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Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Forming a One Way Data Table
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

4. Many models are built for the purpose of permitting experimentation with various scenarios.

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2
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: True
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using Goal Seek
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

5. Goal Seek is a means for answering a large number of what-if questions quickly and easily.
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: False
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using the Formula Auditing Tool
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

6. In Excel terminology, the unknown value used in Goal Seek is called the input cell.
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: False
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.5 Ordering with Quantity Discounts and Demand Uncertainty - Excel Function: Vlookup
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

7. Trace Dependents and Trace Precedents are Formula Auditing commands.

a. True
b. False

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3
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
ANSWER: True
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

8. The NPV function takes two arguments; the discount rate and the number of time periods in the model.
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: False
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

9. In general, any cash flow occurring at the beginning of the first time period must be placed outside the NPV function.
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: True
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Knowledge
Challenging |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

10. The HLOOKUP function works exactly the same as the VLOOKUP function, except the lookup table is arranged in
columns instead of rows.
a. True
b. False
ANSWER: False
POINTS: 1
Copyright Cengage Learning. Powered by Cognero. Page
4
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: True / False
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

Multiple Choice

11. Which of the following is not one of the components of most mathematical models?
a. Inputs
b. Outputs
c. Decision variables
d. None of these options
ANSWER: d
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.2. Basic Spreadsheet Modeling: Concepts and Practices
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

12. Which of the following is not one of the features that can improve the readability of a spreadsheet model?
a. Formatting features
b. Data tables
c. Cell comments
d. Text Boxes
ANSWER: b
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.3 Cost Projections - Developing the Spreadsheet Model
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication DISC- Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

13. Which of the following is a useful tool for investigating what-if questions?
a. Data tables
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5
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
b. VLOOKUP function
c. Formula auditing
d. SUMPRODUCT function
ANSWER: a
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.3 Cost Projections - Developing the Spreadsheet Model
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

14. The Excel tool for solving one equation with one unknown is:
a. Solver
b. Goal Seek
c. Trend function
d. NPV function
ANSWER: b
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.3 Cost Projections - Using the Model for What If Questions
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

15. Which of the following is a useful tool for understanding and troubleshooting a spreadsheet model?
a. Data tables
b. VLOOKUP function
c. Formula auditing
d. SUMPRODUCT function
ANSWER: c
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using Goal Seek
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM

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6
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

16. Which of the following is not one of the required arguments for a VLOOKUP function?
a. The lookup table range
b. The value you want to compare to the values in the left column of the table
c. The index of the column you want the returned value to come from
d. TRUE (for an approximate match) or FALSE (for an exact match)
ANSWER: d
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using Goal Seek
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

17. Estimating the relationships between variables in a spreadsheet model can be done using:
a. data tables
b. Goal Seek
c. the VLOOKUP function
d. curve fitting
ANSWER: d
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using the Formula Auditing Tool
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

18. Which of the following is not one of the types of curve fitting models available in Excel's Trendline tool?
a. Exponential
b. Linear
c. Interpolation
d. Power
ANSWER: c
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Knowledge
Moderate |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice

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7
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.7 Decisions Involving the Time Value of Money - Solution
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

19. An important property of the exponential function is that:

a. if x changes by 1 unit, then y changes by a constant percentage that is approximately equal to the model
constant b times 100%
b. if x changes by 1 unit, then y changes by a constant percentage that is approximately equal to the model
constant b%
c. if x changes by 1%, then y changes by a constant percentage that is approximately equal to the model constant
b times 100%
d. if x changes by 1%, then y changes by a constant percentage that is approximately equal to the model constant
b%
ANSWER: a
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.7 Decisions Involving the Time Value of Money - Solution
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

20. To evaluate which of a set of curves fits the data best, we can use:
a. APE
b. MAPE
c. R2
d. NPV
ANSWER: b
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Easy |Bloom's Knowledge
Easy |Bloom's Comprehension
QUESTION TYPE: Multiple Choice
HAS VARIABLES: False
TOPICS: 2.5 Ordering with Quantity Discounts and Demand Uncertainty - Excel Function: Vlookup
OTHER: BUSPROG- Communication
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:36 PM

Subjective Short Answer

Exhibit 2-1

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8
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
A t-shirt company is planning a production run for an event where the attendance (and thus demand for t-shirts) is
uncertain. The event planners have indicated that they think the attendance will be 500, 750 or 1000, with probabilities of
30%, 50% and 20% respectively. The company must pre-order the blank t-shirts (cost=$5 per shirt) and it can sell finished
shirts for $12 apiece. Any finished shirts that cannot be sold at the event can be sold for $2 apiece to a used clothing
vendor.
21. Refer to Exhibit 2-1. What Excel function is useful for calculating the expected value of demand for t-shirts? What is
the expected demand?
ANSWER: The SUMPRODUCT function is useful for multiplying the respective probabilities times the demand
outcomes and summing the products. The expected value is 725.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Application
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-1
TOPICS: 2.5 Ordering with Quantity Discounts and Demand Uncertainty - Developing the Spreadsheet Model
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

22. Refer to Exhibit 2-1. What Excel function is useful for calculating revenue? Explain why it is useful.
ANSWER: The IF function is useful for calculating revenue. This because there are two difference cases;
demand could exceed production, in which case only the amount produced can be used to calculate
revenue, and demand could be less than production, in which case only the demand can be used to
calculate revenue.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Application
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-1
TOPICS: 2.2 Basic Spreadsheet Modeling: Concepts and Best Practices - Excel Function IF
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

23. Refer to Exhibit 2-1. What are the two possible cases for the amount of t-shirts that will be sold to the used clothing
vendor? How would you calculate this amount in a spreadsheet model?
ANSWER: The company will either sell no t-shirts to the used clothing vendor (if it produces less than demand)
or it will sell a surplus equal to the difference between production and demand (if it produces more
than demand). This logic can be implemented in a spreadsheet model using an IF statement.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Moderate |Bloom's Application
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-1
TOPICS: 2.2 Basic Spreadsheet Modeling: Concepts and Best Practices - Excel Function IF
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
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9
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

24. Refer to Exhibit 2-1. Suppose that blank t-shirts can only be ordered from the wholesale vendor in batches of 100?
How many t-shirts should the company order?
ANSWER: We can set up a one-way data table with net profit as the output and order as the input (with trial
quantities of 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, and 1000), which shows that the net profit is maximized at
$4900 with an order of 700 shirts.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-1
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Forming a One Way Data Table
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

25. Refer to Exhibit 2-1. Suppose now that blank t-shirts can only be ordered from the wholesale vendor in batches of 50?
How many t-shirts should the company order?
ANSWER: We can again set up a one-way data table with net profit as the output and order as the input (with
trial quantities of 600, 650, 700, 750, and 800), which shows that the net profit is maximized at
$5000 with an order of 750 shirts.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-1
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Forming a One Way Data Table
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

Exhibit 2-2
A small sporting goods company is considering investing $2000 in a project at the start of year 1 that will produce
volleyballs over the next five years. The company plans to produce and sell 200 volleyballs in the first year, and expects
that volume to grow by 10% each year thereafter. The unit selling price forecast the company has developed is $20 in year
1, $22 in year 2, $25 in year 3, $28 in year 4, and $31.50 in year 5. Variable costs are forecast to be $15 per unit produced,
and there will be a fixed overhead cost in each year of $500. (Unless otherwise indicated, assume that all cash flows
occur at the end of the year.)
26. Refer to Exhibit 2-2. Use the above information to develop a simple cash flow proforma sheet, and then apply Excel's
NPV function to calculate the project value assuming a 10% discount rate. What is your answer?
ANSWER: The project NPV is $5,468.24 (allowing for a fraction of a volleyball)
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis

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10
Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-2
TOPICS: 2.7 Decisions Involving the Time Value of Money - Solution
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

27. Refer to Exhibit 2-2. Suppose the company thinks it may be able to produce and sell more than currently planned.
What growth rate of production would produce an NPV of $10,000?
ANSWER: Using Excel's Goal Seek function, the required growth rate would be 27.4% per year.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-2
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using Goal Seek
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

28. Refer to Exhibit 2-2. Suppose instead that the company thinks it can reduce its variable cost rate. What rate would
produce an NPV of $10,000?
ANSWER: Using Excel's Goal Seek function, the required variable cost rate would be $10.02 per unit of
production.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-2
TOPICS: 2.4 Breakeven Analysis - Using Goal Seek
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

29. [Part 1] Refer to Exhibit 2-2. Use the graphing function in Excel to construct a scatterplot of forecasted price versus
time, and fit a linear trendline to the data. What are the coefficients of the linear model, and what is the MAPE of a linear
model forecast, compared to the company's forecast?
ANSWER: The linear trend fit produces an intercept of 16.6 and a slope of 2.9. Forecasting with this model and
comparing against the company forecast results in a MAPE of 1.5%.
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-2

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Chapter 2 - Introduction to Spreadsheet Modeling
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

30. [Part 2] Refer to Exhibit 2-2. Use the same scatterplot constructed for the previous question, fit an exponential
trendline to the data. What are the coefficients of the exponential model, and what is the MAPE of an exponential model
forecast, compared to the company's forecast?
ANSWER: The exponential model fit produces a constant of 17.684 and an exponent of 0.115. Forecasting with
this model and comparing against the company forecast results in a MAPE of 0.47%
POINTS: 1
DIFFICULTY: Challenging |Bloom's Analysis
QUESTION TYPE: Subjective Short Answer
HAS VARIABLES: False
PREFACE NAME: Exhibit 02-2
TOPICS: 2.6 Estimating the Relationship Between Price and Demand
OTHER: BUSPROG- Analytic
DATE CREATED: 5/17/2017 3:44 PM
DATE MODIFIED: 10/21/2017 8:11 PM

Copyright Cengage Learning. Powered by Cognero. Page 11

Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with
calmness the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus
established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or
reconcile those opinions.79 They disapprove especially that dialectic
debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to the
negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the
historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the
philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing
worthy of being called reasoned truth can exist, without full and
equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

78 See Professor Bain’s Chapter on Belief; one of the

most original and instructive chapters in his volume on
the Emotions and the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp.
505-538.]

79 This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion — between

the speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks
for himself, and the established traditional convictions
of the public — is nowhere more strikingly enforced
than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of the
Republic; together with the corrupting influence
exercised by King Nomos, at the head of his vehement
and unanimous public, over those few gifted natures
which are competent to philosophical speculation. See
Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts

to analyse morality (especially when quite novel, as
such attempts were in the time of Sokrates) are
received in a community — are noticed by Mr. John
Stuart Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-
39:—

“The question is often asked, and properly so, in

regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its
sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more
specifically, What is the source of its obligation?
Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a
necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the
answer to this question: which though frequently
assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian
morality, as if it had some special applicability to that
above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It
arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a
standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he
has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary
morality, that which education and opinion have
consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to
the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory:
and when a person is asked to believe that this
morality derives its obligation from some general
principle round which custom has not thrown the same
halo, the assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed
corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the
original theorem: the superstructure seems to stand
better without than with what is represented as its
foundation.… The difficulty has no peculiar application
to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every
attempt to analyse morality, and reduce it to principles:
which, unless the principle is already in men’s minds
invested with as much sacredness as any of its
 applications, always seems to divest them of a part of
their sanctity.”

Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines

acquired by the self-reasoning philosopher, often failed
to attain that intense hold on his conviction, which the
“rotten doctrines” inculcated from childhood possessed
over the conviction of ordinary men. Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι
(οἱ πολλοὶ, οἱ ἰδιῶται) ὑμῶν (των φιλοσόφων)
ἰσχυρότεροι; Ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ σαπρὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ
δογμάτων λαλοῦσιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν
χειλῶν.… Οὕτως ὑμᾶς οἱ ἰδιῶται νικῶσι· Πανταχοῦ γὰρ
ἰσχυρὸν τὸ δόγμα· ἀνίκητον τὸ δόγμα. (Epiktêtus, iii.
16.)

These historians usually speak in

The same charges which
very harsh terms of the Sophists, as
the historians of philosophy
well as of Eukleides and the Megaric
bring against the Sophists
sect; who are taken as the great
were brought by
apostles of negation. But the truth is,
contemporary Athenians
that the Megarics inherited it from
against Sokrates. They
Sokrates, and shared it with Plato.
represent the standing
Eukleides cannot have laid down a
dislike of free inquiry, usual
larger programme of negation than
with an orthodox public.
that which we read in the Apology of
Sokrates, — nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than the
Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in principle
as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato in his
Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge against
the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the
Sophists — such as corruption of youth — perversion of truth and
morality, by making the worse appear the better reason —
subversion of established beliefs — innovation as well as deception
— all these were urged against Sokrates himself by his
contemporaries,80 and indeed against all the philosophers
indiscriminately, as we learn from Sokrates himself in the Apology.81
They are outbursts of feeling natural to the practical, orthodox
citizen, who represents the common sense of the time and place;
declaring his antipathy to these speculative, freethinking innovations
of theory, which challenges the prescriptive maxims of traditional
custom and tests them by a standard approved by herself. The
orthodox citizen does not feel himself in need of philosophers to tell
him what is truth or what is virtue, nor what is the difference
between real and fancied knowledge. On these matters he holds
already settled persuasions, acquired from his fathers and his
ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic authorities, spiritual and
temporal;82 who are to him exponents of the creed guaranteed by
tradition:—

“Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo

Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones.”

80 Themistius, in defending himself against

contemporary opponents, whom he represents to have
calumniated him, consoles himself by saying, among
other observations, that these arrows have been aimed
at all the philosophers successively — Sokrates, Plato,
Aristotle, Theophrastus. Ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς καὶ ἀλαζὼν
καὶ καινότομος πρῶτον μὲν Σωκράτους ὀνείδη ἦν,
ἔπειτα Πλάτωνος ἐφεξῆς, εἶθ’ ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλους
καὶ Θεοφράστου. (Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.)
 We read in Zeller’s account of the Platonic
philosophy (Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd):

“Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen

Philosophie besteht im Allgemeinen darin, dass der
unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und die
Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit
nachgewiesen wird. Im Besondern können wir drey
Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. Den
Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein.
Indem die Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein
Erstes und Festes gegolten hatten, dialektisch zersetzt
werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das negative Resultat
der Sophistik. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist,
kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt
werden.”

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists

(Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias and others) who first
applied negative analysis to the common
consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny,
those hypotheses which had before exercised authority
therein, as first principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the

Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did not do
what Zeller affirms, and that Sokrates (and Plato after
him) did do it. The negative analysis was the weapon
of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias,
&c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that
false persuasion of knowledge was at once universal
and ruinous, and who devoted his life to the task of
exposing it by cross-examination. The conversation of
the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv.
2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive
analysis, brought to bear on the common
consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the Sophists:
the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-
examines upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety,
Virtue, &c., are of the like character; and we know
from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates passed
much time in such examinations with pre-eminent
success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is

peculiar to him (for most of the modern historians of
philosophy affirm the same; and his history, which is
the best that I know, merely repeats the ordinary
view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which
I take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the
unmeaning abstract “Sophistik,” given by Zeller and
others, we ought properly to insert the word
“Sokratik,” if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again — The negative analysis, which these authors

call “Sophistik,” they usually censure as discreditable
and corrupting. To me it appears, on the contrary, both
original and valuable, as one essential condition for
bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of
philosophy or “reasoned truth”.

Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote,

Paris, 1860, p. 119) takes a juster view than Zeller of
the difference between Plato and the Sophists
(Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). “Les Sophistes,
comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur
des questions de philosophie, et en particulier sur la
morale et la politique, s’appuyaient sur l’autorité et le
témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers des poètes
célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des
oracles de sagesse: ils invoquaient l’opinion du
commun des hommes. Platon récusait absolument ces
deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni le
commun des hommes ne savent ce qu’ils disent,
puisqu’ils ne peuvent en rendre raison....... Aux yeux
de Platon, il n’y a d’autre méthode, pour arriver au vrai
et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui est à la
fois l’art d’interroger et de répondre, et l’art de définir
et de diviser.”

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly)

that the Sophists appealed to the established ethical
authorities, and dwelt upon or adorned the received
common-places — that Plato denied these authorities,
and brought his battery of negative cross-examination
to bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M.
Thurot thus gives a totally different version of the
procedure of the Sophists from that which is given by
Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with Zeller, and
with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp.
91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made
money by deceiving and perverting the minds of
hearers (p. 120).
81 Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν
ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν
φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα
λ έ γ ο υ σ ι ν , ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς κ α ὶ
θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον
κ ρ ε ί τ τ ω π ο ι ε ῖ ν , &c.

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις

ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον. The rich families in
Athens severely reproached their relatives who
frequented the society of Sokrates. Xenophon,
Sympos. iv. 32.

82 See this point strikingly set forth by Plato,

Politikus, 299: also Plutarch, Ἐρωτικός, c. 13, 756 A.

This is the “auctoritas majorum,” put forward by

Cotta in his official character of Pontifex, as conclusive
per se: when reasons are produced to sustain it, the
reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5, 6, 9.)

The “auctoritas maiorum,” proclaimed by the

Pontifex Cotta, may be illustrated by what we read in
Father Paul’s History of the Council of Trent, respecting
the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the
duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of
Scripture:—“Lorsqu’on fut à opiner sur le quatrième
Article, presque tous se rendirent à l’avis du Cardinal
Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l’Écriture ayant été
expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en
doctrine, l’on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de
meilleur: Que les nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées
 des nouveaux sens qu’on avoit donnés à l’Écriture, il
étoit nécessaire d’arrêter la licence des esprits
modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par
les Anciens et par l’Église: Et que si quelqu’un naissoit
avec un esprit singulier, on devoit le forcer à le
renfermer au dedans de lui-même, et à ne pas troubler
le monde en publiant tout ce qu’il pensoit.” (Fra Paolo,
Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par
Le Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate
of Paul III.)

P. 289. “Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en

substance, de tenir l’Edition Vulgate pour authentique
dans les leçons publiques, les disputes, les
prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que
ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d’expliquer la
Saint Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui
donne la Sainte Église notre Mère, et au consentement
unanime des Pères, quand bien même on auroit
intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on
ordonnoit que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette
défense fussent punis par les Ordinaires.”

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these

consecrated traditions; he does not approve the tribe of fools who
despise what they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable
novelties:83 he cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-
splitters, priests of subtleties and trifles — dissenters from the
established opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to
be wise above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and
mothers,84 and to cheat their creditors — mischievous instructors,
whose appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and
who ought to be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.85
Such feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative
philosophy and dialectic — against the libertas philosophandi —
counts as a branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens,
rich or poor, oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or
modern. It is an antipathy common to men in other respects very
different, to Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as
well as to Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the
Roman Cato (the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a
dangerous and violent citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the
institutions and customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of
his fellow-citizens with opinions hostile to the laws.86 How much
courage is required in any individual citizen, to proclaim
conscientious dissent in the face of wide-spread and established
convictions, is recognised by Plato himself, and that too in the most
orthodox and intolerant of all his compositions.87 He (and Aristotle
after him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King
Nomos, were bold enough88 to try and condemn him, and to
imagine (each of them) a new Νόμος of his own, representing the
political Art or Theory of Politics — a notion which would not have
been understood by Themistokles or Aristeides.

83 Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

Ἔστι δὲ φῦλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιοτατον,

Ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω,
Μεταμώνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

84
 Οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσι·
Πατρίους παραδοχὰς, ἃς θ’ ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ
Κεκτήμεθ’, οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
Οὔδ’ εἰ δι’ ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ηὕρηται φρενῶν.
(Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.)

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis

Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque
Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.)

Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Eurip. pp. 38, 39, cap.

5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading

the youth to contract doubts and to slight the authority
of their fathers, see Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato,
Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A touching
anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers
against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon,
Cyropæd. iii. 1, 89, where the father of Tigranes puts
to death the σοφιστὴς who had taught his son,
because that son had contracted a greater attachment
to the σοφιστὴς than to his own father.

Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20;

compare the speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato,
Politikus, p. 299 E.

Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his

successors the title of ἀκριβόλογοι. Diog. Laert. ii. 19.
Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes,
130, where Strepsiades says —
 πως οὖν γερὼν ὦν κἀπιλήσμων καὶ βραδὺς
λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι;

Compare 320-359 of the same comedy — σύ τε

λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ — also Ranæ, 149, b.

When Euripides (ὁ σκηνικὸς φιλόσοφος) went down

to Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving
clever exhibitions among the malefactors there, with
great success and applause. Ranæ, 771 —

Ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθ’ Εὐριπίδης, ἐπεδείκνυτο

τοῖς λωποδύταις καὶ τοῖς βαλαντιητόμοις …
ὅπερ ἔστ’ ἐν ᾍδου πλῆθος· οἱ δ’ ἀκροώμενοι
τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ λυγισμῶν και στροφῶν
ὑπερεμάνησαν, κἀνόμισαν σοφώτατον.

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are

attributed by Aristophanes, and the other comic
writers, to his frequent conversations with Sokrates.
Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet. p. 301-355.
Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes
describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from
the palæstra (Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces
him as having stolen a wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc.
Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). The fragment
of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, Ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, ὦ
σοφιστά) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the
sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic
writers on Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25.
 The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν
Τεττάρων, pp. 406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking
on the very vague and general manner in which the
title Σοφιστὴς was applied among the Greeks
(Herodotus having so designated both Solon and
Pythagoras), mentions that Androtion not only spoke
of the seven wise men as τοὺς ἕπτα σοφιστάς, but also
called Sokrates σοφιστὴν τοῦτον τὸν πάνυ: that Lysias
called Plato σοφιστὴν, and called Æschines (the
Sokratic) by the same title; that Isokrates represented
himself, and rhetors and politicians like himself, as
φιλοσόφους, while he termed the dialecticians and
critics σοφιστάς. Nothing could be more indeterminate
than these names, σοφιστὴς and φιλόσοφος. It was
Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name
σοφιστὴς (ὁ μάλιστα ἐπαναστὰς τῷ ὀνόματι) but
others had tried to discredit φιλόσοφος and τὸ
φιλοσοφεῖν in like manner. It deserves notice that in
the restrictive or censorial law (proposed by
Sophokles, and enacted by the Athenians in B.C. 307,
but repealed in the following year) against the
philosophers and their schools, the philosophers
generally are designated as σοφισταί. Pollux, Onomast.
ix. 42 ἔστι δὲ καὶ νόμος Ἀττικὸς κατὰ τῶν
φιλοσοφούντων γραφείς, ὃν Σοφοκλῆς Ἀμφικλείδου
Σουνιεὺς εἶπεν, ἐν ᾧ τινα κατὰ αὐτῶν προειπὼν,
ἐπήγαγε, μὴ ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ τ ῶ ν σ ο φ ι σ τ ῶ ν
διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι.

85 Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ οὐ

σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι
διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλους
οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἶτ’ οὖν φθόνῳ,
ὡς συ λέγεις, εἴτε δι’ ἄλλο τι.

86 Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested

here by Anytus against the Sophists, is the same
feeling which led him to indict Sokrates, and which
induced also Cato the Censor to hate the character of
Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato,
23: ὅλως φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκεκρουκὼς, καὶ πᾶσαν
Ἑλληνικὴν μοῦσαν καὶ παιδείαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας
προπηλακίζων· ὃς γε καὶ Σωκράτη φησὶ λάλον καὶ
βίαιον γενόμενον ἐπιχειρεῖν, ᾧ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἦν,
τυραννεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, καταλύοντα τὰ ἔθη, καὶ πρὸς
ἐναντίας τοῖς νόμοις δόξας ἕλκοντα καὶ μεθίσταντα
τοὺς πολίτας. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.

87 Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. νῦν δε ἀνθρώπου

τολμηροῦ κινδυνεύει δεῖσθαί τινος, ὃς παῤῥησίαν
διαφερόντως τιμῶν ἐρεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἄριστ’ εἶναι πόλει
καὶ πολίταις, ἐν ψυχαῖς διεφθαρμέναις τὸ πρέπον καὶ
ἑπόμενον πάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάττων, ἐναντία λέγων ταῖς
μεγίσταισιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ οὐκ ἔχων βοηθὸν ἀνθρώπων
οὐδένα, λόγῳ ἑπόμενος μόνῳ μόνος.

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere

convictions is spoken of with respect: compare the
contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in the tenth
book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic,
referred to in a previous note (vi. 492) Plato declares
the lessons taught by the multitude — the contagion of
established custom and tradition, communicated by
the crowd of earnest assembled believers — to be of
overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The
individual philosopher (he says), who examines for
himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly
maintain himself without special divine aid.

88 In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces

formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had
asserted before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive
pretensions of the Βασιλεὺς Τεχνικὸς (representing
political science, art, or theory) to rule mankind — the
illusory nature of all other titles to rule and the
mischievous working of all existing governments. The
same view is developed in the Republic and the Leges.
Compare also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27
ad fin.

In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638

C), Plato observes, in touching upon the discrepancy
between different local institutions at Sparta, Krete,
Keos. Tarentum, &c.:—“If natives of different cities
argue with each other about their respective
institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient
reason. This is the custom with us; with you perhaps it
is different. But we, who are now conversing, do not
apply our criticisms to the private citizen; we criticise
the lawgiver himself, and try to determine whether his
laws are good or bad.” ἡμῖν δ’ ἐστι οὐ περὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν
νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. King Nomos
was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial.
 The dislike so constantly felt by
Aversion towards Sokrates
communities having established
aggravated by his extreme
opinions, towards free speculation and
publicity of speech. His
dialectic, was aggravated in its
declaration, that false
application to Sokrates, because his
persuasion of knowledge is
dialectic was not only novel, but also
universal; must be
public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.89
understood as a basis in
appreciating Plato’s
The name of Sokrates, after his death,
Dialogues of Search.
was employed not merely by Plato, but
by all the Sokratic companions, to
cover their own ethical speculations: moreover, all of them either
composed works or gave lectures. But in either case, readers or
hearers were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons
prompted by some special taste or interest: while Sokrates passed
his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate every one, and
sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon reluctant hearers.90
That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for
thirty years, when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology)
of the antipathy which he provoked — and when we recollect that
the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict —
is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of Athenian
practice.

89 Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. “Est enim philosophia

paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa
fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa,” &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive

conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by
Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, Ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν) as
aggravating the displeasure of the public against him.
 90 Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that

the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read
them under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates
enunciates to the Dikasts. “False persuasion of knowledge is almost
universal: the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and
indispensable: the dialectic search for truth between two active, self-
working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own
ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end
without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than
that of discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue.” The
modern reader must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if
he would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must
learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in
itself,91 even though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the
steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of
opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened,
various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first
half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even
without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the
problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative
solution.92 But Plato presumes that the search will be renewed,
either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon
responsive energy in the youthful subject; he addresses himself to
men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on
by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit — men who, having
listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate
on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate
conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents,
who, after having been puzzled and put to shame by one cross-
examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves
again — were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.93 For him, as
well as for Plato, the search after truth counted as the main business
of life.

91 Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion

of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the
habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in
the days of Aristotle, and afterwards; but had
comparatively ceased in his own time, haying been
exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol.
Brandis, also Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the
Commentary of Proklus thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and
p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.

92 A passage in one of the speeches composed by

Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts,
shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite
opinions were accounted as essential to the process
τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν — καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ᾤμην φιλοσοφοῦντας
αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον
λόγον· οἱ δ’ ἄρα οὐκ ἀντέλεγον, ἀλλ’ ἀντέπραττον.
(Lysias, Or. viii. Κακολογιῶν s. 11, p. 273; compare
Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in

terms which illustrate the Platonic διάλογοι ζητητικοί,
— the character of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as
contrasted with that of the confident affirmer and
expositor:—“Me ipsum autem ad veritatis
contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum
deprehendi, ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem
(quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis mobilem, et
ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam
et intentam haberem — qui et quærendi desiderium,
et dubitandi patientiam, et meditandi voluptatem, et
asserendi cunctationem, et resipiscendi facilitatem, et
disponendi sollicitudinem tenerem — quique nec
novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et
omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam
cum veritate quandam familiaritatem et cognationem
habere judicavi.” (Impetus Philosophici, De
Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium.)

Σωκρατικῶς εἰς ἑκάτερον is the phrase of Cicero, ad

Atticum ii. 3.

93 Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the

following remarks, illustrating Plato’s Dialogues of
Search. I should have been glad if I could have
transcribed here many other pages of that admirable
Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved
vindication of the rights of the searching individual
intelligence, against the compression and repression of
King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):—

“The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent

and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by
the necessity of explaining it to or defending it against
opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no
trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal
recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I
confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind
endeavouring to provide a substitute for it: some
contrivance for making the difficulties of the question
as present to the learner’s consciousness, as if they
were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion
eager for his conversion.

“But instead of seeking contrivances for this

purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The
Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the
dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this
description. They were essentially a discussion of the
great questions of life and philosophy, directed with
consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any
one, who had merely adopted the common-places of
received opinion, that he did not understand the
subject — that he as yet attached no definite meaning
to the doctrines he professed: in order that, becoming
aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to
attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension
both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence.
The school-disputations of the middle ages had a
similar object. They were intended to make sure that
the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by
necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it — and
could enforce the grounds of the one and confute
those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had
indeed the incurable defect, that the premisses
appealed to were taken from authority, not from
reason; and as a discipline to the mind they were in
every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which
 formed the intellects of the ‘Socratici viri’. But the
modern mind owes far more to both than it is
generally willing to admit; and the present modes of
instruction contain nothing which in the smallest
degree supplies the place either of the one or of the
other.… It is the fashion of the present time to
disparage negative logic — that which points out
weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without
establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism
would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result,
but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or
conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too
highly; and until people are again systematically
trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low
general average of intellect, in any but the
mathematical and physical departments of speculation.
On any other subject no one’s opinions deserve the
name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had
forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself,
the same mental process which would have been
required of him in carrying on an active controversy
with opponents.”

Another matter must here be

Result called Knowledge,
noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of
which Plato aspires to.
Search. We must understand how Plato
Power of going through a
conceived the goal towards which they
Sokratic cross examination;
tend: that is the state of mind which he
not attainable except
calls knowledge or cognition.
through the Platonic
Knowledge (in his view) is not attained
process and method.
until the mind is brought into clear
view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate communion with
them: but the test (as I have already observed) for determining
whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to ascertain
whether he can give to others a full account of all that he professes
to know, and can extract from them a full account of all that they
profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner exhaustive
as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of asking
and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the
Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it
without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.94
Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may
easily see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct,
demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the
hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together
with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with
each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and
analogies: he must have had before him objections with their
refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the
theorem, but do not really prove it:95 he must be introduced to the
principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent
will enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal
terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is
cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining
an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together
with full promptitude and flexibility, before he will be competent to
perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the
test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely
distant and hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits
the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to
show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a
long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we
read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of
mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this
continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).96 The
Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with
the Platonic result, as described and pursued.

94 See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about παιδεία,

as developing τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ: and 534, about ἐπιστήμη, with its test, τὸ
δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. Compare also Republic, v.
477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B,
Phædrus, 276; and Sympos. 202 A. τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν
καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι, οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι οὔτε
ἐπίστασθαι ἐστιν; ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη
ἐπιστήμη;

95 On this point the scholastic manner of handling in

the Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the
Platonic dialectic. I borrow a passage from the treatise
of M Hauréau, De la Phil. Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190.

“Saint Thomas pouvait s’en tenir là: nous le

comprenons, nous avons tout son système sur l’origine
des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu’il n’a plus rien à
nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne
suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments,
réputés invincibles, ce que l’on suppose être la vérité,
il faut, en outre, répondre aux objections première,
seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de divers interlocuteurs,
souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la parfaite
concordance de la conclusion enoncée et des
 conclusions precédents ou subséquentes; il faut
réproduire, à l’occasion de tout problème controversé,
l’ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s’est
déclaré.”

96 Longinus De Sublim. s. 6. καίτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα

δύσληπτον· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λόγων κρίσις πολλῆς ἐστι πείρας
τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα. Compare what is said in a
succeeding chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see
also Sir W. Hamilton’s Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p.
224.

Moreover, not merely method and

Platonic process adapted to
result are in harmony, but also the
Platonic topics — man and
topics discussed. These topics were
society.
ethical, social, and political: matters
especially human97 (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) familiar
to every man, — handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the
assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it
is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most
interesting, varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in
themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety
of causes, co-operating and conflicting. Account must be taken of
many different points of view, each of which has a certain range of
application, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others:
the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and
under ordinary circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those
circumstances undergo important change. There are always
objections, real as well as apparent, which require to be rebutted or
elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the
Platonic dialectic was adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and
comparisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each
of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable
principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but
also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general
terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions
suggested, followed up by objections available against each,
included a large and instructive survey of ethical phenomena in all
their bearings.

97 Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the

following passage from an article in the Edinburgh
Review (April, 1866, pp. 325-326), on the first edition
of the present work: an article not merely profound
and striking as to thought, but indicating the most
comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic
writings:—

“The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and

the warfare against whom was the incessant
occupation of his life and writings, was — not
Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the
term, but — Commonplace. It was the acceptance of
traditional opinions and current sentiments as an
ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract terms
which express approbation and disapprobation, desire
and aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a
meaning thoroughly understood and universally
assented to. The men of his day (like those of ours)
thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and
Unjust, Honourable and Shameful, were — because
they could use the words glibly, and affirm them of this
or that, in agreement with existing custom. But what
the property was, which these several instances
possessed in common, justifying the application of the
term, nobody had considered; neither the Sophists,
nor the rhetoricians, nor the statesmen, nor any of
those who set themselves up, or were set up by
others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this
question was wandering in darkness — had no
standard by which his judgments were regulated, and
which kept them consistent with one another — no
rule which he knew and could stand by for the
guidance of his life. Not knowing what Justice and
Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and virtuous:
not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it,
but are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a
condition, to any one capable of thought, made life not
worth having. The grand business of human intellect
ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most
rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that
lie at the bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done
and real knowledge attained, it is already no small
benefit to expel the false opinion of knowledge: to
make men conscious of the things most needful to be
known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their
own state, and rouse a pungent internal stimulus,
summoning up all their energies to attack those
greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as
possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato’s
notion of the condition of the human mind in his time,
and of what philosophy could do to help it: and any
 one who does not think the description applicable, with
slight modifications, to the majority of educated minds
in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly
has not brought either the teachers or the practical
men of any time to the Platonic test.”

The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive

description by a valuable citation from Max Müller to
the same purpose (Lectures on the Science of
Language, Second Series, pp. 520-527). “Such terms
as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance,
Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration,
Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed about in the war of
words as if every body knew what they meant, and as
if every body used them exactly in the same sense;
whereas most people, and particularly those who
represent public opinion, pick up these complicated
terms as children, beginning with the vaguest
conceptions, adding to them from time to time —
perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their
involuntary errors — but never taking stock, never
either enquiring into the history of the terms which
they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their
meaning according to the strict rules of logical
definition.”

The negative procedure is so

Plato does not provide
conspicuous, and even so
solutions for the difficulties
preponderant, in the Platonic
which he has raised. The
dialogues, that no historian of
affirmative and negative
philosophy can omit to notice it. But
veins are in him completely
distinct. His dogmas are many of them (like Xenophon in
enunciations à priori of describing Sokrates) assign to it only a
some impressive subordinate place and a qualified
sentiment. application: while some (and
Schleiermacher especially) represent all
the doubts and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to
call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and
satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic
dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the
last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were
certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended
as exercises to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to
the solution of them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does
not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority
by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties
exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his
speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and
independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially
present (as in Timæus), the negative altogether disappears. Timæus
is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which
the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant
cross-examination: but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with
respectful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so
often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher — that
he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others,
but cannot discover any good solution of them — this declaration,
which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true.98 The
Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the
commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties — not
only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself.
When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether à
priori: they enunciate preconceptions or hypotheses, which derive
their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the
objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment
of some kind or other — religious, ethical, æsthetical, poetical, &c.,
the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas
are enunciations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just,
beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,99 which Plato follows out into corollaries.
But this is a process of itself; and while he is performing it, the
doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are
forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose100
that Plato ties knots in one dialogue only with a view to untie them
in another; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully
solved in his own mind, only that he defers the announcement of the
solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for
himself.
98 See the conversation between Menippus and
Sokrates. (Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)

99 Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics

upon which Plato renounces the character of a
searcher, and passes into that of a vehement
affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above
human investigation and evidence — the
transcendental: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Plato) τὰ δόγματα οὐκ
αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνεται, εἶτα περὶ αὐτῶν διαγωνίζεται· ἀλλ’
ἐν μεσῳ τὴν ζήτησιν ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς
διαλεγομένους, εὑρίσκων μᾶλλον τὸ δέον δόγμα, ἢ
φιλονεικῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται· πλὴν ὅσα περὶ τῶν
κρειττόνων, ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, λέγεται (Dion. Hal. Ars Rhet.
c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style

of theorising in the physical sciences, very analogous
to that of Plato, generally:—

Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel.

“De ces deux explications des phénomènes de la
lumière, l’une s’appelle la théorie de l’émission; l’autre
est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On
trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits
d’Empédocle. Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer
parmi ses adhérents Képler, Newton, Laplace. Le
système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans moins
illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler,
l’avaient adopté.…
 “Au reste, si l’on s’étonnait de voir d’aussi grands
génies ainsi divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la
question on litige ne pouvait être résolue; que les
expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu’alors les
divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non des
déductions logiques des faits, mais, si je puis
m’exprimer ainsi, de simples vérités de sentiment,
qu’enfin, le don de l’infaillibilité n’est pas accordé
même aux plus habiles, des qu’en sortant du domaine
des observations, et se jetant dans celui des
conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche sévère et
assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours
avec raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables
progrès.”

100 Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they

thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty
which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the
means of solving; and Munk treats the idea which I
have stated in the text as ridiculous. “Plato (he
observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on
the subject of pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct
others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his
own ideas on the question, he proposes, in
propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to
solve, while he has not yet solved them himself; and
all this for the praiseworthy (ironically said) purpose of
correcting in their minds the false persuasion of
knowledge.” (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon
Schrift. p. 515.)
 That which Munk here derides, appears stated,
again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real
purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous, but
the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic
Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing
himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with
the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also,

Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato
could not have composed the Parmenidês, including,
as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and
objections against the theory of Ideas, until he
possessed the means of solving all of them himself.
This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural; for
there is no solution of them given in any of Plato’s
writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as
given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to
be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much
beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die

Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, p. 103-104); that
Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears
as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a
matured thinker, who has already gone through the
investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties,
but who goes back upon the work of search over
again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. “The
special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates
displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be
 explained by supposing that he has already acquired
for himself a firm and certain conviction on the
question discussed.”

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite

untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous
opinion which he had given elsewhere (Platonische
Welt-seele, p. 69-70) — That the Platonic Ideenlehre
was altogether insufficient for explanation. The
impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon
me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to
understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if
he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can
avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the
literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates; while
Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into

the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of
his most expository compositions) see a remarkable
passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα
ἄμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, &c.

Some critics, assuming confidently

Hypothesis — that Plato
that Plato must have produced a full
had solved all his own
breadth of positive philosophy to
difficulties for himself; but
countervail his own negative fertility,
that he communicated the
yet not finding enough of it in the
solution only to a few
written dialogues look for it elsewhere.
select auditors in oral
Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is
lectures — Untenable.
partly shared by Boeckh and K. F.
Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of
Plato’s philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: that the
core, the central points, the great principles of his system (der Kern)
were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad
terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as to convey
only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these great principles,
together with refutation of various errors opposed to them: that
Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or
systematic revelation to the general public.101 I have already said
that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we
know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered
not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared
audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some which,
far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are
highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself
to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-
sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that
the oral lectures De Bono were also.

101 Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 205-220.

Hermann, Ueber Plato’s Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-
294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine

to be unworthy of Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras
and other Sophists, on the authority of a passage in
the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all sustain
his allegation.

Hermann considers “die akroamatischen Lehren als

Fortsetzung und Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort
erst zur vollen Klarheit principieller Auffassung erhoben
wurden, ohne jedoch über den nämlichen Gegenstand,
 soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, etwas
wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren” (p. 293).

Towards filling up this gap, then, the

Characteristic of the oral
oral lectures cannot be shown to lend
lectures — that they were
any assistance. The cardinal point of
delivered in Plato’s own
difference between them and the
name. In what other
dialogues was, that they were
respects they departed
delivered by Plato himself, in his own
from the dialogues, we
name; whereas he never published any
cannot say.
written composition in his own name.
But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way this
difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, delivered
to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special
communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. Here
however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in
these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to
controvert what was said in the last page — that Plato’s affirmative
philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out
of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells
us102) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philosophy
was an ascending one toward the principia (ἀρχὰς), or a descending
one down from the principia. A good philosophy ought to suffice for
both, conjointly and alternately: in Plato’s philosophy, there is no
road explicable either upwards or downwards, between the two: no
justifiable mode of participation (μέθεξις) between the two disparate
worlds — intellect and sense. The principia of Plato take an
impressive hold on the imagination: but they remove few or none of
the Platonic difficulties; and they only seem to do this because the
Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never
seriously brought to bear against them.