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THE PRESS EFFECT
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û
The
Press Effect
Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories
That Shape the Political World
2003
Oxford New York
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto
www.oup.com
135798642
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
To Robert,
who keeps ships afloat.
To Al Bennett,
who opened the mind
of every student he taught.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction xi
CHAPTER 1
The Press as Storyteller 1
CHAPTER 2
The Press as Amateur Psychologist, Part I 24
CHAPTER 3
The Press as Amateur Psychologist, Part II 41
CHAPTER 4
The Press as Soothsayer 74 vii
viii CONTENTS
CHAPTER 5
The Press as Shaper of Events 95
CHAPTER 6
The Press as Patriot 130
CHAPTER 7
The Press as Custodian of Fact 165
Conclusion 194
Notes 199
Index 209
Acknowledgments
ix
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Introduction
words of President Bush, as “the Evil One.” Thus even if he hadn’t actually
uttered the words, it was plausible that he might have, and there was com-
fort in believing that all but the ringleaders had been deceived by the Devil
incarnate. If some of the hijacking terrorists who boarded the planes on
September 11 didn’t realize that they were about to end the lives of hun-
dreds along with their own, then the fact that they boarded at all was some-
how more comprehensible. Even after the tape was broadcast and
transcribed, some later news reports repeated the original erroneous claim.
For instance, on March 13, 2002, NBC reporter John Hockenberry said on
Dateline, “There is this famous video of Osama Bin Laden talking about
how some people on the airplanes in New York and Washington did not
even know that they were going to die, had no idea that this was a suicide
mission.” Because it was not corrected, the inaccuracy had become part of
the historical memory of some journalists, and could thus be repeated.
This is one small case in which an inaccuracy was passed from po-
litical actors to reporters and on to the public. Because it was not cor-
rected, the inaccuracy persisted in public memory. Officials were able to
control the frame because they held a temporary monopoly on relevant
information; when that monopoly disappeared, other facts were deemed
to be of greater consequence and a continuing, compelling narrative over-
whelmed any impulse reporters might have had to address the question
of whether they and the public had been misled.
In a complex world, what the public knows and understands is a
collection of facts both small and large, and stories both fleeting and
persistent. In describing the process by which real-world events are trans-
lated into public knowledge through journalism, we use two primary
metaphors, one novel and one common in the study of communication
and public opinion. In order for an event to reach the public, it must
first be viewed by reporters, then related in stories. To describe report-
ers’ views of the world they are asked to explain (we use the metaphor of
lenses) the shifting perspectives that color what reporters see of the world
at a given moment. To describe the news coverage that results from those
views, we use the metaphor of frames, the structures underlying the de-
pictions that the public reads, hears, and watches.
Because they determine the content of news, those lenses and frames
continuously shape what citizens know, understand, and believe about
the world. In The Press Effect, we make sense of moments such as the Bin
Laden tape and their effects on public knowledge by examining the vari-
ous lenses through which reporters saw events and the frames they de-
ployed as they told us stories about the meaning of politics in a year of
Introduction xiii
The 1988 presidential election produced a telling case in which the press
failed to challenge facts that sounded plausible because they completed
a dramatic narrative. Seeing the story through the lens of strategy and
tactics, reporters neglected their role as custodian of fact. What were the
facts? William Horton, who had been convicted as an accessory to a felony
murder for his part in a robbery in which a young man was murdered,
was released from a Massachusetts prison on a furlough. He jumped
furlough and traveled to Maryland, where he held a couple hostage,
stabbed the man and raped his fiancée. The Bush campaign used the
story to paint the Democratic nominee, Massachusetts governor Michael
Dukakis, as soft on crime.
Whether or not the Horton story accurately symbolized Dukakis’s
record on crime, George H. W. Bush’s embellishment of it and the press’s
failure to challenge the untruths the vice president told as he repeated
the story provide an excellent example of the power of narrative to over-
whelm concern about fact. On the stump, for example, Bush alleged that
“Willie Horton was in jail, found guilty by a jury of his peers for mur-
dering a seventeen-year-old kid after torturing him.”1 There is no direct
evidence that Horton killed Joseph Fournier, and nothing on which to
base a charge of torture. The untrue claim that Horton had cut off
Fournier’s genitals and stuffed them in the victim’s mouth was whis-
pered to reporters by Bush campaign operatives. There is some evidence
that Horton may have been in the getaway car shooting heroin while his
associates robbed and killed Fournier. A court official indicated that one
of Horton’s accomplices confessed to killing Fournier but the confes-
sion was disallowed because it had been secured without the reading of
Miranda rights. Horton was convicted as an accomplice to a felony mur-
der. In other words, there is no evidence that he killed Fournier and
reason to believe that he did not.
Bush next alleged that Horton had murdered again when he jumped
furlough. As he described it in an Ohio speech in September, “You re-
member the case of Willie Horton in the Reader’s Digest, the guy was
furloughed, murderer, hadn’t even served enough time for parole, goes
down to Maryland, and murders again, and Maryland wouldn’t even let
him out to go back to Massachusetts, because they didn’t want him to
kill again. I don’t believe in that kind of approach to criminals.”2 Bush’s
claim that Horton had committed murder while on parole was untrue.
The Republican candidate’s story, then, had three flaws: It increased
The Press as Storyteller 3
Horton’s role in the crime for which he was originally in jail, it embel-
lished the details of the crime, and it magnified the horror of Horton’s
post-furlough activities. There is symmetry in the notion that a killer
has killed again; thus Bush’s exaggerated version of the story cohered
thematically with the undisputed facts, and that coherence increased its
plausibility. When Dukakis failed to challenge the Bush claims on the
assumption that they were unbelievable, the press, taking its cue in part
from the Democrat, gave Bush a pass. While reporters discussing the
story usually correctly stated its facts, they did not charge Bush with
deception for making the story more awful than it actually was.
The Bush campaign also falsely asserted that the furlough program
was Dukakis’s invention (he had inherited it from his Republican pre-
decessor), that Horton was a first-degree murderer not eligible for pa-
role at the time of his furlough (he was in a category that made him
eligible for parole), that there were hundreds of others who escaped from
Massachusetts furloughs and committed violent crimes (none commit-
ted murder, and Horton was the only one who committed rape), and
that Horton’s name was not William but “Willie.” In fact, until June of
1988 Horton was referred to as William in all court documents and news-
paper stories, including those of the Lawrence Eagle-Tribune, the Massa-
chusetts newspaper that won a Pulitzer Prize for its exposé of the furlough
program. The advertisement featuring Horton, which was paid for by
the National Security PAC,3 referred to him as “Willie,” and Bush, who
mentioned him in speeches in the summer of 1988 as well as in his de-
bate with Dukakis on September 25, referred to him as “Willie.” An ex-
amination of newspaper stories reveals that once the Bush campaign
began referring to him as Willie, most newspapers began calling him
that as well. Only the Washington Post and New York Times continued to
call him William—although they shifted back and forth between the
two names. Given the controversy, one would assume that reporters
would have gone back to look at the documents surrounding the Horton
case, including the Eagle-Tribune series. Had they done so, they would
have noticed that Horton hadn’t been called Willie until Bush began
talking about the case. One explanation for the lack of correction is that
the name Willie sounded more lower class, more criminal, and indeed
more “black” to reporters, and thus cohered with the narrative concern-
ing Horton’s crimes.
The question of Horton’s name demonstrates that the stories on which
political arguments are built have embedded within them a variety of facts
both large and small, any of which may be subject to distortion. The fact
4 THE PRESS EFFECT
that reporters failed to call Bush on his claim that Horton had killed
again while on furlough suggests the extent to which reporters, like the
rest of us, often fail to check facts that seem compatible with compelling
narratives. This is particularly true when the lens through which report-
ers are seeing is a strategic one, evaluating candidates’ words and actions
for their tactical intentions and electoral effects.
Republicans would argue that the recount requested by Gore had been
unconstitutional. But that is not actually what the Court said. “Because it
is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be
unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed,” the justices wrote,
“we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a
recount to proceed” (emphasis added). One can parse the opinion into
three questions: Was the recount to that point acceptable? Seven said no.
Were the recount problems remediable? Seven said yes. (“It is obvious
that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the require-
ments of equal protection and due process without substantial additional
work.”) Were they remediable in the time remaining? Five said no.
If Bush v. Gore was a 7–2 ruling then the court acted decisively; if the
ruling was 5–4, the court was instead closely divided. Republicans favored
the first construction; Democrats the second. Just before midnight De-
cember 12, the Gore campaign issued a statement saying that Gore and
Lieberman were “reviewing the 5–4 decision issued tonight by the Su-
preme Court of the United States . . .” The next evening he seemed to lay
fights over the size of the majority behind the ruling to rest with the words
“The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt. While I
strongly disagree with the court’s decision, I accept it. I accept the finality
of this outcome.” The Bush camp, on the other hand, characterized the
ruling differently. James Baker, appearing before Gore’s concession, said
that the Texas governor was “very pleased and gratified that seven justices
of the United States Supreme Court agreed that there were constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.”4
More than six months after the Supreme Court ruling, the person
who led the Bush team in the thirty-six days was still working to cast the
decision as a 7–2 vote. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times,
James Baker protested the fact that “you have once again described Bush
v. Gore as a 5-to-4 decision . . . a point that is accurate but also incom-
plete . . . The court’s holding that the lack of uniform standards for the
recount violated the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection
was decided on a 7-to-2 vote, with one of two Democrats joining six of
seven Republicans.”5 The statement by Baker says more than he may
have intended. Presumably in their role as justices of the Supreme Court,
individuals do not consider themselves members of a party, although
one could appropriately characterize them as nominated by presidents
who were either Republicans or Democrats. In his eagerness to establish
that the important decision was rendered 7–2, Baker reopened a far more
damaging charge—that the justices acted politically.
6 THE PRESS EFFECT
Could they fight on? Sure, Boies said. Should they? “It is not just mak-
ing a decision of whether this is viable or sensible,” he said later. “It is
whether the viability of it or the sensibility of it [is] great enough to
consider it. It is not just a legal question.” It was a question about a
divided country, and about the future of Al Gore.
All this was hashed and rehashed in early morning conference
calls. At about 8:30, Daley and Gore spoke again. “The spin on the
morning news was ‘It’s over,’” Daley noted. Even if they wanted to
keep fighting, there was scant running room and vanishing support.6
A process that had begun when the vice president believed the me-
dia reports and called to concede ended when the vice president heard
from an aide that the news interpretation precluded any further legal
The Press as Storyteller 7
challenge. The frame through which the Supreme Court decision was
discussed provided a coda to the contested 2000 election. The reliance
on the 5–4 frame opened a story line suggesting that a single Supreme
Court justice had in fact selected the president of the United States. As
we will argue later, when the so-called media recounts were complete,
the press itself dismissed that story line.
Clinton, he had spent the night in the White House only at the invita-
tion of George H. W. Bush.
Because it was known that Clinton had rewarded contributors with
nights in the Lincoln Bedroom, and it was also known that Ken Lay had
given large amounts of money to many politicians, it was plausible that
Ken Lay had rested in Lincoln’s bed at Clinton’s invitation. The claim
originated on the Drudge Report, and was then picked up by the Chicago
Tribune and USA Today. Subsequently, it appeared in, among other places,
a news story in the Washington Times; editorials in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Portland Oregonian, and Augusta Chronicle; and in a Newhouse
News Service column by James Lileks distributed to multiple newspa-
pers. It reached overseas, appearing in the Times of London, the Sunday
Age of Melbourne, and the Korea Herald. Fred Barnes wrote it in the
Weekly Standard and made the claim on Fox News’s Special Report with
Brit Hume. On the same network, Republican activist David Bossie said
the same thing on Greta Van Susteren’s On the Record. Republican me-
dia consultant Alex Castellanos made the claim on CNN’s Crossfire on
February 14, then again on ABC’s This Week on February 17. That ap-
pearance was the only time anyone directly challenged the assertion.
The exchange on This Week offers a good example of the way in which
such claims survive untethered to fact.
Brendan Nyhan in the on-line magazine Salon, but the correction did
not diffuse into the national media. Mistaken information given plausi-
bility by the past actions of Clinton and Lay and by its coherence with
an existing narrative was thus able to help Republicans widen the sphere
of responsibility for Enron to include Democrats. With each subsequent
retelling, the story became less and less likely to be checked for accuracy.
When a contested piece of information such as this arises, reporters have
a responsibility to discover the truth, then sanction anyone who repeats
a falsehood.
When two sides are projecting competing outcomes from a piece of leg-
islation, reports are likely to simply set their claims against each other
and probe for tactical advantage. If the facts are checked, reporters are
more likely to scrutinize the claims of those who have demonstrated a
capacity to deceive the public in the past. If the contest is between the
tobacco companies on one hand and groups such as the American Can-
cer Society and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids on the other, the
fact that internal documents had confirmed that the tobacco industry
had lied about marketing to kids meant that the media were more likely
to explore the accuracy of its arguments than those of the other side.
There was not a week in a three-and-a-half-month period in 1998
in which tobacco industry ads addressing an antitobacco bill sponsored
by John McCain were not being aired. The McCain bill would have settled
the states’ suits against the tobacco industry by providing protection for
the industry from class-action lawsuits in return for an increased to-
bacco tax and assurances that the industry would no longer advertise to
the young through billboards near schools and the like. The industry’s
ad campaign was significant in part because it was the first time a large-
scale, long-running nationwide broadcast ad campaign on a piece of
pending legislation had run with negligible response from those on the
other side. The only television ad by proponents of a “tough bill” against
“Big Tobacco” was aired by the American Cancer Society for a single
week in May in five states and nationally on CNN. By contrast, the to-
bacco industry’s ads aired widely (in from thirty to fifty markets) on
both cable and local spot broadcast. Much of the industry budget was
spent on CNN, which did not air a single news piece evaluating the ac-
curacy of the ads’ claims.
10 THE PRESS EFFECT
cited article referred not to the McCain bill but to a request in President
Clinton’s budget. On-screen citations for information, which have become
commonplace in both candidate and advocacy ads in recent years, are a
welcome development. As this case illustrates, the fact that someone of-
fers citations does not mean that they are necessarily telling the truth.
And what of Martelle’s claim that teens simply got their cigarettes
on the black market created by the tax increase? In a May 19 adwatch on
ABC, Aaron Brown evaluated both the industry ad claim that the McCain
bill would produce a black market and the implication that kids would
buy cigarettes there:
Tonkin Gulf as “open aggression on the high seas against the United
States of America.” He asked Congress to pass “a resolution making it
clear that our government is united in its determination to take all nec-
essary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in south-
east Asia.”10 On August 10, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
The narrative that initiated the United States’s formal entry into the
war in Vietnam was simple in its construction. The United States had
been attacked. The attack constituted aggression on the high seas. The
United States responded at once on the order Johnson gave “after the
initial act of aggression.” The response of the military was heroic “in the
highest tradition of the U.S. Navy.” The U.S. response was “limited and
fitting.” The cause was just; the goal, peace. “Firmness in the right is
indispensable today for peace,” said Johnson.
There was only one problem with the narrative. The U.S. destroyer
Maddox had, in all likelihood, not been attacked. In 1995, Johnson’s de-
fense secretary, Robert McNamara, said that he was convinced the at-
tack that prompted the U.S. retaliation had never actually occurred. As
was later revealed in his secretly recorded audiotapes, President Johnson
himself doubted whether the attack took place.11 McNamara also said
that had it not been for the Tonkin Gulf incident, the war resolution
(which had been drafted months before) would have been sent to Con-
gress later and would have been subject to a more extensive debate.12
The Tonkin Gulf case illustrates a number of important features of
political discourse. First, what we believe is in part a function of what we
are told by those entrusted with information we lack. Congress believed
Johnson at a time when skepticism would have better served the country’s
interests. In turn, the country believed Johnson, for it had little reason
to expect that a president would lie about such a consequential matter.
Second, this example shows that facts matter. Policies are built on argu-
ments describing the past, present, and future; if those arguments con-
tain untruth, the consequences can be enormous. Third, it demonstrates
that the impulse to bend the truth in order to maintain support for one’s
goals is a powerful one.
This is not to say that politicians persuade mostly by lying. Instead,
they tell the public stories, selecting facts and arguments that support
their interpretation of reality. In the context of events occurring in war
zones overseas, the press is constrained by its often limited ability to
confirm the factual assertions made by the government. As the next ex-
ample shows, in times of crisis the press often refrains from punishing
the government for deception, even when it learns the truth.
14 THE PRESS EFFECT
After word of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
reached President George W. Bush’s staff at a school in Florida where
Bush was making an appearance, Air Force One flew the president from
Miami to a military base in Louisiana and from there to the Strategic Air
Command headquarters in Nebraska before returning to Washington.
Members of the press wondered why he had done this. Hoping to blunt
a narrative in which Bush appeared to be the object of forces beyond his
control rather than a decisive leader guiding the country through the
crisis, Bush aides told reporters that there had been a “credible threat”
against Air Force One. If that was true, then the moves across the coun-
try were the reasonable response of a vigilant Secret Service and a na-
tional security process to protect the commander in chief. If it was not
true, then the Bush aides were deceiving reporters to create a false image
of a President’s behavior. “Credible evidence” that Air Force One was at
risk was quickly disseminated. Bush adviser Karl Rove told journalists
that the Secret Service had received a telephoned threat that “contained
language that was evidence that the terrorists had knowledge of his pro-
cedures and whereabouts. In light of the specific and credible threat, it
was decided to get airborne with a fighter escort.”13
Reporters later learned that Rove and administration spokesperson
Ari Fleischer had misled them. Administration officials had no record
of any such call, and were unable to explain why Air Force One was less
vulnerable in one location than another even if there had been such a
message.14 Had such an act occurred in a political campaign, headlines
would have reported the deception. Instead, the facts were largely bur-
ied. The country needed to believe in a decisive, commanding president
in the anxious days after September 11, and the press was not disposed
to feature evidence incompatible with that narrative.
People generally assume that the press plays an adversarial role to
those in power and is quick to unmask, debunk, and challenge. In fact,
reporters play this role selectively. If they assume that the country sup-
ports the person telling the story (in this case the president) and oppos-
ing narratives are not being offered by competing players, the tendency
to challenge is dramatically curtailed. At the time of the Tonkin Gulf
speech, Johnson was on his way to a landslide victory against Barry
Goldwater. After assuming the presidency at the death of John Kennedy,
LBJ had driven much of the Kennedy legislative agenda through Con-
gress. His was a formidable presence. At the same time, the Tonkin Gulf
The Press as Storyteller 15
this world can fail to do everything within their power to remove this
scourge from the face of our earth . . . [A]ll the countries of the world
. . . must join together and take whatever action may be necessary to free
the people of Kuwait.” The audience for the account included the presi-
dent, who told Porter that “he had seen it on CNN and that he was
shocked at some of the things that he had heard.”15
It is unclear why President Bush should have been shocked, since
the day before Nayirah’s testimony, identifying the Emir of Kuwait as
the source, he had alluded to babies taken from incubators. In that first
telling, however, he added that the stories may not have been authenti-
cated. Specifically, at a press conference October 9, he said “babies in
incubators [were] heaved out of the incubators and the incubators them-
selves sent to Baghdad. Now I don’t know how many of these tales can
be authenticated but I do know that when the Emir was here he was
speaking from the heart.” “Speaking from the heart” uses perceived sin-
cerity as a test of reliability. This is one unusual instance in which the
elder Bush used a technique similar to one employed often by his son,
using good intentions—the contents of the Emir’s heart—as a counter-
weight to potential criticism or factual refutation.
There was at the time another source that confirmed the incubator
story. After the young woman testified, her observations were corrobo-
rated by Amnesty International, which concluded that 312 infants had
died after Iraqi soldiers removed them from their incubators.
After the first reference, in which Bush qualified the story by ex-
pressing uncertainty about its authenticity, the incident moved from an
undocumented tale to a statement of presumed fact. Rallying troops en
route to Iraq on October 28, Bush said that twenty-two babies had died
and “the hospital employees were shot and the plundered machines were
shipped off to Baghdad.”
The story then became a staple of the Bush drive to mobilize public
support for the impending war. In a speech in Mashpee, Massachusetts
on November 1, Bush said of Saddam Hussein and his forces, “They’ve
tried to silence Kuwaiti dissent and courage with firing squads, much as
Hitler did when he invaded Poland. They have committed outrageous
acts of barbarism. In one hospital, they pulled twenty-two premature
babies from their incubators, sent the machines back to Baghdad, and
all those little ones died.” Speaking to the allied forces near Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia, Bush said on November 22, “It turns your stomach when
you listen to the tales of those that have escaped the brutality of Saddam,
the invader. Mass hangings. Babies pulled from their incubators and scat-
tered like firewood across the floor.”
The Press as Storyteller 17
On March 15, 1991, not long after the fighting had ended, ABC re-
porter John Martin revealed that the incubator story was a fiction when
he interviewed employees at the hospital where the incident allegedly
took place. In a 60 Minutes exposé in January 1992, Morley Safer talked
with Andrew Whitley, executive director of Middle East Watch, who re-
ported that a colleague went to the Adon Hospital after the liberation of
Kuwait “and interviewed the doctors, and he was able to speak to people
who said they had been on duty at that time, and that this incident didn’t
happen.” Asked by Safer to explain, a representative of Hill & Knowlton,
the powerhouse Washington lobbying and public relations firm that
choreographed the campaign, said, “I’m sure there will always be two
sides to a story. I believe Nayirah. I have no reason not to believe her.
The veracity of her story was indelibly marked on my mind when I saw
her and when I talked to her.”18 In this telling, truth is relative and the
perceived authenticity of the speaker is the test of veracity. But there
either were or were not Iraqi soldiers in the hospital in Kuwait. If there
were, they either did or did not remove babies from incubators and put
them on the floor; they either did or did not kill hospital personnel; they
either did or did not then ship the empty incubators to Baghdad; the
babies either did or did not die. President Bush either did or did not
have a warranted reason for outrage.
While the Gulf War may have been justified on any number of
grounds, the incubator story was offered repeatedly by the war’s propo-
nents as primary evidence of the moral righteousness of the cause. In
the Senate, where a resolution supporting the use of force was passed by
five votes, the incubator story was cited six times during debate on the
resolution. The incident was mentioned in floor debates about the war a
total of twenty-two times.
In the President’s rhetoric the synoptic statement justifying the war—
“This aggression is not going to stand”—was built in part on a deception
about babies and incubators. More important for our purposes here, the
narrative was used to rebut the charge that the purpose of going to war
was securing access to oil, as opponents of the war alleged (“No blood for
oil” was the chant heard at protests of the war). Bush used the dramatic,
heartrending story to reframe the conflict as a moral one in which no
compromise was possible and the United States’s actions, in the past or
present, would not be subject to debate given the evil of the enemy.
The Nayirah tale is instructive for other reasons that speak to our
need for public wariness and press vigilance when public discourse veers
into emotional anecdote. MacArthur’s book and Safer’s exposé both
The Press as Storyteller 19
appeared in 1992, nearly a year after the war was over; the ABC News story
was the first attempt to disprove the incubator story, but it appeared after
the war ended as well. The incubator story raises a number of important
questions: First, was the president deceived? What efforts were made to
verify the facts used to justify consequential action? Did the president be-
lieve the account because he heard it from the Emir, saw Nayirah’s testi-
mony on CNN, and read Amnesty International’s seeming corroboration?
Was the analogy comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler—which was
made from the day Iraq invaded Kuwait—given more legitimacy by the
incubator story? These questions are important because 200,000 troops
were already on the ground when the incubator story emerged.
Why did it take so long for reporters to check the facts? Of course,
journalists would have had trouble getting into Kuwait to talk with the
medical personnel in the hospital. Nonetheless, why was there no skepti-
cism about a story from a young woman speaking under an assumed
name? Why no tests of her credibility? Didn’t any reporter in Washing-
ton know enough about the family of the ambassador to recognize his
daughter? Why didn’t any reporter ask for a copy of her passport to verify
that she was in Kuwait at the reported time? John MacArthur reported
that Congressman Tom Lantos, the cochair of the Human Rights Cau-
cus, knew before the hearing that “Nayirah” was in fact the ambassador’s
daughter. Although Congressman Porter denies knowing, the Kuwaiti
ambassador himself claimed that both congressmen were aware of her
identity. Why did no reporters ask Lantos or Porter if they had any in-
formation that would substantiate her claims?
Why didn’t someone test the claim of Amnesty International by ask-
ing U.S. doctors who had visited Kuwait how many incubators a single
hospital would be expected to have in use at a given time? Does Kuwait
have an unusually large number of premature births? Why didn’t re-
porters spot the contradictions in Bush’s accounts? For example, in a
speech in Des Moines on October 16, Bush said, “In a hospital Iraqi
soldiers unplugged the oxygen to incubators supporting twenty-two
premature babies. They all died. And then they shot the hospital em-
ployees.” Did the soldiers unplug the oxygen or throw the babies to the
ground? The story changed in various tellings. As C. Wright Mills ob-
served in The Sociological Imagination, “The problem of empirical veri-
fication is ‘how to get down to the facts’ . . . The problem is first what to
verify and second how to verify it.”19
The reporter who uncovered Nayirah’s identity did so while writing
a book about propaganda and the Gulf War. John R. MacArthur told
20 THE PRESS EFFECT
60 Minutes, “I set out to find out, like any reporter does. And I started
asking questions. And I finally heard a rumor that Nayirah was the daugh-
ter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, so I used an old reporter’s trick. I called
up the embassy, and I said, ‘Nayirah did a terrific job at the Human
Rights Caucus, and I think her father must be very proud of her. And
doesn’t she deserve her place in history?’ And the ambassador’s secre-
tary said to me, ‘You’re not supposed to know that. No one’s supposed to
know she’s the ambassador’s daughter.’ ”
The conditions of war made the press both more willing to accept
the incubator story and less able to determine whether it was true. But
in other cases, assertions that would have been quite simple to investi-
gate have been accepted at face value because they cohered to form a
powerful, coherent narrative.
As Congress and the president once again debate the feasibility of de-
ploying a missile defense shield, the ability of what Dwight Eisenhower
called the “military industrial complex” to produce technology that
shoots down incoming weapons should be open to question. We all re-
member watching the Patriot missiles blasting Scuds out of the sky, ren-
dering Saddam Hussein’s malevolence impotent in the face of our
technological prowess. During the Gulf War, we were told that the Patri-
ots worked nearly perfectly.
The rhetoric at the time reduced the Scuds vs. the Patriots to a tale
of U.S. superiority, a rebuke to those who had doubted the Patriot. On
February 15, 1991, President Bush visited the Raytheon plant that con-
structed the Patriot missiles. “The critics said that this system was plagued
with problems, that results from the test range wouldn’t stand up under
battlefield conditions,” he told the workers. “You knew they were wrong,
those critics, all along. And now the world knows it too. Beginning with
the first Scud launched in Saudi Arabia, right into Saudi Arabia and the
Patriot that struck it down and with the arrival of Patriot battalions in
Israel, all told, Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted . . .
Not every intercept results in total destruction. But Patriot is proof posi-
tive that missile defense works. I’ve said many times that missile defense
threatens no one, that there is no purer defensive weapon than one that
targets and destroys missiles launched against us. Thank God for the
The Press as Storyteller 21
shield appear now to be, we might be more skeptical about claims that a
workable technology is in the offing.
What these examples and the others we have cited have in common
is that those who utilized them were able to present a dramatic narrative
that played an outsized role in the debate of the moment, driving out
relevant facts. As psychologists have known for many years, people don’t
evaluate situations and make decisions by conducting an inventory of
all the information to which they have been exposed about a subject.
Instead, both the press and the public use heuristics, often referred to as
“information shortcuts,” to make evaluation easier. One of the most com-
monly employed is the availability heuristic; we rely on what is most
easily available in our memories. Because evocative images are more
available in memory, they carry a greater importance in evaluations.24
Dramatic, repeated, visually evocative materials can be tools of terror or
vehicles that reassure. By repeatedly showing the hijacked planes hitting
the World Trade Center towers, news increased our sense that such at-
tacks were likely to occur. By repeatedly showing the towers collapsing,
news magnified our fear that we would be trapped in a tall building as it
collapsed. By repeatedly airing stories about anthrax, news increased the
likelihood that we would be fearful as we opened our mail.
The dramatic narrative can thus drive out relevant facts. Ordinary
Americans, the vast majority of whom would not be targets of an attack,
feared opening their mail because of the stories of the few letters that con-
tained anthrax, despite the billions of letters delivered spore-free. In 1991,
Americans remembered the incubator and the success of the Patriot mis-
sile, understanding the war as a battle against evil in which victory was
obtained in large part through the triumph of American technology. When
voters in 1988 evaluated Michael Dukakis’s crime record, the fact that the
furlough program was begun by his Republican predecessor and that se-
rious crime was down in Massachusetts were forgotten by most (although
he mentioned them often), while the dramatic story of “Willie” Horton
was remembered. In a contest between data and dramatic narrative, the
narrative is likely to be stored and recalled.
The political narratives on which we have focused underscore the
insight underlying Aristotle’s observation that pity and fear are power-
ful drivers of stories, and Kenneth Burke’s realization that identification
is at the core of the powerful rhetoric. We respond by identifying with
Nayirah and with the babies who have died because Saddam’s soldiers
have thrown them from their incubators; we fear criminals who, if re-
leased by well-intentioned but naive liberals, might prey on us. We fear
The Press as Storyteller 23
those who might harm the young while thinking that they are helping
them. The story that unmasks the well-intentioned but harmful act is
powerful because it serves to warn—Dukakis’s furloughs, the black mar-
kets produced by taxation of tobacco in Canada.
As custodians of fact, journalists need to help viewers and readers
make sense of statements about fact while not losing sight of those facts
political actors are reluctant to acknowledge. We make no claim that
this is a simple task, but it is at the core of the journalist’s responsibility
to the public. The task becomes particularly difficult when the relevant
facts are embedded in a compelling narrative.
2
24 THE PRESS EFFECT
CHAPTER
private and public moments and from them draws inferences with a
broad brush. Of President Bill Clinton, for example, Lewis Lapham of
Harper’s wrote, “He defines himself as a man desperately eager to please,
and the voraciousness of his appetite—for more friends, more speeches,
more food and drink, more time onstage, more hands to shake, more
hugs—suggests the emptiness of a soul that knows itself only by the
names of what it seizes or consumes.”3 About an April 2002 speech by
2000 Democratic nominee Al Gore, the Philadelphia Inquirer’s Dick
Polman noted, “He gave the strongest signal thus far that his lifelong
thirst for the highest office remains unquenched.”4
When the Voter News Service exit poll asked, “Will Gore say any-
thing to become president?” 74% of all voters surveyed answered yes,
compared to 58% who held that opinion of Bush. When the same sur-
vey asked, “Does Gore know enough to be president?” 67% agreed that
he did; 54% thought that was true of Bush. How did voters come to see
Gore as untrustworthy and Bush as somewhat less prepared than Gore
for the presidency? One answer is that these were the two candidate quali-
fications stressed by the press and the campaigns in 2000.
The extent to which those characteristics are featured is colored by
each candidate’s fortunes in the polls. When a candidate is leading, the
press seeks to answer the question why, naturally focusing on what is
appealing about the man and effective about his campaign. When he
falls behind, the same question leads to a focus on his personal failings
and his campaign’s missteps. New York Times reporter Frank Bruni rec-
ognized the extent to which the story reporters are telling about a candi-
date dictates the facts which they feature and the ones they dispatch.
George W. Bush, he wrote, “often seemed content to get by on as little as
possible, and we perhaps focused less on this than we might have in the
fall of 1999 because his failings on the stump didn’t fit the narrative in
place at the time.”5
Reporters covering the campaign create simple frames, based on one
or two characteristics of personality, and channel their coverage through
those frames. In so doing they simplify the task set for them in James
David Barber’s influential book The Presidential Character, which argued:
“Over the last thirty years . . . [j]ournalists began to examine the per-
sonal histories of candidates for president, looking for clues that might
bear on what kind of presidents they could turn out to be,” write Downie
and Kaiser. “One stimulus to this kind of reporting was a 1972 book by
professor James David Barber of Duke . . . which urged journalists and
academics to do more to explore the personalities of presidential candi-
dates before they got elected.” While Downie and Kaiser make the con-
nection between the exploration of character and presidential conduct,
this connection is precisely what is missing in much campaign reporting.
The struggle reporters face in linking campaigning to governance
and the personal to the political was at play in the Dole–Clinton elec-
tion. In 1996 the Post applied the relevance standard when its editors
decided not to write that Republican nominee Bob Dole had had an
extramarital affair two and a half decades before. Downie argued that
“the revelation of a love affair from a quarter century earlier had to be
justified by its relevance to the candidate’s suitability for the presidency
or his past conduct in public life. In this case he didn’t see the relevance.”7
In deciding whether to publish, the reporters and editors at the Post
weighed such questions as the following: Was it fair to explore Clinton’s
sex life but not Dole’s? Was Dole’s campaign arguing that he was mor-
ally superior to Clinton and hence engaged in hypocrisy? Was an almost
three-decade-old event worthy of revelation without evidence that the
behavior persisted?
We suspect that the relevance test used by the Post in 1996 was in
part a function of the subject matter—sexual behavior—and in part a
function of how dated the information was. In 2000, the press seemed
less concerned about making the tie between the personality traits on
which it focused and their relevance to conduct in office.
Following Barber’s advice, campaign reporters have become amateur
psychologists, probing the candidates for fatal flaws and trying to discover
the “real” person behind the speeches, position papers, and staffers. This
process creates a pair of portraits, neither complimentary, that determines
the shape of coverage. But the press has largely failed to make the link that
Barber urged: that between a candidate’s character and presidential per-
formance. Reporters have attempted to discover who the candidate really
is, but have spent far less time explaining how this character—or, more
specifically, these character flaws—relate to governance. If citizens are told
that a candidate is dishonest or inexperienced, they should also be told in
detail how this flaw would affect the job the candidate would do as presi-
dent. How would it affect the policies he would propose? His success in
The Press as Amateur Psychologist, Part I 27
about Gore—that he was inaccessible, and that when he did make him-
self available he came across as scripted and careful:
Within five minutes of meeting me for the first time, Bush developed
some shorthand to signify our intimate connection. Since the press
was writing about Bush, and I was writing about the press, he and I
were joined together in a kind of enemies-of-my-enemies equation.
Now—I’ve spent a total of about five days traveling with the Bush
press corps—whenever Bush sees me, he sticks out his right hand,
wrapping his middle finger around his index finger. And then, as he’s
waving his hand back and forth, he shouts out, “Me and you, right?”10
New York Times reporter Frank Bruni relates that on the campaign
trail, Bush “touched those of us around him a lot . . . He pinched our
cheeks or gently slapped them, in an almost grandmotherly, aren’t-you-
adorable way.”11 Where Bush succeeded was not simply in making the
press like him better than Gore (although that was certainly the case as
well). By participating with reporters in typically backstage interactions,
he convinced them first that they had access to the “real” person, and
second that his frontstage persona was not substantially different from
the backstage persona. Because Gore did not offer reporters a convinc-
ing backstage persona, his frontstage performance was assumed to mask
an unknown and necessarily different reality.
Thus the fact that Gore wore too much makeup in the first debate
was noticed and discussed by journalists and ridiculed on late-night tele-
vision. Jay Leno said Gore “had so much makeup on that if he went to
the White House looking like that, Clinton would have hit on him.” Frank
Bruni later wrote that Gore “was a pumpkin-headed sigh master, ill served
by both his cosmetologist and his petulance.”12 The symbolism is hard
to miss: Makeup serves to conceal and alter the appearance, presenting a
varnished version of the true self.
The Press as Amateur Psychologist, Part I 29
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