30 Act One
mystification designed for profit. Mathew Martin, in his article “Play and Plague
in Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist,” refers to the play’s “anti-transformative poetics”
indicating that the corruption in the play furthers only character motivation, but
founders any possibility for social or material change (2000: 401). Remembering
Mao once again, the potential for internal change in the make-up of matter, as
Martin points out, accompanies the possibility for social and economic change as
well. Martin goes on to describe the lab as the space of “unlicensed theater,”
surreptitiously performed in a temporarily vacated house. Martin summarizes
the effect of the play: “Jonson offers no external, stable vantage point from
which illusory existence might be distinguished . . . only equally illusory and
groundless epistemologies competing in the theatrical marketplace” (407). In the
era of an economic crisis over value, filled with anxieties of the counterfeit and
the simulations of the money market, the alchemist, who was thought to produce
gold, that ultimate value, is really only a con, a performer, an illusionist.
However, the price of the ticket has changed the operations of access. Illusion
extracts a cost, while delivering little. We will attend to the practice of licensing
later, but for now, it may suffice to note how many details of the play point to a
satire of its own theatrical conditions of production: the audience pays to see a
two-hour show which concerns two hours of con work through a fake experi-
ment; the house in which the play takes place is located in Blackfriars, where the
theater itself was located, and the epilogue addresses the audience directly to
articulate the pleasures of illusion, inferring that perhaps they, too, have been
gulled.11 Mercury has truly jumped out of the fire into the frying pan, where he
will be served up to the paying public. He no longer catalyzes baser metals into
gold, but exchanges money for illusion. Like city comedy, of which The Alchemist
took a part, the virtual becomes a space designed for for-profit illusion. As the
alchemists were employed to make gold, theater will be licensed to make money,
and the “new” science will be turned toward invention and product.
. . . mercury is engender’d;
Sulphur o’ the fat and earthy part: the one,
(Which is the last) supplying the placed of male,
The other of the female, in all metals.
Act One 31
The “malleable” and the “ductile,” however, would delve underground with the
esoteric practices and “hermaphrodeity,” a figure of the fusion of sexual differ-
ence, would become a utopic fantasy, perhaps corporealized in the human. In
contrast to this dynamic muddle of matter, Middleton and Dekker staged Moll—
a woman dressed as a man. Moll’s gender exchange operates as a counterfeit
crossing. She appears to some in the play as one who “strays from her kind/
Nature repents she made her” (The Roaring Girl 2001: 211–212). Sex/gender,
which, in alchemy were an aspect of nature’s dynamism are Moll’s iteration of
social codes. Insofar as her performance of gender is malleable, she “strays.” She
is a counterfeit. Note how the term “nature” here functions as an attribute of the
human condition.
Moll character-izes how gender appears as a property of a human subject,
locating it within strictly social relations. Rather than an element of natural
philosophy, as it operated in alchemy, gender becomes a key definitive element in
the organization of the social, displacing the aspiration to conflate matter with
metaphysic. As Jonathan Dollimore, in his book on the era, Sexual Dissidence,
describes it: “The metaphysical is displaced by, and then collapsed into, the
social” (1991: 295). If Jonson foregrounded the virtual as illusion, Middleton and
Dekker portray it as the social sphere—a space of partition and conflict.
Dollimore (280):
The early modern view of identity . . . was also, and quite explicitly, a
powerful metaphysic of social integration. . . . Metaphysics here underpins a
discursive formation of the subject, of subjection.
As gender attains the status of a regulatory code, rather than an aspect of trans-
mutation, its properties become fixed and fix the location of the subject. The
imagined construction of the virtual realm is signified as the social. As character
and motivation take center stage, the remains of the perception of a unified field
of the virtual are gradually sucked into the construction of individual interiority.
Gender will become key to what Dollimore characterizes as the era’s “quest for
authenticity: underpinning and endorsing a philosophy of individualism” (284).
The seventeenth century, according to Michel Foucault, established the discourse
of sexuality as it installed gender.12 Change is no longer the nature of the fabric
of matter and the social, but a disruption of it—Sexual Dissidence, as Dollimore so
aptly termed it. Theater and the new science thus initiate humans into the exclu-
sive rights of the subject position, taking the stage for their machines and
machinations of the illusory and the social for the virtual realm of their conflict
and wedded harmony.
32 Act One
accomplished alchemist that has ever lived.”14 Numerous puppet plays and frag-
ments inspired by his legend had enacted the story for more than a century.
Perhaps these shows offered one of the first examples of grassroots performances
of science. Alchemy, the science of the day, was imagined in this popular realm
through puppets.
However, one Faust commentator, Erich Trunz, figures Paracelsus to be the
more persuasive model for the character of Goethe’s Faust than Faust legends.
Some critics contend that Goethe actually read Paracelsus during his convales-
cence in 1768 (Zajonc 1998: 21). So perhaps Goethe’s source for the character
was an alchemist who practiced and taught as a medical expert. In other
words, a scientist. Paracelsus was a leading medical innovator and alchemist of
his time (1493–1541), a recalcitrant practitioner, who was rewarded for his
medical innovations and shunned for his direct challenges of the Latin tradition.
His discoveries and his biography haunted the intellectual traditions that
followed, making him a rich historical figure from which Goethe could derive
the character of Faust (Trunz 1976: 461). If Goethe was ruminating on
Paracelsus, then his suppression of the Islamic origins of the practice is even
more obvious, for Paracelsus traveled extensively through Egypt and other
non-European sites and brought back his alchemical discoveries to Switzerland
and beyond. His success derived from the inventive, one might say the experi-
mental, hands-on tradition of the Islamic and alchemical practices. In the
idiomatic language of an enthusiast, Manly P. Hall, a contemporary chronicler
of esoteric traditions, describes how Paracelsus gained his knowledge in
Paracelsus, His Mystical and Medical Philosophy: “not from long-coated pedagogues
but from dervishes in Constantinople, witches, gypsies, and sorcerers, who
invoked spirits and captured the rays of the celestial bodies in dew.”15 Successful
in treating medical problems with new techniques learned on his travels,
Paracelsus was made chief medical officer and lecturer at the University in Basel.
However, he became so agitated about the iterated practices of medicine
unquestionably received from Galen, that he publicly burnt the manuscripts.
Of course, the public spectacle caused the demise of his employment in public
office and he hurriedly fled Basel to wander through much of Europe. His biog-
raphy resounds with the combination of great medical innovation and a
dedication to alchemy and astrology. On the one hand, he was respected for his
experimental approach to maladies, and on the other, he was regarded as suspect
for his public reliance upon alchemical texts such as the Corpus Hermeticum. Trunz
interprets Goethe’s turn to this figure as characteristic of his age, when, in
Germany “Die paracelsische Sehnsucht nach Erkenntnis ist religiös” (“the
Paracelsian longing for knowledge is [was] religious”; 1976: 461). Thus, the
reception of the figure was, by then, less focused on his introduction of medical
techniques, such as cauterizing a wound, than in the philosophies within which
these practices were located. An adept, Paracelsus was re-translated into one who
“longed” for knowledge—was unsatisfied by his expertise. The opening scene of
Faust illustrates this shift.
34 Act One
in the early 1780s to the post of minister of mines, war, and finance in Weimar.
Surely aware of the spirit of his time, he observed the world of contracts and
financial obligations of his time and perhaps did not find them completely
divorced from theater and the metaphysical. Laura Brown summarizes the
dynamics of the age in Fables of Modernity (2001: 97):
The early eighteenth century was the first age to live the immediate intensity
of credit, loans, discounts, shares, futures, national debt, deficit spending . . .
An international money market and a futures commodity market were
established in the first decade of the Restoration.
suggests that “There is a delicate empiricism, which identifies itself with the
object” (quoted in Cottrell 1998: 259). In other words, in Goethe’s paradigm, the
scientist would not act as a removed observer, but one who would somehow
share the subject position with the object, if only through identification. From a
shared sense of the experience of the object, as in alchemy’s notion of a qualita-
tive not quantitative measure, the scientist would come to better understand the
object of study. In this way, Goethe’s scientific practice was dedicated to this
principle of interaction, as exemplified by the title of one of his essays, The
Experiment as Mediator Between Object and Subject. The research experience, for
Goethe, was positioned as a binding one. Moreover, the translation of the
observed into language also troubled the immediate, bonded apprehension of
the living: “Yet how difficult it is not to put the sign in the place of the thing;
how difficult to keep the being (Wesen) always livingly before one and not to slay
it with the word” (quoted in Zajonc 1998: 24). Understood as a version of
phenomenology, Goethe’s notion of observation, if that’s a suitable term, is one
that “accedes with one’s intentionaliy to their [the subject/objects’] patterns . . .
” (Amrine 1998: 37). As Frederick Amrine puts it, in “The Metamorphosis of the
Scientist” (38):
Goethe understood his scientific practice and findings on color and light to be in
direct contradiction to Newton’s. Around 1666, Newton began a study of color
by using light and prisms, publishing his Opticks, in 1704. He divided the white
light into the seven colors of the prism that composed it. The problem, as
Goethe saw it, was that Newton studied light in isolation, extracting the under-
standing of it from other forces, most importantly, the human perception of it. In
his Theory of Color, Goethe finds that the perception of color is related to optics,
the eye itself, which both perceives and produces color, thus co-constituting the
process along with light and substance. Color, then, is not an entity, a bounded
zone with properties, as in the prism, but as Goethe describes it in the opening
remarks to his 1810 edition, “Colors are the deeds of light; its deeds and suffer-
ings . . . ” (quoted in Zajonc 1998: 19). For Goethe, colors are actions, not things.
As he phrased it, more generally, the “objects” (Gegenstände) of nature are better
viewed as “acts” (Tätigkeiten) (Fink 1991: 44). For this reason, Goethe preferred
the classical Greek discourse of color to the German. In the Greek, color is not
fixed as a noun, with properties and differences; instead, it acts as a verb: yellow
can “redden” and red can “yellow” (Fink 1991: 47). Goethe also criticized
Newton’s omission of the role of darkness in the production of light, calling it a
Act One 37
“light darkness polarity.” Light could only appear in a dialectic with darkness—a
dialog, if you will, invoking the Faust/Mephistopheles duality.
While color presents a more obvious example, Goethe located dynamic
change in all substances—even granite. He perceived a “play of elements” (Spiel
der Elemente), in which all things enjoy an “inner development” over time (quoted
in Fink 1991: 18). Goethe’s paradigm of knowing, then, is an active one in which
the researcher enters into an ongoing relationship with changing substances,
altered by and co-constituted with the substances involved. While it is not exactly
alchemical, it is certainly reminiscent of its basic assumptions.
For Goethe, “delicate empiricism” contested both the overdetermined scien-
tific empiricism and the philosophical abstractions of his era. He disagreed with
Hegel’s dialectics because, he argued, they were conceptualized as operating
apart from continued direct observation, and he wrote against the received tradi-
tion of Newton’s mechanistic universe. He also opposed what he termed
“mathematical formalism,” arguing against “Mathematics [that] must . . .
declare itself independent of everything external, must proceed according to its
own spirit and laws” (quoted in Heitler 57). Rather than these paradigms of
removed reason, or causal chains, or quantifying mathematical equations,
Goethe sought an empiricism combined with an interrelational dynamic.
Experience and change were categories of knowing within these bonded rela-
tionships.
Reviewing Faust from the perspective of Goethe’s scientific studies, we can
perceive, most obviously, the scripting of the interaction of dark and light
(Mephistopheles and the Christian God) as necessary to what Goethe believed to
constitute the structures of appearance. Recalling Mao’s sense of contradiction
and dynamism as the essential make-up of the elements, Goethe’s dialectic mode
of the production of appearance seems to invoke this more potentially alterable
universe. The prelude in the theater initiates the virtual space of representation,
where one can actively observe appearance through the dialectic/dialogue of
opposing forces. In viewing Creation, the god welcomes a wager with
Mephistopheles that makes the dramatic conditions occur. Contradiction is the
apparatus of appearance. Instead of the moralistic message that most readings
of Goethe presume, the play may actually be staging the conditions of Goethean
optics.
Faust could be understood as the alienated scientist, whose distanced, with-
drawn relation to the object of learning is signified by his remove in his study.
Although he longs for a more dynamic relation to the world, he maintains a strict
division from it in his study. The esteemed German critic, Georg Lukacs, puts it
this way: “Faust longs for the same thing for which the young Goethe longs: a
philosophy [and we might add practice] which transcends the solely contempla-
tive, dead objectivity, and the disunity between the knowledge of nature and
human activity” (1968: 168). Faust’s fault resides in his resistance to an active
engagement with what he would know, preferring, instead, to peruse the contem-
plative texts. Goethe writes this against “pure” contemplation:
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foot and a half deep. We did not know that the time would come
when these dark, rude huts would seem luxurious quarters.
Our mess was composed of George Thomas, Clay Lowe, Bob
Bond and myself. George had been left behind at Fredericksburg,
where he was ill for some time. He and a private from another
company decided to come to camp and spend Christmas with the
boys. They left the train and tramped a mile and a half to surprise
the mess, arriving in the nick of time. George said they could not
bring us turkey, so they brought some whiskey and eggs. They
began beating eggs early Christmas morning, and they made a huge
pan full of egg-nog. We invited the officers and our friends to take
some with us. In the evening the boys went for Col. Fagin and
invited him to drink egg-nog. By that time they were pretty full and
Clay Lowe told Col. Fagin that he wanted him to understand that he
was “Fifth Sergeant of Company G.” He succeeded in impressing the
Colonel with his rank. Then everyone began to make things lively.
I did not touch the egg-nog, therefore did not enjoy their hilarity.
I left the hut, found Sam Shoup in his hut, and we went out and sat
by the fire thinking we were away from the crowd. But the boys did
not intend to let us off so easily. When we came back into the hut
we could not see very well. The cabin was dark, as the only light
came from the doorway, and the snow had blinded us. The boys
made a rush for us. I got into a dark corner, and after they were all
in we both ran out. They caught Sam, but failed to get me.
Clay Lowe, followed by about twenty-five of the boys, went down
to the middle of the company grounds and commenced to make a
speech, which he could do so well. Some of the boys, not wishing
Clay to have all the glory, put John Loftin on the stump to make an
address and he began: “My friends, I am not as eloquent as Clay,
but I speak more to the point.”
That evening at dress parade, Sam Shoup as corporal had to
march out and present arms, reporting two commissioned officers,
four non-commissioned officers, and twenty-seven privates drunk.
The rest of the regiment was there, and to our consternation, we
were ordered to cook three days’ rations and be ready to march at
daylight. The order read that any private who straggled or failed to
keep up with the command would be court martialed.
When we stopped late next evening on the march, Clay was
nearly dead and could hardly walk, from the effect of the Christmas
spree. Colonel Fagin rode along by our company and seeing how
Clay was said, “Hello, Fifth Sergeant of Company G, how do you
feel?” Clay replied, “Colonel, I am damned dry; how are you?”
December 26, 1861, we reached Aquia Creek and went into
winter quarters in log huts and tents. Here we had “Sunday
Soldiering.” We were close to Fredericksburg, and could order what
we wanted to eat. Confederate money was good and we could grab
things cheap with it. Fifty cents a gallon for shelled oysters; twenty-
five cents a pound for butter; pies and cakes every day. Think of
such grub for a soldier! But, ah, to stay in the snow, eighteen inches
deep, and guard the Potomac river all night! No shelter, but a corn
stalk house; no fire, but a driftwood blaze, not very bright either, as
it would be a signal for the enemy to cannonade. That was like war
and soldier duty.
We had three points to guard on the river, one on the island with
battery, and one at the lower end of the line. It required a whole
company for all points at night, since the guard had to be relieved
every twenty minutes. Otherwise he would have been frozen by the
snow and sleet which swept across the Potomac.
One night a squad from our company under a sergeant was
ordered to the island, which was only guarded at night. We had to
cross over in a flat boat. The evening before supplies had been sent
to the island for the use of the Battery Company and they had failed
to haul them. The squad on the lower part of the guard line found
them, all unused, in a pile on the landing. The night was bitter cold,
the snow was deep, the wind blowing a gale, no wood was in sight.
The supplies were bacon. It was good to eat, and in this emergency
it was good to burn, so the boys proceeded to burn it. Dawn
revealed other things besides bacon. They discovered two jugs of
red liquor, which they immediately confiscated. At daylight they were
ordered to camp two miles away and proceeded to march—and drink
on empty stomachs until the whole squad was drunk. We, on the
upper part of the guard line, had to wait in the snow and wind until
they came up, for all must report in camp together. We did not know
what caused their delay, but we were in no pious frame of mind
when we saw them coming, wabbling from side to side, yelling like
Commanches. The officers with us were red-headed and said things
to that squad that “were bad”.
But the boys from the lower end knew how dry the officers were
after being out all night, so they offered the jug of snake bite
medicine. The officers found it so good they did not let it go in a
hurry. After that the privates could not refuse for fear of making the
boys angry. By the time we reached camp almost everybody was
overcome. The officers went to sleep, and when they awoke they
forgot all about discipline. So nobody suffered but the Battery
fellows, and they could never prove who captured their supplies.
Sometimes a company would buy a barrel of oysters, take it to
their hut and open it, and find in the center a five gallon jug of red
rye. It was so concealed to pass the provost guard on train. But the
boys did even worse. Seven of them from other commands, went to
Fredericksburg, bought a coffin and filled it with jugs. With sad faces
and measured steps they carried it solemnly to the train. But the
joke was too good to keep. The boys unscrewed the lid and yelled at
the guard. Of course, when the train returned no one could name
the offenders.
But our “Sunday Soldiering” did not last long. The regiment was
composed of one year troops, who now re-enlisted for three years,
or for the war. The re-enlisted men were ordered to rendezvous at
Memphis, to reorganize the regiment, but later were ordered to
Corinth, Mississippi.
The Virginia people had been good to us, and had tried to make
us feel at home. Some of the boys had gone into society at
Fredericksburg, and found it hard to part from their new friends.
George (my old friend, George Thomas) “had it mighty bad.” He said
to me, “Bill, I must go to Fredericksburg to see my girl. Will you cook
my three days’ rations? I’ll meet you at the train tomorrow.” “But
Pard, how will you get off?” “I’ll ask Col. Fellows.” He went to
Colonel Fellows, who was in charge that day and told his tale of
woe. The colonel was in deep sympathy with the boy (perhaps he
had had the disease himself sometime,) and agreed to help him.
George went to Fredericksburg, and the next day I saw him there
with his girl. Our train pulled out, I yelled at him, but still he
lingered. They gazed and gazed at each other, and it seemed that
George did not have the nerve to tear himself away. Finally they
parted and by hard running he caught the train and stood waving to
her until we were out of sight. The mails were kept hot after that.
Poor George was killed at Atlanta. He was the bravest man I ever
knew, and if he had lived, would have made that girl a noble
husband.
March 17, 1862, at Corinth, Mississippi, the re-organization of the
regiment took place. The newly elected officers of Company G were:
Samuel Shoup, Captain.
A. T. Watchell, First Lieutenant.
Clay Lowe, Second Lieutenant.
John R. Loftin, Third Lieutenant.
W. B. Densford, First Sergeant.
Henry Clements, Second Sergeant.
W. H. Reid, Third Sergeant.
George Spaulder, Fourth Sergeant.
Thomas Davis, First Corporal.
John W. Baird, Second Corporal.
T. S. Logan, Third Corporal.
Forrest Dillard, Fourth Corporal.
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